Political Philosophy
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NussbaumHumanCapabilitiesFemaleHumanBeings.pdf
17.M A
R T
H A
C .
N U
S S
B A
U M
N u
ssb au
m d efen
d s
a v ersio
n o f
th e
cap ab
ilities ap
p ro
ach to
ju stice.
T h is
ap p ro
ach h o ld
s th
at ju
stice is
cen trally
co n cern
ed w
ith m
ak in
g p
o ssib
le th
e realizatio
n o f
certain h u m
an fu
n ctio
n in
g s
o r
cap ab
iliiies. S
h e
d e rn
o n strates
how th
is ap
p ro
ach can
g u id
e d ev
elo p m
en t
p o
licy lo
en su
re th
at w
o m
en h
av e
eq u al
cap ab
ilities w
ith m
en .
k id
sh e
arg u
es th
at h er
v e r
sio n
o f
th e
cap ab
ilities ap
p ro
ach can
ad eq
u ately
an sw
er the
m o
st serio
u s
ch arg
es m
ad e
by relaliv
ists ag
ain st
eth ical
u n iv
ersalism .
H u m
a n
C a p
a b
ilitie s,
F e m
a le
H u m
a n
B e in
g s
F irstpublished
in W
o m
en ,
C u ltu
re and
D ev
elo p
m en
t: A
S tudy
o f
H u
m an
C apabilities,
ed. M
arth a
C .N
ussbaum an
d Jo
n ath
an (3/over
(O xford:
O xford
U niversity
Press, 1995),
61— 104.
H u
m an
beings are
n o t
by nature
kings, or
nobles, or
courtiers, or
rich.A ll
are b
o rn
naked and
poor.A ll
are subject
to the
m iseries
o f
life, to
fru stratio
n s,
to ills,to
needs, to
pains o
f every
kind. F
inally all
are co
n d
em n
ed to
d eath
. T
h at
is w
h at
is really
the h u m
an b
ein g
; th
at is
w h at
no m
o rtal
can avoid.
B egin,
th en
, by
stu d
y in
g w
h at
is the
m ost
inseparable from
h u
m an
nature, th
at w
hich m
ost co
n stitu
tes hum
anness.
— Jean-Jacques
R ousseau,
E m
ile, B
ook IV
W om
en, a
m ajority
o f
the w
orld’s population,
receive only
a sm
all share
o f
d ev
elo p
m en
tal o p p o rtu
n ities.
T hey
are o
ften excluded
from education
or from
the b
etter jobs,
from political
system s
or from
adequate health
care. . . .
In the
countries for
w hich
relevant
II
L v 1 n -L
’--I- 1
1 _
ri- ‘ _ f lJ
O U
f lU
iV I
- ‘ 1
t
data are
available, the
fem ale
hum an
developm ent
index is
only 60
percent that
of m
ales.
— H
um an
D evelopm
ent R
eport, 1993, U
n lied
N ations
D evelop
m ent
P rogram
m e
W ere
our state
a pure
dem ocracy
there w
ould still
be excluded
from our
deliberations w
om en,
w ho,
to prevent
depravation of
m orals
and am
biguity of
issue,should not
m ix
prom iscuously
in gatherings
of m
en.
— T
hom asJefferson
B eing
a w
om an
is not
yet a
w ay
ofbeing a
hum an
being.
— C
atIjarine M
acK innon
1. F
E M
IN IS
M A
N D
C O
M M
O N
H U
M A
N IT
Y
B egin
w ith
the hum
an being:w
ith the
capacities and
needs th
atjoin all
hum ans,
across barriers
ofgender and
class and
race and
nation.’ T
o a
person concerned
w ith
the equality
and dignity
o f
w om
en, this
advice should
appear in
one w
ay prom
ising.F or
it instructs
us to
focus on
w hat
allhum an
beings share
rather than
on the
privileges and
achievem ents
of a
dom inant
group, and
on needs
and basic
fisnctions rather
than on
pow er
or status.W
om en
have rarely
been kings,
or nobles,
or courtiers,
or rich.
T hey
have, on
the other
hand, frequently
been poor
and sick
and dead. B
ut this
starting point
w ill
be regarded
w ith
skepticism by
m any
co n tem
p o rary
fem inists.
F or
it is
all too
obvious th
at th
ro u
g h
o u
t the
history o f
political th
o u g h t,
b o th
W estern
and n
o n
-W estern
, such
allegedly unbiased
general concepts
have served
in various
w ays
to bolster
m ale
privilege and
to m
arginalize w
om en. H
u m
an beings
are not
born kings,ornobles, or
courtiers.T hey
are,orso it seem
s, 2
born m
ale and
fem ale.T
he nakedness
on w
hich R
ousseau places
such em
phasis reveals
a difference
th at
is tak
en by
R ousseau
h im
self to
im p ly
p ro
fo u n d
differences in
capability and
social role.
H is
rem arks
about hum
an nature
are the
prelude to
his account
of E
m ile’s
education. S
ophie, E
m ile’s
fem ale
com panion,w
ill be
said to
have a
different “nature”
and a
different education. W
hether, as
here,w om
en are
held to
be bearers
of
a different”nature”from
unm arked
“hum an
nature,”or w
h eth
er they
are sim
ply said
to be
degenerate and
substandard exem
plars o f
the sam
e “nature,”
th e
result is
usually the
sam e:
aju d
g m
en t
o ffem
ale inferiority,
w h ich
can th
en b
e u
sed to
ju stify
an d
stab ilize
o p
p ressio
n .
3 I
sh all
arg u
e n o n eth
eless th
a t
w e
sh o u ld
in fact
b eg
in w
ith a
c o n
ception o
f the
hum an
being and
hum an
functioning in
thinking about
w om
en’s equality
in developing
countries.T his
notion can
be abused.
It can
be developed
in a
gender-biased w
ay It
can be
unjustly and
prejudicially applied.
It can
be developed
in w
ays that
neglect relevant
differences am
ong w
om en
ofdifferent nationalities,classes,and
races.B ut
I shall
argue that,articulated
in a
certain w
ay (and
I shall
be em
phatically distinguishing
m y
approach from
others th
at use
an idea
of “hum
an nature”)
it is
our best
starting point
for reflection.
It is
our best
route to
stating correctly
w hat
is w
rong w
ith the
situations th
at confronted
S aleha
B egum
and M
eth a
B ai, 4
the bestbasis
for claim
s ofjustice
on their
behalf;and on
behalfof the
huge num
bers o f w
om en
in the
w orld
w ho
are currently
being deprived
o f
their fill
“hum an
developm ent.”
I note
that the
concept ofthe
hum an
being has
akeady been
central to
m uch
ofthe best
fem inist
and internationalist
thinking.C onsider,for
exam ple,J.S. M
ill’s rem
arks on
“hum an
im provem
ent” in
7he S
ubjection o
f W
om en;
A niartya
Sen’s use
ofa notion
of “hum an
capability” to
confront gender-based
inequalities; the
S en-inspired
use of
a notion
of “hum
an developm
ent” in
the T
IN R
eport to
describe and
criticize gender—
based inequalities;
Susan ivloller
O kin’s
proposal for
a “hum
anistjustice”in her
recent m
ajor w
ork o ffem
inist politicaltheory;
C atharine
M acK
innon’s graphic
description ofw
om en’s
currentsituation,quoted as
m y
epigraph; and,o
fcourse, the role
th at
various accounts
of”hum an
rights,” or
even “T
he R
ights of M
an,” have
played in
claim ing
justice forw
o m
en .
5 M
uch the
sam e
can be
said m
ore generally,
I think,
about internationalist
th o u g h t.
6 T
o cite
just one
exam ple,I
take m
y proposal
to be
the fem
inist analogue
ofthe proposalrecently
m ade
by G
hanaian philosopher
K w
am e
A nthony
A ppiah
w hen
he w
rote,“W e
w ill
only solve
our problem
s ifw
e see
them as
hum an
problem s
arising out
of a
special situation,
and w
e shall
notsolve them
ifw e
see them
as A
frican problem
s,generated by
our being
som ehow
unlike others.” 1
]V Iy
proposal is
frankly universalist
and “essentialist.”
T hat
is, it
asks us
to focus
on w
hat is
com m
on to
all rather
than on
differences (although,
as w
e shall
see, it
does not
neglect these),
and to
see som
e capabilities
and fi.inctions
as m
ore central,
m ore
at the
core of
hum an
I 498
O L
Q B
A L
JV ST
JC E
: SE
M iN
A L
ESSA Y
S M
A R
IH A
C .N
U SbdA
U M
•4
life,than others.Its
prim ary
opponents on
the contem
porary scene
w ill
be “anti-essentialists”
of various
types, thinkers
w ho
urge us
to begin
not w
ith sam
eness but
w ith
difference— both
betw een
w om
en and
m en
and across
groups ofw
om en—
.and to
seek norm
s defined
relatively to
a local
context and
locally held
beliefs. 8
‘This opposition
takes m
any form
s, and
I shall
be responding
to several
distinct objections
that opponents
m ay
bring against
m y
universalist proposal.
B ut
I can
begin to
m otivate
m y
enterprise by
telling several
true stories
of conversations
that have
taken place
atV ID
E R
,in w
hich the
relativistp o
sitio n
9 seem
ed to
have alarm
ing im
plications for
w om
en’s lives.
I have
in som
e cases
conflated tw
o separate
conversations into
one; otherw
ise things
happened as
I describe
them .’°
1.A t
a conference
on “V
alue and
T e c h n o lo
g 3” a n
A m
erican eco
n o
m ist w
ho has
long been
a left-w
ing critic
ofneoclassicaleconom ics
delivers a
paper urging
the preservation
o f
traditional w
ays oflife
in a
rural area
ofIndia,now under
threatofcontam ination
from W
estern developm
ent projects.A
s evidence
ofthe excellence
o f
this ruralw
ay oflife, he
points to
the fact
that, w hereas
w e
W esterners
experience a
sharp split
betw een
the values
th at
prevail in
the w
orkplace and
the values
th at
prevail in
the hom
e, here,
by contrast,
there exists
w hat
the econom
ist calls
“the em
bedded w
ay o
f life”;
the sam
e values
obtaining in
both places.
H is
exam ple:Just
as in
the hom
e a
m enstruating
w om
an is
th o u g h t
to p o l
lute the
kitchen and
therefore m
ay not
enter it, so
too in
the w
orkplace a
m enstruating
w om
an is
taken to
pollute the
loom and
m ay
not enter
the room
w here
loom s
are kept.A
m artya
Sen objects
th at
this exam
ple is
repellent, rather
than adm
irable: S
urely such
practices both
degrade the
w om
en in
question and
inhibit their
freedom .T
he first
econom ist’s
collaborator, an
elegant F
rench anthropologist
(w ho
w ould,
I suspect,
object violently
to a
purity check
at the
sem inar
room door),
replies to
S en.D
oesn’the realize
that there
is,in these
m atters,no
privileged place
to stand?
T his, after
all,has been
show n
by both
D errida
and F
oucault. D
oesn’t he
know th
at he
is neglecting
the otherness
ofIndian ideas
by bringing
his ‘W
estern essentialist
values into
the picture?’
2. T
he sam
e F
rench anthropologist
now delivers
her paper.
She expresses
regret that
the introduction
o f
sm allpox
vaccination to
India by
the B
ritish eradicated
the cult
of S
ittala D
evi, the
goddess to
w hom
one used
to pray
in order
to avert
sm allpox.
H ere,
she says,
is another
exam ple
o fW
estern neglectofdifference.S
om eone
(it m
ighthave been
m e)
objects that
itis surely
better to
be healthy
ratherthan ill,to
live rather
than to
die.’T he
answ er
com es
back: W estern
essentialist m
edicine c o n
ceives o
f things in
term s
ofbinary oppositions:
life is
opposed to
death,
health to
disease.’ 1
B ut
if w e
cast aw
ay this
binary w
ay o f
thinking,w e
w ill
begin to
com prehend
the otherness
of Indian
traditions.
A t
this point
E ric
H obsbaw
m ,
w ho
has been
listening to
the p ro
ceedings in
increasingly uneasy
silence, rises
to deliver
a blistering
indictm ent
o f the
traditionalism and
relativism that
prevailin this
group.
H e
lists historical
exam ples
o f
w ays
in w
hich appeals
to tradition
have
been used
to support
oppression and
v io
len ce.
1 3
H is
final exam
ple is
that
of N ational
Socialism in
G erm
any. In
the confusion
that ensues,
m ost
o f
the relativist
social scientists—
above all
those from
far aw
ay, w ho
do not
know w
ho H
obsbaw m
is— dem
and th
at he
be asked
to leave
the room
.
‘The radical
A m
erican econom
ist, disconcerted by
this apparent
tension
betw een
his relativism
and his
affiliation w
ith the
left, convinces them
,
w ith
difficulty,to let
H obsbaw
m rem
ain. 3.W
e shift
now to
another conference
tw o
years later,a
p h ilo
so p h i
cal conference organized
by A
m artya
Sen and
m e.’ 4
Sen m
akes it clearthat
he holds
the perhaps
unsophisticated view
that life
is opposed
to death
in a
very binary
w ay
and th
at such
binary oppositions
can and
should
be used
in developm
ent analysis.
H is
p ap
er’ 5
contains m
uch universalist
talk of hum
an functioning
and capability;
he begins
to speak
of freedom
ofchoice as
a basic
hum an
good.A t
this point
he is
interrupted by
the
radical econom
ist o fm
y first story, w
ho insists
that contem porary
an th
ro
pology has
show n
th at
non-W estern
people are
not especially
attached
to freedom
o f
choice. H
is exam
ple: A
new book
on Japan
has show
n
that Japanese
m ales,
w hen
they get
hom e
from w
ork, do
not w
ish to
choose w
hat to
eat for
dinner, w
hat to
w ear,
and so
on. T
hey w
ish all
these choices
to be
taken out
o f
their hands
by their
w ives.
A heated
exchange follow
s about
w hat
this exam
ple really
show s. I
leave it to
your
im aginations
to reconstruct
it. In
the end,
the confidence
of the
radical
econom ist
is unshaken:
Sen and
I are
both victim
s of
bad universalist
thinking, w ho
fail to
respect “difference.” 1 6
H ere
w e
see the
relativist position w
hose influence
in developm
ent
studies m
otivated the
w ork
that has
led to
the presentvolum
e [W
om en,
C u/litre
an d
D eve/opnzentl
. T he
phenom enon
is an
odd one.
F or
w e
see
here highly
intelligent people,
people deeply
com m
itted to
the good
of
w om
en and
m en
in developing
countries, people
w ho
th in
k of
th e m
selves as
progressive and
fem inist
and antiracist,
people w
ho correctly
argue that
the concept
ofdevelopm ent
is an
evaluative concept requiring
I 500
G L
O B
A L
JU S
T IC
E :
S E
M IN
A L
E SSA
Y S
s ,rn
a L
1a .
norm ative
a r g u m
e n t
1 7
— e f f e c tiv
e ly
eschew ing
norm ative
argum ent
and
taking up
positions that
converge, as
H obsbaw
m correctly
saw ,
w ith
the positions
of reaction,
oppression, and
sexism .
U nder
the banner
of
their fashionable
opposition to
“essentialism ”
m arch
ancient religious
taboos, the
luxury of
the pam
pered husband,
educational deprivation,
unequal health
care,and prem
ature death. (A
nd in
m y
ow n
universalist
A ristotelian
w ay, I
say it
at the
outset, I
do hold
that death
is opposed
to life
in the
m ost
binary w
ay im
aginable, and
freedom to
slavery, and
hunger to
adequate nutrition,
and ignorance
to know
ledge. N
or do
I
believe that
it is
only, or
even prim
arily, in
W estern
thinking that
such
oppositions are, and
should be, im
portant.) T
he relativist
challenge to
a universal
notion o
f the
hum an
being
and hum
an functioning
is not
alw ays
accom panied
by clear
and explicit
philosophical argum
ents. T
his is
especially true
in the
m aterial
from
developm ent
studies to
w hich
I have
referred, w
here the
philosophical debate
concerning relativism
in ethics
and in
science is
not confronted,
and universalism
is sim
ply denounced
as the
legacy ofV
V estern
c o n
ceptions o f “epistem
e’ 8
th at
are alleged
to be
in league
w ith
im perialism
and o p p ressio
n )
9 T
he idea
behind this
volum e
[W om
en, C
ulture and
D evelopm
ent] as
a w
hole w
as that
to sort
out various
strands in
the
philosophical debate
on these
questions w
ould be
ofthe first im
portance
in m
aking further
progress on
w om
en’s issues;
and the
papers by
A lcott
[“D em
ocracy and
R ationality:
A D
ialogue w
ith H
ilary P
utnam ,”
pp. 225—
34], B enhabib
[“C ultural
C om
plexity,M oral
Interdependence,and the
G lobal
D ialogical C
om m
unity,”pp.235— 58], G
lover [“T
he R
esearch
P rogram
m e
of D
evelopm ent
E thics,”
pp. 116—
39], and H
ilary P
utnam
[“P ragm
atism and
M oral
O bjectivity,”
pp. 199—
224] carry
out various
aspects of
this antirelativist
project. H
ere, then,
I shall
sim ply
set out
rath er
schem atically
and briefly,for
the purposes
o f
m y
ow n
argum ent,
several objections
to the
use ofa
universal notion
of hum an
functioning
in developm
ent analysis
to w
hich I
shall later
respond.
2.T H
E A
S S
A U
L T
O N
U N
IV E
R S
A L
IS M
M any
critics ofuniversalism
in ethics
are really
critics o
f m
etaphysical
realism w
ho assum
e th
at realism
is a
necessary basis
for universalism
.
I shall
argue that this
assum ption
is false.B
y m
etaphysical realism I
m ean
the view
(com m
only held
in both
W estern
and non-W
estern p h ilo
so p h i
cal traditions)
th at
there is
som e
determ inate
w ay
the w
orld is,
apart
from the
interpretive w
orkings of the
cognitive faculties
ofliving beings.
F ar
from requiring
technical m
etaphysics for
its articulation,
this is
a very
natural w ay
to view
things, and is
in facta
very com
m on
daily-life view
, in
both W
estern and
non-W estern
traditions.W e
did not m
ake the
stars, the
earth, the trees:T
hey are
w hat
they are
there outside
of us, w aiting
to be
know n.A
nd our
activities o f
know ing
do not
change w
hat they
are.
O n
such a
view ,the
w ay
the hum
an being
essentially and
universally
is w
ill be
part o f
the in
d ep
en d
en t
furniture of
the universe,
som ething
that can
in principle
be seen
and studied
independently of
any ex
p eri
ence o
f hum
an life
and hum
an history. F
requently it
is held
th at
a god
or gods
have this
sort o f
know ledge,
and perhaps
som e
w ise
hum ans
also.T his
know ledge
is usually
understood to
have norm
ative force.T
he
heavenly account
o f
w ho
w e
are constrains
w hat
w e
m ay
legitim ately
seek to
b e .
2° It
is this
conception o f
inquiry into
the nature
of the
hum an
th at
the M
arglins are
attacking in
their critique
ofw h
at they
call W estern
episteine.T hey
clearly believe
it to
be a
necessary prop
to
any ethical
universalism .
T he
com m
on objection
to this
sortof realism is
that such extra-histori
cal and
extra-experiential m
etaphysical truths
are n
o t
in fact
available.
S om
etim es
this is
p u
t skeptically:T he
independent structure m
ay still be
there, but w e
cannot reliably grasp
it. Pvlore often, today, doubtis
cast on
the coherence
o fthe
w hole
realist idea that there
is som
e one
determ inate
structure to
the w
ay things
are, independent ofallhum
an interpretation.
T his
is the
objection that nonphiosophers
tend to
associate w
ithJacques
D errida’s
assaulton the
“m etaphysics
ofp resen
ce,” 2’
w hich
he takes
to have
dom inated
the entirety
of the W
estern philosophical
tradition, and w
ith
R ichard
R orty’s
closely related
assaulton the
idea that the
know ing
m ind
is,
at its best,a
“m irror
of n atu
re.” 2 2
B ut
it actually
has a
far longer
and m
ore
com plicated
history, even
w ithin
W estern
philosophy, beginning at
least
as early
as K
ant’s assault
on transcendent
m etaphysics,
and perhaps
far
earlier, in som
e ofA
ristotle’s criticism
s ofP
latonism Y
A sim
ilar debate w
as
long fam
iliar in
classical Indian
philosophy, and no
doubt it has
figured
in other
philosophical traditions
as w e ll.
2 4
C ontem
porary argum
ents about
realism are
m any
and com
plex, involving, frequently, technical issues in
the
philosophy of
science and
the philosophy
of language.
T he
debate about
realism appears
to be
far from
over.T he
central
issues continue
to be
debated w
ith vigor
and subtlety, and
a w
ide range
ofview s
is currently
on the
table.O n
the other
hand,the attack
on real
ism has
been sufficiently
deep and
sufficiently sustained
that it
w ould
I ‘Z
lb J 1
a flJ
U 3
O 4
flA IN
tU L
O IiX
M A
R T
H A
C .
N U
S S
B A
U M
• 503
appear strategically
w ise
for an
ethical and
political view
th at
seeks broad
support not
to rely
on the
tru th
o fm
etaphysical realism
,if it
can defend
itself in
som e
other w
ay. If,
then, all
universalist and
hum anist
conceptions in
ethics are
required to
regard the
universal conception
of the
hum an
being as
part of
the independent
furniture of
the w
orld, unm
ediated by
hum an
self-interpretation and
hum an
history, such
conceptions do
appear to
be in
som e
difficulty, and
there m
ay w
ell be
good reasons
to try
to do
w ithout
them .
B ut
universalism does
not require
such su
p p o rt.
2 5
F or
universal ideas
o f
the hum
an do
arise w
ithin history
and from
hum an
ex p eri
ence, and
they can
ground them
selves in
experience. Indeed,
if, as the
critics of
realism allege,w
e are
alw ays
dealing w
ith our
ow n
in terp
re tations
anyhow ,
they m
ust acknow
ledge th
at universal
conceptions of
the hum
an are
p ro
m in
en t
and pervasive
am ong
such interpretations,
hardly to
be relegated
to the
dustbin o
f m
etaphysical history
along w
ith rare
and recondite
philosophical entities
such as
the P
latonic form
s. A s
A ristotle
so sim
ply puts
it,“O ne
m ay
observe in
one’s trav
els to
distant countries
the feelings
o f
recognition and
affiliation that
link every
hum an
being to
every other
hum an
b e in
g .”
2 6
O r,
as K
w am
e A
n th
o n
y A
ppiah eloquently
tells the
story o
f his
bicultural childhood,
a child
w ho
visits one
set of
grandparents in
G h an
a and
another in
rural E
ngland, w
ho has
a L
ebanese uncle
and w
ho later,
as an
adult, has
nieces and
nephew s
from m
ore than
seven different
nations, com es
to notice
not unbridgeable
alien “otherness,”
but a
great deal
ofhum an
com m
onality, and
com es
to see
the w
orld as
a “netw
ork o
f points
of affin
ity .”
2 7
P ursuing
those affinities,one
m ay
accept the
conclusions of
the critics
o f
realism w
hile still
believing th
at a
universal conception
o f
the hum
an being
is both
available to
ethics and
a valuable
starting point.
I shall
be proposing
a version
o f
such an
account, attem
p tin
g to
identil5’ a
group o
f especially
central and
basic hum
an functions
that ground
these affinities.
B ut
such an
experiential and
historical u n iv
ersalism 2 5
is stillv
u ln
er able
to som
e, if
not all,
o f
the objections
standardly brought
against universalism
. I
therefore need
to introduce
those objections,
and later
to test
m y
account against
them .
T he
opposition charges
th at
any attem
p t
to pick
o u
t som
e elem
ents o
f hum
an life
as m
ore fu
n d
am en
tal th
an others,
even w
ith o
u t
appeal to
a tran
sh isto
rical reality,
is bound
to be
insufficiently respectful
of actual
historical and
cultural differences.
P eople,
it is
claim ed,
u n d erstan
d h
u m
an life
and hum
anness in
w idely
different w
ays: and
any attem
p t
to produce
a list
o f
the m
ost fu
n d
am en
tal properties
and functions
o f
h u
m an
beings is
bound to
enshrine certain
u n
d e r
standings o
f the
h u
m an
and to
dem ote
others. U
sually, the
objector continues,
this takes
the form
o f
en sh
rin in
g the
u n
d erstan
d in
g o f
a d o m
in an
t group
at the
expense of m
inority understandings.T
his type
of objection
is frequently
m ade
by fem
inists and
can claim
su p
p o
rt from
m any
historical exam
ples, in w
hich the
hum an
has indeed
been defined
by focusing
on the
characteristics o f
m ales,
as m
anifested in
the definer’s
culture. It
is far
from clear
w hat
this objection
show s.In
particular it
is far
from clear
th at
it supports
the idea
th at
w e
ought to
base our
ethical norm
s, instead,
on the
current preferences
and the
self— conceptions
o f
people w
ho are
living w
hat the
objector herself
claim s
to be
lives of
deprivation and
o p p ressio
n .
2 9
B ut
it does
show at
least th
at the
project of choosing
one picture
of the
hum an
over another
is fraught
w ith
d if
fic u lt
political as
w ell
as philosophical.
2 .2
. N
E G
L E
C T
O F
A u
T o
N o
J ’w
A d ifferen
t objection
is p
resen ted
by liberal
o p
p o
n en
ts o f
univer— salism
; m
y relativist
o p p o n en
ts, the
M arg
lin s,
endorse it
as w
ell. (M
any such
o b
jecto rs,
th o
u g
h n o t,
I believe,
the M
arg lin
s, are
them selves
w illin
g to
give a
universal acco
u n
t o f
the h
u m
an in
at least
som e
w ays,
h o ld
in g
freed o
m o f
choice to
be everyw
here o
f cen
tral im
p o
rtan ce.)
T h
e objection
is th
at by
d eterm
in in
g in
advance w
h at
elem en
ts o f
hum an
life have
m ost
im p o rtan
ce, the
universalist project
fails to
respect the
rig h t
o f
people to
choose a
plan o
f life
according to
th eir
ow n
lights, d eterm
in in
g w
h at
is central
and w
h at
is n
o t.
3 0
T h
is w
ay o f
p ro
ceed in
g is
“im perialistic.”
S uch
evaluative choices
m ust
be left
to each
citizen. F
or this
reason, politics
m u st
refuse itself
a d eterm
in ate
th eo
ry o f
the h
u m
an being
and the
h u m
an good.
2 .1
. N
E G
L E
C T
O F
H IS
T O
R IC
A L
A N
D C
U L
T U
R A
L D
IF F
E R
E N
C E
S
2 .3
. P
Iw jlJm
cIM .i.A
P P
L IC
A T
IO N
5U 4
(JL O
B A
L JIJS
T JC
E :
S E
M IN
A L
E S
S A
Y S
IV LEt$.1
tilt L...
IN L
O aD
nU a,A
.IU J
Ifw e
operate w
ith a
determ inate
conception ofthe
hum an
being thatis
m eant
to have
som e
norm ative
m oral
and politicalforce,w
e m
ust also,
in applying
it, ask w
hich beings
w e
shall take
to fall under
the concept.
A nd
here the
objector notes
that,all too
easily— even
ifthe conception
itself is
equitably and
com prehensively
designed— the
pow erless
can be
excluded.A ristotle
him self;
it is
pointed out,
held that
w om
en and
slaves w
ere not
hill-fledged hum
an beings;
and since
his politics
w ere
based on
his view
o fhum
an functioning,the
failure o
fthese beings
(in his
view )
to exhibitthe
desired m
ode o
ffunctioning contributed
to their
political exclusion
and oppression.
It is,
once again,
hard to
know w
hat this
objection is
supposed to
show .
In particular,
it is
hard to
know how
, if
at all,
it is
supposed to
show that
w e
w ould
be better
off w
ithout such
determ inate
universal concepts.F
or it
could be
plausibly argued
that itw
ould have
been even
easier to
exclude w
om en
and slaves
on a
w him
ifone did
not have
such a
concept to
contend w
ith.Indeed,this is
w hat
I shall
be arg
u in
g .
3 1
O n
the other
hand, it
does show
that w
e need
to think
not only
about g e t
ting the
concept right
but also
about getting
the right
beings adm
itted under
the concept.
E ach
o f these
objections has
som e
m erit.M
any universal
co n cep
tions o f
the hum
an being
have been
insular in
an arrogant
w ay,
and neglectful
o fdifferences
am ong
cultures and
w ays
oflife.Som e
have been
neglectful o f
choice and
autonom y.
A nd
m any
have been
prejudicially applied.
B ut
none o
f this
show s
that all
such conceptions
m ust
fall in
one or
m ore
ofthese w
ays.B ut
atthis point
I need
to advance
a definite
exam ple
o f such
a conception,in
order both
to display
its m
erits and
to argue
that it
can in
fact answ
er these
charges.
3.A C
O N
C E
P T
IO N
O F
T H
E H
U M
A N
B E
IN G
: T
H E
C E
N T
R A
L H
U M
A J’J
C A
P A
B IL
IT IE
S
H ere,
then, is
a sketch
for an
account o
f the
m ost
im portant
functions and
capabilities o
f the
hum an
being, in
term s
o fw
hich hum
an life
is defined.T
he basic
idea is
that w
e ask
ourselves,“W hat
are the
ch arac
teristic activ
ities 3 2
of the hum
an being?
W h
at does
the hum
an being
do, characteristically,as
such— m
d not,say, as
a m
em ber
ofa particular
group, or
a particular
local com
m unity?”
T o
put it
another w
ay, w
hat are
the form
s o factivity,ofdoing
and being,that
constitute the
hum an
form of
life and
distinguish it
from other
actual or
im aginable
form s
oflife, such
as the
lives ofanim
als and
plants, or,on the
other hand, of im
m ortal gods
as im
agined in
m yths
and legends
(w hich
frequently have
precisely the
function of
delim iting
the h u m
an )?
3 3
W e
can get
at this
question better
if w e
approach itvia
tw o
so m
e
w hat
m ore
concrete questions
that w
e often
really ask
ourselves. First
is a
question about
personal continuity
W e
ask ourselves
w hat
changes
or transitions
are com
patible w
ith the
continued existence
o fthat
being
as a
m em
ber of
the hum
an kind,
and w
hat are
not. (S
ince continued
species identity
seem s
to be
at least
necessary for
continued personal
identity, this is
also a
question about
the necessary
conditions for
c o n
tinuing as
one and
the sam
e individual.)
S om
e functions
can fail
to be
present w ithout
threatening our
sense that w
e still
have a
hum an
being
on our
hands; the
absence of
others seem
s to
signal the
end of
a hum
an
life.T his
question is
asked regularly,w
hen w
e attem
pt to
m ake
m edical
definitions of
death in
a situation
in w
hich som
e o f
the functions
of
life persist,
or to
decide, for
others or
(thinking ahead)
for ourselves,
w hether
a certain
level of illness or
im pairm
ent m
eans the
end o f the
life
of the
being in
question?’ T
he other
question is
a question
about kind
inclusion. W e
recognize
other hum
ans as
hum an
across m
any differences
of tim
e and
place, o f
custom and
appearance. K
w am
e A
nthony A
ppiah w
rites about
the
experience o f
seeing his
heterogeneous nieces
and nephew
s playing
together, and the
term “the
hum an
fiiture”nanirally occurs
to h
im .
3 5
IV Iuch
though w
e m
ay love
our dogs and
cats,w e
recognize such
scenes as
crucially
different from scenes
ofa child
playing w
ith a
dog or
cat. O n
w hat do
w e
base these
recognitions? ‘N
e often
tell ourselves stories,on
the other hand,
aboutanthropom orphic
creatures w
ho do
notget classified as
hum an,on
account of
som e
feature of
their form
of life
and functioning.
O n
w hat
do w
e base
these exclusions?
In short, w
hat do w
e believe
m ustbe
there,if
w e
are going
to acknow
ledge that
a given
life is
hum an?3 6
T his
inquiry proceeds
by exam
ining a
w ide
variety ofself-interpreta
tions o
fhum an
beings in
m any
tim es
and places.
E specially
valuable are
m yths
and stories
that situate
the hum
an being
in som
e w
ay in
the
universe, betw
een the
“beasts” on
the one
hand and
the “gods”
on the
other; stories
that ask
w hat
it is
to live
as a
being w
ith certain
abilities
that set
it apart
from the
rest of
the w
orld of
nature and
w ith,
on the
other hand,
certain lim
its that
derive from
m em
bership in
the w
orld of
nature.T he
idea is
that people
in m
an)’ different
societies share
a general
5 0 6
G L
O B
A L
JtJS T
IC E
: S
E M
IN A
L E
S S
A Y
S LW
JU %
L F
lit b.n
L N
JII3 1 3 flU
fl •
JU l
outline o fsuch
a conception.T
his is
notsurprising,since they
do recognize
one another
as m
em bers
of the
sam e
sp ecies,
3 7
m arry
one another,
have children
together, and
so forth—
and indeed
do tell
one another
such stories,
w ithout
m uch
difficulty o
f translation.T
his convergence
gives us
som e
reason for
optim ism
, th
at ifw
e proceed
in this
w ay,using
our im
aginations, w
e w
ill have
in the
end a
theory th
at is
not the
m ere
projection oflocal
preferences,b u t
is fully
international and
a basis
for cross-cultural
attunem ent.
Several im
portant m
ethodological points
m ust
now be
em phasized:
1. T
he procedure
th ro
u g h
w hich
this account
o f
the hum
an is
derived is
neither ahistorical
nor a
priori.It is
an attem
ptto set
dow n
a very
generalrecord o
fbroadly shared
experiences of
hum an
beings w
ithin history.
A related
point can
be m
ade about
the results
o f
the inquiry:
they do
not claim
to be
ahistorical or
a priori
tru th
, but,
rather, an
especially deep
and continuous
sort o
f experiential
and historical
truth.
2. O
n the
o th
er h an
d ,
the g u id
in g
q u estio
n s
o f
the inquiry
direct it
to cross
national and
tem poralb
o u n d
aries, looking
for features
th at
ground recognitions
o f
hum anness
across these
boundaries. T
hus w
e can
expect th
at its
results w
ill em
body w
hat is
continuous rather
than rapidly
changing,internationalrather than
local.
3. T
he account
is neither
a biological
account nor
a m
eta physicalaccount.(F
orthese reasons
I have
avoided using
the term
“hum an
nature,” w
hich is
usually associated
w ith
attem pts
to describe
the hum
an being
either from
the point
ofview o
f an
allegedly value-free
science or
from the
point o
fview o
fnorm ative,often
theological, m
etaphysics.) T
he inquiry
pays attention
to b io
lo g
but as
it figures
in and
shapes hum
an experience.
It is
an evaluative
and,in a
broad sense,
ethical inquiry.It
asks us
to evaluate
com ponents
o f
lives, asking
w hich
ones are
so im
portant th
at w
e w
ould not
call a
life hum
an w
ithoutthem .T
he resultofthis
inquiry is,then,nota
list ofvalue-neutral
facts,but a
norm ative
co n cep
tio n .
3 8
4. T
he account
is m
eant to
be both
tentative and
open- ended.
W e
allow explicitly
for the
possibility th
at w
e w
ill learn
from our
encounters w
ith o
th er
hum an
societies to
recognize things
about ourselves
th at
w e
had not
seen before,or
even to
change in
certain w
ays, according
m ore
im p
o rtan
ce to
so m
eth in
g w
e had
th o
u g
h t
m ore
peripheral. (W
e m
ay also
shift to
reach a
political consensus.)
5. ‘The
account is
not intended
to deny
th at
the item
s it
enum erates
are to
som e
extent differently
constructed by
different societies. It
claim s
only th
at in
these areas
there is
considerable continuity
and overlap, sufficient
to ground
a w
orking political
co n sen
su s.
3 9
6. A
lthough the
account appeals
to consensus
in this
w ay,
it should be
understood th
atthe consensus
is acceptable
only if
it is
reached by
reasonable procedures, w
here the
notion of reasonableness
has norm
ative co
n ten
t. 4°
In this
w ay
it is
different from
consensus as
m ere
o v
erlap .
4 1
7. T
he listis
heterogeneous: for it contains
both lim
its against
w hich
w e
press and
capabilities through
w hich
w e
aspire. ‘This
is not
surprising, since w
e began
from the
intuitive idea
ofa creature
w ho
is both
capable and
needy.
8. T
he concept “hum
an being,”
as this
view understands
it,
is in
one w
ay like
the concept “person”
as used
elsew here
in m
oral philosophy:
th at
is, it
is a
norm ative
ethical concept.
O n
the other
hand, because
o f
its link
w ith
an em
pirical study
o f
a species-specific
form of
life, and
w ith
w hat
is m
ost central
in such
a form
of life,
it m
ay prove
m ore
difficult to
w ithhold
from certain
beings in
an arbitrary
w ay
(see S
ection 7
below ).T
his m
ay com
m end
it to
fem inists:
for the
label “person”
has frequently
been w
ithheld from
w om
en, w
ithout substantial
arg u m
en t.
4 2
H ere
then, as
a first
approxim ation, is
a story
about w
hat seem
s to
be part
o f
any life
w e
w ill
count as
a hum
an life:
L ’.JaJn
I M
A I{
1 i-IA
C .
£ N
U b b A
U M
• S
U 9
3.1. L
E V
E L
O N
E O
F T
H E
C O
N c E
P T
IO N
O F
T H
E H
u iw
c B
E IN
G :
T H
E S
H A
P E
O F
T H
E H
uisw c
Foiuw O
F L
IF E
3 .1
.1 . M
o rta
lity
A ll
hum an
beings face
death and,
after a
certain age,
know that
they face
it.’T his
fact shapes
m ore
or less
every other
elem ent
o f
hum an
life. M
oreover,allhum an
beings have
an aversion
to death.A
lthough in
m any
circum stances
death w
ill be
preferred to
the available
alternatives, the
death of
a loved
one, or
the prospect
ofone’s ow
n death,
is an
occasion for
g riefan
d lo
r fear.If
w e
encountered an
im m
ortal anthropom
orphic being,
or a
m ortal
being w
ho show
ed no
aversion to
death and
no te
n dency
at all
to avoid
death,w e
w ould
judge,in both
ofthese cases,that
the form
o flife
w as
so different
from our
ow n
th at
the being
could not
be acknow
ledged as
hum an.
3.1.2. T
he H
u m
an B
ody
W e
live all
our lives
in bodies
of a
certain sort,w
hose possibilities
and vulnerabilities
do n o t
as such
belong to
one hum
an society
rather than
another.T hese
bodies, sim
ilar far
m ore
than dissim
ilar (given
the enorm
ous range
of possibilities)
are our
hom es,
so to
speak, opening
certain options
and denying
others, giving
us certain
needs and
also certain
possibilities for
excellence.T he
thct that
any given
hum an
being m
ight have
lived anyw
here and
belonged to
any culture
is a
great part
o f
w hat
grounds our
m utual
recognitions; this
fact, in
turn, has
a great
deal to
do w
ith the
general hum
anness of
the body,its
great distinctness
from other
bodies.T he
experience o
fthe body
is culturally
shaped,to be
sure; the
im portance
w e
ascribe to
its various
functions is
also culturally
shaped. B
ut the
body itself,
not culturally
variant in
its nutritional
and other
related requirem
ents, sets
lim its
on w
hat can
be experienced
and valued,
ensuring a
great deal
o f
overlap. T
here is
m uch
disagreem ent,o
f course,about
how m
uch ofhum
an experience
is rooted
in the
body.H ere
religion and
m etaphysics
enter the
picture in
a nontrivialw
ay.T herefore,in
keeping w
ith the
nonm etaphysi
cal character
of the
list, I
shall include
at this
point only
those features
th atw
ould be
agreed to
be bodily
even by
determ ined
dualists.T he
m ore
controversial features,such
as thinking,perceiving,
and em
otion,I shall
discuss separately,taking
no stand
on the
question o
f dualism
.
1. H
unger an
d thirst:
the needfo
rfo o
d an
d drink.
A ll
hum an
beings need
food and
drink in
order to
live; all
have com
parable, though
v ary
ing, nutritional
requirem ents.
B eing
in one
culture rather
than another
does not
m ake
one m
etabolize food
differently. F
urtherm ore,
all hum
an beings
have appetites
that are
indices ofneed.A
ppetitive experience
is to
som e
extent culturally
shaped; butw
e are
not surprised
to discover
m uch
sim ilarity
and overlap.M
oreover,hum an
beings in
general do
notw ish
to be
hungry or
thirsty (though
ofcourse they
m ightchoose
to fastfor
som e
reason). Ifw e
discovered som
eone w
ho really
did not
experience hunger
and thirst
at all,or,
experiencing them
, really
did not
care about
eating and
drinking,w e
w ould
judge th
atthis creature
w as
(in A
ristotle’s w
ords) “far
from being
a hum
an being.”
2. N
eed fo
r shelter.
A recurrent
them e
in m
yths o f
hum anness
is the
nakedness o f
the hum
an being,
its relative
unprotectedness in
the anim
al w
orld, its susceptibility
to heat,cold,and
the ravages
ofthe e le
m ents.
S tories
th at
explore the
difference betw
een our
needs and
those of
flurry or
scaly or
othenvise protected
creatures rem
ind us
how far
our life
is constituted
by the
need to
find protection
through clothing
and housing. 3. S
exualdesire.T hough
less urgentas
a need
than the
needs for
food, drink,
and shelter
(in the
sense th
at one
can live
w ithout
its satisfac
tion), sexual
need and
desire are
features of
m ore
or less
every hum
an life,
at least
beyond a
certain age.
It is,
and has
all along
been, a
m ost
im portant
basis for
the recognition
o f
others different
from ourselves
as hum
an beings.
4.M obility.
H u
m an
beings are,
as the
old definition
goes, feath
er less
bipeds— that
is, creatures
w hose
form oflife
is in
part constituted
by the
ability to
m ove
from place
to place
in a
certain characteristic
w ay,
not only
through the
aid of
tools th
at they
have m
ade, b
u t
w ith
their very
ow n
bodies. H
u m
an beings
like m
oving about
and dislike
being deprived
o f
m obility.
A n
anthropom orphic
being w
ho, w
ithout disability,
chose never
to m
ove from
b irth
to death
w ould
be hard
to view
as hum
an.
E xperiences
o fpain
and pleasure
are com
m on
to allhum
an life
(though, once
again, both
their expression
and, to
som e
extent, the
experience itself
m ay
be culturally
shaped). M
oreover, the
aversion to
pain as
a
3.1.3. C
ap acity
fo r
P leasu
re an
d P
ain
1 U
• U
L L
JW thJL
T h
I IL
t: b tM
1 N
L S
A T
h L
vIA R
I’H A
C .
N U
SSB A
U T
V I
• 511
fundam ental
evilis a
prim itive
and, itappears,unlearned
part o fb
ein g
a hum
an anim
al.A society
w hose
m em
bers altogether
lacked th
ataversion w
ould surely
be judged
to be
beyond the
bounds o
f hum
anness.
3.1.4. C
o g
n itiv
e C
ap ab
ility :P
erceiv in
g ,Im
ag in
in g ,
T h
in k
in g
A ll
hum an
beings have
sense-perception,the ability
to im
agine,and the
ability to
think, m
aking distinctions
and “reaching
out for
u n
d erstan
d in
g .”
4 3
A nd
these abilities
are regarded
as o
fcentral im
portance.It is
an open
question w
h at
sorts o
f accidents
or im
pedim ents
to individuals
in these
areas w
ill be
sufficient for
us to
judge th
at the
life in
question is
n o
t really
hum an
any longer.
B ut
it is
safe to
say that
if w
e im
agine a
group ofbeings
w hose
m em
bers totally
lack sense-perception,or
totally lack
im agination,
or totally
lack reasoning
and thinking,w
e are
not in
any o f
these eases
im agining
a group
ofhum an
beings, no
m atter
w hat
they look
like.
3.1.5. E
arly In
fa n
tD ev
elo p m
en t
A ll
hum an
beings begin
as hungry
babies, aw
are of
their ow
n h e lp
lessness, experiencing
their alternating
closeness to
and distance
from that,
and those,on
w hom
they depend.T
his com
m on
structure to
early l i f &
4— w
h ic
h is
clearly shaped
in m
any differentw
ays by
differentsocial arrangem
ents— gives
rise to
a great
deal ofoverlapping
experience th
at is
central in
the form
ation o
f desires,and
o f
com plex
em otions
such as
grief, love,
and anger.T
his, in
turn, is
a m
ajor source
of our
ability to
recognize ourselves
in the
em otional
experiences of
those w
hose lives
are very
different in
other respects
from our
ow n.
If w
e encountered
a group
ofapparenthum ans
and then
discovered th
atthey never
had been
babies and
had never,in
consequence,had those
experiences o
fextrem e
dependency; need,
and affection,
w e
w ould,
I think,
have to
conclude th
at their
form oflife
w as
sufficiently different
from our
ow n
th at
they could
n o
t be
considered p art
o f
the sam
e kind.
3.1.6. P
racticalR easo
n
A ll
hum an
beings participate
(or try
to) in
the planning
and m
anaging o f
their ow
n lives,asking
and answ
ering questions
about w
hat is
good and
how one
should live.M
oreover,they w
ish to
enact their
th o u g h tin
their lives—
to be
able to
choose and
evaluate, and
to function
acco rd
ingly. T
his general
capability has
m any
concrete form
s, and
is related
in com
plex w
ays to
the other
capabilities, em
otional, im
aginative, and
intellectual. B
ut a
being w
ho altogether
lacks this
w ould
not be
likely to
be regarded
as filly
hum an,
in any
society;
3 .1
.7 .A
ffiliatio n
w ith
O th
erH u ,n
an B
eings
A ll
hum an
beings recognize
and feel
som e
sense of
affiliation and
concern for
other hum
an beings.
M oreover,
w e
value the
form of
life th
at is
constituted by
these recognitions
and affiliations.W
e live
w ith
and in
relation to
others, and
regard a
life n
o t
lived in
affiliation w
ith others
to be
a life
notw orth
the living.
(H ere
I w
ould really
w ish,w
ith A
ristotle,to spell
things out
fhrther. W
e define
ourselves in
term s
ofat least
tw o
types o f
affiliation: intim
ate fam
ily andlor
personal relations,
and social
or civic
relations.)
3.1.8. R elatedness
to O
th er
S pecies
an d
to N
atu re
H u m
an beings
recognize th
at they
are not
the only
living things
in their
w orld:
that they
are anim
als living
alongside other
anim als,
and also
alongside plants,in
a universe
that,as a
com plex
interlocking order,
both supports
and lim
its them
.W e
are dependent
upon th
at order
in countless
w ays;
and w
e also
sense th
at w
e ow
e th
at order
som e
respect and
concern,how ever
m uch
w e
m ay
differ about exactly
w hatw
e ow
e,to w
hom ,and
on w
hatbasis.A gain,a
creature w
ho treated
anim als
exactly like
stones and
could not
be brought
to see
any difference
w ould
p ro
b ably
be regarded
as too
strange to
be hum
an. So
too w
ould a
creature w
ho did
not in
any w
ay respond
to the
natural w
orld.
H u m
an life
w herever
itis lived,m
akes room
for recreation
and laughter.
T he
form s
play takes
are enorm
ouslyvaried— andyetw
e recognize
other hum
ans, across
cultural barriers,
as the
anim als
w ho
laugh. L
aughter and
play are
frequently am
ong the
deepest and
also the
first m
odes of
our m
utual recognition. Inability
to play
or laugh
is taken,correctly,as
a sign
o fdeep
disturbance in
a child;
W itproves
perm anentw
e w
ill doubt
w hether
the child
is capable
o f
leading a
fully hum
an life.
A n
entire
3.1.9. H
u m
o r an
d P
lay
512’ G
L O
B A
L JU
ST IC
E :
SE M
IN A
L ESSA
Y S
society th
at lacked
this ability
w ould
seem to
us both
terribly strange
and terribly
frightening.
3 .1
.1 0 .
S ep
araten ess
H ow
ever m
uch w
e live
w ith
and for
others, w
e are,
each o
f us,“one
in n u m
b er,”
4 5
proceeding on
a separate
path through
the w
orld from
birth to
death. E
ach person
feels only
his or
her ow
n pain
and not
anyone else’s.
E ach
person dies
w ithout
entailing logical])’
the death
o f
anyone else.‘W
hen one
person w
alks across
the room
, no
other person
follow s
autom atically’vV
hen w
e count
the num
ber o
fhum an
beings in
a room
, w
e have
no difficulty
figuring outw
here one
begins and
the other
ends. ‘These
obvious facts
need stating, since
they m
ight have
been othenvise.
W e
should bear
them in
m ind
w hen
w e
hear talk
about the
absence of
individualism in
certain societies.
E ven
the m
ost intense
form s
of hum
an interaction,
for exam
ple sexual
experience, are
experiences of
responsiveness, not
o f
frision. If
fusion is
m ade
the goal,
the result
is bound
to be
disappointm ent.
3 .1
.1 1 .
S tro
n g
S ep
araten ess
B ecause
o f
separateness, each
hum an
life has,
so to
speak, its
ow n
peculiar context
and surroundings—
objects, places,
a history,
p articu
lar friendships,
locations, sexual
ties— that
are not
exactly the
sam e
as those
o f
anyone else,
and in
term s
ofw hich
the person
to som
e extent
identifies herself. T
hough societies
vary a
great deal
in the
degree and
type of
strong separateness
th at
they perm
it and
foster, there
is no
life yet
know n
th at
really does
(as P
lato w
ished) fail
to use
the w
ords “m
ine” and
“not m
ine” in
som e
personal and
nonshared w
ay. W h at
I use,
live in,respond
to, I use, live
in,respond to
from m
y ow
n separate
existence. A
nd on
the w
hole, hum an
beings recognize
one another
as beings
w ho
w ish
to have
atleast som
e separateness
o f context,a
little space
to m
ove around
in, som
e special
item s
to use
or love.
‘Ibis is
a w
orking list.
It is
p u t
out to
generate debate.
It has
done so
and w
ill continue
to do
so, and it
w ill
be revised
accordingly. A
s I
have said,
the list
is com
posed of
tw o
different sorts
o f
item s;
lim its
and capabilities.
A s
far as
capabilities go,
to call
them parts
of hum
anness is
to m
ake a
very basic
sort of
evaluation. It
is to
say that
a life
w ithout
this item
w ould
be too
lacking, too
im poverished,
to be
hum an
at all.
O bviously,
then, it
could not
be a
good hum
an life.
So
this list
o f
capabilities is
a ground-floor
or m
inim al
conception of
the
good. (In
the sense
th at
it does
not hilly
determ ine
the choice
of a
w ay
o f
life, b u t
sim ply
regulates the
param eters
of w
hat can
be chosen,
it
plays, how
ever, the
role traditionally
played in
liberal political
theory
by a
conception o f
the rig
h t.)
4 6
W ith
the lim
its, things
are m
ore com
plicated. In
selecting the
lim its
for attention,
w e
have, once
again, m
ade a
basic sort
of ev
alu a
tion, saying
th at
these things
are so
im portant
th at
life w
ould not
be hum
an w
ith o
u t
them .
B ut
w hat
w e
have said
is that
hum an
life, in
its general
form ,
consists o f
the aw
areness of
these lim
its plus
a struggle
against them
. H
um ans
do not
w ish
to be
hungry, to
feel pain,
to die.
(S eparateness
is highly
com plex,
both a
lim it
and a
capability. M
u ch
the sam
e is
true of
m any
of the
lim its
im plied
by the
shape and
the capacities
of the
body.) O
n the
other hand, w
e cannot
assum e
th at
the correct
evaluative conclusion
to draw
is th
at w
e should
try as
hard as
possible to
get rid
of the
lim it
altogether. It
is characteristic
of hum
an
life to
prefer recurrent
hunger plus
eating to
a life
w ith
neither hunger
nor eatin
g to
prefer sexual
desire and
its satisfaction
to a
life w
ith neither
desire nor
satisfaction. E
ven w
here death
is concerned,
the
desire for
im m
ortality, w
hich m
any hum
an beings
certainly have,
is a
peculiar desire:
F or
it is
n o
t clear
th at
the w
ish to
lose one’s
finitude com
pletely is
a desire
th at
one can
coherently entertain
for oneself
or for
som eone
one loves.
It seem
s to
be a
w ish
for a
transition to
a w
ay
of life
so w
holly different, w
ith such
different values
and ends,
th at
it
seem s
th at
the identity
o f
the individual
w ill
not be
preserved. So
the evaluative
conclusion,in m
apping outa
ground-floor conception
o fthe
good (saving
w hat
functioning is
necessary for
a life
to be
hum an)
w ill
have to
be expressed
w ith
m uch
caution, clearly,in term
s of w
hat w ould
be a
hum anly
good w
ay of
countering the
lim itation.
4 .T
H E
T W
O T
H R
E S
H O
L D
S
T hings
now get
very com
plicated. F or
w e
w ant
to describe
tw o
distinct thresholds:
a threshold
o f
capability to
function beneath
w hich
a life
w ill
be so
im poverished
that it
w ill
not be
hum an
at all;
and a
so m
e
w hat higher
threshold, beneath w
hich those
characteristic functions
are
available in
such a
reduced w
ay that,
though w
e m
ay judge
the form
of life
a hum
an one,
w e
w ill
not think
it a
good hum
an life. T
he latter
M A
R T
H A
C ,N
U S
S B
A U
M ’S
lS
threshold is
the one
th at
w ill
eventually concern
us w
hen w
e turn
to public
policy: forw
e don’t
w ant
societies to
m ake
their citizens
capable ofthe
bare m
inim um
.M y
view holds,w
ith A
ristotle,th ata
good p o liti
cal arrangem
ent is
one “in
accordance w
ith w
hich anyone
w hatsoever
m ight
do w
ell and
live a
flourishing life
.” 4 7
‘These are
clearly, in
m any
areas, tw
o distinct
thresholds, requiring
distinct levels
of resource
and opportunity.
O ne
m ay
be alive
w ithout
being w
ell nourished.
A s
M arx
observed, one
m ay
be able
to use
one’s senses
w ith
o u t
being able
to use
them in
a fully
hum an
w a
A n d
yet there
is need
for caution
here.F or
in m
any cases
the m
ove from
hum an
life to
good hum
an life
is supplied
by the
citizen’s ow
n pow
ers ofchoice
and self—
definition, in
such a
w ay
th at
once society
places them
above the
first threshold,m
oving above
the second
is m
ore or
less up
to them
. T
his is
especially likely
to be
so,I think,
in areas
such as
afluliation and
practicalreasoning,w here
in m
any cases
once socialinstitutions
perm ita
child to
cross the
first threshold
its ow
n choices
w ill be
central in
raising it
above the
second. (‘This
is not
alw ays
so, how
ever: for
certain social
conditions,for exam
ple certain
m indless
form s
o flab
o r
or,w e
m ay
add, traditional
hierarchical gender
relations, m
ay im
pede the
flourishing of
affiliation and
practical reason,w
hile not
stam ping
it out
entirely.) O
n the
other hand,
it is
clear th
at w
here bodily
health and
nutrition, for
exam ple,
are concerned,
there is
a considerable
difference betw
een the
tw o
thresholds, and
a difference
that is
standardly m
ade by
resources over
w hich
individuals do
not have
full control.
It w
ould then
be the
concern o f
quality-of-life assessm
ent to
ask w
hether all
citizens are
capable, not
just of
the bare
m inim
um ,
but o
f good
/jfr in
these areas.
C learly
there is
a continuum
here. N
or w
ill it
in practice
be at
all easy
to say
w here
the upper
threshold, especially,
should be
located. I
shall not
say m
uch about
the first
threshold, but
shall illustrate
it by
a few
exam ples.W
h at
is an
existence that
is so
im poverished
that it
cannot properly
be called
a hum
an life?
H ere
w e
should count,I
believe, m
any form
s of
existence that
take place
at the
end o
f a
hum an
llfe— all
those in
w hich
the being
th at
survives has
irretrievably lostsensation
and consciousness
(in w
hatis called
a “perm
anentvegetative condition”);
and also,I
w ould
hold, som
e th
at fall
short ofthis,but
in w
hich the
capacity to
recognize loved
ones, to
think and
to reason,
has irreversibly
decayed beyond
a certain
point.I w
ould include
the extrem
e absence
ofability to
engage in
practical reasoning
that is
often the
outcom e
ofthe notorious
frontallobotom y.Iw
ould also
include an
absence ofm
obility so
severe that
it m
akes speech,
as w
ell as
m ovem
entfrom place
to place,im
possible.
It follow
s from
this th
at certain
severely dam
aged infants
are not
hum an
ever, even if
born from
tw o
hum an
parents: again,
those w
ith globaland
total sensory
incapacity an
d /o
r no
consciousness or
thought; also,I
think, those
w ith
no ability
at all
to recognize
or relate
to others.
(T his
o f course
tells us
nothing aboutw
hat w
e ow
e them
m orally
it just separates
that question
from m
oral questions
about hum
an b ein
g s.)
4 8
A gain, w
e notice
the evaluative
character of
these threshold
judg— m
ents.T he
fact th
at a
person w
ho has
lost her
arm s
cannot play
a piano
does not
m ake
us judge
that she
no longer
lives a
hum an
life; had
she lost
the capacity
to th
in k
and rem
em ber,
or to
form affectionate
re la
tionships, it
w ould
have been
a different
m atter.
IV Iany
such disasters
are not
to be
blam ed
on social
arrangem ents,
and in
those cases
the first
threshold has
no political
im plications.
B ut
m any
are, w here
bad nutrition
and health
care enter
in.T he
role ofsociety
is e v
e n
m ore
evident if w
e think
of a
m ore
controversial group
o f
first— threshold
cases, in w
hich the
nonhum an
outcom e
w as
environm entally
caused: the
rare cases
of children
w ho
have grow
n up
outside a
hum an
com m
unity, or
in a
severely dysfunctional
hom e,
and utterly
lack la
n guage
and reason,or
lack social
abilities in
an extrem
e and
irreversible w
ayc W
e can
focus the
political question
m ore
productively, how ever, if
w e
now turn
from the
question of
m ere
hum an
life to
the question
of good
life, the
level w
e w
ould really
like to
see a
hum an
being attain.
H ere,
as the
next level
o f
the conception
of the
hum an
being, I
shall now
specif5i certain basic
functional capabilities
at w hich
societies should
aim for
their citizens,
and w
hich quality
o f
life m
easurem ents
should m
easure. In
other w
ords, this
w ill
be an
account o f
the second
threshold— although
in som
e areas
it m
ay coincide,
for the
reasons I
have given,
w ith
the first
O nce
one is
capable of
hum an
functioning in
this area
one is
also capable,
w ith
som e
further effort
and care,
of good
functioning. I introduce
this list
as a
listo f capabilities
to function,
rather than
o f actual flinctionings, since
I shall
argue that
capability,not actual
functioning, should
be the
goal of
public policc
4 .1
. L
E V
E L
2 O
F T
H E
C 0
N C
E F
rIO N
O F
T H
E H
u rw
iN B
E IN
G :
B A
S IC
H u w
’ F
U N
C T
IO N
A L
C A
P A
B IL
IT IE
S
1. B
eing able
to live
to the
end ofa
hum an
life of norm
al le
n g th
, 4 9
not dying
prem aturely,
or before
one’s life
is so
reduced as
to be
n o
t w
orth living.
I 516
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M I t M
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______ A
Y U
U L
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2. B
eing able
to have
good health;
to be
adequately n o u r
ish e d ;
5 0
to have
adequate sh
elter; 5 1
having o p p o rtu
n i
ties for
sexual satisfaction,
and for
choice in
m atters
o f
rep ro
d u
ctio n
; 5
2 being
able to
m ove
from place
to place.
3. B
eing able
to avoid
u n n ecessary
and n o n b en
efi cial
pain, so
far as
possible, and
to have
pleasurable experiences.
4. B
eing able
to use
the senses;
being able
to im
agine,to think,
and to
reason— and
to do
these things
in a
w ay
inform ed
and cultivated
by an
adequate education,
including, b u t
by no
m eans
lim ited
to, literacy
and basic
m athem
atical and
scientific tra
in in
g .
5 3
B eing
able to
use im
agination and
th o u g h t
in connection
w ith
experiencing and
producing spiritually
enriching m
aterials and
events o
f one’s
ow n
choice; religious,
literary,m usical,and
so forth.I
believe th
at the
p ro
tec tion
of this
capability requires
not only
the provision
o f
education, b u t
also legal
guarantees of
freedom of
expression w
ith respect
to both
political and
artistic speech,
and of
freedom of
religious exercise.
5. B
eing able
to have
attachm ents
to things
and persons
outside ourselves;
to love
those w
ho love
and care
for us,
to grieve
at their
absence; in
general, to
love, to
grieve,to experience
longing and
g ra
titu d
e .
5 4
S u
p p
o rt
ing this
capability m
eans supporting
form s
o f
hum an
association th
at can
be show
n to
be crucial
in their
d ev
elo p m
en t.
5 5
6. B
eing able
to form
a conception
of the
good and
to engage
in critical
reflection about
the p lan
n in
g o
f one’s
ow n
life.T his
includes, today,
being able
to seek
em ploym
ent outside
the hom
e and
to participate
in political
life.
7. B
eing able
to live
for and
to others,
to recognize
and show
concern for
other hum
an beings,
to engage
in
various form
s ofsocialinteraction;
to be
able to
im agine
the situation
of another
and to
have com
passion for
that situation;
to have
the capability
for both
justice and
friendship. P
rotecting this
capability m
eans,once again,
p ro
tectin g
in stitu
tio n s
th at
co n
stitu te
such form
s o f
affiliation, and
also protecting
the freedom
s of
assem bly
and political
speech.
8. B
eing able
to live
w ith
concern for
and in
relation to
anim als,plants,
and the
w orld
of nature.
9. B
eing able
to laugh,
to play,
to enjoy
recreational activities.
10. B
eing able
to live
one’s ow
n life
and nobody
else’s. ‘This
m eans
having certain
guarantees of
n o
n in
terfer ence
w ith
certain choices
th at
are especially
personal and
definitive o f
sellhood, such
as choices
regarding m
arriage, childbearing,
sexual expression,
speech, and
em ploym
ent.
lO a.
B eing
able to
live one’s
ow n
life in
one’s ow
n su
rro u
n d
ings and
context.T his
m eans
guarantees offreedom
o f
association and
of freedom
from unw
arranted search
and seizure;
it also
m eans
a certain
sort of guarantee
o f
the integrity
ofpersonalproperty,though this
guarantee m
ay be
lim ited
in various
w ays
by the
dem ands
ofsocial equality,and
is alw
ays up
for negotiation
in connection
w ith
the interpretation
o f
the other
capabilities, since
personal property,
unlike personal
liberty, is
a tool
o f
hum an
functioning rather
than an
end in
itself.
M y
claim is
th at
a life
th at
lacks any
one o f
these capabilities,
no m
atter w
h at
else it
has,w ill
fall short
o f
being a
good hum
an life.
So it
w ould
be reasonable
to take
these things
as a
focus for
concern, in
assessing the
quality of
life in
a country
and asking
about the
role of
public policy
in m
eeting hum
an needs.T
he list
is certainly
general— and
this is
deliberate, in
order to
leave room
for plural
specification and
also for
further negotiation.
B ut
I claim
th at
it does,
rather like
a set
o f
constitutional guarantees,
offer real
guidance in
the ongoing
• L
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L :
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b .
.
historical process
o f
further refinem
ent and
specification,and far
m ore
accurate guidance
than th
at offered
by the
focus on
utility, or
even on
resources. A
few com
m ents
are in
order about
the relationship
o f
this version
of the
list to
other versions
I have
published previously.
F irst,
taking som
e lessons
from the
H um
an D
evelopm ent
R eport,
it is
considerably m
ore specific
about m
atters such
as education
and w
ork,so as
to give
the developm
ent theorist
som ething
concrete to
m easure.
S econd,
it is
far m
ore explicitly
concerned w
ith guarantees
ofpersonal liberty ofex
p res
sion, reproductive choice,
and relig
io n .
5 6
T his
w as
not only
called for
in general, butcalled
forth by
the attem
ptto articulate
the specific
requisites ofequal
fem ale
c a p a b ility
5T h i r d ,
in accordance
w ith
its com
m itm
entto the
distinction betw
een ends
and m
eans, it understands
“property rights”
as instrum
ental to
other hum
an capabi1ities, 5
and therefore
to a
certain extent,
as up
for negotiation
in general
social planning.
T he
list is,
em phatically,
a list
o f
separate com
ponents. W
e cannot
satisfy the
need for
one of
them by
giving a
larger am
ount of
another. A
ll are
o f
central im
portance and
all are
distinct in
quality.’T his
lim its
the trade-offs
th at
it w
ill be
reasonable to
m ake,
and thus
lim its
the applicability
o f quantitative
cost-benefit analysis.A
t the
sam e
tim e,the
item s
on the
list are
related to
one another
in m
any com
plex w
ays. F or
exam ple
our characteristic
m ode
of nutrition,
unlike th
at of
sponges, requires
m oving
from here
to there.
A nd
w e
do w
hatever w
e do
as separate
beings, tracing
distinct paths
through space
and tim
e. N
otice th
at reproductive
choices involve
both sexual
capability and
issues of
separateness, and
bind the
tw o
together in
a deep
and com
plex w
ay. A
further com
m ent
is in
order, concerning the
relationship of
this threshold
list to
an accountofhum
an equality
A com
m itm
ent to
b rin
g ing
all hum
an beings
across a
certain threshold
o f
capability to
choose represents
a certain
sort o
f com
m itm
ent to
equality: for
the view
treats all
persons as
equal bearers
of hum
an claim
s, no
m atter
w here
they are
starting from
in term
s o
f circum
stances,special talents,w
ealth,gender, or
race. O
n the
other hand,
I have
said nothing
so far
about how
one should
regard inequalities
th atpersistonce
the threshold
level has
been attained
for all
persons.T o
som e
extent I
feel this
w ould
be prem
ature, since
the threshold
level has
so rarely
been attained
for the
com plete
capability set. O
n the
other hand, one
can im
agine a
situation— perhaps
it could
be th
at of
the U
S A
or Japan,
given certain
large changes
in health
support here, or
educational distribution
there, th at
w ould
m eet
threshold conditions
and stillexhibit inequalities
o f attainm
entbetw een
the genders
or the
races. W e
have tw
o choices
here: either
to argue
th at
this situation
actually contains
capability failure
after all;
or to
grant that
the capability
view needs
to be
supplem ented
by an
independent theory
of equality. I am
notyet certain
w hat
I w
antto say
about this, but
I am
inclined to
the first
alternative, since I
think th
at gender inequality
of the
sort one
sees in
a prosperous
nation does
nonetheL ess
push the
subordinated racial
or gender
group beneath
an acceptable
threshold ofautonom
y, d ig
n ity
and em
otional w
ell being.
Indeed, subordination
is itself
a kind
of capability
failure, a
failure to
attain com
plete person-
hood. So
I am
inclined to
say that,
properly fleshed
out, the
second threshold
w ould
be incom
patible w
ith system
atic subordination
o f one
group to
another.
5 .T
H E
R O
L E
O F
T H
E C
O N
C E
P T
IO N
IN D
E V
E L
O P
M E
N T
P O
L IC
Y
M y
claim is
th at
w e
urgently need
a conception
of the
hum an
being
and hum
an functioning
in public
policy. If
w e
try to
do w
ithout this
sort o
f guidance
w hen
w e
ask how
goods, resources,
and opportunities
should be
distributed, w
e reject
guidance th
at is,
I think,
superior to
that offered
by any
o f
the other
guides currently
available. 1
shall focus
here on
the area
of m
ost concern
to our
project: the
assessm ent
o f
the quality
o f
life in
a developing
country, w
ith special
attention to
the lives
o f
w om
en. F
or the
tim e
being, I
shall take
the
nation-state as
m y
basic unit,
and the
question I
shall ask
is,“H ow
is
the nation
doing,w ith
respect to
the quality
o f
life of
its citizens?”
In other
w ords,
I shall
be asking
the sort
of question
asked by
the U
N H
um an
D evelopm
ent R eport.
I shall
not propose
a general
theory about
how the
needs revealed
by such
an assessm
ent should
be m
et: w
hether
by centralized
governm ent
planning, for
exam ple,
or through
a sy
s tem
of incentives,
and w
hether through
direct subsidies
or through
the provision
of opportunities
for em
ploym ent.
N or
shall I
ask w
hat
responsibilities richer
nations have
to poorer
nations, in
ensuring that
the needs
o fall hum
an beings
are m
et the
w orld
over. T hat
is an
urgent
question,and it
m ust
at a
later date
be confronted.
F or
now , how
ever, I
shall focus
on the
correct understanding of the
goal, w here
each separate
nation is
concerned. T
he basic
claim I
w ish
to m
ake— concurring
w ith
A m
artya S
en— is
that the
central goal
o f
public planning
should be
the capabilities
of
citizens to
perform various
im p o rtan
t functions.
T he
questions th
at should
be asked
w hen
assessing quality
of life
in a
country are
(and of
course this
is a
central part
o f
assessing the
quality of
its political
arrangem ents)
“H ow
w ell
have the
people ofthe
country been
enabled to
perform the
central hum
an functions?”
and,“H ave
they been
put in
a position
of m
ere hum
an subsistence
w ith
respect to
the functions,or
have they
been enabled
to live
w ell?”
In other
w ords,w
e ask
w here
the people
are, w
ith respect
to the
second list.A
n d
w e
focus on
getting as
m any
people as
possible above
the second
threshold, w
ith respect
to the
interlocking set
o f
capabilities enum
erated by
th at
lis t.
5 9
N aturally,
the determ
ination ofw
hether certain
individuals and
groups are
across the
threshold is
only as
precise a
m atter
as the
determ ination
of the
threshold; and
I have
left things
deliberately som
ew hat
open-ended at
this point,
in keeping
w ith
the procedures
of the
H um
an D
evelop— inent R
eport,believing th
at the
bestw ay
to w
ork tow
ard a
m ore
precise determ
ination is
to allow
the com
m unity
o f
nations to
ham m
er it
out after
an extended
com parative
inquiry,o fthe
sort the
reportm akes
p o s
sible. A
gain,w e
w ill
have to
answ er
various questions
about the
costs w
e are
w illing
to pay
to get
all citizens
above the
threshold,as opposed
to leaving
a sm
all num
ber below
and allow
ing the
rest a
considerably above-threshold
life quality.
H ere
m y
claim is
th at
capabffity-equality in
the sense
o f
m oving
all above
the threshold,
should be
taken as
the centralgoal. A
s w
ith R
aw ls’s
difference principle,so
here:Inequalities in
distribution above
the threshold
should be
tolerated only
if they
m ove
m ore
people across
i t ;
6° once
allare across,societies
are to
a great
extent free
to choose
the other
goals th
at they
w ish
to pursue.
T he
basic intuition
from w
hich the
capability approach
starts,in the
political arena,is
th at
hum an
capabilities exert
a m
oral claim
th at
they should
be developed.
H u m
an beings
are creatures
such that,
provided w
ith the
right educational
and m
aterial support,
they can
becom e
fully capable
of the
m ajor
hum an
functions, can
cross the
first and
second thresholds.’T
hat is,they
are creatures
w ith
certain low
er— levelcap
ab ili
ties (w
hich I
have elsew
here called
“basic cap
ab ilities”)
6 1
to perform
the functions
in question.W
h en
these capabilities
are deprived
o f
the nourishm
ent th
at w
ould transform
them into
the high-level
cap ab
ili ties
th at
figure on
m y
list, they
are fruitless,
cut off,
in som
e w
ay but
a shadow
o f
them selves.T
hey are
like actors
w ho
never get
to go
on the
stage,or a
m usical
score that
is never
perform ed.T
heir very
being m
akes forw
ard reference
to functioning.
T hus
if functioning
never arrives
on
the scene,
they are
hardly even
w hat
they are.T
his m
ay sound
like a
m etaphysical
idea, and
in a
sense it
is (in
th at
it is
an idea
discussed in
A ristotle’s
M etaphysics).
B ut
th at
does not
m ean
th at
it is
not a
basic and
pervasive em
pirical idea,
an idea
th at
underw rites
m any
of our
daily practices
and judgm
ents in
m any
tim es
and places.
I claim
that just
as w
e hold
th at
a child
w ho
dies before
getting to
m aturity
has died
especially tragically—
for her
activities o f
grow th
and preparation
for adult
activity now
have lost
their point—
so too
w ith
capability and
functioning m
ore generally:
W e
believe th
at certain
basic and
central hum
an endow
m ents
have a
claim to
be assisted
in developing,and
exert thatclaim
on others,and
especially,as A
ristotle saw
,on governm
ent.W e
shall see
the w
ork this
consideration can
do in
argum ents
for w
om en’s
equality. I
th in
k it
is the
underlying basis,in
the W
estern p
h ilo
so p
h i
cal tradition, for
m any
notions o f
hum an
rights.I suggest, then,th
at in
thinking of
political planning
w e
begin from
this notion,
thinking of
the basic
capabilities of
hum an
beings as
needs for
functioning,w hich
give rise
to correlated
political duties.
T here
is,then, an
em pirical
basis for
the determ
ination th
at a
c e r
tain being
is one
of the
ones to
w hich
our norm
ative conception
and its
associated duties
applies. It is
the gap
betw een
potential hum
anness and
its full
realization th
at exerts
a m
oral claim
.Ifthe w
orker described
by M
arx as
not capable
of a
truly hum
an use
of his
se n se
s 6
2 had
really been
a nonhum
an anim
al,the factth
at he
w as
given a
form of life
suited to
such an
anim al w
ould not
be a
tragedy. Ifw om
en w
ere really
turtles, the
fact th
at being
a w
om an
is n
o t
yet a
w ay
of being
a hum
an being
w ould
n o tbe,as
itis, an outrage.T
here is,of course,enorm
ous potential
for abuse
in determ
ining w
ho has
these basic
capabilities.T he
history of
IQ testin
g is
just one
chapter in
an inglorious
saga o f
prejudiced capability-testing
th at
goes back
at least
to the
N oble
L ie
of Plato’s
R epublic.
T herefore
w e
should, I
think, proceed
as if
every offspring
of tw
o hum
an parents
has the
basic capabilities,
unless and
until long
experience w
ith the
individual has
convinced us
th at
dam age
to that
individual’s condition
is so
great th
at it
could never
in any
w ay
arrive at
the higher
capability level.
T he
political and
econom ic
application of
this approach
is evident
in a
variety o f
areas.A m
artya S
en has
developed a
num ber
of its
c o n
crete im
plications in
the areas
o fw
elfare and
developm ent
econom ics,
and has
focused particularly
on its
application to
the assessm
ent o f
w om
en’s quality
oflife .
6 3
W ith
his advice,the
U N
H um
an D
evelopm ent
b44 • U
L O
A k JU
b jjL
jt: b M
L N
A L
tS S
A Y
b -
— -
R eports
have begun
to gather
inform ation
and to
rank nations
in acco
r dance
w ith
the type
o fplural-valued
capability-focused m
easuring the
approach suggests.In
a closely
related study,lftelthar
H ossein
has used
the approach
to give
an account
o fpoverty
as capability
failure.64 In
d e
pendently, a
very sim
ilar approach
has been
developed by
F innish
and S
w edish
social scientists,
above all
E rik
A llardt
and R
obert E
rik so
n .
6 5
W ish
in g
to develop
w ays
of gathering
inform ation
about how
their people
are doing
th at
w ould
be m
ore sensitive
and inform
ationafly com
plete than
polls based
on ideas
o f
utility, they
w orked
out lists
of the
basic hum
an capabilities
for functioning
and then
exam ined
the perform
ance of
various groups
in the
population— above
all w
om en
and m
inorities— in
these term
s,thus anticipating
the procedures
o fthe
H u m
an D
evelopm entR
eport,w hich
devotes a
great deal
o f
attention to
gender differences,
urban-rural differences,
and so
forth. ‘The
“capabilities approach”has
clear advantages
over other
current approaches
to quality-of--life
assessm ent.
A ssessm
ent th
at uses
G N
P per
capita as
its sole
m easure
falls to
concern itselfw
ith the
distribution of
resource and
thus can
give high
m arks
to countries
w ith
enorm ous
inequalities.N or
does this
approach exam
ine other
hum an
goods thatare
n o t
reliably correlated
w ith
the presence
ofresources: infant
m ortalit)ç
for exam
ple, or
access to
education, or
the quality
o f
racial and
gender relations,
or the
presence or
absence o f
political freedom
s.T he
H um
an D
evelopm entR
eport for
1993 inform
s us,
for exam
ple, that
the U
nited A
rab E
m irates
has real
G N
P per
capita o f
$16,753— tenth-highest
in the
w orld,
higher, for
exam ple,
than N
orw ay
or A
ustralia— w
hile overall,
in the
aggregation o f
all the
indicators o f
life quality
it ranks
only sixty-seventh
in the
w orld
(outo f
173 nations
m easured).Its
adult literacy
rate is
55% ,
far low
er than
any o f
the 60
countries generally
ahead o f
it, and
also than
m any
generally below
it. (B
oth N
orw ay
and A
ustralia have
adultliteracy of99%
.) T
he m
aternal m
ortality rate
o f130
per 100,000
live births
is com
paratively high.T
he proportion
ofw om
en progressing
beyond secondary
education is
very low
, and only
6% ofthe
labor force
is fem
ale (as
opposed,for exam
ple,to 42%
in Seychelles,35%
in B
razil, 43%
in C
hina, 47%
in V
ietnam ,
26% in
India, and
20% in
N igeria).
In fact,in
all the
w orld
only A
lgeria (496)
has a
low erp
ro p o r
tion o f
fem ales
in the
labor force,only
Iraq (6%
) ties
it,and only
Q atar
(7% ),
S audi
A rabia
(7% ),
L ibya
(9% ),Jordan
(10% ),
P akistan
(11% ),
B angladesh
(7% ),
and A
fghanistan (8%
) com
e close.
E vidence
links fem
ale w
age-earning outside
the hom
e strongly
to fem
ale health
care
and life-ex
p ectan
cy .
6 6
A nd
in fact,
w e
find th
at the
ratio of
fem ales
to
m ales
in the
U nited
A rab
E m
irates is
the am
azing 48:100,low
est in
all
the w
orld. If this
is discounted
as em
ploym ent
related, w e
m ay
pursue
the other
countries in
our low
external em
ploym ent
com parison
class.
T he
ratio o f
fem ales
to m
ales in
nations in
w hich
there is
no reason
to
suppose sexual
discrim ination
in nourishm
ent and
health care
is, S
en
has show
n, about
106:100 in
E urope
and N
o rth
A m
erica— or,
if w
e
focus only
on the
developing w
orld, taking
sub-S aharan
A frica
as our
“norm ,”
102:100.In O
jtar iris
60:100, in S
audi A
rabia 84,
in L
ibya 91,
in Jordan
95, in
P akistan
92, in
B angladesh
94, in
A fghanistan
94.
T hese
are som
e of
the num
bers th
at w
e start
noticing if
w e
focus
on capabilities
and functioning
rather than
sim ply
on G
N P
. T hey
are
essential to
the understanding
o f
how w
om en
are doing.
In fact,
they
are the
num bers
from w
hich Sen’s
graphic statistics
regarding “m
issing
w om
en” em
erge. (T
he num
ber o f
“m issing
w om
en” is
the num
ber of
extra w
om en
w ho
w ould
be in
a given
country if
th at
country had
the
sam e
sex ratio
as sub-S
aharan A
frica.) ‘They
strongly support
M artha
C hen’s
argum ent
th at
the right
to w
ork is
a right
basic to
the lives
o f
w om
en n o t
only in
itself, but
for its
im pact
on other
basic capabilities
and functionings.
S aleha
B egum
’s em
ploym ent
led to
better nutritional
and health
status for herselfand,indeed, her
children and
fam ily. M
eth a
B ai
m ay
soon becom
e one
of the
statistics from
w hich
the num
ber of
m issing
w om
en is
m ade.
W ould
other available
approaches have
done the
job as
w ell?
T he
com m
on approach
that m
easures quality
oflife in
term s
o f utility—
poll
ing people
concerning the
satisfaction of their
preferences— w
ould have
m issed
the obvious
fact th
at desires
and sukjective
preferences are
not
alw ays
reliable indicators
of w
hat a
person really
needs. P
references,
as A
m artya
Sen’s w
ork has
repeatedly show
n, are
highly m
alleab le.
6 7
T he
rich and
pam pered
easily becom
e accustom
ed to
their luxury,
and
view w
ith pain
and frustration
a life
in w
hich they
are treated
just like
everyone else.
IV Iales
are a
special case
of this:
W e
do not
need to
go
abroad to
know that
m ales
frequently resent
a situation
in w
hich they
are asked
to share
child care
and dom
estic responsibilities
on an
equal
b a sis.
6 8
T he
poor and
deprived frequently
adjust their
expectations and
aspirations to
the low
level of life
they have
know n. T
hus they
m ay
not
dem and
m ore
education, better health
care. L ike
the w
om en
described
in Sen’s
account of
health surveys
in India,
they m
ay not
even know
w hat
it is to
feel h ealth
y .
6 9
L ike
the rural
B angladeshi
w om
en so
vividly
II ‘ - ° “ ‘ ‘
M A
R T
H A
C .
N U
S S
B A
U M
•5 2
5
described in
M arth
a C
hen’s A
Q uiet
R ev
o lu
tio n
, 7 0
they m
ay not
even know
w hat
it m
eans to
have the
advantages o
f education.
W e
m ay
im agine
th at
m any
w om
en in
the countries
I have
m en,tioned
w ould
not fight,
as S
eleha B
egum did,
for participation
in the
w orkforce;
nor w
ould they
be aw
are of
the high
correlation betw
een w
ork outside
the hom
e and
other advantages.A
s S
en argues,
they m
ay have
fully in
te r
nalized the
ideas behind
the traditional
system of
discrim ination,
and m
ay view
their deprivation
as “natural.”T
hus if w
e rely
on utility
as our
m easure
of life
quality,w e
m ost
often w
ill get
results that
support the
status quo
and oppose
radical ch
an g e.
7’ If
these criticism
s apply
to approaches
th at
focus on
utility in
general,they apply
all the
m ore
pointedly to
the sort
o flocal-tradition
relativism espoused
by the
Ivlarglins, in
w hich
the m
easure of
quality oflife
w ill
be the
satisfaction of
a certain
group of
preferences, nam
ely the
traditional ones
o f
a given
culture.Indeed, it
is illum
inating to
c o
n sider
how close,in
its renunciation
of critical
norm ative
argum ent,
the M
arglin approach
is to
the prevailing
econom ic
approaches of
w hich
it presents
itselfas a
radical critique.A
preference— based
approach th
at gives
priority to
the preferences
o f
traditional culture
is likely
to be
especially subversive
o f
the quality
of life of w
om en
w ho
have been
on the
w hole
badly treated
by prevailing
traditional norm
s. A
nd one
can see
this clearly
in the
M arglins’ow
n exam
ples. F or
m enstruation
taboos im
pose severe
restrictions on
w om
en’s pow
er to
form a
plan o
flife and
to execute
the plan
they have
chosen.T hey
are m
em bers
o f
the sam
e fam
ily o f
traditional attitudes
about w
om en
and the
w orkplace
th at
m ade
it difficult
for S
aleha B
egum to
support herself
and her
fam ily,
th at
m ake
it im
possible for
M eth
a B
ai to
sustain the
basic functions
o f
life. A
n d
the Japanese
husband w
ho allegedly
renounces freedom
of choice
actually enhances
it, in
the w
ays th
at m
atter, by
asking the
w om
an to
look after
the boring
details oflife.O
ne can
sym pathize
w ith
m any
o f
the M
arglins’ goals—
respect for
diversity, desire
to preserve
aspects of
traditional life
th at
appear to
be rich
in spiritual
and artistic
value— w
ithout agreeing th
atextrem e
relativism ofthe
sortthey endorse
is the
best w
ay to
pursue these
concerns. A
s for
liberal approaches
th at
aim at
equality in
the distribution
of certain
basic resources,these
have related
problem s,
since these,
too, refuse
to take
a stand
on the
ends to
w hich
the resources
are m
e a n
s. 7 2
W ealth
and incom
e are
notgood in
their ow
n right;
they are
good only
insofar as
they prom
ote hum
an functioning. S
econd,hum an
beings have
w idely
varying needs
for resources,and
any adequate
definition o fw
ho is
“better off’and
“w orse
off” m
ust reflect
th at
fa c t.
7 3
W om
en w
ho have
traditionally not
been educated,
for exam
ple,m ay
w ell
require m
ore of
the relevant
resources to
attain the
sam e
capability level:
th at
is w
hy,in the
case discussed
by M
arth a
C hen,
the B
angladesh R
ural A
d v
an ce
m ent
C om
m ittee
created a
special fem
ale literacy
program ,rather
than a
program th
at distributed
equal resources
to all.
T hird,
by defining
being “w
ell-off”in term
s ofpossessions
alone,the liberal
fails to
go deep
enough in
im agining
the im
pedim ents
to functioning
th at
are actually
present in
m any
lives— in
their conditions
of labor
or exclusion
from labor,
for exam
ple, in
their frequently
unequal fam
ily responsibilities,
in the
obstacles to
self-realization im
posed by
traditional norm
s and
v alu
es. 7 4
T he
stories o f
S aleha
B egum
and M
eth a
B ai
are vivid
exam ples
ofsuch unequal
obstacles.N o
rig h
t-to -w
o rk
effort,and no
expenditure of
resources in
th at
connection, w
ere necessary
in order
to m
ake m
en capable
ofw orking
in the
fields in
B angladesh.
N o
m ale
o fM
eth a
B ai’s
caste w
ould have
to overcom
e threats
of physical
violence in
order to
go out
o f
the house
to w
ork for
life-sustaining food.
6 .A
N S
W E
R IN
G T
H E
O B
JE C
T IO
N S
: H
U M
A N
F U
N C
T IO
N IN
G A
N D
P L
U R
A L
IS M
I have
com m
ended the
hum an-function
view by
contrast to
its rivals
on the
developm ent
scene.B ut
I m
ust now
try to
show how
it can
answ er
the objections
I described
earlier. C
o n cern
in g
neglect o fhistorical
an d
cultural d
re n
c e ,
I can
begin by
insisting that
this norm
ative conception
o f
hum an
capability and
functioning is
general,and in
a sense
vague,for precisely
this reason.T
he list
claim s
to have
identified in
a very
general w
ay com
ponents that
are fundam
ental to
any hum
an life.B
ut it
allow s
in its
very design
for the
possibility of
m ultiple
specifications of
each of
the com
ponents. T
his is
so in
several different
w ays.
F irst,
the constitutive
circum stances
of hum
an life,
w hile
broadly shared,
are them
selves realized
in different
form s
in different
societies.’T he
fear ofdeath,
the love
ofp la)
relatio n
ships offriendship,and
affiliation w
ith others,even
the experience
ofthe bodily
appetites never
turn up
in sim
ply the
vague and
general form
in w
hich w
e have
introduced them
there,but alw
ays in
som e
specific and
historically rich
cultural realization,
w hich
can profoundly
shape not
only the
conceptions used
by the
citizens in
these areas,but
also their
I Z.SO
• L
L L
JW U
JJU L
J.L .1
L :
L iY
iir4 flL
t 1
i X
M A
R T
H A
C .N
U S
S B
A !JM
• 527
experiences them
selves. N
onetheless,w e
do have
in these
areas of
our com
m on
hum anity
sufficient overlap
to sustain
a general
conversation, focusing
on our
com m
on problem
s and
prospects. A
n d
som etim
es the
com m
on conversation
w ill
perm it
us to
criticize som
e conceptions
o f
the grounding
experiences them
selves, as
at odds
w ith
other things
hum an
beings w
ant to
do and
to be.
W h
en w
e are
choosing a
conception o
f good
functioning w
ith respect
to these
circum stances,w
e can
expect an
even greater
degree of
plurality to
becom e
evident. H ere
the approach
w ants
to retain
plurality in
tw o
significantly different
w ays:
w hat
I m
ay call
the w
ay o
f p lu
ral specj/ication,
and w
hat I
m ay
call the
w ay
o f
localspecj/ication. P
lural specification
m eans
w hat
its nam
e im
plies. P
ublic policy,
w hile
using a
determ inate
conception o
f the
good at
a high
level of
generality,leaves a
great deal
of latitude
for citizens
to specify
each of
the com
ponents m
ore concretely,and
w ith
m uch
variety,in accordance
w ith
local traditions,
or individual
tastes. IV
Iany concrete
form s
o f
life, in
m any
different places
and circum
stances, display
functioning in
accordance w
ith all
the m
ajor capabilities.
A s
for local
specification: G
ood public
reasoning,I believe
and have
argued, is
alw ays
done, w
hen w
ell done,
w ith
a rich
sensitivity to
the concrete
context,to the
characters o fth
e agents
and their
socialsituation. T
his m
eans th
at in
addition to
the pluralism
I have
just described,
the A
ristotelian needs
to consider
a different
sort o
fplural specification
of the
good.F or
som etim
es w
hat is
a good
w ay
o fprom
oting education
in one
part o f
the w
orld w
ill be
com pletely
ineffectual in
another. F
orm s
o f
affiliation th
at flourish
in one
com m
unity m
ay prove
im possible
to sustain
in another.
In such
cases, the
A ristotelian
m ust
aim at
som e
concrete specification
of the
general list
th at
suits, and
develops out
of, the
local conditions.
T his
w ill
alw ays
m ost
reasonably be
done in
a participatory
d ialo
g u e
7 5
w ith
those w
ho are
m ost
deeply im
m ersed
in those
conditions. F
or though
A ristotelianism
does n o t
hesitate to
criticize tradition
w here
tradition perpetrates
injustice or
oppression, it
also does
not believe
in saying
anything at
all w
ith o u t
rich and
full inform
ation, gathered
not so
m uch
from detached
study as
from the
voices o f
those w
ho live
the w
ays of
life in
question. M
arth a
C hen’s
w ork,
both here
and in
her book,
gives an
excellent exam
ple of
how such
sensitivity to
the local
m ay
be com
bined w
ith a
conviction that
the central
values on
the list
are w
orth pursuing
even w
hen tradition
has not
endorsed them
.
T he
liberalcharges the
capability approach
w ith
neglectofautonom y,
arguing th
at any
such determ
inate conception
rem oves
from the
c iti
zens the
chance to
m ake
their ow
n choices
about the
good life.T
his is
a com
plicated issue:
T hree
points can
be stressed.
F irst,
the list
is a
list o f
capabilities, not
a list
ofactual functions,precisely
because the
co n cep
tion is
designed to
leave room
for choice.
G overnm
ent is
not directed
to push
citizens into
acting in
certain valued
w ays;instead,
it is
directed to
m ake
sure th
at all
hum an
beings have
the necessary
resources and
conditions for
acting in
those w
ays.It leaves
the choice
up to
them .A
person w
ith plenty
o f
food can
alw ays
choose to
fast. A
person w
ho has
been given
the capability
for sexual
expression can
alw ays
choose celibacyT
he person
w ho
has access
to subsidized
education can
alw ays
decide to
do som
ething else
instead. B
y m
aking opportunities
av ail
able, governm
ent enhances,
and does
not rem
ove, ch
o ice.
7 6
It w
ill not
alw ays
be easy
to say
at w
hat point
som eone
is really
capable of m
aking a
choice,especially in
areas w
here there
are severe
traditional obstacles
to functioning.
S om
etim es
our best
strategy m
ay w
ell be
to look
at actual
functioning and
infer negative
capability (tentatively)
from its
ab sen
ce. 7
7 B
ut the
conceptual distinction
rem ains
very im
portant. S
econd,this respectfor
choice is
builtdeeply into
the listitself,in
the architectonic
role it gives
to practical
reasoning. O
ne o fthe
m ost
central capabilities
prom oted
by the
conception w
ill be
the capability
o f
choice itself. 7 8
W e
should note
thatthe m
ajorliberalview in
this area
(that o fjo
h n
R aw
ls) agrees
w ith
our approach
in just
this area.F
or R
aw ls
insists that
satisfactions thatare
notthe outgrow
th ofone’s
very ow
n choices
have no
m oralw
orth; and
he conceives
ofthe tw
o m
oralpow ers
(analogous to
our practical
reasoning), and
o f
sociability (corresponding
to our
affiliation) as
builtinto the
definition ofthe
parties in
the originalposition, and
thus as
necessary constraints
on any
outcom e
they w
ill select. 7
9 Finally,the
capability view
insists th
at choice
is not
pure sp
o n tan
e ity
flourishing independent
o f
m aterial
and social
conditions. If
one cares
about au
to n o m
) then
one m
ust care
about the
rest ofthe
form of
life th
at supports
it, and the
m aterial
conditions that
enable one
to live
that form
of life.T hus
the approach
claim s
that its
ow n
com prehensive
concern w
ith flourishing
across all
areas of
life is
a better
w ay
of p ro
m oting
choice than
is the
liberal’s narrow
er concern
w ith
spontaneity alone,w
hich som
etim es
tolerates situations
in w
hich individuals
are in
other w
ays cut
off from
the fully
hum an
use of
their faculties.
I turn
now to
the objection
about application;
it raises
especially delicate
questions w
here w
om en
are concerned.
I 525’
G L
O B
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•529
7 .W
H O
G E
T S
IN C
L U
D E
D ?
W O
M E
N A
S H
U M
A N
B E
IN G
S
In a
now w
eU —
know n
rem ark,
w hich
I cite
here as
an epigraph,
the fem
inist law
yer C
atharine IvlacK
innon claim
ed that
“being a
w om
an is
not yet
a w
ay of
being a
hum an
b ein
g .”
8° T
his m
eans, I
think, that
m ost
traditional w
ays o
f categorizing
and valuing
w om
en have
not accorded
them fill
m em
bership in
the hum
an species, as
that species
is generally
defined. M acK
innon is
no doubt
thinking in
particular ofthe
frequent denials
to w
om en
of the
rational nature
that is
taken to
be a
central part
o f w
hat it
is to
be hum
an. It
is sobering
to rem
ind oneself
that quite
a few
leading philosophers, including
A ristotle
and R
ousseau, the
“fathers” (certainly
not m
others) o
f m
y idea,
did deny
w om
en full
m em
bership in
hum an
functioning as
they understood
that notion.
If this
is so,
one m
ight w
ell ask,
of w
hat use
is it
really to
identil5’ a
set of
central hum
an capabilities?
F or
the basic
(low er—
level) capacity
to develop
these can
alw ays
be denied
to w
om en, even
by those
w ho
grant their
centrality. D
oes this
problem show
that the
hum an
function idea
is either
hopelessly in
league w
ith patriarchy
or, at
best, im
potent as
a tool
for justice? I
believe th
at it
does not.
F or
if w
e exam
ine the
history o
f these
denials w
e see,
I believe,
the great
pow er
of the
conception o
f the
hum an
as a
source o
f m
oral claim
s. A
cknow ledging
the other
person as
a m
em ber
of the
very sam
e kind
w ould
have generated
a sense
of affiliation
and a
set of
m oral
and educational
duties. T
hat is
w hy,
to those
b en
t on
shoring up
their ow
n pow
er, the
stratagem of
splitting the
other off
from one’s
ow n
species seem
s so
urgent and
so seductive.
B ut
to deny
hum anness
to beings
w ith
w hom
one lives
in conversation
and interaction
is a
fragile sort
of self—
deceptive stratagem
,vulnerable to
sustained and
consistent reflection,
and also
to experiences
th at
cut through
self-deceptive ratio
n alizatio
n .
8’ A
ny m
oral conception
can be
w ithheld,
out o
f am
bition or
hatred or
sham e.
B ut
the conception
of the
hum an
being, spelled
out, as
here, in
a roughly
determ inate
w ay,
in term
s of
circum stances
of life
and functions
in these
circum stances,
seem s
m uch
harder to
w ithhold
than other
conceptions that
have been
m ade
the basis
for ethics—
”rational being,”
for exam
ple, or
(as I
have suggested)
“person.” T
o illustrate
this point, I
now turn
to the
earliest argum
ent know
n to
m e
in the
W estern
philosophical tradition
th at
uses a
conception of
the hum
an being
for fem
inist ends. It
is not
the first fem
inist argum
ent
in the
W estern
tradition: F
or Plato’s
R epublic
precedes (and
influences) itY 2
B u t
P lato’s
arg u
m en
t in
favor of equaleducation
forw om
en is
h eav
ily qualified
by his
elitism w
ith respect
to all
functions for
all hum
an beings;
thus it
is able
to generate
only elitist
conclusions for
m ales
and fem
ales alike.
P latonic
justice is
not the
“hum anist
justice” o f
S usan
O k in
’s pow
erfiil phrase.
T he
argum ent
I have
in m
ind is,
instead, the
first argum
ent o f
the R
om an
S toic
thinker Ivlusonius
R ufus
in his
b rief
treatise “T
hat W
om en
T oo
S hould
D o
P hilosophy,”
w ritten
in the
first cen
tu ry
A d ) .
8 3
T his
a rg
u m
e n t
is all
the m
ore interesting
in that
it, in
effect, uses
A ristotelian
concepts to
correct A
ristotle’s m
istake about
w om
en— show
ing, I
think, th
at an
A ristotelian
w ho
is b
o th
internally consistent
and honest
about the
evidence cannot
avoid the
egalitarian norm
ative conclusion
th at
w om
en, as
m uch
as m
en, should receive
a higher
education (for
th at
is in
effect w
hat is
m eant
by doing
p h ilo
so p h y ).
8 4
‘The argum
ent has
a tacit
prem ise.
It is
that— at
least w
ith respect
to certain
central functions
of the
hum an
being— the
presence in
a creature
o f
a basic
(untrained, low
er-level) capability
to perform
the functions
in question,
given suitable
support and
education, exerts
a claim
on society
th at
those capabilities
should be
developed to
the point
at w
hich the
person is
fully capable
of choosing
the functions
in question.T
his prem
ise needed
no argum
entin the
philosophical culture
ofC reco-R
om an
an tiq
u ity
since that
m oral
claim is
m ore
or less
taken to
be im
plicit in
the notion
o f
capability itself.
I have
tried to
give it
intuitive support
in the
argum ent
of this
paper. T
he argum
ent itself
now follow
s w
ith a
truly radical
sim plicity.Its
second prem
ise consists
o fan
appealto the
experience of the
im aginary
recalcitrant m
ale interlocutor.
W om
en, he
is asked
to concede
on the
basis o
f experience,
do in
fact have
the basic
capabilities to
perform a
w ide
v ariety
ofthe m
ostim portant
hum an
fiinctions.T hey
have the
five senses.
T hey
have the
sam e
num ber
of bodily
parts, im
plying sim
ilar functional
p o ssib
ilities in
that sphere.T
hey have
the ab
ility to
th in
k an
d reason,just
as m
ales do. A
nd, finally,they have
responsiveness to
ethical distinctions,
m aking
(w hether
w ell
or badly)
distinctions betw
een the
good and
the bad. S
om e
tim e
is then
spent establishing a
third prem
ise: that
“higher education”
of the
sort offered
by the
S toic
ideal o f
liberal education,is
necessary for
the full
developm ento
fthe perceptual, in
te l
lectual, and
m oral
capabilities. C
onclusion: W
om en,
like m
en, should
have this
education.
• U
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• 531
T he
puzzle,for us,is
the second
prem ise.W
hy does
the interlocutor
accept it?
‘N e
see from
the surrounding
m aterialthat
the interlocutor
is a
husband w
ho interacts
w ith
his w
ife in
a num
ber ofareas
oflife that
are explicitly
enum erated:
planning and
m anaging
a household
(w here
she is
the one
w ho
m anages
m ost
of the
daily business);
having and
raising children
(w here
he observes,or
im agines,her
in labor,enduring
risk and
pain for
the sake
o f
the fam
ily and,
later, caring
for and
educating the
child); having
sexual relations
w ith
him ,
and refusing
to have
sex w
ith others;having
a realfriendship
w ith
him ,based
on com
m on
contem porary
ideas of”sharing
life to
g eth
er”; 8
5 deciding
how to
treatthe people
around her;being
fair,forexam ple,to
the household
staffiand,finally,confronting all
the dangers
and the
m oral
am biguities
ofthe politics
of first
century A
.D .R
om e—
refusing to
capitulate, he
says, to
the unjust
dem ands
of a
tyrant. In
all o
f these
operations of
life, the
argum ent
seem s
to be,
he tacitly
acknow ledges,in
fact strongly
relies upon,
his w
ife’s capability
to engage
in practicalreasoning
and ethical
distinction m
aking.Indeed,he is
depicted as
som eone
w ho
w ould
like these
things done
w ell—
for he
w ants
his w
ife not
to reason
badly w
hen political
life gets
tough, or
to treatthe
servants w
ith cruelty, or
to botch
the education
ofthe children.
So in
his daily
life he
acknow ledges
her hum
anity,her possession
ofthe basic
(low er-level)
capabilities for
fully hum
an functioning.
H ow
, then,
M usonius
reasonably asks
him ,can
he consistently
deny herw
hat w ould
be necessary
in order
to develop
and fhlflll
that hum
anity? Ih
is, I
believe,is an
im pressively
radical argum
ent.A nd
itled to
(or reflected)
a social
situation that
m arked
a high
point for
w om
en in
the W
estern tradition
for thousands
ofyears since
and to
co m
e. 8 6
W e
do not
need to
show that
the view
s ofM
usonius on
w om
en w
ere perfect
in all
respects;in m
any w
ays they
w ere
not.B ut
his argum
entshow s,I
believe, the
pow er
ofa universalconception
ofthe hum
an being
in claim
s o fju
s tice
for w
om en.F
or the
interlocutor m
ight have
refused to
acknow ledge
that his
w ife
w as
a “person”:
It w
as to
som e
extent up
to him
to define
thatrather refined
and elusive
concept.H e
could notfailto
acknow ledge
thatshe w
as a
hum an
being,w ith
the basic
capability for
the functions
in question.
F or
he had
acknow ledged
that already,in
his daily
life.
8. W O
M E
N A
N D
M E
N :T
W O
N O
R M
S O
R O
N E
?
B ut
should there
be a
single norm
of hum
an functioning?
It has
often been
argued, in
both non-W
estern and
W estern
traditions, that
there
should be
tw o
different standards
ofhum an
functioning and
capability corresponding
to the
different“natures” ofthe
m ale
and the
fem ale.U
su ally
these overlap
in the
areas ofbodily
health,m obility,and
perception, but
differ sharply
in the
areas of
practical reason
and affiliation.
M ost
com m
only, citizenship,
public activity,and
full practical
autonom y
are assigned
to m
ales, care
for hom
e and
fam ily
to fem
ales.W e
m ust
now confront
the claim
s of
this position.
T hose
w ho
recognize separate
spheres offunctioning
for m
ales and
fem ales
have taken
up tw
o im
portantly-different positions,
w hich
w e
need to
be careflil
to distinguish.T
he first,w
hich I
shall call
P osition
A ,
assigns to
both m
ales and
fem ales
the sam
e general
norm ative
list offunctions,but
suggests that
m ales
and fem
ales should
exercise these
functions in
differentspheres oflife.T
he second,w
hich I
shallcallP o si
tion B
,insists that
the listoffunctions,even
ata high
level ofgenerality,
should be
different. (It
is B
rather than
A thatis
usually associated
w ith
the claim
that m
ales and
fem ales
have different“natures”.)
P osition
A is
com patible
w ith
a serious
interest in
equality and
in gender
justice. F
or w
hat it
says, after
all, is
that m
ales and
fem ales
have the
sam e
basic needs
for capability
developm ent
and should
get w
hat they
need. It
is determ
ined to
ensure that
both get
to the
higher (developed)
level o fcapability
w ith
respect to
all the
central functions.
It sim
ply holds
that this
can (and
perhaps should)
be done
in separate
spheres.Itis a
kind ofgender-based
localspecification.A is,after
all,the position
ofM usonius,w
ho holds
that the
m ajor
functions ofaffiliation
and practicalreason
m ay
be exercised
by the
w om
an in
the m
anagem ent
of the
hom e
and by
the m
an in
the public
sp h ere.
8 7
It evidently
seem s
to him
convenient, given
w om
en’s childbearing
role,that the
cu sto
m ary
divisions o f
duties should
not be
overturned, and
he believes
that all
the m
ajor capabilities
can flourish
in either
sphere.Is this
any m
ore problem
atic than
to say
that hum
an functioning
in India
can,and even
should, take
a different
concrete form
from functioning
in E
ngland? T
he difficulty
is,how ever,
that once
w e
have recognized
the extent
to w
hich gender
divisions have
been socially
constructed in
m orally
arbitrary and
injurious w
ays, and
once w
e insist,
instead, on
using com
m on
hum anity
as our
m oral
and political
basis, it
is difficult
to see
w hat
good argum
ents there
are for
P osition
A ,w
hich just
happens to
m aintain
in place
divisions thathave
often proven
oppressive to
w om
en. W
h at
could such
argum ents
be? I
have m
entioned biological
differences.B ut
how m
uch separation
offunction is
really suggested
by w
om en’s
childbearing,especially today?
334 •
tzI4JflhiJ.iJU O
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M A
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• 533
1
E ven
in the
fourth century
n.c.,P lato
w as
able to
see that
the situation
ofm ales
and fem
ales is
notvery different
from the
situation ofm
ale and
fem ale
hunting dogs:T
he fem
ale needs
a period
o frest
for childbearing
and nursing,
b u
t this
in no
w ay
requires, or
even suggests,
a lifelong
differentiation o
f functions.
A dvances
in the
control of
reproduction are
m aking
this less
and less
plausible. A
nd it
should be
evident to
all th
at the
disability im
posed by
childbearing for
the m
em ber
of the labor
force is
to a
large exient
constructed, above allby
the absence
ofsupport for
child care,both
from the
public sphere
and from
em ployers.
O th
er bodily
differences th
at have
standardly been
m entioned—
for exam
ple, differences
in bodily
strength th
at have
often been
held to
im ply
a d if
ferentiation of functions—
are increasingly
being found
to be
based on
bad scientific
arg u m
en t,
8 8
and are
also less
and less
plausible as
bases for
functional differentiation.
M ilitary
functions, for
exam ple,
depend less
and less
upon bodily
strength and
m ore
and m
ore on
education. T
he recognition
of this by
the U
S C
ongress in
its recent
equalization o
f m
ilitary roles
sim ply
grants w
hat should
long ago
have been
obvious. O
ne m
ightalso point
to contingent socialfacts.S
ocieties are
already divided
along gender
lines. So
ifw e
are going
to m
ove to
a situation
in w
hich w
om en
w ill
be capable
o f
exercising all
the m
ajor functions,
it
v ill
be prudent
to develop
the resources
of that
gender-divided stru
c ture,
seeking greater
independence and
flililllm ent
for w
om en
w ithin
it, rather
than trying
to break
it up.T
his, I think,
is w
h at
is really
going on
in M
usonius. A
s a
G reek-speaking
philosopher in
N ero’s
R om
e, he
hasn’t the
ghost o
f a
chance of
m aking
institutional changes
o f
the sort
recom m
ended in
S toic
view s
o f
the ideal
city in
w hich
m ales
and fem
ales w
ere to
be fully
equal citizens
w ith
no distinction
ofspheres and
even no
distinction o
f clo
th in
g !
8 9
H e
does have
a hope
o f
convincing individual
husbands to
allow their
w ives
access to
education,so he
does w
hat he
can.M uch
the sam
e is
true in
M artha
C hen’sA
Q uiet
R ev
o lu
tion. N
either C
hen nor
her colleagues
proposed to
jettison all
gender divisions
;vithin the
village.Instead, they
found “fem
ale jobs”
th at
w ere
som ew
hat m
ore dignified
and im
p o rtan
t than
the old
jobs, jobs th
at looked
continuous w
ith traditional
fem ale
w ork
b u t
w ere
outside the
hom e
and brought
in w
ages. F
requently this
is a
p ru
d en
t strategy
in bringing
about real
social change.A
s M
arth a
C hen
show s,
the “revolution”
in w
om en’s
quality of
life never
w ould
have taken
place b u t
for the
caution o
f the
w om
en, w
ho at
each stage
gave the
m en
o f
the village
reason to
believe that
the transform
ations w
ere not
overw helm
ingly threatening
and w
ere good
for the
w ell-being
o f
the entire
group. O
n the
other hand,
such pragm
atic decisions
in the
face o f
recalcitrant realities
do n
o t
tell us
how things
ought to
be. T
o hold
that a
gender-divided tw
o-spheres result
is an
acceptable specification
o f
the norm
is deeply
problem atic.
F or
very often
the traditionally
fem ale
norm is
socially devalued,
and the
traditionally m
ale functions
pow erfully
connected w
ith im
portant advantages.
In M
usonius’s R
om e,
a husband
can be
both a
citizen and
a household
m anager;
a w
ife does
not have
the choice
to be
a citizen.
In M
eth a
B ai’s
contem porary
India, the
confinem ent
of w
om en
to the
dom estic
sphere cuts
them off
from the
choice to
earn a
living, a
pow erful
determ inant
o f
overall capability
status. In
short, “separate
but equal”
assignm ents
usually serve
the ends
o f
a dom
inant group
and perpetuate
the oppression
of the
p o
w erless. 9°
T his
point needs
particular attention
in thinking
about divisions
of labor
w ithin
the fam
ily. It
seem s
perfectly reasonable
th at
in any
household there
should be
a division
o f
labor, even
a long-standing
one, w
ith som
e m
em bers
gaining greater
skills at
one task,
som e
at another.
It w
ould already
be great
progress, vis—
à— vis
the current
state ofthings
in all know
n countries,if dom
estic duties
w ere
equally divided
by tim
e and
effort. B
ut even
in th
at utopian
situation, assignm
ent of
tasks along
traditional gender-divided
lines m
ay be
suspect, on account
o f
its possible
association w
ith lack
o f
respect and
seW —
respect. If
all and
only girls
are taught
to cook, for
exam ple,this
does not
seem to
be a
m orally
neutral case
o f
functional specialization
(like teaching
one child
the piano,
another the
clarinet); for
it reinforces
stereotypes th
at are
associated, historically,w ith
the denial
to w
om en
o f citizenship
and autonom
y. I
conclude th
at there
are no
good argum
ents for
position A
, and
th at
even the
prudent use
o f
A in
prom oting
gradual social
change should
be view
ed w
ith caution,
and w
ith a
constant aw
areness o f
m ore
genuinely equal
norm s.
I turn
now to
P osition
B , w
hich has
been influentially
defended by
m any
philosophers,including R
ousseau and
som e
o fhis
contem porary
fo llo
w ers.
9 8
T his
position m
ay be
criticized in
a num
ber of differentw
ays. F
irst,w e
should insist
that, insofar
as it
rests on
the claim
that there
are tw
o different
sets o f
basic capabilities,
this claim
has not
been borne
out by
any responsible
scientific evidence.
A s
A nne
F austo-S
terling’s M
yths of
G ender
repeatedly show
s, experim
ents th
at allegedly
show
534 G
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535
strong gender
divisions in
basic (untrained)
abilities are
fullo fscientific
flaw s;
these flaw
s rem
oved, the
case for
such differences
is altogether
inconclusive. S
econd,w e
should note
th ateven
w hat
is claim
ed w
ithout su
b stan
tiation in
this body
of scientific
m aterial
usually does
n o t
am ount
to a
difference in
w hat
I have
been calling
the central
basic capabilities.
W h at
is alleged
is usually
a differential
statistical distribution
o f
som e
specific capacity
for a
high level
o f
excellence, not
for crossing
the threshold,
and excellence
in som
e very
narrow ly
defined function
(say, geom
etrical ability),
rather than
in one
o f
our large-scale
capabilities such
as the
capability to
perform practical
reasoning (w
hich m
ay,recall, be
done in
a num
ber o
fdifferentw ays,in
accordance w
ith the
particular tastes
and abilities
o f
the individual).
So: E
ven if
the claim
w ere
true, it
w ould
n o
t be
a claim
about capabilities
in our
capacious sense;
nor, since
it is
a statistical
claim ,w
ould ithave
any im
plications for
the w
ays in
w hich
individuals should
be treated.
So the
political consequences
ofsuch gender
differences in
our schem
e o
fthings,even had
they been
established,w ould
be nil.
Finally,w e
m ust
also note
th at
it is
in principle
next to
im possible,
rig h
t now
,to do
the sort
o fresearch
th atw
ould be
required ifsuch
d if
ferences w
ere ever
to be
convincingly established.F
or ithas
been show
n th
at rig
h t
now ,
from b irth
on, babies
of the
tw o
sexes are
differently treated
by parents
and other
adults, in
accordance w
ith the
perception o
ftheir external
genitalia.T hey
are handled
differently,spoken to
d iffer
ently,given different
toys.T heir
em otions
are labeled
differently— thus
a crying
infant tends
to be
labeled “angry”
if the
observer believes
it to
be a
boy, and
“frightened” if
the observer
believes it
to be
a g irl.
9 2
T his
m eans
th at
in the
present gender-divided
state o
fthings w
e cannot
get beneath
culture reliably
enough to
getthe necessary
evidence aboutbasic
capabilities.I think
this supports
the conclusion
I defended
earlier:T he
potential for
error and
abuse in
capability testing
is so
great th
at w
e should
proceed as
if every
individual has
the basic
capabilities. B
utw e
can also
criticize P
osition B
in a
differentw ay.F
or I
believe th
at it
can also
be show
n th
at the
differentiated conceptions
o f
m ale
and fem
ale functioning
characteristically p u tforw
ard by
B are
internally inadequate,
and fail
to give
us viable
norm s
o f
hum an
flo u rish
in g .
9 3
W h
at do
w e
usually find,in
the versions
ofB th
atour philosophical
tradition bequeaths
to us?
(R ousseau’s
view is
an instructive
exam ple.)
W e
have, on
the one
hand, m
ales w
ho are
“autonom ous,”
capable of
practical reasoning,
independent and
self-sufficient, allegedly
good at
political deliberation.T
hese m
ales are
brought up
not to
develop strong
em otions
o flove
and feelings
ofdeep need
th at
are associated
w ith
the aw
areness of
one’s ow
n lack
of self-sufficiency.
F or
this reason
they are
not w
ell equipped
to care
for the
needs of
their fam
ily m
em bers,
or, perhaps,even
to notice
those needs.O
n the
other hand,w
e have
fem ales
such as
R ousseau’s
S ophie,broughtup
to lack
autonom y
and self-respect,
illequipped to
rely on
her ow
n practicalreasoning,dependent
on m
ales, focused
on pleasing
others,good at
caring for
others.Is either
of these
viable as
a com
plete life
for a
hum an
being? Itw
ould seem
not.T he
internal tensions
in R
ousseau’s accountare
a good
place to
begin seeing
this; they
have been
w ell
described by
S usan
0km and
Jane R
oland M
artin. R
ousseau,in E
rnile,places trem
endous em
phasis on
com passion
as a
basic social
m otivation.
H e
understands com
passion to
require fellow
feeling, and
a keen
responsiveness to
the sufferings
ofothers.A nd
yet,in preparing
E m
ile for
autonom ous
citizen ship,
in the
end he
shortchanges these
em otional
functions, allocating
caring and
responsiveness to
the fem
ale sphere
alone.It appears
likely th
at E
m ile
w ill
be not
only an
incom plete
person but
also a
defective citizen,
even by
the standards
of citizenship
recognized by
R ousseau
him self. W
ith S
ophie, things
again go
badly.T aught
to care
for others,b
u t
not taught
th at
her life
is her
ow n
to plan,
she lives
under the
sw ay
of external
influences and
lacks self-governm
ent. A
s R
ousseau him
self show
s,in his
fascinating narrative
of the
end o f
her life,
she com
es to
a bad
end th
o u g
h her
lack ofjudgm
ent. Ivloreover— as
M usonius
already argued
to his
R om
an husband,defending
equalfunctioning— she
proves to
be a
bad partner
and deficient
in love.
F or
love, as
w e
com e
to see,
requires ju
d g
m en
t and
constancy if
it is
to be
truly deep
and truly
p e r
ceptive. So
each o f
them fails
to live
a com
plete hum
an life;
and each
fails,too, to
exem plif5r
fully and
w ell
the very
functions for
w hich
they w
ere being
trained, since
those functions
require support
from other
functions for
w hich
they w
ere not
trained.T he
text leads
its th
o u g h t
ful reader
to the
conclusion th
at the
capabilities th
at have
traditionally m
arked the
separate m
ale and
fem ale
spheres are
not separable
from one
another w
ithout a
grave functional
loss.T hey
support and
educate one
another. So
society cannot
strive for
com pleteness
by sim
ply a d d
ing one
sphere to
the other.It
m ust
strive to
develop in
each and
every person
the full
range o f
hum an
capabilities.
• Z
JA 3
tU .g
JU 3
n .4
; 3
iL Y
U P
Q U
. .a
a n
t a
M A
R T
H A
C ,
N U
S S
B A
U M
• 5
3 7
T his
m ore
inclusive notion
o f
hum an
functioning adm
its tragic
conffict.F or
itinsists on
the separate
value and
the irreplaceable
im p
o r
tance of
a rich
plurality o
f functions.
A n
d the
w orld
does not
alw ays
guarantee th
at individuals
w ill
notbe faced
w ith
painfulchoices am
ong these
functions,in w
hich,in order
to pursue
one o
fthem w
ellthey m
ust neglect
others (and
thus, in
m any
cases, subvert
the one
as w
ell). B
ut this
show s
once ag
ain ,l
believe,the trem
endous im
portance ofkeeping
som e
such list
ofthe central
functions before
us as
w e
assess the
quality o flife
in the
countries o
f the
w orld
and strive
to raise
it.F or
m any
such tragedies—
like m
any cases
o f
sim ple
capability failure—
result from
unjust and
unreflective social
arrangem ents.
O ne
can im
agine, and
try to
construct,a society
in w
hich the
tragic choices
th at
faced E
m ile
and S
ophie w
ould n o tbe
n ecessar
in w
hich both
m ales
and fem
ales could
learn both
to love
and to
reason. B
eing a
w om
an is
indeed not
yet a
w ay
o f
being a
hum an
being. W
om en
in m
uch o
fthe w
orld lack
support for
the m
ost central
hum an
functions,and this
denial ofsupport
is frequently
caused by
their being
w om
en.B utw
om en,unlike
rocks and
plants and
even dogs
and horses,
are hum
an beings,have
the potential
to becom
e capable
ofthese hum
an functions,given
sufficient nutrition,education,and
other support.T
hat is
w hy
their unequal
failure in
capability is
a problem
ofjustice. It
is up
to us
to solve
this problem
.I claim
th ata
conception o fh
u m
an functioning
gives us
valuable assistance
as w
e undertake
this ta
sk .
9 4
N O
T E
S
[N o te
ad d
ed by
au th
o r
in 2007:]
T his
paper represents
an early
and rath
er p rim
itiv e
stage o
f m
y th
in k
in g
ab o u t
h u
m an
capabilities. M
o re
developed versions
are found
in m
y books
W om
en an
d H
u m
an D
evelopm ent:
Y he
C a p a
bilities A
pproach (C
am b rid
g e
U niversity
P ress,
2 0
0 0 ),
and F
rontiers ofJustice:
D isability,
N ationality,
Species M
em bership
(H arv
ard U
niversity P
ress, 2006).
A m
o n
g the
im p
o rtan
t developm
ents in
th e
view ,
the m
o st
im p
o rtan
t are:
(1) m
y endorsem
entofa form
ofR aw
lsian “politicalliberalism
,” in
such a
w ay
that the
capabilities list
is introduced
not as
a com
prehensive view
of a
flourish ing
life,but only
as the
source for
political principles
that can
potentially be
en d
o rsed
as the
basis for
a d ecen
t co
m m
o n
life by
people w
h o
share different
com prehensive
doctrines ofthe
good; (2)
an account
ofpoliticaljustification and
of the
relationship betw
een m
y view
and view
s in
both the
U tilitarian
and so
cial-co n tract
trad itio
n s;
(3) an
acco u n t o f
the role
o f
a n o tio
n o
f h u m
an
equality in
the capability
approach,in w
hich som
e capabilities
are thoughtto
be d
istrib u
ted adequately
only if
they are
d istrib
u ted
equally (e.g.,
freed o
m o
f religion,the
rightto vote,the
rightto education),w
hereas others
(e.g.,the right
to suitable
housing) are
taken to
be d
istrib u
ted adequately
once an
am ple
social m
inim um
is attained;
(4) a
m ajor
revision in
the notion
of“basic capabilities,”
w ith
the result
th at
being b
o rn
o f
tw o
h u
m an
parents is
sufficient for
being a
bearer o
f fully
equal h
u m
an dignity, w
ith only
a few
exceptions, such
as the
person in
a p
erm an
en t
vegetative state
and the
anencephalic child;
in o th
er w
ords,so long
as som
e kind
o f
in ten
tio n al
focusing and
striving is
present,the person,
how ever
severely disabled,
has en
titlem en
ts frilly
equal to
those o
f the
so-called “norm
al” person;
(5) an
account o
f political
im p
lem en
tatio n
, w
hich m
akes it
clear th
at the
capabilities list is
a basis
for in
tern atio
n al
discussion and
persuasion only, b
u t
th at
im p lem
en tatio
n is
the jo
b o
fg o
v ern
m en
ts chosen
by and
accountable to
the people,
except in
extrem e
cases o
f genocide
and o th
er trad
itio n ally
recognized occasions
for h u m
an itarian
in terv
en tio
n .
1.T he
argum ent
of this
paper is
closely related
to that
o f
several o th
er papers
o f m
ine,to w
hich I
shall refer
freq u
en tly
in w
h at
follow s: “N
ature,F u n c
tion,and C
apability,” O
xford S
tudies in
A ncient Philosophy,
suppl.v o
l.1 (1988):
145— 84;
“N o n -R
elativ e
V irtues:
A n
A risto
telian A
pproach,” M
id w
est S
tudies in
P hilosophy
13 (1988):
32— 53,and,
in an
expanded version,in
lvi.N u
ssb au
m and
A .
S en,
eds., The
Q uality
o f L
Jè (O
xford: C
laren d
o n
P ress,
1993), pp.
242— 76;
“A ristotelian
S ocial
D em
ocracj4” in
R .
B .
D ouglass,
G .M
ara, and
H .
R ich
ard so
n ,
eds., L
iberalism an
d the
G ood
(N ew
Y ork:
R o
u tled
g e,
1990), pp.
203— 52;“A
ristotle on
H u m
an N
atu re
and the
F o
u n
d atio
n s
o fE
thics,” in
W orld,
M ind,
an d
E thics:E
ssays on
the P
hilosophy o fB
ern ard
W iiia,ns,ed. R
.H arrison
an d j.
A lth
am eds.
(C am
b rid
g e:
C am
b rid
g e
U niversity
P ress,
1995); “H
u m
an F
u n ctio
n in
g and
S ocial
Justice: In
D efen
se o
f A
risto telian
E ssen
tialism ,”
P olitical T
heory 2
0 (1
9 9
2 ):
202— 46.
2. B y
this I
m ean
that the
difference in
external genitalia figures
in social
life as
it is
in terp
reted by
h u m
an cultures;
thus w
e are
never dealing
sim ply
w ith
facts given
at birth,
but alw
ays w
ith w
hat has
been m
ade of
them (see
below ,
section 8
for discussion
o f th
e role
o f
culture in
biological claim
s about
m ale/fem
ale differences).T
hus,even the
com m
on distinction
betw een
“gender,” a
culturalconcept,and “sex,”the
allegedly pure
biologicalconcept,is inadequate
to capture
the d ep
th o
fcultural in
terp retatio
n in
p resen
tin g
even the
biological “facts”
to h u m
an beings,
fro m
the very
start o
f a
child’s life.
S ee
A n n e
F a u sto
S terling,
M yths
o f
G ender
(2nd ed.,
N ew
Y ork:
B asic
B ooks,
1992). I
have discussed
these issues
fu rth
er in
“C o n stru
ctin g
L ove,
D esire,
and C
are,” in
D .
E stlu
n d
and lvi.N
u ssb
au m
,eds.,Sex, P
reference,an d
F am
ily:E ssays
on L
aw an
d N
ature (N
ew Y
orlc O
xford U
niversity Press,
1997), pp.
17— 43,
and in
m y
Sex an
d S
ocialJustice (N
ew Y
orlc O
xford U
n iv
ersity P
ress, 1999),
p p
. 2 5 3
—2 7 5 .
3.For a
historical argum
ent along
these lines
from the
history ofW
est ern
scientific th
o u g h t,
see T
hom as
L aqueur,
M ak
in g
Sex (B
erkeley and
L os
538 • G
L Q
$ A
L JL
Jb iiC
: SF1Y
IIN A
L S
S A
T h
M A
R T
H A
C .N
U S
S B
A U
M •
539
A ngeles:
U n
iv ersity
o f
C alifo
rn ia
P ress,
1989). T
he papers
in this
volum e
[W om
en, C
ulture an
d D
evelopm ent]
by A
m arty
a S
en [“G
en d
er In
eq u ality
and T
heories o fJu
stice,” 259—
73], X iaorong
L i
[“G en
d er
In eq
u ality
in C
hina and
C u ltu
ral R
elativism ,”
407— 25], and
R oop
R ekha
V erm
a [“
F e m
in in
it 3s
E q u al
ity,and Personhood,”
433— 43]
show that
the use
of ideas of
nature to
convey a
false sense
of appropriateness, “justil5’ing”
unjust practices,
is by
no m
eans confined
to the
W estern
tradition. 4.See
M artha
C hen’s
“A M
atter of
Survival: W om
en’s R
ight to
E m
p lo
y m
en t
in In
d ia
and B
angladesh,”in W
om en,
C ulture
andD evelopm
ent:A S
tudy o f
H u ,n
an C
’apabilities, ed. M
arth a
C .
N u ssb
au m
and Jo
n ath
an G
lover (O
xford: O
x fo
rd U
niversity P
ress, 1995),
3 7 -5
7 .
5.J. S.M
ill, The
S ubjection
o fW
om en
(Indianapolis: B
obbs M
errill, 1988);
A m
arrva S
en,“G en
d er
and C
o o p erativ
e C
onflicts,” in
I.T in
k er,
ed., P
ersistent Inequalities
(N ew
Y ork:
O xford
U niversity
P ress,1990);“G
en d er
In eq
u ality
and T
heories ofJustice”
in IV
om en,
C ulture
an d
D evelopm
ent,p p .
2 5 9 -7
3 ,
and “M
ore T
han 100
M illio
n W
o m
en A
re M
issing,” N
ew Y
ork R
eview o fB
ooks; H
um an
D evelopm
ent R
eport, 1993,
for the
U n
ited N
atio n s
D ev
elo p m
en t
P ro
g ram
m e
(U N
D P
) (N
ew Y
ork and
O xford:
O xford
U niversity
P ress,1993);
S usan
M oller
O k in
,Ju stire,
G ender,
an d
the F
am ily
(N ew
Y ork:
B asic
B ooks,
1989), see
m y
review o
f 0 k m
, “Justice
for W
o m
en ,”
N ew
Y ork
R eview
o f
B ooks
(O cto
b er
1992); C
ath arin
e M
acK in
n o n ,
rem ark
cited by
R ich
ard R
orty in
“F em
inism and
P rag
m atism
,”M ith
ig an
Q uarterly
R eview
3 0 (1
9 8 9 ):
263. M acK
in n o n
has since
acknow ledged
the rem
ark. 6.
F o r
a co
m p ellin
g arg
u m
en t
lin k in
g fem
inism and
in tern
atio n
alism ,
see O
n o
ra O
’N eill,
“Justice, G
en d er,
and In
tern atio
n al
B o u n d aries,”
in M
. N
u ssb
au m
and A
. S
en, eds.,
The Q
uality ofL
tfe, p p .
3O3—2 3 .
7. K
w am
e A
n th
o n
y A
p p iah
,In M
y F
atherc 1-b
use:A frica
in the
Philosophy o f C
ulture (N
ew Y
ork and
O x fo
rd :
O x fo
rd U
niversity P
ress, 1992),
pp. 136.
8. O
n the
o th
er h an
d ,
it is
closely related
to K
an tian
approaches using
the universal
n o
tio n
o f
p erso
n h o o d .
S ee,
for exam
ple, O
n o ra
O ’N
eill, “Justice,
G en
d er,and
In tern
atio n
al B
o u n d aries,”w
ith m
y co
m m
en tary
(324— 35).In
the p resen
t volum
e [iV
om en,
C ulture
an d
D evelopm
ent], see
the papers
o f
O n o ra
O ’N
eill [“Justice, C
ap ab
ilities, and
V ulnerabilities,”
140— 52],R
u th
A n n a
P u
t nam
[“W h
y N
o t
a F
em in
ist T
heory o f
Justice?” 298—
331], and
R oop
R ekha
V erm
a [“F
em ininit)s
E q
u a Iit
and P
erso n h o o d ,”
433— 43].
B elow
I shall
be m
aking som
e criticism
s o f
the concept
o f
“person” in
fem in
ist arg
u m
en t,
and related
criticism s
o f
liberal K
antian ap
p ro
ach es
(on w
hich see
also A
S D
and m
y review
o f
0 k m
). B
u t
these differences
are subtle
and take
place against
a b ack
g ro
u n d
o f
su b stan
tial ag
reem en
t. See
also D
avid C
rocker, “F
u n ctio
n in
g and
C apabili
.T he
F o u n d atio
n o f Sen’s
and N
ussbaum ’s
D ev
elo p m
en t
E thics,”
P oliticalT
heory 2 0 (1
9 9 2 ):
5 8
4 ff
9.B y
relativism ,I
m ean
the view
th at
the only
available criterio
n o
f a d ju
d icatio
n is
som e
local group
or individual.T
hus relativism
, as
I u n d erstan
d it,
is a
genus o
fw h
ich the
b ran
d o
f reliance
on individuals’subjective
preferences freq
u en
tly en
d o
rsed in
neoclassical econom
ics is
one species.
(E co
n o
m ists,
o f
course, are
relativist only
about value,
n o
t ab
o u
t w
h at
they construe
as the
d o m
ain o
fscientific “fact.”)
T his
affinity w
ill later
be relevant
to m
y co
m m
en ts
on the
M arg
lin project.M
y o p p o n en
ts also
freq u
en tly
em ploy
the term
“post- m
o d ern
ist” to
ch aracterize
th eir
position: T
his is
a vaguer
term ,
associated in
a very
general w
ay w
ith the
rep u
d iatio
n o
f b o th
m etaphysical
realism (to
be defined
below )
and universalism
. 10.M
u ch
o f
the m
aterial described
in these
exam ples
is now
published in
D o m
in atin
g K
now ledge:D
evelopm ent,
‘u ltu
re, an
d R
esistance,ed.F.A . Ivlarglin
and S.A
. M
arg lin
(O xford:
C laren
d o n
P ress,
1 9
9 0
).T h
e issue
o f “em
b ed
d ed
ness”and m
en stru
atio n
tahoos is
discussed in
S .A
.M arg
lin ,”L
o sin
g T
o u ch
:T h e
C u
ltu ral
C o n
d itio
n s
o fW
o rk
er A
cco m
m o
d atio
n and
R esistance,”pp. 217—
82, and
related issues
are discussed
in S
.A .M
arg lin
,“T ow
ard the
D ecolonization
o f
the M
in d ,”
1— 28.O
n S
ittala D
cvi,see F
.A .M
arg lin
,“S m
allpox in
T w
o S
ystem s
o f
K now
ledge,” 102—
44; and
for related
arg u
m en
ts see
A shis
N an
d y
and S
hiv V
isv an
ath an
,“M o
d ern
M ed
icin e
and Its
N o
n -M
o d
ern C
ritics,” 144—
84. 11.
F or
Sen’s ow
n account
o f
the plurality
and in
tern al
diversity o
f In
d ian
values, one
th at
strongly em
phasizes the
presence o
f a
ratio n
alist and
critical strand
in In
d ian
trad itio
n s,
seeM .
N u
ssb au
m and
A .
S en
,”ln tern
al C
riticism and
In d ian
R elativist T
rad itio
n s,”
in M
. K
rausz,ed.,R elativism
(N o
tre D
am e,
IN :
N o tre
D am
e U
niversity P
ress, 1989)—
a p
ap er
originally p
resen ted
at the
sam e
M IlD
E R
conference and
refused p
u b
licatio n
by the
M arg
lin s
in its
proceedings; and
“India and
the W
est,”N ew
R epublic
(7 Ju
n e
1993). 1
2 .S
. A
. M
arg lin
, in
“T ow
ard the
D eco
lo n
izatio n
,” 22—
23, suggests
th at
b in
ary th
in k
in g
is peculiarly
W estern
.B ut
such o
p p
o sitio
n s
are pervasive
in all
trad itio
n s
w ith
w h
ich I
have any
acquaintance: in
the U
panishads,for exam
ple (seeth
e ep
ig rap
h to
“H u m
an F
u n
ctio n
in g
”), in
C o
n fu
cian th
o u
g h
t (see, again,
the epigraph
to “H
u m
an F
unctioning”), in
Ibo th
o u g h t
(see,for m
any exam
ples, C
h in
u a
A chebe’s
T hings
F all
A p art
[L o n d o n :
W illiam
H ein
em an
n ,
1958]). C
ritics o
f such
o p
p o
sitio n
s have
n o t
explained how
one can
speak coherently
w ith
o u t
b o
u n
cin g
o ff
one th
in g
against an
o th
er. I
believe th
at A
risto tle
w as
right to
hold th
at to
say an
y th
in g
at all
one m
ust rule
out so
m eth
in g
,at the
very least
the co
n trad
icto ry
o f w
h at
one puts
fo rw
ard .T
h e
arg u
m en
ts o
f N ietzsch
e, w
hich are
freq u
en tly
put forw
ard as
if they
u n
d erm
in e
all binary
o p
p o
sitio n
s, actually
m ake
far m
ore subtle
and concrete
points about
the origins
o f
certain oppositions,
and the
interests served
by th
em .
13. See
E .
H o b sb
aw m
and I
R anger,
eds., The
In v
en tio
n o
f T
radition (C
am bridge:
C am
bridge U
niversityP ress,1
9 8
3 ).In
his N
ew R
epublic piece, S
en m
akes a
sim ilar
argum ent
about co
n tem
p o
rary India:T
he ‘W
estern construction
o fIn
d ia
as m
ystical and
“other” serves
the purposes
o f
the fu
n d
am en
talist B
JE w
ho are
busy refashioning
history to
serve the
ends o
fth eir
ow n
political pow
er. A
n elo
q u en
t critique
o f
the w
hole n
o tio
n o
f the
“other,” and
o f
the associated
“nativism ,”
w here
A frica
is co
n cern
ed ,
can be
found in
A p
p iah
(above n.
7), especially
in the
essays “T
he P
ostcolonial and
the P
o stm
o d ern
,” pp.
137— 57
and “T
opologies o f
N ativ
ism ,”p
p .
47— 72.
14. T
he proceedings
o f
this conference
are now
p u b lish
ed as
N u ssb
au m
and S
en, eds.,
The Q
uality o fL
ffe (n.
1 above).
15.“C ap
ab ility
and W
ell-B ein
g ,”
in N
u ssb
au m
and S
en, pp.
30— 53.
16.M arglin
has since
published this
p o in
t in
“T ow
ard the
D ecolonization.”
H is
reference is
to T
akeo D
o i,
The A
natom y
offlependence (T
o I’o
: K
edansho, 1971).
O n
w om
en and
m en
in jap
an ,
see H
u m
an D
evelopm ent
R eport,
1993, p.
26: “Japan,
despite som
e o f
the w
orld’s h ig
h est
levels o
f h u m
an d ev
elo p m
en t,
still has
m arked
inequalities in
ach iev
em en
t betw
een m
en and
w o m
en .
T he
1993 h
u m
an d
ev elo
p m
en t
index p
u tsJap
an first.B
ut w
hen the
H D
I is
adjusted for
g en
d er
disparity, Jap
an slips
to n u m
b er
1 7
.... W
om en’s
average earnings
are only
51 p ercen
t those
o f
m en,
and w
o m
en are
largely excluded
fro m
d e c i
sio n -m
ak in
g p
o sitio
n s....
T heir
rep resen
tatio n
is even
low er
in the
political sp
h ere....
In legal
rights in
general,Japan’s p atrilin
eal society
is only
gradually ch
an g in
g to
offer w
o m
en g reater
reco g n itio
n and
in d
ep en
d en
ce. Jap
an now
has political
and n o n -g
o v ern
m en
tal o rg
an izatio
n s
pressing for
change T
he q
u estio
n o f
freed o m
o f
choice is
thus on
the agenda
in Jap
an in
a large
w ay,
precisely on
account o f
the so
rt o f
u n eq
u al
fu n
ctio n
in g
vividly illu
strated in
M arglin’s
exam ple, w
here m
enial functions
are p erfo
rm ed
by w
o m
en ,
in order
th at
m en
m ay
be free
to p erfo
rm th
eir m
anagerial and
political functions.
17. See
S. A .
IV larglin,“T
ow ard
the D
eco lo
n izatio
n .”
18. S
ee S.
A .
M arg
lin ,
“L osing
T o
u ch
.”I p
u t
the term
in quotes
to in
d i
cate th
at I
am allu
d in
g to
v1arglin’s use
o f
the term
, n
o t
to the
co n
cep t
as I
u n d erstan
d it.
19. S
ee S.A
. M
arg lin
, “T ow
ard the
D ecolonization”
and “L
osing T
ouch.” S
im ilar
claim s
are co
m m
o n
in fem
in ist
arg u m
en t.
F or
exam ple,
in The
F em
in ist
T heory
ofthe S
tate (C
am bridge,iv[A
: H
arv ard
U niversity
P ress,1989), C
ath arin
e IviacK
innon argues
th at
“objectivity” as
trad itio
n ally
conceived in
the W
estern epistem
ological trad
itio n
is causally
linked to
the objectification
and abuse
o f
w om
en. T
his line
o f
arg u m
en t
is effectively
criticized in
L o u ise
vI. A
ntony, “Q
u in
e as
F em
inist: T
he R
adical Im
p o
rt o f
N atu
ralized E
p istem
o lo
g u ”in
L .
M .
A n
to n
y an
d C
.W irt,
ed s.,A
M in
d o fO
nec O
w n:
F em
in ist E
ssays on
R eason
an d
O bjectivity
(B oulder,
C C
: W
estview P
ress, 1992),
pp. 185—
225. S
ee also
the detailed
exam ination
o f
M acK
innon’s arg
u m
en t
in the
sam e
volum e
by S
ally H
asL anger,
in “O
n B
eing O
bjective and
B eing
O b jectified
,” 85—
125. M
acK innon’s
fu n d am
en tal
co n trib
u tio
n s
in the
areas o
f sexual
h arassm
en t
and p o rn
o g rap
h y
do n o t
d ep
en d
on this
analysis, and
are actually
u n d erm
in ed
by it.T
he core
o f
h er
th o u g h t
actually reveals
a stro
n g
co m
m itm
en t
to a
type o
f ethical
universalism ,
as m
y ep
ig rap
h indicates.
S ee,
in the
A n to
n y
volum e,
the persuasive
analysis by
L iz
R ap
p ap
o rt,
“G en
eralizin g
G en
d er:
R eason
and E
ssence in
the L
egal T
h o u g h t
o f
C ath
arin e
M acK
in n
o n
,” pp.
127— 43.
A lcoff’s
co n trib
u tio
n in
the p
resen t
volum e
[“D em
ocracy and
R ationality:
A D
ialogue w
ith H
ilary P
utnam ”
in IV
om en,
C ulture
an d
D evelop
‘nent, pp.225— 34]
continues the
debate ab
o u
t fem
inism and
reason; and
see also
L .
A lcoff
and E
. P
otter, eds.,
F em
in ist
E pistem
ologies (N
ew Y
ork: R
outledge, 1993).
F or
a healthy
skepticism ab
o u
t the
role o
f “anti—
essentialism ”
w ith
in fem
in ism
, see
S eyla
B enhabib,
“F em
inism and
the Q
iestio n
o f
P o
stm o
d ern
ism ,”
in S
itu a t
ing the
S e(f
G ender,
C om
m unity,
an d
P ostm
odernis,n in
C ontem
porary E
thics (N
ew Y
ork: R
outledge, 1992),
pp. 203—
42; S
abina L
ovibond, “F
em inism
and P
o stm
o d
ern ism
,” N
ew L
eft R
ev iew
178 (N
ovem ber—
D ecem
ber 1989):
5— 28;
V al
lSvloghadam ,“A
gainst E
u ro
cen trism
and N
ativism ,”
S ocialism
an d
D enzoc—
racy (fall/w
in ter
1989): 81—
104; M
o g h ad
am ,
G ender,
D evelopm
ent, an
d P
olicy: T
hw ard
E quity
an d
E m
pow erm
ent,U N
U /W
ID E
R R
esearch for
A ctio
n series
(N o v em
b er
1990). 20.
F o
r an
acco u n t
o f
this so
rt o
f n o rm
ativ e
arg u m
en t,
see A
lasd air
M acln
ty re,A
fter V
irtue (N
o te
D am
e, IN :
N o te
D am
e U
niversity P
ress, 1989).
2 1
.J. D
errid a,
O f G
ram m
atology,trans. U .
S pivak
(B altim
o re:Jo
h n
s H
o p
kins U
niversity P
ress, 1
9 7
6 ).T
h e
term is
m ean
t to
suggest the
idea th
at reality
is sim
ply “there”
and th
at know
ledge consists
in being
“present” to
it, w ith
o u
t any
in terferin
g b
arrier or
m ed
iatio n
. 22.
R .
R orty,P
hilosophy an
d th
eM irro
ro fN
atu re
(P rin
ceto n
,N J:
P rin
ceto n
U niversity
P ress,
1979). 23.
S ee,
for exam
ple, G
. E
. L
. O
w en
, ‘T
ith en
ai ta
P hainom
ena”, in
L ogic,
Science, an
d D
ialectic (L
o n
d o
n :
D u ck
w o rth
, 1986),
and M
. N
u ssb
au m
, The
F rag
ility o
f G
oodness: L uck
an d
E thics
in C
reek T
ragedy an
d P
h ilosop/iv
(C am
- bridge:
C am
b rid
g e
U niversity
P ress,
1986). S
ee also
H liary
P u
tn arn
,A risto
tle after
iV ittgenstein,
L in
d lay
L ectu
re, U
niversity o
f K
ansas, 1991.
24. S
ee the
illu m
in atin
g discussion
in B
. K
. M
atilal, P
erception (O
xford: C
laren d
o n
P ress,
1985). It
is w
o rth
n o tin
g th
at this
fu n d am
en tal
w o rk
is n o t
cited anyw
here in
M arg
lin and
M arg
lin ,
alth o
u g
h M
atilal w
as p
resen t
at the
conference and
delivered a
paper critical
o f
the fvlarglins’
ch aracterizatio
n o
f In
d ian
trad itio
n s.
T his
paper w
as d
ro p
p ed
from the
volum e.
Ivlatilal also
described the
im p
licatio n
s o
f the
realism debate
for In
d ian
ethical th
o u
g h
t: see
“E thical
R elativism
and the
C o n fro
n tatio
n o fC
ultures,”in K
rau sz,ed
.,R elativ
is,,z (N
o tre
D am
e, IN
: N
o tre
D am
e U
niversity P
ress, 1989),
pp. 339—
62. 2
5 .
T here
is a
longer version
o f
m y
criticism o
f co
n tem
p o
ran ’
attacks on
universalism in
“H u m
an F
u n
ctio n
in g
.” See
also “S
kepticism ab
o u
t P
ractical R
eason in
L iteratu
re and
the L
aw ,”
H arv
ard L
aw R
eview 107
(1994): 714—
44. In
both o
f these
papers I
study the
surprising convergence
betw een
“left” and
“right” in
the critique
o f
norm ative
arg u
m en
t, the
“postniodern” positions
o f
m any
thinkers on
the left
proving, often,
difficult to
d istin
g u
ish fro
m claim
s about
the arbitrariness
o fev
alu atio
n in
neoclassicaleconom ics. In
B arbara
H e r
rn stein
S m
ith’s C
ontingencies o
f V
alue (D
u rh
am ,
N C
: D
u k e
U niversity
P ress,
l9 8 8 ),w
e even
see a
fusion o
f the
tw o
positions, a
p o
stm o
d ern
ism co
n clu
d in
g
i z ’t
• j u
a i ss,t:
t1 v
u t4
n L
. tir
IV IA
R T
H A
C .
N U
SSB A
U ?vl
• 543
th at,
in the
absence o f
tran scen
d en
t stan
d ard
s, w
e should
u n d erstan
d value
ju d
g m
en ts
as attem
p ts
to m
axim ize
expected utility.
26.A n
stotle,N icom
achean E
th ics V
III.I, I 1 5
5 a
21— 22.1
discuss this
passage in
“A ristotle
on H
u m
an N
atu re”
and “N
o n -R
elativ e
V irtues.”
27. K
.A .A
p p iah
, l# M
y F
ath eriH
ouse,pp. vii— viii:“Ifm
y sisters
and I
w ere
‘children o f
tw o
w orlds’,
no one
b o th
ered to
tell us
this; w
e lived
in one
w orld,
in tw
o ‘extended’
fam ilies
divided by
several th
o u san
d m
iles and
an allegedly
in su
p erab
le cultural
distance th
at never,
so far
as I
can recall,
puzzled or
p e r
plexed us
m uch.”
A ppiah’s
arg u m
en t
does n o t
in any
sense neglect
distinctive features
o f
concrete histories;
indeed, one
o f its
purposes is
to d
em o
n strate
how varied, w
h en
concretely seen,
histories really
are. B
u t
his arg
u m
en t,
like m
ine, seeks
a subtle
balance betw
een perception
o f
the p
articu lar
and recognition
o f
the co
m m
o n
. In
his essay”T
he P
ostcolonial and
the P
ostm odern”
(pp. 137—
57), A
p p iah
show s
th at
it is
all too
o ften
the focus
on “otherness”
th at
produces a
lack o
f concrete
en g ag
em en
t w
ith individual
lives. S
p eak
in g
o f
the sculpture
“Y oruba
M an
w ith
B icycle”
th at
appears on
the cover
o f
the book,
A p
p iah
co m
m en
ts; “T
he M
an w
ith a
B icycle
is produced
by som
eone w
ho does
n o
t care
th at
the bicycle
is the
w hite
m an’s
in v en
tio n —
it is
n o
t th
ete to
be O
th er
to the
Y oruba
S elf
it is
there because
som eone
cared for
its solidity;
it is
there because
it w
ill take
us fu
rth er
th an
our feet
w ill
take u s....”
(157). 28.
In this
categoryç as
closely related
to m
y ow
n view
, I
w ould
place the
“internal— realist”
co n cep
tio n
o f
H ilary
P u
tn am
articu lated
in R
eason, T
ruth, an
d H
istory (C
am b rid
g e:
C am
b rid
g e
U niversity
P ress, 1981),
E lheM
any Faces
o f
R ealism
(L a
S alle:
O p en
C o
u rt
P u b lish
in g ,
1987),and R
ealism w
ith a
H u
m an
F ace
(C am
b rid
g e,
IV IA
: H
arv ard
U niversity
P ress,
1990); and
also the
view s
o f
C h
arles T
aylor,for exam
ple, in
Sources ofthe
S e(f
The M
aking ofM
odern Identity
(C am
btidge,IV IA
:H arv
ard U
niversity P
ress, 1989),and “E
xplanation and
P ra
c tical
R eason,”
in N
u ssb
au m
and S
en, eds.,
The Q
uality o fL
jfe, pp.
208— 31.
29. In
this sense
I am
th o ro
u g h ly
in ag
reem en
t w
ith S
usan O
kin’s reply
to the
charge o
f “substitutionalism
” th
at has
been m
ade ag
ain st
her book,
and in
ag reem
en t
w ith
b o
th 0km
and R
u th
A n
n a
P u tn
am th
at it
is a
m istake
to conceive
o f
the m
oral p
o in
t o f
view as
co n stitu
ted by
the actual
voices o f
all d
isad v
an tag
ed parties;
see O
kin’s “Inequalities
betw een
the S
exes in
D ifferen
t C
u ltu
ral C
o n
tex ts,”
pp. 274—
97 and
P utnam
’s “W
h y
N o t
a F
em in
ist T
heory o f Justice?”
pp. 298—
331 in
W om
en, C
’ulture an
d D
evelopm ent.
See m
y fu
rth er
co m
m en
ts below
, S
ection 5.
30. C
an the
M arg
lin s
co n sisten
tly m
ake this
objection w
hile h
o ld
in g
th at
freed o
m o
f choice
is ju
st a
parochial W
estern value?
It w
o u ld
appear not;
on the
o th
er hand,F.A
. M arg
lin (here
differing, I
believe,fro m
S .A
. M
arglin) also
held in
oral rem
arks delivered
at the
1986 conference
th at
logical consistency
is sim
ply a
parochial W
estern value.
31. T
he politics
o f
the h isto
ry o f
‘W estern
philosophy have
been in
te r
p reted
this w
ay, w
ith m
u ch
plausibility th
o u
g h
perhaps insufficient
h isto
rical
arg u m
en tatio
n ,by
N o
am C
h o m
sk in
C artesian
L ingiustics
(N ew
Y orlc
H arp
er
& R
ow ,
1966). C h o m
sk y
argues th
at C
artesian ratio
n alism
,w ith
its insistence
on innate
essences,w as
politically m
ore progressive, m
ore hostile
to slavefl’
and im
p erialism
, th
an em
p iricism
, w
ith its
in sisten
ce th
a t
p eo
p le
w ere
ju st
w h at
experience had
m ade
o f
th em
. M
y analysis
o f
S toic
fem in
ist arg
u m
en t
(below S
ection 7)
bears this
out. 3 2 .T
h e
use o
fthis term
does n o t
im ply
th at
the functions
all involve
doing
so m
eth in
g especially
“active.” (S
ee here
S en,“C
ap ab
ility and
W ell-B
eing,” in
The Q
uality o f L
ife, pp.
30— 53.)
In A
risto telian
term s,
and in
m ine,
b ein
g h ealth
)
reflecting, being
pleased, are
all “activities.”
33. F
o r
fu rth
er discussion
o f
this p
o in
t, and
exam ples,
see “A
ristotle on
H u m
an N
atu re.”
34. Ibid.
discusses the
treatm en
t o
f this
p o in
t in
co n tem
p o rary
m e d
i
cal ethics.
C o
u ld
one cease
to be
one’s individual
self w
ith o u t
ceasing to
be
hum an?
T his
is ru
led out,
I th
in k
, in
A ristotle’s
co n
cep tio
n ,
b u t
is possible
in
som e
o th
er m
etaphysical conceptions.
B ut
th e
so rt
o f
case th
at w
ould m
ost forcefully
raise this
possibility is
nor the
sort involving
illness or
im p
airm en
t, b
u t
instead the
sort involving
p erso
n ality
or m
em o
ry change;
and I
shall n
o t
attem p
t to
deal w
ith such
cases here.
35. A
p p
iah ,
In M
y F
atherc H
ouse, p.
viii.
36. In “A
ristotle on
H u
m an
N ature,”
there is
a m
ore ex
ten d
ed account
o f
this procedure
and how
itjustifies. 37.
T his
o f
course is
n o
t in
co m
p atib
le w
ith calling
certain groups
n o n
h u m
an or
su b
h u
m an
for political
purposes.B ut
such denials
are usually
eith er
tran sp
aren t
p ro
p ag
an d
a or
form s
o f self-d
ecep tio
n ,w
h ich
can be
u n
m ask
ed by
critical arg
u m
en t.
S ee
below for
a case
involving w
om en;
and for
an extensive
analysis o
f the psychology
o f
such self-d
ecep tio
n , and
its u
n m
ask in
g , see
R aoul
H ilb
erg ,
The D
estruction o f
the E
uropean Jew
s, abridged
edition (N
ew Y
ork:
H o
lm es
& M
eier, 1985),
pp. 274—
93. 38.
In order
to m
ake this
clear, I
speak o
f it
as a
co n
cep tio
n o
f the
good,
at a
very m
in im
al and
general lev
el.T h
e phrase
I have
elsew here
used is
“the
th ick
vague th
eo ry
o f
the g
o o
d .”T
h e
term “thick”
contrasts this
account, in
its
com prehensiveness, w
ith R
aw ls’s
“thin” th
eo ry
o f
the good, w
h ich
is designed
to avoid
even partial
com prehensiveness.
39. O
n this
see especially
“N on—
R elative
V irtues.”
40.1 have
discussed m
y ow
n view
s about
practical ratio
n ality
elsew here,
particularly in
“T he
D iscern
m en
t o
f P
erception,” in
L ovec
K nots
ledge (N
ew
Y ork:
O x
fo rd
U niversity
P ress,
1990). A
related account,
w hich
I adm
ire and
to a
large ex
ten t
agree w
ith, is
given by
H en
ry R
ich ard
so n
in P
racticalD elib—
eration about
F in
al E
nds (C
am b
rid g
e U
niversity P
ress, 1994).
R ichardson’s
account is
closely related,
as w
ell, to
the p
rag m
atist conception
su p
p o
rted by
H ilary
P u tn
am in
his “P
ragm atism
and M
oral O
bjectivity” in
W om
en, C
ulture
an d
D evelopm
ent, pp.
199— 224.
5 4
4 G
L O
B A
L JU
S T
IC E
: S
E M
IN A
L E
S S
A Y
S M
A R
T H
A C
. N
U S
S B
A IJM
‘ 545
S h
o u
ld the
co n cep
tio n
o f
reasonableness be
defined w
ith reference
to dem
ocratic procedures,
as S
eyla B
en h ab
ib has
reco m
m en
d ed
? I
see the
a ttra
c tions
o f
this proposal,b
u t
I have
n o
t follow
ed it.F
irst o
f all,
it seem
s to
m e
th at
d em
o cratic
procedures as
they actuafly
are do
n o
t alw
ays em
body reaso
n ab
le ness;
so to
describe w
h at
m akes
a dem
ocratic procedure
reasonable w
e v ill
have to
have a
notion o f
the reasonable
th at
is to
at least
som e
ex ten
t in
d ep
en d en
t o
f the
n o tio
n o f
dem ocracy.
S econd,
to build
dem ocracy
in to
the g
ro u
n d
level o f
the co
n cep
tio n
o f
the h u m
an fro
m the
start prevents
us fro
m raising
later on
the q
u estio
n o f
w h at
political arran
g em
en t
w ill
best secure
to citizens
the list
o f
h u m
an capabilities,
in a
w ide
variety o f
circum stances.
It m
ay tu
rn o
u t
th at
the answ
er w
ill alw
ays be
“dem ocracy.”
B u t
even th
en ,
I th
in k
it w
ill rareL
y be
ju st
dem ocracy
(an cien
t A
th en
ian or
N ew
E n
g lan
d to
w n -m
eetin g
style). N
o m
o d ern
d em
o cratic
state is
a pure
dem ocracy,
and it
should at
this p o in
t rem
ain an
open q u estio
n as
to w
h at
role should
be played
by relatively
u n d em
o cratic
in stitu
tio n s
such as
the U
S S
uprem e
C o u rt
in p ro
m o tin
g the
capabilities o f
citizens. 41.
F o r
R aw
is’s use
o f
a n o tio
n o f
consensus, see
R aw
is, “T
he Id
ea o
f an
O v erlap
p in
g C
onsensus,” O
xford Jo
u rn
al o fL
egal S
tudies 7
(1987), and
now P
olitical L
iberalism (N
ew Y
ork: C
o lu
m b
ia U
niversity P
ress, 1993).
R aw
ls’s n o tio
n o f
consensus appears
am biguous
betw een
the tw
o n o tio
n s
I id
en ti&
here. S
ee,on this,
the exchange
betw een
Jo sh
u a
C o h en
and Jean
H am
p to
n in
The Idea
ofD em
ocracy (N
ew Y
ork: O
xford U
niversity P
ress,1992).C o h en
argues th
at R
aw ls
needs, and
can co
n sisten
tly defend,
the w
eaker “overlap”
reading H
am p to
n argues
that,w hatever
R aw
L s
intends, the
plausibility o
f his
arg u
m en
t rests
on his
o p tin
g for
the n o rm
ativ e
reading. I
co n cu
r w
ith H
am p to
n .
4 2 .T
o cite
only a
few recent
exam ples
w ith
serious practical
consequences: in
the U
n ited
S tates
in the
lS 9O
s, the
S u p rem
e C
o u rt,
d en
y in
g a
V irginia
w om
an’s appeal
against a
law fo
rb id
d in
g w
o m
en to
practice law
,ju d g ed
th at
itw as
up to
the state
S uprem
e C
o u rt
“to d eterm
in e
w h eth
er the
w ord
‘person”’ in
the statu
te on
w hich
the w
om an
based h er
appeal “is
confined to
m ales.”
(In reL
ockw ood,
154 U
S 116,
discussed in
0 k
m ,
W om
en, p
. 2
5 1
and n.
10, and
see S
unstein’s ‘G
en d er,
C aste,
and L
aw ”
in W
om en,
C ulture
andD evelopm
ent,
pp. 332—
59.) In
M assach
u setts
in 1932,
w o m
en w
ere d
en ied
eligibility for
ju ry
service, alth
o u g h
the law
stated th
at “every
person qualified
to vote”
w as
eligible. T
he state
S uprem
e C
o u rt
w rote:
“N o
in ten
tio n
to include
w o m
en can
be d ed
u ced
fro m
the o m
issio n
o f
the w
o rd
‘m ale”(C
om m
onw ealth
‘a. W
elosky,276 M
ass. 398,
curt. d en
ied ,
284 U
S 684
[1 9 3 2 ]),
discussed in
0 k
m ,
kT ’,nen,p
. 2
5 I
and n.
11. S
uch readings
no d o u b t
reflect faithfully
en o u g h
the view
s th
at the
F o u n d ers
had about
the term
“person” w
h en
th ey
used it
in the
C o
n stitu
tio n
: S
ee m
y Jefferson
epigraph. A
lth o
u g h
this construal
o f
the term
does n
o t
prevail today
in A
m erican
its legacy
is w
ith us
in countless
m ore
inform al
w ays.
43. A
risto tle,
M etaphysics
1.1.
44.1 discuss
this issue
in m
uch m
ore detail
in L
ectu re
3 o
fm y
1993 G
if ford
L ectu
res, U
niversity o
f E
d in
b u rg
h ,
in ch
ap ter
4 o
f U
pheavals o f T
hought: The
Intelligence ofE
m otions
(N ew
Y ork:
C am
b rid
g e
U niversity
P ress,
2001). 45. A
risto tle,
u b
iq u
ito u
sly in
the accounts
o f
substance. 46.
O n
these issues,
see fu
rth er
in “A
ristotelian S
ocial D
em ocracy.”
47. A
risto tle,
P olitics
V III:
see “N
ature, F
u n
ctio n
, and
C ap
ab ility
” 48.
It m
ay su
p p o rt
w h at
Jam es
R achels
calls “m
oral individualism
” (C
rc ated
fro m
A nim
als [O
x fo
rd and
N ew
Y orlc
O x
fo rd
U niversity
P ress,
1990]), in
w hich
our m
oral obligations
flow fro
m the
en d
o w
m en
ts o
f the
individual creature
w ith
w h
o m
w e
are dealing,
rath er
th an
from its
species, and
our goal
should be
to p ro
m o te—
o r
at least
n o
t to
im p
ed e—
th e
form o
f flourishing
o f
w hich
the being
is basically
capable. O
n this
view such
an in
fan t
should get
the sam
e treatm
en t
th at
w e
w ould
give to
an anim
al o
f sim
ilar en
d o
w m
en t.
B ut
w e
m ay
also decide
to give
the fact
th at
it is
an offspring
o f h
u m
an s
som e
m oral
w eight;
n o th
in g
I have
said here
rules th
at out.
49. A
lth o u g h
“norm aL
length” is
clearly relative
to cu
rren t
h u
m an
p o
s sibilities
and m
ay need,
for practical
purposes,to be
to som
e extent
reL ativized
to local
co n d
itio n
s, it
seem s
im p o rtan
t to
th in
k o
f it—
at least
at a
given tim
e in
h isto
ry —
in universal
and com
parative term
s, as
the H
u m
an D
evelopm ent
R eport
does, to
give rise
to co
m p
lain t
in a
co u
n try
th at
has done
w ell
w ith
som e
indicators o
flife quality
b u
t badly
on life
expectancy.A n d
alth o
u g
h som
e degree
o f
relativity m
ay be
p u
t dow
n to
the differential
genetic possibilities
o f
different groups
(the “m
issing w
om en”
statistics, for
exam ple,
allow th
at on
the average
w om
en live
so m
ew h
at longer
th an
m en),
it is
also im
p o rtan
t n
o t
to conclude
p rem
atu rely
th at
inequalities betw
een g
ro u
p s—
fo r
exam ple,
the grow
ing inequalities
in life
expectancy betw
een blacks
and w
hites in
the U
S A
— are
sim ply
genetic variation,
n o
t co
n n
ected w
ith social
injustice. 50.
‘The precise
specification o
f these
h ealth
rights is
n o
t eas%
b u
t the
w o rk
cu rren
tly being
done on
th em
in d
raftin g
new co
n stitu
tio n
s in
S o
u th
A frica
and E
astern E
u ro
p e
gives reason
for hope
th at
the co
m b
in atio
n o
f a
general specification
o f
such a
rig h t
w ith
a trad
itio n
o fju
d icial
in terp
retatio n
w ill
yield so
m eth
in g
practicable. It
should be
n o
ticed th
at I
speak o
f h
ealth ,
n o
tju st
h ealth
care: and
h ealth
itself in
teracts in
com plex
w ays
w ith
housing, w
ith ed
u catio
n , w
ith dignity.
B oth
h ealth
and n u tritio
n are
controversial as
to w
h eth
er the
relevant level
should be
specified universally,
or relatively
to the
local co
m m
u n ity
and its
traditions: for
exam ple,
is low
h eig
h t
associated w
ith n u tritio
n al
practices to
b e
th o
u g
h t
o f
as “stunting,”
or as
felicitous ad
ap tatio
n to
circum stances
o f
scarcity? F
or an
excellent sum
m ary
o f
this debate,
see S.R
. O
sm an
i, ed .,N
u tritio
n an
d P
o v
erty ,W
ID E
R series
(O x
fo rd
: C
laren d
o n
P ress,
1990), especially
the follow
ing papers:
on the
relativist sid
e,T .
N .
S rinivasan,
“U n d ern
u tritio
n :
C o
n cep
ts, M
easu rem
en ts,
and P
olicy I m
p lic
a tio
n s ,”
9 7
—1 2 0 ;
on the
u n iv
ersalistsid e,C
.G o p alan
,”U n d ern
u tritio
n :M
easu rem
en t
and Im
p ll
cations,” 17—
48; for a
com pelling
adjudication o f the
debate,com ing
out on
the
5 4
6 ’
G L
O B
A L
JU S
T IC
E :
S E
M IN
A L
E S
S A
Y S
M A
R T
H A
C .
N U
S S
B A
U M
‘ 547
universalist side,
see O
sm an
i, “O
n S
om e
C ontroversies
in the
M easu
rem en
t o f
U n d ern
u tritio
n ,”
121— 61.
51. T
here is
a grow
ing literatu
re on
the im
p o rtan
ce o
f shelter
for health:
e.g., th
at the
provision o f
adequate h o u sin
g is
the single
largest d eterm
in an
t o
f health
status for
H IV
— infected
persons. H
o u sin
g rights
are increasingly
com ing
to be
constitutionalized,atleastin a
negative form
— giving
squatters grounds
for appeal,
for exam
ple, against
a landlord
w ho
w ould
bulldoze th
eir shanties.
O n
this as
a co
n stitu
tio n al
right, see
proposed A
rticles 11,
12, and
17 o
f the
S outh
A frican
C o n stitu
tio n ,
in a
d raft
p u
t forw
ard by
the A
N C
co m
m ittee,
adviser A
lbie S
achs,w here
this is
given as
an exam
ple o
f a
justiciable h o u sin
g right.
52. I
shall n o t
elaborate here
on w
h at
I think
p ro
m o
tin g
this capability
requires, since
there is
a W
ID E
R project
and conference
devoted to
this topic.
53. A
good exam
ple o f
an ed
u catio
n rig
h t
th at
I w
ould su
p p o rt
is given
in the
A N
C S
o u th
A frican
C o
n stitu
tio n
d raft,
A rticle
11: “E
d u
catio n
shall be
free and
co m
p u lso
ry up
to the
age o f
sixteen, and
provision shall
be m
ade for
facilitating access
to se
c o n d a r
vocational and
tertiary ed
u catio
n on
an equal
basis for
all. E
d u catio
n shall
be directed
tow ard
the d
ev elo
p m
en t
o f
the h u m
an p
erso n ality
and a
sense o f
p erso
n al
dignity, and
shall aim
at stre
n g th
ening respect
for h
u m
an rights
and fu
n d am
en tal
freed o m
s and
p ro
m o tin
g u n d erstan
d in
g ,tolerance
and frien
d sh
ip am
o n g st
S outh
A frican
s and
betw een
n atio
n s.”T
h e
public (or
otherw ise
n eed
-b lin
d )
provision o
f h
ig h
er education
w il]
have to
be relative
to local
possibilities,b u t
it is
at least
clear th
at the
U S
A lags
far b
eh in
d m
o st
o th
er countries
o f
com parable
w ealth
in this
area. 54.
O n
the em
o tio
n s
as basic
h u m
an capabilities,
see, in
ad d itio
n to
m y
“E m
o tio
n s
and V
/om en’s
C apabilities,”
in iV
om en,
C ulture
an d
D evelopm
ent, pp.
360— 95,
m y
1993 G
iffo rd
L ectu
res, U
pheavals o
f T
hought: The
Intelligence o fE
m otions
(C am
b rid
g e:
C am
b rid
g e
U niversity
P ress,
2001), and
m y
H id
in g
fro m
H u m
an ity
:D isg
u st,
S ham
e, an
d th
e L
aw (P
rin ceto
n :
P rin
ceto n
U niversity
P ress,2
0 0
4 ).M
y om
ission o fan
g er
fro m
this list
o fb
asic em
o tio
n al
capabilities reveals
an am
bivalence ab
o u t
its role
th at
I discuss
at len
g th
, b
o th
in G
ifford L
ectu res
3 an
d 10, an
d in
The T
herapy ofD
esire:T heory
an d
P ractice
in H
ellenistic E
thics (P
rin ceto
n , N
J: P
rin ceto
n U
niversity P
ress, 1994),
chs. 7
,1 1
, and
12. See
also “E
q u
ity and
M ercy,”
P hilosophy
an d
P ublic
A ffairs
(sp rin
g 1993).
55. In
m y
1993 G
ifford L
ectu res,
I spell
out w
h at
I th
in k
this entails
w here
“the fam
ily” is
concerned. O
n the
w hole,I
am in
ag reem
en t
w ith
S usan
0km th
at som
e form
o f
in tim
ate fam
ily love
is o
fcrucial im
p o
rtan ce
in child
d ev
elo p
m en
t, b
u t
th at
this need
n o t
be the
trad itio
n al
W estern
nuclear fam
ily. I
also agree
w ith
0km th
at the
im p o rtan
t ed
u catio
n al
role o
f the
fam ily
m akes
it all
the m
ore crucial
th at
the fam
ily should
be an
in stitu
tio n
ch aracterized
by ju
stice, as
w ell
as love.
S ee
O k
in ,Ju
stice, G
ender, an
d the
F am
ily. 56.“A
ristotelian S
ocial D
em o cracy
”said th
at a
list o
f such
liberties needed
to be
added to
the A
risto telian
schem e,
b u
t it
did n
o t
include th
em in
the account
o f
capabilities itself
T hese
issues are
fu rth
er developed
in a
W ID
E R
project and
conference on
reproductive rights
and w
om en’s
capabilities. 57.
F or
reproductive choice
as an
equality issue,
see S
unstein’s “G
ender, C
aste, and
L aw
’” in
W im
en, C
ulture an
d D
ev elo
p m
en t,
pp. 332—
59, and also
his “G
ender, R ep
ro d
u ctio
n , and
L aw
”p resen
ted at
the conference
on reproductive
rights and
w om
en’s capabilities
at W
ID E
R in
1993. 58.
O n
this see
also “A
ristotelian S
ocial D
em ocracy.”
59.W ith
S en, I
hold th
at the
capability set
should be
treated as
an in
te r
locking w
hole: for
m y
co m
m en
ts on
his argum
ents, see
“N ature, F
u n
ctio n
, and
C ap
ab ility
.”T en
sio n
s w
ill freq
u en
tly arise
am o
n g
m em
bers o
f the
list, and
I shall
co m
m en
t on
som e
o f
those below
. B
ut it
should be
clear by
now th
at the
arch itecto
n ic
role o
f practical
reasoning im
poses strict
lim its
on the
so rt
o f
curb on
personal au
to n
o m
y th
at w
ill be
to lerated
for the
sake o
f increased
n u
tritio n
al w
ell-b ein
g ,
etc. 60.
C h ris
B o
b o
n ich
“In tern
al R
ealism ,
H u
m an
N atu
re, and
D istrib
u tiv
e justice:
A R
esponse to
Ivlartha N
u ssb
au m
,” M
odern P
hilology (l\’Iay
1993), su
p p lem
en t,
74— 92,
w orries
th at
this w
ill im
pose en
o rm
o u
s sacrifices.
B u t
I th
in k
th at
this is
because he
has n o t
im agined
things in
detail, nor
th o
u g
h t
about m
y claim
th at
once people
have w
h at
they basically
need, th
ey can
get all
sorts o f o
th er
good things
th ro
u g h
th eir
ow n
efforts. If
I have
en o
u g
h food
to be
w ell
n o
u rish
ed ,
m ore
food w
ill ju
st rot
on the
sh elf
or m
ake m
e fat.
If m
y basic
h ealth
needs are
m et,
it seem
s rig
h t
th at
I should
n o
t be
able to
claim expensive
unnecessary luxuries
(say, cosm
etic surgery)
at the
public expense
so long
as even
one person
in m
y co
u n
try is
w ith
o u t
su p p o rt
for basic
needs. A
nd so
forth. O
n e
m u
st take
seriously the
A risto
telian idea,
w hich
is basic
to both
Sen’s and
m y
p ro
g ram
s, th
at resources
are ju
st tools
for h in
ctio n in
g and
have a
lim it
given by
w h at
is needed
for th
at 6anctioning.
A bove
th at
lim it,
they are
ju st
a heap
o f
sm W
o f
no value
in them
selves. 61.
S ee
“N ature,
F u
n ctio
n ,
and C
apability,” w
ith reference
to A
risto tle.
62. M
arx, E
conom ic
an d
P hilosophical
!vlanuscripts o
f 1844,
discussed in
“N ature,
F u
n ctio
n ,
C apability”
and “A
ristotle on
H u m
an N
atu re.”
63. S
ee especially
Sen’s “G
en d er
In eq
u ality
and T
heories o
f Justice,”
in IV
om en,
C ulture
an d
D evelopm
ent, pp.
259— 73;
also “M
ore T
han 100
M illion
W o m
en A
re M
issin g ,”N
ew Y
ork R
ev iew
o fB
ooks 37
(1990): 61—
66. 64.
Iftekha.r H
o ssein
, “P
overty as
C ap
ab ility
F ailure,”
P h
.D .
d issertatio
n in
E co
n o m
ics, H
elsin k
i U
niversity, 1990.
65. S
ee A
llardt, “H
aving, L
oving, B
eing: A
n A
lternative to
the S
w edish
M o d el
o f
W elfare
R esearch,”
and E
rik so
n ,
“D escrip
tio n
s o
f Inequality:
T he
S w
edish A
p p
ro ach
to W
elfare R
esearch,” in
N u
ssb au
m and
S en,
The Q
u ality
o fL
ift, pp.
88— 94
and 67—
84. 66.
S ee
S en,
“M ore
T han
100 M
illio n
W o
m en
.” 67.
S ec
also Jo
n E
lster, S
our G
rapes (C
am b
rid g
e: C
am b
rid g
e U
niversity P
ress, 1983);
C ass
R . S
u n
stein ,”P
referen ces
and P
olitics,” P
hilosophy an
d P
ublic
A ffairs
20 (1991):
3— 34.
5 4
U L
O 8
A L
JU S
T IC
E :
S E
M IN
A L
E SSA
Y S
M A
R T
H A
C . N
U S
S B
A U
M •
549
68.P ãivi
S etala,P
rofessor ofW
om en’s
S tudies
at the
U niversity
o fH
elsin k i,
inform s
m e
th at
recent studies
show th
at even
in F
inland, only
40 p ercen
t o
f the
h o
u sew
o rk
is done
by m
ales.T h is,in
the second
n atio
n in
the w
orld (after
N ew
Z ealan
d ,
in 1 9 0 6 )
to give
fem ales
the vote,
a n atio
n as
co m
m itted
to sex
equality as
any in
the w
orld.\1V e
can assum
e th
at the
situ atio
n is
causally related
to m
ale preferences.
69. O
n the
d isp
arity betw
een externally
observed h
ealth status
and self-
reports o
f satisfaction
ab o u t
h ealth
, see
S en,
C om
m odities
an d
C apabilities
(A m
sterd am
: N
o rth
-H o llan
d ,
1985). 70.
IvIartha C
h en
, A
Q uiet
R evolution:
W om
en in
T ransition
in R
u ral
B angladesh
(C am
b rid
g e, M
A :
S ch
en k m
an ,
1 9
8 3
).I describe
this account
o f
a rural
w om
en’s literacy
project, and
its large-scale
im p act
on w
om en’s
quality o
f life,in
“N o
n -R
elativ e
V irtu
es,””A risto
telian S
ocial D
em o
cracy ,”an
d “H
u m
an F
u n
ctio n
in g
and S
ocial Justice.”
71. T
his is
a criticism
o f
econom ic
u tilitarian
ism ,
n o
t o
f so
p h
isticated p h
ilo so
p h
ical form
s o f
u tilitarian
ism th
at build
in m
eans to
filter or
correct preferences.N
o n eth
eless, the
h u
m an
-fu n
ctio n
in g
approach w
ould still
object to
the role
played by
the co
m m
en su
rab ility
o f
values in
u tilitarian
ism ,
and to
the related
suggestion th
at for
any tw
o d istin
ct ends
w e
can, w
ith o u t
loss o
f w
h at
is relevant
for choice,
im agine
trad e-o
ffs in
purely q
u an
titativ e
term s.
F u rth
erm o re,
m o st
form s
o fu
tilitarian ism
are co
m m
itted to
ag g reg
atin g
u tili
ties across
lives, and
thus to
neglecting sep
araten ess,w
h ich
I have
d efen
d ed
as fu
n d
am en
tal.I have
addressed som
e o f
these questions
elsew here,for
exam ple,
in “T
he D
iscern m
en t
o f
P erception”
in L
ove’s K
now ledge,
and in
“T he
L iterary
Im ag
in atio
n in
P ublic
L ife,”
N ew
L iterary
H istory
(fall 1993).
Sen’s w
o rk
has addressed
th em
in greater
detail. I
th erefo
re leave
th em
to one
side for
the purposes
o f
the p resen
t inquiry.
72.F or
a detailed
consideration o
fth ese
approaches, see
“A ristotelian
S ocial
D em
ocracy,” “H
u m
an F
u n
ctio n
in g
,”w ith
references to
related arg
u m
en ts
o f
S en.“A
ristotelian S
ocial D
em ocracy”
contains a
d etailed
account o
f the
re la
tionship betw
een R
aw ls’s
resourcism and
m y
project, w
hich is
a particularly
subtle one.
R aw
is is
w illing
to take
a stand
on certain
item s:
T hus
lib erty
and the
social co
n d
itio n s
o f
self-respect figure
on his
list o
f”p rim
ary goods,”as
w ell
as w
ealth and
incom e.
O n
the o th
er h an
d ,
he has
rep eated
ly denied
th at
his index
o f p rim
ary goods
could, or
sh o u ld
,be replaced
by an
index o
f fu
n c tio
n ings
as in
the H
u m
an D
evelop inentR
eport. 73.
T his
is the
central p
o in
t rep
eated ly
m ade
by S
en ag
ain st
R aw
ls; for
an overview
, see
“C ap
ab ility
and W
ell-B ein
g ”
in The
Q uality
o fL
fri, w
ith references.
74.In R
aw ls’s
liberalism the
problem is
even m
ore acute,
since the
parties w
ho are
eith er
w ell
or n o t
w ell
o ff
are “heads
o f
h o u seh
o ld
s, t’
usually taken
to be
m ale,w
h o
are alleged
to deliberate
on b
eh alfo
f the
interests o
f th
eir fam
ily m
em bers.B
u t
w o m
en can
n o t
in fact
rely on
the altruism
o f
m ales
to guarantee
th eir
econom ic
security, or
even survival.
In ad
d itio
n to
Sen’s w
o rk
on this
issue, see
S usan
M o ller
O kin,Justice,
G ender,
an d
the F
am ily.
in m
y review
o f
0 k m
, I
offer this
as a
reason for
O W
n to
be m
ore critical
o f
resource-based liberalism
th an
she is.
75. M
arth a
C h en
and h
er fellow
d ev
elo p
m en
t w
orkers, in
the project
described m
A Q
uiet R evolution,w
ere in
d eb
ted in
their practice
to P
aolo Freire’s
n o
tio n
o f
“participatory dialogue.”
76. S
en has
stressed this
th ro
u g
h o
u t
his w
ritin g
on the
topic. F
o r
an overview
, see
“C ap
ab ility
and W
ell-B ein
g .”
77. T
his is
the strateg
y used
by E
rikson’s S
w edish
team ,
w h
en studying
inequalities in
political participation:
see “D
escriptions o f Inequality.”T
he p
o in
t w
as w
ell m
ade by
B ern
ard W
illiam s
in his
response to
Sen’s T
an n er
L ectures
[the one
delivered M
ay 22,
1979 is
rep rin
ted herein
61— 81]:
see W
illiam s,
“T he
S tan
d ard
o f L
iving: In
terests and
C apabilities,”
in 0 .
H aw
th o rn
, ed.,
The S
tan d ard
o fL
iv in
g (C
am b
rid g
e: C
am b
rid g
e U
niversity P
ress, 1987).T
o give
ju st
one exam
ple o
f th
e issue,w
e w
ill need
to ask
to w
h at
ex ten
t law
s re
g u la
t ing
ab o
rtio n
, sodom
y law
s, the
absence o
f civil
rights law
s, etc.,
restrict the
capability for
sexual expression
o f w
o m
en and
hom osexuals
in a
given society.
T he
gay A
m erican
m ilitary
officer w
h o
chooses celibacy
for fear
o f
losing his
job has
not, in
the relevant
sense, been
given a
capability o
f choosing.
78. S
ec also
S en,
C om
m odities
an d
C apabilities.
79.T he
relevant textual
references are
g ath
ered and
discussed in
“A risto
telian S
ocial D
em ocracy.”
80.T he
rem ark
w as
cited by
R ich
ard R
orty in
“F em
inist and
P rag
m atism
,” M
ichigan Q
uarterly R
eview 30
(1989): 231;
it has
since been
confirm ed
and repeated
by IvlacK
innon herself.
81. S
ee n.
37 above
on R
aoul H
ilberg’s account,
in The
D estruction
o fthe
E uropean
Jew s, o
f the
N azi
device o
f categ
o rizin
g Jew
s as
anim als
or in
an im
ate objects,
and the
vulnerability o
f th
at stratag
em to
“breakthroughs,” in
w h
ich the
m echanism
s o
f denial
w ere
cau g
h t
o ff
guard. 82.
T he
m ost
com prehensive
and incisive
account o
f P
lato’s arg
u m
en ts
about w
o m
en is
now in
S tep
h en
H alliw
ell, P
lato: R
epublic, B
ook V
(W a rm
inster: A
ris and
P h
illip s,
1992), In tro
d u ctio
n and
co m
m en
tary to
the relevant
passages. S
ee also
0 k m
, W
om en
in W
estern P
olitical T
hought. 83. F
or M
usonius’s collected
w orks,
see the
edition by
0 .
H en
se (L
eipzig: T
eu b n er
L ibrary,
1905). O
th er
w orks
w ith
radical conclusions
for w
om en’s
issues include
“S hould
B oys
and G
irls H
ave the
S am
e E
ducation?” (answ
ering
yes to
th at
question); “S
hould O
n e
R aise
A ll
the C
h ild
ren W
h o
A re
B orn?”
(arguing against
infanticide, a
p articu
lar th
reat to
fem ale
offspring); “O
n the
G oal
o f
M arriage”
(arguing ag
ain st
the sexual
double stan
d ard
and in
favor o
f equal
sexual fidelity
for b o th
sexes; arguing
as w
ell against
th e
co m
m o
n view
th at
fem ale
slaves w
ere available
for sexual
use). 84.S
toics are
o fco
u rse
highly critical
o f
m uch
th at
passes for
higher e d u c a
‘U L
U H
A L
JU S
T IC
E :
S E
M IN
A L
E S
S A
Y S
M A
R T
H A
C .
N U
S S
B A
U M
551
tion, h o ld
in g
th at
the trad
itio n al
“liberal studies”
are n o t
“liberal” in
the rig
h t
w ay,
th at
is, do
n o t
truly “free”
the m
in d
to take
charge o f
its ow
n reasoning.
S ee
S eneca,
]lvloralE pistle,
p. 88.
85. S
ee M
u so
n iu
s, “O
n the
C o al
o f
Ivlarriage.” S
im ilar
conceptions are
d efen
d ed
by S
eneca and
P lu
tarch .
O n
this sh
ift in
th in
k in
g abour
the m
arital relationship,
see the
useful discussion
in F
oucault, J-Iistory
o fS
exuality, vol.111, trans.
R .
H u rley
(N ew
Y ork:
P an
th eo
n ,
1985). 86.
O n
the w
ay in
w hich
C h ristian
ity d isru
p ted
the em
erg in
g fem
inist consensus,
see C
. E
. lvi.
de S
te. C
roix, The
C lass
S truggle
in the
A ncient
G reek
W orld
(L o n d o n :
D u ck
w o rth
, 1987).
87. S
ee the
last section
o f
“T hatW
o m
en T
o o ,”w
h ere
he answ
ers the
m ale
interlocutor’s im
ag in
ary objection
rhat ed
u cated
w o m
en w
ill spend
too m
uch tim
e sittin
g around
and talking,
and neglect
th eir
practical duties,
by telling
him th
at the
very sam
e issue
arises for
him :
H e
too has
practical duties
th at
m ay
seem less
in terestin
g th
an talking
about ideas,
and he
too should
m ake
sure th
at he
doesn’t neglect
th em
. It
is,I th
in k ,
because IV
lusonius has
a p retty
low view
o f
the w
o rth
0f m
ale p u b lic
life th
at he
can easily
view th
at sphere
as equivalent
and equal
to the
fem ale
sphere. 88.
S ee
A n n e
F au
sto -S
terlin g ,
M yths
o f G
ender. 89.
F or
the evidence,
see M
alco lm
S chofield,
The Stoic
Idea o f
the C
ity (C
am b rid
g e:
C am
b rid
g e
U niversity
P ress,
1992). 90.
Is the
N ig
erian siW
ation d ep
icted in
N zegw
u’s paper
an exception?
W e
can agree
w ith
h er
th at
the trad
itio n al
system in
w h ich
w o m
en c o n
trolled certain
vital ag
ricu ltu
ral fu
n ctio
n s,
and m
en o th
ers, w
as so
m ew
h at
better, in
capability term
s, th
an the
system o f
co n fin
em en
t to
the dom
estic sphere
im p o sed
by B
ritish colonialism
, w
ith o u t
being alto
g eth
er sure
th at
the trad
itio n al
system w
as m
orally acceptable.
T his
w ould
d ep
en d
on a
closer scrutiny
o f
the w
hole system
o f
flinctionings and
capabilities, as
affected by
g en
d er
divisions.I am
no expert
in Ib
o culture,
clearly; b u t
the trad
itio n al
Ibo fam
ilies d ep
icted in
C h in
u a
A chebe’s
novels, for
exam ple,
do n o t
seem to
m e
to m
an ifest
full g en
d er
equality in
c a p a b ilit
3c O
k o n k w
o (in
T hings
F allA
part) can
decide to
beat his
w ife;
she can
n o t
choose to
beat him
in retu
rn ,
or even
to stop
him ,
in all
b u t
the m
o st
egregious o f
cases. O
k o n k w
o can
choose to
take an
o th
er w
ife; no
w ife
o f
his can
choose an
o th
er h u sh
an d .T
h e
reason w
hy O
k o n k w
o keeps
w ish
in g
th at
E zin
m a
had been
a boy
rath er
th an
a girl
is th
at he
perceives th
at, being
a girl,
she is
debarred from
m any
fu n ctio
n s
for w
hich she
seem s
w ell
suited. H
is fear
o f
being seen
as a
“w om
an” is,
by co
n trast,
a fear
o f
capability failure.
91. O
n R
ousseau,see 0 k m
, W
om en,and
Jane R
oland Iviartin,R
eclaim ing
a C
onversation (N
ew H
aven:Y ale
U niversity
P ress,1985).O
n som
e related
co n tem
porary argum
ents, for
exam ple
those o f A
llan B
loom ,
see O
k in
,Ju stk
e, ch.
1. 92.
O n
all this,
see F
au sto
-S terlin
g .
93. H
ere I
am in
ag reem
en t
w ith
the general
line o f
arg u m
en t
in 0 k m
, W
om en,
and M
artin ,
R eclaim
ing, and
w ith
the related
arg u m
en ts
in N
ancy
C hodorow
’s The
R ep
roduction ofiviothering, w
hich I
discuss in
m y
o th
er ch
ap ter
[“E m
o tio
n s
and vvom
en’s C
apabilities,” in
14’o,nen, C
ulture an
d D
evelopnent,
pp. 360—
95]. 94.
I am
grateful to
all the
m em
bers o f
our m
eetin g
for valuable
c o m
m ents,
and especially
to A
m arty
a S
en for
valuable discussions
and to
D avid
C ro
ck er,Jo
n ath
an C
lover, C
ass S
u n stein
, and
S usan
W o lf
for helpful
w ritten
co m
m en
ts. I
am also
grateful to
C h ris
B o b o n ich
, D
avid E
stlu n d ,
and H
en ry
R ichardson
for co
m m
en ts
on related
earlier w
ork.
