Asian American project

A study on the sociospatial context of ethnic politics and entrepreneurial growth in Koreatown and Monterey Park

Sookhee Oh • Angie Chung

Published online: 28 April 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The study examines the various sociospa-

tial features of immigrant populations in two transna-

tionally-linked ethnic enclaves in terms of how they

may facilitate and constrain the politics of growth and

development. In recent decades, the growing ethnic

enclave economies of Koreatown and Monterey Park

have witnessed the emergence of progrowth ethnic

interest groups comprised of immigrant capitalists,

entrepreneurs, developers, and organizations, who are

playing key roles in politically spearheading

(re)development projects in the Los Angeles metro-

politan area. Our aim is to understand how the

sociospatial, entrepreneurial, and residential layout

of these host municipalities set the context for the

politics of growth in these ethnic enclave economies

based on an analysis of GIS spatial mapping,

2000–2010 census data, and other secondary sources.

The data suggests that Korean and Chinese elite face

different political opportunities and challenges

because of their different sociospatial characteris-

tics—the former based on their greater entrepreneurial

influence and weak electoral impact and the latter on

their stronger political presence as residents.

Keywords Ethnic enclave � Growth machine � Koreatown � Monterey Park � Ethnic politics � Immigrant entrepreneurship

Introduction

Whereas small Asian-owned businesses used to be

socially isolated in declining inner-city minority

neighborhoods, new globally-connected firms are

now redeveloping and gentrifying downtown areas,

expanding into outlying suburbs, and assuming key

economic roles in today’s global economy. Embedded

in a worldwide network extending from Taiwan to

Sydney to Vancouver, Asian immigrant firms contrib-

ute to the Southern Californian economy by using

overseas capital, labor, products, and cultural influ-

ences from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South

Korea to stimulate population growth, gentrification

and commercial development in large metropolitan

regions. Scholars are beginning to examine the

economic impact of this shift (Li 2008; Lin 1998;

Park and Kim 2008; Zhou and Kim 2003), but there is

less known on the political players and processes that

have been steering this new development in immigra-

tion gateways of metropolitan regions.

A number of studies (Light 2002; Chung 2007; Park

and Kim 2008) have indirectly referred to the rise of an

‘‘immigrant growth machine’’, or a loose coali-

tion of pro-growth immigrant leaders comprised of

S. Oh (&) University of Missouri-Kansas City, Kansas City, MO,

USA

e-mail: [email protected]

A. Chung

State University of New York, Albany, NY, USA

123

GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71

DOI 10.1007/s10708-013-9478-x

entrepreneurs, land developers, global investors, and

economic development organizations that have

worked to promote their economic growth agenda in

the local politics and civic institutions of cities and

suburbs throughout Los Angeles. Immigrant growth

machines only recently entered the U.S. political

scenes as a result of global economic restructuring and

shifting national immigration and trade policies that

enabled capital-endowed immigrants to contribute to

the emerging (re)development initiatives in central

cities. Driven by the interest to maximize the financial

profitability of land, immigrant growth machines, not

unlike traditional growth machines, work in collabo-

ration with local political/economic elites to attract

outside investment and government subsidies for land-

use projects in the interests of stimulating growth in

post-industrial cities. However, a combination of

factors related to the ethnic composition and cultural

distinctiveness of the immigrant elite sets these

political machines apart from their traditional White

pro-growth counterparts, all of which shape their

political trajectories.

The main objective of the article is to identify the

different political opportunities and challenges the

immigrant growth machine face within this broader

structural context. More specifically, our study exam-

ines the demographic, political and sociospatial char-

acteristics of two different ethnic enclave economies

undergoing extensive development in the urban

Korean core of Koreatown and the suburban Chinese

core of Monterey Park, Los Angeles. For our data, we

rely on descriptive statistics from various secondary

sources, including census summary files and the

American Community Survey (2010), Economic

Census (2007), Community Redevelopment Agency

data on property ownership, and directories of public

officials, as well as GIS mapping techniques. The

secondary data gives us a sense of the different local

contexts of Koreatown and Monterey Park, including

their demographic composition, industrial layout,

financial institutions, and political infrastructures,

within which these growth machines operate. We

use these data to speculate on how the various

sociospatial features of each enclave may facilitate

and impede on the pro-growth initiatives of immigrant

leaders. It is our contention that how immigrant elites

are situated with respect to the local political oppor-

tunity structure around these factors will shape the

way they pursue their pro-growth agenda.

Immigrants and the ‘‘political economy of space’’

This study takes as its starting point one of the

important theoretical frameworks that have explained

the political dynamics of local economic growth in the

body of urban sociology literature (Jonas and Wilson

1999; Logan 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch

1976). Rejecting the human ecology viewpoint that the

production of urban space is the natural outcome of

market processes, Logan and Molotch (1987) pay

greater attention to the elite groups that govern the

political processes of urban development and the

economic interests that drive them. They argue in their

co-authored book, Urban Fortunes: the Political

Economy of Place that the desire for economic and

population growth unifies a wide range of place-based

elites including developers, entrepreneurs, investors,

realtors, pro-growth politicians, and bankers around

issues of land use and development—what they call

the ‘‘growth machine.’’ In contrast to residents whose

main interests focus on quality-of-life issues, or ‘‘use

values’’, such as affordable housing, good schools,

public safety and recreational spaces, the economic

fortune of the so-called ‘‘growth machine’’ is depen-

dent on the financial ‘‘exchange value’’ of land

through the promotion of condominiums, high-end

restaurants, convention centers, and other profitable

ventures. These elites often form pro-growth coali-

tions with government units and work closely with

secondary interest groups and institutions (e.g., local

media, universities, museums, convention centers, and

tourism) in order to maximize their financial gains.

As Light (2002) notes, early studies on urban

growth machines assumed that the key economic

players in urban development and redevelopment

were for the most part native-born white American

economic and political elites. In recent years, scholars

are taking a closer look at the growing role of

transnational immigrant entrepreneurs and capitalists

in reviving declining inner city neighborhoods and

expanding ethnic-based economies into suburban

areas (Li 2008; Light 2002; Lin 1998; Nijman 1997;

Portes et al. 2002). Immigrant growth machines only

recently entered the U.S. political scenes as a result of

global economic restructuring and shifting national

immigration and trade policies that enabled capital-

endowed immigrants to contribute to the emerging

(re)development initiatives in central cities. Even as

inner cities are squeezed by the pressures of

60 GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71

123

deindustrialization and urban decline, these so-called

place entrepreneurs have begun to purchase, develop,

market, and sell land to newly-arriving affluent

immigrants and the upwardly-mobile in neighbor-

hoods beyond the traditional ethnic enclave.

Although there has been no systemic study done on

immigrant growth machines, various studies con-

ducted on Asian communities including Koreatown

and Monterey Park have verified the existence of a

core circle of immigrant elite who work both privately

and in collusion with public officials, developers,

transnational financiers, media, and other relevant

institutions to promote economic development in their

respective ethnic economies, which has had both

positive and negative ramifications on the communi-

ties they occupy (Chung 2007; Park and Kim 2008).

Building on their strong economic base, these entre-

preneurs are exerting their influence in local politics

by pushing forth business-friendly legislation, making

financial contributions to politicians, coordinating

alliances with other ethnic groups, and even running

for political office in the hopes of promoting their

interests.

Nevertheless, immigrant growth machines face a

number of cultural and structural obstacles caused by

strong resistance from both nativist and growth-control

movements, the non-majority pluralist politics of the

neighborhoods they tend to occupy, and their relatively

weak voting power and underrepresentation at all levels

of government. In the case of Southern California

Asians, anti-growth or slow-growth movement initiated

by local residents, environmental, cultural, and neigh-

borhood preservation groups; interracial and intraethnic

conflicts over territory, political control, and class

interests; and unstable relationships with local politi-

cians often put immigrant pro-growth elites in heated

conflicts over a range of issues from the prevalence of

Asian-language signs to the late hours of restaurant,

karaoke, and liquor establishments (Fulton 1997; Hor-

ton 1995; Purcell 2001). Furthermore, the sheer physical

visibility, cultural differences, and economic power of

immigrant leaders create a visible target for local native-

born white residents and competing entrepreneurs

(Horton 1995; Park and Kim 2008).

In general, the immigrant growth machine lacks the

political leverage to respond to these challenges because

of both linguistic and cultural obstacles as well as lack of

experience and knowledge in American politics. Asian

Americans in many of the suburban neighborhoods and

even urban enclaves like Koreatown where these

immigrant growth machines operate do not have a clear

political majority. In settings where no dominant group

exists, resistance from activists or non-Asian residents

can potentially heighten ethnic fault lines and lead to an

unstable political balance, characterized by fluctuating

phases of effective alliance-building followed by the

dismantling of an ethnic consensus (Saito 1998).

Given the many obstacles they must overcome, we

propose that only certain immigrant groups exhibit the

appropriate characteristics to qualify as an ‘‘immigrant

growth machine’’ and that various pre-conditions must

be at play for these machines to appear as key players

in local development. These include:

1. The presence of a highly-developed ethnic enclave

economy as defined by their wide range of special-

ized economic activities, highly differentiated and

specialized labor force, and strong class of ethnic

entrepreneurial elites (Portes and Stepick 1993).

2. Bimodal circulation of capital from the local

informal enclave economy to the transnational

corporate front creates new patterns of ethnic

succession and economic development and facil-

itates the integration of these ethnic enclaves into

the national and global economy (Hum 2002;

Zhou and Kim 2003). Ethnic-owned and transna-

tional banks are the main institutions that insti-

gate, support, and manage these transactions.

3. The presence of local elite brokers who either

establish a strong residential presence within the

neighborhood or at least maintain some kind of

compelling interest in the property of said neigh-

borhood (e.g., vis-à-vis businesses, churches, and

afterschool programs) that would push them to

become active participants in local development. In

most cases, this intermediary leadership is com-

posed of local immigrant elite and bilingual 1.5

generation leaders, who are equipped to navigate

both ethnic and local mainstream power structures.

4. Absence of strong competing interest groups

including not only the usual opponents of uncon-

trolled growth (e.g., environmental groups, slow-

growth advocates, rentiers, etc.), but also, rival

corporations (e.g., Walmart) and pro-growth

leaders, White-led nativist groups, and unionized

minority residents and workers.

As these conditions suggest, an examination of dif-

ferent demographic, financial, institutional, and political

GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71 61

123

attributes will allow us to better understand the

political obstacles and opportunities that local ethnic

elites face as they work to spearhead development

based on these pre-conditions in these two globalizing

enclaves.

Local contexts and political opportunities

in Koreatown and Monterey Park

Koreatown, subsumed under the City of Los Angeles

is three miles west of downtown L.A. The enclave

began as a first-stop neighborhood for Korean new-

comers and small commercial enterprises catering

mainly to Korean clientele around the 1970s. The

enclave has since experienced a major economic boom

and grown to be the economic center of Korean

immigrants in the region as a result of the heavy inflow

of affluent immigrants, capital and corporation

branches from South Korea (Light 2002; Park and

Kim 2008). Beginning in the 1980s, upwardly-mobile

Koreans spread out into small residential clusters

throughout Los Angeles and Orange Counties and the

San Fernando Valley, including Glendale, Northridge,

Torrance, Cerritos, Garden Grove, Fullerton, and

Irvine as a result of their safer neighborhoods and

better schooling systems (Chung 2007) (Fig. 1).

According to the 2010 census, Latinos constitute

the majority of residents in Koreatown (53 %),

Koreans are the next largest ethnic group at 18 %,

and non-Hispanic whites are a mere 11 % of the

population (Table 1). While ethnic composition has

remained relatively stable over this decade, a few

Asian minorities such as Filipinos, Asian Indians, and

Bangladeshis have grown in size. Koreatown is

characterized by relative lack of residential stability

as indicated by the higher percentage of rentals

(approximately 85 %) and lower number of married

couples (36 %). Koreatown is also relatively poor

compared to other parts of the city, although its

median income increased slightly from 2000 to 2010.

The median household income of Koreatown was

$33,448 in 2010 while that of the city was $49,138.

The combination of poverty and racial conflicts with

Blacks in the early 1990s set the context for the

outbreak of the 1992 Los Angeles Civil Unrest by

Black and Latino rioters that destroyed approximately

1,867 Korean-owned businesses and inflicted an

estimated $347 million in damages, according to more

conservative figures (Kwong 1993).

From a political standpoint, the stark inequality,

residential instability and demographically marginal

position of Koreatown within the larger municipality

of Los Angeles means that Korean leaders have more

cultural and structural obstacles to overcome before

they can advance their agenda in the municipal power

structure. Koreans’ weak representation in local

politics and governance reflects this limitation. Out

of more than 500 public official positions (elected and

appointed) in the city government of Los Angeles,

there are 24 (about 5 %) individuals with distinctive

Korean last names who serve the local government

(based on a list of public officials and commissioners

compiled from the LA government website). Many of

these appointed officials are members of planning or

housing commissions, which means they are involved

in local (re)development processes (Table 2). We

could not identify any Korean elected officials in the

city government, at least by their names. Despite the

lack of official political representation, Korean busi-

ness elites have maintained some semblance of

political solidarity by donating to political candidates

and clustering their major political organizations and

activities in Koreatown (Chung 2007).

Unlike Koreatown, Monterey Park is located not in

the central city but in inner-ring suburbs ten miles east

of downtown Los Angeles but has also served as

Southern California’s gateway for transnational Chi-

nese and Taiwanese businessmen and capitalist inves-

tors. Starting out as a small bedroom community of

mostly white residents, Monterey Park witnessed its

first dramatic change when affluent Taiwanese inves-

tors began to purchase property and market it to

wealthy immigrants from Taiwan through a combina-

tion of residential and commercial development and

vigorous marketing campaigns (Zhou and Kim 2003;

Tseng 1995). As property values skyrocketed, ‘‘Little

Taipei’’ as it was initially known began to attract a

large influx of affluent immigrants from mainland

China, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia until mainland

Chinese began to outnumber the Taiwanese. With the

help of capital, products, and cultural influences from

Asia, Chinese businesses in Monterey Park have

expanded from small-scale mom-and-pop stores to a

wider variety of large-scale businesses such as super-

market chains, upscale cafes and restaurants, high-

62 GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71

123

technology firms and financial and professional

services

According to the 2010 Census, Monterey Park’s

Chinese population comprises the ethnic majority

(48 %) in this relatively smaller municipality with the

remaining racial and ethnic groups spread across

Latinos (27 %), non-Hispanic whites (5 %), and other

Asians (18 %) (Table 1). The increasing growth of the

Chinese population has reinforced their status as the

ethnic majority (from 41 % in 2000 to 48 % in 2010).

Monterey Park is a relatively affluent Chinese subur-

ban center where a large proportion of home owners

and married couple households reside amongst a

visible senior population (19 %). Monterey Park is

now recognized as the Chinese gateway into the more

extended regions of the San Gabriel Valley, including

as San Marino, Arcadia, Alhambra, Rowland Heights,

Walnut, and Diamond Bar (Fig. 2).

The numerical dominance of the Chinese in a

smaller municipality has helped them to maintain

strong influence in local elections, build numerous

political organizations and powerful alliances, and

send a number of Chinese political representatives to

office, including council members and mayors (Hor-

ton 1995; Zhou et al. 2009). 57 out of approximately

174 positions of elected and appointed public officials

are now Chinese, as identified by their last names.

Approximately 33 % of the total positions are filled by

individuals with Chinese names. These officials serve

a wide range of government units and commissions

from the school district board of education to the

business improvement district advisory committee

(Table 3). The greater horizontal and vertical integra-

tion of Chinese officials throughout the local gover-

nance may put coethnic pro-growth advocates in a

more secure position when promoting various devel-

opment projects.

Table 4 uses more explicit measures such as

naturalization and length of residence to gauge the

potential political influence of ethnic groups in each

fieldsite. Koreans residing in Koreatown are more

likely to be non-citizens while Chinese in Monterey

Fig. 1 The spatial distribution of Koreans in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Source: U.S. Census Summary File (2010)

GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71 63

123

Park are more likely to be naturalized citizens (53 %).

Chinese in Monterey Park reported slightly longer

years of residency (approximately 15 years on aver-

age) than Koreans in Koreatown (13 years). As one of

the consistently significant predictors of voter partic-

ipation, the income level of each group also suggests

that the Chinese population in Monterey Park have

greater capacity for political influence than the Korean

population in Koreatown. The 1.5 generation, 1

or

leaders who were raised in both cultures, offers

another potential base for political representation

because of their capacity to act as mediators

between first generation immigrants and host society

communities. The 1.5 generation has indeed been

known to help first generation immigrants overcome

language and cultural limitations in the mainstream

local political realm, particularly after large-scale riots

erupted in 1992 amidst tensions between Koreans and

Blacks in Los Angeles (Chung 2007). Both Koreatown

and Montery Park show a similar proportion of 1.5

generation members (18, 20 % respectively) and

bilingual members (23, 26 % respectively).

Ethnic business

While demographic contexts may help facilitate or

inhibit political empowerment, economic activities

and ethnic banks mainly serve as the financial and

entrepreneurial engine that drives (re)development

projects. In general, both Chinese and Korean immi-

grants have established a strong entrepreneurial pres-

ence in the Los Angeles metropolitan regions. Many

Chinese and Korean individual entrepreneurs find a

pathway into the U.S. through the EB-5 visa, which

allows foreign investors to enter the U.S. on the

condition that they spur economic development in

declining areas through the establishment of commer-

cial enterprises. The EB-5 visa status gives permanent

residency to foreign nationals who can directly or

indirectly create at least ten jobs in America by

investing a minimum of $1 million. The minimum

investment is reduced to $500,000 if a foreign national

invests through regional centers in rural areas or urban

regions with high unemployment rates. Chinese and

Korean immigrants are currently ranked among the

top two nationality groups to take advantage of this

program (Green 2010). The 1997 amendment of the

U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act recently insti-

tuted a non-immigrant investor visa known as the E-2

visa, which encourages non-immigrant entrepreneurs

to invest and live in the U.S. Foreign investors often

prefer the E-2 visa to the EB-5 because it requires a

relatively smaller amount of investment ($150,000–

$250,000) than the EB-5 and offers a renewable status

to investors (Park and Kim 2008).

The numbers of business per 1,000 persons are 165

and 131 respectively for the Chinese and the Korean

populations in the Los Angeles metropolitan area

(Table 5). The sales per 1,000 persons are not so much

different ($81,166 and $77,597). However, because of

its densely developed commercial environment,

Table 1 Demographic characteristics of Koreatown and Monterey Park (2000–2010)

Koreatown Monterey Park

2000 2010 2000 2010

Total population 283,522 262,471 60,051 60,269

Population density 25,359 23,710 7,870 7,856

Non-Hispanic white

(%)

8.7 10.5 7.3 5.4

Non-Hispanic Asian

(%)

22.2 26.1 61.5 66.3

Hispanic (%) 56.1 53.0 29.0 26.9

Chinese (%) 0.6 0.9 41.2 47.7

Korean (%) 15.0 17.5 1.4 1.3

Owner occupied

housing (%)

15.0 15.3 54.0 55.4

Renter occupied

housing (%)

85.1 84.7 46.0 44.6

Age 65? (%) 7.5 9.1 17.9 19.3

Married couple

household (%)

39.3 35.9 54.2 51.0

Median household

income ($)

22,716 33,448 40,724 52,159

BA or more (%) 19.1 23.6 25.1 28.1

Source US Census Summary File 1 (2000 and 2010); American

Community Survey (2010); Koreantown is identified as an area

comprising five zipcodes (90004, 90005, 90006, 90019, and

90020), which are commonly associated with Koreatown based

on the literature and census data (Light and Bonacich 1988;

Yoon 1997; Census 2010)

1 Researchers do not completely agree on the definitions of the

1.5-generation. Nevertheless, they usually define members of

the 1.5-generation as children with at least one immigrant parent

who were born in their home countries and immigrated to the

United States at age 12 or earlier (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Oh

and Min 2011).

64 GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71

123

Koreans in Koreatown are more likely to be business

owners than the Chinese in Monterey Park (Table 4).

This difference might also be attributed to the larger

number of Chinese workers employed by co-ethnic

employers, the effect of which decreases the propor-

tion of employers relative to employees (Department

of Housing and Urban Development 2003–2007).

Growth in the construction and professional indus-

tries can signify a more advanced phase in the

development of the enclave beyond traditional retail

growth. The Chinese economy in Monterey Park has

witnessed a rapid expansion in the construction and

professional industries (Department of Housing and

Urban Development 2003–2007). However, an

observational comparison of Monterey Park and

Koreatown clearly reveals that more of this construc-

tion has occurred in the residential sector as is typical

of suburban areas, highlighting Monterey Park’s

significance as both a place of residence and com-

mercial enterprise. Reinforcing their influence on local

development decisions, we find that individuals with

Chinese surnames predominate in the leadership

positions of the local business associations and

advisory councils, including the Monterey Park

Chamber of Commerce and the Business Improve-

ment District Advisory Committee.

Unfortunately, there is no parallel data on con-

struction available for Koreans in Koreatown. How-

ever, an observational survey of Koreatown shows the

extent to which this enclave has witnessed substantive

entrepreneurial growth over the past few decades.

Following the 1992 riots, Koreatown entered a new

phase of (re)development, erecting upscale shopping

malls, multipurpose sports facilities, and luxury con-

dominiums, particularly in the Wilshire district, which

had experienced a severe decline in the late 1980s.

South Korean investment in the California real-estate

market also rose, triggered by the 1997 Asian financial

crisis. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa also promoted

foreign investment from wealthy South Koreans to

Koreatown, much of it in the form of redevelopment as

part of a larger scheme to strengthen the downtown

and mid-Wilshire district (Kang 2007). According to

data collected by the L.A. Community Redevelopment

Agency (2011), 2,252 properties in the Koreatown-

Wilshire District are Korean-owned, demonstrating

the overall purchasing power of Koreans in real estate

and commercial development. Their entrepreneurial

clout has been strengthened by their representation in

numerous local business associations, including the

Koreatown Chamber of Commerce and the Wilshire

Center Business Improvement District, whose current

chairman is incidentally from Jamison Services, a

large Korean real estate firm that owns most of the

commercial buildings along the Wilshire Corridor.

Thus, while these generic census categories may

highlight more similarities in the types of commercial

enterprises present in each enclave, it is clear that the

commercial district in the suburb of Monterey Park

caters more towards its local residential population

and transnationals with a wide range of businesses

such as upscale restaurants, huge supermarkets, mul-

tifunction shopping centers, and professional services;

Table 2 Korean public officials in Los Angeles

Position # Position occupied

by Koreans

Affordable Housing Commission 1

Rent Adjustment Commission 1

Dept. of Building Safety 3

Bureau of Contract Administration 1

Cultural Affairs Commission 1

Area Planning Commission—Central 2

Commission for Community and

Family Services

1

Convention and Exhibition Center

Authority

1

Board of Harbor Commissioners 1

Rent Adjustment Commission 1

Board of Neighborhood

Commissioners

1

Planning Commission 2

Board of Police Commissioners 1

Board of Public Works Commissioners 1

Quality and Productivity Commission 2

Commission on the Status of Women 1

Board of Transportation

Commissioners

1

Commission on Asian & Pacific

Islander American Affairs

2

# Korean officials 24 (4.6 %)

# Non-Korean officials 498

Total 522

Source The government website of the city of Los Angeles

accessed March 2012

There are no public Korean officials who hold multiple

positions in the enumeration

GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71 65

123

Koreatown on the other hand has developed its

enclave economy into both a commercial hub for the

spatially-dispersed Korean community as well as the

site for the vibrant Hollywood/downtown nightlife

industry through night clubs, upscale restaurants, and

trendy coffee shops and cafe. Within this context, the

strategic significance of Koreatown to the City’s plans

(and hence its dependency) becomes even more

apparent (Zhou et al. 2009; Park and Kim 2008).

‘‘Ethnobanks’’, defined by Dymski and his col-

leagues as ‘‘a bank whose business decisions are

controlled by members of one or more ethnic minority

groups, and whose market orientation involves serving

the specific needs of ethnic businesses and residents’’

(Dymski et al. 2010, p. 160), provide the financial base

for urban redevelopment. Studies show that ethno-

banks usually adopt loan strategies aimed at providing

financial resources for the development of the ethnic

enclave (Dymski et. al. 2010). Chinese and Koreans

show comparable levels of development in the bank-

ing sector. Korean American banks have experienced

remarkable growth (295 %) from 1999 to 2010,

including 154 branches whose headquarters are mostly

concentrated along a mile-long stretch of Wilshire

Boulevard in LA’s Koreatown (Table 6). As of 2010,

there are 336 Chinese American banks located in the

Los Angeles area. The headquarters of these banks

extend father east into the San Gabriel Valley, in line

with the residential patterns of Chinese (Table 7).

Ahn (2010) and Dymski et al. (2010) explain that these

different spatial patterns of ethnic banking development

are due to the distinct banking strategies and practices of

each population: Korean ethnic banks have a much higher

portion of business loans (87 %) as compared with real

estate loans (12 %), while Chinese banks’ portfolios

emphasize real estate loans (37 %). The close link

between banking strategies and residential development

also implies different political opportunities and chal-

lenges for these immigrant growth machines.

As a result of their stronger residential presence, the

Chinese immigrant growth machine has the electoral

power to work within the context of local municipal

Fig. 2 The spatial distribution of Chinese in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Source: U.S. Census Summary File (2010)

66 GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71

123

politics, especially around homeowner interests. This

increasingly powerful voting block in Monterey Park,

however, does not necessarily imply that the interests

of Chinese residents are homogeneous. In fact, the

labor force that feeds the Chinese enclave economy

includes a significant number of low-skilled co-ethnic

workers, which frequently may result in competing

economic and political interests (Zhou et al. 2009). In

contrast, the Koreatown growth machine may pursue

local (re)development projects with a strong

entrepreneurial bent and struggle for recognition as

an ethnic minority as a result of their weaker

residential presence. This specialized interest also

puts their interests in conflict with those of Korean and

Latino labor, trade unions, and both White and

minority residents.

Discussion and conclusion

Based on a demographic and institutional analysis of

two different globalizing ethnic enclaves, we suggest

that the way immigrant growth machines are incor-

porated into the municipal government and local

neighborhood structures shapes the way their

(re)development agenda plays out in city politics in

different ways. The findings indicate that each group

has different political resources, knowledge, and

connections within local power structures, which

may determine the strategies and alliances that each

will use to achieve its goals and structures. At the same

time, it is important to note that immigrant growth

machines also bring to the table different degrees of

socioeconomic influence, as determined by factors

such as type of entrepreneurial development, institu-

tional ties to foreign capital, and property ownership.

Table 3 Chinese public officials in Monterey Park

Position # Position occupied by

Chinese

Mayor 1

Mayor Pro Tem 1

Council Member 1

Council Member 1

Art and Culture Commission 7

Commission on Aging 2

Business Improvement District

Advisory Committee

5

Community Relations Commission 2

Design Review Board 2

Economic Development Advisory

Commission

1

Environmental Commission 4

Historical Heritage Commission 4

Library Board of Trustees 1

Modification Committee 2

Personnel Board 2

Planning Commission 2

Recreation and Parks Commission 1

Sister Cities Commission 6

Traffic Commission 1

Youth Advisory Board 5

Alhambra School District Board of

Education

2

Garvey School District Board of

Education

3

LA Unified School District Board of

Education

1

# Chinese officials 57 (32.7 %)

# Non-Chinese officials 117

Total 174

Source The government website of the city of Monterey Park

accessed March 2012

There are no public Chinese officials who hold multiple

positions in the enumeration

Table 4 Indicators of political representation (2010)

Koreans in

Koreatown

Chinese in Monterey

Park

Not a citizen 49.1 22.5

Naturalized 34.5 53.0

Self-employed 17.7 9.8

Bilingual 22.8 26.2

Mean years in the

US

12.8 14.5

Median HH

income

43,457 58,742

First generation 80.3 78.6

1.5 generation 17.8 20.4

2nd generation? 1.9 1.0

Source U.S. Census Bureau, The 2010 American Community

Survey (ACS)

In the ACS survey, the place of residence is reported for Public

Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). As a PUMA typically contains

approximately 100,000 persons, major metropolitan areas are

subdivided into many PUMAs. Koreatown is approximately

identified with PUMA codes 5412, 5414, and 5417, and

Monterey Park with 6112

GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71 67

123

In particular, the findings seem to suggest that these

case studies provide two ideal type contexts for

immigrant growth machines.

Based on this sociospatial analysis, we suggest

that the growth machine in Koreatown can be

classified as an auxiliary immigrant growth machine,

or an ethnic elite that exercises significant entrepre-

neurial and financial power but must work in

accommodation to the local governance of the City

of Los Angeles as a result of their marginal political

status within municipal power structures. On one

hand, Koreans have a weak electoral presence, lack

meaningful representation in public office, and

contend with a more racially diverse mix of interest

groups—all of which weakens their political influ-

ence within the large municipality of Los Angeles.

At the same time, they have established a strong

entrepreneurial presence boosted by institutional

concentration and access to foreign capital that

provides them with the financial engine they need

to promote their development projects, assuming

they can negotiate them with local public officials.

Although it took many years to establish, the

Chinese and Taiwanese on the other hand have

built both a strong residential and entrepreneurial

presence within Monterey Park, largely based on

their population size and related success in sending

coethnic political representatives to office. Such

political presence helps to strengthen their position

as an autonomous immigrant growth machine, or an

independent political entity that needs to negotiate

its development agenda only with factions within

their ethnic community with relatively fewer

struggles with outside racial interest groups and

public officials. At the time of Horton’s (1995)

well-known study on Monterey Park, the Chinese

had to deal with many tense encounters with

nativist and slow-growth white movements but

our preliminary research suggests that since then,

they have been able to raise strong residential

support for their growth agenda and increase their

representation in local politics. Although this is not

to claim that the Chinese do not have internal

conflicts and competing interests, they are posi-

tioned relatively better than Koreatown elites as an

ethnic constituency within the political opportunity

structures of this smaller municipality—a situation

which leads to different dynamics of conflict and

cooperation.

How these political dynamics play out for other

immigrant communities may vary depending on the

specific demographic and political features of the local

Table 5 Chinese and Korean economy in the Los Angeles metropolitan area

Chinese Korean

Population 469,537 304,198

# Business 77,649 39, 980

Sales ($) 38,110,634 23,604,962

# Business per 1,000 persons 165 131

Sales ($) per 1,000 persons 81,166 77,597

Source US Census Summary File 1 (2010); Economic Census

(2007)

Table 6 Korean American Banks in California

Source Adapted from Ahn

(2010, p. 659)

Banks Head quarter # Branches

in 1999

# Branches

in 2010

% Growth

in # branches

Pacific Union Bank Los Angeles 10 13 30

Wilshire State Bank Los Angeles 5 24 380

Hanmi Bank Los Angeles 10 28 180

Center Bank Los Angeles 4 23 475

California Chohung Bank Los Angeles 1 15 1,400

Nara Bank Los Angeles 6 24 300

Saehan Bank Los Angeles 2 11 450

Asiana Bank Sunnyvale 1 2 100

Uniti Bank Buena Park na 3 na

Mirae Bank Los Angeles na 4 na

Pacific City Bank Los Angeles na 7 na

Total 39 154 295

68 GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71

123

and regional governance but as more enclave econo-

mies expand economically, we predict elite immigrant

players to be intricately involved in the inner workings

of urban and suburban growth machines in select

areas. In particular, we expect immigrant growth

machines to be particularly prevalent among vertically

and horizontally-integrated ethnic enclave economies

with strong linkages to multinational corporations in

newly-industrialized countries in the Pacific Rim that

are eager to pursue new areas of investment abroad.

Some scholars (Lin 1998; Zhou and Kim 2003) have

indirectly alluded to such immigrant-directed growth

in other transnational enclave economies such as

Chinatown in New York, although further research

needs to be done in these cases. However, another

parallel case may be found in the Cuban enclave of

Miami, which has built a robust political economy

around its majority-minority Cuban population, its

many ties with multinational corporations and banking

services in Latin America, the vigorous political

activities of exile leaders, and growing representation

in the local government. The political visibility and

dominating presence of Cuban entrepreneurship in the

past few decades have helped to transform Miami

from a medium-sized tourist economy to a global trade

center for Latin American nations (Nijman 1997).

The sociospatial context of ethnic enclave econo-

mies as it affects the political and economic standing

Table 7 Chinese American Banks in California

Source Adapted from Ahn

(2010, p. 660)

Banks Head quarter # Branches in 1999 # Branches in

2010

% Growth in # branches

Universal Bank West Covina 7 na

Cathay Bank Los Angeles 10 53 430

Chinatrust Bank Torrance 7 15 114

East West Bank Los Angeles 20 137 585

International Bank of

California

Los Angeles 6 7 17

Far East National Bank Los Angeles 7 12 71

Guaranty Bank of California Los Angeles 3 6 100

Trust Bank, f.s.b. Monterey Park 3 na

First Global Bank Los Angeles na na

American Int’l Bank Los Angeles 8 na

Omni Bank Alhambra 4 5 25

General Bank Los Angeles 9 21 133

United Pacific Bank City of Industry 2 2 0

Los Angeles National Bank Buena Park 2 5 150

Golden Security Bank Alhambra 1 1 0

Grand National Bank Alhambra 2 13 550

United National Bank San Marino 6 11 83

Pacific Business Bank Santa Fe Springs 7 4 -43

Easters Int’l Bank Los Angeles 2 2 0

Standard Bank Monterey Park 6 na

First Central Bank Cerritos na na

Asian Pacific National Bank San Gabriel 2 2 0

First Continental Bank Rosemead 3 4 33

First United Bank San Diego 1 7 600

Preferred Bank Los Angeles 6 10 67

Evertrust Bank City of Industry 2 6 200

First Commercial Bank (USA) Alhambra 2 7 250

InterBusiness Bank Los Angeles na 6

Total 128 336 163

GeoJournal (2014) 79:59–71 69

123

of different ethnic groups raises a host of questions

about the strategic approach and future development

of immigrant growth machines. Among other things,

does the resulting disparity between economic power

and political influence mean that the collective

political sway of groups like the Koreatown elite is

more limited than that of Chinese elites in Monterey

Park? Does decision-making for Koreatown elites

depend more heavily on consensus and coalition-

building with the City of Los Angeles and other local

community leaders than it does for Chinese elites?

Does Monterey Park’s significance as both a home and

workplace for Chinese Americans lead to different

interests than Koreans in Koreatown whose residential

ties are weaker and unstable? Future studies should

also explore if auxiliary immigrant growth machines

with diminished electoral influence may seek more

flexible and informal institutional mechanisms (e.g.,

quasi-government and ad-hoc committees, commis-

sions, and special agencies or ethnic community-based

organizations) to navigate or bypass the bureaucratic

hurdles of formal local politics (e.g., mayor, council).

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