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NGOs without Aid: Beyond the Global Soup Kitchen Author(s): Kamal Malhotra Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4, NGO Futures: Beyond Aid (Aug., 2000), pp. 655-

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Third World Quarterly, Vol 21, No 4, pp 655-668, 2000

NGOS without aid: beyond the global soup kitchen

KAMAL MALHOTRA

ABSTRACT The past two decades have seen some of the most rapid changes in the world environment in recent human history. A key engine of change is a globalisation process led by capital flows of unprecedented magnitude, unevenly spread around the globe, which are increasingly dwarfing the role of ever diminishing concessional aid. Ironically, an NGo future with vastly decreased aid can herald a healthy transformation. It should facilitate a move away from the current resource transfer paradigm, reducing the asymmetrical and often unac- countable power that is currently conferred on Northern NGOs in their relation- ships with their Southern counterparts. Thereby, it should engender more genuine partnerships between such organisations, altering the substantive roles of both Northern and Southern NGOs and the relationships between them. Moving beyond relations premised on aid should enhance the possibilities of building a much stronger global movement for social justice and poverty eradication.

The global and Asian regional context-the past two decades

The past two decades have seen some of the most rapid rates of change in both the external global and regional (eg Asian) environments in recent human history. The 'Third World' external debt crisis which emerged in the early 1980s; the subsequent fundamental restructuring of economies and societies through the enforcement of structural adjustment programs (SAPS) in over 100 countries; the rapid economic growth 'miracle' of first and second generation Newly Industrialising Countries (NICS) in East and Southeast Asia and their recent economic and financial unravelling; the end of the Cold War; the dramatic continuing transition of many countries from command central planning, com- munism and socialism to a market orientation; and the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its 'socialist market economy' as the world's latest economic growth engine are but some examples of the momentous changes that have taken place globally and regionally during this relatively short period in world history.

To these features of change can be added: the supposed victory of the neoliberal economic and political agenda-until the recent cracks in the Wash- ington Consensus on which it has been based; an associated acceleration of economic globalisation and regionalisation processes and agendas; their con-

Kamal Malhotra is at the United Nations Development Program, One UN Plaza, New York, NY 100017, USA. E-mail: [email protected].

ISSN 0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/00/040655-14 i) 2000 Third World Qularterly 6555

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comitant processes of rapid economic and financial liberalisation, transnational corporate capitalism and privatisation; the resultant weakening and fragmen- tation of the nation-state as the fundamental unit of sovereignty in an increasing number of critical areas (eg business, investment and capital flows, the environ- ment, human rights and possibly even social development); the revolution in computing and other aspects of information technology; capital flows of unpre- cedented magnitude and volatility, unevenly spread around the globe, which are increasingly dwarfing the role of ever diminishing overseas development assist- ance (ODA); and escalating regional and intra-national conflict in the absence of new, appropriate, global, regional or national mediation institutions or mecha- nisms in a post-cold war world. These are just some aspects of a new scenario which some have called the New World Order and others the New World Disorder.

Dramatically increasing wealth for some and escalating poverty and inequality for many already poor, powerless and marginalised population groups (eg poor women, poor children, indigenous peoples) are other important aspects of this New World Disorder which are, unfortunately, less often acknowledged in mainstream debate than some of the other trends mentioned earlier.

A future without aid?

Against this scenario, a future without aid would clearly be a welcome develop- ment if this was a result of developing countries making the transition from their current condition of absolute or relative poverty to its total eradication. After all, conceptually, aid has always been viewed as a transitionary but necessary evil until poverty is removed. It is clearly not desirable as a permanent state of affairs!

Unfortunately, though, the future without aid or, more accurately, the future with vastly diminished aid that we are contemplating in this issue is not happening because poverty has declined and there is no need for aid. Instead, a beyond-aid scenario is under discussion both because the richer industrialised countries of the world have chosen to diminish their flow of concessionary assistance to developing countries and because, intentionally, private capital flows to developing countries in this decade have all but eclipsed it.

Indeed, the current dominant processes of globalisation are led by the forces of market economics and borderless international finance. These processes have had and continue to have an overarching, overwhelming and pre-eminent role in both stimulating and determining many of the dramatic trends described earlier. They have a particular impact on trade, investment and other financial and economic flows and arrangements that are predominant among current global and regional trends.

As a direct result of the current dominant processes of economic globalisation under way, total private capital flows (eg foreign direct investment, portfolio equity) to developing countries increased more than six-fold from US$41.9 billion to US$256 billion in less than a decade, ie between 1990 and 1997.' Of this amount, portfolio equity capital, which is relatively footloose and volatile, reached close to $46 billion in 1996 (a 14-fold increase over 1990) before falling

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to $32.5 billion in 1997 in the wake of the Asian-led global financial crisis. Such flows to Asia are now in the process of gradually recovering. Global official development finance or ODA, on the other hand, declined to $44.2 billion in 1997 from $56.4 billion in 1990. This amount represents just slightly more than private capital flows to one Asian country in 1996, namely the PRCY, which received a record $42.3 billion that year (World Bank, 1998).

The astonishing increase in the magnitude of foreign private capital inflows (outside OECD countries) has resulted in a ratio of almost 6:1 in favour of private capital flows in 1997. This is a dramatic reversal from the ratio of less than 0.75:1 in favour of ODA less than a decade ago. Such a reversal has far-reaching implications, not least of which has been the dramatically changed dynamic in both the relationships between the market and the state and between those who can actively participate in the former versus those who remain primarily dependent on the latter. The poor and already vulnerable who have largely depended on ODA flows through the state have, not surprisingly, been among the major losers in this new scenario of greatly diminishing ODA.

In this context, NGOS that have largely depended on their governments or multilateral agencies for their funding (eg in Canada) have also had to contem- plate a future without aid, or at least with greatly diminished aid. While it is true that many governments and multilateral donors are placing an increasing proportion of their shrinking ODA resources through NGOS, the overall magnitude of the cuts to the aid budget in many industrialised countries has nevertheless resulted in diminished contributions to NGOS in these countries. Moreover, many northern bilateral donors are increasingly channelling their diminished ODA directly to Southern NGOS, bypassing Northern NGOS in many instances. Develop- ment education centres run in the North that have, in many situations, been totally dependent on ODA, have also often suffered most, with many of them closing forever.

Coupled with increased market pressures is competition for the private donor dollar. For the context of shrinking states forces a proliferation of overseas-focused NGOS to compete with domestically focused charities and social welfare organisations that face increasing demands from within the industrialised North itself. Many Northern development NGOS, especially those without solid and committed constituencies or tried and tested marketing and fundraising strategies, have found that their non-ODA private funding base has significantly shrunk at the same time that their ODA contributions have reduced. While not universally applicable, a reduction in the funding base of many northern NGOs appears to have been a general trend cutting across most industrialised countries during the mid to late 1990s-a trend that remains true today.

Despite the recent economic and financial crises of the erstwhile 'miracle' economies (eg Thailand), NGOS of East and Southeast Asia have also had to contemplate a future without aid. This is because, despite the crisis, their countries are viewed, at least in a relative sense (eg compared with most of Africa and South Asia), as having 'graduated' from the need for aid. Recent economic and financial setbacks have, at best, only given them a brief, short- term reprieve from a future beyond aid.

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The past and emerging context for NGOS

It is the twin trends of diminishing ODA and increased competition for the limited private donor dollar in industrialised countries-the traditional providers of concessional development assistance finance-and the (now fractured) 'miracle' phenomenon in East and Southeast Asia that force us to think of NGOS in a future without aid.

Indeed, the context for NGOS in the second half of the 1990s and well into the 21st century will continue to change rapidly in a variety of ways and for a multiplicity of interacting reasons. The fast-changing global, regional, national and local external environment which provides the overarching context for all social movement and NGO activity creates one set of reasons. Another, related to the above is the changing relative roles of the state, the market and civil society and NGOS. A further set of reasons stems from changing roles and relationships between Southern and Northern NGOS caused partly by changes in the external environment (Draimin, 1995). Yet another is the emerging challenges in the relationships between NGOS themselves (both Southern and Northern) that prioritise humanitarian and poverty reduction concerns, and the broader social movement for change dealing with larger social justice issues such as human rights, debt cancellation, gender and the environment, of which humanitarian and development NGOs are only a small, albeit highly visible part.

The continuing past

NGOS, a phenomenon primarily of the post-World War II context, have multiplied spectacularly, particularly in the past two decades of neoliberalism and the shrinking state. They have, in an overall sense, operated within a North-South resource transfer paradigm, which has not been significantly different from the paradigm of the much larger bilateral and multilateral donors. Funding, there- fore, has been the important parameter in the evolution of relationships between most Northern NGOS (NNGOS) and their southern 'partners' and counterparts. While 'progressive' NGOS have had important additional 'non-funding' dimen- sions to their interaction with Southern organisations, the general trend has been consistent and clear-a largely one-way resource transfer relationship between North and South and the exercise of the power (by NNGOS) that goes with such an asymmetry (Nyoni, 1987).

It is only in rare cases, and particularly in the case of small Northern NGOS without much money, that the power relationship has been more equal, with non-funding roles such as policy dialogue and advocacy moving to the centre of northern NGO relationships with Southern non-governmental organisations. Very interesting political South-North exchange and advocacy partnership relation- ships have been built up. However, they remain rare cases.

The traditional resource transfer paradigm has remained the overarching framework for North-South NGO relationships in all the five development decades after World War II. However, within this framework in the past 15 years the role of many NGOs has shifted to surrogate service provision. NGOS (from

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both North and South) in much larger numbers and on a much larger scale have often been all too willing to take on the tasks of social service and welfare provision that have traditionally been the prerogative and responsibility of states (eg health, education, disability). This has happened for two allied reasons. The first results from the abdication of the state's traditional roles to the 'magic hand of the market' (as a result of the fast globalising and liberalising market economy of the post-cold war period and the concomitant shrinking state). The second, is a consequence of the active contracting of many NGOs-by bilateral and multilateral donors and governments-to fill the increasing gaps in social policy implementation created by the latter's greater and greater omissions in this area.

The unsustainable social safety net programmes that are inadequately attempt- ing to deal with the growing gaps in social policy can be seen as constituting a 'global soup kitchen', with NGOs being critically described by one astute commentator as 'ordained to be ladles' of this New World Order (Fowler, 1994).

NGOS have been favoured for these roles at least partly because this has kept the lid on simmering public discontent and social explosion. The lid would be much more likely to blow off if the gaps created by state and ODA omission had been left totally unfilled by such surrogate NGO service provision. In other words, NGOs are the vehicle for investments to maintain social stability.

Issues for the future

The traditional roles and the changed global and regional context raise many important issues for the future of NGOs in the New World Order. In the emerging reality, NGOS will need to metamorphose from being primarily humani- tarian relief and development finance grant-making organisations. This will be especially necessary in an NGO future without aid or with greatly diminished aid. Some of the questions or issues that they will need urgently to confront in this scenario include:

* Can NGOS continue and afford to be ladles in the global soup kitchen, even if they wish to remain so, in a future of diminishing aid?

* What are the implications of increased direct funding of Southern NGOS (SNGOs) by Northern bilateral and multilateral agencies for both the future roles and responsibilities of NNGOs and the already imperfect partnership relationships that exist between Northern and Southern NGOs?

* What are the programme, campaigning, development education, lobbying and advocacy implications for Northern NGOS in their own countries in the context of diminishing ODA, increased competition from home-focused charities for the private donor dollar and growing inequality and a growing 'South' in their own countries?

* Likewise, how should we visualise both the role of NGOS and their partnerships with their Northern counterparts in a context both of diminishing ODA and a growing 'North', ie an emerging if still relatively small rich and 'contented' middle class, in their countries?

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* Most importantly, what are the implications for relationships between Northern and Southern NGOS in a future of diminishing aid? In particular, what are the possibilities of joint and effective policy influence in the changed global environment, especially one which lends itself to much easier global civil society action, allied to an opening up of international financial institu- tions (even if this is incremental, instrumental and not fundamental) and of some parts of the UN system (less instrumentally) to NGO and broader civil society organisation (cso) concerns, scrutiny and participation?

Possibilities for NGO roles and relationships in a future without aid

The forgoing analysis suggests that there are a number of threats to the old foundations and assumptions on which the NGO edifice has been built. But equally these new demands can be viewed as a positive opportunity for adaptation and reform that can reinvigorate NGOs both individually and collec- tively. This section therefore describes how NGOS can constructively respond to the challenges of a beyond-aid scenario.

Challenges and possibilities

An NGO future without aid may, in this context and against this historical background, turn out to be quite a refreshing and healthy change both for North-South NGO 'partnerships' and other relationships (Inter Pares, 1998). It may prompt at least some NGOS that have strayed from the desirable path to return to roles that are more appropriate for themselves at local, national, regional and international levels.

This is a possibility partly because such a future world should, by definition, facilitate a move away from the current resource transfer paradigm, thereby greatly reducing the asymmetrical power that is currently conferred on Northern NGOS in their relationships with their Southern counterparts. As a result, it should ensure much greater accountability, respect and genuine 'partnership' between Northern and Southern NGOs, something that the current partnership rhetoric has failed to deliver (Yates, 1988; Fowler, 1992a; Hately & Malhotra, 1997). Indeed, genuine partnerships are rare, if not impossible to achieve in the current 'aid chain' approach to development finance.

An NGO future without aid should also force changes in such relationships towards a greater acceptance, especially by northern NGOS, that the problems of globalisation are similar everywhere and that they need to do much more work among Northern constituencies than they currently appear to be willing to accept as necessary. This should enhance the possibilities of building a much stronger global movement for social justice and poverty eradication, a most desirable outcome if it can be achieved.

Ironically, this potentially significant outcome should be more achievable in an NGO future without aid not just because of the implementation of structural adjustment in the North and the diminishing role of ODA and aid in general, but because of the nature of the globalisation process itself. This is because a

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significant result of this process has been the globalisation of poverty and the creation of a much larger 'global South' in the richer industrialised countries of the North than they have traditionally had in the post-World War II period. The incidence of growing poverty and inequality is increasingly transcending traditional North-South borders.

This has made it increasingly possible for people living in industrialised countries to witness directly the impact of poverty, inequality, structural unem- ployment, growing social exclusion and insecurity. Consequently, they should also be more able to understand the similarity of the processes that create and sustain such domestic phenomena to the processes that cause poverty and inequality in developing countries.

The creation of a distinguishable global North and South should also give a much-needed impetus to alliance building among like-minded groups with similar visions and objectives. Indeed, the recognition of similar problems and the reduced availability of money (and the latter's probable displacement as the central basis for North-South NGO relationships in a future without aid) should also strengthen North-South joint advocacy and campaign work against common local, regional and global civil society problems and concerns.

Equally if not more importantly, it should also force governments and international multilateral and financial institutions to take the fulfilment of their core obligations to citizens (eg poverty eradication, universal, free basic social service provision) more seriously and urgently than they currently do. This is because they know that in the current 'moral hazard' system they can remain relatively complacent because they are inevitably bailed out by willing but surrogate NGO social service deliverers. In a world with much reduced NGO aid, such service delivery substitution will obviously not be feasible for NGOS for purely financial reasons, either in terms of the overall need or even the scale that is currently implemented by them.

Consequently, governments and the international civil service community will be under much more pressure to deliver on their core roles and responsibilities. If they do not do so, the risks of social and political upheaval and the systemic failure of the globalised laissez-faire market economy will be significantly higher than it is at present or is likely to remain in the prevailing system, notwithstand- ing the current crisis in key aspects of globalisation. This is because, even in the existing crisis, the 'ladles in the global soup kitchen' role of most NGOs has remained intact. In fact, it has been enhanced, once again cushioning what would otherwise have been a much more severe social impact than that currently being felt by the most affected population groups. Such cushioning will clearly be less possible in a world of greatly diminished aid!

It can only be hoped that a future with greatly diminished aid will force many governments and NGOS to revert to what their main role should be. It should remind both sets of actors that there are core or 'universal' roles and duties of states and governments to their citizens that should not vary over time in different societies at the same stage of development (see van Tuijl in this issue). This should also be the fundamental and overarching premise and framework that guides the determination of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of NGOS.

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Appropriate NGO roles and possible outcomes in a future without aid

NGO roles and responsibilities in a beyond-aid framework should prioritise the societal watchdog rather than the surrogate service deliverer function. Why? Because NGO outreach to the poor-estimated to be, at best, 15-20% of the world's total of 1.2 billion people living on a dollar a day or less-will always be modest. While obviously morally just, it remains a 'gap filling' and surrogate approach that does not get to the structural heart of poverty as a product of human action that is amenable to human resolution (Sogge, 1996). If people, directly and through their governments, really want to eradicate poverty they have the means to do so. The NGO task is to keep this agenda on the table by holding both government and society to account for the growing gap between anti-poverty rhetoric and practice.

As far as North-South NGO relationships are concerned, ideally funding should only be one (preferably small) part of the overall organisational relationship if it is necessary at all (as, realistically, it will be for Southern and some Northern NGOS for some time to come!). This is because building strong relationships between different organisations (especially but not restricted to those between Northern and Southern ones) is usually fraught with problems, dilemmas and inequities. Examples of such problems include significant unequal access to information and to the centres of global power and decision making among Southern organisations. Adding a funding dimension worsens what is an already difficult relationship between Northern and Southern organisations. Building genuine partnership relationships requires bridging gaps and creating a basis of trust that can often take years. When funding is introduced as a major variable in this equation (as it is in most current situations), achieving genuine partner- ship becomes more complex and is often unattainable (Malena, 1995).

While money is not always determining in a relationship, control over such an essential resource certainly provides a large part of the power over any development situation. A future without aid or with greatly diminished aid can significantly reduce the power that funding has conferred on NNGOS. Conse- quently, such a new scenario should make the following desirable outcomes more possible:

1. De-operationalisation of Northern NGOs from the South. This will apply to operational NNGOs and should increase the emphasis on capacity building of SNGOs and people's organisations to take over roles traditionally played by many NNGOS.

2. Embracing mutual transparency and accountability mechanisms. Such mech- anisms have primarily been one-way rather than mutual (eg SNGOS to NNGOS). This remains a major arena for change. Desirable transformations in this area are more likely to happen in an NGO future with vastly diminished aid because of a subordination of current imperatives, which priorities financial account- ability to Northern donors, Boards and Charity Commissions (eg in the UK). Instead, accountability will be linked to a broader vision and goals of building a global movement for social change which is based on mutual trust, respect and co-responsibility among its members, regardless of whether they are from the South or North.

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3. Redefining the NNGO policy role. This is more likely to happen because of the change in the balance of power between NNGOS and SNGOS in favour of the latter. It will involve modifying, and in many cases, reducing the current typical NNGO role of speaking on behalf of their Southern partners. NNGOS will also be less able to conduct direct policy research in the South. Instead, they are more likely to be forced to redefine their institutional role in policy advocacy and lobbying in the South. The task will be to focus much more than they currently do on mobilising, synthesising and disseminating infor- mation (which is often much more readily available in the North) rapidly and in relevant popular form to people's organisations, SNGOs and Southern support NGOS (SSNGOS). This should also result in Southern organisations and other groups being forced to do more of their own policy research in the South. NNGOS, on the other hand, will be called upon to facilitate and enable much more direct advocacy and lobbying by SNGOS in Washington DC, Brussels and other traditional Northern centres of power.

4. Working in the North. A lack of aid-based financial resources may lead NNGOS to place an increased emphasis on social justice and development work in their own countries. One reason is that fewer financial resources are necessary to do this compared with the implementation of surrogate service delivery in the South. This should enable NNGOS to truly become part of a South-North alliance of organisations working on similar issues in their respective coun- tries.

This step should enhance NNGO credibility with many of their Southern partners. Why? Because it is increasingly clear that, whether NNGOS like it or not, legitimacy in partnership relationships with SNGOS and SSNGOS who are most credible in their home countries will only be possible if NNGOS are seriously and more substantially engaged with the poverty and social justice problems of their own countries, especially as these continue to escalate and become more explicit and visible (eg in the USA and UK).

Such engagements can be achieved in a variety of ways. They do not necessarily imply starting a direct project-based poverty alleviation pro- gramme in the UK, USA or Canada requiring significant financial resources. Nevertheless, the onus of demonstrating a more intense, appropriate and effective engagement with traditional Northern publics and policy makers will increasingly rest with NNGOS. Domestic initiatives should, at the very least, involve a more substantial element of development education, mobilis- ation and conscientisation of Northern publics about international develop- ment problems and issues, their lifestyles and their roles in contributing to global poverty and injustice. While these are politically and personally sen- sitive issues, often difficult to raise with Northern publics, they involve activities which require relatively small amounts of finance for the potentially significant level of strategic impact or outcomes that can be achieved.

Such engagement in the North should also lead to strategic alliances between NNGOS and workers, women's and other groups in their own countries at relatively little cost compared with the finance-intensive social service delivery programmes that many NGOs are currently involved with.

5. Educating domestic constituencies. A greater emphasis can be placed on

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development education and awareness raising of the unemployed, the work- ing underclass and other discriminated-against publics, for example political and economic migrants and refugees, the victims of jobless economic growth and unemployment, the urban poor, farmers and the socially excluded. The key focus of such desirable programmes should be on interpreting the work of Southern partners and broader 'global South' development issues to these groups with the view of raising awareness leading to action and subsequent changes in the latter's attitudes. This should also result in new welcome alliances between groups in the North and South who are being similarly affected by newly emerging global instruments for a rule-based world order (eg the World Trade Organization (wro)).

6. Building domestic constituencies. Related to and based on the above, there is an urgent need for NNGOS to build or enlarge their organised constituencies in their home countries and enable their active and direct participation in a global movement for social justice and change. A solid, educated and aware constituency from different societal strata in both the 'global south' and 'north' of the traditional North will be the best guarantor of the longevity and sustainability of a global movement for social justice in the richer industri- alised countries. Again, ironically, this may have a higher chance of becom- ing a reality in an NGO future with diminished aid than in an era with large amounts of it.

Few NNGOS currently prioritise or emphasise the desirable roles described above. In fact, because of a concern for institutional survival, many appear to have consciously de-emphasised these possibilities for change. Ironically, such re- forms may have a much higher chance of becoming a reality in an NGO future with diminished aid than in the prevailing resource transfer paradigm.

NGO roles vis-ai-vis the state, governments and intergovernmental organisations

A future without significant aid implies that NGOS will not be engaged in large-scale social programmes that perpetuate a surrogate role and in the perception that this is their primary value to society. If this is the case, NGOS should be better able to select functions and interface with the state, governments and intergovernmental organisations in a wider variety of ways.

The definition of what constitutes appropriate NGO roles, functions and tasks should be considered against a likely 21st century context in many poor countries. Here, the core social, economic, political and cultural responsibilities and commitments of governments to their citizens, especially those who are already poor or vulnerable, will be increasingly difficult to meet from within a dominant framework of neoliberal macroeconomics policy, financial globalisa- tion, structural adjustment programmes and trade liberalisation.

This context, however likely, is not a good rationale to justify NGOs becoming substitutes for the state in service delivery in areas where the latter has a primary and legitimate role (eg health, education, water, power, roads and other public infrastructure). Nevertheless, it is the context in which more suitable NGO roles need to be analysed.

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The appropriate framework for determining desirable NGOS functions needs to consciously consider areas in which they have a distinct potential or a demon- strated comparative advantage vis-a-vis the state and the market (Korten, 1990). Here again, NGO strengths do not lie in the large-scale service delivery that is necessary to make a significant dent in either poverty or inequality reduction, employment creation or even social integration. Only governments and intergov- ernmental multilateral institutions are equipped to operate on the scale that is necessary if poverty eradication, full employment and social integration are to be achieved in a sustainable manner. Assigning such roles to NGOS instead of to governments and intergovernmental organisations whose main duty this should be is, therefore, both inappropriate and counterproductive, especially in the long run.

An NGO future without aid should make such roles less possible and frequent. This change would increase the chance that more appropriate roles, which require significantly fewer financial resources than surrogate service delivery, will receive a higher priority from most NGOS than they have been accorded so far. As argued above, potential functions should primarily be in the 'watchdog' areas of monitoring, advocacy and policy influencing to ensure that an enabling environment is created and sustained by states and intergovernmental organisa- tions.

As part of their seriousness in pursing this outcome, NGOS need to help politically committed governments to build a socially cohesive and integrated national, regional and global constituency for such a social agenda. An emphasis on long-term development education of the kind already discussed will make an important contribution to this objective. NGOs are clearly better placed than governments and intergovernmental organisations to play such roles.

All of the above implies that in an NGO future without aid, such organisations can be and, hopefully, are more likely to direct their limited resources and energies to campaigning, advocacy and other policy influencing strategies aimed at ensuring that states and intergovernmental organisations fulfil their core responsibilities and nationally and internationally agreed commitments. Indeed, such tasks will be increasingly attractive thanks to their cost-effectiveness as well as their civic appropriateness!

Policy influencing should be directed at the major national, regional and global power holders, including but not limited to governments. Such a task also implies an NGO commitment to monitoring the performance of official organisations against commitments made by them (eg Social Watch) or pioneer- ing process and content alternatives to the dominant mainstream policies of the international financial institutions (eg as the Structural Adjustment Participa- tory Review Initiative (SAPRI) and the broader network, SAPRIN, are attempting to do).

Notwithstanding a changed emphasis prioritising 'non-funding' roles over funding and service delivery and even in an environment of diminished aid, NGOS should, through their grassroots-level initiatives, be able to continue to strengthen those aspects of government policies and services which contribute to the realisation of the latter's core responsibilities. This is best achieved through practical, innovative, grassroots, community-based NGO programmes of action,

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grammes of action, which politically committed governments can replicate and scale up (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993).

NGOS should also concentrate more on finding strategic ways in which such micro practical work can directly influence broader macro-policy alternatives which are better suited to achieving the core responsibilities and commitments of states to the poor and vulnerable in society. This will clearly require a range of negotiating and advocacy skills that most NGOs have not demonstrated either an interest, willingness or capability of developing so far. However, this is slowly but surely changing as more NGOS realise that their objectives will remain utopian without linking such micro-macro issues. An NGO future of greatly diminished aid should surely give an impetus to such programmes that require relatively little financial input, especially in relation to their strategic value and potential impact and 'multiplier' outcomes.

Other appropriate functions that NGOS may be more willing to take up in a future without aid (not least because they will or should be less worried that bilateral sources will reduce their financial resources) include:

(a) Effectively challenging the authoritarian roles and tendencies of govern- ments, while simultaneously attempting to identify and strengthen the enabling and activist role that the state has also played in the erstwhile 'economic miracle' and aspiring miracle countries of East and Southeast Asia. This is particularly important in non-democratic states where it is hard to see how NGOS can work in partnership or collaboration with their governments and where, therefore, putting continuous pressure on such governments for change in appropriate ways may be the primary enabling environment role that NGOS should prioritise and play, if this is realistic.

(b) Helping to build transparent and accountable states and governments with the political will, capacity and ability to guard, strongly regulate and enforce legislation and other appropriate action against the excesses of both an unregulated market and civil society on behalf of and in favour of poor, vulnerable and marginalised people all over the world. This is an increas- ingly urgent but challenging task in the current global and regional environ- ment. It is nevertheless essential for the achievement of the core duties and commitments of states.

(c) Devising an appropriate and effective response to the major and increasing service delivery gaps being created by the dominance of macroeconomic neoliberalism, which is simultaneously causing the roll-back of the state and the growing asymmetrical power of the market, especially big business, over both governments and civil society.

It is crucial that NGOS find ways of doing this without themselves becoming mere 'ladles in the global soup kitchen'. While this does not imply that NGOS should never be involved in direct poverty reduction or employment expan- sion programmes, it does imply that their state substitution roles in scaled-up direct service delivery should be limited to situations of short-term crisis and humanitarian response as far as possible.

Their major role at the local community level, in addition to demonstrating innovative approaches of service delivery for replication by government, should

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BEYOND THE GLOBAL SOUP KITCHEN

be to strengthen the capacity of poor, powerless and marginalised communities and population groups to make legitimate social demands on the state and governments in power. This, once again, implies prioritising awareness building, organising and analytical capacity building functions over direct service delivery.

Finally, in this era of fast accelerating globalisation, there is a need to support state capacity and ability to constrain and regulate effectively the power and reach of global international financial and trade institutions and transnational corporate conglomerates. It is but part of a wider effort to restore more power to both local communities and a reformed, more activist and enabling nation-state.

While some people feel that such an endeavour, however worthwhile, is futile given the current dominant opposing global trends, we cannot accept this as our common and foregone destiny. Therefore, it must be prioritised by governments, NGOS and the broader community if we are to have any hope of achieving both basic rights and the right to development for the world's poor and vulnerable majority.

Conclusion

The metamorphosis in roles and responsibilities suggested in the preceding pages, especially for the current major NGO service providers, will neither be easy or without pain. It will require major institutional surgery that is always more painful when forced (as in an NGO future without aid) compared with when it comes voluntarily. It will also require NGOS to 'compete' with citizens' social movements and other groups in both North and South that have never entered the aid resource transfer paradigm but historically have instead chosen, since their very inception, to play the role of societal watchdogs and activists.

Despite the obvious difficulties and challenges, it is still worthwhile and necessary to stimulate a global movement for social change and against poverty that is not premised on the old aid paradigm of resource transfer. Indeed, only then will we be able to move closer to the desirable vision of 'a more global view of development problems built upon alliances of competent agencies having wide experience and bringing complementary resources and skill to bear-such alliances must be made up of a wide variety of non-governmental agencies, people's organisations, women's movements, environmental groups as well as those human rights, peace and lobbying organisations who are dealing with the broader issues.' (Roche, 1998).

Indeed, this is the brave new unfamiliar world that many currently large NGOS will find themselves forced into for survival for the first time in a future without aid or with vastly diminished aid. This will require both rapid and significant institutional downsizing and a fast learning curve all at once if such NGOs are to survive and build or retain their relevance and credibility with their erstwhile or new partners in the new millennium we have just entered.

Note 1 Although the vast disparities in allocation of foreign direct investment to South East Asia over the rest must

not be forgotten, with Africa particularly disadvantaged in this regard.

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KAMAL MALHOTRA

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Religion State & Society EDITOR Dr Philip Walters, Keston Institute, Oxford, UK

Religion, State & Society is the only English-language academic publication devoted to issues of church, state and society in the former Communist countries. The joumal reflects the conviction that the experiences of religious communities in their encounter with communism will be central to the evolution of the new Europe and of the Western world in general in the next century. Tackling social, cultural, ethnic, political and eclesiological problems is in future going to be a cooperative effort, in a way hitherto impossible, involving religious communities of both East and West.

Religion, State & Society will continue to monitor the experiences of religious communities in communist and former communist countries throughout the world, serving as a forum for debate on issues of global concern.

As well as authoritative and provocative articles, Religion, State & Society includes book reviews, bibliographies and translations of important documents. The journal encourages debate within the pages of a single issue and in the form of responses to articles which have appeared in earlier issues.

This journal is also available online. Please connect to http://www.tandf.co.uk/online.html for further information.

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