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MSc Global Affairs Dissertation: Research methods

Notions of Causation

Sunil Mitra Kumar

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Today

In the context of dissertation projects 1. Identifying when claims are causal, what might be some

non-causal claims?

2. What does “A causes B” mean?

3. Challenges to posing causal claims

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Are dissertations ubiquitously causal?

Dissertation arguments can be 1. Causal claims: how/why/whether one or more A shapes one or

more B 1.1 What explains B? 1.2 Does A cause B? To what extent? 1.3 Under what circumstances can A cause B?

2. Non-causal arguments or descriptions 2.1 a detailed description of some phenomenon without suggesting

what explains A 2.2 Proving a mathematical theorem

My claim: You will write a causal dissertation!

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Some recent dissertation titles

Safe Third Country? An analysis of the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperation Agreement (2019) and the principle of non-refoulement in international refugee law

Does a consumption based approach to emission accountability minimise climate colonialism in a post-2015 climate change governance? A comparative study of India and the USA

To what extent to India’s strides towards modernisation and expansion of its nuclear arsenal directly challenge the posture of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrance’ enshrined in its official nuclear doctrine?

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Enquiries into causation

“Causes of effects”

“Effects of causes”

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Hang on...

What does it mean to say “A causes B”? 1. Necessity?

2. Likelihood

⇒ More specifically, a shift in the probability distribution of outcomes

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Hang on...

What does it mean to say “A causes B”? 1. Necessity?

2. Likelihood ⇒ More specifically, a shift in the probability distribution of outcomes

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J.L. Mackie’s INUS conditions

An electric short circuit caused a fire in a house. This short circuit was an “INUS condition” for the fire: 1. The short circuit was IN:

I On its own it was insufficient to have caused the fire I But it was necessary in this case to have caused the fire ⇔

the fire wouldn’t have happened without it

2. ...and, the short circuit was part of another enabling condition(s) that were US: I The presence of flammable material was on its own

unnecessary, but in this case proved I sufficient to lead to a fire once the short circuit provided the

spark

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J.L. Mackie’s INUS conditions

An electric short circuit caused a fire in a house. This short circuit was an “INUS condition” for the fire: 1. The short circuit was IN:

I On its own it was insufficient to have caused the fire I But it was necessary in this case to have caused the fire ⇔

the fire wouldn’t have happened without it

2. ...and, the short circuit was part of another enabling condition(s) that were US: I The presence of flammable material was on its own

unnecessary, but in this case proved I sufficient to lead to a fire once the short circuit provided the

spark

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INUS!

An electric short circuit caused a fire in a house. This short circuit was an “INUS condition” for the fire: 1. The short circuit was IN:

I insufficient: other enabling conditions were required to be present to cause the fire

I necessary: at that moment in time and with other conditions as they stood, the fire wouldn’t have happened without it

2. ...and, the short circuit was part of another enabling condition(s) that were US: I unnecessary: there exist many alternative conditions that

would cause fire; this particular one wasn’t necessary, but...

I sufficient: but in this case, this specific enabling condition combined with the short circuit was sufficient for the fire ⇔ we need not search for other explanations

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Problems with constructing causal arguments

1. We wrongly infer “A causes B” when in fact there exists a C such that “C causes B” or “C causes A and B”

2. We wrongly infer “A causes B” when in fact “B causes A”

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Problems of the first type

A: School B: Learning achievement

C: Socioeconomic status

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Problems of the first type

A: School B: Learning achievement

C: Socioeconomic status

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Problems of the first type

A: School B: Learning achievement

C: Socioeconomic status

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Problems of the second type

The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:

An Empirical Investigation

By DARON ACEMOGLU, SIMON JOHNSON, AND JAMES A. ROBINSON*

We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institu- tions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlledfor, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes. (JEL 011, P16, P51)

What are the fundamental causes of the large differences in income per capita across

countries? Although there is still little con- sensus on the answer to this question, differ- ences in institutions and property rights have

received considerable attention in recent

years. Countries with better "institutions," more secure property rights, and less distor-

tionary policies will invest more in physical and human capital, and will use these factors

more efficiently to achieve a greater level of

income (e.g., Douglass C. North and Robert

P. Thomas, 1973; Eric L. Jones, 1981; North,

1981). This view receives some support from cross-country correlations between measures of property rights and economic development (e.g., Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, 1995; Paulo Mauro, 1995; Robert E. Hall and

Charles I. Jones, 1999; Dani Rodrik, 1999), and from a few micro studies that investigate the relationship between property rights and investment or output (e.g., Timothy Besley, 1995; Christopher Mazingo, 1999; Johnson et al., 1999).

At some level it is obvious that institutions matter. Witness, for example, the divergent paths of North and South Korea, or East and West Germany, where one part of the country stagnated under central planning and collec- tive ownership, while the other prospered with private property and a market economy. Nevertheless, we lack reliable estimates of the effect of institutions on economic perfor- mance. It is quite likely that rich economies

choose or can afford better institutions. Per- haps more important, economies that are dif- ferent for a variety of reasons will differ both

* Acemoglu: Department of Economics, E52-380b, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA

02319, and Canadian Institute for Advanced Research

(e-mail: [email protected]); Johnson: Sloan School of Man- agement, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cam- bridge, MA 02319 (e-mail: [email protected]); Robinson: Department of Political Science and Department of Eco-

nomics, 210 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berke- ley, CA 94720 (e-mail: [email protected]).

We thank Joshua Angrist, Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo,

Stan Engerman, John Gallup, Claudia Goldin, Robert Hall, Chad Jones, Larry Katz, Richard Locke, Andrei

Shleifer, Ken Sokoloff, Judith Tendler, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the University of California-Berkeley, Brown University, Canadian Insti- tute for Advanced Research, Columbia University, Har- vard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

National Bureau of Economic Research, Northwestern University, New York University, Princeton University,

University of Rochester, Stanford University, Toulouse

University, University of California-Los Angeles, and the

World Bank for useful comments. We also thank Robert

McCaa for guiding us to the data on bishops' mortality.

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A third problem: Cartwright on extrapolation

Nancy Cartwright’s chapter Predicting “it will work for us”: (Way) beyond statistics 1. Policy evidence, especially statistical, and especially

randomised experiments: something worked, somewhere, at some time

2. something, somewhere, some time: will it work in a different context at a future date?

⇐ an inferential leap

3. The concern is with, therefore, “external validity”

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A third problem: Cartwright on extrapolation

Nancy Cartwright’s chapter Predicting “it will work for us”: (Way) beyond statistics 1. Policy evidence, especially statistical, and especially

randomised experiments: something worked, somewhere, at some time

2. something, somewhere, some time: will it work in a different context at a future date? ⇐ an inferential leap

3. The concern is with, therefore, “external validity”

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