Cyber
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On_domains_Cyber_and_the_prac.pdf
International Journal
2014, Vol. 69(3) 394–412
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702014540618
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Scholarly Essay
On domains: Cyber and the practice of warfare
Chris McGuffin Canadian Armed Forces, ON, Canada
Paul Mitchell Canadian Forces College, ON, Canada
Abstract
Cyberspace is a new and evolving realm of human interaction with specific security and
defence concerns. Threats to commercial and government interests are being identified
and many nations have accepted cyberspace as a domain of military of operations. While
governments are investing in the development of military cyber capabilities, there are
few examples of military cyber operations from which military doctrine can be devel-
oped. In order to bridge the gap between speculation and experience, the principles
related to land, sea, and air forces can be used to provide a helpful reference for the
cyber domain. The adoption of cyberspace as a domain has more to do with marketing
than doctrinal consistency with physical domains. Until some future military cyber
operations are categorized as armed attacks, there is insufficient cause to categorize
cyberspace as a distinct domain.
Keywords
Cyber warfare, military operations, information technology, military technology,
defence policy
Every fortnight the senior civilian and military leaders of Canada’s Department of National Defence meet as a Programme Management Board (PMB) to decide the fate of key projects and initiatives. These leaders, representing the army, navy, air force, and each of the other departmental Level 1 organizations,
1 have a keen
interest in the allocation of resources. Decisions regarding the staffing of new pos- itions are particularly contentious at a time when the Canadian Armed Forces’
Corresponding author:
Paul Mitchell, Canadian Forces College, 215 Yonge Blvd, Toronto, ON M5M 3H9, Canada.
Email: [email protected]
1. Level One Organizations are those at the top of the DND bureaucratic hierarchy, generally headed by a three-star officer, including the three services, the vice chief of the defence staff, the Canadian Joint Operations Command, and the Canadian Special Forces Command.
(CAF’s) strength is being reduced due to budgetary limitations. 2 Nonetheless, when
the PMB chairperson, the vice chief of the defence staff, raised the subject of staffing for the CAF Cyber Task Force, the board members approved the imme- diate allocation of 20 persons to undertake the new assignments.
3 These people will
have to be exceptionally motivated, technically proficient, and well supported to deliver the advice, education, and doctrine required for the CAF.
These challenges have been faced before. A similar decision was made 100 years ago when Canada’s minister of militia and defence ordered the creation of the Canadian Aviation Corps.
4 As early as 1907, in a work of science fiction, H.G.
Wells described the German rise of air power and how they ‘‘may seize the air—as once the British seized the seas.’’
5 Two years later, Giulio Douhet, an Italian staff
officer, predicted that ‘‘the sky would become another battlefield no less important than the battlefields on land and sea.’’
6 At the start of the First World War, and
only 5 years after the first controlled powered flight in Canada, the initial attempt to create a national air force experienced numerous challenges.
7 Nonetheless,
Canada eventually contributed flight training, pilots, and two squadrons of aircraft to the allied war effort. It was not until the Second World War that the employ- ment of military aviation would reach a sufficient level of maturity for commanders to capitalize on the capabilities delivered by air power. Douhet, who would rise to command Italy’s air force at the end of the First World War, published The Command of the Air in 1921. This early treatise on air power presented the case for a separate and distinct military service.
Douhet’s writing was a welcome foundation to air power theory but it also contained several exaggerations. As he noted: ‘‘Nothing man can do on the surface of the earth can interfere with a plane in flight, moving freely in the third dimen- sion.’’
8 The influence of ground-based air defence systems and stinger missiles on
aircraft are reminders that it is unwise to be so definite when making predictions about new technology.
9 The statements made by military theorists addressing new
2. Budgetary reductions in fiscal year 2012 imposed a cap of 68,000 regular force members and a reduction in reserve force contracts. New capabilities like the C–17, Chinook helicopters, and the Cyber Task Force create additional demand for personnel without offering trade-offs. See http:// www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/defstra/rebuild-rebatir-eng.asp (accessed 22 May 2014); and David Pugliese, ‘‘Canada to freeze size of regular forces, shut down facilities,’’ National Post, 24 October 2011, http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/10/24/canada-to-freeze-size-of-regular-forces- shut-down-facilities/ (accessed 11 March 2014).
3. A.B. Donaldson, ‘‘Memorandum to PMB – Immediate surge requirements in support of CF Cyber Force,’’ 1150-110/P15 (Cyber TF), February 2012.
4. ‘‘The history of Canada’s Air Force,’’ http://www.canadianwings.com/history/beginning.php (accessed 13 January 2013).
5. Herbert George Wells, The War in the Air, Project Gutenberg EBook #780, 10 August 2008, chapter 4.
6. Douhet, cited in Dan McCaffery, Battlefields in the Air: Canadians in the Allied Bomber Command (Toronto: Lorimer, 1995), 3.
7. ‘‘The history of Canada’s Air Force,’’ http://www.canadianwings.com/history/establishment.php (accessed 28 May 2014).
8. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, Dino Ferrari, trans. (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, (1921) 1998), 10.
9. P.W. Singer, Wired for War (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 9.
McGuffin and Mitchell 395
capabilities may be influenced by partisan perspectives or the belief that overesti- mations are required in order to be acknowledged.
10
The Internet has matured considerably since the first packet-switching networks of the 1960s.
11 Standardization of the TCP/IP network interconnection protocol
and the affordability of personal computers in the 1980s initiated a growth that would expand rapidly with the distribution of commercial Internet service pro- viders in the late 1980s. In 2000, 5 percent of the world’s population and 31 percent of North Americans made use of the Internet. By 2012, those numbers were 34 percent and 79 percent.
12 Today, a sufficiently representational portion of our
cultural exchanges occur over this electronic medium that we think of it as the artificial environment described in 1980s cyberpunk writing by William Gibson: ‘‘The matrix has its roots in primitive arcade games . . . Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation.’’
13
Of course, there are many forms of social exchange, licit and illicit. It is therefore not surprising that early technophiles wanted to do more than the messaging and file exchanges permitted by Bulletin Board Services in the 1980s. By the 1990s, marketing, commerce, sex services, and crime began to thrive. Robert O’Connell suggests a pattern for the evolution of human social interaction in Ride of the Second Horseman: The Birth and Death of War. As the population increased in early Sumerian times, O’Connell describes an environment rich in social interaction that naturally led to culture, politics, and conflict.
14 This same evolution can be
observed in the Internet’s history. Today, there appear to be more opportunities for military activity in this artificial environment than originally envisioned by its cre- ators within the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States Department of Defense.
15
After the attacks on Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, Iran in 2009, and Burma in 2010, the wired nations of the developed world are just beginning to rationalize the scope and nature of the powers that threaten their sovereignty in the virtual world.
16 Notably, the US Cyber Command declared initial operational capability
10. Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail—But Some Don’t (Penguin Press e-pub, 2012), introduction, 24/32.
11. Barry M. Liner et al., ‘‘Brief history of the Internet,’’ http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/ what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet (accessed 13 January 2013).
12. Internet World Stats, ‘‘World Internet Usage and Population Statistics,’’ 30 June 2012, http:// www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (accessed 25 January 2013).
13. William Gibson, Neuromancer (Ace Books e-publication, January 2010), 91/720. Gibson first described cyberspace in Burning Chrome (1982). Fiction author Jack Womack suggested that these writings shaped the development of the Internet. See the afterword in the 2000 re-issue of Neuromancer.
14. Robert O’Connell, Ride of the Second Horseman: The Birth and Death of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 93.
15. Liner et al., ‘‘Brief history of the Internet.’’ 16. Matt Murphy, ‘‘War in the fifth domain,’’ The Economist, 1 July 2010, http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/16478792 (accessed 11 March 2014); Jim Giles, ‘‘Are states unleashing the dogs of war?’’ NewScientist, 16 December 2010, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827915.100- are-states-unleashing-the-dogs-of-cyber-war.html (accessed 13 January 2013); NATO Cooperative
396 International Journal 69(3)
in May 2010 and the existence of a Cyber Centre in the People’s Liberation Army of China was reported in July 2010.
17 The Canadian response to cyber threats is
articulated in general terms in the 2010 Canada Cyber Security Strategy. 18
In actuality the CAF have been operating in cyberspace for as long as that nomen- clature has existed. The Defence Wide Area Network (DWAN), classified and environmental networks, even the issued Blackberry devices, constantly give us access to what people think of as cyberspace. Given that these established systems are already maintained and defended by network administrators, what changes are called for to address military activity to operational practice in cyberspace?
This paper will argue that cyberspace does not possess the characteristics neces- sary to be categorized as a separate domain. While this new realm introduces new and distinct methods with which to apply force, it falls short of the full war-fighting spectrum that can occur in land, sea, air, and space conflicts. Several authors have taken to describing cyberspace as the fifth domain of operations.
19 While we agree
that cyber threats must be recognized, studied, and countered, operational practice and the opportunities for decisive control in cyberspace differ significantly from those that exist in established domains of operation.
The nature of a domain
The tremendous cost of maintaining professional military forces should compel the parent nation to be deliberate and discriminating about the capabilities that will be resourced. Political opponents frequently target decisions to acquire costly equip- ment for criticism. To substantiate these costly investments, procurement decisions are often implicitly based on doctrinal employment concepts and government defence policy. Doctrine—‘‘the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives’’
20 —is developed for each of the ser-
vices, whether armies, navies, or air forces. These principles serve as an authorita- tive guide to how the group thinks about fighting in its corresponding environment. The various environments (land, sea, and air) have become known as ‘‘domains’’ in military terminology.
21 Within these domains, military capabilities are applied to
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, ‘‘The Tallinn Manual,’’ http://www.ccdcoe.org/249.html (accessed 19 December 2012).
17. United States Department of Defense, ‘‘DOD Announces First U.S. Cyber Command and First U.S. CYBERCOM Commander,’’ http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid¼13551 (accessed 28 May 2014); Times of India, ‘‘PLA sets up cyber base, assures it’s not for war,’’ 23 July 2010, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-07-23/china/28321900_1_cyber-war-cyber- security-base (accessed 13 January 2013).
18. Government of Canada, Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2010), 10.
19. See Murphy,‘‘War in the fifth domain,’’ and William Lynn, ‘‘Defending a new domain,’’ Foreign Affairs.com, September/October 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j- lynn-iii/defending-a-new-domain (accessed 18 April 2013).
20. NATO, AAP–6(V) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (Brussels: NATO, 2008). 21. Unfortunately, the use of the terms environment, domain, and dimension are not consistent in
Canadian doctrine publications. The United States JP 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
McGuffin and Mitchell 397
observe, move, defend, and strike; the manner in which military objectives are pursued varies with the environment in which the activity takes place. The domains are where the activity takes place to create effects and ultimately compel an adver- sary to comply with the will of the victorious state.
The continental perspective
The original domain of military operation is land, where early people hunted, gathered, and eventually formed communities. The recorded history of land- based warfare extends back to Sumerian times when conflict was sufficiently preva- lent to document early doctrinal concepts: ‘‘The state weak in armaments—The enemy will not be driven from its gates.’’
22
The fundamental principles of land operations are prescribed by the nature of the terrain itself. Sun Tzu wrote: ‘‘The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally.’’
23 However, the opposite is also true. Terrain can be a persistent
opponent to land forces even when the enemy is not present. In Military Strategy, J.C. Wylie explains that terrain is ‘‘the point of departure for the soldier’s concept of warfare.’’
24 The land domain comprises geography, weather, indigenous popu-
lation, infrastructure, and the enemy. Canadian doctrine states that land combat is ‘‘characterized by friction, uncertainty, ceaseless change, and violence . . . it is a fundamentally human endeavour.’’
25 The proximity of the soldiers to their envir-
onment and the limits of range and endurance result in a perspective on the oper- ational environment that is different from those operating in other domains. The natural boundaries created by shores, mountains, and deserts delineate soldiers’ views into theatres, whereas the nature of sea and air compel a much larger view from sailors and aviators.
26
Land forces exist to control the threats that may jeopardize security, however defined. The most obvious expression of control is through combat power, but land forces are employed in a wide spectrum of activities. This spectrum can be described as a continuum of operations between peace at the low end and war at the high end. Defensive operations are used ‘‘to defeat or deter an adversary’s offensive actions, and to hold ground.’’ Manoeuvre operations are used to gain an advantageous position and include advancing to the enemy, envelopments, and obstacle crossings. Delay operations are used to gain time, usually to permit the completion of a defensive position. Stability operations are meant ‘‘to establish and
Military and Associated Terms (15 December 2012) uses domain in the context proposed in this paper.
22. O’Connell, Ride of the Second Horseman, 98. 23. Sun Tzu and Lionel Giles, The Art of War (Internet Classics Archive: 1994), chapter X, paragraph
21. 24. J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power and Control (New York: Rutgers, 1967),
50. 25. Canada, Department of National Defence, B–GJ–300-001/FP–001, Land Operations (Ottawa:
DND Canada: 2008), 2–17. 26. Wylie, Military Strategy, 49.
398 International Journal 69(3)
maintain the conditions for normal civic activity and responsible government.’’ Land force activities are designed to attack an adversary’s cohesion, or to affect the will of the adversary and other legitimate targets. Canadian doctrine states that these operations are executed through three core dynamic functions: ‘‘Find, Fix, and Strike.’’
27 Thus, we have a doctrinally based starting point.
The maritime perspective
The second domain of military operation is maritime. The first water craft were used for harvesting food from, and for transportation on, lakes, rivers, and seas. There are 8000-year-old Chinese maritime artifacts illustrating the early history of people using watercraft. The Khufu ship buried at the foot of the Great Pyramid of Giza is an impressive example of shipbuilding skill from 4500 years ago. The technology of naval warfare likely evolved from the vessels used for commerce. In 500 BCE, the Greeks and Persians were using ships to transport troops and supplies over the Mediterranean Sea. Navy crew began defending their ships and eventually adopted offensive weapons and procedures. The Vikings were successful raiders and reached North America by ship 200 years before the Portuguese and Spanish. Ship propulsion technology progressed from oar to sail to steam to oil, and today the atom powers the largest military vessels.
28
An increase in maritime trade led to greater interest in protecting trade routes. 29
Navies were expanded both in order to defend the sources of prosperity and because of them. Canadian doctrine lists four roles for the navy: sea control, sea denial, fleet in being, and maritime power projection.
30 Naval historian S.W.
Roskill has explained that maritime strategy is not so much ‘‘to establish complete control of all sea communications . . . as to develop the ability to establish zones of maritime control wherever and whenever they may be necessary.’’
31 It is pertinent
to note that these roles are not viewed in isolation. Sea control can be limited in scope, geography, or time and still achieve the desired freedom of movement.
32
Wiley adds that maritime theory is both the ‘‘control of the sea, and the exploit- ation of the control of the sea toward establishment of control on the land.’’
33
Notwithstanding the relative autonomy of modern war ships, which are able to sail for months at a time (limited only by food supply in the case of nuclear vessels), there remains a strong joint element to naval forces. In his examination of sea
27. Canada, Department of National Defence, Land Operations, 749, 793, 419. 28. Geoffrey Till, Seapower—A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 9;
Danee Gilmartin, ‘‘Did Pharaohs get seasick? Khufu Boat Museum: Giza, Egypt,’’ 1 March 2010, http://museumchick.com/2010/03/khufu-boat-museum-giza-egypt-felucca.html (accessed 29 January 2013); Colin Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 94.
29. Till, Seapower, 10. 30. Canada, Department of National Defence, Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers—Charting the
Course from Leadmark (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 18. 31. S.W. Roskill, History of the Second World War, The War at Sea 1939–1945, vol. 1, The Defensive
(London: HMSO, 1954), 3. 32. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power, 9. 33. Wylie, Military Strategy, 39.
McGuffin and Mitchell 399
power, Colin Gray has noted that ‘‘Navies fight at sea only for the strategic effect they can secure ashore, where people live.’’
34 The blockade may occur on the ocean
but its purpose is to isolate land from a maritime line of communication. Sparta, for example, was unable to defeat Athens in land warfare due to the resources Athens accessed through maritime commerce. Athens was defeated only after Persia supplied Sparta with the resources necessary to build a powerful naval fleet. Joint requirements similarly drove modern operations in the Second World War when the re-conquest of Europe and the Pacific islands required the merging of ships, weapons, communications, and doctrine to permit amphibious operations against a defending enemy.
35
Operations on open water are vastly different than those on land. While land forces seek to maintain contact with the enemy, opposing navies will search, pursue, and evade until they have opportunity to engage the adversary in advan- tageous conditions. Historical victories at sea were therefore the result of superior scouting and concealing one’s intentions and naval power: essentially the basis for manoeuvre warfare.
36
Admittedly, operating in littoral waters shares some similarities with continental warfare. Naval vessels must negotiate the coast and bottom terrain features.
37
Icebergs and islands can be obstacles to movement and limit radar and visual observation. Weather will degrade the performance of a ship just as it degrades land operations. However, unlike land force personnel, the navy moves, lives, and fights in an environment that can ultimately consume it. The Spanish Armada sailing against England in 1588 was decimated by an unusually strong North Atlantic storm off the west coast of Ireland. The US Navy has lost over 40 ships to storms in its history, 22 of them in the last century.
38
The aviator’s perspective
The air domain was used for military purposes well before the first controlled heavier-than-air flight in 1903. The Chinese reportedly made use of small, hot-air ‘‘sky lanterns’’ as military signals in the third century, and balloons were employed for reconnaissance and artillery spotting by France in 1794 and by both sides in the American civil war in the 1860s. Aerial capabilities developed rapidly in the First World War, evolving from strictly reconnaissance platforms to specialized fighter and bomber aircraft. The pace established in the early twentieth century has con- tinued since, with new capabilities such as supersonic speeds, precision guided
34. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power, 1. 35. Wylie, Military Strategy, 41. 36. Wayne Hughes, ‘‘Naval manoeuvre warfare,’’ Naval War College Review 50, no. 3 (summer 1997):
25–49. 37. Canada, Department of National Defence, Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers, 34. 38. See ‘‘The Spanish Armada,’’ http://britishbattles.com/spanish-war/spanish-armada.htm (accessed
18 April 2013); and Naval Historical Center, ‘‘U.S. Navy ships lost in selected storm/weather related incidents,’’ 3 June 2005, http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq102-2.htm (accessed 18 April 2013).
400 International Journal 69(3)
munitions, stealth technology, and unpiloted aerial vehicles (UAVs) appearing with astonishing swiftness.
39
In spite of the advances in aircraft technology, several of the principles proposed by Douhet before the First World War have survived in contemporary air power doctrine. Concepts like the deep battle and destroying adversary air forces while they are on the ground remain sound. Likewise, his definition—‘‘command of the air means to be in a position to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself’’
40 —is readily applicable to modern air forces.
Aircraft provide a platform from which to deliver valuable military capabilities, but they are also finicky. Aircraft are capable of delivering rapid effects such as the movement of troops, bombs on targets, and imagery of specific sites with little concern for surface obstacles.
41 However, flying operations are sensitive to weather
and can be limited by crew fatigue and mechanical wear. The physical platforms are fragile and depend on infrastructure both to protect them from damage and for the conduct of frequent maintenance. The versatility of aircraft creates consider- able demand for support to land and sea forces. Bombers can reach far beyond the range of artillery guns, and aircraft can rapidly insert regular soldiers and para- troopers on the battlefield where they can be most effective. Aircraft greatly expand the range of ship sensors beyond the horizon; they can launch torpedoes at distant enemy vessels; and they provide a lifeline to shore for high-priority personnel and equipment movement. This versatility creates a demand that has traditionally exceeded available capacities. To address the need for prioritization, the CAF employs the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution of air power.
42
Common domain attributes
In each of the three domains, military forces are able to observe, move, strike targets, defend from threats, and exist. Each of these abilities is affected to some degree by weather conditions. Military power can be projected from any of the previous domains to generate effects in the other domains. Land forces employ air defence systems that deny access to aircraft.
43 Aircraft can drop bombs on land
39. ‘‘What is Sky Lantern?’’ http://www.chineseskylantern.com/ (accessed 5 February 2013); Civil War Trust, ‘‘Civil war ballooning,’’ http://wwwcivilwar.org/education/history/civil-war-ballooning/ civil-war-ballooning.html (accessed 20 April 2013); Century of Flight, ‘‘Aces of World War One,’’ http://www.century-of-flight.net/new%20site/frames/WW1%20aces_frame.htm (accessed 8 February 2013); David Axe, ‘‘Real U.S. stealth-tech advantage: Its assembly lines,’’ 6 July 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/stealth-advantage/ (accessed 6 February 2013).
40. Douhet, The Command of the Air, 24. 41. Canada, Department of National Defence, B–GA–400–000/FP–000, Aerospace Doctrine (Ottawa:
DND Canada: 2010), 25. 42. Ibid., 28. 43. In Canada the air defence role is assigned to the artillery branch while other countries like
Germany have assigned the role to the air force. However, hand-held ground-to-air missiles known as Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) like the US-made Stinger and Russian SA series are available to land forces in over 100 countries. See Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘‘MANPADS Countering the Terrorist Threat,’’ Commonwealth of
McGuffin and Mitchell 401
targets or anti-submarine torpedoes in the water. Navy destroyers can reach land targets with their guns and some nuclear submarines carry inter-continental bal- listic missiles (ICBMs). The littorals and seaways are where ships are vulnerable to land-based defences.
44 Land forces have the ability to strike maritime targets using
direct and indirect fire from guns and artillery, as evidenced by the military forts that pepper the Great Lakes in North America.
The land, sea, and air domains each possess a dimensional quality. The funda- mental objective of the elemental forces is to control portions of those domains. Army elements may measure progress in kilometres, defend a frontage of specific width, and compare the effective ranges of their weapons. Range and distance are critical factors for both aviation and maritime forces. The freedom of movement and freedom of action that come from the control of land, maritime, and air traffic are what permit one force to dominate another. As such, the exercise or imposition of sovereign control is also closely related to these dimensional attributes.
Comparing matter and space
The examination of space provides a yardstick with which to compare the criteria distilled from the first three domains. Space is classified as a separate domain of military operation by Canada, NATO, and the US, and has been supported by a distinct military command in the US military since 1982.
45 As with the other three
domains, there are unique physical characteristics associated with space operations. Foremost are the particularities associated with orbital mechanics. Satellites travel at speeds and altitudes that are orders of magnitude beyond those of atmospheric craft. Global positioning satellites, for example, travel 11,000 kilometres per hour at an altitude of 20,000 kilometres.
46 Boeing’s 737, the most common passenger
airliner, flies at a comparatively slow 800 kilometres per hour and 10–12 kilometres in altitude. Satellites are not flown or controlled like airplanes.
47 Orbits are fixed by
the final trajectory of the launch delivery system and only minor changes can be made to correct attitude and rotation speed. The amount of fuel that powers the thrusters for attitude control is a critical factor in the service life of the satellite. When there is no means of correcting a satellite’s attitude, it will eventually degrade due to a variety of physical forces. These positional changes affect communications controlling the satellite, since antennas cannot be oriented toward their ground
Australia, June 2008, http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/MANPADS_countering_terrorist_threat. pdf (accessed 19 April 2013).
44. Peter Dutton, Robert S. Ross, and Oystein Tunsjo, Twenty-First Century Seapower (New York: Routledge, 2012), 21.
45. Robert Kehler, ‘‘Shaping the joint fight in air, space and cyberspace,’’ Joint Force Quarterly 49, (2
nd quarter 2008): 33.
46. ‘‘Everything you ever wanted to know about GPS,’’ 23 March 2010, http://royal.pingdom.com/ 2010/03/23/everything-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-gps/ (accessed 11 March 2014).
47. Max Kingsley-Jones, ‘‘6,000 and counting for Boeing’s popular little twinjet,’’ Flightglobal.com, 22 April 2009, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-6000-and-counting-for-boeings- popular-little-twinjet-325472/ (accessed 9 February 2013).
402 International Journal 69(3)
stations. The remoteness of objects in orbit makes them costly to refuel and they normally become space debris in the course of their lifecycle.
The argument favouring the integration of space operations into the domain of air power provides an alternate view of the space domain. While their extreme elevation is beneficial for political and technical reasons, the capabilities delivered by satellites can be compared with those delivered by assets operating in earth’s atmosphere. The command and control, monitoring, and management of these assets are similar to long-range and high-endurance UAVs, like the Global Hawk, which are occupying a greater role in some fixed-wing fleets.
The dimensional and atmospheric qualities of space also create some notable differences. National sovereignty does not extend to space in the same way as on land, water, and air. Above 100 kilometres—the lowest altitude that can accom- modate an earth satellite—international treaties do not recognize national owner- ship.
48 The 1967 Space Treaty makes clear that assets in space are owned by the
nation of origin but space and celestial bodies cannot be claimed by states. The weak signals used to communicate between satellites and their ground stations are subject to atmospheric attenuation, which is further degraded by rain, snow, and dust. Atmospheric attenuation applies only to objects in low earth orbit, but solar wind and flares can affect all satellites.
49
The dimensional aspects of objects in orbit also change the notion of control in space. In Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance, James Lee suggests that it is unnecessary to control space by destroying satellites. The lasting impact of space debris makes the physical destruction of adversary satellites problematic. Conventional jamming, destruction of, or interference with satellite ground sta- tions can deny an adversary the benefit of satellite imagery and communications that are valued by the military. By targeting the information flow to and from satellites, space control can be achieved indirectly.
50
Summary
Canadian, NATO, and US doctrine provide a sound basis from which to draw key attributes for defining a domain. By comparing the land, sea, air, and space domains we can also conclude that domains possess a dimensional quality that can define an area of operation but is not necessarily bound by the historical concept of sovereign territory. From each of the domains examined, it is possible to project influence into
48. Several equatorial countries claimed the space above their borders in 1976 through the Bogota Declaration, but their claims have not been acknowledged. Thomas Gangale authored an explan- ation of why terrestrial land claims principles should not apply to orbital mechanics. See Thomas Gangale, ‘‘National sovereignty over the geostationary orbit,’’ Out of the Blue and into the Black, http://tgangale1.blogspot.ca/2009/09/national-sovereignty-over-geostationary.html (accessed 28 May 2014).
49. Peter J. Brown, ‘‘Solar weather effects on satellites,’’ http://exnetapps.intelsat.com/resources/tech- talk/solar-weather.asp (accessed 28 May 2014).
50. James G. Lee, ‘‘Counterspace operations for information dominance,’’ MA research paper, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1996.
McGuffin and Mitchell 403
the other domains. The physical environment of each domain directly shapes the conduct of activity therein. The ability to direct activity, observe, move, strike, defend, and preserve those abilities is key to the projection of military force and influence that results in direct control of activities taking place within them.
The nature of cyberspace
While cyberspace possesses many of the characteristics necessary to qualify as a domain of military operations, it lacks permanence and habitability. Cyberspace is not easily defined by physical operational boundaries and is influenced by multiple actors, most of them non-governmental. This creates a high potential for interfer- ence. These characteristics imply the need for centralized control and centralized execution of cyber operations. This section will argue that the aforementioned deficiencies make it inappropriate to compare cyberspace with the four established domains. In many ways, cyberspace has more in common with special operations than an environmental domain.
Land, sea, and air power theories are derived from our occupation of the cor- responding environment and how its characteristics influence the way we project force. The army, navy, and air force all train specialists in the tactics and oper- ations of those domains. Notwithstanding the years of study required to develop that domain-centric proficiency, soldiers, sailors, and aviators can draw parallels and understand the other’s domain using joint language.
51 Even space, defined by
vacuum, gravity, and orbits can be described in plain terms to a non-specialist. Space can become as accessible to military operations as the atmosphere is today. This is not the case with cyberspace.
Contemporary military doctrine is struggling with the form and function of cyberspace. Vincent Manzo, a research analyst at the National Defense University, agrees that it is misleading to treat cyberspace as an independent domain when its effects are better categorized as a ‘‘cross-domain enabler.’’
52
This struggle is consistent with previous attempts to qualify non-physical force projection in common terms. Despite the ubiquity of cyberspace through private, corporate, and government activity, non-specialists fail to understand it. As Michael Hayden, former director of the US National Security Agency, has noted: ‘‘rarely has something been so important and so talked about with less clarity and less apparent understanding than this phenomenon.’’
53 This new
realm has expanded and continues to grow faster than our ability to grasp the military implications.
51. Refer to Canadian Forces Joint Publication A1: Department of National Defence, A–AE–025– 000/FP–000, Joint Doctrine Development Manual (Ottawa: DND, May 2008), forward; and Till, Seapower—A Guide, 33.
52. Vincent Manzo, ‘‘Deterrence and escalation in cross-domain operations: Where do space and cyberspace fit?’’ JFQ 66 (3
rd quarter 2012): 9.
53. Quoted in Thomas Rid, ‘‘Cyber war will not take place,’’ Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no.1 (2012): 9.
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Fundamentally, it is the malleability of cyberspace and our inability to occupy it that set it apart from the established domains. Cyberspace can be exploited for military purposes and may prove to be decisive in future conflicts. However, that possibility does not provide the seed from which to grow a cyberspace force akin to the Royal Canadian Air Force. While land, sea, and air can be called doctrinal siblings and space is (for now) a cousin, cyberspace is not in the same family.
What is cyberspace?
Cyberspace comprises all existing computer networks and all the devices connected to those networks.
54 This scope is much larger than the Internet. The Internet,
rather, is a vast network of commercial, educational, government, and private computer networks all linked and able to exchange data using a common set of communication protocols. Connectivity is a criterion for inclusion for the Internet, so a regular mobile telephone, an MP3 player, and GPS receiver are excluded. Cyberspace, however, includes the three previous devices just as it includes all network enclaves and isolated devices so long as they contain a data processing element.
Engineers use a variety of models to simplify the complex relationships between hardware, software, and human users. The various elements in these models are typically broken up into ‘‘layers.’’ The key to understanding activity in cyberspace is to recognize that, whatever model is used, each layer offers intentional or unin- tentional opportunities for access into the environment.
55
The terrain of cyberspace is defined by each of the layers that make up an IT system. The hardware can be compared with continental geography. The latter is permanent and immobile: shaped into mountains, swamps, rivers, and highways at the time it was manufactured. The firmware provides the first layer of program- ming and data for the hardware. It may remain unaltered for the life of the device if it is recorded on permanent memory. If it is recorded on Electronically Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM) or flash memory, it can be upgraded or altered in a process sometimes referred to as ‘‘jailbreaking.’’
56 This malleability
is the first characteristic that truly separates cyberspace from the other domains. ‘‘Cyber-geography’’ can be altered in subtle ways. The pressure for IT compa-
nies to deliver products with a vast array of features in order to remain competitive
54. Richard Clarke, William Barnes, and Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It (Harper Collins e-books, 2010), 148/571.
55. The OSI model separates an information system into seven layers, each of which can be vulnerable to attacks that influence the availability, integrity, or confidentiality of the data or service: phys- ical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, and application. With reference to the Internet, the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model describes four layers: link, Internet, transport, and application. See Bradley Mitchell, ‘‘OSI Model—Open Systems Interconnection Model’’; and H. Zimmerman, ‘‘OSI Reference Model—The ISO model of architecture for open systems interconnection,’’ IEEE Transactions on Communications 28 (1980): 425–432.
56. Apple iPhone School, ‘‘What is Jailbreaking?’’ Appleiphoneschool.com, http://www. appleiphoneschool.com/what-is-jailbreaking/ (accessed 7 April 2013).
McGuffin and Mitchell 405
drives a continuous cycle of innovation. Many of these features are made possible by the computational speed of central processing units and special purpose inte- grated circuits. In a process known as ‘‘vertical specialization,’’
57 the outsourcing
of production from brand name firms to secondary manufacturers also accelerates the cycle between product design, engineering, manufacturing, and delivery to market. This product delivery model creates an opportunity for the manufacturer to add features to the integrated circuits or the firmware that would be known only to it; the complexity of the assemblies is such that new features are likely to remain undetected. The result is that any level of outsourcing creates opportunities for an adversary to take advantage of these ‘‘cyber terrain features.’’ The US House of Representatives’ intelligence committee has stated publicly that products from Huawei and ZTE, large Chinese technology firms, are cyber security threats to national telecommunications infrastructure. Other Chinese companies that assem- ble computers and load software have been accused of adding malware and coun- terfeit operating systems with security vulnerabilities.
58
The subsequent layers of the IT systems are as malleable as they are porous to intrusion, and those entry points come from many sources. Operating systems, software applications, and the user interface can all contain thousands of lines of programming code. Frequently, they are created to achieve the objectives of the program before there are any thoughts of security. Even when security is a delib- erate consideration at the designing and programming stages of application devel- opment, vulnerabilities are common. When first revealed, these weaknesses are called zero-day exploits, a reference to the time the manufacturer has had to correct the vulnerability.
59 There was also a cultural shift in programming from the 1980s
to the 1990s. As the cost of computer memory dropped, there was less pressure on programmers to be efficient and elegant with their code. The popularity of Object Oriented Programming in the 1990s established large libraries of modular code from which programmers could draw to accomplish common tasks. Programmers can integrate these modules for interpreting mouse movements,
57. Boy Lüthje, ‘‘IT and the changing social division of labor: The case of electronics contract man- ufacturing,’’ draft paper for Conference on Transforming Enterprise, Washington, DC, 27–28 January 2003, 5. See also Cyber Media, ‘‘From the labs: Information technology,’’ http:// www.technologyreview.in/computing/38506/ (accessed 2 April 2013); and Keshav Murgesh, ‘‘Innovation to drive growth in IT,’’ Business Standard, 15 February 2013, http://www.business- standard.com/article/companies/innovation-to-drive-growth-in-it-113021500085_1.html (accessed 6 April 2013).
58. Charles Arthur, ‘‘China’s Huawei and ZTE pose national security threat, says US committee,’’ Guardian, 8 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/oct/08/china-huawei-zte- security-threat, (accessed 7 April 2013); Associated Press, ‘‘Malware infecting PCs on production line, Microsoft says,’’ cbc.ca, 13 September 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2012/ 09/13/tech-ap-malware-microsoft.html (accessed 12 March 2014). See also Sally Adee, ‘‘The hunt for the kill switch,’’ IEEE Spectrum, 1 May 2008, http://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/design/ the-hunt-for-the-kill-switch (accessed 29 August 2013).
59. Larry Dignan, ‘‘Why is security usually an afterthought?’’ ZDNet, 8 February 2008, http:// www.zdnet.com/blog/security/why-is-security-usually-an-afterthought/865 (accessed 7 April 2013); ‘‘Zero-day exploit,’’ SearchSecurity, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/zero- day-exploit (accessed 2 April 2013).
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manipulating data, or creating graphics without ever seeing the way those lines were coded. The now common practice of introducing new versions of popular software that remain compatible with previous versions also invites the retention of vulnerabilities that an adversary can exploit, such as the case with Java.
60
Programming practices are not the only source of porosity. Vulnerabilities can stem either from the way the system was designed or the way it is employed by the end user or administrator. The analogy of automobile security provides a useful reference. Modern locks and electronic theft deterrents are intended to enhance security, yet cars can still be stolen if the vehicle operator leaves the doors unlocked. Similarly, factory settings for devices like routers, when left unchanged by users, amount to unlocked doors for adversaries to exploit.
61
Comparing cyberspace and real space
There are many rational explanations for the current popular acceptance of cyber- space as a domain. The growth of this artificial environment over the past 15 years has delivered new ways of communicating, conducting business, and projecting influence. Clearly, an environment that permits the exchange of services, currency, and ideas can be compared with the physical world. Cyberspace can, in some circumstances, be used to compel behaviour and create tangible physical effects.
62
Supporters of the cyber domain will argue that an environment that supports criminal activity and police work can also be used for military purposes.
63
The US military endorsed the addition of cyberspace as the fifth domain with the announcement of a US Cyber Command in 2009. Its mission statement spe- cifies the conduct of ‘‘full spectrum military cyberspace operations.’’
64 We suggest
that a structure of tactical means, operational organization, and strategic policy is required to effect control in any domain. The creation of a new command may
60. Oregon State University, ‘‘Thinking object oriented,’’ http://web.engr.oregonstate.edu/�budd/ Books/oopintro2e/info/chap01.pdf. (accessed 2 April 2013); Luca Cardelli, ‘‘Bad engineering properties of object-oriented languages,’’ Digital Equipment Corporation, Systems Research Center, http://lucacardelli.name/Papers/BadPropertiesOfOO.html (accessed 2 April 2013); Jeong Wook (Matt) Oh, ‘‘Recent Java exploitation trends and malware,’’ n.d., 2012, https://media. blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Oh/BH_US_12_Oh_Recent_Java_Exploitation_Trends_and_ Malware_WP.pdf (accessed 2 April 2013).
61. H.D. Moore, ‘‘Whitepaper: Security flaws in universal plug and play: Unplug, don’t play,’’ Security Street, 29 January 2013, https://community.rapid7.com/docs/DOC-2150 (accessed 2 April 2013).
62. Russell F. Mathers, ‘‘Cyberspace coercion in phase 0/1: How to deter armed conflict,’’ research paper, US Naval War College, 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a476693.pdf (accessed 3 April 2013).
63. David S. Wall, ‘‘Policing cybercrimes,’’ revised version of Wall, ‘‘Policing cybercrimes: Situating the public police in networks of security within cyberspace,’’ Police Practice & Research: An International Journal 8, no. 2 (2007): 183–205, http://www.cyberdialogue.ca/wp-content/uploads/ 2011/03/David-Wall-Policing-CyberCrimes.pdf (accessed 3 April 2013).
64. U.S. Cyber Command factsheet, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/ (accessed 7 January 2014).
McGuffin and Mitchell 407
eventually lead to the required understanding in those areas if international policies can mature with technological advancements.
Much information can be gathered from network accessible storage once a computer network has been penetrated through techniques like Trojans and key logging malware. In their book Cyber War, Richard Clarke et al. describe cyber threats that have the potential to deliver physical effects. Experiments have demon- strated that the electrical grid, power generators, and the control systems for hydroelectric dams can, under certain conditions, be compromised by malware.
65
In terms of defence, the protection of data, network integrity, and availability remains a full-time effort for network administrators and information technology security staff. There is a complex ecosystem of viruses and malware circulating and interacting in cyberspace.
66 Most of the threats are variants of a few hundred
distinct viruses, none of which are openly known to originally have been launched for military purposes. Once a piece of code has been released into the wild it can be recycled and repurposed by other actors. Malware can be ‘‘weaponized’’ for mili- tary use as demonstrated by Stuxnet, which exploited a vulnerability originally targeted by the Conflicker worm.
67 Command can be enabled by cyberspace just
as it is enabled by the electromagnetic spectrum upon which radios depend. Command can also be crippled by a cyber-attack that disables radars, networks, or databases, but the effect can be directed to the land, sea, air, and space domains just as much as the cyber domain.
Key differences
The key differences between cyberspace and the other domains are technical, pro- cedural, and physical. The fundamental technical difference is that cyberspace is a human creation that can be altered, creating considerable volatility in what we have described as cyber-geography. In cyberspace this volatility presents opportunities for the sides with the technical ability to identify vulnerabilities and reprogram the environment in which they wish to operate.
68 An advancing army with this power
could flatten hills, create open lanes, turn night into day, and neutralize enemy weapons. Although it is possible to alter the physical environments in the conduct of war, laying minefields, destroying bridges, and establishing air defence barriers take time and are frequently limited by geography, weather, politics, and the desire to minimize post-conflict reconstruction.
65. Clarke et al., Cyber War, chapter 3/59. 66. Ed Bott, ‘‘The malware numbers game: How many viruses are out there?,’’ ZDNet, 15 April 2012,
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/bott/the-malware-numbers-game-how-many-viruses-are-out-there/ 4783 (accessed 5 April 2013).
67. Stuxnet has been described as a sophisticated cyber-weapon and we do not intend to trivialize the effort or accomplishment of the designers. Simply, it is pertinent to note that existing malware was leveraged to create Stuxnet. See Aleksandr Matrosov et al., Stuxnet under the Microscope Rev 1.31 (ESET 2011), 34.
68. Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009), 144.
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Procedural differences result from the technical distinctions between cyberspace and the physical domains. The volatility of cyberspace suggests that security vul- nerabilities can be corrected or countered
69 as soon as they are recognized. This
places a premium value on the zero-day vulnerabilities that are identified. Since an exploit is unlikely to compromise an adversary network the same way twice,
70 the
malware produced with that aim may be controlled at very high levels in a military hierarchy. However, a large portion of cyberspace is governed by civilian infra- structure and software. The Border Gateway Protocol, Domain Naming Service, and Secure Sockets Layer have held known vulnerabilities for several years.
71
System administrators can alter network security settings to considerable effect, but short of removing commercial software, some vulnerabilities will remain until they are addressed by the software manufacturer. Cyberspace’s volatility also means that vulnerabilities can be eliminated at any time, rendering a cyber- weapon useless. This unknown ‘‘best-before’’ and ‘‘bad-after’’ expiry date may result in a greater inclination for commanders to launch the malware. If there is concern that subordinate commanders will launch cyber-weapons prematurely, control over them will be retained at the highest levels.
The potential for conflicting cyber activities also suggests that a high level of control will be necessary. If a subordinate commander’s cyber soldiers were con- ducting an operation to benefit their mission, the act could alert the adversary that their network has been compromised.
72 This might derail higher-priority cyber
operations planned to occur at a later time. Therefore, coordination of and author- ity for cyber operations are likely to remain at a very high level.
Furthermore, it may be impossible to establish the full control over cyberspace that can be practised in physical domains. The only physical control that can be exercised over cyberspace is to create enclaves by severing the links to external networks. Moreover, Stuxnet demonstrated that ‘‘air-gapped’’ networks remain vulnerable.
73
Finally, people cannot enter or occupy cyberspace. In his examination of mari- time and air power, Wylie explains that naval guns and aerial bombs, while
69. An organization may not have the ability to eliminate a security vulnerability, but its awareness of that vulnerability enables different forms of mitigating action. For example, deliberate traffic screening, router port controls, staff procedures, and data segregation can all be applied to counter some forms of network infiltration.
70. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, 20. 71. Richard Bejtlich, ‘‘Review of Cyberdeterence and Cyberwar,’’ amazon.com, 25 November 2009,
http://www.amazon.com/review/R927SD2CZ7NTB (accessed 6 April 2013). 72. Ralph Langer has discussed the two different attack vectors associated with Stuxnet, noting that
the first was meant to confuse the Iranian engineers working on Natanz centrifuges, whereas the second was intended to send a deliberate message to them that they were under cyber assault. Langer suggests that this explains why the first attack remained undetected, while the second was quickly revealed. Ralph Langer, To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Attempted to Achieve, 16 November 2013, http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/ uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf (accessed 31 January 2014). Thomas Rid has made simi- lar observations regarding the possibilities influencing attribution in cyber-attacks. Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 158–159.
73. Matrosov et al., Stuxnet under the Microscope, 43.
McGuffin and Mitchell 409
formidable, are incapable of winning a war in isolation. 74
Douhet’s theory that air power was the ultimate means for military victory was proven wrong in the Second World War, when the massively destructive bombing campaigns failed to subdue either Axis or Allied nations. In order to achieve victory, military force must be in direct contact with the adversary and its population (through soldiers on the ground). Cyber warriors may be highly skilled technicians, programmers, or engin- eers, but they will fight from a keyboard physically removed from the battle space. Cyber operations will certainly be key enablers to each of the domains, but cyber- space does not need the status of a domain to achieve that effect.
Summary
While the doctrinal functions described earlier in this article can be helpful in categorizing cyber activities, other terms have no meaning in cyberspace.
75
Tactical terms used in continental warfare such as vital ground and in-contact are not consistent with an environment where bits and bytes are proxies for warriors. Unless designed to erase itself, malware cannot be recalled by the nation that launches it, so a withdrawal is just as impossible as an occupation is meaningless. Air superiority does not translate to an environment where friendly and adversary activities can occur simultaneously and without attribution.
76 The blockade, a key
form of sea control, cannot occur without a network being isolated. 77
The traditional domains of warfare evolved as technological innovations intro- duced new ways for people and nations to exert physical force against each other. The different environmental influences in the physical domains have compelled dissimilarities in the manner in which land, sea, air, and space power is applied to achieve military effects. However, there are also consistencies in the doctrine that apply to each domain. Each of the domains possesses a dimensional quality that military forces seek to control. The nature of that control can be limited in scope or duration, but the common purpose is to establish freedom of action for friendly forces and deny the same to the adversary. Military operations in any of the estab- lished domains can create effects in the other domains.
Cyberspace is fundamentally different from land, sea, air, and space. The IT sandwich made of hardware, firmware, and software layers creates a complex arti- ficial environment that few people truly understand. First, this virtual space is impermanent. System administrators are regularly updating software, adding
74. Wylie, Military Strategy, 41. 75. For how metaphors complicate the understanding of cyber security, see David Betz and Tim
Stevens, ‘‘Analogical reasoning and cyber security,’’ Security Dialogue 44, no. 2 (2013): 149. 76. Some authors have ranked certain nations based on their perceived cyber capability. However,
cyber war is not like an aerial dogfight. There is no evidence that a superior ‘‘cyber war strength’’ will translate into superiority in conflict. See Clarke et al., Cyber War, 300/571. Furthermore, as Rid has noted, ‘‘History does not know of acts of war without eventual attribution.’’ Rid, Cyber War Will not Take Place, 2.
77. Martin C. Libicki, ‘‘Cyberspace is not a warfighting domain,’’ I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 8, no. 2 (fall 2012): 333.
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hardware, and changing settings with corresponding effects to the space. The com- plexity of each layer, market-driven prioritization of feature delivery over security, and sourcing from dubious manufacturers create vulnerabilities that adversaries can use to their advantage. The cyber terrain is also subject to the influence of commercial software and hardware providers.
The impermanence of cyberspace compels a centralized control and execution structure that is unlike the physical domains. Vulnerabilities require a high level of skill to identify and may be useful for only one attack. Those that can be used in zero-day exploits have an unknown useless-after date. Also, the possibility of inter- ference between different actors (allied or otherwise) suggests that a central control and execution command structure is required for operations in cyberspace.
Cyber war is an extension of the theories that evolved from information warfare, command and control warfare, and network-centric warfare, concepts with which militaries have struggled since their introduction.
78 While there is agreement that
force and influence can be projected through cyberspace, the examples thus far have not been considered armed attacks. Even the kinetic effects resulting from Stuxnet were not described as an armed attack by the targeted state. The ephemeral nature of electronic signatures from cyber-attacks creates an attribution problem that shares more commonality with special operations than the projection of force in the physical domains. This conclusion suggests the employment of cyber cap- abilities in a supporting role to enable war fighting on land, on sea, in air, and in space. There is insufficient doctrinal commonality between physical domains and cyberspace for it to warrant the status of a domain. Rid has argued that the adoption of cyberspace as a war-fighting domain has more to do with marketing and resourcing than the conduct of military activities. The senior officers are accus- tomed to operational activities from their experiences in the four physical domains. Therefore, they have a natural tendency to describe cyberspace in similar terms when creating policy and lobbying for resources to generate the desired capabil- ities.
79 In 1995, Libicki compared discussions of cyber warfare with a Victorian-era
discussion of air-to-air combat. 80
It follows that doctrinal maturity of cyber war- fare may not be realized until the cyber equivalent of two great wars has passed.
Funding
We would like to acknowledge the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis of Defence Research and Development Canada for their generous assistance in funding research into cyber warfare at the Canadian Forces College.
78. Martin C. Libicki, ‘‘The specter of non-obvious warfare,’’ Strategic Studies Quarterly, 6, no. 3 (fall 2012): 90; Martin C. Libicki, What is Information Warfare? (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, October 1995), 1–6.
79. Rid, Cyberwar Will Not Take Place, 165. 80. Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? 75.
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Author Biographies
LCol. Chris McGuffin is the commander of 76 Communications Group in the Canadian Armed Forces.
Dr. Paul T. Mitchell is the deputy chair of the Department of Military Plans and Operations at the Canadian Forces College (Toronto, Ontario). The opinions expressed here are those of the authors alone. They do not represent those of the Canadian Forces College or the Department of National Defence.
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