DISCUSSION 2 - TIME
Dee5
Newton and Time
1 Abstract
Newton's conception of time has had a profound influence upon science,
particularly psychology. Five characteristics of explanation have devolved
from Newton's temporal framework: objectivity, continuity, linearity,
universality, and reductivity. These characteristics are outlined in the
present essay and shown to be central to psychological theories and methods.
Indeed, Newton's temporal framework is so central that it often goes
unexamined in psychology. Examination is important, however, because
recent critics of Newton's framework--including both scientists and
philosophers--have questioned its validity and usefulness.
Newton and Time
2 Newtonian Time and Psychological Explanation
Brent D. Slife, Baylor University
Perhaps no conception is more fundamental to any science than time.
If a science is concerned at all about the order, organization, and
measurement of events, then it has to have assumptions of time. Indeed, the
notion of "event" itself is wrapped up in temporal assumptions. Even "soft"
sciences, such as psychology, must adopt philosophical assumptions about
temporal order and measurement. Psychological researchers not only
measure time in many of their experiments, but psychological theorists
assume certain characteristics of time in virtually all their explanations.
What are these assumptions? Why are these assumptions used and not
others? The problem is that such questions are virtually never addressed in
psychology. With certain rare exceptions,1 psychologists have ignored the
assumption of time. They have studied how people perceive and manage
their time, but they have not examined the assumptions of time in their own
theorizing.
The reason for this is clear. At the point in history when psychology
was conceived as a discipline, time had become reified. That is, time was no
longer an "assumption;" time was a property of reality existing independently
of our consciousness. Indeed, this was the view of time implicit in our
culture. As this article will show, psychologists adopted this cultural view, in
part, because it was not recognized as a view. Several historical factors are
described below as leading to this reification. Undoubtedly, a prime factor
was Isaac Newton's popularization of this reification in the physical sciences.
This essay outlines how Newtonian physics--the ideal of sciences during
psychology's formative years--became a model for all that early psychologists
wished their discipline to become. Much of this model, however, involved
Newton and Time
3 Newtonian assumptions of the world that were accepted uncritically. One of
these assumptions, as this essay will show, is Newton's own rendition of
time--Absolute Time.
The bulk of the present essay outlines how Newton's conception of time
has influenced "scientific" explanations ever since. As we shall see, five
characteristics of explanation have devolved from Newton's temporal
framework: objectivity, continuity, linearity, universality, and reductivity.
The article first describes each of these as it is related to Absolute Time.
Then, criticisms of this framework by philosophers and physicists are
delineated. The latter group of critics is especially important because many
contemporary physicists have abandoned these temporal characteristics (as
well as Absolute Time) in their explanations. Nonetheless, contemporary
psychology--with its identity now somewhat intact--has not looked back to
physics. This essay reveals how psychology currently maintains most, if not
all, of these temporal characteristics in its mainstream explanations of
behavior, mind, and abnormality.
The Rise of Absolute Time in Western Culture
The view of time held so widely by psychologists is also the view of
time held widely in Western society. Time is "out there" flowing like a line
from past to present to future. No examination of this linear notion of time is
considered necessary, because it is part of reality. An interesting example of
that "reality" is our dependence upon the past. All events that occur in the
present are thought to be explainable by events in the past. Because the
past, present, and future are considered to be consistent with one another--as
part of the same "line"--the present and future must be consistent with, if not
determined by, the past. In this manner, it is "common sense," both in
Newton and Time
4 psychology and our general culture, to explain behavior, attitudes, and
personality through past events. The question is: How did this 'common
sense' become so common? How has this linear view of time gained such a
hold on our culture and such an influence in psychology?
Actually, the predominance of linear time is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Ancient peoples did not view time as an objective frame of
reference for marking events. They relativized time by making it conform to
events, rather than events conform to time. For the Romans, each hour of
daylight in the summer was longer than each hour of daylight in the winter.
Time was a dynamic and adjustable organization tailored to fit our world
experiences. Cyclical rather than linear views of time dominated these
cultures because so many aspects of nature seemed cyclical, such as the
seasons and heavenly bodies. Plato believed that the order of world events
was destined to repeat itself at fixed intervals. Aristotle's students wondered
whether Paris would once more carry off Helen and thus again spark the
Trojan War (Porter, 1980).
Our Western view of time arose primarily as a result of three historical
developments: the spread of Christianity, the industrialization of society,
and the invention of cheap watches (cf. Porter, 1980; Morris, 1984, chs. 1 and
2; Whitrow, 1980, section 2.3). Pre-Judaic religions complemented the
cyclical view of time. They either portrayed time as infinite and possessing
no beginning or end, or as a cycle of rebirth and future life with time forever
repeating itself. The spread of Christianity brought to bear a "stunning" new
conception (Porter, 1980, p. 13). Christians considered their God to be the
creator and ultimate destroyer of the universe. Hence, the world had a
beginning and an end, and important Christian events, such as the birth of
Christ, were unique and nonrepeatable. The spread of these conceptions
Newton and Time
5 resulted in a competition between the cyclical and linear views during the
medieval period (Whitrow, 1980, section 2.3).2
The temporal tide began to turn in the favor of linearity--at least for
our Western culture--when industrial economies arose. As Lewis Mumford
concludes, "The clock, not the steam engine, is the key machine of the
modern industrial age" (Mumford, 1934, p. 14). When power stemmed from
the ownership of land, time was considered plentiful and cyclical, being
associated with the unchanging cycle of the soil. However, with the rise of a
mercantile economy and the mechanism of industry, emphasis was placed on
the scarcity of time and "forward" progress (Whitrow, 1980, pp. 58-59). "Time
is money" was the byword; time could now be "saved" or "spent."
The coup d'état for the linear view was the increased availability of
cheap watches. The mass-production of watches in the nineteenth century
made it possible for even the most basic functions of living to be regulated by
time. "One ate, not upon feeling hungry, but when prompted by the clock:
one slept, not when one was tired, but when the clock sanctioned it"
(Mumford, 1934, p. 17). Regulation of our lives by the clock meant that the
abstract assumption of linear time could be endowed with a type of concrete
reality (Morris, 1984, ch. 3). People now seemed to be able to "see" and "feel"
time (the clock). Time also appeared to be one of the causes of psychological
factors, because the thoughts and behaviors of individuals seemed to turn on
what time "told" them. In short, a convenient (linear) way of organizing
events became reified as the way events were organized.
Psychology was conceived and developed during this temporal
zeitgeist, when time was a concrete actuality rather than a point of view.
The spread of Christianity, industrialization, and the invention of cheap
clocks, all coalesced to make linear time a "reality." Before this coalescence,
Newton and Time
6 many scientists, including Newton, felt it necessary to make their
assumption of time explicit. Several views of time were possible, 3 and so one
view had to be identified and supported. On the other hand, psychologists
were not called upon to articulate their temporal assumptions. Linear time
had become a given and required no discussion or defense. Time existed as a
line, independently of us, and virtually everyone accepted this reification
without awareness.
Newtonian Time
Psychology was not the only discipline that reified time. Einstein
described a similar state of affairs in his own discipline at the turn of this
century:
Concepts which have proved useful for ordering things easily assume
so great an authority over us that we forget their terrestrial origin and
accept them as unalterable facts. They then become labeled as
"conceptual necessities," "a priori situations," etc. The road of
scientific progress is frequently blocked for long periods by such errors.
It is therefore not just an idle game to exercise our ability to analyze
familiar concepts, and to demonstrate the conditions under which their
justification and usefulness depend. (as quoted in Holton, 1973, p. 5)
Einstein's point here, of course, is that sometimes the very pervasiveness of
an idea leads to its anonymity. Certain ideas can be so commonplace and so
widely accepted that they go completely unrecognized. Yet it is these very
ideas that are often the most influential for thinkers in a discipline.
Part of Einstein's immense contribution to knowledge was the
realization that time played an unrecognized role in physics. Indeed, linear
time was seen as an absolute truth--an unquestioned part of reality--during
Newton and Time
7 the preceding three hundred or so years of physics. This led to a curtailment
in the number of new ideas in physics (cf. Burtt, 1954, Ch. VII, sections 3-4).
Acceptable ideas about reality had to be compatible with time's supposedly
linear properties. Einstein's theory of relativity, however, was in large
measure based upon his examination and eventual rejection of this
traditional view of time. 4 He proposed an alternative view that ultimately
revolutionized the discipline of physics in the twentieth century (to be
discussed later).
Still, this revolutionary view has had little impact upon the lay
culture. Except for parts of physics and philosophy, the Newtonian picture of
the world remains dominant in Western culture (McGrath and Kelly, 1986, p.
26-30). This is not to say that this "picture" was totally original to Newton.
When it came to crucial aspects of his metaphysic, Newton often accepted the
view of the world handed down by his predecessors (Burtt, 1954, p 231). In
regard to time, his most immediate forerunner was Isaac Barrow (1735), who
regarded time as "passing with a steady flow" (p. 35). Aristotle is also viewed
as one of the primary philosophical precursors of Newton's view of time
(Faulconer and Williams, 1985; Williams, 1990). Nevertheless, Newton
rightly deserves the credit for assembling their ideas into the current
package our culture calls "time." Let us therefore examine Newton's views in
more detail.
Newton postulated Absolute Time which ". . .of itself, and from its own
nature, flows equably without relation to anything external. . ." (Newton,
1687/1990, p.8). Newton needed this assumption for two main reasons.
First, his conceptions of motion and causality required an absolute frame of
reference (Burtt, 1954, p. 249). Motion, for example, could not be detected or
measured without an objective "past" and "present." The rolling ball begins
Newton and Time
8 its roll at some point in the past but is "now" at some point in the present.
Second, his mathematics required the continuity of events (flowing
"equably"). He regarded moments of absolute time as a continuous sequence
like that of real numbers, believing that the rate of this sequence was
independent of events (Whitrow, 1980, pp. 185-190).
For these reasons, absolute time became the standard by which all
scientific explanations were judged. The order (and directionality) of the
world was thought to be synonymous with the absolute and linear
organization of events. Characteristics of Newton's absolute time became the
"rules" for acceptable scientific explanation for nearly three centuries and
still form the rules for many disciplines such as psychology. It is thus
important that we explicate these rules and their modern criticisms and then
check the specific role these rules play in psychological explanation.
Newtonian Temporal Framework for Explanation
Newton's approach to time left science with a legacy of five somewhat
overlapping implications or characteristics for "scientific" explanation. These
include objectivity, continuity, linearity, universality, and reductionism.
Some of these characteristics are the properties of time itself, as envisioned
by Newton, and some are the necessary properties of the events to be
explained, because they are in absolute time.
The assertion that events are "in" time is itself an implication of a
temporal characteristic. Newton viewed time as objective, existing
"absolutely" and independently of consciousness. Time is conceived as a
medium in which and against which events occur and can be related to one
another. Motion, causation, and change are seen to exist "out there," and so
an absolute framework for evaluating these conceptions must also exist "out
Newton and Time
9 there," separate from them (and our consciousness). If time were subjective--
Newton might argue--distinctions between the temporal dimensions (past,
present, and future) would be left up to the perceiver, and an objective
science would be in jeopardy. Indeed, the notion that cause and effect
require succession in time occurred with the advent of absolute time (Bunge,
1959, pp. 62-64).
This view of causality was bolstered by another property of Newtonian
time, its linearity. Newton was a highly religious man whose theology
guided much of his scientific work (Burtt, 1954, pp. 256-264). God, for
Newton, was the First Cause of the world, and thus time has a beginning
point (unlike cyclical time), and properties akin to a geometric line, with no
gaps or spaces. Time begins in the past and advances into the present on its
way to the future.5 This places the greatest weight upon the past (or the
"first" in a sequence), because it is the temporal entity which supposedly
starts this process. The metaphor of the line means that the present and
future must remain consistent with the past. Moreover, the past is the
temporal entity with the most utility. The present is less useful because it is
just an evanescent "point" on the line of time, and the future is less useful
because it is not (yet) known with any certainty. Only information from the
past is thought to be substantive and certain enough to be truly known and
understood.6
Newton also considered time to be continuous, proceeding smoothly
and "equably," as he put it (Newton, 1687/1990, p. 8). Actually, this
characteristic of time has two properties worth separating out: consistency
and uniformity. Consistency is the well-known Newtonian notion that events
which happen at one point in time will be consistent with events occurring
later in time--the past is continuous with the future. This is the origin of
Newton and Time
10 Newton's conviction that the world is predictable. If enough is known about
the present situation (or the past), then future events or states can be
predicted. Uniformity, on the other hand, is the notion that time is
homogeneous. Although the events in time can move at different rates, time
does not itself slow down at some points and speed up at others--it "flows" at
a constant, never-changing pace. This uniformity provides the perfect frame
of reference for measuring events.
Time's continuity has also had significant implications for change. In
Newton's metaphysic, change could not be discontinuous or instantaneous,
moving abruptly from one state into the next.7 Change had to be continuous
and smooth, much as a flower gradually blooms, because Newton conceived of
time as infinitely divisible--like a line. No matter how small the interval of
time, there is always a line of time (points in time) that spans the interval.
This means change can only be incremental. Whatever change occurs, it is
assumed to have intervening levels that correspond to intervening points in
time. Change can occur at different rates, and motions can proceed faster or
slower. However, change cannot occur through sudden jumps from one stage
into another--such as a flower bud jumping to a full bloom--without some
points of time (and levels of change) falling in between the two stages.
This characteristic of continuity has led to another major feature of
scientific explanation, labeled by some authors as "universality" (Schrag,
1990, p. 65), "atemporality" (Faulconer and Williams, 1985, p. 1180), or
"symmetry" (Ballif and Dibble, 1969, p. 32). This characteristic of
universality, as we shall here call it, assumes that natural laws are
universal and unchangeable, regardless of the period of time in which they
are observed. Natural processes are still thought to unfold across time in the
continuous manner just described. Nevertheless, the principles behind the
Newton and Time
11 processes are considered to be independent of the events and particular
period of history in which the events unfold. The laws of planetary motion,
for example, are the same laws at one point in earth's history as they are at
another point in earth's history. This universality is only possible if time is
uniform in the Newtonian sense. If time changes its rate or quality, then the
temporal relations between planetary events would not be consistent from
one period of history to the next. Scientific laws, in this sense, would not be
lawful.
The notion that lawful processes take place across time has had
another implication for explanation--reductionism. Reductionism results
from the fact that any one moment in time contains only a reduced portion of
the process. That is, if a process begins at time 1, proceeds through time 2,
and culminates at time 3, only a portion of this process can be studied at any
point in this sequence. This is tantamount to saying that the process as a
whole literally never exists, because only a piece of the process is occurring at
any one moment in time. The only way in which the pattern or "wholeness"
of such processes can be recognized at all in Newtonian physics is through a
recording device (e.g., an observer's memory). Recording devices permit each
piece of the process to be "photographed" and juxtaposed with the next
moment's piece and the next moment's piece until all the process is viewed at
the same time. Nonetheless, no direct access to the whole of any process is
possible, given the separation of its pieces in time.
Newton brilliantly coalesced all five of these characteristics of
explanation into a coherent package by calling upon mechanistic
metaphors. He felt the universe--with its motions and chains of causation
across time--was directly analogous to the great machine of his day: the
clock. Through his writings and discoveries, he combined the implications of
Newton and Time
12 absolute time just described--objectivity, linearity, continuity, universality,
and reductionism. He represented them all with machine metaphors that
embodied these characteristics.8 Machines seem to objectively operate
through a continuous and linear sequence of events. This sequence is
universal, because it appears to be repeatable, regardless of the period of
time in which the repetition occurs. Machines also seem to evidence
temporal reductionism in their functioning; their sequentiality provides no
direct access to the whole of their processes at any given moment in time.
When the universe is presumed to possess these five temporal
characteristics, explanations that are properly "scientific" also possess these
characteristics. "Mechanistic" explanations of data are, of course, preferred
because they naturally embody these characteristics. The reverse is also
true--those processes that manifest linear and lawful properties are
considered "mechanisms" and thus accorded appropriate scientific status.
Newton even carried his temporal approach to explanation into his method.
He assumed that in order to observe parts of the machine universe in its
mechanistic regularity, a scientist should track the effect of some antecedent
(in time) experimental manipulation on its consequent. Orderly
relationships between variables can thus be observed and cataloged until all
of the universe is understood.
Criticisms of Newton's Framework
As undeniably brilliant and influential as this temporal framework for
explanation has been, it has not avoided criticism. Indeed, Whitrow
characterizes Newton's conception of time as the "most criticized, and justly
so, of all Newton's statements" (Whitrow, 1980, p. 33). Newton's conception
of time has been called into question on theoretical, practical, and empirical
Newton and Time
13 grounds, primarily by subsequent philosophers and physicists. For example,
Whitrow (1980) himself notes that the "equable flow" of time is problematic
on purely theoretical grounds:
If time were something that flowed then it would itself consist of a
series of events in time and this would be meaningless. Moreover, it is
equally difficult to accept the statement that time flows 'equably' or
uniformly, for this would seem to imply that there is something which
controls the rate of flow of time so that it always goes at the same
speed. However, if time can be considered in isolation "without
relation to anything external," what meaning can be attached to
saying that its rate of flow is not uniform? If no meaning can be
attached even to the possibility of non-uniform flow, then what
significance can be attached to specifically stipulating that the flow is
"equable?" (p. 33)9
Some have questioned the practical utility of Newton's conception of
time as a frame of reference (e.g., Burtt, 1954, pp. 256-264). Because Newton
regarded time as uniform and infinite, any position that an object might take
in time is not discernible from any other position. One portion of time is
identical (and uniform) to another. Wherever the object resides (in time),
there is no distinguishing feature for that period of time. There is also a
similar quantity of time surrounding it in the past and future (infinity). It is
therefore impossible to locate an object in absolute time and establish
whether it is in motion. Temporal position and motion can only be discerned
with reference to another body (e.g., a clock), and Newton's conception of
absolute time is unnecessary. Indeed, Newton's conception seems useless for
the main reason he formulated it--as a standard for temporal position and
motion.
Newton and Time
14 Other criticisms of absolute time are long-standing, and convince most
analysts that Newton was "mistaken in several different respects" (Morris,
1984, p. 209) or "uncritical, sketchy, inconsistent, even second-rate" as a
theoretician (Burtt, 1954, p. 208). The ancient philosopher Zeno, for
instance, provided an penetrating critique of the infinite divisibility and
continuity of time (Ariotti, 1975; Harris, 1988, pp. 48-51). Other critics have
focused upon Newton's confounding of linear flow (his theory) and temporal
sequence (his data) (e.g., Morris, 1984, ch. 1). That is, the existence of
temporal sequence--"time's arrow"--does not necessarily imply the existence
of linear flow. There are other ways to explain the data (Slife, 1993, p. 5).
Newton, though, considered all physical events to be influenced by the
temporal medium in which they supposedly occurred. Therefore, any
sequence of related events supposedly involved all the characteristics of
absolute time described above.
The trouble is that a sequence of physical events does not have to
involve these characteristics. Consider the sequence of hydrogen and oxygen
gases becoming water. Although this particular set of events has a very
definite and predictable relationship, this relationship does not have to be
viewed as linear. Its predictability is not derived in classical Newtonian
fashion from its "past." The past properties of hydrogen and oxygen gases do
not permit us to predict the qualitatively different, future properties of water
(cf. Polkinghorne, 1983, 136-137). The predictability of this relationship
stems from our repeated observations of this sequence, not from its
continuous unfolding from a past state. Indeed, this particular change (gases
into water) can be construed as discontinuous in nature--from one
qualitatively different gestalt to another. The point is that the directionality
Newton and Time
15 or sequence of natural events does not require linear or continuous
characteristics (or any of the other characteristics of Newton's framework).
Newton also confounded his linear theory with his method. Some
philosophers, for example, have criticized him for "making a metaphysics of
his method" (e.g., Burtt, 1954, p. 229). That is, Newton confused his
metaphysical theory of the universe (being a linear and continuous machine)
with his scientific method (observing the natural order of variables). He
experimentally intervened in antecedent events in order to observe their
later effects in time, all the while assuming that linear flow was involved in
this sequential relation. In this way, his metaphysics could not be proven
wrong. His method (sequential observation) made it seem that his
assumptions of time were constantly being affirmed. If, on the other hand, a
crucial event for explaining a phenomenon were simultaneous, Newton's
linear method would be unable to discover it. This type of nonlinear
explanation would be overlooked due to the institutionalization of linear
explanation in his scientific method (see discussion in Slife, 1993, chapter 4).
The most significant criticisms of Newton's notion of time have come
from his fellow physicists. Einstein's precursor, the physicist Ernst Mach,
criticized the reductive implications of Newton's conception, focusing
particularly upon what absolute time did to causality. Mach felt that a linear
conception was incapable of embracing the multiplicity of relations in nature.
He viewed events of the world as functionally interdependent, with no
particular event taking precedence over the other just because it occurred
"prior" to the other in time. He noted that measures of time were themselves
based on space, such as the spatial positions of clock hands or heavenly
bodies. "We are thus ultimately left with a mutual dependence of positions
on one another" (Mach, 1959, p. 90). In this sense, our dimensions of reality
Newton and Time
16 are not time and space, but space and space. There is no separate temporal
entity against which to measure the "past" or "future" of even causal events
(see also DeBroglie, 1949).
Einstein, too, was highly critical of Newton's temporal framework. In
what follows, Morris (1984) summarizes the effects of relativity theory upon
absolute time:
Time is not absolute, it is relative. As the special theory of relativity
shows, time measurements depend upon the state of motion of the
observer. Time is not a substance that "flows equably without relation
to anything external" [Newton's assertion]. According to the general
theory of relativity, the presence of matter creates gravitational fields
that cause time dilation. Finally, if time does "flow," . . .the movement
of the "now". . .seems to be a subjective phenomenon. . . .At best, one
can only say that time moves onward at the rate of one second per
second, which is about as meaningful as defining the word "cat" by
saying "a cat is a cat." (pp. 209-210)
Central to Newton's view is the notion that events which are
simultaneous for one observer are simultaneous for all observers, regardless
of their frame of reference. In other words, a particular instant of time is the
same instant of time everywhere in the universe, and hence absolute or
universal. Einstein, however, demonstrated through his special theory of
relativity that this is not true. Avoiding Newton's linear methodology, he
used gedanken (or thought) experiments to show that two or more observers
in relative motion do not necessarily agree that two independent events are
simultaneous. When events A and B are simultaneous in one inertial frame
of reference, A can be observed to occur before B in another inertial frame of
Newton and Time
17 reference. In still another inertial frame of reference, B can be observed to
occur before A.
If one assumes an absolute temporal frame of reference, the next
question is "which observer is really correct?" This query implies that only
one (objective) interpretation of events is correct, because there can be only
one temporal measure of events. The same events cannot occur in opposite
sequences when observed at the same time. Nonetheless, Einstein held that
all observers are correct within their own inertial frames of reference, and no
observer is more correct than any other.10 In short, there is no absolute truth
about the matter. Einstein resolved the apparent contradiction between
these observations by noting that time flow is not totally a result of the
events themselves. The apparent flow of time is due, at least in part, to each
observer's inertial frame of reference (Nicolson, 1980).
Modern physicists have not only disputed the reductivity, linearity,
and objectivity of time, they have also challenged the continuity of events
across time. Many quantum physicists, for instance, contend that electrons
move from one orbit to another instantaneously, i.e., without time elapse
(Wolf, 1981, pp. 83-84). Electrons simply disappear from one quadrant and
reappear in another. Similarly, changes between various stationary states
are considered to be discrete and discontinuous (Bohm, 1980, p. 128).11
Discontinuous change, as mentioned above, is akin to a flower growing from
a bud to a full bloom instantaneously--one instant it is closed, the next
instant it is fully opened. This seems to fly in the face of our linear notions of
common sense. Our usual notion of time implies that one instant has to be
connected to the next with a line, and thus there is always a small interval of
time in which the change must occur. Nevertheless, quantum physicists
Newton and Time
18 have demonstrated that change can truly be discontinuous--not just faster
rates of change, but change without temporal duration.
Psychology's Newtonian Framework
These challenges to Newton's temporal framework for explanation
have not been widely recognized. Linear time continues to reign supreme in
our lay culture and most disciplines other than physics and philosophy.
Linear time certainly rules mainstream psychology. After psychologists
modeled physics, prior to Einstein's "revolution" at the turn of the century,
they never looked back. Because of the historical factors described above,
early psychologists never concerned themselves with assumptions of time.
Linear time was part of reality. Criticisms of Newton's temporal
assumptions prompted no reexamination in psychology, because no temporal
assumptions were recognized. Psychology's reliance upon Newtonian
assumptions, therefore, remains undeterred in virtually every important
respect.
Consider psychologists' objective view of time as existing
independently of human consciousness. As Ornstein (1972) notes, "most
psychologists, in considering time, have taken for granted that a 'real' time,
external to our construction of it, does exist, and that this time is linear" (p.
79). Faulconer and Williams (1985) also discuss psychology's "objectification"
of time (p. 1182), and McGrath and Kelly (1986) observe that most research
on time is "done on the premise that there is a singular, and known or
knowable, objective time" (p. 24). Many psychological experiments, for
example, have been conducted to discover how accurately such "real" time is
perceived. Time is treated as if it consists of its own stimuli for perception,
though real time is always identified with clock-time. The clock, of course,
Newton and Time
19 only marks or measures time; the clock is not time itself. To call the clock
"real time," as Ornstein (1972) points out, "is somewhat like calling American
money 'real money:' it is parochial at best" (p. 81).
Second, time is viewed as continuous. Psychological events are seen as
continuous in the sense of later events being consistent with earlier events.
Abrupt "discontinuous" shifts that are incongruent with previous events are
thought to be improbable, if not impossible. As the developmentalists Emde
and Harmon (1987) have observed most researchers have "expectations for
connectivity and continuity" (p. 1), presuming a "linkage from early behavior
to later behavior" (p. 3). People in general are presumed to be continuous
with their upbringing. Personalities and attitudes are traditionally thought
to be consistent with the person's past experiences. Any behaviors or
thoughts that appear to be exceptions to this rule (sometimes deemed
"abnormal") merely indicate that some of the person's past is not known. If it
were known, then we would see its continuity to the "exceptional" behaviors
and thoughts in question.
Temporal continuity is also used to explain change in psychology.
Indeed, in accordance with Newton, change and time are considered almost
synonymous--both being smooth and gradual. Change from one
psychological stage to another must occur through intermediary states (or
moments in time). "Spurts" of change are possible, but some amount of time
must occur between changes. For example, changes that researchers
consider "discontinuous" are often observed in child development (Kagan,
1984). Still, these are normally viewed as rapid continuous changes--
changes across a short span of time--rather than changes with no time or
transition between events (e.g., Fischer, 1984). A child cannot move from one
stage of development to the next without passing "in between." Continuity
Newton and Time
20 implies that one instant is connected to the next with a line, and thus there
must always be a small interval of time in which change occurs.
Virtually all mainstream psychological explanations are universal
(Faulconer and Williams, 1985). Psychologists have long sought general
"laws" of behavior that are independent of the particular historic situation in
which they are embedded (cf. Rakover, 1990, ch. 2). Examples are Fechner's
law of sensation strength and Skinner's principles of reinforcement--both
presumably still applicable, despite their having been formulated many years
ago. Most psychologists attempt to look "behind" their data to find the
universal principles that underlie them (Fuller, 1990, ch. 1). In their study
of memory, for instance, cognitive psychologists expect to glean universal
principles that can be applied uniformly under specified experimental
conditions (cf. Ashcraft, 1989). These psychologists implicitly assume that
time itself will remain uniform from situation to situation.
The linearity of explanation in psychology is also readily apparent.
Time is considered to "flow" between psychological events like a line and to
function as a medium for the sequence of events (Ornstein, 1972, p. 82-84).
This is most clearly observed in the "causal" explanations of psychologists.
Any event observed "before" is automatically considered for, if not awarded,
causal status over events observed "after" (Rakover, 1990, ch. 2). The time
interval--the points on the line--between cause and effect must be filled with
causal process (McGrath and Kelly, 1986, p. 128-131). From this perspective,
it is easy to see why so many psychologists place so much emphasis upon the
past. The present is an effect of the past. Moreover, the present is only one
point on the line of time, and a durationless and fleeting point at that. A
person's life, therefore, consists of the past almost exclusively. It seems only
logical that the most theoretical and therapeutic attention is paid to the past.
Newton and Time
21 The fact that psychological processes supposedly take place across time
has the same implication it had in Newtonian physics: reductionism. No
process--whether it be mental, emotional, or behavioral--can exist as a whole
at any point in time. A reduction of the process is all that is directly
available for study. Consequently, it is only natural to conceptualize
processes as component parts that are separated by linear time. Consider,
for example, some models of family therapy. Although family therapists
typically wish to conceptualize the whole of the family system, their
theorizing often depicts this system as occurring piecemeal along the line of
time. This type of linear explanation has overlooked reductive ramifications.
Because the system-as-a-whole is never present at any one point in time, the
therapist is necessarily resigned to interventions that directly affect only a
portion of the system. No truly systemic intervention--at least in the sense of
affecting all parts simultaneously--is possible.
Similar to Newtonian physicists, psychologists also seem to favor
machine metaphors for explaining psychological processes. Aveni (1989)
rightly declares, "Machinery is, for us, the power tool of metaphor" (p. 36).
Just as Newtonian explanations relied upon the clock, psychological
explanations have historically relied upon a host of different machines. The
human mind, for instance, has been analogized to whatever mechanism was
prominent in that historic period, from the hydraulics of the steam engine to
the relays of telephone switchboards (Martindale, 1981, p.3). Today, of
course, the computer is the ascendant machine, and true to form, computer
metaphors abound in theories of the mind. Even families are understood
through computer metaphors (e.g., Nichols, 1984, p. 421). Computers, no less
than their mechanistic predecessors, operate across time in temporal stages
that minimally included input and output (Dreyfus, 1979, ch. 10). In this
Newton and Time
22 sense, Newtonian time and mechanistic models have each served to catalyze
the popularity of the other.
Finally, many contemporary psychologists and Newtonian physicists
view scientific method with similar temporal assumptions (Rychlak, 1988, p.
47-49; cf. Slife, 1987). Psychological scientists view themselves as intervening
experimentally, and then observing the consequences of this intervention
later in time. This view is aided by psychology's decidedly linear approach to
causation. Temporal sequence is so conflated with causation that the two are
often indistinguishable in research. Psychological experimenters have rarely
been accused of "making a metaphysics of their method"12 (as has Newton),
but this may be because psychologists have not made their own assumption of
time explicit. Without an awareness that linearity is a part of psychology's
metaphysic, psychological researchers cannot be accused of confounding this
assumption with their method. Yet, their method may incorporate linear time
in a way that prohibits any true test of its validity.
Conclusion
It is important, then, that we identify the linear view of time in all of
its manifestations. Temporal assumptions cannot be discerned through the
use of a method that assumes them. Thus, in this essay, the process of
identification has begun with a brief cultural and historical analysis. Our
cultural analysis finds psychology's temporal conception to be a product of
modern Western culture to some degree--likening time to a continuous line
that is independent of the events it supposedly measures. Still, it is unlikely
that psychology would have adopted this conception without reputable
scientists also endorsing it--hence, the significance of Isaac Newton. Newton,
to his credit, made his conception of time explicit. However, there is no
indication that early psychologists (particularly those pressing for natural
Newton and Time
23 science methods) did likewise. Instead, methods and modes of explanation
were adopted that contained temporal assumptions implicitly.
Five of those implicit temporal assumptions are described in this
essay: objectivity, continuity, linearity, universality, and reductivity. These
five characteristics have served historically as an important guide to
scientific explanation in general. Should the recent criticism and
abandonment of these characteristics--in physics and philosophy--give
psychologists pause? There is no question in the mind of the present author
that it should. This is not to say that the issues of psychology are identical to
those of physics or philosophy. However, one is struck by the almost total
lack of examination of the Newtonian temporal framework in psychology.
How can psychologists know if the problems of physics and philosophy are
relevant when most psychologists have no idea they even endorse the
framework in question? This, then, is the importance of recognizing the
"Newtonian legacy."
Newton and Time
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Newton and Time
28
Footnotes
Requests for reprints should be sent to: Brent D. Slife, P.O. Box 97334, Department of
Psychology, Baylor University, Waco, Texas 76798.
1For exceptions, see Rychlak (1981, 1988), McGrath and Kelly (1986), and Slife (1981, 1987, in
press), Williams (1990).
2Christian doctrine may have been interpreted historically as supportive of a linear view, and thus
led to its rise in Western culture. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether Christian doctrine implies
linear time. Biblical revelation points to the directionality of events, but it does not necessarily
point to a linear interpretation of this directionality. The past, for example, is not necessarily
primal in Christian theology. The present (e.g., the indwelling of the Holy Spirit) and the future
(e.g., Christ's Second Coming) seem to be as important as the past. Moreover, God is often
thought to transcend time, and sinners are viewed as being "reborn" and thus transcending their
pasts.
3Not only was cyclical time possible, but Newton also differentiated his "absolute time" from
"relative time" (Newton, 1687/1990, p. 8). Moreover, Leibniz opposed Newton's conceptions with
his notion of "relational time." From Leibniz' perspective, time does not exist in its own right,
independently of events. Time is the successive order of the events themselves (Whitrow,
1980, p. 36-39).
4This is not to imply that Einstein eliminated time. As Whitrow (1980, section 6.5) has noted,
modern notions of "cosmic" time are not incompatible with relativity theory.
5This linear characteristic of absolute time may seem in contradiction with Newton's contention
that natural processes are "reversible." Newton believed, for example, that celestial mechanics
were consistent with his mathematical laws whether they were run "forward" or "backward." This
would seem to imply that time itself can run forward and backward (e.g., Coveney & Highfield,
1990, p. 30; McGrath & Kelly, 1986, p. 29). However, Newton made clear distinctions between
natural change processes and Absolute Time. Absolute Time flows "without relation to anything
Newton and Time
29
external," and is independent of these natural processes. Natural processes may be reversible,
but their temporal medium--absolute time--is not. How else could we know, Newton might ask,
whether natural processes of change are forward or backward, unless we have some absolute
standard by which to judge this directionality? As Newton (1687/1990) described it, ". . .the
flowing of absolute time is not liable to any change. . .the order of the parts of time is immutable"
(pp. 9-10). For the purposes of this book, reference to Newtonian time is a reference to Absolute
Time which has definite linear properties.
6Of course, whenever the past is fully understood in a Newtonian framework, the present and
future are also considered to be illuminated (and predicted) as well.
7An interesting exception to this was Newton's conception of gravitation. For him, gravity was a
force which acted instantly across the distance between one mass and another (Nicolson, 1980,
p. 165). As Bunge (1959) notes, the notion of instantaneous physical actions was actually quite
prevalent during this period of history (p. 64).
8How well machines actually embody these characteristics is, of course, open to debate. The
order that machines represent does not have to be considered linear in nature. That is, the
directionality implicit in mechanisms does not have to be framed in absolute and linear terms.
Historically, however, machines and linear time have tended to be highly associated.
9Morris (1984) presents a similar challenge: "Nor can any meanings be attached to the
statement that time 'flows equably.' If the flow of time is not uniform, how can one measure its
irregularities?" (p. 210).
10Einstein did not believe, however, that causal relations were relative to each observer's inertial
frame of reference. He considered the order of cause and effect to be invariant and absolute
(Ballif & Dibble, 1969, p. 412).
11Bohm cites other examples of instantaneous change, including empirical experiments (pp. 71-
72). Essentially, a molecule of two atoms is disintegrated, resulting in the two atoms flying apart.
While the atoms are in flight (and potentially separated by great distances), any attempt to
Newton and Time
30
measure the spin of one atom is instantaneously registered in its "brother" atom. No time has
occurred in which to allow any "transmission" from one atom to the other, yet the two are
somehow instantaneously related.
12Rychlak (1988) is a notable exception, because he has accused psychological experimenters of
an "S-R Bind." That is, an S-R type of linear framework is imposed on a nonlinear style of
theorizing in order to make the latter more "scientific" (in the linear sense). This is perhaps most
readily seen in the confounding of the S-R theory with the IV-DV of method (Rychlak, 1988, 172-
174).