

RACE
IDENTITY
AND
IN **REPRESENTATION**
EDUCATION

Edited by Cameron McCarthy and Warren Crichlow

Routledge • New York & London

On the Theoretical Status of the Concept of Race

MICHAEL OMI AND HOWARD WINANT

INTRODUCTION

RACE USED TO BE a relatively unproblematic concept; only recently have we seriously challenged its theoretical coherence. Today there are deep questions about what we actually mean by the term "race." But before (roughly) World War II, before the rise of Nazism, before the end of the great European empires and before the decolonization of Africa, before the urbanization of the U.S. black population and the rise of the modern civil rights movement, race was still largely seen in Europe and North America (and elsewhere as well) as an essence, a natural phenomenon, whose meaning was fixed—constant as a southern star.

In the earlier years of this century only a handful of pioneers, people like W.E.B. DuBois and Franz Boas, conceived of race in a more social and historical way. Other doubters included avant-garde racial theorists emerging from the intellectual ferment of the Harlem Renaissance; black nationalists and pan-Africanists who sought to apply the rhetoric of national self-determination expressed at Versailles to the mother continent, and who returned from the battlefields of France to the wave of antiblack race riots that swept the country in 1919; a few Marxists (whose perspectives had their own limitations); and to some extent the Chicago school of sociology led by Robert Ezra Park. But even these intellectuals and activists made incomplete breaks with essentialist notions of race, whether biological or otherwise deterministic.

That was then; this is now. Today the theory of race has been utterly transformed. The socially constructed status of the concept of race, which we have labeled the *racial formation* process, is widely recognized (Omi and Winant, 1986), so much so that it is now often *conservatives* who argue that race is an illusion. The main task facing racial theory today, in fact, is no longer to problematize a seemingly "natural" or "common sense" concept of race—although that effort has not been entirely completed by any means. Rather our central work is to focus attention on the *continuing significance and changing meaning of race*. It is to argue against the recent discovery of the illusory nature of race; against the supposed contemporary transcendence of race; against the widely reported death of the concept of race; and against the replacement of the category of race by other, supposedly more objective categories like ethnicity, nationality, or class. All these initiatives are mistaken at best, and intellectually dishonest at worst.

In order to substantiate these assertions, we must first ask, what is race? Is it merely an illusion, an ideological construct utilized to manipulate, divide, and deceive? This position has been taken by a number of theorists, and activists as well, including many

who have heroically served the cause of racial and social justice in the U.S. Or is race something real, material, objective? This view too has its adherents, including both racial reactionaries and racial radicals. From our perspective both these approaches miss the boat. The concept of race is neither an ideological construct nor does it reflect an objective condition. In this essay we first reflect critically on these two opposed viewpoints on the contemporary theory of race. Then we offer an alternative perspective based on the approach of racial formation.

RACE AS AN IDEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT

The assertion that race is an ideological construct—understood in the sense of a “false consciousness” that explains other “material” relationships in distorted fashion—seems to us highly problematic. This is the position taken by the prominent historian Barbara Fields in a recent, well-known article, “Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America” (1990). Although Fields inveighs against various uses of the concept of race, she directs her critical barbs most forcefully against historians who “invoke race as a historical explanation” (p. 101).

According to Fields, the concept of race arose to meet an ideological need: its original effectiveness lay in its ability to reconcile freedom and slavery. The idea of race provided “the means of explaining slavery to people whose terrain was a republic founded on radical doctrines of liberty and natural rights” (p. 114). But, Fields says, to argue that race—once framed as a category in thought, an ideological explanation for certain distinct types of social inequality—“takes on a life of its own” in social relationships, is to transform (or “reify”) an illusion into a reality. Such a position could be sustained “only if race is defined as innate and natural prejudice of color.”

Since race is not genetically programmed, racial prejudice cannot be genetically programmed either, but must arise historically.... The preferred solution is to suppose that, having arisen historically, race then ceases to be a historical phenomenon and becomes instead an external motor of history; according to the fatuous but widely repeated formula, it “takes on a life of its own.” In other words, once historically acquired, race becomes hereditary. The shopworn metaphor thus offers camouflage for a latter-day version of Lamarckism. (p. 101)

Thus race is either an illusion that does ideological work, or an objective biological fact. Since it is certainly not the latter, it must be the former. No intermediate possibility—for instance the Durkheimian notion of a “social fact”—is considered.

Some of this account—for example, the extended discussion of the origins of North American race-thinking—can be accepted without major objection.¹ Furthermore, Fields effectively demonstrates the absurdity of many commonly held ideas about race. But her position is so extreme that at best it can only account for the origins of race-thinking, and then only in one social context. To examine how race-thinking evolved from these origins, how it responded to changing sociocultural circumstances, is ruled out. Why and how did race-thinking survive after emancipation? Fields cannot answer, because her theoretical approach rules out the very perpetuation of the concept of race. As a relatively orthodox Marxist, Fields could argue that changing “material conditions” continued to give rise to changes in racial “ideology,” except that even the limited autonomy this would attach to the concept of race would exceed her standards. Race cannot take on “a life of its own”; it is a pure ideology, an illusion.

Fields simply skips from emancipation to the present, where she disparages opponents of “racism” for unwittingly perpetuating it. In denunciatory terms she concludes by arguing for the concept’s abolition:

N
re
or
it,
of

Fields is
one can
acts of
slavery
reason,
and acc
demarca

W
an artic
dictum
(Thoma
persists
both the

In
intellect
common
science
white, o
Further
especial
phrases
“...that
by the co

Th
it fails
millenni
principle
concept,
produced
a fortiori
biologica
recognize
part of o
identity is
Indeed,
interpreta
perhaps C
but it doe

On the o
concept.
unsavory,
are thinki

Nothing handed down from the past could keep race alive if we did not constantly reinvent and re-ritualize it to fit our own terrain. If race lives on today, it can do so only because we continue to create and re-create it in our social life, continue to verify it, and thus continue to need a social vocabulary that will allow us to make sense, not of what our ancestors did then, but of what we choose to do now. (p. 118)

Fields is unclear about how "we" should jettison the ideological construct of race, and one can well understand why. By her own logic, racial ideologies cannot be abolished by acts of will. One can only marvel at the ease with which she distinguishes the bad old slavery days of the past from the present, when we anachronistically cling, as if for no reason, to the illusion that race retains any meaning. We foolishly "throw up our hands" and acquiesce in race-thinking, rather than...doing what? Denying the racially demarcated divisions in society? Training ourselves to be "color-blind"?²

We venture to say that only a historian (however eminent) could have written such an article. Why? Because at the least a sociologist would know W. I. Thomas's famous dictum that if people "define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas and Thomas, 1928, p. 572). Nor is Fields alone in claiming that racial ideology persists because people insist on thinking racially. Her position is espoused by many, on both the left and the right of racial debates.³

In any case the view that race is a kind of false consciousness is not held only by intellectuals, based on both well-intentioned and ulterior motivations; it also has a common sense character. One hears in casual discussion, or in introductory social science classes, variations on the following statement: "I don't care if a person is black, white, or purple, I treat them exactly the same; a person's just a person to me." Furthermore, some of the integrationist aspirations of racial minority movements, especially the civil rights movement, invoke this sort of idea. Consider the famous phrases from the "I Have a Dream" speech, the line that made Shelby Steele's career: "...that someday my four little children will be judged, not by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character."

The core criticisms of this "race as ideology" approach, in our view, are two. First, it fails to recognize that the salience of a social construct can develop over half a millennium or more of diffusion, or should we say enforcement, as a fundamental principle of social organization and identity formation. The longevity of the race concept, and the enormous number of effects race-thinking (and race-acting) have produced, guarantee that race will remain a feature of social reality across the globe, and *a fortiori* in our own country, despite its lack of intrinsic or scientific merit (in the biological sense). Our second, and related, criticism of this approach is that it fails to recognize that at the level of experience, of everyday life, race is an almost indissoluble part of our identities. Our society is so thoroughly racialized that to be without racial identity is to be in danger of having no identity. To be raceless is akin to being genderless. Indeed, when one cannot identify another's race, a microsociological "crisis of interpretation" results, something perhaps best interpreted in ethnomethodological or perhaps Goffmanian terms. To complain about such a situation may be understandable, but it does not advance understanding.

RACE AS AN OBJECTIVE CONDITION

On the other side of the coin, it is clearly problematic to assign objectivity to the race concept. Such theoretical practice puts us in quite heterogeneous, and sometimes unsavory, company. Of course the biologicistic racial theories of the past do this: here we are thinking of the prototypes of fascism such as Gobineau and Chamberlain (see Mosse,

1978), of the eugenicists such as Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant, and of the "founding fathers" of scientific racism such as Agassiz, Broca, Terman, and Yerkes (See Kevles, 1985; Chase, 1977). Indeed up to our own time we can find an extensive legacy of this sort of thinking. Stephen Jay Gould makes devastating critiques of such views (1981).

But much liberal and even radical social science, though firmly committed to a social, as opposed to biological, interpretation of race, nevertheless also slips into a kind of objectivism about racial identity and racial meaning. This is because race is treated as an *independent variable* all too frequently. Thus, to select only prominent examples, Daniel Moynihan, William Julius Wilson, Milton Gordon, and many other mainstream thinkers theorize race in terms that downplay its variability and historically contingent character. Even these major thinkers, who explicitly reject biologicistic forms of racial theory, fall prey to a kind of creeping objectivism of race. For in their analyses a modal explanatory approach emerges: As sociopolitical circumstances change over historical time, racially defined groups adapt or fail to adapt to these changes, achieving mobility or remaining mired in poverty, etc. In this logic there is no problematization of group identities, of the constantly shifting parameters through which race is understood, group interests are assigned, statuses are ascribed, agency is attained, and roles performed.

Contemporary racial theory, then, is often "objectivistic" about its fundamental category. Although abstractly acknowledged to be a sociohistorical construct, race in practice is often treated as an objective fact: one simply *is* one's race; in the contemporary U.S., if we discard euphemisms, we have five color-based racial categories: black, white, brown, yellow, and red.

This is problematic, indeed ridiculous, in numerous ways. Nobody really belongs in these boxes; they are patently absurd reductions of human variation. But even accepting the nebulous—"rules" of racial classification—such as "hypodescent" (see Harris, 1964; Davis, 1991) many people don't fit anywhere. Into what categories should we place Arab Americans, for example? Brazilians? South Asians? Such a list could be extended almost indefinitely. Objectivist treatments, lacking a critique of the *constructed* character of racial meanings, also clash with experiential dimensions of the issue. If one doesn't act black, white, etc., that's just deviance from the norm. There is in these approaches an insufficient appreciation of the *performative* aspect of race, as postmodernists might call it.⁴

To summarize the critique of this race-as-objective-condition approach, then, it fails on three counts. First, it cannot grasp the process-oriented and relational character of racial identity and racial meaning. Second, it denies the historicity and social comprehensiveness of the race concept. And third, it cannot account for the way actors, both individual and collective, have to manage incoherent and conflictual racial meanings and identities in everyday life. It has no concept, in short, of what we have labeled racial formation.

TOWARD A CRITICAL THEORY OF THE CONCEPT OF RACE

The foregoing clearly sets forth the agenda that any adequate theorization of the race concept must fulfill. Such an approach must be constructed so as to steer between the Scylla of "race as illusionary" and the Charybdis of "racial objectivism." Such a critical theory can be consistently developed, we suggest, drawing upon the racial formation approach. Such a theoretical formulation, too, must be explicitly historicist. It must recognize the importance of historical context and contingency in the framing of racial categories and the social construction of racially defined experiences.

What would be the minimum conditions for the development of such a critical, process-oriented theory of race? We suggest that it must meet three requirements:

Let us a

The me
new re
postcol
race prc
A
efforts t
notably
egalitari
binary l
more co
qualitati

C
making
mere de
oppositi
by limit
generati
relatively
currents
extent fo
integrati

In
also has s
importar
decade o
the simpl
of politic

The geog
perial rea
globalizea
possible r
has been
disparitie
capital an
point whe
1982), as
majoritari
"Americar
models of
such cour
and North
polities, c

- It must apply to contemporary political relationships
- It must apply in an increasingly global context
- It must apply across historical time.

Let us address each of these points briefly.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

The meaning and salience of race are forever being reconstituted in the present. Today such new relationships emerge chiefly at the point where some counterhegemonic or postcolonial power is attained. At that point the meanings and the political articulations of race proliferate.

A central example is the appearance of competing racial projects, by which we mean efforts to institutionalize racial meanings and identities in particular social structures, notably those of individual, family, community, and state (see Winant, 1990, 1991). As egalitarian movements contend with racial "backlash" over sustained periods of time, as binary logics of racial antagonism (white/black, ladino/indio, settler/native, etc.) become more complex and decentered, political deployments of the concept of race come to signal qualitatively new types of political domination, as well as new types of opposition.

Consider the U.S. case. It is now possible to perpetuate racial domination without making any explicit reference to race at all. Subtextual or "coded" racial signifiers, or the mere denial of the continuing significance of race, may suffice. Similarly, in terms of opposition, it is now possible to resist racial domination in entirely new ways, particularly by limiting the reach and penetration of the political system into everyday life, by generating new identities, new collectivities, new (imagined) communities that are relatively less permeable to the hegemonic system.⁵ Much of the rationale for Islamic currents among blacks in the U.S., for the upsurge in black anti-Semitism, and to some extent for the phenomenon of Afrocentrism, can be found here. Thus the old choices, integration vs. separatism and assimilation vs. nationalism, are no longer the only options.

In the "underdeveloped" world, proliferation of so-called postcolonial phenomena also has significant racial dimensions, as the entire Fanonian tradition (merely to select one important theoretical current) makes clear. Crucial debates have now been occurring for a decade or more on issues such as postcolonial subjectivity and identity, the insufficiency of the simple dualism of "Europe and its others," and the subversive and parodic dimensions of political culture at and beyond the edges of the old imperial boundaries.⁶

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF RACE

The geography of race is becoming more complex. Once more easily seen in terms of imperial reach, in terms of colonization, conquest, and migration, racial space is becoming *globalized* and thus accessible to a new kind of comparative analysis. This only becomes possible now, at a historical moment when the distinction "developed/underdeveloped" has been definitively overcome. Obviously by this we don't mean that now there are no disparities between North and South or rich and poor. We mean that the movement of capital and labor has internationalized all nations, all regions. Today we have reached the point where "the empire strikes back" (see Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1982), as former (neo)colonial subjects, now redefined as "immigrants," challenge the majoritarian status of the formerly metropolitan group (the whites, the Europeans, the "Americans" or "French," etc.). Meanwhile such phenomena as the rise of "diasporic" models of blackness, the creation of "pan-ethnic" communities of Latinos and Asians (in such countries as the U.K. or the U.S.), and the breakdown of borders in both Europe and North America all seem to be internationalizing and racializing previously national polities, cultures, and identities. To take just one example, popular culture now

nt, and of the
nd Yerkes (See
nsive legacy of
views (1981).
ommitted to a
ips into a kind
ce is treated as
ent examples,
er mainstream
ally contingent
forms of racial
alyses a modal
over historical
ing mobility or
ation of group
lerstood, group
erformed.
ts fundamental
nstruct, race in
e contemporary
es: black, white,

really belongs in
t even accepting
ee Harris, 1964;
d we place Arab
extended almost
character of racial
oesn't act black,
as an insufficient
all it.⁴
proach, then, it
ational character
icity and social
r the way actors,
onflictual racial
of what we have

CONCEPT OF RACE

ation of the race
teer between the
." Such a critical
racial formation
storicist. It must
framing of racial

of such a critical,
ements:

internationalizes racial awareness almost instantaneously, as reggae, rap, samba, and various African pop styles leap from continent to continent.

Because of these transformations a global comparison of hegemonic social/political orders based on race becomes possible. We think that in a highly specified form, i.e., not as mere reactions to or simple negations of "Western" cultural/theoretical dominance, such notions as diasporic consciousness or racially informed standpoint epistemologies deserve more serious attention as efforts to express the contemporary globalization of racial space (see Mudimbe, 1988; Rabinow, 1986; Harding, 1986). Indeed, recent developments such as the construction of new racial identities or the phenomenon of pan-ethnicity simply cannot be understood without recognizing that the territorial reach of racial hegemony is now global.

The dissolution of the transparent racial identity of the formerly dominant group, that is to say, the increasing racialization of whites in Europe and the U.S., must also be recognized as proceeding from the increasingly globalized dimensions of race. As previous assumptions erode, white identity loses its transparency and the easy elision with "racelessness" that accompanies racial domination. "Whiteness" becomes a matter of anxiety and concern.

THE EMERGENCE OF RACIAL TIME

Some final notes are in order in respect to the problem of the epochal nature of racial time. Classical social theory had an enlightenment-based view of time, a perspective that understood the emergence of modernity in terms of the rise of capitalism and the bourgeoisie. This view was by no means limited to Marxism. Weberian disenchantment and the rise of the Durkheimian division of labor also partake of this temporal substrate. Only rarely does the racial dimension of historical temporality appear in this body of thought, as for example in Marx's excoriation of the brutalities of "primitive accumulation":

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations with the globe for a theater. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes giant dimensions in England's Antijacobin War, and is still going on in the opium wars with China, etc. (Marx, 1967, p. 751)

Yet even Marx frequently legitimated such processes as the inevitable and ultimately beneficial birth-pangs of classlessness—enacted by the ceaselessly revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Today such teleological accounts seem hopelessly outmoded. Historical time could well be interpreted in terms of something like a racial *longue durée*. For has there not been an immense historical rupture represented by the rise of Europe, the onset of African enslavement, the *conquista*, and the subjugation of much of Asia? We take the point of much poststructural scholarship on these matters to be quite precisely an effort to explain "Western" or colonial time as a huge project demarcating human "difference," or more globally, as Todorov, say, would argue, of framing partial collective identities in terms of externalized "others" (Todorov, 1985). Just as, for example, the writers of the *Annales* school sought to locate the deep logic of historical time in the means by which material life was produced—diet, shoes, etc. (Braudel, 1981)—so we might usefully think of a racial *longue durée* in which the slow inscription of phenotypical signification took place upon the human body, in and through conquest and enslavement to be sure, but also as an enormous act of expression, of narration.

In short, just as the noise of the "big bang" still resonates through the universe, so the overdetermined construction of world "civilization" as a product of the rise of Europe and the subjugation of the rest of us still defines the race concept. Such speculative notes, to be sure, can be no more than provocations. Nor can we conclude this effort to reframe the agenda of racial theory with a neat summation. There was a long period—centuries—in which race was seen as a natural condition, an essence. This was only recently succeeded, although not entirely superseded, by a way of thinking about race as subordinate to supposedly more concrete, "material" relationships; thus we have become used to thinking about race as an illusion, an excrescence. Perhaps now we are approaching the end of this racial epoch too.

We may, to our dismay, have to give up our familiar way of thinking about race once more. If so, there may also be some occasion for delight. For it may be possible to glimpse yet another view of race, in which the concept operates neither as a signifier of comprehensive identity, nor of fundamental difference, both of which are patently absurd, but rather as a marker of the infinity of variations we humans hold as a common heritage and hope for the future.

NOTES

1 Minor objections would have to do with Fields's functionalist view of ideology, and her claim that the race concept only "came into existence" when needed by whites in North American colonies beginning in the late 17th century. The concept of race, of course, has a longer history than that. (Fields, 1990, p. 101)

2 Fields's admirer David Roediger also criticizes her on this point. "At times she nicely balances the ideological creation of racial attitudes with their manifest and ongoing importance and their (albeit ideological) reality.... But elsewhere, race disappears into the 'reality' of class." (see Roediger, 1991, pp. 7–8)

3 Another important thinker who has at least flirted with the idea of race as illusion is Kwame Anthony Appiah. See "The Uncompleted Argument: DuBois and the Illusion of Race" (Gates, ed., 1985); idem, "Racisms" (Goldberg, ed., 1990).

4 "The question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy—it is always the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image" (Bhabha, 1990, p. 188).

5 The work of Paul Gilroy, which focuses on the British racial situation, is particularly revealing in regard to these matters. Gilroy's analysis of the significance of popular music in the African diaspora is indispensable (see Gilroy, 1991).

6 There is a vast literature by now on these matters, whose founding statement is undoubtedly Edward Said's *Orientalism* (Said, 1978); also useful is Bhabha, ed., 1990.

7 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu define pan-ethnicity as "...the development of bridging organizations and solidarities among subgroups of ethnic collectivities that are often seen as homogeneous by outsiders." Such a development, they claim, is a crucial feature of ethnic change—"supplanting both assimilation and ethnic particularism as the direction of change for racial/ethnic minorities." While pan-ethnic formation is facilitated by an ensemble of cultural factors (e.g., common language and religion) and structural factors (e.g., class, generation, and geographical concentration), Lopez and Espiritu conclude that a specific concept of race is fundamental to the construction of pan-ethnicity. (Lopez and Espiritu, 1990, p. 198)

REFERENCES

- Appiah, K. A. (1985). The uncompleted argument: DuBois and the illusion of race. In H. L. Gates (ed.), *"Race," Writing, and Difference*. Chicago: Chicago UP.
- _____. (1990). Racisms. In D. T. Goldberg (ed.), *Anatomy of Racism*. Minneapolis: Minneapolis UP.

- Bhabha, H. K. (ed.) (1990). *Nation and Narration*. New York: Routledge.
- ———. (1990). Interrogating identity: The postcolonial prerogative. In D. T. Goldberg (ed.), *Anatomy of Racism*. Minneapolis: Minneapolis UP.
- Braudel, F. (1981). *The Structures of Everyday Life: The limits of the possible*, vol. 1 of *Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century*. (S. Reynolds, trans.). New York: Harper.
- Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. (1982). *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and racism in 70s Britain*. London: Hutchinson.
- Chase, A. (1977). *The Legacy of Malthus: The social costs of the new scientific racism*. New York: Knopf.
- Davis, F. J. (1991). *Who Is Black: One nation's definition*. University Park: Pennsylvania State
- Fields, B. (1990). Slavery, race, and ideology in the United States of America. *New Left Review*, 181, 95-118.
- Gilroy, P. (1991). "There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack": *The cultural politics of race and nation*. Chicago: Chicago UP.
- Harding, S. (1986). *The Science Question in Feminism*. Ithaca: Cornell UP.
- Harris, Wilson. (1964). *Patterns of Race in the Americas*. New York: Norton.
- Kevles, D. J. (1985). *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the uses of human heredity*. New York: Knopf.
- Lopez, D., & Espiritu, Y. (1990). Panethnicity in the United States: A theoretical framework. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 13, 198-224.
- Marx, K. (1967). *Capital*, vol. 1. New York: International Publishers.
- Mosse, G. L. (1978). *Toward the Final Solution: A history of European racism*. New York: Fertig.
- Mudimbe, V. Y. (1988). *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, philosophy, and the order of knowledge*. Bloomington: Indiana UP.
- Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1986). *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s*. New York: Routledge.
- Rabinow, P. (1986). Representations are social facts: Modernity and post-modernity in anthropology. In J. Clifford & G. E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing Culture: The poetics and politics of anthropology*. Berkeley: U of California P.
- Roedinger, D. (1991). *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the making of the American working class*. London: Verso.
- Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon.
- Thomas, W. I., & Thomas, D. S. (1928). *The Child in America: Behavior problems and programs*. New York: Knopf.
- Todorov, T. (1985). *The Conquest of America: The question of the other*. (R. Howard, trans.). New York: Harper.
- Winant, H. (1990). Postmodern racial politics in the United States: Difference and inequality. *Socialist Review*, 90 (1), 121-47.
- . (1991). Rethinking race in Brazil. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 24 (1), 173-92.

2

IN THE I
sensibili
new kin
These n
of critic
in the a
critique
Distinct
and hor
abstract
historic
variable
the hist
politics
and gra
extermi
region a
previou
differen
momen
represe
contem
capitali
women,
hegemo
culture:
commu
commu
subordin
areas of
Th
the main
of shock
talented
with de
empowe