Discussion board Q&As week 4

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http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/beyondgood/context.html

Notes on Beyond Good and Evil

Friedrich Nietzsche

Context

Friedrich Nietzsche was born in 1844 in Rocken, Germany. His father, part of a

long lineage of Lutheran ministers, went insane and died when Nietzsche was only

four years old. An older brother, Joseph, died six months later and young Nietzsche was left to grow up as the only

boy in a household of women. Nietzsche was an excellent student and so thoroughly impressed his university

professor that he was granted a doctorate and obtained a professorship in philology at the age of 24, before he had

even written a dissertation. At this time, he was deeply impressed by the philosophy of Kant and Schopenhauer,

though he would later come to criticize these figures and their theories.

In 1870, Nietzsche served as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War, during which he contracted dysentery,

diphtheria, and possibly syphilis. He continued to suffer from increasing ill health--migraines, indigestion, insomnia,

and near blindness--for the rest of his life.

While the Germany of Nietzsche's day was marked by an unbridled optimism in the promise of scientific progress,

the expanse of human knowledge and the prosperity of the German people, Nietzsche characterized his age as

“nihilistic.” The once monolithic Christian faith no longer dominated European thought as it once had (a fact

Nietzsche vehemently expresses in the phrase “God is dead”), and the rise of Darwinian evolutionary theory along

with the proliferation of modern sciences had led people to see the world as an increasingly fragmented, chaotic

and meaningless jumble. Nietzsche recognized the need to establish a set of potent, positive principles that would

give direction to the energy and will of Europe. Prophetically, he predicted that if European nihilism were to run

unchecked, the following century would bring wars of a kind this earth had never before experienced.

In Nietzsche's first book, The Birth of Tragedy, published in 1872, he draws on the work of composer and long-time

friend, Richard Wagner, to expound his views on western art and the role of the artist. Nietzsche's admiration for

Wagner cooled during the 1870's, however, due largely to Wagner's adherence to anti-Semitic, nationalist, and

Christian values. In response to the reactionary stance of his one-time mentor, whose views were shared by

Nietzsche's equally anti-Semitic and nationalistic sister, Nietzsche became an outspoken critic of German

nationalism, anti-Semitism, and religious dogmatism.

Nietzsche's mature period, when he penned his most perceptive and incendiary texts, began with the publication

of Human, All-Too-Human in 1878, and culminated with Thus Spoke Zarathustra, published in four parts between 1883

and 1885. Nietzsche wrote each of the first three books during ten day sessions, while living a hermetic existence

that was punctuated by battles with his failing health. The three parts were originally published as separate volumes,

and the fourth part did not reach the general public until 1892, more than seven years after it was first completed.

Ironically, the sheer vitality and energy of Zarathustra belies the physical and emotional state of its author--Nietzsche

was continually plagued by bouts of extreme misery and debilitating illness.

Oddly, as Nietzsche's health continued to decline, he became a more prolific writer, perhaps sensing his inevitable

mental collapse. In an outstanding display of stamina and inspiration, he wrote Beyond Good and Evil, On The

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Genealogy of Morals, The Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, The Case of Wagner, and Nietzsche Contra

Wagner between 1886 and 1888. In January 1889, at the sight of a coachman whipping a horse, Nietzsche collapsed

and suffered a nervous breakdown. He never fully recovered from this attack, remaining in a vegetative state for the

better part of eleven years until expiring in August of 1900.

As Nietzsche's literary executor, his sister, Elisabeth, used her brother's reputation and work to advance her own

proto-Nazi views. By distorting Nietzsche's theories and selectively publishing works Elisabeth enlisted Nietzsche

in support of her own pro-Aryan quasi-fascist agenda. For the first half of the twentieth century Nietzsche was

largely misjudged as a precursor to and proponent of the Nazi platform, despite his often explicit abhorrence of

German nationalism and anti-Semitic sentiments.

Nietzsche has had an undeniably profound influence on the development of twentieth century thought. He has

played a role in the birth of almost every modern theoretical movement--his philosophical insights and methods

were simply decades ahead of their time. Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Thomas Mann, George Bernard

Shaw, W. B. Yeats, James Joyce, Jacques Derrida, Sigmund Freud, and Jean-Paul Sartre are a few of the

innumerable theorists who are indebted to the intellectual struggles of Nietzsche.

Summary

Beyond Good and Evil is a comprehensive overview of Nietzsche's mature philosophy. The book consists of 296

aphorisms, ranging in length from a few sentences to a few pages. These aphorisms are grouped thematically into

nine different chapters and are bookended by a preface and a poem. While each aphorism can stand on its own,

there is also something of a linear progression between aphorisms within chapters and from one chapter to

another. Nonetheless, each aphorism presents a distinctive point of view, and even the individual chapter

summaries omit a great deal.

The preface accuses philosophers of dogmatism, and the first chapter explores this claim. Every great philosophy,

Nietzsche asserts, is little more than the personal confession. Philosophers build up complex systems of thought to

justify their own assumptions and prejudices. If we can dig these out, we can see what these philosophers value

most deeply, and so gain insight into their character.

Nietzsche contrasts their dogmatism with the “free spirit” that is not caught up in a particular point of view. He

hopes the philosophers of the future will be characterized by such an experimental method, willing to try out any

hypothesis, and follow any argument all the way to its conclusion.

After a discussion of the religious spirit, which he claims is a kind of dogmatism, Nietzsche embarks on a series of

epigrams, most of which highlight our bizarre psychological make-up. Next, he looks at the long history of moral

systems as a set of different attempts at self- overcoming. He speaks out strongly against the morality of the “herd”

that encourages a dull mediocrity in all. He finds such a mediocrity in modern scholarship, which is overly

concerned with digging up dry, dull facts. Nietzsche's ideal philosopher creates meaning and values, and does not

simply deal with empty facts.

Nietzsche asserts that there is an “order of rank” according to which the spiritual strength of all people can be

measured. Because of this difference between people, it would be absurd to apply one moral code to all people.

Nietzsche suggests that the strongest people are marked by a cruelty to themselves, according to which they

mercilessly expose their every prejudice and assumption in order to dig more deeply into themselves. At bottom,

however, everyone has prejudices. To prove this point, Nietzsche launches an eight-page tirade against women.

Next, he addresses the question of nationalities and nationalism, drawing on a kind of Lamarckism that sees

different nationalities or “races” as inherently having certain characteristics. Among other things, Nietzsche attacks

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anti- Semitism, criticizes the English, and advances the concept of the “good European,” who rises above

nationalist sentiment to find true individuality.

The final chapter presents Nietzsche's conception of “what is noble”: a solitary, suffering soul, who has risen so far

above the common rabble as to be unrecognizable and totally misunderstood by them. He closes the book with a

weak poem about such a noble soul sitting on a mountaintop wishing he had more friends.

Terms

Will to power - The fundamental drive motivating all things in the universe. The will to power, which Nietzsche

refers to elsewhere as the “instinct for freedom,” is the drive for autonomy from and dominance over all other

wills. This will to power can find unrefined expression in the rape, pillage, and torture of primitive barbarians, or it

can be refined into a cruelty turned against oneself, struggling to make oneself deeper, stronger, and with an

independent mind.

Sublimation - The act of repressing one's immediate instincts for power in order to achieve a more refined

expression of power. For instance, if I can resist the temptation to assault others, I can turn that instinct for cruelty

inward upon myself, making my mind and my will stronger.

Eternal recurrence - The central concept of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which is only touched upon in this work. The

eternal recurrence concerns a recognition that everything is connected and nothing is permanent, and that if one

says “yes” to one thing in the universe, one must necessarily then be saying “yes” to everything. Nietzsche's ideal is

the person who has the strength and courage for this universal affirmation.

Perspectivism - Nietzsche's position regarding truth, which asserts that there is no such thing as an absolute truth,

but merely different perspectives that one can adopt. We could think of truth as a sculpture, where there is no

single “right” perspective to look at it. To properly appreciate the sculpture, we must walk around it, looking at it

from as many different perspectives as possible. Similarly, Nietzsche insists that we should not get caught up in

dogmatism, but rather look at the truth from as many perspectives as possible.

Slave morality - The morality of the slave caste, who are poor, sick, and unhappy, and are oppressed and made to

suffer by their masters. They see life as something bad and wrong, and identify the masters as “evil” for enjoying

life in all their health and riches. Consequently, they come to see themselves and all their sickly characteristics as

“good.” Also see master morality.

Master morality - The morality of the aristocratic, or noble, caste, who are rich, healthy, and cheerful. They

celebrate themselves as “good,” seeing in themselves everything that is noble. By contrast, they establish a distance

between themselves and the poor, sick, unhappy slaves, seeing the slaves' lot as contemptible and “bad.” Also see

slave morality.

Herd - The name Nietzsche often gives to the common, mediocre masses. He sees them as herd animals, lacking

any individual will and living by group instincts. Nietzsche often speaks of “herd morality” as the democratic will to

render everyone equal in mediocrity.

Free spirit - Someone who has the flexibility of mind not to be caught up in any one point of view or dogma. A

free spirit looks at the world from many different perspectives, uncovering the prejudices and assumptions that

underlie any particular point of view.

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Good European {good Europeans, good European, good Eurpoeans} - Nietzsche's ideal citizen of Europe, who

rises above nationalist sentiments in order to assert a free spirited individuality. Nietzsche considers Goethe,

Napoleon, and Stendhal, among others, to be “good Europeans.”

Self-overcoming - According to Nietzsche, we are both creature and creator. We are both the animal with its

instincts for cruelty and aggression and the overman with his self-made will and set of values. In order to become

more noble, to approximate the overman, we must turn our animal instincts for cruelty against the creature in us. In

a painful process of self-examination and inner struggle, we must make ourselves deeper and stronger. Nietzsche

calls this self-punishment “self-overcoming.”

Overman - Often also called the “superman,” the overman is nowhere mentioned in Beyond Good and Evil, but he

is alluded to in the commentary. The term is derived from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which Nietzsche proclaims the

overman as the end goal of humanity. The overman is someone who has so refined his will to power that he has

freed himself from all outside influences and created his own values.

Nihilism - Literally, a belief in nothing. Nietzsche characterized his age as nihilistic, because of its unswerving faith

in a science that describes the world as meaningless and under the sway of unchanging laws.

Overall Analysis and Themes

An understanding of Nietzsche's work as a whole relies on a solid grasp of his views on truth and language, and his

metaphysics and conception of the will to power. At the very bottom of Nietzsche's philosophy lies the conviction

that the universe is in a constant state of change, and his hatred and disparagement of almost any position can be

traced back to that position's temptation to look at the universe as fixed in one place. Nietzsche is skeptical of both

language and “truth” because they are liable to adopt a fixed perspective toward things.

Words, unlike thoughts, are fixed. Our thoughts can flow and change just as things in the universe flow and change,

but a word, once uttered, cannot be changed. Because language has this tendency toward fixity, it expresses the

world in terms of facts and things, which has led philosophers to think of the world as fixed rather than fluid. A

world of rigid facts can be spoken about definitively, which is the source of our conception of truth and other

absolutes, such as God and morality.

Nietzsche sees the facts and things of traditional philosophy as far from rigid, and subject to all sorts of shifts and

changes. He is particularly brilliant in analyzing morality, showing how our concept of “good,” for instance, has had

opposite meanings at different times. The underlying force driving all change is will, according to Nietzsche. In

specific, all drives boil down to a will to power, a drive for freedom and domination over other things. The concept

of “good” has had different meanings over time because different wills have come to appropriate the concept.

Meaning and interpretation are merely signs that a will is operating on a concept.

Because facts and things depend for their meaning on ever-shifting and struggling wills, there is no such thing as

one correct or absolute viewpoint. Every viewpoint is the expression of some will or other. Rather than try to talk

about the “truth,” we should try to remain as flexible as possible, looking at matters from as many different

perspectives as possible. Nietzsche's ideal “philosophy of the future” is one that is free enough to shift perspectives

and overturn the “truths” and other dogmas of rigid thinking. Such philosophy would see moral concepts such as

“good” and “evil” as merely surfaces that have no inherent meaning; such philosophy would thus move “Beyond

Good and Evil.” Nietzsche's ideal philosophers would also turn their will to power inward, struggling constantly

against themselves to overcome their own prejudices and assumptions.

Nietzsche's unorthodox views on truth can help to explain his unusual style. Though we can follow trains of

thought and make connections along the way, there is no single, linear argument that runs through the book.

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Because Nietzsche does not see the truth as a simple, two-dimensional picture, he cannot represent it accurately

with a simple linear sketch. Nietzsche sees the world as complex and three-dimensional: more like a hologram than

a two-dimensional picture. And just as a hologram is a three-dimensional image made up of infinitesimal two-

dimensional fragments, each approximating the whole, Nietzsche presents his worldview in a series of two-

dimensional aphorisms, each approximating a more complex worldview. Beyond Good and Evil is Nietzsche's

perspectivism in practice: we can read every aphorism as one different perspective from which to look at

Nietzsche's philosophy. There is some sort of line we can trace, moving from perspective to perspective, but

essentially we end up with Nietzsche's philosophy in 9 big pieces and 296 smaller fragments. In this way, Nietzsche

attempts to find the expression of his thoughts in language that best preserves their fluidity and three-

dimensionality.

Preface

Summary

Nietzsche opens with the provocative question: “Supposing truth is a woman--what then?” The dogmatism of most

philosophers, Nietzsche suggests, is a very clumsy way of trying to win a woman's heart. At this time, no

dogmatism seems wholly satisfactory and philosophy has yet to conquer the truth.

While dogmatism bumbles along in all seriousness, earnest of its purpose, Nietzsche suggests that the foundations

of all dogmatism are based on childish superstitions or prejudices. He cites as examples the “soul superstition”

which remains even in atheistic philosophy as the “subject and ego superstition” as well as seductions of grammar,

or gross generalizations based on a narrow set of facts.

Dogmatism has been responsible for Plato's ideals of pure spirit and the Form of the Good which Nietzsche calls

“the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of errors so far,” and he also indicts Christianity as “Platonism for

'the people.'“ However, the struggle against this dogmatism has created a tension in the spirit of modern Europe,

and, Nietzsche suggests, “with so tense a bow we can now shoot for the most distant goals.” He accuses Jesuits and

democrats of trying to ease this tension rather than feeling it as a need, a means to a goal. This “magnificent

tension” is valued by the kind of people Nietzsche values: “good Europeans and free, very free spirits.”

Commentary

Nietzsche's association of philosophy with dogmatism was more apt in his day than in ours, but to his credit, he is

in part responsible for philosophy's renunciation of dogmatism. Nineteenth- century German philosophy was

particularly rife with “system” philosophers--the greatest of which was Hegel--who developed from a few basic

principles vast, complex systems that were supposed to provide complete and thorough explanations of the human

experience. Because this was the philosophical mood of his day, we should not be surprised that Nietzsche was

inclined to see the entire history of philosophy in the systematic terms in which his contemporaries interpreted it.

In particular, Plato is far from being a dogmatist in many senses, though many persistently try to read him as such.

As a result, Plato's influence has largely been propagated according to dogmatic readings. The reading of Plato that

Nietzsche associates with dogmatism interprets Plato as saying that the world of the senses is illusory, and that

truth and reality reside in invisible, eternal, and unchanging Forms that underlie and animate the less real material

objects that we perceive. This Plato, who had a tremendous influence on Christianity, suggests that our bodies are

only temporary, physical things, but that we have a pure spirit, or soul, that is immortal and which animates us.

Plato also posits the Form of the Good as being the highest of all Forms, that which is the ultimate ground for all

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reality. As a result, our task as human beings is to pursue and approximate the Form of the Good, and this task is

essentially what all morality is based upon.

Nietzsche identifies dogmatism in this belief in the “pure spirit” and the Form of the Good. These beliefs are

dogmatic to Nietzsche because they serve as foundations that do not themselves admit of criticism. According to

the popular reading of Plato, the Form of the Good is the anchor for the rest of the Platonic “system” of

philosophy. If we can believe in the Form of the Good as an absolute, everything else follows from it. Similarly,

belief in the absoluteness and eternality of the pure spirit within us allows for a number of inferences about human

nature, human society, and human morality.

Dogmatism, to Nietzsche, is taking any claim as an absolute truth that does not need to be justified. While

philosophers claim to base everything in reason and to take nothing on faith, Nietzsche argues ultimately that all

philosophy is grounded on some leap of faith. It is logically impossible to create a system where every claim in the

system is justified by another part of the system. If we see a system as a building, where every block has to rest

upon another block, we ultimately must arrive at the foundation blocks upon which all the other blocks rest.

Philosophers generally take the foundations of their systems to be very simple and indubitable truths. Nietzsche, on

the other hand, takes these foundations to be childish superstitions and prejudices. Nietzsche operates on the

maxim that a claim taken as obviously true is really just based in assumptions so deep that we no longer recognize

them as assumptions.

Nietzsche is often difficult to understand because he argues against anything that parades itself as an absolute truth,

and our thinking is so influenced by a belief in absolutes that it is often difficult to take Nietzsche at face value. His

position, which has been called “perspectivism,” insists that there are not absolute truths, but only different and

equally valid perspectives with which we can look at the truth. We might think of truth as of a sculpture: by looking

at it from only one side, we don't understand or appreciate the whole sculpture. Only by walking around it and

looking at it from all different angles can we properly appreciate it.

Nietzsche's main objection to Platonism is that it fixes our perspective, saying “there is only one truth and it must

be looked at in this way.” Such an insistence paralyzes our understanding and makes it impossible for us to reason

freely. Nietzsche's ideal of “free spirits” is of people who do not allow themselves to be tied down to any one

perspective, dogmatism, or faith.

The themes outlined in this preface serve to introduce the frame of mind with which the rest of the book must be

approached. Nietzsche is essentially saying: “check all your assumptions at the door. I will not accept any objections

that are based on any kind of dogmatism.”

1 - “On the Prejudices of Philosophers”

Summary

Nietzsche opens by questioning the will to truth that makes us such inquisitive creatures. Of all the questioning this

will excites in us, we rarely question the value of truth itself.

Nietzsche confronts what he calls the “faith in opposite values.” This is the belief that the world can be divided

into opposites, starting with the opposition of truth and falsehood. Nietzsche suggests that perhaps the relationship

between so-called “opposites” is far more complex. Often, our “truths” are born from our prejudices, from our will

to deceive; they are born from our falsehoods.

For instance, conscious thinking is usually contrasted with instinct, but Nietzsche argues that most conscious

thinking tends to be informed precisely by instinct. Instinctively, we value truth over falsehood, but perhaps

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falsehood can be a valuable--even indispensable--condition for life. While philosophers generally would like to

proclaim their objectivity and disinterestedness, their instincts and prejudices are usually what inform them. At

bottom, we find a bunch of old prejudices called “truths” and a whole system of philosophy built up after the fact

to justify these “truths.” Nietzsche believes that every philosophy is, essentially, the confession of a philosopher,

and it gives us more of an insight into that philosopher's character than anything else.

To elaborate on this point, Nietzsche examines a number of different philosophers, beginning with the Stoics.

These philosophers who urged us to live “according to nature” were not trying to re- create us in the image of

nature (which Nietzsche argues is absurd) but were trying rather to re-create nature in the image they desired.

Philosophy, “the most spiritual will to power,” says Nietzsche, “always creates the world in its own image; it cannot

do otherwise.” This will to power, according to Nietzsche, is our cardinal instinct, more fundamental even than the

instinct of self-preservation.

Nietzsche also dissects anti-realism, Kantianism, and materialistic atomism. He argues that Kant never gives

anything more than circular reasons for believing that there is a faculty capable of synthetic a priori judgments.

Nonetheless, we need to believe in synthetic a priori judgments and will believe in such a faculty even though we

don't actually have it.

Another prejudice of philosophers is the belief in “immediate certainties,” the most famous of which is Descartes’s

assertion that he cannot possibly doubt that he is thinking. This certainty only reflects a lack of reflection on what is

meant by “I think.” Why am I so certain that it is “I” that thinks? That I am the cause of the thinking? Doesn't a

thought come to me, isn't it the thought that thinks? And how can I know, without further assumptions or

certainties, that I am thinking, and not willing or feeling or something else?

Nietzsche is particularly harsh on our conception of “free will.” First, he argues that the will is far more

complicated than we make it out to be: the word “I” obscures and fudges together a whole complex of

commanding and obeying wills. This “freedom” of the will comes only from identifying this “I” as the source both

of the commanding and the obeying. The concept of free will also relies on the erroneous notions of cause and

effect, which see our will as a “cause.” Cause and effect are a part of a larger picture of physics, according to which

nature is governed by laws. Nietzsche argues that this is a democrat's interpretation of nature: we could equally well

see it as totally lawless, governed only by the unfettered assertion of wills.

Commentary

Nietzsche's understanding of “truth” is subtle and deep. Logically speaking, “true” and “false” apply to sentences

and propositions, not to things or wills or people. Any statement that purports to be true can be seen as expressing

a particular point of view. According to Nietzsche, no point of view can comprehend absolute truth: there are only

different perspectives from which one can see a matter. If one sees a matter from only one perspective, one is

seeing a distorted and incomplete picture. Truth, being something expressible only in propositions, demands a

point of view, a particular perspective, and, in claiming truth for that perspective, distorts the bigger picture. Truth,

we might say, falsifies the overall picture. Once we abandon a belief in absolute truths and absolute falsehoods, the

relationship between truth and falsity becomes richer and more complex.

Our “truths,” according to Nietzsche, are not absolute, but are rather particular interpretations of what we see. For

instance, Nietzsche argues that it is only “true” that nature operates according to laws if we take a particularly

democratic perspective toward the workings of nature. Nietzsche sees the same regularity in nature, but doesn't

interpret this regularity as the proper governance of law so much as the constancy of the domination of stronger

wills over weaker ones. Nietzsche's discussion of wills will be discussed shortly.

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Our interpretation of experience is ultimately based on the perspective we choose, and the perspective we choose is

largely based on moral assumptions and prejudices: we see the world the way we want to see it. Philosophers are in

the business of trying to justify seeing the world in their own particular way, and they come up with reasons why

the world should be viewed from their perspective rather than some other. Ultimately, they see their moral

prejudices and their perspective on things as “truths.” As a result, philosophy is as much autobiography as anything

else: philosophers attempt to justify and to convince others of what it is that drives and motivates them.

The obvious, and sometimes justified, objection to lots of talk about relative truths and perspectives and the like is:

“But aren't there some things that are simply true or simply false? That 1 + 1 = 2 doesn't depend on my

perspective.” True enough. To understand what Nietzsche means, we need to understand his conception of the will

to power.

According to Nietzsche, the significant fact about the universe is that it is always changing. A philosophy of facts

and things only reinforces the misconception that the universe is fixed. Nietzsche identifies will as the agent of all

change in the universe, and so focuses his philosophy more on the will. All wills struggle for domination,

independence, and power over one another, which is the source of change in the universe. This change is thus

effected by what Nietzsche calls the “will to power,” the struggle for independence and dominance over other wills.

Nietzsche sees people not as “things” or “selves” but as a complex of wills, all struggling with one another for

domination. He calls philosophy the “most spiritual will to power” because it is an attempt on the part of the

philosopher to impose his prejudices and assumptions--his “spirit”--on everyone else. The philosopher wants his

will to be “truth.”

To return to the earlier objection, 1 + 1 = 2 without a doubt, but this truth is a simple fact, and we only get a part

of the picture unless we ask who asserts it and why. Why would a mathematician devote his entire life to the pursuit

of such truths? What does that say about the mathematician? What does it then say about the truths? What wills are

at play, what will is dominant in the pursuit of mathematics? These are the questions that interest Nietzsche, as a

philosopher of the will, and not of facts and things. The “truths” of philosophers are expressions of their wills and

not simple facts. A particular perspective taken on the truth is evidence for a particular will claiming dominance.

One of Nietzsche's pet peeves is the influence that grammar, and particularly the subject-predicate form, has upon

philosophy. For instance, Nietzsche accuses us of misunderstanding “I think” as implying that there is an “I” which

is a distinct entity, and thinking, which is an action undertaken by the “I.” First of all, as Nietzsche explains, this “I”

only appears as a stable thing on the surface, but it is in essence a complex of competing wills. Further, he suggests,

thoughts come to us: we don't create them. While it is impossible to find a satisfactory expression in language, we

might be better off substituting for “I think” the less simple sentence: “the will to think became dominant over

other wills at such-and-such place and time.”

2 - “The Free Spirit”

Summary

Nietzsche opens with the suggestion that our knowledge relies on a simplification of the truth that makes it

expressible in language and understandable to all. Essentially, then, our will to knowledge is built upon, and is even

a refinement of, our will to ignorance. Philosophers most of all should not pose as defenders of truth or

knowledge. The “truths” of philosophers are just their prejudices, and no philosopher has even been “proved”

right. Philosophers are at their best when they are questioning themselves and freeing their spirits from their

prejudices.

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The “free spirits” among us thrive on isolation and independence, though this is a difficult and dangerous life to

follow. On one's own, one faces unknown dangers that no one else will understand. One's successes and failures

are entirely one's own and cannot be shared. The thoughts of these free spirits are liable to be misinterpreted and

dangerously misunderstood by lesser people. Still, free spirits devoted to knowledge will commit themselves to

forgoing their independence and mingling with others. In terms of knowledge, the rule is more interesting than the

exception.

Nietzsche draws a brief contrast between “pre-moral” societies where the value of an action is found in its

consequences, and modern, “moral” societies where the value of an action is found in its origin. Today, we praise

or blame an action primarily based on its motives. Nietzsche identifies in this an advance over the “pre-moral”

valuation since this “moral” worldview places an emphasis on self- knowledge. However, he also looks beyond our

“moral” world to an “extra- moral” world that recognizes that the true value of an action lies beneath the conscious

level in the unintentional drives that motivate it. We need to “overcome” morality, recognizing that the intentions

and motives for actions are just the surface of a far more complex set of drives that need to be uncovered and

analyzed.

After a skeptical onslaught in which Nietzsche questions the value of thought, truth, morality, and pretty much

everything else that has served as a basis for philosophy, he suggests that we admit nothing as “real” except our

drives, desires, and passions. Thought, for instance, he suggests, is ultimately just the relation of our different drives

to one another. Can we, he asks, also explain the workings of the mechanistic, material world using just our drives

as data? If just one agent of causation--will--explains all change, we needn't look for additional causes.

We might interpret the material world not as separate from the organic world, but as a primitive form of the

organic world, from which organic life springs. Will does not affect nerves or dead matter, but only other wills.

However, if we can trace all our drives back to a fundamental will to power, as Nietzsche proposes, we can then

interpret the world and its “intelligible character” based entirely on the will to power.

Nietzsche concludes by returning to the nature of free spirits and profound thinkers. These people often need

“masks” to disguise their true nature. Most people are unable to understand them, and so will necessarily

understand them differently from what they truly are. In order to be independent, they must constantly test

themselves and not allow themselves to become attached to anything, be it other people, their fatherland, science,

or even the spirit of detachment itself or the virtues they admire in themselves. Nietzsche identifies the new species

of philosophers that he sees coming as “attempters,” free spirits who will shun dogmatism and embrace the

hardships of independence of mind and spirit.

Commentary

Nietzsche's critique of truth and knowledge in this chapter rests largely on the claim that anything that is made

understandable to the majority of people has necessarily been distorted and simplified. Truth and knowledge are

thus artificial certainties that people can fall back upon. As Nietzsche suggests in the previous chapter, our “truths”

are founded on a bedrock of prejudice.

Because the majority of people remain tied to assumptions and prejudices, they tend to misunderstand truly deep

thoughts. We can only understand things on a level that our intellect is capable of handling, and we tend to simplify

and caricature ideas that are above us. Thus, Nietzsche suggests, the free spirit must appear “masked” to the

masses: people cannot understand such freedom of spirit and so interpret it as something else entirely. This point is

particularly apt for Nietzsche, whose writings have been so misunderstood and misinterpreted--notably by the

Nazis, who forced a reading of Nietzsche that was quite contrary to his intentions. Nietzsche aims to re-evaluate so

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many of our assumptions that he is prone to being misinterpreted. Karl Jaspers gives us a clue as to how to read

Nietzsche when he says that we should be nowhere satisfied until we have “also found the contradiction.”

“Free spirits” are so called because they do not allow themselves to be tied down to any of the certainties or

“truths” that are based on prejudice. They engage in a radical skepticism that drives them to question everything.

We get a good sense of what this skepticism might entail in Nietzsche's discussion of an “extra-moral” worldview.

Our current morality is based on origins and intentions, so that we say a certain action is good or bad depending on

the spirit in which it was performed. Nietzsche sees a simplification of the facts in the way this position assumes

that our intentions are simple and transparent. Quite to the contrary, he suggests that our outward intentions are a

mere surface that covers up a great deal of unconscious motivation. (For instance, one person's kindness to another

might be motivated by an unconscious desire on the first person's part to make herself feel superior to the other.)

Late in the chapter, Nietzsche asserts that the new breed of free-spirited philosophers will be “attempters” (or

“experimenters,” depending on the translation). This title may be meant as a contrast to Nietzsche's earlier labeling

of philosophy-to-date as dogmatism. While previous philosophers have built up complex systems meant to justify

underlying prejudices, these “attempters” will be remarkable for their flexibility and their careful evasion of all

prejudice. They will constantly be juggling new ideas, never discarding them for their unattractiveness, but always

greeting them with an open mind. We find Nietzsche giving an example of this experimentalism with his discussion

of the will to power.

Nietzsche suggests that if we can identify one efficient cause that can explain all phenomena, we are better off than

if we need to rely on many different causes. Nietzsche suspects that the will to power can serve as this one efficient

cause, and he suggests that we test this hypothesis experimentally. He believes that all human behavior is dictated

by this will, so that, for instance, thought is not an ideally rational and disinterested activity, but is rather a struggle

between different drives within the thinker. That I think one thing rather than another is merely a sign that one

drive is dominant over another inside me. If this will to power also governs our drive for reproduction and

nutrition, we could see it as motivating the whole cycle of life on this planet. Further, he suggests that the will to

power isn't present only in living things, but can also be found in dead matter. Rocks and water simply lack the

organization and cohesion of a human body, and so lack a focused will to power, but even there the will to power is

operating.

Nietzsche is far from careful or precise in what he means by all this, but his discussion of the will to power is only

meant to show how his “experimental method” could be carried out: this is not meant to be an instance of it. Of

course, Nietzsche falls into the frustrating habit of most philosophers of suggesting that we can work out the details

but never bothering to do the detail work himself. Instead, he remains on the level of generalities, a level that is

always more prone to error. While Nietzsche's “experiment” may rest upon a bold and ingenious exercise of

creativity, it lacks the rigor and detail that the experimental method of science calls for.

3 - “What is Religious”

Summary

Nietzsche considers the demands that Christianity makes: for renunciation of freedom, pride, self-confidence of

spirit, and much else besides. This Christian saintliness is best exemplified by the priestly type, who denies

everything good in life and submits himself to isolation, humility, and chastity. This ascetic ideal has held a great

fascination in all places and times, as the saint then effects a reversal whereby he is able to make his self-

debasement appear as the highest form of good. The power of the saint, Nietzsche says, lies precisely in the

mystery of the value of all this self-denial. Someone willingly submitting himself to such torture must know

something the rest of us don't know. The saint exemplifies a new form of power, a new will to power.

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Nietzsche characterizes us today as being atheistic, but still religious. The ideas of God as father, judge, or rewarder

are no longer valid. God does not seem to hear us, nor to respond. Modern philosophy has been a great help to the

growth of atheism. In questioning the subject-predicate form of grammar, it has questioned whether there really is

an “I” distinct from its predicates. In doubting the sovereignty of this “I” we doubt the existence of the soul. Also,

religion demands a leisure class that can look down on work, seeing it as a distraction from spiritual matters. It

should come as no surprise that this industrious age is turning away from religion.

While Nietzsche suggests that the modern age is atheistic, he thinks it is marked by an ever stronger religious spirit,

albeit one that has evolved beyond theism. Religion demands sacrifice, and in primitive religions, this sacrifice was

of a loved one or a first born: one was asked to sacrifice one's nearest and dearest. This spirit of sacrifice was

refined so that we no longer sacrificed others, but sacrificed ourselves instead. We surrendered our will, our

freedom, and our strength to our God. Having completely sacrificed ourselves, the next logical step was that taken

by Christianity: we sacrificed our God, the one thing in which we had placed all our hopes and faith. Having

sacrificed our God, we are now left with nothing, and worship rocks, gravity, “the nothing”: we have traded God in

for science, and worship that instead.

If we delve deep enough into this pessimism and nihilism, however, Nietzsche suggests we might find the most life-

affirming spirit of all, the person that is not only reconciled with all that is, but would wish it repeated into all

eternity.

Religion can mean different things for different people. To the ruling classes, it is a means to relate to their subjects

and to keep them in line. To a rising class, it teaches self-discipline and prepares it for future rule. To the masses, it

teaches them to rest content in their lowly position. But religion does not only serve others' purposes; Christianity

has purposes of its own. Primarily, it seeks to preserve and care for the human species. This means preserving the

majority who are sick and weak of spirit. As a result, it comes to value the suffering and the weakness in those it

cares for. It effects a total reversal in our moral valuations, so that weakness and suffering are considered “good”

and health and strength are considered “evil.” While we can admire the “spiritual men” of Europe, Nietzsche

concludes that this devaluation of all our noble instincts has bred a Europe of mediocrity and banality.

Commentary

Underlying much of what Nietzsche says here is the important contrast between master morality and slave morality.

According to Nietzsche, morality was originally a matter of saying that health, strength, freedom, and the like were

good, and that their undesirable opposites were bad. This morality was reversed by the Judeo- Christian “slave

revolt of morality,” where those who were neither healthy, strong, nor free came to resent the people in positions

of power and identified them as “evil.” They then came to identify themselves--weak, sick, and poor--as “good.”

This is the remarkable reversal of the ascetic priest or saint, who finds power in a turning-inward of all aggressive

instincts.

Nietzsche characterizes the majority of humanity as “weak” and “sick” because they lack the power to direct their

aggressive instincts outward. A poor slave cannot find any outlet for his animal instincts, and so turns his

aggression inward, developing resentment toward those who oppress him. Because the majority of us are similarly

incapable of outward aggression, Christianity panders to this majority, and creates a heaven that rewards poverty,

chastity, and humility. Those who have no power in this life are convinced that they will have power in another life.

Thus, Christianity encourages and rewards the sicknesses and weaknesses that Nietzsche thinks we should try to

overcome. It persuades us to rest content in our weakness rather than to try to grow strong. Because the Christian

instinct has grown so powerful in Europe, it has developed a Europe that sees this mediocrity as a goal worth

pursuing.

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It is fashionable to see science as the antithesis of religion, as an exemplar of reason fighting against faith and

superstition. However, Nietzsche does not see science as a force opposed to religion so much as he sees it as

religion's latest development. Nietzsche lives in an age that has become increasingly atheistic, but in which he

believes the Christian instinct toward weakness and mediocrity is stronger than ever. Science has become supremely

powerful in this age because it preaches that there is no meaning at all: there are just the laws of physics and the

interactions of matter. In science, asceticism has grown so strong that it has renounced not only strength, health,

and happiness, but even God, who was previously the only justification for asceticism. Nietzsche characterizes this

lack of positive faith as “nihilism,” and sees it as a great danger. We need something to aim for, some higher goal,

or we will give up on life entirely. (In another work, Nietzsche prophetically hints that the nihilism of his age, if left

unchecked, will lead to wars unlike any this earth has ever seen.)

Nietzsche only alludes briefly, in section 56, to the force that he hopes will oppose nihilism. If we can see a

universe of meaningless events, following one after the other, and delight in this, wishing nothing more than its

constant repetition, we will have found affirmation precisely in the emptiness of the nihilism that threatens us.

Nietzsche introduces this idea, called the “eternal recurrence,” at the climax of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and considers

this the culmination of all his philosophy. Unfortunately, nobody seems to agree on what the eternal recurrence is

or what it means.

One of the better formulations comes from Gilles Deleuze, who discusses the eternal recurrence as the “being of

becoming.” If we recall, Nietzsche's metaphysics rests on the assertion that the fundamental nature of the universe

is change, and not constancy. If we focus on what is changing rather than what is remaining the same, we will see

the universe as being in a perpetual process of becoming. All philosophy and religion looks for some kind of

permanence in which to ground things, be it God, morality, Plato's Forms, or the laws of science. However, if we

can acknowledge that nothing is fixed, nothing is true, and yet celebrate this inconstancy, we will celebrate the

“being of becoming,” and will have freed ourselves from all dogmatism and faith.

Deleuze's is just one interpretation of the eternal recurrence. Walter Kaufmann provides a less adventurous account

when he suggests that the eternal recurrence simply means the recurrence of the same events over and over without

change. In spite of many differences in interpretations, there seems to be a consensus that this culmination of

Nietzsche's philosophy rests in the ability to say “yes” to all of life, the good and the bad, and to accept it for what

it is without any belief in or hope for anything beyond this life.

4 - “Epigrams

Summary

This chapter is made up of 122 short one- or two-line epigrams on a wide range of topics. Rather than try to touch

on each epigram individually, this summary and commentary will trace several themes that run throughout, and

identify a few epigrams as particularly illustrative.

Nietzsche focuses largely on psychological observations. He challenges our habit of seeing our motivations and

drives as transparent and easily understood. For instance, in section 100, he says: “In front of ourselves we all pose

as simpler than we are: thus we take a rest from our fellow men.” We seem to assume that we understand ourselves

perfectly well, but Nietzsche suggests that in fact we are far more complicated than we think. We are made up of

conflicting drives, and our reason is far from being able to take an unbiased perspective toward these drives. In

section 158, he asserts that both our reason and our conscience bow toward “the tyrant in us,” our strongest drive.

Nietzsche's observations dig up a number of facts we try to keep hidden. Our dislike for others, for instance, says

more about ourselves than about those we dislike: “The vanity of others offends our taste only when it offends our

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vanity” (176); “The familiarity of those who are superior embitters because it may not be returned” (182). In a

particularly brilliant epigram, Nietzsche suggests why we fail to recognize the darker motives behind many of our

thoughts and actions: “'I have done that,' says my memory. 'I cannot have done that,' says my pride, and remains

inexorable. Eventually--memory yields” (68). Our pride does not permit us to see ourselves as we really are, and will

work all kinds of self-deception to hide us from ourselves. However, a careful observer can catch hints of what lies

beneath by the way we unconsciously betray ourselves: “Even when the mouth lies, the way it looks still tells the

truth” (166).

Our inner life is more like a battlefield than an open book. Nietzsche writes, “Under peaceful conditions a warlike

man sets upon himself” (76). If our drives can find nothing in the world to struggle against, they turn inward and

struggle against themselves. Our reason, thoughts, morality, etc., are all just expressions of different drives. There is

no will that is purely our own: “The will to overcome an affect is ultimately only the will of another, or of several

other, affects” (117). This inner struggle is a difficult one that only the strongest are adequately equipped to cope

with, a thought Nietzsche expresses in one of his more famous epigrams: “Whoever fights monsters should see to

it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks

into you” (146).

Nietzsche sees morality as born out of our inner struggle. In section 143, he suggests we might find the origin of a

great deal of our morality in the fact that “our vanity desires that what we do best should be considered what is

hardest for us.” Morality does not exist in itself, but is instead just a way of looking at the world that is directed by

our inner drives: “There are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena” (108).

The epigrams in this chapter also cover a number of other topics, including remarks on the nature and value of

knowledge, the psychology of women (not Nietzsche's strong point), Christianity, sexuality, nationalism, and

teaching and learning.

4 - “Epigrams and Interludes”

Commentary

This section is a return to the style of some of Nietzsche's earlier writings. Human, All-Too-Human, The

Dawn, and The Gay Science are all collections of aphorisms and epigrams on various themes, not arranged in any

particular order. Given that Beyond Good and Evil presents a far more cohesive philosophy than those earlier works,

we might ask what purpose these “interludes” serve.

The subject matter of this chapter is also more akin to these earlier books. They were laden with disconnected

series of witty and insightful psychological and other observations. These observations served as the raw data from

which Nietzsche built his mature philosophy. From these observations he inferred the will to power as the

underlying drive that motivates all things, and developed his conception of the overman and the eternal recurrence,

which were introduced in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Starting with Zarathustra, Nietzsche's thought took on a more

cohesive and directed shape. For instance, in Beyond Good and Evil we get not a disconnected series of aphorisms,

but aphorisms organized into chapters, building upon themes, and developing the major conclusions of Nietzsche's

mature period.

If Beyond Good and Evil is to present Nietzsche's thought in its completeness, however, it must also present the

psychological and other observations upon which his more organized thoughts were built. This chapter does largely

that. The other chapters play upon themes that took shape with the advent of Nietzsche's mature philosophy.

Because these observations are the basis for, and not the result of, Nietzsche's mature philosophy, they lack the

shape and direction of the thoughts developed in the other chapters.

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Nietzsche's view of psychology has been touched upon earlier. He battles against the conception of the human

mind and will as being unified and transparent. If it were, it would be static: such dynamic processes as thought and

conscience could not exist. That we even have an inner life suggests that there are multiple drives competing within

us for dominance. If we see our mind as a battlefield of competing drives, we can no longer assume that we can

take an unbiased look at ourselves. What we think of ourselves is always biased by the perspective of whatever

drive is dominant at a particular time, and does not represent the whole complex of drives that make us up.

Nietzsche often refers to our vanity or our pride convincing us that our motives or feelings are different than they

are. Self- deception is a concept that is only possible when the “self” can be divided into deceiver and deceived.

This view of psychology then informs much of Nietzsche's criticism. In particular, morality is no longer seen as a

simple and rational matter, but comes to represent the competing drives within us and their drive to remake our

view of the world in the image they desire.

Much of what Nietzsche says here is more comprehensible and agreeable to us in the post-Freudian world. When

Nietzsche was writing, the idea of the unconscious had not been introduced, and the prevailing theme in Western

philosophy of mind was a Cartesian rationalism that saw the mind as an open book, the one thing that could be

known with certainty. We could see Nietzsche in some ways as a precursor to Freud, and indeed, Freud

acknowledged a great debt to Nietzsche.

5 - “Natural History of Morals

Summary

Morality is as old as humanity, and there have been many different kinds of morality across the millennia. Moral

philosophers today lack this historical perspective, and in searching for a “rational foundation” for morality, all they

really do is try to justify their own morality. Unable to see outside the perspective of their own morality, they are

unable to see the concept of morality itself as problematic and needing to be questioned and justified.

Anything great that we have achieved or become has been the result of a strict obedience in one particular direction

over a long period of time. Great art, thinking, and spirituality has occurred through constant and harsh discipline.

Only through a kind of enslavement and hardship can we refine ourselves.

Nietzsche asserts that we actually register far less than we think we do. For instance, when we see a tree, we don't

see the detail of every branch and leaf, but only glance at the rough shape of the whole, and from that construct all

the smaller details in our head. Similarly when we read a book, we really take in only a few words and then fit those

words into what we already think we know. In this sense, Nietzsche suggests, we are all inventors, artists, and liars:

our so-called “knowledge” is our own make-believe.

People differ not only in what they think is worth pursuing, but also in what they take to be possession of what

they pursue. One man may feel he “possesses” a woman if he can have sex with her, while another feels this

possession is only worthwhile if the woman is willing to give up everything for him. This second kind of possession

is made the more valuable the more deeply the woman knows the man, so the man must be able to make himself

known to her as best he can. Nietzsche also uses examples of charity and education as means of possession. For

instance, in educating, the teacher makes the child see the world according to the teacher's perspective; the teacher

thus comes to possess another soul.

Nietzsche bemoans the “slave revolt in morality,” which considered the rich, violent, and sensual to be evil, while

considering the poor holy. We have come to see everything healthy, dangerous, and passionate about ourselves as

pathological. This morality of the “herd” claims in the name of “happiness” that we should avoid our darker

instincts. This may be true for some, but Nietzsche despises moralizers precisely because they generalize on matters

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that depend greatly on the individual. There have always been more people obeying than commanding, but simply

because the majority is suited to submissiveness we should not conclude that this is a general principle that all

should obey. Nowadays, those who command are almost ashamed of it, and dare only do so if they do it in the

name of God, the law, or the people.

Nietzsche suggests that our moral valuations are based largely on fear. In a community that is safe from external

threats, any aggressive members of that community come to be seen as a threat. Thus, our morality condemns all

that is lively, preferring the safety of a tamed, mediocre mass. This morality of the “herd” then proclaims itself as

the only true morality (other moralities are “immoral”) and as the savior of the herd.

Nietzsche worries democratic sentiments may tame us and render us all equal in mediocrity with no way out. He

calls for a species of “new philosophers” to arise and lead the way out of this longing for peace and mediocrity.

Commentary

As we have discussed earlier, Nietzsche sees all drives as resting ultimately on the will to power. My beating up my

neighbor and my giving my neighbor a gift are both expressions of my will to power; they are both ways in which I

can gain a feeling of power over my neighbor. But how is it that two totally opposite deeds can ultimately boil

down to the same will? Nietzsche suggests that we learn to sublimate our will to power; we channel it and redirect it

in order to give it a refined, more subtle, and higher expression. Beating up my neighbor is about as unsubtle an

expression of power as there is; I get a simple and immediate gratification. However, if I resist the urge to beat up

my neighbor, and instead give him a gift, I will have sublimated my will to power. Now I will feel my neighbor is in

my debt and will have a greater, longer- lasting, and more sublime feeling of power than if I had just beaten him up.

Nietzsche clarifies the importance of sublimation in his suggestion that refinements in art, thinking, and spirituality

depend upon a kind of obedience. If one is unable to command, one will be a slave, but if one is unable to obey,

one will be a mindless barbarian. True artists submit themselves to all kinds of rigorous laws in order to discipline

themselves and their art. Obedience and sublimation go hand in hand; the obedience of artists teaches them to

sublimate their will to power so that their feeling of power reaches a climax in the act of creation. Most of us lack

the talent and the discipline for truly great art, but for those who can create, what greater feeling of power is there

than to know that one is the source of something truly beautiful?

We also see the concept of sublimation present in Nietzsche's discussion of possession. His example of the man

who “possesses” a woman by having sex with her has only the basic non-sublimated animal instincts of lust. The

man who wants the woman to give up everything for him wants a more refined feeling of power over the woman.

This man also recognizes that he can only be certain that the woman is giving up everything for him, and not some

false conception of him, if she knows him deeply. In order for him to reveal himself deeply to the woman, he must

first know himself deeply. Thus, a refined will to power, among other things, encourages self-knowledge.

We have now found a formula for what Nietzsche considers to be good: sublimated will to power. The slave is

powerless, the modern European has no will, and the barbarian lacks sublimation. While Nietzsche admires the

“healthy” power of the violent barbarian, he admires this power only as an alternative to the impotency of the

modern European.

If we contrast what Nietzsche considers worth pursuing with other moralities, we can understand why he so bitterly

despises utilitarianism, democracy, and other “taming” forces. The Christian ethic, which is now the only ethic,

wants to speak for everyone. Everyone should love his or her neighbor, everyone should act with the happiness of

the greatest number in mind. Nietzsche calls this “herd” morality because it speaks to our herd instincts. It assumes

that we are all the same and should all follow the same rules.

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In urging us to sublimate our will to power, Nietzsche does not pretend to be speaking to everybody. Some of us

were simply born to be mindless slaves, according to Nietzsche, and those people are not his concern. What

worries Nietzsche is that the minority that is potentially great has been seduced by the preaching of the herd and

has attempted to follow the same rules as everyone else. These rules, Nietzsche claims, exist in large part precisely

to keep these freer, more dangerous spirits in line. Democracy is just one more attempt to force us all to be equal.

While it is easy for an atheist reader of Nietzsche to nod passively at his criticisms of Christianity, morality, or

mediocrity, it might raise a few eyebrows when he vilifies democracy. After all, most of us have been brought up to

think of democracy as a great thing. This commentary will not attempt a synthesis of Nietzsche and the democratic

spirit, and it will not take a side; instead, it will rest content in having highlighted just one way in which Nietzsche's

bold worldview is mightily at odds with everything we presently take for granted. If anything, the liberal

democracies of today would seem far worse to Nietzsche than his own Germany. Our consumer- driven society is

fully geared toward making life as easy as possible for everyone. A sublimated will to power is a result of a struggle

that demands that we make life as difficult as possible.

6 - “We Scholars”

Summary

The main contrast of this chapter is between real philosophers as Nietzsche conceives of them and “philosophical

laborers” and scholars. The great success of science and scholarship has generally encouraged philosophy to lower

itself to the level of laboring on behalf of science, concerning itself with the theory of knowledge. A real

philosopher must be able to rise above all this science, but this becomes increasingly difficult as our body of

knowledge grows increasingly larger.

Nietzsche is critical of the objective spirit of modern scholars. A removal of oneself from one's work and a craving

for generalities can be beneficial in that it helps us make sense of what we already know and thereby helps us to

come to terms with and overcome our past. However, we should not see this objective spirit as an end in itself.

Rather, it is a means that can be used by philosophers and artists to create something new. Nietzsche characterizes

true genius as “one who either begets or gives birth,” and mockingly associates scholars with old maids: neither is

“conversant with the two most valuable functions of man.” These scholars are not self- sufficient or creative, they

lack self-knowledge and strong passions, and they thrive on a mediocrity that seeks to eliminate everything that is

unusual or irregular.

Nietzsche also discusses two kinds of skepticism that he associates with these two different types. The first kind of

skepticism, which he associates with mediocrity, is plagued by doubts that inhibit all kinds of action. By reassuring

themselves with doubts, these skeptics pursue science and objectivity. By means of contrast, Nietzsche discusses a

different kind of skepticism that he associates with Frederick the Great's influence. This kind of skepticism is

strong-willed and intrepid, never resting content with easy answers but always questioning, seeking, and

discovering.

Philosophers, as opposed to “philosophical laborers,” are legislators and creators. While scholars and philosophical

laborers seek to clear up the past, philosophers look to the future and say “thus it shall be.” Because they speak for

tomorrow, they are necessarily out of place in the here and now, and are always struggling against the spirit of the

present. Socrates, for instance, rebelled against the aristocratic spirit of his day, showing the nobles by means of his

irony that they were just as stupid and weak as he or anybody else. Today, on the contrary, a philosopher would

rebel against the democratic spirit of the time, seeking solitude and difference.

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For these philosophers, thinking is a light and easy process. Most of us find careful thinking difficult, and therefore

serious. Most of us, Nietzsche suggests, don't have the strength of will to be philosophers. Such great minds need

to be bred and cultivated.

Commentary

Nietzsche spends most of this chapter blasting modern scholarship or exalting his vision of what a philosopher

should be in vague but vigorous language. As a result, he is often unclear as to what precisely a “real” philosopher

might be like and how precisely the common university philosopher differs from this ideal.

The most notable characteristic of a Nietzschean philosopher is that such a philosopher must be a creator and a

legislator. As we saw earlier, Nietzsche dislikes the spirit of objectivity that reigns in scientific research because

there is a total absence of will. According to Nietzsche, there is no such thing as an objective standpoint: an

interpretation of any fact (and Nietzsche might ask, what is an uninterpreted fact?) is a sign that some will is taking

possession of that fact. A philosopher must not just describe the world, but must also give meaning to the world.

Such a creative act is the sign of a strong and sublimated will to power.

To say that a philosopher must “give meaning to the world” hardly gets us beyond the vagueness Nietzsche himself

presents us with. This concept might become clearer if we understand it in terms of a sublimated will to power. As

we discussed in the previous commentary, sublimation consists of suppressing one's immediate instincts for

domination in order to achieve a more sublime and satisfying feeling of power. The earlier example was of

suppressing the instinct to beat up one's neighbor, and to gain instead a more sublime feeling of power by putting

that neighbor in one's debt. The creative instinct is an example of an even more deeply sublimated will to power. In

creating a work of art, for example, one is interpreting the world in a certain way, and persuading others to share

that interpretation. Thus, one is not only exerting power over others, by making them see the world in a certain

way, but one is also expressing one's power over the world by submitting it to one's own point of view. All acts of

creation are acts of interpretation, and all acts of interpretation express a will to power.

Specifically, Nietzsche suggests that a philosopher should be a creator of values. A great deal of Nietzsche's writings

deal with morality and the way that morality has shaped our history. Different moralities impose different kinds of

order on the world. Philosophers who create their own morality will thus create a new world order.

Walter Kaufmann criticizes the simplicity with which Nietzsche presents his position. First, he suggests that all

great moral philosophers have created a value system of sorts, and second, he suggests that a legislator of values

who does not also do the analysis and scholarly work of the “philosophical laborer” is not a philosopher. This

second criticism is more apt than the first: Nietzsche admires Napoleon, a man who set up a new code of laws, but

he does not consider Napoleon to be a philosopher. The first criticism is a little weaker, and answering it might give

us a clearer sense of what Nietzsche means. Nietzsche is often critical of Kant, who is undeniably responsible for

one of the most influential systems of ethics in the modern world. Nietzsche's complaint is precisely that Kant does

not create a new system of values, but rather comes up with reasons for justifying a morality that is already accepted

and which he already holds. Nietzsche is quite explicit elsewhere in criticizing moral philosophers for doing very

little more than coming up with reasons to justify what they already believe.

The difference, then, between Kant and a philosopher more after Nietzsche's heart is that Nietzsche's ideal

philosopher is free from the morality of his own day. He is a “man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow”

because he creates new values that will influence the future.

As soon as we try to imagine what these philosophers might look like we recognize the vagueness of Nietzsche's

formulation. The only clear example he uses is Socrates, who urged his fellow Athenians toward self-knowledge

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and a more rational way of thinking that relied on careful definitions as well as a recognition of one's own

ignorance. But beyond this one example and the vague notion that a philosopher must be creative and not caught

up in present-day morality, we are left pretty much in the dark.

7 - “Our Virtues”

Summary

One of the driving concepts in this chapter is that there is an “order of rank” that exists between people and

between moralities. Some people simply have stronger and more refined spirits than others. Those of lower rank

hate those who are exceptional, and this hatred is most commonly expressed in moralizing against and condemning

the higher spirits. The idea of divine justice was invented so that people could falsely claim that we are all equal on a

fundamental level.

No moral philosopher seems to consider that perhaps no moral laws are universally applicable. For instance, while

self- effacement can be a virtue in some people, the self-effacement of a born leader who doesn't feel worthy of

taking charge would be the waste of a virtue. In that sense, “it is immoral to say: 'what is right for one is fair for the

other.'“

Pity, at bottom, is merely one way of covering up self-contempt. Because misery loves company, a self-condemning

person will feel pity for others in order to suffer with them. Pleasure and pain, like pity, are mere surfaces for our

deeper drives, and any philosophy that stops with those impulses--such as utilitarianism--is shallow. For instance,

suffering is not something to be avoided (if that were possible), but celebrated. Nietzsche suggests that humans are

unique in being both creature and creator: we necessarily make ourselves suffer in our creative efforts to make

ourselves greater. Pity for suffering is essentially pity for the creature in us that is being remade into something

greater. Nietzsche feels pity only for the creator in us that is being stifled by modern society.

Nietzsche goes so far as to suggest that all of higher culture is derived from the “spiritualization of cruelty.” We like

to think that we've killed our animal instincts for cruelty when in fact we've rendered them divine by turning them

against ourselves. The search for knowledge is one of the highest forms of cruelty; we uncover truths we would

have been happier not knowing, and go against our natural inclination for superficiality and shallowness. For

instance, we would like to believe that we are naturally higher beings, but we learn to our dismay that we are

descended from apes and are not essentially different from them.

Among the virtues of Nietzsche's ideal philosophers of the future, this will to go deeper than all superficialities (call

it honesty or cruelty, as you prefer) is paramount. The knowledge that scholars try to look at with disinterest is

precisely what interests Nietzsche.

Even in the freest of free spirits, however, this digging for truth will hit bedrock. Fundamentally, we all have a set

of unshakeable convictions that make up the core of our being, that say “this is I.” These expressions of what is

fundamentally settled in us show “the great stupidity we are.”

As if to prove that this core does indeed consist of stupidity, Nietzsche shares some of his unshakeable convictions

about “woman as such,” which he opens with the disclaimer: “these are after all only-- my truths.” The rant goes

on for several pages: Nietzsche argues that women are pretty and superficial and are at their best when using their

charms to make men take care of them. He mocks the feminist movement for trying to make women more like

men. To say that Nietzsche claims that women should be locked up in the kitchen is only half right: while he

suggests that men should treat women as possessions, he also argues that women lack the subtlety and intelligence

to make good cooks.

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Commentary

Considering Nietzsche's cavalier attitude toward the truth, it might seem odd that this chapter essentially lauds the

pursuit of knowledge as the highest goal for Nietzsche's philosophers of the future. While we normally associate

“truth” with “knowledge,” it is crucial to our understanding of Nietzsche to recognize that he does almost the

opposite. When Nietzsche talks about “truth” he almost always uses a tone of derision. To believe in “truth” is to

allow one's perspective to become locked, so that one is unable to see a matter from any different point of view.

Knowledge, on the other hand, involves free inquiry into the way things are. If we recall the earlier analogy of

reality as a statue, and a “truth” as a fixed point of view, we might consider the pursuit of knowledge to be an

inquisitive stroll around the statue, looking at it from all sorts of angles. The pursuit of knowledge, in Nietzsche's

understanding of the phrase, is to see all “truths” as fixed perspectives, to doubt all assumptions, and to ponder

what motivates our will to adopt this or that way of looking at the world and then proclaim it to be the only way.

For these reasons, Nietzsche condemns the shallowness of the utilitarian emphasis on pain and pleasure. Pain and

pleasure are mere sensations that point to deeper drives working within us. To rest content with them as the

ultimate basis of any system displays an unwillingness to dig deeper. Nietzsche claims that this pursuit of knowledge

is a sublime form of cruelty to oneself: one never allows oneself to rest content with any truth, but is always digging

deeper and upsetting one's assumptions.

This kind of inquiry takes mental courage and flexibility. Nietzsche calls it honesty--the ability to look oneself in the

eye and challenge every last assumption. We suffer as the creature in us, while its instinct to rest content with

simple “truths” writhes and screams, but this is done for the sake of our better half, the creator in us, and its

sublimated will to power.

In the end, however, Nietzsche asserts that we cannot eliminate the creature in us. We may dig very deeply and

overturn all sorts of prejudices and assumptions, but we have to stop somewhere, and wherever we stop there will

be a set of assumptions, a set of “truths” lying underneath. Nietzsche's “truths” seem largely to be about women.

Rather than dismiss it or laugh it off, however, we should ask what Nietzsche's misogyny can teach us about him

and his thought.

First of all, let us try to be as charitable as we can. Nietzsche opens his rant with a disclaimer that these are his

“truths.” He has mocked “truth” from the start, and now he is finding what there is in himself to laugh about.

Clearly, he himself acknowledges that his bias against women is unreasonable, and he has greater courage than most

of us in being able to admit to his prejudices and even to laugh at them.

His discussion of truth and his blatant example of prejudice also highlight an interesting new twist to his

perspectivism. It seems that, while Nietzsche lauds the ability to remain free-spirited and see matters from all sorts

of different points of view, he is convinced that no one is totally free from being fixed in a certain perspective. In a

sense, one of the virtues of digging deeply into oneself is to uncover one's own prejudices, one's own “truths,” with

as much clarity as possible.

Nietzsche's confession of his prejudice against women can also help us to highlight a more general weakness in his

writing: he has a tendency to see people according to types. While his attitude toward the Jews is far more complex

and admiring than anti-Semitic interpreters believe, Nietzsche does have a tendency to talk about “the Jews” as

though what he says could possibly apply to all Jews. He generalizes about race a great deal, and this criticism could

also be extended to Nietzsche's remarks about Christianity and democracy. Nietzsche tends to caricature his

opponents, and while his criticisms are often viciously accurate, it is highly contestable that they apply

to all Christians or all democrats. In fact, we could even use Nietzsche's own method, and suggest that stopping

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with “Christian” or “democrat” is like stopping with “pleasure” or “pain”; these generalizing titles obscure the

more complex and subtle fact that, for example, all sorts of different people believe in democracy for all sorts of

different reasons.

8 - “Peoples and Fatherlands”

Summary

As the title suggests, this chapter deals primarily with nationalism and nationalities. While heavy spirits spend half

their life wallowing in the prejudices and narrow-mindedness of nationalistic sentiment, Nietzsche suggests that

even “good Europeans” descend into such stupidity for brief moments. He alludes to his earlier remarks about

women as “a plop and relapse into old loves and narrownesses.”

Nietzsche finds modern Europe most strongly characterized by the democratic movement that will mix the races of

Europe together, creating increasingly less national distinctiveness. While it will breed a great deal of mediocrity, it

will also prove the source for a very few, very exceptional spirits.

A great deal of this chapter deals with Nietzsche's discussion of different races, particularly the Germans. The

Germans, more than any other race, are made up of a great mixture of bloods: there is no such thing as “pure”

German. As a result, the German spirit is complex and mysterious, without any firm definition. The Germans see

this complexity as profundity, and are often considered a profound race.

Nietzsche criticizes German literature and language for lacking a sense of rhythm and tempo. In ancient times,

when reading was always done aloud, the sound of a language was crucial. Now that everyone reads silently, there

are few writers who still understand the natural music of language.

Nietzsche draws a distinction between races that, like women, need to be fertilized and give birth; and races that,

like men, need to beget and impregnate. He takes the Greeks and the French as examples of “feminine” races, who

assimilate the force and spirit of other races and craft it into something beautiful. Among “masculine” races,

Nietzsche suggests Romans and Germans, but above all, the Jews. These are races whose creative drive is absorbed

by the cultures they contact, giving the impetus for great creations.

Nietzsche speaks highly of the Jews, saying that, while they are responsible for slave morality and the grand style of

moralizing, this creative act has been one of the greatest Europe has ever seen. Nietzsche asserts that the Jews are

the strongest race in Europe, and that German anti-Semitism arises precisely because Germany is unable to cope

with the strength of Jewish spirit. Contrary to anti-Semitic paranoia, Nietzsche suggests that the Jews do not want

to take over Europe. Rather, they want to be assimilated by Europe, and this could only be to Europe's benefit.

Nietzsche isn't so charitable with the English. They are unphilosophical, shallow, rely on insipid Christian

moralizing, and lack any sense of music or dance, in both the figurative and literal senses. The best of England are

mediocre men with good minds, like Mill, Darwin, or Herbert Spencer. Free spirits want more than the knowledge

that these men dig up so well: free spirits want to be something new, to create new values, and the pursuit of

knowledge is of secondary importance.

The English, Nietzsche claims, are also responsible for the democratic French ideals that come from figures such as

Rousseau. The true French spirit of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is artistic, passionate, sensitive, and

made lighter by its contact with the Mediterranean.

In spite of prevailing nationalism, Nietzsche asserts that Europe fundamentally longs to be united. The most

exemplary figures of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche argues, have all risen above their own nationality. Nietzsche

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cites as examples Napoleon, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, Schopenhauer, and even Wagner, in

spite of Nietzsche's criticisms of what Wagner became.

Commentary

At the beginning of the chapter, Nietzsche admits that even those who are above nationalism sometimes descend

into petty prejudices and the like. He even alludes once more to his vitriolic remarks about women in the previous

chapter. We might ask how much of the rest of this chapter consists of remarks that a “good European” might be

ashamed of.

While Nietzsche's praise of the Jews might seem as commendable as his attack on the English might seem narrow-

minded, we must recognize that they come from the same source. A prevailing view in nineteenth century Europe

was a kind of Lamarckism adapted by the likes of Herbert Spencer, which came to see different races as having

different “acquired characteristics.” From living together in the same place with the same needs for extended

periods, different nationalities would develop different characteristics to help them adapt to their environment. This

philosophy led, among other things, to vicious stereotypes and racism.

While Nietzsche doesn't seem to question the basic principle that certain characteristics can meaningfully be applied

to an entire race, he is very clever in reversing many of the stereotypes. Most notable is his opposition to anti-

Semitism. The common conception of the Jews saw them as an effeminate race that lacked any creative instinct of

their own, but merely stole from other cultures. Nietzsche suggests the contrary, that the Jews are a “masculine”

race that plants the creative seed that blossoms in other cultures. Nietzsche also knocks away the anti-Semitic

assumption that Germans come from pure, Aryan stock. On the contrary, Nietzsche suggests that no race is more

mixed than the Germans, and it is precisely this mixture that explains their character. On a less political bent,

Nietzsche anticipates twentieth-century scholarship in identifying the Greeks as owing a great debt to the cultures

that preceded them. The Greeks are “feminine” because they absorbed the heritage of the Asian cultures that had

preceded them and “gave birth” to some of the greatest philosophy and literature the world has seen.

If we want to be charitable to Nietzsche (and it is always good form to be charitable to philosophers one studies),

we could argue that Nietzsche doesn't really believe the racial stereotyping he employs. He writes in earlier chapters

about how a great thinker is always “masked” and must rarely reveal his true colors. It seems a great deal of his

discussion of race in this chapter is meant to oppose the nationalistic, anti-Semitic Germans who were in power at

the time. A critique of the very concept of “race” might have gone right over their heads, but a reversal of their

stereotypes, which praises the Jews and disdains the idea of “pure” German stock, might hit them directly where it

hurts. Of course, this reading still leaves us wondering why Nietzsche chose to pick on the English. I suppose it's

good fun, if nothing else.

This reading of Nietzsche is also supported by his conception of the “good European.” Nietzsche was eager to be

read as a European writer, and not as a German writer. He lived in Switzerland and Italy, he uses many French

terms, and is generally critical of German nationalism. According to Nietzsche, the best among Europeans are able

to see beyond the nationalism that their homeland foists upon them. Nietzsche's admiration for Napoleon, for

instance, does not come from some “master morality” of conquering and dominating others. Rather, it comes from

Napoleon's vision of uniting Europe and bringing all nationalities under a common rule. Nationalism, to Nietzsche,

brings just one more set of prejudices that a truly free spirit must move beyond. We see the direct influence of

Nietzsche on James Joyce in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: “When the soul is born in this country there are

nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those

nets.” Even Joyce's choice of metaphors is Nietzschean.

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A final point worth noting is Nietzsche's disparagement of English thinkers as being obsessed with knowledge. In

the previous chapter, he lauds the pursuit of knowledge as the highest possible pursuit. This contrast helps to bring

out Nietzsche's use of words to mean opposite things. The “knowledge” of a Darwin or a Spencer is the digging up

of facts, devoid of meaning. The “knowledge” of a free spirit is a removal of inhibitions, assumptions, and

prejudices that allows one to create meaning. We must always be careful not to ascribe simply a positive or simply a

negative to any words used by Nietzsche.

9 - “What is Noble”

Summary

According to Nietzsche, an aristocratic caste is fundamental to the ennoblement of the human species. This caste

must believe that there is an order of rank that differentiates great humans from the commoners, and that they, as

being of the highest rank, are the meaning and end goal of their society. Society exists in order to create the few

exceptional individuals that are its crowning glory, that justify any sacrifice or hardship endured by that society. Life

is will to power, says Nietzsche, and will to power is exploitation. All organic processes rely on some form of

exploitation of the weaker by the stronger, and it is folly to try to eliminate this exploitation altogether.

Section 260 is a concise and definitive account of Nietzsche's conception of master and slave morality. The contrast

of “good” and “bad” was developed by the aristocratic “masters,” and is analogous to the contrast of “noble” and

“contemptible.” The masters see themselves- -strong, healthy, and powerful--as “good,” and look down upon the

weak, poor, unhappy slaves as “bad.” The slaves, on the other hand, come to see their oppressive masters as “evil,”

and develop the concept of “good” to describe themselves in contrast to these masters.

These are the two fundamental types of morality in the world, and all modern moralities are some kind of

amalgamation of these two. For instance, our concept of vanity is a combination of the masters' inclination to think

well of themselves and the slaves' sense that their worth is determined by the opinion of other people. Thus, vanity

is an attempt to make others think highly of oneself so as to convince oneself of this good opinion.

Nietzsche makes explicit his Lamarckism in section 264. Our character is to a large extent determined by the

characters of our ancestors as determined by their station in life. Thus, some people are naturally disposed to being

of a more noble character.

By simple majority rule, the exceptional is always marginalized. Nietzsche points to the development of language as

a means of expressing what people share in common and can understand of one another. Whatever is exceptional

and uncommon is thus necessarily difficult to express in language and difficult for the majority to understand. The

greater a thought is, the longer it takes for posterity to recognize it. Higher spirits are thus always misunderstood

and made to suffer. In order to ward off unwanted pity, these higher spirits create masks that conceal this suffering

from the public. The only thing worse than being misunderstood is being understood; that would mean someone

else had been made to endure their suffering as well.

Nietzsche also remarks on the solitude of people who aspire to rise above the masses. To such people, all company

is a means, a delay, or a resting-place: until their goal is reached, nothing else is of any importance. Reflecting on

this fact, Nietzsche suggests that perhaps it is not genius, but the opportunity to take full advantage of genius, that

is so rare. The noble man is not distinguished by works or deeds so much as by a degree of self-respect that

commoners lack.

After a rhapsodizing to his god, Dionysus, Nietzsche concludes by despairing that his thoughts cannot find

adequate expression in language. While his thoughts were free, light, and malicious, rendering them into words has

tied them in place, making them dull and solemn: “some of you are ready, I fear,” Nietzsche says to them, “to

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become truths.” Language can only capture thoughts and ideas that are relatively rigid and fixed: the most beautiful,

free- moving thoughts always escape expression.

Commentary

This chapter is Nietzsche at his stylistically strongest, and consists in large part of small observations and remarks

using a variety of authorial voices and styles that defy summary. In both the thoughts and the expression we get one

of the more vivid portraits of the philosopher behind the philosophy. Nietzsche was a lonely man with very few

friends, persistently misunderstood, and suffering both from this loneliness and from ill health. Remarkably, he

didn't simply endure this suffering, but turned it to his advantage, crafting some of the most remarkable books of

the nineteenth century. While one should never reduce a philosophy to biographical details, it is not hard to see

why Nietzsche is at his clearest and most poetic when writing about the loneliness, hardships, and self-overcoming

necessary to genius. We can also see why Nietzsche might write so vigorously about the self- torture necessary to

self-ennoblement, about how the creator in us thrives only at the expense of the creature in us.

Not surprisingly, the most stylistically exciting chapter of the book deals to a large extent with the difficulties of

finding the right words for a thought. According to Nietzsche, language is rigid and talks about facts and things,

whereas the universe is fundamentally in flux: there are no fixed facts or things. Nietzsche expresses the difficulty

of putting thoughts into words with the brilliant metaphor of thought as a bird in flight. He alludes to this

metaphor in the last section of this chapter, but it finds a more concise expression in section 298 of The Gay Science:

I caught this insight on the way and quickly seized the rather poor words that were closest to hand to pin it down lest it fly away

again. And now it has died of these arid words and shakes and flaps in them-- and I hardly know anymore when I look at it how

I could ever have felt so happy when I caught this bird.

What makes a thought beautiful to Nietzsche is the way is “flies,” the way a free and flexible mind can move

around a topic, seeing it from different angles. Language, in adopting a particular point of view, clips the wings of a

thought, awkwardly forcing it to remain in place. Thus, the translation of any thought into language necessarily kills

the birdlike quality that is the essential beauty of that thought.

A writer must necessarily be “masked” because best thoughts defy expression, and so in writing at all, he is giving

the public a falsified, rigidified picture of the whole. Interestingly, we find Plato--a writer Nietzsche accuses of

dogmatism-- saying something very similar in Letter VII: “whenever we see a book...we can be sure that if the

author is really serious, this book does not contain his best thoughts; they are stored away with the fairest of his

possessions.”

Nietzsche's position on language also explains his aphoristic style. Rather than present one sustained argument, he

attacks a given matter from as many points of view as possible.

This chapter also finds Nietzsche at his most abrasive. We might want to deal in particular with his highly

contestable assertion that all life is exploitation. His assertion that all life is will to power has been discussed

elsewhere, and we will accept it for the sake of the argument. The will to power, we must also concede, consists in

what we might call exploitation: the dominance of one will over another. However, at its most sublime, this will to

power is a kind of self- overcoming, where one turns one's instincts for cruelty and freedom upon oneself.

“Exploitation” carries the connotation that one group of people exploits another, and Nietzsche's doctrine of the

will to power does not always call for such exploitation.

In Nietzsche's defense, however, his discussion of exploitation is meant largely as a justification for the aristocratic

caste's exploitation of the commoners. Nietzsche wishes to explain it as an expression of the aristocrats' will to

power, and thus as nothing more than a fact of life.

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We may wish to question Nietzsche's Lamarckism that divides the world up into different types, but we should also

note that Nietzsche goes to some length in this chapter to suggest that the distinctions between different types of

people is blurred, and that true greatness is usually unrecognizable anyway.

“From High Mountains”: Aftersong

Summary

The poem begins with the speaker calling out to his friends, urging them to join him at a point high up in the

mountains. When his friends arrive, however, they hardly recognize him. He suggests that he has undergone great

changes through a constant struggle with himself. He has learned to live in inhospitable climates, and has

“unlearned mankind and god, prayer and curse.” His friends can't live with him here in the mountains: they are not

strong enough for it. He has trained himself to be a hunter, a “wicked archer”: his bow is bent so far that the ends

touch, and can fire arrows with unimaginable force.

His friends begin to leave, causing the speaker some heartache. He resolves to let these old friends go and await the

arrival of new friends. He should not cling to memories: he knew these friends when he was young, and now he is

even younger. Friendship, he suggests, fades like words and cannot remain fixed. The distance that now exists

between him and his friends is a result of their aging: while he has changed they have not. Now all he can do is sit

alone and await new friends.

The speaker concludes by remarking that this song of longing for friendship has now ended. It is time instead for

feasting, laughter, and celebration. Joined by Zarathustra, “the guest of guests,” they can begin “the wedding...of

dark and light.”

Commentary

We can be thankful that Nietzsche wrote better prose than he wrote poetry. His aggressive style makes for exciting

prose reading, but it lacks the subtlety and grace we might hope for in poetry. He also has a very narrow poetic

range. The entire poem consists of little more than a limited and unsubtle use of symbols that we find more

elegantly placed in his prose. For a writer who places so much emphasis on multiple perspectives, this poem strikes

the reader as single- minded and unswerving in its course. Perhaps it sounds better in German, but even Walter

Kaufmann, the translator, confesses that he dislikes the poem.

The poem can be useful to us in its very clumsiness, as it gives us a rare opportunity to examine Nietzsche's use of

symbolism free from its usual ambiguities and subtleties. The poem gives us a portrait of Nietzsche's noble type as

sketched in the previous chapter: alone, above the crowd, misunderstood, constantly changing through a process of

self-overcoming. (One wonders, though, why Nietzsche's ideal noble type is such a lousy poet.)

Mountain heights have both a symbolic and an autobiographical significance to Nietzsche. His discussion of “high”

and “low” is over- used so much that it is tedious even in his prose. The master is “higher” than the slave, and so

can look “down” in contempt. Hatred, ressentiment, envy, jealousy, etc., are all feelings expressed by someone

looking “up.” The theme of “going down” is “rising above” is also played upon very heavily in Thus Spoke

Zarathustra, where they are given extra shading by the “self-overcoming” of the “overman.”

Nietzsche was very ill during the 1880s, and he found the clean, mountain air did wonders to improve his health.

He spent many of his happiest moments and wrote many of his greatest works in solitude in the Alps. No wonder,

then, that he should associate freedom of spirit with heights, and with mountains in particular.

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The image of the bent bow also pops up a number of times in Nietzsche's writing. He compares inner struggle and

self- overcoming to the bending of a bow, and speaks harshly against democrats and Jesuits for trying to “unbend”

this bow. Like the bending of a bow, this struggle creates great inner tension, but, he argues, the tightly bent bow

shoots arrows the farthest. This image of the bow also fits in with Nietzsche's conception of humans as a kind of

bridge between animal and overman. We are not ends in ourselves: we are merely a means, a bow that must be bent

in order to shoot for the overman, our ultimate goal.

Nietzsche also plays frequently with youth and wickedness. He concludes the previous chapter with an affectionate

reference to his “wicked thoughts.” For Nietzsche, “wicked” is not a negative term, but rather suggests a kind of

lightness and slyness, a refusal to remain fixed in place. It would be the perfect adjective to describe a free spirit.

That Nietzsche's speaker is a “wicked archer” suggests that he has freed his spirit through a process of self-

overcoming. Nietzsche associates this freedom of spirit with youthfulness: one only grows old if one allows oneself

to get fixed in place. Thus, as the speaker has grown older chronologically, he has grown younger spiritually.

Lastly, we might remark on the importance of friends to Nietzsche. He lived a very lonely life, and rarely had

friends who understood him at all. He longed for a disciple who would not admire him abjectly, but who would be

able to engage with his thoughts, criticize them, and move beyond them. Sadly, Nietzsche never found such a

disciple, and his “new friends” never arrived.

Study Questions

Why does Nietzsche think that the belief in a soul is a “superstition”?

Nietzsche identifies many of the errors in traditional philosophy with a misunderstanding of and a heavy reliance

on grammar. One of his pet peeves is the misunderstanding of the subject-predicate form. Because we can separate

sentences like “I think” into a subject and a predicate, we come to see the subject and predicate as distinct. There is

the subject, “I,” and then the act of thinking is a predicate tacked onto it so that the “I” is some entity distinct from

the thinking itself. If we were to ask what this “I” is, we might say that “I am a thing that thinks” or “I am a human

being,” but in each case, we would be attaching a predicate onto the “I,” a predicate that can also be detached.

“...am a human being” is just one thing we can say about “I,” but it doesn't tell us what the “I” itself is. Ultimately,

there is nothing that is inseparably attached to this “I,” and, according to Nietzsche, we come to name this nothing

a “soul.”

What does Nietzsche take to be wrong with our understanding of cause and effect?

Nietzsche complains that we “reify” the notions of cause and effect, that we come to see them as things. Our use

of language leads us to believe that there is something in, say, a billiard ball--some sort of “causal power”--that

allows it to “effect” the movement of another billiard ball it comes into contact with. Nietzsche suggests that there

is no such thing as cause and effect in nature: they are just concepts that we invent and apply to the things we

observe. Interestingly, this position is almost identical to Hume's, a philosopher whom Nietzsche condemns as

being “a debasement and lowering of the value of the concept of 'philosophy'“ in section 252.

Describe Nietzsche's “experimental method.” How does it relate to free spirits and the “philosophy of the future”?

Nietzsche's experimental method is not the one used by scientists. Rather, it represents a willingness to look at a

matter from any point of view, and to follow out that point of view to all its consequences. For instance, many of

us will find Nietzsche's assertion that all human interactions ultimately consist of a struggle for power quite

disagreeable. Perhaps Nietzsche feels the same way, but his experimental method dictates that he cannot discard

that suggestion simply because it is unpleasant. He must try it out, see if it works, see if it is a good interpretation of

the world. This ability to look at matters from any point of view is crucial to the flexibility of mind that Nietzsche

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values in a free spirit, and is necessary to the “philosophy of the future” if it is to have the courage to uncover

assumptions and prejudices that have glued down philosophy for millennia.

How does Nietzsche characterize the relationship between science and religion? How is the concept of nihilism

significant here?

How might we account for the different format of the “Epigrams and Interludes” chapter? What might we then

infer about the material contained in that chapter?

What is sublimation? What is a “sublimated will to power”? What work does the concept of sublimation do for

Nietzsche?

How does Nietzsche's ideal philosopher differ from what he considers to be “philosophical laborers”? Do you

agree with this distinction Nietzsche makes?

What is the difference between “truth” and “knowledge” in Nietzsche's writings?

Describe some of the characteristics of Nietzsche's “good European.”

Explain Nietzsche's views on language. How might this color our interpretation of some of his other writings?