

I. The Significance of The W.H.I Case

A. Path-Dependent WAR
- Shapes the Possible Choices
And Outcomes of the 21st
Century (Explaining W.H.I.
d. the Cold WAR)

B. World Historical WAR-
Changes

1. Decline of Europe - Rise
of U.S. & Japan

2. Russian Revolution & Empire
3. Collapse

C. Least Likely WAR For Structural
and Institutional Reasons

* Present Choices Limit (Constraint)
Future Possibilities

* The Rational WAR Choice

A WAR IS Coordinated
Inter-Societal Violence
a Central Decision-
Maker Is Necessary

B. The WAR Choice
Is Rational/It
Benefits > Costs

I. Core Concepts

A. System - A Distinct Geographical Region - (Like Europe, etc.)

B. Structure - The Number (No.) of Units In A System Calculated by Capabilities (Population, Economic Resources [Industrial Core], Domestic Commitment)

C. Major Powers - Powers At the Top of the System In Terms of Relative Power Ranks & ranges

* (The Analysis, Power Is Relative)

Q Example of Major Powers
- Europe 1914

Germany = 4

Britain And France = 3

Russia = 2

Austria-Hungary = 1

(All Other Powers Are Minor Powers*)

1. Only Major Powers

Can Start A Systemic WAR

2. Conflict Sources of WAR

1 Objective Conflict -

Result of Relative Power And

Objective Threat

a. Hegeinous - Threaten All,

Threatened by All (Germany, 1914)

* Serbia, example, 1914

9.2. Contingent Conflict -
Contingent on historically
specific conflict (Path-
dependence narrows options)

a. France - Germany

b. Russia - Austria

c. Britain - Germany

d. Russia - Germany

F. Anarchy - Absence of
single decision-maker -
1 Anarchy And Conflict

G. Ration / WAR Choice

- WAR Is Ration / If
Benefits > Costs

G. 1 Rational / WARR Choices

a. Reverse / of Survival /
Threats (Relative Decline Power)

b. Expansion of Power
(Hegemony)

c. The Prisoner's Dilemma

	Coop	Defect	
Cooperate	3, 3	1, 4	4737279
Defect	4, 1	(2, 2)	

(2, 2) = Stable Equilibrium

d. P.D. Can Represent

1. Structural Anarchy

2. Rational / WARR Choice

3. Security Dilemma 4. Survival Threat

I. The Security Dilemma

A. The Extended (Complete) Model:

B. At Time 1, All Major Powers Invest An Average Amount of Resources (like Taxes) In Order To Gain A Predicted Level of Security.
1. This Reinforces The Overall Balance of Power

C. At T_2 , One Or More Major Powers Invest More Than The Average In Security, Thus Destabilizing The Balanced Power

D. The Decision To Intervent
More Than The Average Can Be
A Rational Choice For A Power

(1. In Relative Decline or
(2. An Aggressive Power Attempting
To Gain A Security Advantage
(like Germany 1932-39)

E. Security Resources Can

Include (1. Territory
(2. Economic Resources (3. New
Weapons, Size of Military (Europe
1890-1914)

F. Consequences - The Security
Dilemma Can Increase

(1. Conflicted (2. Distrust
3. Destabilizes The Balance of Power

II. Examples of Significant Security Dilemmas That Contributed To WAR

A. The Naval Arms Race
- 1880-1914 (The Dreadnought Era)

B. The Naval Arms Race
1931-1941 U.S. And Japan

C. The Land Arms Race -
Europe 1890-1914

D. Inter-WAR Europe 1919-39

E. The Cold War - 1945-92

I. The Logic of Rising And Declining Powers

A. A Rising Power

Has No Rational Incentive
To Initiate WAR UNLESS

1. I + Perceives That

I's Rise will Generate

An Attack By An Adversary

or Adversary Coalition Created

To Block The State's Rise

And Restore AN UNSTABLE

Balance of Power *

*WAR OCCURS ONLY Among Adversaries

B. A Declining Power
May Rationally Initiate
WAR In Order To

1. Reverse Decline And C-
Escape A Survival Threat

2. Restore The Balance
of Power

3. Block The Rise of An
Adversary

4. The Problem of Hegemony
(Predominant Power)

* Adversaries And Allies

A. Adversaries Are Enemies Defined by

1 Objective Conflict
(like Hegemony)

2. Contingent (Historical)

Conflict) - Generated By
Conflict Over Power, Resources,
Territory

B. Allies Are Always Second
Best To Self-Help. Alliances
Among States Are Always Subject To Change

* Deterrence (To
Deter) - Also Compellence
(To Compel)

A Deterrence Means To
Prevent An Outcome Either
Through Active Threats
or Bribes or Structural
Automaticity

1 Structure Can Automatically
Deter Through The Balance
of Power - In A Balance,
No one Has An Incentive
To Increase The Probability of Winning
If No Greater Than Losing

I. Structural Theory

A. "Realism" - focuses on Power and the Balance of Power

1. Balance of Power Automatically Deters WAR (Balance $\neq 5$)
WAR Choice Is Only Rational If the Benefits Exceed Costs ($B > C$) Otherwise Stability (Balance) Is Robust.

B First Premise: Dichotomous Order Anarchy or Hierarchy

C. First Deduction - If Anarchy, the Balance of Power Is A Balance of Conflict, Given Power -

Maximize the And Resource Scarcity (Resource Scarcity of the Power Sources)

D. Second Premise Hypothesis
of the Unitary Actor-Like An
Individual States Maximize
Rationally Like Individuals

E. Second Deduction:
1. Rational Self-Interest
2. Rational Self-Help
3. Rational Distrust

F. Institutional/Informational
Theory

A. First Premise-Non-
Antagonistic Interests, Even In
Anarchy

B. First Deduction - Balance
of Power Is A Balance of
the Status Quo (Peace to WAR)

C. Second Premise - The
Disutility of WAR - Fighting
(No Utility, WAR Never Pays)

D Second Deduction -
(How Is WAR Ever Possible) -

The Hypothesis of the
Better Bargain (Always
A Bargain Better Than WAR
1. Win Without WAR Is
Always > Than Win with WAR
($w_n > w_w$)

2. Because of Disutility -
WAR Always Entails - Costs
of Resource Mobilization (opportunity
costs) + Cost of WAR Fighting +
Cost of Damage or Defeat

I. Implications

A. Structural Theory
Measures Power And
Predicts WAR If AN
UNSTABLE Balance Or
No Balance Either Threatens
The Survival of A State Or
Generates An Incentive For
A Rising State To Attack
1 The Logic of Rising And
Declining Powers
2 Majo. Powers Are The
Primary Focus

8. Institutional Theory
1. WAR Is Only Likely
If The Information
About Pay-Offs of One
Or More Adversaries Is
Incomplete (Cannot Judge
Preference For WAR And
Peace) - Bluffing Problem
2. And Or - There Are
No Institutional Mechanisms
For Negotiating Binding
Bargains (Binding =
Gains From Trade That
Can Be Enforced At Made At Non Cost

I, Structural Explanation of the W.W.I Case

A. Fundamental Faultline - Major Power Conflict

1. Historical (Contingent)

2. Objective-Hegemonic

Threat - Germany The

German Dilemma - Potential

Strategic Encirclement -

Potential Hegemony (Threatens
All, Threatened By All)

B. Armed Anarchy

& The 2 million man armies

C. Alliance Polarization -

No Third Party Neutral Balance

C. 1. Gt. Britain, France -
Russia vs. Germany And
Austria-Hungary

2. Alliance Lock-In -
No Potential For New
Alliance Groups

3. Germany = 4 Power
Britain, France = 3 Ranking
Russia = 2

Aus-Hungary = 1

4. Germany + Aus-Hungary -
Gains Fran Trade - Most In
Need Of Allies

D. Security Dilemma

E. Survival Threat - Tipping Point

I. Institutional Explanation of h.h.I.

A. Domestic Level

1. WAR STATE In System (unlikely)

2. Externalization of Domestic Conflict) By Germany - unlikely

3. Institutional Constraints On Domestically Caused Aggression
a. Audience Costs (Public Opinion)
b. Institutional Instability (Favors Peace Not WAR) ✓

B. International Institutions

1. The Congress Tradition
2. Diplomacy

C. The Problem of Austria-Hungary And The Tipping Point Assassination (1914)

1. The Monarchy As The Core of the State

- a. Administrative
- b. Military
- c. Cultural

2. Thus, the Assassination of the Heir Triggers A Survival Threat

3. Aus-Hungary Must Choose To Do Nothing And Face Collapse Or Move Against Serbia And Risk Systemic WAR

C.4. The Choice Is To
Mobilize Against Se-Lia
And Signal To Russia That
The Mobilization Is Partial
(50%) Not Total (100%).
Can This Be A Credible
Commitment - In Order To
Be Credible, Russia Must
Not Believe Peace Lies
From Austria Are Bluffing
And Germany Does Nothing
This Is The Problem of
Incomplete Information
(Preferences For War And Peace And Bargaining)

* General Explanations of WAR

A. Structural - The
Collapse of the Balance
of Power or A Fundamental
Imbalance Caused by Dynamic
Factors like technological change
1 Germany - 1939-46-Ja, 45

B Institutional Change In
International System Caused
by Institutional And Bargaining
Failure

I. The Short-WAR

Illusion Explanation

A W.I. Caused by False

Beliefs (Misperception not
Miscalculational) Due To A
Failure To Understand The

Implications of post-1870

Weapons (Rifles, Machine Guns,
Rapid Firing Artillery) Defense

Dominates Offense - However,

There Are Countervailing
Factors That Nullify This

Hypothesis (First & Second
Constraints On WAR Plans)

B. First Strategic Constraint
Offensive Necessity But
Extreme Defensive Advantage
of All Major Powers Must
Attach Gr. Risk The Loss
of Initiative & The Costs
of A Passive Defense (Also
Domestic Demand For A Short War,

C. Second Strategic Constraint

of Maximum Mobilization
(of Manpower) But Minimum
Mobility - Favors First Strike

D. Thus, WAR Plans Must Focus
on A Decisive Battle or Risk
Attrition

* WAR STATE - Peace States

A WAR STATE - First Preference

Fc - WAR (Peace State - First Preference Fc - Bargaining) -

Preference Ordering

4 = WAR AND WIN

3 = Stans Quo

2 = Bargaining

1 = Defeat

= WAR STATE

Preference

B Peace State

4 = Advantageous Peace

3 = Stans Quo

2 = WAR

1 = Defeat - Can Be Represented

As A Prisoners Dilemma

~~Prisoners Dilemma~~

Prisoners Dilemma		
State	3, 3	1, 4
X	4, 1	(2, 2)

4 = Advantageous Peace

3 = Stans Quo

2 = WAR

1 = Defeat

Thus, Peace States Can Originate WAR But Prefer Peace

C. Does this describe Germany in 1914

* WAR STATES AND Peace States
 - WAS there A WAR STATE in 1914?

A. WAR STATE Preferences

4 = WAR AND WIN

3 = Status Quo

2 = Bargaining

1 = Defeat

B. Peace States

4 = Advantageous Peace

3 = Status Quo

2 = WAR

1 = Defeat This can be described

As A Prisoner's Dilemma

	Cooperate	Defect
cooperate	3, 3	1, 4
Defect	4, 1	(2, 2)

(2, 2) is Solution

Thus Peace State Can Enter WARS
 As A Result of Mutual Choice For
 Maximum Advantage (Not WAR Preference)
 C. Is this Germany in 1914?

I. Two Essential Paths:
Cause/Paths To WAR

A WAR AS NO Available

Bargain (W.W.I) no incentive
to Bargain By Russia, Germany

B WAR AS Better Than A

Bargain (Major-Minor
Power WARS) Counteractive
WARS (Should Never Occur,
Minor Powers Should Always
Bargain, Yet OFten Choose
WAR NOT Bargaining

1 example - French WAR
- 1939 - 46

II. Explaining Major - Minor Power Wars

A. Major Powers Seek Retribution To Weaken Or Destroy A Minor Power To Prevent It From Allying With Major Power Adversaries On His Resources Desired by Major Powers.

1. The Choice For War Or Peace Rests With The Minor Power.

2. For Major Power War v. Peace - Major Power Is Indifferent Between the

3. Minor Power Will
Only Choose WAR
If The Benefits
From Fighting Will

(a. Maintain Autonomy

(b. Not Result In Excessive
Damage c. Will Have

The Support (Commitment)
of The Domestic Population
d. Domestic Commitment
Is Therefore The Key Variable

* No Bargain
Available For

Austria-Hungary

1. Russia will Choose
To Let Austria-H Collapse
2. Germany will
Support Aus H. - Not Bargain
3. A. Hungary will Prepare
Mobilize —

WAR Results

I. ~~Counter~~ Intuitive WARS-
Major-Minor Power WARS
(WARS of Retribution Against
Minor Power)

A. Major Power Is
Initially Indifferent Between
Bargaining And WAR (Pay-OFFS
Are The Same)

B. Major Power Will Bargain
If Minor Power Bargains, But
ONLY If Minor Power OFFERS
More Than Initial/Positive Bargain

C. But This Begins To Threaten
Loss of Sovereignty (Autonomy)?

C. Loss of Key Resources

1. The Serbian Problem 1914

D. Major Power Chooses
WAR IF Minor Power
Chooses WAR

E. When Would Minor
Powers Choose WAR

F. If Leaders Believe
Domestic Commitment
Is Sufficiently High
To Prevent Defeat And
Unacceptable Damage -
Force Bargaining

1. America 1975-83
The Revolution Choice

I. WARFARE A 1st & 6th Western World

A. 1200-1500 - The Diffusion And Adaptation of Gunpowder Weapons - From China to Europe

1. The Western innovation -

True Firearms (Muskets, pistols)

2. The Improvement of Artillery

B. 1500-1700 - The Growth of Armies & Purpose-Built Navies

1. From 20,000 to 200,000 Permanent Armies

2. The Floating Artillery Ship (16th - to 160 cannons)

3. Nationalization of Military Service and the Decline of the True Mercenary (esp. after 1700)

a. National Colors (The Redcoats)

C. 1700-1789 - Limited Wars And the Emergence of the Balance of Power (Wars for Territory And Influence)

C. 1. The Cl. maxet Limited Land
WARFARE & Region of State -
The WARS of Frederick the Great (1740-89)
D. Revolution, Mass Mobilization And
Total WAR (1792-1815) -
Portuguese W.W.I & W.W.II.

1 American Revolution (1775-83) &
Saratoga (1777)

2. Napoleonic Revolutionary Congress
1800-1815

a. Spain And People's WARS of
National Liberation

3. The Re-invention of the Citizen
Soldier

4. The Industrialization of WAR
1850-1930's - Trains, Telegraphs, & the
Trucks, Tanks, and Aircraft Create
Militaries of Mobility & Mass
Mobilization

F. The Aircraft Carrier And the
Revelation in Sea WARS (Midway, 1942)

G. Mass Conscription and the Basis
of Total WAR

1 Prussia's Defeat of Austria-
Hungary (1866) & France (1870-1).
along with U.S. Civil WAR Prove
that short-term citizen conscripts
can decisively defeat Militaries
of Long-Term Professionals

2 The New Indispensable Role
of the Professional - NCO's

H. The Engineering of WAR-
1914-2000's


1 Nuclear Weapons-
Or Nuclear Submarine

I. The True WAR-Winning
Weapon Infantry Combat Soldier

I. The Paradox of Domestic Commitment

A. The Paradox - How Do We Explain the Increasing Willingness of Domestic Populations To Bear The Costs of Increasingly Expensive WARFARE (Counterintuitive)

1. Cost Curve



2. Commitment Curve



II. Hypotheses

A. Coercion - Too

Costly (Utilization, Organization
Costs, Resistance)

B. Bargaining - Rules

Exchange High-Value

Benefits For Domestic

Compliance (Taxation,
~~Debt~~, Conscription)

C. The Strategic Bargain

1. Efficient Land Use
Property Rights

2. Citizenship (Legal, Political,
Social Rights)

III. Combat Compliance
How Do We Explain
The Willingness of
Rational, Maximizing
Individuals To Obey
Commands That Place
Them In Immediate
Peril.

IV. Hypotheses

A. Automaticity

1. Habituation

2. Coercion

3. Terrain-Entrapment

B. Leadership

1 Charismatic

2. Institutional

C. Combat Contract

1. Incentives - Negative
And Positive

2. Negative - Shame

(Peer Pressure), Penalties

3. Positive

a. Status And National
Survival / Aggrandizement
b. Economic Assets
c. Friends And Family
Effect

d. Compliance Bonus
(G.I. Bill, Welfare
State)

e. Social / Enfranchisement
(442nd)

f. War Termination

g. Realization of
Principle / Holy
WAR / Political WAR

h. The U.S. Civil /
WAR

1861-65

I. The Paradox of
Domestic Commitment
A. How Do We Explain
The Ability of Modern States To
Generate High Levels Of
Domestic Commitment
To Incur The Escalating
Costs of Modern, Mass
WARS

1. Opportunity Costs
2. Conversion / Explanation,
Expectation - Domestic Populations
will Resist Paying More
For The Same Levels of Security And
State Benefits

II. Cost And Commitment Curves

A. Cost Curve



1 costs (a. Direct Costs
(Taxes, Conscriptual, 2. Damage
3. Duration

B. Commitment Curve



C. Examples.

- 1 American Revolution
- 1775-83
- 2 U.S. Civ. / W AR C Both Sides
- 3 W. W. I - 1914-18
- 4 W. W. II 1939-45
- 5 German, Japanese
Commitment Increases
As Both Sides Face Defeat

D. Explanations

- 1 State Control (Coercion)
2. Social/Fear (of Defeat)
3. Bargaining - Commitment
To Picket State Bargains

I. The Paradox of Domestic Commitment - Origins - The Logistics Constraint

A. Logistics - Production And Distribution of ~~the~~ Means of WARFARE

1. The Means of WARFARE

a. Fighters & Weapons

c. Inputs (Food, Transport)

B. All Societies Must Solve The Logistics Constraint In Order To Fight And Win WAR

C. Two Models - The Relationship of Fighters To Producers

1. Fighters Are Producers

2. Military Division of Labor - Separate Roles

C. Fusion Model (Fighters
Are Producers)

1. Greek Cities (404 B.C. etc.)

2. Early Romans

3. Aztecs

4. Local Militia (1200-1800 Europe)

D. Specialization Model -
Fighters Are Specialized,
Supported By Producers

1. The Origins of Taxation

2. The Origins of Public

Borrowing & Public (State) Debt

3. Mass Conscription

E. How? How Do States

Solve The Logistics Constraint

Two Hypotheses

1. Coercion

2. Bargaining

II. Coercion-Limitations

A. Significant Governments

Do Utilize Coercion To
Deter Shirked Free-Riding

1. But Is This The
Primary or Sole Incentive

a. The U.S. Income Tax

B. Coercion-Limitations

1. The Paradox of Perfect

Tyranny - The Perfect
Tyrant Is Perfectly Powerless

Because -

a. Rule Is Based On

No Benefits Only Costs

(Threats, Coercion)

b. Thus, no group has an incentive
To Support The Perfect Tyrant
($1 + 7 > 7$)

B 2. Any Act of Opposition If
Credible Can Cause Mass
Opposition And The Tyrant
Falls

3. examples - 1980's - 2000's -

The Fall of the Dictators

C. The Myth of Invincibility

(Derived From Rational

Expectations

→ Any Opposition Shatters

The Myth of the Regime

(Dictator) Falls

D. The Empirical Fact
of Resistance

→ Tax Revolt In Europe
- 1500 - 1800's.

III. The Bargaining Hypothesis

A. Domestic Commitment
Is A Function of How Closely
Populations Are Tied To The
Fate of Their States -

1 Membership Will Be
Defended If It Is
Valuable

a. Asset (like Citizenship)
Binds Members To
States, Provides Incentive
To Protect States From
Defeat, Pay Costs of
Domestic Commitment
(like Taxes)

B. Rulers Bargain with
Domestic Populations For
An Expected Level of
Domestic Commitment

1. The Origins of Representative
Government (like Parliament)

C. The Four Strategic Bargains
(Strategic - Allows Rulers To
Play International Strategies of
WAR-FIGHTING

1. The Specialization
Bargain - 1500-1600's

a. Permanent Taxation For
Territorial Security, Legal
Rights And Privileges
(Especially Secure, Efficient
Property Rights)

(1600-1800)

2. The Fiscal Bargain -
Taxes, Debt For-Enhanced
Citizenship Values (Asset
Binding) - Legal, Political/
Rights)

3. 1800-1945 - Conscription -
Bargain -

a. Taxes, Debt, Conscription
For - Legal, Political, "Social"
Rights:

1 Voting - Italy post 1900,
Example

2. Social Reform, Prussia,
Russia - 1800's

3. W. W. I - II - Expansion
of Education, Health Care, Veterans' Rights,
Welfare Payments

4. The Security Bargain -
1745-2000's

a. High Value Citizenship
For -

1 Permanent Military
Spending

2 From long-Service

Professionals (1500-1800)

To Conscript Soldier

(1800-1950's-60's) To

Citizen Professional
(1960's-2000's)

3. The Ultimate Weapon

a. One Combat Soldier

I. The Problem of Combat Compliance

A. The Problem - Rational Obedience (To Commands)

And Moral Peer

1. Coercing Self As
Opposed To Coercing Other

B. Alternative Hypotheses

1. Habituation, Coercion,
Entrapment (Automaticity)

2. Leadership

3. Combat Contract -

The Cause (What Motivates)
What Are the Factors For

II. Authority - Significance And Limitations

A Habituation - (Problem - ^{Variable} Habit Type)

1. The Limits of Socialization

a. Can Soldiers Be
Habituated To Override
Rational Self-Interest

2. Significance

a. Learning Standard
Operating Procedures

b. Creating Cohesion -
Combat As Team Production

c. Balancing Initiative
And Obedience

B. Coercion - Too Costly
(Limitation) And

Inefficient (The Enemy
Is without)

1. Significant - Demonstrative

Coercion - Demand Among
Soldiers For Coercion of the

Untrustworthy - Shirkers,

Fice loaders, Deserters, etc

c. Demonstration Effect

Units will Be Protected

Against Dangerous

Behavior

C. Entrapment (Terror) -

Learning And Retaliation

III, Leadership - The Core Analysis - The Level of Compliance Is A Function of The Quality of Leadership

a Problem (Contingent) -
The Variability of
Compliance Bad
leaders High levels
(U.S. Civil War)

↳ Significance

1. Demonstrate

Leadership (Small Unit)

Demonstration of Rational Possibility

2. Battlefield Innovation a. Tank WARFARE

c. Central Leadership- Functions

1. Management
(Efficient + Costless)
2. Institutional Design
(How To Fight, Selection
of Leaders, Organization)
3. Coordination (of Forces)
4. Estimation of Compliance
Types (Character Enemy)
5. Organization / Learning
And Innovation

C. Limitation - The
Imperfect Correlation
Good Soldiers - Bad
Leaders

IV. Explanation of
Variability of Compliance
- Combat Contract
A. The More You Can
Win or Lose The
Greater The Incentive
To Comply
→ The Motivating Power
of Modern Citizenship

B. Incentives

1. Compliance Bonus

a. G.I. Bill

b. "Hone Fit Fe-
Hercell


2. Social Enfranchisement
(Proof of Citizenship)

a. Freedmen - 1863-65
(200,000)


3. b. Japanese-American
WAR-Termination

4. Family And Friends
Effect (Best Predictor)

5. Realization of Principle



A. Immigrants B. Yankees
C. Ideologues b. Freedmen
w. h. II



Troops (1000s) Levels

A. Replacement
B. Conscripts
C. Immigrant Conscripts
(Parents are European)
D. Sent to France

Ch. 1

IV, Virtue -

A. Moral Values Are
Expressed As Virtues

B. Examples - The Four
Sprouts

1. Also - Frugality
Family Responsibility

C. Virtue Morality Is
Not Self-Sacrifice

D. It Is Balance
Of the Interests of
Self and Others!

