discipline

New Perspec tives in Policing

J U N E 2 0 1 1

Police Discipline: A Case for Change

Darrel W. Stephens

Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety This is one in a series of papers that will be pub­ lished as a result of the Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety.

Harvard’s Executive Sessions are a convening of individuals of independent standing who take joint responsibility for rethinking and improving society’s responses to an issue. Members are selected based on their experiences, their repu­ tation for thoughtfulness and their potential for helping to disseminate the work of the Session.

In the early 1980s, an Executive Session on Policing helped resolve many law enforcement issues of the day. It produced a number of papers and concepts that revolutionized policing. Thirty years later, law enforcement has changed and NIJ and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government are again collaborating to help resolve law enforce­ ment issues of the day.

Learn more about the Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety at:

NIJ’s website: http://www.nij.gov/topics/law­ enforcement/administration/executive-sessions/ welcome.htm

Harvard’s website: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ criminaljustice/executive_sessions/policing.htm

National Institute of Justice

Introduction

Police disciplinary procedures have long been a

source of frustration for nearly everyone involved

in the process and those interested in the out­

comes. Police executives are commonly upset by

the months — and sometimes years — it takes

from an allegation of misconduct through the

investigation and resolution. Their frustration is

even greater with the frequency with which their

decisions are reversed or modified by arbitrators,

civil service boards and grievance panels. Police

officers and their unions generally feel discipline

is arbitrary and fails to meet the fundamental

requirements of consistency and fairness. Unless

it is a high-profile case or one is directly involved,

few in the community are interested in the police

disciplinary process. Those interested are mysti­

fied by both the time involved in dealing with

complaints of misconduct and the various steps

in a lengthy, confusing and overly legal process.

The one area about the administration of police

discipline where there is general agreement: it

is a frustrating experience that leaves everyone

with a sense that it has fallen well short of the

primary purpose of holding officers accountable for

their actions and encouraging behavior that falls

2 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

within departmental expectations and values.

News accounts reinforce the overall dissatisfac­

tion with police discipline:

• United Kingdom. Publishing the Review of

Police Disciplinary Arrangements, Ms. Hazel

Blears said: “I am grateful to William Taylor for

his thorough review. There is clear agreement…

that police disciplinary arrangements need to

move away from being lengthy, costly, heavily

regulated and punitive” (Taylor, 2005).

• Newark, N.J. “The Newark City Council

launched an investigation today into the

police department’s disciplinary procedure

after African-American and Hispanic officers

complained supervisors were disproportionally

punishing them” (Adarlo, 2009).

• San Francisco, Calif. “Police Commission

President John Keker says he hopes the

uproar over the panel’s vote not to fire Officer

Marc Andaya will spur the city to revamp the

‘broken’ police disciplinary system” (Zamora,

1997).

Twelve years later: “Almost six years after San

Francisco voters gave civilians unparalleled

power over police officers, the city’s discipline

system is beset by delays of months and

sometimes years, officials in charge of it say”

(Cote, 2009).

Cite this paper as: Stephens, Darrel W., Police Discipline: A Case for Change, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2011.

• Madison, Wis. “Two lawmakers are proposing

a statewide solution to the problem of how

to establish a system for disciplining and

dismissing law enforcement officers and

to end pay for those who are fired” (Forster,

2007).

• Montgomery County, Md. “In 2008, one out

of nine officers found by the department to

have committed a serious offense received

the punishment originally recommended by

Police Chief J. Thomas Manger, according

to Assistant County Attorney Chris Hinrichs”

(Suderman, 2009).

• C i n c i n n a t i , O h i o . “ T h e m o s t s e v e r e

punishments for police misconduct in

Cincinnati are the least likely to stick. Police

officers disciplined for major violations —

from breaking policies to breaking laws — get

their penalties reduced nearly three times

more often than officers accused of minor

violations” (Anglen and Horn, 2001).

These news accounts, and others from the past

few years, clearly ref lect w idespread concern

with the processes used by police to discipline

errant officers. The disciplinar y process is sup­

posed to help address police misconduct while

supporting officers who have exercised their dis­

cretion appropriately and within the framework

of law and policy. Unfortunately, the approaches

police generally use fall well short of achieving

their primary purpose and leave the department,

employees and the community with concerns.

There is significant dissatisfaction with the dis­

cipline approach: it is predominately punishment

oriented, it takes an excessive amount of time,

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 3

many decisions are overturned on appeal, and the

entire process leaves one with a sense that there

should be a better way to help officers stay within

the boundaries of acceptable behavior and learn

from the mistakes made in an increasingly difficult

and challenging job.

This paper focuses on discipline process issues

and purposes within the context of the organiza­

tional challenge of managing and modifying officer

behaviors. It begins by discussing the task of creat­

ing an environment in which officers understand

expectations and avoid the formal disciplinar y

process altogether. It then describes the issues with

traditional approaches to discipline and reviews

different approaches that some police agencies are

trying. These include the Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Police Department’s discipline philosophy, now

used for almost 10 years, and the Education-Based

Discipline approach recently implemented by the

Los A ngeles Count y Sheriff ’s Depart ment and

others. The paper will also offer a way forward for

police to implement more effective approaches to

discipline.

Creating the Right Environment

The best situation for a police department, its employ­

ees and the community is to create an environment

in which the formal disciplinary process to deal with

employee mistakes and misconduct is both the last

option and the one least used. Creating that envi­

ronment requires the department’s leadership to pay

close attention to several essential elements that play

central roles in an effectively managed organization.

These areas include:

• The Hiring Process. Finding and employing

the right people is the foundation for creating

an organization that effectively serves the

community. Employment standards must

be clear. For example: How is prior illegal or

prescription drug abuse handled? What is

the standard for driving and arrest records?

What are the educational requirements? Do

candidates have the right personality and

character? With clear standards the selection

process can identify and screen out candidates

that may have difficulty maintaining the conduct

and ethical behavior expected of a police officer.

• Training. Officers must have the skills and

knowledge to effectively do their jobs. High-

quality, entry-level, field and in-service training

programs are key to ensuring that officers not

only understand the department’s expectations

but have the skill level to meet them. Police

departments and their employees must commit

to a regimen of lifelong learning.

• Clear Expectations. Training is an important

aspect of ensuring that officers understand

the department’s expectations, but more is

required. The department’s mission, vision,

values and ethical standards convey essential

messages to employees, as do formalized

departmental goals and objectives. The policies

and procedures the department has developed

to guide decisions provide a framework for

acceptable performance. These must not

only be written in clear, understandable

language but must also be reinforced in

daily operations. For example, a pursuit that

begins in conflict with the department’s policy

4 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

but for which no disciplinary proceeding

ensues because of a positive outcome sets

the stage for confusion and contributes to

questions about consistency and fairness in

the disciplinary process. Likewise, a policy

that prohibits gratuities in an organization

where a substantial number of people at all

levels routinely accept them sends confusing

messages and undermines all efforts at

accountability.

• Effective Supervision. One of the most

important steps in creating a healthy work

environment is the frontline supervisor and

the level just above. These are also the most

challenging jobs in police organizations as

these levels have the most direct interaction

with frontline employees and the community.

These front-line supervisors are largely

responsible for translating the department’s

mission, vision, values, policies, rules and

regulations into operational practice. By

emphasizing some things and not others,

they establish the organizational expectations

for officers and shape the culture. Effective

s u p e r v i s i o n i s c r i t i c a l t o c r e a t i n g a n

environment in which coaching, not the

threat of discipline, helps mold officers into

professionals.

• Performance Standards and Review. Officers

need to know what the work standards are and

periodically review with their supervisor how

they are doing. This is a difficult process for

most police agencies. Setting standards is very

challenging given the workload and types of

problems officers encounter in different parts

of the community and at different times of the

day. Some officers are assigned to areas where

the only work they are able to do is handle calls

for service while others must self-initiate the

majority of their work. Whatever the standards

and review processes are in the department, it

is important that officers understand them and

that supervisors are helping to achieve them.

• Complaint Reception and Investigative

Procedures. The department must have

effective complaint reception protocols

and investigative procedures. It should not

be overly difficult for a citizen to lodge a

complaint against a police employee. Like

employees, citizens should be informed of

the steps that will be taken to follow up on the

complaint and should also be informed of the

outcome. The investigative process should

also have defined time frames for completion,

with complainants notified of any delays.

• Technology. Police agencies have increasingly

turned to technology to help deter misconduct

and investigate it when it occurs. Automatic

vehicle locators and in-car camera systems

have become standard equipment in many

police agencies in America. Some agencies are

testing head-mounted cameras that record

what officers see and hear when they are away

from their vehicle handling a call. Although

this technology has not been subjected to

rigorous evaluation as an investigative aid or

deterrent to misconduct, most police agencies

believe that it serves that purpose.

• Code of Silence. The “code of silence” has

been a significant issue for policing for many

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 5

years. Creating the right environment to

discourage misconduct requires that police

executives confront this issue. Even with

indications that things may be improving,

research suggests the code of silence is alive

and well in policing (Rothwell and Baldwin,

2007). The code severely hampers a police

department’s ability to learn about and

investigate misconduct. It also undermines

credibility in the eyes of the community.

Paying attention to all of these elements will help

department leaders reduce employee mistakes

and misconduct and contribute to creating the

right environment, even though it will not elimi­

nate the need for effective disciplinary processes

that have legitimacy both internally and externally.

Effective disciplinary processes serve a number of

important functions in a police agency. They punish,

change behavior, signal organizational expecta­

tions internally and externally, respond to citizen

complaints and serve as an early warning tool

about potential problem behaviors and tensions in

the community. Ineffective processes do the same

things except they have a tendency to punish with­

out an appropriate behavior change, send the wrong

signals and frequently leave the public with a sense

that its complaints have not been taken seriously.

Persistent problems with current disciplinary pro­

cesses have limited their effectiveness.

Disciplinary Process Issues

In a nation where citizens have always valued

individual liberties and have been reluctant to

grant too much authority to government, police

off icers are given signif icant powers and are

expected to use them judiciously. Citizens also

expect that the police will be held accountable for

the manner in which they use their authority and

that any misconduct will be dealt with appropri­

ately. The disciplinary process plays an important

role in holding police officers accountable for

their behavior. It also helps sort out situations in

which officer misconduct has been alleged but

in fact the officer acted appropriately. Obviously,

there is a lot at stake for the community, for the

officers and for the department. Effective policing

depends on a disciplinary process that is capable

of serving the interests of all three parties in a fair

and equitable manner. In many cases the cur­

rent disciplinary systems fail to do this, reducing

police legitimacy and effectiveness. Some current

issues with police disciplinary processes include:

The disciplinary process is an ongoing source

of conf lict with employees and unions. The

majority of police officers will not be the subject

of an internal affairs investigation or significant

disciplinar y act ion during t heir careers. Yet,

because of the potential for complaints or inno­

cent mistakes, they are always concerned about

the possibility of being investigated by Internal

Affairs. Officers are influenced by the locker room

talk about Internal Affairs investigations and gen­

eral perceptions of not being treated fairly in the

process1 (Curry, 2004).

The disciplinar y process is a source of mis­

trust and tension for some in the community,

particularly in minority communities where

many believe too many police decisions are

inf luenced by race. Although there has been

improvement, minorit y communit ies repor t

6 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

lower levels of confidence in the police and their

honesty and integrity than white communities2

(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2009). Obviously, many

factors contribute to citizens’ views of the police,

but one that has substantial influence is a sense

that police officers are not always held accountable

for their behavior. A 2006 Seattle Post-Intelligencer

editorial board poll revealed that 66 percent of

respondents did not believe that complaints

against the police were handled fairly and openly

(Seattle Post-Intelligencer Editorial Board, 2006).

The focus of discipline is predominately pun­

ishment, not behav ior change. Most police

executives would say t he purpose of punish­

ment is to deter future misconduct by the officer

involved and send a message to others that such

behavior will not be tolerated. Alternative courses

of action that would lead to behavioral change

are seldom part of the sanctions imposed on offi­

cers who have had sustained misconduct charges.

Punishment for misconduct is appropriate at

times, and it may lead to behavioral change, but

it also brings resentment and at times contrib­

utes to the sense of unfairness that many officers

have about how discipline is handled. In an Op/

Ed piece, Ted Hunt (2009), the former president of

the Los Angeles Police Protective League, noted:

One of the things that officers often com­

plain about when they are disciplined is

the way it was done. “I was not treated

with respect,” said one officer. It wasn’t

long u nt i l t hat of f icer’s hu m i l iat ion

turned into anger and t hen to resent­

ment. An angr y, resentful officer is not

good for the organization.

For the most part, the disciplinary process fails

to deal adequately with the small group of offi­

cers who are the source of a disproportionate

share of complaints received and use-of-force

situations. It is common knowledge that a small

number of officers account for an inordinate

number of complaints and use-of-force situations.

The Independent Commission on the Los Angeles

Police Department (1991) found 44 officers with

extremely high rates of citizen complaints who

could have been identif ied from department

records. Journalists have noted departments in

which 2 percent of the officers accounted for as

much as 50 percent of the complaints (Walker,

Alpert and Kennedy, 2000). This realization has

resulted in the establishment of early interven­

tion systems to help identify problem officers.

Inconsistent messages are sent to officers by

the department heads handling complaints

and misconduct allegations. A common myth

in policing is that aggressive officers working in

high-crime areas can expect to receive a higher

number of complaints and encounter a greater

number of situations where they will have to use

force. Supervisors and managers often reinforce

this belief in the way they handle complaints and

reviews of use-of-force situations from these areas

of the community. In police agencies where offi­

cers are required to file a report when they use

force, supervisors are expected to investigate the

circumstances under which force was used. Too

often, these are pro forma investigations that focus

on whether the degree of force used was within

policy, not whether force should have been used.

This tends to reinforce officers’ behavior and misses

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 7

an opportunity to provide coaching on how these

encounters might have been handled differently.

The disciplinary appeal processes often weaken

the purpose of discipline. Police executives’ dis­

ciplinary decisions are frequently overturned or

reduced by review boards and arbitrators, under­

mining the impact of the discipline. Anglen and

Horn (2001) found that in Cincinnati,

Nearly 37 percent of cases involv ing

more than three days of discipline were

reduced, compared to 14 percent of cases

with lesser punishments…. Part of the

reason is that officers who get the stiffest

punishments are more likely to appeal.

And when fired officers appeal to an out­

side arbitrator, they get their jobs back

every time.

I n bot h C h ic ago a nd Hou ston, a rbit rators

reduced the initial sanction imposed by the chief

in 50 percent of the cases (Iris, 2002). Are police

executives w rong half of the time when they

determine sanctions for misconduct or do those

hearing the appeal just disagree with the sanc­

tion? W hat is the impact of the frequency with

which disciplinary decisions are overturned? Do

officers in the organization believe this shows the

process works, or are they more likely to believe

this shows that the sanctions imposed were harsh

and inappropriate? In high-profile cases, what is

the impact on community confidence and trust

when officers in the department are known to

have been involved with misconduct?

Processes generally take an excessive amount

of time to complete. In large departments, it

takes about six months to complete a complaint

investigation, reach a finding and determine

the disciplinar y action if the allegation is sus­

tained. In the most serious cases this time can

be increased significantly and, when discipline

is appealed, it can take well over a year or longer

to completely resolve the matter. An article in the

Atlanta Journal-Constitution described a police

officer who had been on administrative leave for

four years for a criminal allegation before he was

charged with a felony sexual assault. He was only

one of 26 officers who had been placed on admin­

istrative leave for a long period of time pending

case investigation (Torpy, 2009). The impact of

discipline on the officer and the messages to the

department and to the community are severely

compromised the longer it takes from the time

the misconduct occurred to its resolution.

Processes and outcomes often do not appear to

be fair to employees. Several factors contribute

to the impression held by many employees that

the disciplinar y process is not fair. First, disci­

pline is a personnel matter and in many states

and cities personnel issues are confidential.3 In

these locations, departments cannot disclose

the discipline or the circumstances that led to

the decision. Second, there may be real or per­

ceived variations in the punishment for similar

offenses. These variations most often arise when

different people are making the decisions. A com­

mander in one part of the department may view

the misconduct differently than another, produc­

ing different outcomes. Third, the amount of time

that has elapsed from the time the misconduct

occurred to when the sanctions are imposed

sometimes influences employees’ opinions about

8 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

fairness. For example, an officer suspended a year

after the misconduct, but who has performed well

in the interim, is likely to resent the imposition of

the sanction; in such instances, the officer’s col­

leagues frequently believe that imposition of the

sanction is unfair. Finally, there are instances in

police agencies where an officer is commended

for his or her actions yet is disciplined for the

same incident. Officers almost always see this as

unfair disciplinary action. “Fair” is a tricky stan­

dard to establish in the best of circumstances and

almost always requires some careful explanation.

Processes and outcomes may be influenced by

the amount of publicity the alleged misconduct

receives. A high-profile incident of officer miscon­

duct may affect the investigation and the outcome

of the discipline process. In some cases the process

is expedited while others are slowed down consid­

erably by all the attention. In a case in Portland,

Ore., that received extensive news media attention,

it took more than three years for the chief to reach

a decision in an incident where a Taser was used

and the person being arrested died. The chief

determined the officer acted within policy but the

officer was suspended because he did not send

the victim to the hospital soon enough (Bernstein,

2009). In another case three years later, the same

officer was placed on administrative leave for

shooting a 12-year-old girl with a bean bag shot­

g un because she was resisting arrest. Union

leaders claimed the suspension was more about

the visibility of these cases than the behavior of

the officer (Pitkin, 2009).

High-profile cases are particularly difficult for

police executives and the community. The news

media may disseminate information, video or

photo images provided by citizens before the

departmental hierarchy even knows something

has happened. Executives then have to make

statements as soon as possible with very limited

information, and what they say may change (and

often does) as the investigation gets under way

and progresses. The community struggles with

sorting out what happened as they hear conflict­

ing statements or see segments of videotapes that

include only part of the encounter with officers.

Discipline in some states is very public (e.g.,

Florida and Texas) but in most, it is a person­

nel matter protected by privacy laws (e.g., North

Carolina). Debate continues about whether dis­

cipline of police officers should be open to public

scrutiny. Some believe that open records serve

as a deterrent to police officers and other public

officials. They also believe the transparency that

comes from being open improves confidence

and trust in the police. In an article written to

help gain access to disciplinary records, commu­

nications law yers Steven Zansberg and Pamela

Campos (2004) argue that: “Public access would

help assure citizens that their complaints are

taken seriously, investigated thoroughly in an

unbiased fashion, and that officers who are found

to have violated departmental policies are appro­

priately sanctioned.”

Others believe it is unfair to officers to have per­

sonnel records completely open to the public

— par t icularly internal affairs records. They

believe that being a police officer does not mean

they have to give up their right to privacy. They

are concerned that unsubstantiated misconduct

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 9

allegations could damage their reputations and

careers if open to the public. They point out that

officers are sometimes the subject of false allega­

tions made by people trying to get back at them

simply for doing their job.

Policies on openness are far from settled and vary

significantly from state to state. Florida’s public

records law is among the most open in the nation.

It makes Florida one of two states where access

to these records is a right protected by the state

constitution. Passed in the late 1970s, Florida’s

law makes most police records open to the public,

including personnel records and internal affairs

records (after an investigation has concluded).

The police chief’s authority to administer disci­

pline varies widely even though it is a critically

important responsibility in the overall opera­

tion of the department. An important aspect

of leading and managing a police agency is the

authority to ensure that law, policy, procedures

and organizational expectations are carried out

by employees. Disciplinary authority is an impor­

tant aspect of that authority but surprisingly, it

is limited for many police executives. In a 2006

report to the Board of Supervisors on police dis­

ciplinary procedures, a survey of 25 California

police departments, including the state’s eight

largest, revealed t hat the chief’s aut horit y to

implement disciplinary sanctions ranged from

none at all to officer termination. In most cases,

the authority was limited to suspensions of less

than 10 days with greater sanctions requiring the

city manager’s or some type of board approval

(Van de Water, 2006).

The administration of discipline in police

departments has taken on the characteristics

of a criminal process in the way the investi­

gation is conducted, testimony and evidence

are considered and, in many respects, the way

sanctions are imposed. This observation applies

to policing within and beyond the United States.

The Review of Police Disciplinary Arrangements

Report (Taylor, 2005) noted the adoption of legal

system procedures for handling discipline as an

impediment to effective discipline. Following are

excerpts from the report:

The language and environment for han­

dling police discipline should be open

and transparent. It should be much less

quasi-judicial. Investigations need not be

centered on the crime model, the style

of hearing should be less adversarial and

similarities with a ‘military court martial

model’ avoided (p. 5).

The language in which the regulations

are written and the processes operated

is often viewed as inaccessible and the

judicial style creates a formality which

does not aid understanding, openness

and simplicity. This is particularly so for

the member of the public who becomes

embroiled in the process (p. 19).

The report also encourages that involvement of

law yers in the process be limited except in the

appeal stage. The new procedures in the United

Kingdom are designed to provide a fair and open

way of dealing with misconduct and performance

problems, creating an environment in which the

10 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

emphasis is on learning and development, both

for the employees and for the organization.

The overall impact of the issues described above

will var y from one communit y to another, but

all are affected by at least some of these issues. It

seems clear that police disciplinary processes are

in need of revision, but what is not clear is what

should be done or how.

Alternative Police Discipline Processes

Re c og n i z i ng t he s hor tc om i ng s of c u r rent

approaches to police disciplinary practice, and

in an effort to respond to concerns, some police

depar t ments have beg un to ex plore a lterna­

tives and make changes. Some of the alternative

approaches are relat ively new, while ot hers

have been tried in some places, abandoned and

then tried again in other places. Because of the

complex it y of the processes and the range of

influences, most alternate approaches are not

complete revisions of the process. Rather, they

are designed to address one or more issues that

cause major concern for individual departments.

Discipline Matrix

Although not a new idea, a number of depart­

ments have developed matrices that spell out the

options for sanctions when there is a sustained

violation of the rules of conduct or other poli­

cies. These departments believe that in addition

to letting employees know in advance, a matrix

will help make the sanctions applied both fair

and consistent. In late 2003, the Oakland Police

Department and the University of Nebraska at

Omaha cosponsored a conference on the use of a

disciplinary matrix as an effective accountability

tool. The matrix was described as follows (Walker,

2004: 2):

A discipline matrix is a formal schedule

for disciplinary actions, specifying both

the presumptive action to be taken for

each type of misconduct and any adjust­

ment to be made based on an officer’s

previous disciplinary record.

The primar y pur pose of a discipline

matrix is to achieve consistency in disci­

pline: to eliminate disparities and ensure

that officers who have been found to have

committed similar forms of misconduct

will receive similar discipline.

Conference participants concluded that a matrix

has the potential to improve accountability and

consistency. They also cautioned that successful

implementation is not guaranteed, as many of the

precise details of using a matrix to guide disciplinary

decisions remain to be worked out (Walker, 2004).

Several police departments are moving forward

in an effort to work through the details required

to put a discipline mat ri x in place. Denver’s

efforts represent one of the most comprehen­

sive revisions of the disciplinar y process that

includes a matrix.4 The Denver Manager of Safety

appointed an 80-member Disciplinary Advisory

Group to review the entire process in an effort to

administer discipline in a fair and timely man­

ner. It was a diverse group that represented all of

the stakeholders. The members worked for more

than three years to understand the process that

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 11

was in place and develop a process that included

spelling out sanctions in a matrix.

The Washington State Patrol adopted a discipline

matrix in Januar y 2002 that contains three dif­

ferent levels of misconduct from minor to major

and defines sanctions for each level based on

the number of offenses. The resulting process

provides an opportunit y for officers to “admit

their mistake and move on.” Officers can choose

to ack nowledge their mistake and accept the

sanct ion f rom t he mat ri x w it hout a leng t hy

investigation and hearing. In 2002, the patrol

resolved 43 percent of its complaints without a

formal investigation and most were resolved in

less than 14 days. The process also facilitated res­

olution of level 3 (minor) complaints at the first

line supervisory level rather than through a full-

scale investigation as required by the old system.

The first full year of implementation saw a reduc­

tion in lengthy investigations, reduced costs, a

reduction in citizen complaints and considerable

cost savings (Serpas, Olson and Jones, 2003).

More recently, the Tucson Police Department

adopted a mat ri x to g uide disciplinar y deci­

sions. Union President Jim Parks said, “W hile

no disciplinary system will ever be foolproof, I

believe that we at the Tucson Police Department

took a step in the right direction” (Parks, 2006).

Tucson followed the lead of the Phoenix Police

Depa r t ment, which bega n using t he mat r i x

several years before.5 Table 1 is an example of a

discipline matrix recommended to the Vancouver

(Wash.) Police Department (Matrix Consulting

Group, 2009). The “Offense Class” represents the

seriousness of the offense.

Overall, matrices have become a more commonly

used device for improving disciplinary decision-

mak ing processes for police agencies, and it

seems many officers see this as an improvement.

Table 1. Vancouver Discipline Matrix

First Offense Second Offense Third Offense

Offense Class Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum

1 N/A Memo of Correction N/A Written Reprimand Memo of Correction 1-Day Suspension

2 Memo of Correction Written Reprimand Memo of Correction Written Reprimand 1-Day Suspension 3-Day Suspension

3 Memo of Correction 1-Day Suspension Written Reprimand 3-Day Suspension 1-Day Suspension 5-Day Suspension

4 Written Reprimand 3-Day Suspension 1-Day Suspension 5-Day Suspension 3-Day Suspension 15-Day Suspension

5 1-Day Suspension 5-Day Suspension 3-Day Suspension 15-Day Suspension 10-Day Suspension Termination

6 5-Day Suspension Termination 15-Day Suspension Termination Termination N/A

7 Termination N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

12 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

They provide a better sense of what the range of

sanctions might be for classes of misconduct,

which officers generally believe is a positive step.

Even so, in some cases, the old system has been

re-arranged to fit in a matrix and the punishment

orientation remains. Although a discipline matrix

provides a range of sanctions, it does not remove

discretion entirely (nor should it) and leaves the

department open to the criticism of inconsistent

application of discipline when the luster of a new

approach begins to fade.

Education-Based Discipline6

Education-Based Discipline (EBD) is the creation

of Sheriff Leroy Baca and the Los Angeles County

Sheriff’s Department (LASD). It represents the

most sig nif icant depar t ure f rom t radit iona l

police disciplinary practice in the United States

and perhaps the world. As the name implies,

the process is designed to focus on behavioral

change t hrough educat ion rat her t han pun­

ishment. The process gives the individual the

option of voluntarily participating in a person­

ally designed remedial plan that can include

education, training or other options designed to

address the misconduct issue, including writing

a research paper. Moreover, all of the activities

related to the plan are conducted during on-duty

time. The option to participate is open to employ­

ees who are facing a one- to 30-day suspension.

One mandatory component of the program is an

eight-hour training session developed specifi­

cally for EBD called the Lieutenants’ Interactive

Forum for Education (LIFE) Class. It is conducted

by lieutenants and middle managers from LASD

and focuses on understanding the influences that

affect decision-making. In a Leadership Message

from Sheriff Baca (2007), he said:

Ou r leadersh ip va lues requ i re us to

believe that until a Department member

leaves our service, he or she will always

be our responsibilit y. We must always

care for all of our personnel, work closely

with those who are experiencing prob­

lems, and be straightforward in building

a trustworthy relationship.

We must care and give to those in need

whether they like us or not. Ineffective

discipline is when we fail to be fair. Not

listening to why Department members

have acted in v iolat ion of a polic y is

widely believed to be unfair, especially

by me.

The focus of discipline should be on cre­

ation of a corrective action plan rather

than punishment for punishment’s sake.

The plan should emphasize training and

remediation along with more creative

interventions designed to correct deficits

in performance and maximize the likeli­

hood of the Department member and his

or her peers responding appropriately in

the future.

EBD is just getting under way at LASD but has

attracted the interest and encouragement of union

leaders across the country — traditionally the loud­

est critics of punishment-based practices. Sheriff

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 13

Baca has clearly demonstrated considerable leader­

ship and courage in implementing a system that is

likely to have as many critics as supporters.

Mediation

A lt hough not w idely used, some police agen­

cies have turned to mediation between officers

and citizens as a way of resolving complaints. A

national survey identified 16 police departments

with mediation programs (Walker, Archbold and

Herbst, 2002). Some suggest that the approach has

had value in helping both officers and citizens

understand their own actions during the encoun­

ter. Mediation is often used as an alternative to

the formal disciplinary process and usually it is

the officer’s decision to participate. This approach

is most suitable for complaints involving discour­

tesy, insensitivity and minor procedural issues.

The Denver (Colo.) Police Department has made

med iat ion a pa r t of its overa l l approach to

handling citizen complaints and discipline. A

complaint is dropped if officers involved volun­

teer to participate in mediation regardless of the

outcome. With professional mediators, officers

and citizens meet at a neutral location to discuss

the circumstances of the complaint. The satisfac­

tion level of both officers and citizens in the way

complaints have been handled in the three years

the program has been operating has increased

from 10-15 percent to 75-85 percent (Proctor,

Clemmons and Rosenthal, 2009).

An evaluation of the mediation approach used by

the Pasadena (Calif.) Police Department in 2005

indicated that it had great promise for improving

understanding and trust between the police and

the communit y (Police Assessment Resource

Center, 2008).

Peer Review

In the early 1970s, the Oakland and Kansas City

Police Departments implemented a peer review

process based on work that social psychologist

Dr. Hans Toch did in a correctional setting with

corrections officers. The process involved expe­

rienced senior officers reviewing the behavior of

officers who received a complaint or reached a

predetermined threshold volume in areas such as

use of force, resist arrests and vehicle collisions.

Identifying officers, through analysis of variables

of this type, represented one of the first forms of

early intervention.

Officers could elect to participate in peer review

rather than the formal disciplinary process if they

were facing charges or exceeded the thresholds.

The peer review panel considered the circum­

stances and suggested behavior changes they

believed wou ld help minimize f ur t her com­

plaints. In one situation, the panel conducted a

role play session with the officer and learned he

was violating the personal space of people during

the interaction, which tended to intimidate them.

The panel suggested he move back a few feet to put

him in a safer position and to reduce the potential

for intimidation. He complied and had no further

difficulty in his interactions with citizens.7

A project evaluation determined that officers who

participated in peer review when compared to a

control group were not significantly different in

14 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

their behaviors, attitudes and peer ratings (Pate

et al., 1976). The idea was not adopted on a per­

manent basis by either department follow ing

the trial, nor is there any indication it has been

tried by other agencies — a disappointing out­

come given the overall power of peer influence

on officer conduct and the focus of the program

on behav ior change rather than punishment.

It seems that peer rev iew is worthy of further

exploration as a formal — or perhaps informal —

initiative aimed at encouraging and reinforcing

positive attitudes and behavior.

Early Intervention8

Early intervention systems are designed to track

various indicators and provide early identifica­

tion of off icers whose performance indicates

emerging problems and then intervene in a useful

way. In large departments, these are often com­

plex database management systems that track a

wide variety of performance indicators, including

citizen complaints, use of force, sick leave, per­

formance evaluations, training, failure to appear

in court and car stops, among others. Thresholds

are established that let the officer and supervisor

know there may be a problem that needs correc­

tion before it becomes a disciplinary issue. These

systems are not a part of the police disciplinary

process, although they are closely connected as

they help resolve potential performance issues

before an officer reaches the stage where the dis­

ciplinary process is engaged. They also serve as

one important way of addressing the challenges

presented by that small group of officers who

account for a large number of citizen complaints

and other misconduct issues. Such officers can

be identified sooner and steps can be taken to

address the behavioral problems.

Police agencies that have adopted early interven­

tion systems believe they have value. The U.S.

Department of Justice frequently includes in its

consent decrees or memoranda of understand­

ing the requirement to put such systems in place.9

Although they have not been the subject of rigor­

ous evaluations to determine their effectiveness at

dealing with problematic behavior, these systems

continue to evolve as more police agencies adopt

them. A closer look at early intervention systems

may provide greater insight on the most appropri­

ate behavioral indicators, suitable thresholds and

most effective intervention strategies.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Discipline Philosophy10

In 2000, t he Cha rlot te-Meck lenbu rg Pol ice

Depa r t ment (CMPD) rest r uc t u red it s i nter­

nal affairs investigative process in response to

concerns about the length of time involved and

off icers’ concerns about the consistency and

fairness of discipline. It adopted the disciplinary

philosophy developed and implemented in St.

Petersburg, Fla., in 1993. The original philosophy

was devised by the then-chief of the St. Petersburg

Police Department11 for several reasons. The first

purpose was to inform the department and the

communit y about how disciplinar y decisions

would be made. Florida’s public records law made

the outcomes known in St. Petersburg, but the

decisions were made behind closed doors and

neither the public nor police employees knew

what was considered in determining sanctions

for misconduct. The philosophy contributed to

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 15

a better understanding of how these decisions

would be made.

The second purpose was to provide operational

definitions of “consistency” and “fairness.” For

employees and their unions, these are the two

most f requent ly voiced concerns w it h disci­

pline. Officers and their representatives want to

know that similar misconduct will receive the

same sanctions regardless of who violated the

rules. Employees are particularly concerned that

supervisors, managers and favored people in the

organization might be treated more leniently than

they would be. This helps explain the favorable

view unions often hold toward the use of a disci­

plinary matrix because the sanctions are spelled

out for various levels and types of misconduct.

F o r t h e C h a r l o t t e - M e c k l e n b u r g P o l i c e

Department, consistency is defined as holding

ever yone equa l ly accountable for unaccept­

able behavior and fairness is understanding the

circumstances that contributed to the behav­

ior while applying the consequences in a way

t hat ref lects t h is u ndersta nd i ng (Cha rlot te-

Mecklenburg Police Department, 2001).

This definition formally introduces the notion

that “fairness” includes an understanding of the

circumstances in which the misconduct took

place. A violation of a rule or policy can take place

because the officer made an honest mistake in

judgment. It also can occur when the officer is

fully aware of the rule but goes forward with the

conduct anyway. The officer in both cases should

be held accountable for the violation, but the two

cases beg for different treatment.

The third purpose was to provide guidance to

supervisors and managers participating in the

disciplinary process on the factors they should

consider when making their decisions. Factors to be

considered, with brief explanations, are as follows

(Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, 2001):

• Employee Motivation. The police department

exists to serve the public. One factor in

examining an employee’s conduct will be

whether or not the employee was operating

in the public interest. An employee who

violates a policy in an effort to accomplish a

legitimate police purpose that demonstrates

an understanding of the broader public

interest inherent in the situation will be

given more positive consideration in the

determination of consequences than one

who was motivated by personal interest.

Obviously there will be difficulty from time

to time in determining what is in the public

interest. For example, would it be acceptable

for an employee to knowingly violate an

individual’s First Amendment right to the

freedom of speech to rid the public of what

some might call a nuisance? Or is it acceptable

as being in the public interest to knowingly

violate a Fourth Amendment right against

an unlawful search to arrest a dangerous

criminal? Although it would clearly not be

acceptable in either case for an employee to

knowingly violate a Constitutional right, these

are very complex issues that officers are asked

to address. The police have a sworn duty to

uphold the Constitution. It is in the greater

public interest to protect those Constitutional

guarantees in carrying out that responsibility

16 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

even though it might be argued the public

interest was being better served in the

individual case. But if an employee attempts

to devise an innovative, nontraditional

solution for a persistent crime or service

problem and unintentionally runs afoul of

minor procedures, the desire to encourage

creativity in our efforts at producing public

safety will carry significant weight in dealing

with any discipline that might result.

• The Degree of Harm. The degree of harm an

error causes is also an important aspect in

deciding the consequences of an employee’s

behavior. Harm can be measured in a variety

of ways. It can be measured in terms of

the monetary cost to the department and

community. An error that causes significant

damage to a vehicle for example could be

examined in light of the repair costs. Harm can

also be measured in terms of the personal injury

the error causes such as the consequences of

an unnecessary use of force. Another way in

which harm can be measured is the impact of

the error on public confidence. An employee

who engages in criminal behavior — selling

drugs for example — could affect the public

confidence in the police if the consequences

do not send a clear, unmistakable message that

this behavior will not be tolerated.

• Employee Experience. The experience of the

employee will be taken into consideration

as well. A relatively new employee (or

a m o r e e x p e r i e n c e d e m p l o y e e i n a n

unfamiliar assignment) will be given greater

consideration when judgmental errors are

made. In the same vein, employees who

make judgmental errors that would not be

expected of one who has a significant amount

of experience may expect to receive more

serious sanctions.

• Intentional/Unintentional Errors. Employees

will make errors that could be classified as

intentional and unintentional. An unintentional

error is an action or decision that turns out to

be wrong, but at the time it was taken, seemed

to be in compliance with policy and the most

appropriate course based on the information

available. A supervisor for example, might give

permission for a vehicle pursuit to continue on

the basis the vehicle and occupants met the

general description of one involved in an armed

robbery. The pursuit ends in a serious accident,

and it is learned the driver was fleeing because

his driver’s license was expired. Under these

circumstances, the supervisor’s decision would

be supported because it was within the policy at

the time it was made. Unintentional errors also

include those momentary lapses of judgment or

acts of carelessness that result in minimal harm

(backing a police cruiser into a pole for example,

failing to turn in a report, etc). Employees will

be held accountable for these errors but the

consequences will be more corrective than

punitive unless the same errors persist.

An intentional error is an action or a decision

that an employee makes that is known to

be in conflict with law, policy, procedures

or rules (or should have [been] known) at

the time it is taken. Generally, intentional

errors will be treated more seriously and

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 17

carry greater consequences. Within the

framework of intentional errors there are

certain behaviors that are entirely inconsistent

with the responsibilities of police employees.

These include lying, theft, or physical abuse

of citizens and other equally serious breaches

of the trust placed in members of the

policing profession. The nature of the police

responsibility requires that police officers be

truthful. It is recognized however, that it is

sometimes difficult to determine if one is being

untruthful. The department will terminate

an employee’s employment when it is clear

the employee is intentionally engaging in an

effort to be untruthful. Every effort will also

be made to separate individuals from the

department found to have engaged in theft

or serious physical abuse of citizens.

• Employee’s Past Record. To the extent

allowed by law and policy an employee’s

past record will be taken into consideration

in determining the consequences of a failure

to meet the department’s expectations. An

employee who continually makes errors can

expect the consequences of this behavior

to become progressively more punitive. An

employee who has a record of few or no

errors can expect less stringent consequences.

Also, an employee whose past reflects hard

work and dedication to the community and

department will be given every consideration

in the determination of any disciplinary action.

Laying out these factors helps police command­

ers think through the circumstances involved

in the misconduct. The philosophy explicitly

points out that unintentional mistakes are to be

treated differently from intentional misconduct

and that officers who run afoul of policy while

genuinely trying to serve the public good should

be given consideration in determining sanctions.

Although thoughtful chiefs and commanders

undoubtedly consider these factors when faced

with the responsibility of making discipline deci­

sions, it is important to put them in writing as a

part of the department’s directive system. Not only

does this let employees know how they will be

treated, the transparency also adds legitimacy to

the process inside and outside of the organization.

However, laying out these factors in writing within

the directives system is not, by itself, enough. In

Charlotte–Meck lenburg, the philosophy was

presented to both the civil service board and the

citizens review committee before it was adopted.

This also prov ided the opportunit y for news

media review. The philosophy was presented and

discussed by the chief before supervisory and com­

mand staff, officer-in-service training, promotional

classes and every class of recruit officers. In July

2005, the department published a widely circulated

guidebook titled Employee Conduct: Investigations

and Discipline that was aimed at audiences inside

and outside the department. The disciplinary phi­

losophy was also addressed in the guidebook. All of

these steps served to ensure that both employees

and the community were informed of the depart­

ment’s approach to discipline.

Other Alternatives

Conversations about improving police disciplin­

ar y processes often turn to the use of civilian

18 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

review or approaches that professional associa­

tions of law yers, doctors and others use to guide

and control members. Civilian review is widely

used in the United States with the hope that it

will improve the legitimacy of handling, inves­

tigating and resolving citizen complaints. The

closest equivalent within the police profession is

where state-level police standards boards have

the authority to revoke an officer’s certification,

effectively taking away his or her ability to work

in the state as a sworn officer. There are as many

variations of civilian review as there are cities

that have implemented this process. Some review

boards receive complaints and forward them on to

the police department for investigation and resolu­

tion. In other communities, an appointed group of

civilians conducts the investigation. Some review

boards have the authority to recommend disciplin­

ary action. Many such review boards come into

play after an investigation is complete, and some

are focused on specific misconduct categories like

use of force. Some act only when a citizen appeals

directly to them. Civilian review boards are cer­

tainly an important ingredient in disciplinar y

processes and constitute one of many possibili­

ties that ought to be considered when reviewing

alternatives to traditional discipline. The models

that other professions use to sanction their mem­

bers do not seem to offer much promise. One of the

most significant obstacles is that they do not offer

any greater legitimacy — perhaps less — than the

processes currently in use in policing.

None of the alternatives discussed above repre­

sent complete departures from the traditional

police disciplinar y processes. They represent

efforts to change the things that can be changed

within the plethora of constraints imposed by

law, contracts and tradition. They represent steps

toward what may potentially be more effective

methods of handling discipline.

A Way Forward

In a perfect world, employees would fully under­

stand the organization’s expectations, report to

work on time and always do the right thing. In such a

world, employees would manage their own behavior

with little need for elaborate disciplinary processes.

Although that perfect world does not exist in policing

today, a large majority of employees have no experi­

ence with the formal disciplinary processes because

they do understand the expectations, treat people

respectfully and consistently do their jobs in an

acceptable manner. In exchange, these employees

expect to be treated in a fair and consistent manner

should they run afoul of a policy, rule, or regulation,

or are the subject of a citizen complaint. Given all

of the issues and concerns with disciplinary pro­

cesses, how do police executives create systems

that address mistakes and misconduct fairly while

meeting the expectations of the community and

employees? What would that process look like? Is

it a matter of implementing one of the approaches

described above? Is it a matrix that specifies sanc­

tions, or an education-focused approach, or creation

of a philosophy that guides how sanctions are deter­

mined? Is it some combination of these approaches,

or something that has yet to be invented?

There are no definitive answers to these ques­

tions. As one works toward answering them, the

complexity of the administration of discipline in

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 19

a police organization must be taken into account.

A police chief does not have complete control of

all the factors that inf luence disciplinar y out­

comes, but they should all be considered. Court

decisions, state law, local ordinances, union

contracts, civilian review, civil service, arbitra­

tors, politics, complaint processes, investigative

practices and organizational culture are all in

play when disciplinary actions are taken. With all

of this complexity, police executives might under­

standably shy away from a complete overhaul of

the disciplinary process and focus on those parts

over which they have some control or influence

and that they believe might, with a little persua­

sion, be acceptable to stakeholders.

One approach to improving discipline might be

the use of a problem-solving process to engage as

many of the stakeholders as possible in examin­

ing how discipline is handled. It might also be of

value to identify specific characteristics of a dis­

cipline process that would respond to the agreed

deficiencies of current approaches and therefore

be regarded as priorities for any changes made.

Problem Solving

Problem solving offers great potential as a way

to approach t he development of better disci­

plinary processes and a helpful way of looking

at misconduct and other disciplinary problems

at both the organizational and individual levels.

Police officers in many parts of the world have

received problem-solving training over the past

25 years and often apply their knowledge to crime

and other problems. One of the more commonly

used approaches is the SARA12 model developed

by Police Executive Research Forum staff and

members of t he New por t News (Va.) Police

Department in the mid-1980s (Eck and Spelman,

1988). SARA guides officers through a four-step

process to problem solving:

Sca n n ing: Ident if y ing a nd select ing

problems for further study.

Analysis: Break ing the problem down

and looking at all aspects.

Response: Developing responses based

on the analysis.

Assessment: Determining if the response

had the desired impact.

It can be used to look at disciplinary problems

from a number of perspectives. The SARA model

is applied to discipline problems in table 2 (p. 20).

Problem solving seems to be helpful in looking at

specific areas where policies or procedures are

frequently violated.

Disciplinary Process Characteristics

Even an organization with all the right policies,

training and effective supervision needs a dis­

ciplinary process that deals with mistakes and

misconduct in the most appropriate manner.

Given the vast differences in police agencies, state

laws, union contracts, forms of government and

communities, it is unlikely that one model would

meet the requirements of all agencies. Rather than

try to focus on one or two approaches, it seems

more helpful to identify characteristics that will

contribute to an effective disciplinary process:

20 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

Table 2. SARA Model

Scanning

Discipline Problems • Complaints – Citizens – Officers/supervisors – Other agencies

• Use-of-force reports

• Arrest reports/charges

• In-car camera screening

• Early intervention criteria

• News stories

• Division/unit statistics

• Internal investigations

Analysis Response

• Individual with multiple • Warning complaints/misconduct

• Counseling • Types of complaints (e.g.,

• Training discourtesy, excessive force, court absences) • Policy/procedure change ­

• Concentration of complaints (e.g., • Mentor/coach midnight patrol shift, narcotics,

• Reassignment particular supervisor)

• Suspensions/fines • Frequency of complaints/

misconduct • Employment termination

• Demographics of complainant/ officer (e.g., race, gender, age, experience)

• Department policy, procedures

• Training

• Early intervention at the lowest level the same time, that serious misconduct will be

possible. A key part of effective discipline handled and properly documented through

is recognizing mistakes and misconduct as the formal investigative and disciplinary

soon as they occur and taking appropriate processes.

corrective action. It is not unusual for police

officers to say on learning an officer has been

severely disciplined or terminated that it

was about time the department addressed

the behavior. Officers are often aware of

the misconduct of others but fail to see that

bringing it to the attention of supervisors

is one of their responsibilities. The best

intervention, and likely the most effective,

comes from peers and first line supervisors.

Peers can and do influence behavior in both

positive and negative ways. An environment

that encourages employees and supervisors

to take corrective action on minor mistakes

helps create a culture in which everyone takes

• Fair and consistent application of discipline.

One of the most difficult challenges for

discipline in a police organization is ensuring

both the perception and reality of fairness

and consistency. Employees who experience

the discipline process must understand

the reasons for the actions taken by the

department and how they can avoid similar

problems in the future. They must have the

sense that everyone in the organization is

held accountable for their behavior, and

if the sanctions are different for similar

behaviors, that they are appropriate for the

circumstances.

responsibility for their own behavior and for Developing a sense of fairness and consistency

the behavior of others who may need guidance among employees is difficult to achieve. It

from time to time. It should also be clear, at requires that department and hopefully union

Assessment

• Complaint/ misconduct reduction

• Satisfaction survey improvements

• Commendations

• Media coverage

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 21

leadership will spend time in recruit and

in-service training explaining the complaint,

investigation and disciplinary processes. Chief

executives must invest time in these forums

explaining their perspective on discipline.

They must also be ready to explain their

decisions to employees and the community

within the framework allowed by state and

local law.

• B e h a v i o r a l f o c u s . T h e p r i m a r y f o c u s

o f d i s c i p l i n e s h o u l d b e o n c h a n g i n g

unacceptable behavior. If the behavior can

be changed by a supervisor cautioning the

employee or showing the proper way to

handle a situation, that should be all that is

required. If the disciplinary decision includes

sanctions, the employee is entitled to an

explanation of the reasons for the sanctions

and their connection to the behavior problem.

Training should be an option for addressing

honest mistakes. It is one thing for officers

to make judgmental errors because they do

not know the correct procedure or have the

right knowledge. It is quite another for them

to know what to do but intentionally fail to

follow policy and procedures. The latter may

require more severe sanctions to reinforce

departmental guidelines. Even punishment

must be carried out with a view toward

behavioral change.

• T i m e l y . B o t h i n t e r n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s

protocol and the disciplinary process must

have established completion deadlines. To

ensure these deadlines are met, a monitoring

component that tracks progress on the case

from the initial complaint to its resolution is

an important piece of the process.

• Transparent. While respecting individual

p r i v a c y r i g h t s a n d s t a y i n g w i t h i n t h e

framework of the law, police agencies must

be as open as they can possibly be to their

employees and the community they serve.

Transparency increases the community’s

confidence that mistakes and misconduct

are treated seriously. Transparency helps

employees see that the department leadership

supports employees but is also willing to

publicly acknowledge mistakes. Openness

helps contribute to an environment in which

accountability is an important individual and

organizational value.

This means that police agencies must, at a

minimum, share statistical data with the

community on police misconduct, sustained

complaints and disciplinary action. Many

police departments do this by publishing an

annual report that is made available to the

news media and the public. It also means that

complainants receive timely feedback on the

outcome of their complaint.

Consideration should be given to including a

peer on disciplinary review boards so a street

officer’s perspective is considered when

arriving at the decision. Some agencies have

citizens sit in on the board hearings either as

observers or as voting members of the board.

Disciplinary processes that contain these char­

acteristics are likely to have greater legitimacy

in the eyes of the employees and the community.

2 2 | N ew Per sp e c t i ve s in Po lic ing

Bot h are war y of a process t hat t hey do not

understand, that is not transparent in many com­

munities and that takes an inordinate amount of

time to complete.

Conclusion

The purpose of police discipline is to help employ­

ees ser ve the public while staying w ithin the

framework of law, policy, procedures, training

and organizational expectations for their behav­

ior. Effective discipline requires that employees

understand these boundaries and expectations.

W hen officers stray, measured consequences

are consistently and fairly applied to hold them

accountable and to change their behavior. Ideally,

employees clearly understand the relationship

between their behavior and the consequences,

a nd nat u ra l ly ma ke t he appropr iate adjust­

ments. In this ideal system, the complainant and

the general public know employees will be held

accountable for their behavior, and this assur­

ance contributes to their confidence in the police.

It seems police discipline should be a straightfor­

ward process that everyone understands. Clearly

it is not.

In realit y, police discipline is a messy, compli­

cated and controversial process. It takes a long

time from the misconduct to the outcome and,

more often than not, the outcome is appealed

and the sanctions are reversed. In the majority

of communities, the feedback that complainants

receive is limited to the investigative outcome:

quite commonly a finding of “not sustained” that

they struggle to understand.

This is a process that could do with a great deal of

improvement. It is encouraging to see that some

police agencies, such as the Los Angeles County

Sheriff’s Department, are pursuing cutting-edge

changes. But far too many agencies are unwilling

to take the risks involved in engaging stakehold­

ers in a sincere effort to relieve the frustrations in

a process that frequently fails to achieve its core

purposes.

Endnotes

1. I n a st udy of t he L a nsi ng (M ich.) Pol ice

Depart ment, researchers found t hat off icers

believed that discipline was unfairly and incon­

sistently applied. They felt that command-level

personnel were treated differently than officers

and that publicity, rather than behavior, dictated

the disciplinary outcome.

2. See the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics

section on public opinion, http://w w w.albany.

edu/sourcebook/toc_2.html (accessed August 11,

2009). On honesty and ethical standards in 2003,

56 percent of white respondents rated the police

as “high/very high” while only 31 percent of black

respondents did. In 2008, white ratings were 55

percent while blacks increased to 46 percent. On

confidence in 2004, 70 percent of whites indicated

“a great deal” or “quite a lot,” while blacks were at

41 percent. In 2009, ratings by both whites and

blacks dropped to 63 percent and 38 percent,

respectively.

3. A case in Charlotte, N.C., involving a 15-month

employee goes to this point. The officer has been

criminally charged with sexually assaulting six

women while on duty and the case has attracted

Po lice D is c i p lin e: A C a s e f o r C hang e | 2 3

enormous public attention and concern. News

reports indicate the officer had been the subject

of disciplinary action on two occasions and the

media wanted access to the file which, with the

approval of cit y council, is permissible under

certain circumstances. The city council decided

not to review or open the file to the public, which

effectively ends the matter unless attorneys in the

civil or criminal trials are able to convince the

court to open the file.

4. For a detailed account of the Denver effort, see

Report on the Manager of Safety’s Disciplinary

Advisor y Group a nd t he compa n ion Denver

Police Department Discipline Handbook: Conduct

Principles and Disciplinary Guidelines at http://

www.denvergov.org/PoliceDisciplineHandbook/

tabid/432137/Default.aspx.

5. A g row ing number of police and sherif f ’s

agencies have been working on improving their

disciplinary processes. The few named here are

generally reflective of the changes that have been

made by others.

6 . S e e t he L o s A n g e le s C ou nt y S he r i f f ’s

Depa r t ment website, ht t p://w w w.la sd.org /

d iv isions/leadersh ip-t ra i n i ng-d iv/bu reaus/

ebd /about . ht m l, for det a i le d i n for m at ion

on t he Education-Based Discipline program.

Information about the concept comes from this

site unless otherwise noted.

7. Author’s recounting of a conversation with the

officer involved when the author was a police offi­

cer in Kansas City.

8. For a good over v iew of early inter vent ion

s ystems, see Early Intervention Systems for

Law Enforcement Agencies: A Planning and

Management Guide (Walker, 2003). The Charlotte-

M e c k l e n b u r g P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t (2 0 0 5)

publication Early Intervention System: A Tool to

Encourage & Support High Quality Performance,

is also a good example of reaching out to the pub­

lic to explain the system.

9. The Department of Justice’s use of the Pattern

and Practice legislation has been ver y limited

during the past 10 years. There are indications

that these investigations will be pursued more

vigorously in the future.

10. The full CMPD Discipline Philosophy can

be found at CMPD.org under the “Directives”

tab: http://charmeck.org/city/charlotte/CMPD/

z s t o r a g e / I n s i d e C M P D / D o c u m e n t s /

100004DisciplinePhilosophy.pdf.

11. The chief was Darrel W. Stephens, author of this

paper. Parts of the philosophy have been adopted

by other agencies. Recently, the Milwaukee (Wis.)

Police Department incorporated the entire phi­

losophy in its procedures.

12. The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing pro­

vides a detailed discussion of the SAR A model:

http://w w w.popcenter.org/about/?p=sara.

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Author Note

Darrel W. Stephens is the retired Chief of the

Cha rlot te-Meck lenbu rg Pol ice Depa r t ment.

He is currently on the faculty at Johns Hopkins

University’s Public Safety Leadership Program

and is the Executive Director of the Major Cities

Chiefs’ Association. This paper was written in

support of the Executive Session on Policing and

Public Safet y at the Har vard Kennedy School

of Government. The author acknowledges the

impor tant feedback f rom Ma lcolm Sparrow,

David Sklansky and Ellen Scrivner.

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice

Washington, DC 20531 Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

presorted standard postage & fees paid

doJ/niJ permit no. g –91

NCJ 234052

Members of the Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety

Chief George Gascón, San Francisco Police Department

Mr. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy

Chief Cathy Lanier, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Dr. John H. Laub, Director, National Institute of Justice

Ms. Adrian Nicole LeBlanc, Visiting Scholar, New York University

Professor Tracey Meares, Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School

Chief Constable Peter Neyroud, Chief Executive, National Policing Improvement Agency (U.K.)

Ms. Christine Nixon, Chair, Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (Australia)

Chief Richard Pennington, Atlanta Police Department

Mayor Jerry Sanders, City of San Diego

Professor David Sklansky, Professor of Law, Faculty Co-Chair of the Berkeley Center for Criminal Justice, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law

Mr. Sean Smoot, Director and Chief Legal Counsel, Police Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois

Professor Malcolm Sparrow, Professor of Practice of Public Management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Chief Darrel Stephens, Charlotte- Mecklenburg Police Department (retired)

Professor Christopher Stone, Guggenheim Professor of the Practice of Criminal Justice, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Mr. Jeremy Travis, President, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Mr. Rick VanHouten, President, Fort Worth Police Association

Professor David Weisburd, Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law and Criminal Justice; Director, Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University; and Distinguished Professor, Department of Criminology, Law and Society, George Mason University

Dr. Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

Chief Anthony Batts, Oakland Police Department

Professor David Bayley, Distinguished Professor, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany

Dr. Anthony Braga, Senior Research Associate, Lecturer in Public Policy, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Chief William J. Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department

Chief Ella Bully-Cummings, Detroit Police Department (retired)

Ms. Christine Cole (Facilitator), Executive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Commissioner Edward Davis, Boston Police Department

Chief Ronald Davis, East Palo Alto Police Department

Chief Edward Flynn, Milwaukee Police Department

Colonel Rick Fuentes, Superintendent, New Jersey State Police

Learn more about the Executive Session at:

NIJ’s website: http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/administration/executive-sessions/welcome.htm Harvard’s website: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/executive_sessions/policing.htm

*NCJ~234052*