New Thinking in International Relations Theory

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Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory After 1945

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The term "inventing" has become a flag for postmodern questioning of social facts and the historical process that has given them weight. At its most subversive, "inventing" implies the subjection of scholarly endeavors to the microscope of skepticism: Knowledge is neither cumulative nor defined by accepted methods that align it ever more closely with an external and objective truth. Instead it is a human creation subject to many influences that may not coincide with an agreed-upon understanding of scientific progress.[1] My purpose in reexamining the ways in which the new field of international relations dealt with the problem of international change after 1945 is less subversive in its intent. This revisionist review of the history of international relations does, however, fit within a recent wave of disciplinary introspection that has called into question triumphalist and Whiggish views of knowledge creation.[2] The history of such a young field, which only crystallized as part of the social sciences during the 1920s and 1930s, may appear to pose few issues of interpretation. Nevertheless, exploring and explaining the evolution of international relations serves three important ends.

Intellectual archaeology of this kind may produce a less tendentious account of intellectual activity over time, unearthing theoretical alternatives

that have been consigned to darkness for other than scientific reasons. The privileging of particular approaches to international relations may result from both an internal logic of scholarship and from the social and political context of intellectual production. Although both external and internal explanations will be presented, a field so recently professionalized and so attuned to policy demands and contemporary history is likely to be influenced by its external context.[3]

Secondly, how we understand the history of international relations will also influence the future contours of the field; an understanding of our collective past is one determinant of our direction. Comprehending the invention of our traditions may be both illuminating and intellectually significant. Nor would international relations be the first or the oldest sphere of action that displayed recently invented traditions.[4]

Finally, an examination of our past may lead us to a better understanding of how to exit from our current discontents; we may come to understand not only why we have done what we have done but also why we are where we are. Like other, less significant events in the past, the end of the Cold War has introduced a large measure of either disarray (if one was previously content) or effervescence (if one was not) into the study of international relations. The past may provide guides to better and worse ways to resolve our current disciplinary dilemmas.

The historical retelling that follows is self-consciously centered on North America and, to a lesser degree, Britain and Western Europe. The issue of whether international relations remains "an American social science" and the implications of one's answer to that question have been discussed elsewhere.[5] An overlooked benefit of the Cold War's end is the lowering of ideological barriers to the construction of a field that is genuinely international. As the scope of its contributors expands across national borders, a disciplinary narrative that is broader than the one offered here will be required.

History and Great Debates: Thinking About the Past

A stylized version of the history of international relations theory is typically framed by successive "great debates" that haunt countless undergraduate and graduate course descriptions. Although other fields mark their histories with grand theoretical controversies, the choice of "great debate" to describe the engine driving theoretical advance is unusual. The foundational myth of the field is an initial great debate between, on the one hand, idealists, wedded to legal and institutional analysis and blind to the requirements of power politics, and on the other, realists, armed with a theory grounded in human nature and state action and therefore prescient in their

reading of interwar international relations. The idealists went down in deserved defeat; realism established itself as the reigning theory in the field.

A second great debate, between science and tradition, occurred in the 1960s. Misguided, principally British, proponents of the traditional study of international relations, which emphasized law and diplomatic history, went down in defeat (at least on this side of the Atlantic), and the grounding of international relations in a behavioral view of the social sciences was accomplished. Finally, the mainstream now confronts the clamor of a diverse group of critics attacking its scientific pretensions and normative biases, perhaps attacking the entire totalizing metanarrative of a field from a postmodern perspective. These outsiders have argued that they are defining a third great debate; the mainstream, satisfied with its progress, thus far fails to recognize it as such.[6]

Pervading this portrait of six decades or more is a strong belief that each debate has ended in scientific advance. Unfortunately, a reexamination of the field's history calls into question this benign interpretation. The protagonists in the debates are often misidentified. The outcome of the debates are misspecified: Winners and losers are rarely as clear as the official version. Some significant controversies are not included and others that should have occurred but did not—the debates that did not bark—drop from view.

Simply stripping away layers of disciplinary mythology and reconstructing intellectual discourse more completely and accurately would be valuable.[7] Explaining the course of invention in international relations must be far more tentative. At least four explanations for the field's evolution can be advanced. Two are internal to the field and its relations with other social sciences. International relations specialists, as members of one of the youngest social sciences, have been absorbed (occasionally obsessed) with their professional standing. Many "advances" were seen as such because they hardened the professional boundaries and barriers to entry in the field. At the same time, international relations began as a self-consciously interdisciplinary field. Its borrowings over time have shifted from one discipline to another, but its eventual capture by political science could not have been predicted at its beginning. The evolution of international relations was not hermetic, however. Its broader political and social context influenced its intellectual development as well. Many historians of the field have emphasized the influence of events—apparent anomalies presented by contemporary world politics—on the field of international relations. Brian Schmidt argues that the effect of international context has been exaggerated; nevertheless, such influence is not simply inferred by observers after the fact.[8] Those engaged in the invention of the field often acknowledge the impulse given by a turn in international events. The longer sweep of international history has seldom been given the weight of immediate and politically significant developments. Finally, international relations has been driven by demand. Its au-

dience typically includes practitioners as well as scholars; at moments of international change or high uncertainty, policy demand may drive research as much as a purely internal logic. Each of these explanations is related to the others—events-driven and demand-driven periods of evolution tend to coincide; professional hardening over time has reinforced the boundaries of the field and weakened its earlier extravagant borrowing from outside.

Idealists, Realists, and the Hardening of International Relations

The first great debate between idealists and realists is a suitable place to begin excavating the field, since this episode and its misinterpretation have profoundly influenced subsequent development of the field.[9] The much disparaged idealists have nearly been erased from our collective intellectual memories, so thorough has the realist rewriting of history been. Few actually read them, since they have been caricatured as airy and naive proponents of the League of Nations, oblivious to the underlying and persistent realities of power and, above all, as amateurs rather than scholars.[10] Although a complete survey of all those later labeled "idealist" is impossible, two prominent examples, Norman Angell and James T. Shotwell, provide evidence that the interwar "idealists" have been misunderstood and their arguments misrepresented.

Norman Angell, author of *The Great Illusion* and many other works, has long served as a target for those undermining the importance of economic interdependence in shaping state behavior. Repeatedly and falsely, he has been portrayed as an exponent of the impossibility of war in an age of interdependence. Angell argued instead that enhanced economic interdependence among the industrialized nations of Europe had altered the economic calculus of warmaking: Any gains from territorial conquest within Europe could not equal the losses from disrupting patterns of trade and investment. This narrower argument was part of a broader case made by liberals before World War I and during the interwar decades that emphasized joint gains (the struggle of central concern is one of man with the universe, not man with man) and attacked the primacy of the state by exploring the development of transnational communities of opinion. But the underlying argument was not idealist, it was materialist: The contemporary state system and its competitive nationalism was a poor fit with underlying economic reality. "International politics are still dominated by terms applicable to conditions which the processes of modern life have altogether abolished."[11]

James T. Shotwell, a Canadian brought up in a setting of nineteenth-century liberalism, was in many ways the model interwar scholar-activist. He became involved with the U.S. government's propaganda machine during

World War I, worked with Colonel House in the preparations for the Paris Peace Conference, and later was instrumental in pressing for U.S. involvement in the League of Nations and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. An often overlooked part of his career, however, was his role in stimulating large-scale research on international relations and serving as an entrepreneur to obtain funding for such research through institutions such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Despite his training as a medieval historian, Shotwell developed an early interest in the impact of the industrial and scientific revolutions.[12]

Shotwell's immersion in European history made him sensitive to the central role of war in creating European states and the European state system; he could construct blood-curdling passages about the predatory behavior of states.[13] Nevertheless, he argued, like Angell, that industrialization and science had made war "too dangerous to employ" and virtually impossible to limit.[14] Not only was war more costly in the new era, but also the territorial state system was no longer the only "map" of relevance; science and the growth of economic interdependence has created a new web of relations among peoples. In Shotwell's view, this material underpinning separated the post–World War I peace movement from earlier movements based solely on ethical principles or idealism.[15]

Angell and Shotwell could be described as liberals and institutionalists, but they were hardly idealists. What later critics pilloried as idealism in the interwar decades is better described as liberal materialism, neither so deterministic nor so infatuated with international institutions and law as the current image suggests. Shotwell and Angell were not seduced by a pacifist teleology—an inevitable evolution toward more cooperative states in international politics. Neither believed that material trends had eliminated war or had even touched all parts of the world; the conditions of interdependence existed in spatially limited parts of the international system. Although his prescriptions emphasized international institutions, Shotwell did not make exaggerated claims for the achievements of organizations like the League of Nations. More significant was an emphasis on democratic activism to change international relations. Belief in the power of public opinion is often portrayed as another illustration of hopeless liberal naïveté, but public opinion and its influence on diplomacy was one of the striking aspects of the peace-making process after World War I. Discovering that politicians were forced to respond to popular pressures—a source of great anguish to such realists as Harold Nicolson—was a revelation to the interwar liberals, since it offered an instrument by which the lessons of industrial warfare could be translated into policy.[16]

If the content of interwar liberalism has been distorted, its hegemony was also limited: Realism did not mount its theoretical charge against a field that was monolithic in its allegiances. Many active in defining the new field

of international relations during the 1930s—Arnold Wolfers, Frederick Dunn, and Frederick Schuman, a University of Chicago historian who authored an influential text—displayed little of the idealism that was later described as dominant. In the first edition of his work, Schuman devoted scathing comments to overly optimistic accounts of progress in international politics, but he also borrowed materialist premises from some of those he criticized, arguing that the study of politics could not ignore "the 'social' and 'economic' configurations of human relations."[17] In a close examination of textbooks from the interwar decades, William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom discovered neither internationalist nor idealist predominance. Of about forty titles in the mainstream of the new field from 1916 to 1941, "even if by 'idealist' we mean no more than stressing the efficacy of law and organization, only about half of these can be said to be even primarily idealistic in tone."[18]

Realism, the competitor to Anglo-American liberalism, was in large measure a transplant from continental Europe. The great transatlantic emigration of scholars influenced the development of fields as diverse as nuclear physics, sociology, and political theory.[19] The influx of scholars had an even greater impact on the institutionally weak and ill-defined field of international relations. Key members—Hans Morgenthau, Nicholas Spykman, John Herz—introduced a profoundly pessimistic and continental European emphasis on power politics into a field that was beginning to harden and professionalize. Just as idealism has been misportrayed, however, it is important to emphasize the deep pessimism of many realists regarding the rationalism and positivism that they associated with their scholarly foes. Hans Morgenthau, in particular, noted his early reaction against Marxism and Freud and his discontent with the "rationalistic pretenses" of his philosophy courses at Frankfurt in the 1920s. Like other realists, he reflected the turn toward and fascination with irrationalism that characterized European culture after World War I.[20] This aspect of transplanted realism is particularly ironic given the later wedding of realism to rational choice in the neorealist synthesis.[21] A deep distrust of any claims for a scientific study of international politics was also characteristic of realist practitioners such as George Kennan.[22]

This attack on liberalism and reason by some realists could be seen as simply another fusillade aimed at the idealist project that World War II had already fractured. Their critique was also directed at another target, however, one far more influential in the long run, a group that intersected with the so-called idealists more than would be admitted after 1945. This third contingent can be labeled the "scientists." International relations, one of the youngest of academic fields, lagged behind the other social sciences and history in its institutionalization and professionalization. What was later encapsulated as an interwar ideological battle between realism and idealism was coincident with the professionalization of the field and the adoption by

many of its members of the model of natural science for their research. For those shaping this professionalization, the natural science model represented an inevitable and desirable maturation of international relations; for critics, such as Dorothy Ross, international relations simply joined other American social sciences that were marked by "liberal values, practical bent, shallow historical vision, and technocratic confidence."[23]

At the core of this movement was the Chicago school that spearheaded efforts to transform political science during the 1920s and 1930s. Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, and Quincy Wright all contributed to the study of world politics as part of a broader analysis of power and political actors ranging from individuals and groups to national governments.[24] As William Fox has described, for these intellectual godfathers of postwar behavioralism, power was the organizing principle of analysis, but no particular place was given to states or to military power. International relations was embedded in a broader political analysis.[25] Their point of agreement with the realists was narrow—that international politics should be studied as it is and not as it might be. This shared antinormative stance disguised divisions that would reemerge in later decades. The scientists embraced their version of a positivism modeled on the natural sciences; the realists were deeply skeptical of scientific pretensions defined in this way. Each group also held distinct views on the degree of disjuncture between domestic and international politics, with the scientists building out from domestic politics and the realists theorizing in from international anarchy and the security dilemma.

To many in the interwar years, the advance of the scientists, not the debate between realists and idealists, was the most significant development in international relations. When Hans Morgenthau arrived at Chicago, he confronted Quincy Wright and a research enterprise with which he could have had little sympathy. In the words of one of his students, "Power politics was a dirty and forbidden word in the Chicago of his time."[26] The scientific movement of the 1920s and 1930s shared more goals (and personnel) with the idealists or liberals than it did with the realists. Shotwell, in his introduction to an early survey of international relations in the United States, lauded the scientific enterprise and the embedding of international relations within the coalescing social sciences. Science led, in his view, to "constructive planning," which was "the supreme task of the social sciences, and the field of international relations offers the best of laboratories for their study."[27] Shotwell was one of the founding research entrepreneurs of the field.[28] The infrastructure of research that was part of social-scientific enterprise in the 1920s—Merriam was instrumental in founding the Social Science Research Council in 1923—had already been extended to international relations. In the 1930s, university research institutes were devoted specifically to the new field.[29] This burst of foundation-supported research was part of a broader desire to affect public policy and social change

through research. Both interwar liberals and many scientists of the era shared a program to bring knowledge to power.[30] Their chosen targets differed, however: Many liberal internationalists aimed to influence broader public opinion and the educational system; the scientists more often turned to direct policy advice. The line was not sharp, however, and the success of the scientists waxed and waned in political science and in international relations during the interwar decades. Their project was sharply criticized by more traditional scholars, including William Yandell Elliott, future mentor of the realist Henry Kissinger.[31]

Postwar Consensus and the Hardening of the Discipline

Early postwar conferences and surveys of international relations quickly rescripted interwar debates as a battle between a feckless "utopianism" that had "cast a shadow of academic disrepute over the new field" and a new emphasis on power politics as a "natural reaction to the excesses of sentimentalism."[32] Even William Fox took a less measured and tolerant view of interwar research than he later would; his evaluation was later assimilated by others reviewing the postwar state of the field, reinforcing a view of the inevitable joint triumph of realism and science.[33] Interwar scholarship had been disparaged to such a degree that Dwight Waldo admitted in his 1956 survey that it may have been "discounted unduly."[34]

Vulgarization of the interwar record in the decade after 1945 resembled the "counterprogressive" tendency in postwar history: Both constructed a straw man whose hegemony in the field was exaggerated and whose accomplishments were dismissed.[35] The preferred account of the postwar consensus in international relations was events-driven; interwar scholarship could not deal with the anomalous events of the 1930s, World War II, and the Cold War. A threatening international context was only one explanation, however. Professionalization and new external demand also served to tilt the intellectual balance. A new generation of Young Turks, impelled by their service in government and the military during World War II, were intent on overturning their predecessors, a familiar battle between scholarly generations. The new cohort also accelerated the professionalization of the field. International relations, as noted earlier, was among the last of social science fields to achieve disciplinary status. As in history and the other social sciences before it, those defining the field felt it necessary to separate themselves from what was portrayed as an amateurish past. Amateurism was part of the image of interwar liberalism that was transmitted to the postwar generation, a past of League of Nations societies and peace movements. Both realists and scientists rejected that past, not only for its alleged

disregard for the realities of power but also for the obstacles that it presented to achieving professional esteem.

Realists and scientists were also sustained by a new demand for the product of their labors, a demand that offered burgeoning institutional support in exchange. The international relations infrastructure that had begun to appear in the 1930s exploded after World War II as government and foundations increased their demand for knowledge to match the new global interests of the United States. Realism was doubly favored: Not only did it benefit from the same research infrastructure, but also its theoretical stance fit with renewed government emphasis on international commitment and on meeting the Soviet threat; realism was "interpreted as providing a rationale for not appeasing the presumably unappeasable and therefore for the cold war."[36]

Just as later portrayals of the interwar period deserve scrutiny, so too the solidity of post-1945 realist hegemony and the alliance of convenience between realism and science should be carefully qualified. Realism quickly took on the ideological coloration of its new American environment. Even in early realist works, such as Nicholas Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics*, liberal institutions make a surprising appearance: Spykman, for example, urged a "regional League of Nations" for East Asia rather than a "one-sided treaty of alliance."[37] Much as American historians blithely reinterpreted Leopold Ranke as a "scientist" of the American kind in the nineteenth century and political science had "Americanized" earlier in the century, so American international relations quickly gave realism what Fox called a "pragmatic meliorist" cast, accepting the reality of the security dilemma in international politics but urging its mitigation through gradualist, liberal prescriptions.[38] This process of amalgamation reached its endpoint when realist John Herz, who coined the phrase "security dilemma," urged "realist liberalism" on his colleagues.[39] The rationalist, improving, progressive strand in American culture transformed the anti-scientific pessimism of realism and incorporated it.

Many on the scientific side of the postwar consensus continued to express skepticism about realist pretensions, particularly when voiced in philosophical rather than positivist vocabulary. Quincy Wright, a senior member of the scientific wing, wrote sardonically of Herz's work: "This analysis suggests that 'realism' and 'idealism' have functioned as propaganda terms according to which everyone sought to commend whatever policy he favored by calling it 'realistic'. . . . From this usage we learn that in the past two decades political propagandists have regarded 'realism' as a plus term and 'idealism' as a minus term."[40] Another icon of behavioralism, Harold Lasswell, described "power politics" as a "sentimentalized term," an ironic twist of a favorite realist adjective.[41] A new generation of scholars openly took up the idealist cause, although most seemed to prefer putting the tired and increasingly irrelevant great debate behind them.[42]

Other young scholars, such as Ernst Haas, subjected realist terminology to the scientific microscope and found it wanting.[43] The outcome of World War II could, in any case, be interpreted as much as a triumph of liberal internationalism, particularly in the sphere of economic organization, as one that confirmed realist postulates.[44] As a result, the study of international organizations, despite the setbacks of the 1930s, displayed considerable resilience, although the study of international law began its lengthy divorce from international relations.[45]

International relations was not marked by a clear Kuhnian paradigm shift after 1945; the field remained heterogeneous and continued to include a liberal (or at least nonrealist) corps of practitioners. The often tense alliance between realists and scientists did have significant and often unrecognized consequences, however. For both wings of postwar international relations, power became the core analytic concept. Since the scientists yearned for professionalization, the field became embedded in academic political science. Much of the interdisciplinary richness of the 1930s (which had made professional self-definition difficult) was lost.[46] International political economy, whether of the liberal or the historical-materialist variety, was tainted by its association with Marxism during the Cold War.[47] Study of international organizations continued and investigation of regional integration began in the 1950s, but international institutions more broadly defined (including international law) were hardly regarded as the most exciting frontiers of research in the field. For the scientists, individuals and groups were the core units of analysis; for the realists, it was the state in an anarchic international environment. Institutions had been tarred with the idealist brush and would take some time to be reestablished as central to the field.

The environment of postwar professionalization and demand for research from government consumers virtually eliminated any search for an audience beyond one's colleagues and the modern prince and dampened normative inquiry. Advice directed to popular audiences and efforts to influence public opinion were labeled "propaganda." As Novick describes in the case of history, "the approved postwar sensibility was 'the tragic sense,' and the approved posture, spectatorial."[48] To change the world (not a goal to which one would easily admit), an elitist model was prescribed: At a conference on institutes and their publics in 1953, near unanimity was voiced for the view that "the primary task of the institutes must be to influence the minority that shapes public opinion."[49] Gabriel Almond's classic study of public opinion both reflected and influenced this elitist view of foreign policy.[50] Research directed to particular international goals, such as a more peaceful world, carried the whiff of interwar "utopianism" that alarmed specialists during the Cold War. At best such normative speculation was postponed to a time when the requirements of science had been satisfied.[51] At a time when the parameters of U.S. policy were widely per-

ceived as set by an overwhelming threat from Soviet communism, normative debates were shelved for the duration.ê[52]

A final consequence of the alliance of realists and scientists was neglect of explanations for international change. Realists argued for regularities across time in the domain of power politics; scientists sought their own lawlike generalizations about human and national behavior. Explanations of change were not central to either research program. In a Cold War world systemic change was assumed to occur at a glacial pace in any case. International relations had taken its first step toward a future of comparative statics and equilibrium analysis, a future that resembled its past of balances of power and cycles of great-power rise and decline. In this it resembled other social sciences that had moved away from "historico-evolutionary models . . . to specialized sciences focused on short-term processes rather than long-term change over time."[53] It was an oddly comforting, if limited, vision for a field born in a century marked by violent ruptures and revolutionary upheaval.

Realism and Science: End of Alliance

The second great debate bore little resemblance to the first. It was not stimulated by cataclysmic international events; it occurred at a time of superpower dominance and economic tranquillity, before the Vietnam War had rattled American social science. It represented a late and somewhat faint echo of the behavioral revolution in political science played out in the pages of *World Politics* and *International Studies Quarterly*.[54] The debate was not theoretical in content. The proponents of tradition (Hedley Bull in the lead) and science (Morton Kaplan as protagonist) held theoretical and policy positions that cut across the divide that defined the debate. In light of the history already recounted, however, one can interpret these competing definitions of international relations as the end of a tenuous alliance between realists and scientists that had defined the postwar consensus. Many realists shared Bull's unease about the direction of the field: Morgenthau had situated himself squarely on the antibehavioral side and launched a vigorous attack on works by Lasswell and Kaplan in a review article.ê[55] To members of a field that has, whatever its theoretical and methodological disagreements, defined itself as a social science, this great debate now seems a nondebate. Our reaction, however, suggests its larger consequences for the evolution of international relations.

The second debate concerned methodology, not theory or the sources of theoretical innovation. In a telling contribution to the debate, Marion Levy replied to Morton Kaplan:

> I deeply regret that studies in methodology show no promise whatsoever of leading to this kind of knowledge [about international phenomena]. Studies of

> methodology improve the probability of making something of a good idea. But nothing will replace the importance of creativity in discovering ideas that can be stated with rigor, care, and precision, and creativity in discovering those which can be stated in terms of a small number of variables and among which deductive interdependencies can be shown.[56]

Theory in international relations remained underdeveloped (or implicitly realist) in an era of competing methodologies. Method, so important to Bull and others, proved of little significance in explaining theoretical evolution.

The second great debate also gave an inaccurate impression to many Americans that the study of international relations in Britain and the rest of Western Europe—carried out by the second largest national concentration of scholars and a useful antidote to American ethnocentrism—was incurably hidebound and antiscientific in its orientation. The debate only deepened the parochialism that, paradoxically, has long characterized the study of international relations.

Perhaps most important, the debate symbolized the loss not of "tradition" but of a larger conception of international relations; an argument about method was confused with an argument about scope. Although Bull's views borrowed much from the realists, others have included him in a neo-Grotian strand of international relations theory that is concerned with "deep" institutions in an international society that constitutes and defines individual states.[57] Interest in those institutions would not revive for nearly two decades. Bull's criticisms of the scientific approach, which are not a model of clarity, also resembled later postmodern assaults on the lack of a self-conscious and critical stance in mainstream international relations theory:

> [The scientists'] thinking is certainly characterized by a lack of any sense of inquiry into international politics as a continuing tradition to which they are the latest recruits; by an insensitivity to the conditions of recent history that have produced them, provided them with the preoccupations and perspectives they have, and colored these in ways of which they might not be aware . . . by an uncritical attitude toward their own assumptions, and especially toward the moral and political attitudes that have a central but unacknowledged position in much of what they say.[58]

The apparent defeat of the traditional or classical approach in this second great debate imposed losses even on the empirical program that the victorious scientists would pursue. International relations was severed from political philosophy, diplomatic history, and international law. The latter was gradually expelled from political science departments, and even after international relations reinvented the study of institutions in the 1970s, the empirical value of legal studies would remain unrecognized. Within the narrower field that emerged from the second debate, Hedley Bull's exasper-

ation suggested that security studies—in which he played an important role—was also drifting away from the research programs defined by the scientific wing. As professional self-definition continued to sharpen methodologically, those who defined themselves in other terms were quickly consigned to the "amateur" status previously reserved for interwar idealists.

The field of security studies was also undergoing a transformation and division at this time, one that pitted scientist against scientist. The development of deterrence theory in the 1950s and 1960s was a rare example of genuine interdisciplinary collaboration, a rapidly advancing research frontier, and immediate effects on national policy, particularly in the area of nuclear strategy and arms control. Indeed, demand from the policy community and newly forged links to the national security bureaucracies may explain why the second wave of deterrence theory in the late 1950s had a far greater impact than the first wave of the immediate postwar years.[59] The new methodology of game theory figured prominently in the development of deterrence theory; its rational-choice microfoundations, useful in illuminating strategic interaction, marked an important first step toward the neorealist synthesis of the 1980s.[60]

Nevertheless, links between second wave deterrence theorists and the U.S. government as well as the implicit acceptance by many strategists of Cold War realism stimulated dissident currents among international relations specialists. Peace research was the most important reaction to the melding of realism, nuclear weapons, and the new demand from government. The connection to interwar international relations was direct in the case of peace research: The venerable figure of Quincy Wright wrote the first article in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957. In place of the underlying realist basis of much strategic thinking at this time, peace research submitted claims of the inevitability of violent conflict to scientific scrutiny and took a more activist stance toward policy debates, particularly over nuclear weapons. The postwar distaste for "utopianism" was dissipating under the shadow of nuclear weapons. Studying what is no longer implied that fundamental change was impossible. Peace research borrowed its methodology from the scientists and also its belief that the dynamics of violence among individuals, among groups and among states displayed similarities: interstate violence and the realm of international anarchy were no longer privileged.[61]

The Great Debate That Failed: Neoliberalism, Dependency Theory, and Neorealism

Peace research was only one manifestation of a resurgence of neoliberal theorizing that appeared during the 1960s as the Cold War lost its chill. Peace research found much of its support and research infrastructure in

Western Europe. Europe, where long-standing nationalist conflicts had apparently been tamed and a much imitated experiment in regional integration was under way, provided new grounds for challenging realist assumptions, whether in the evolution of security communities, examined by Karl Deutsch and Bruce Russett, or in the exploding field of regional integration, in which Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, and others proposed a neofunctionalist mode of explanation. Students of integration undermined realism by first selecting developments in international relations that fitted realist predictions poorly and then explaining those developments by processes and actors outside the state.

Interwar liberals had been absorbed by the issues of war and peace. Neoliberalism in the 1960s and 1970s was drawn to the implications of international economic change. A long postwar economic boom, combined with concerted liberalizing measures among the industrialized countries, produced rapid growth in trade and financial flows. Large-scale American investment in Western Europe and European reactions to "the American challenge" directed public and scholarly attention to the multinational corporation and its potential for reshaping international politics. Growing cross-border trade and investment provoked the interest of both political scientists and economists and produced a rebirth of international political economy. International organization, which had become a backwater of postwar international relations, revived as the collaborative management of international economic relations rose on the scholarly and policy agenda.[62]

Economic interdependence could be narrowly defined, as it was in the influential work of Richard Cooper, but in other hands, it became a full-blown alternative to the dominant realist conception of international order. Edward Morse challenged the state-centric assumptions of realism, asserting that the growth of economic interdependence and transnational actors had fundamentally altered the classical Westphalian state system.[63] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye's formulation of complex interdependence summed up a decade of neoliberal scholarship that had introduced or reintroduced transnational relations, economic interdependence, security communities, international organizations, and the broader concept of international regimes.[64]

The Vietnam War undermined realism by calling into question the assumption of tight international constraints on national policy. The war also produced a burst of interest in foreign policy and its determinants. Widespread opposition to the war created an audience for revisionist diplomatic historians who disputed conventional accounts of Cold War origins and undermined prevailing images of a reactive United States and a ceaselessly expanding Soviet Union.[65] Convinced that the United States did have a wider scope for choice in its foreign policy, researchers on national policy moved beyond the descriptive studies of decisionmaking characteristic of the early postwar years to theoretical approaches that provided clear cau-

tions for policymakers, whether on the costs of misperception (as social-psychological insights were imported into the field) or on the dangers of organizational slippage and bureaucratic competition.[66]

As these neoliberal innovations challenged an apparent realist hegemony in the United States, another theoretical combatant appeared from an unlikely quarter. Dependency theory responded to many of the same international economic changes as neoliberalism and, like neoliberalism, redefined system structure to emphasize economic links between center and periphery (rather than interstate competition) and disaggregated domestic politics in peripheral societies. Unlike neoliberal theories, however, structuralism, promoted by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and Marxism—central theoretical influences on dependency theory—assigned these systemic and internal constraints a negative (dependence not interdependence) rather than positive value.

The emergence of dependency theory and its rapid acceptance in North America and Western Europe depended on both external context and apparent theoretical anomalies that dependency theory could claim to resolve. Dependency theory was a collective product of the social science research infrastructure that had been constructed in Latin America after 1945. That constellation of research institutions attracted an interdisciplinary group of scholars who shared a belief that there was some blockage in the development of Latin American capitalism. This perceived anomaly (lack of integrated industrialization after more than a century of political independence) is itself puzzling from the vantage point of the 1990s: Latin American economies enjoyed relatively high growth during the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the international economic environment was more benign than it would be in any other postwar period.[67] As Fernando Henrique Cardoso commented, the creators of dependency theory "were seeking new ideas that could explain why the early optimism about development in the postwar years was turning into bitter frustration."[68]

Receptivity to dependency theory in both Latin America and the United States was heightened in the late 1960s and early 1970s by renewed attention to U.S. intervention in the Third World. Theories of imperialism that had been submerged during the Cold War received greater attention and shifted the theoretical base for dependency analysis away from its structuralist roots toward a Marxist perspective.[69] World-systems analysis, which took shape around this time, borrowed much of its vocabulary from structuralist and dependency analysis without adopting Marxist dynamics as the engine for global change. Compared to dependency theory, however, the world-systems approach awarded an even more dominant role to the system in shaping individual societies. In both cases explanations for development or underdevelopment on the periphery were rooted in the evolution of international capitalism, not the state system.

By the mid-1970s the theoretical claims of dependency theory had been taken up by mainstream political scientists in North America (to the dismay of some dependency theorists)e[70] Two challengers, liberal and radical, offered potent alternatives to realist hegemony within international relations. Both emphasized system defined in economic rather than power-political terms; both rejected the state-centric emphasis of realism. In each, domestic development was shaped by the system through transnational linkages that were only partially mediated or not mediated at all by the state. In certain versions of both liberal and dependency theories, the state lost its crucial gatekeeping role vis-à-vis the international system. Despite the apparent strength of these challenges, however, both contenders failed to survive the following decade. Neoliberalism was redefined away from complex interdependence toward a state-centric version more compatible with realism. Dependency theory was virtually driven from the theoretical field. What might have been another great debate faded as realism, redefined and rendered more acceptable to the scientists in international relations, reclaimed a central theoretical position.

The persistence and reassertion of realism during the 1980s has been well documented. K. J. Holsti carefully examined leading textbooks and the works to which they refer, not only in the United States but also in other countries. He found that at the start of the 1980s realism remained the dominant paradigm in each of the countries, with the exception of Japan; in the United States there was a slight shift in favor of neoliberal and dependency theory after 1970, but it was not great.[71] Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* was central in stimulating a new generation to become interested in neorealist theory; his efforts to transform the vague and imprecise tenets of classical realism into a form more acceptable to the scientific mainstream of the field attracted some who had labored on alternative approaches.[72] The turn of realism in a more self-consciously scientific direction occurred at the end of a decade in which criticisms of the realist paradigm from scientists testing hypotheses based on realism had grown louder.[73] By the mid-1980s not only had neorealism claimed a central position in the study of international security (where realism had never been seriously challenged), but also it had, in the form of hegemonic stability theory, claimed a central place in international political economy, which had been the primary source of alternative theoretical viewpoints within international relations.

The rise of neorealism in the 1980s and the fading of both neoliberal and radical (dependency) analyses is not a puzzle for neorealists: In the selective process of theoretical elaboration and testing, neorealism had simply offered more parsimonious explanations. More recent developments suggest that such purely internal and theoretical explanations for the consolidation of neorealism are partial at best. Certainly, the alternatives to neorealist analy-

sis demonstrated shortcomings in elaborating a research program and explaining critical international developments. As Keohane and Nye argue in their perceptive retrospective on *Power and Interdependence*, the concept of complex interdependence was not designed as a theory "but as a thought experiment about what politics might look like if the basic assumptions of realism were reversed."[74] Particularly at the systemic level, it did not seem to present an alternative that could compete with structure defined as distribution of power without including the goals and instruments of state policy. Other elements of neoliberal theory, such as interdependence and international regimes, could be accommodated within neorealism; in certain respects, they were captured by the emerging neorealist synthesis.

Dependency theory's decline was also due in part to its internal and theoretical treatment of two apparent anomalies: rapid industrialization in parts of the periphery (particularly the newly industrializing countries) in the late 1960s and 1970s and a turn toward democracy in Latin America in the 1980s. This degree of variation among the trajectories of developing countries was a major anomaly for a theory that emphasized systemic determinants of national development. Dependency theorists dealt with these developments by amending and supplementing the theory with domestic variables, particularly state capabilities in encouraging industrialization and bargaining with foreign investors. A better fit with existing patterns of industrialization on the periphery was won at the cost of both parsimony and the original systemic emphasis of the theory.[75] Paradoxically, in emphasizing the state, revised dependency theory paralleled the state-centrism of neorealism and redefined neoliberalism, theories with very different images of system structure.

A final, internal explanation for the widespread acceptance of neorealism was its compatibility, after translation, with the rational-choice and game-theoretic approaches that were winning widespread acceptance in international relations and other social sciences. The transmutation of neorealism from its original Waltzian structuralism—Waltz had explicitly argued that his theory did not require rationalist microfoundations—to an approach with rationalist and individualist premises was crucial to its success.[76] The rational and state-centric postulates of revised neorealism attracted many who were less interested in its structural features.

These conceptual and internal explanations for the fading of dependency theory, the redefinition of neoliberalism, and a wider acceptance of the neorealist research program in the early 1980s are only partly convincing. The theoretical weaknesses of neorealism—easily as great as those of its competitors—were overlooked in ways that suggest other explanations for its popularity. One argument for neorealism's success is familiar from the history of international relations since the interwar period: A rise in international insecurity, specifically the onset of the "new" Cold War in 1979 and 1980, added to the appeal of realism, as it had in the past.[77] The field had entered yet another of its events-driven cyclical swings in the realist direction.

Apparent disorder in the international political economy of the 1970s and the adoption of defensive national policies in the face of that turmoil had shifted attention from the new features of economic interdependence to the political prerequisites of a liberal economic order. Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleberger staked out theoretical ground for what would become the theory of hegemonic stability.[78] At the same time, a neoliberal experiment, the European Community, reached a temporary hiatus in the face of external economic shocks. The leading exponent of regional integration theory—perhaps the most fully elaborated body of neoliberal theory—declared that "regional integration in Western Europe has disappointed everybody: there is no federation, the nation-state behaves as if it were both obstinate and obsolete, and what once appeared to be a distinctive 'supranational' style now looks more like a huge regional bureaucratic appendage to an intergovernmental conference in permanent session."[79]

These international events posed questions for competing theoretical stances, but they hardly signaled a return to the military insecurity and state-dominated world economy of the 1930s. Economic integration in the world economy proceeded apace, particularly in the sphere of financial liberalization and globalization of markets. New forms of multinational investment and novel linkages among international firms appeared. Coincident with the fading of dependency theory in the 1980s, debt-ridden economies in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa were more deeply influenced by the capitalist world economy than they had been at any time since 1945.

Events supply only part of the answer to the faltering of these alternatives to neorealism. The spatial distribution of international relations research offers some additional purchase on the shifting balance in theoretical allegiances. National parochialism in the field of international relations combined with the continued central position of the United States to support the agenda of neorealism, an agenda infused with the concerns of anxious Americans. The implications of hegemonic decline (if U.S. decline could be demonstrated) drove the neorealist agenda in international political economy. National setting may have had a second effect: individualist and rationalist models (exemplified by a transformed neorealism) have enormous appeal in American social science. As Dorothy Ross argues, they best "embody the individualistic and ahistorical premises of liberal exceptionalism."[80] In this sense neorealism marked the final stage in the Americanization of realism.

Demand from policymaking consumers of international relations research spurred some earlier theoretical developments in the field, particularly second-wave deterrence theory. Such demand had little to do with the popularity of neorealism, however: Academic neorealists (including Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin) had little time for the revived Cold War views of American conservatives; neorealists were often explicitly critical of Reagan administration defense and foreign policies. Reaganite anticommu-

nism was marked by a revival of ideological competition with the Soviet Union. Neoconservative champions of the ideological battle had little in common with realists like Henry Kissinger or academic neorealists.

Although realism may have served to legitimate U.S. competition with the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, academic neorealism argued for managing and tempering that competition in the 1980s. University research had become disconnected from the policy because of the Vietnam War and a key institutional innovation of the 1970s: the Washington think tank. Policymakers in search of foreign policy advice or a new agenda did not need to turn to the university, as they often had in the 1950s. New suppliers of ideas—tailor-made for policy appetites—now existed within easy reach; many of these suppliers were former policymakers themselves.[81] The new, politically connected think tanks competed successfully for policymaking consumers, but few scholarly members of the field of international relations seemed to care.

Although the policy community exercised less and less influence on the course of international relations research in the 1980s, foundations, through the pattern of their funding, could still shift incentives, particularly for younger scholars. Large-scale funding of security studies in the 1980s undoubtedly strengthened neorealism, since many in the new generation of security specialists, whatever their policy preferences, identified themselves as neorealists. As for the research infrastructure in Latin America that had produced dependency theory, it had been eroded by repressive authoritarian governments in the 1970s. During the following decade academic attention in the region turned toward concrete and pragmatic measures to escape economic crisis rather than systemic explanations for underdevelopment.

Whatever weight is attached to internal and contextual explanations for the evolution of international relations theory in the 1980s, the promised great debate among neoliberals, neorealists, and dependency theorists did not occur. By the end of the 1980s, the theoretical contest that might have been was reduced to relatively narrow disagreements within one state-centric, rationalist model of international interaction. The crucial distinction between neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism came to lie in their assessments of the importance of absolute gains or relative gains calculations among states.[82]

Another Theoretical Turn: Postmoderns and Sociologists

For those content with the Tweedledum of neorealism and the Tweedledee of neoliberalism, the subsidence of great debates was simply a sign that the pre-paradigmatic phase in international relations research was over.

However, the history of the field—its evolution shaped by international events, its professionalization, and demands from competing audiences—casts considerable doubt on this comfortable assumption. The proclamation of a Kuhnian paradigm shift is often a signal that such a shift has probably not occurred; paradigm is as often a weapon used in scientific battles as a description of theoretical achievement.[83] By the 1990s a combination of internal dissatisfaction with the progressive narrowing of the research agenda and dramatic, unexpected international events combined to give a new turn to theoretical debates, much as they had in the past.

Those dramatic events included the end of the Cold War, which represented a fundamental change in great-power competition for the first time since 1945, one that presented a deep challenge to neorealism. Although a complete explanation for the changes that ended the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union itself will not be offered for some time, structural realism is unlikely to contribute much to that explanation. The world was bipolar in 1989 and, some would argue, remains bipolar in military terms today, yet all agree that international politics has been profoundly transformed. Of equal significance, that transformation, which included the rapid demise of an imperial power, occurred with no great-power conflict and remarkably little loss of life.[84]

As might be expected, these events and others, such as accelerated institution-building in the European Community and widespread opening to the international economy by developing countries, revived interest in a broadened liberal theory. The new turn in research addressed the role of international institutions in facilitating cooperation and the transformations produced by economic integration (or the desire for such integration). Above all it represented the triumph of reductionism. Structural realism and its research agenda had gone the way of its system-level rivals—complex interdependence and dependency theory. The explanatory power of structural variables—defined as the distribution of power—was demonstrated to be exceedingly weak. Hegemonic stability theory had been theoretically undermined and empirically challenged: A "strong" version of the theory that relied solely on hegemonic power distribution without accounting independently for the preferences of the hegemonic power seemed to explain very little in the history of international cooperation, the rise and fall of regimes, or the stability of the international economic order. Even the presence or absence of a liberal hegemonic power did not seem necessary to explain the persistence of institutions or habits of cooperation.[85] The same questioning of the importance of polarity as an explanation for international conflict was carried out by scholars using a wide range of methodologies over a considerable historical span.[86] Those who continued to elaborate neorealist theories were forced to improve the empirical fit by adding a domestic (and often subjective) dimension to the explanation.[87] Parsimony was sacrificed to obtain adequate explanatory punch.

Renewed interest in the sources of national policy ranged well beyond the old decisionmaking frameworks or social-psychological critiques of rationalist assumptions. The pattern of research also displayed refreshing differences from the past. Islands of research interest—such as the aversion of democracies to war with one another—attracted scholars using diverse methodologies who conversed with one another. A healthy eclecticism was complemented by clear preferences for particular styles of explanation, from sectoral interests to government institutions to ideational clusters. Few seemed intent on establishing a new dominant paradigm that would render illegitimate alternative research programs. A broad if rough-and-ready agreement on what constitutes "science" in international relations was apparent.

Into this healthy confusion stepped two new challengers that did not fit the old and often poorly defined contenders of realism, liberalism, or Marxism (or their more refined descendants). The appearance of these newest contenders represented the unearthing of some of the buried elements in the history of international relations and also the injection of European social theory into an increasingly Americanized and remarkably parochial field. Although Robert O. Keohane grouped these critics of the neorealist consensus as reflectivist, their numbers included at least two tendencies: a more radical group of critics that centers its attacks on questions of method and epistemology (the postmoderns) and a second group (the sociologists) that does not question the scientific enterprise of the field (whatever its qualms about positivist methodology) but does reject the individualist and state-centric premises of both neorealism and neoliberalism.

The postmoderns and their onslaught on the scientific pretensions of international relations represent the revenge of classical realism on its neorealist heirs. Postmoderns such as Richard Ashley transform an irrationalism and critical stance derived from the European origins of realism into a profound skepticism about scientific claims. Although the affirmative postmoderns (as labeled by Pauline Rosenau) may widen the scope of the field, unearthing the buried strands that were omitted in the writing and rewriting of our short history, one can predict that the postmoderns will fail in their effort to launch a third great debate for two reasons.[88] Postmodernism rejects the totalizing claims of mainstream theory. Therefore, any great debate would be one in which one side refuses to win and also refuses to accept defeat. An intellectual guerrilla war is the most that can be expected. More important, despite frequent theoretical importations into international relations, professionalization over five decades has erected formidable barriers to imports from the humanistic disciplines. The postmoderns must win converts from among individuals who are self-selected and self-defined as social scientists, whatever their methodological choices. Few are likely to forgo that identity for the unsatisfying toil of postmodern analysis,

an analysis that proudly rejects the claims of scientific certainty in favor of an interpretive stance.

If the postmoderns represent a challenge to the scientific pretensions of international relations, another group, the sociologists, take on its current individualist and state-centric premises. Their criticism centers in part on the narrow neoliberal definition of international institutions as an expression of exogenously defined state interests. At least in the case of "fundamental" institutions, the sociologists argue that institutions constitute states and their practices; such institutions are "preconditions for sovereign states and meaningful state action rather than consciously chosen artifacts."[89] Although this view of institutions and their constitutive character parallels that in contemporary sociology, particularly the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens and the new institutionalism of John Meyer, it also recalls the neo-Grotian and traditionalist views that departed American international relations after the second great debate.[90]

Like the postmoderns, the sociologists work against strong investments within international relations. Even those skeptical of the more austere variants of neorealism tend to transfer more and more explanatory power to the level of domestic politics and thus move further away from the system-constituting image presented by the sociologists. The sociologists attempt a revival of system-level theorizing at a moment when most in the field have lost interest in previous systemic projects.

Explaining Theoretical Evolution in International Relations

A Kuhnian model of scientific revolution bears no resemblance to the evolution of theory in international relations. Neorealists proudly trace their origins to classical Greece—revolution is hardly the dominant metaphor for theoretical change in the field. Paradigms do not topple and destroy older foes, although the ability of realism to bury the record of interwar idealism would come close to the Kuhnian model if international relations had existed as a well-defined field at that time. Instead, the history of the field demonstrates the rise and fall of theoretical alternatives over time, according to a rhythm that is often driven by international events: Realism increases its appeal and extends its research program during moments of international insecurity; its critics extend their arguments during moments of relative international stability (in this history, during the 1920s, the 1960s, and perhaps the 1990s).

Even a crude internal account of theoretical development that begins with theoretical variation and proposes a model of testing, selection, and revision in the face of anomalies hardly matches the post-1945 history that

has been described. Initial theoretical variation and innovation has by some measures been excessive: As Holsti noted, there are incentives for apparent innovation in international relations and other American social sciences; grand and middle-range theories proliferate. From another perspective, there has been relatively little genuine innovation, since so much theorizing has centered on realism and liberal and Marxist critics of realism.[91]

Rather than occurring within professional confines, theoretical selection has been influenced at times by external events and the context of the field. Some theories have been buried and others privileged, not by careful tests internal to the discipline but by apparent anomalies thrown up by recent history. The importance of "current events" anomalies gives the development of the field a peculiar volatile quality: Rather than confronting anomalies in the broad stretches of international history that remain unexamined, theoretical "testing" occurs in a random and often surprising fashion.

Finally, the field has also been driven by anxiety about its professional self-definition and concern over its boundaries and membership. These concerns were particularly acute before the field was firmly implanted in political science, but they remain today in the uneasy relationship between the scholarly community and foreign-policy practitioners. Demand from the world of practitioners undoubtedly strengthened the theoretical hold of realism in the immediate postwar years, although policymakers often chose one set of realist recommendations and ignored others (as both George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau discovered). During and after the Vietnam War, however, scholarly and policy worlds drifted apart. Academics became averse to reputations as pundits; policymakers found scholarly theorizing beside the point. This separation was a question of infrastructure (for example, the rise of the Washington think tanks); it was also grounded in the insecurity of university specialists. An easy flow across the boundaries between university and government might endanger the reserved skills and arcana that support professional standing in a field with blurred boundaries and uncertain membership.

Recent scholarship in international relations confirms these historical patterns and also carries suggestions of change. The end of the Cold War set off a predictable new round of rethinking within the field. Whatever the value of this theoretical ferment, one shrewd observer warned before the Cold War ended of "the tendency of academics in our field to develop theoretical innovations on the basis of recent diplomatic developments—even before these developments have assumed the character of long-term trends or patterns of behavior."[92] Increasingly, particularly among those investigating national policies, old realist and liberal labels are difficult to apply. Despite the challenge of the postmoderns, a broad consensus on what constitutes evidence and scientific technique has developed across methodological divides. The second great debate no longer rocks the field. Connections

to the study of comparative politics and political economy have been strengthened by the burst of research activity at the level of national policy, remedying a long-standing weakness in liberal, realist, and radical analysis. The relationship with other disciplines, which has often been characterized by indiscriminate borrowing, appears to rest on a more symmetric basis.

The other contributions to this volume are a strong demonstration of renewed theoretical innovation in the field, innovation that avoids old patterns and old labels. At the risk of reviving old conflicts, it may be said that the research agenda and dilemmas that confront international relations in the 1990s bear some resemblance to those of the 1920s, which was the last decade in this century when great-power conflict did not threaten. From many perspectives, the core concepts of international relations, particularly anarchy and sovereignty, are reexamined and questioned. Rather than erecting a sharp divide between international and domestic politics, anarchy is no longer seen as a unique province of interstate relations (particularly in an era of failed states and vicious ethnic strife). Sovereignty, the irreducible attribute of states, is given a more contingent and historically fluid character.[93] The sovereign territorial state becomes problematic and its dominance of international relations bears historical explanation. Pushed along by these theoretical developments and by strong interest in domestic political institutions, a unified politics may be in view, one that uses similar theoretical approaches and methodological tools to examine institutions and politics, whether international or domestic.[94] The ambitions of the Chicago school of Merriam and Lasswell are reborn. Finally, the material basis of global politics, particularly the advance of economic integration, receives renewed attention from researchers after years of neglect.

One dilemma of the interwar decades also remains for international relations scholars, and that is the field's relationship to politics and policy. Is there a role for political intervention beyond advising the prince? The cautions and skepticism of most postwar scholars may be ending. Nongovernmental organizations advancing the cause of human rights, the global environment, and equitable development are increasingly visible players in a redefined world politics. Scholars, on the model of the 1920s, are increasingly participant-observers, advancing changes that often run counter to state interests. Public intellectuals, virtually an extinct species by the 1980s, have reappeared; international relations may eventually reclaim the wider audience that it gave up in the post-1945 retreat to the academy.

This portrait of change and effervescence in international relations might be labeled progress without qualification were it not for two shortcomings in recent theorizing. One is the decline of system-level theory. Dependency theory and neoliberalism conceded this dimension of theory first, but structural realism has also failed to develop a convincing research program at this level of analysis.[95] The second is a persistent unwillingness, at least

since the rise of realism and science after 1945, to offer explanations of international change. As described earlier, realism was interested in explaining not change but rather enduring regularities, a feature adopted in the comparative statics of its more scientific descendent, neorealism. Its static quality was reinforced by the equilibrium analysis that characterizes many rational-choice and game-theoretic accounts. Liberalism, which often endorsed a progressive view of history, has been more confident of change, but, in the worst case, change was equated to vague hopes of progress or, in more analytically sound variants, was reduced to economic and political change within societies. Dependency theorists and other radical theorists accepted a broad, Marxist-inspired, and rather deterministic account of the sources of international change that required constant revision in the face of a slippery, chameleon-like capitalism.

The dynamic for international change may finally be sought at the level of developments within societies; the current turn toward second-image theorizing could be a healthy response to the overblown claims of past systemic theory. Before transforming international relations into a branch of comparative politics, however, it is worth considering whether international change can be adequately explained at the level of national politics and policy. Some link between system (however defined) and unit that couples relative analytical precision and dynamism, an engine that drives international change, is required. Two approaches at the center of research programs in other social sciences are possible candidates for this role. Neither is easily characterized by the old realist or liberal labels.

The first, which places more of the explanatory burden on the system, is an evolutionary theory of change in which variation and selection are the dynamic. An evolutionary theory requires very little information about units and very few assumptions, if any, about their behavior. Waltz's structural realism, rationalized and individualized by others, explicitly adopts selection as one of the key links between system and unit, and the only link that can explain change.[96] Unfortunately, Waltz himself and other neorealists have not extended this critical (and briefly remarked) feature of structural realism. Gilpin's neorealist alternative, with far more attention paid to the motivations and calculus of states, does introduce a selective mechanism of sorts as an explanation of change. As Stephan Haggard has pointed out, Gilpin's attention to changing comparative costs suggests a mechanism for explaining greater predisposition for states to change the system. One could push such arguments further in an evolutionary direction as well by arguing that the shifts in comparative costs favor (in terms of capabilities or economic development) certain societies over others. This type of reformulation offers only one systemic selector that may have explanatory value.[97]

A valuable research agenda could be constructed around an evolutionary model of international change, directed to explaining the scale and charac-

teristics of units in the system. Hendrik Spruyt and Charles Tilly have already offered quasi-evolutionary accounts of the emergence of the modern territorial state in the face of its institutional rivals. The question of scale of units is also an important one at a time when existing states are threatened with fragmentation: Does large or small scale carry with it particular selective advantages? Finally, the intensities themselves of selective pressures are an important subject for research. Since 1945 very few states have been selected out, despite the existence of microstates whose military and economic viability would have been in doubt in earlier systems. Identifying the selective pressures in earlier systems, their decline after 1945, and their apparent intensification in recent years (as many more states are threatened with disintegration) would constitute another line of investigation.

Evolutionary models of international change require few assumptions about state goals or strategies. Social learning models explain change by incorporating a much more active image of societies in relation to the international environment. The appeal of learning as a metaphor cannot disguise serious disagreements about the prerequisites of learning models and even the definition of learning itself.[98] Linking cognitive change or learning to particular changes in behavior (and eliminating alternative explanations for behavioral change) is only one empirical hurdle for models of learning. Models of social learning must also contend with the "level-of-learning" problem: If individual cognitive change is required for social learning to occur, individual change must be transferred to an organization; social and political learning requires embedding learning in more than one institution. This process of transfer is typically murky. Individual cognitive change may not be required; a process of political selection may choose one body of knowledge (and its bearers) "off the shelf," demoting its competitors. The dynamic then becomes one of political competition and influence, not cognitive change at the individual level. Finally, the depth and permanence of learning must be investigated. Peter Hall delineates first-order, second-order, and third-order learning to capture these differences.

The appeal of evolutionary or learning models may be enhanced by international events. Explanations for the end of the Cold War and the transformation and disintegration of the Soviet Union typically include both external competitive pressures and an internal process of learning.[99] Although social learning models are often associated with liberal approaches to international relations and evolutionary models with the selective and competitive images of realism, the association is neither necessary nor strong. These models may be compelling precisely because they lie outside the divide between liberal and realist. The end of the Cold War enhanced the security of most citizens of the world. If it produces a new surge of theoretical variation before the inevitable process of scientific selection, rather than another

swing in the cyclical predominance of the hoary theoretical contenders from the past, it will have fulfilled another, not insignificant promise.

Notes

I wish to thank Hayward Alker, Brian C. Schmidt, participants in the Australian National Research School of Pacific Studies seminar, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

1. For a genealogical account of self-images in international relations that stakes out this position, see Steve Smith, "The Self-images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory," in *International Relations Theory Today*, edited by Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 1–37.

2. Among such studies are John G. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Raymond Seidelman, *Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884–1984* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).

3. An externalist account of the hegemony of certain fields within political science was offered by Theodore J. Lowi in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association. "The State in Political Science: How We Became What We Study," *American Political Science Review* 86, 1 (March 1992):1–7.

4. One intriguing example of the way in which invented traditions shape behavior is given by the Maoris, who accepted "inaccurate" readings of their past by early Western investigators, incorporated those misreadings, and made those "traditions" their own. See also Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

5. See Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106, 3 (1977):41–60; K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1985), chapter 6; Miles Kahler, "International Relations: Still an American Social Science?" in *Ideas and Ideals: Essays on Politics in Honor of Stanley Hoffmann,* edited by Linda B. Miller and Michael Joseph Smith (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 395–414.

6. Even critics of realism often accept this stylized view of the field's development. See Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory," in *Conflict in World Society,* edited by Michael Banks (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984), pp. 3–21, and Jack Donnelly, "Realism and the Academic Study of International Relations," in *Political Science in History,* edited by James Farr, John S. Dryzek, and Stephen T. Leonard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 175–197.

7. Brian C. Schmidt argues forcefully for such an "internal discursive history" in "The Historiography of Academic International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 20, 4 (October 1994):349–367.

8. Schmidt, "Historiography," p. 362.

9. Schmidt contends that the "prehistory" of international relations (before World War I) is also important for understanding the interwar reaction against the juristic state as a central artifact of international relations. ("Lessons from the Past: A Reconsideration of the Great Debate Between Idealism and Realism" [paper presented at the Ninety-first Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31–September 3, 1995]).

10. For a highly selective lampooning of the idealists along these lines, see Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

11. Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (1909; reprint of 1911 edition, with an introduction by S. J. Stearns, New York: Garland Publishing, 1972), p. 44. On Angell and other economists writing at this time on the issue of war, see William J. Barber, "British and American Economists and Attempts to Comprehend the Nature of War," in *Economics and National Security: A History of Their Interaction,* edited by Craufurd D. Goodwin (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), and Jaap de Wilde, "Norman Angell: Ancestor of Interdependence Theory," in *Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics,* edited by James N. Rosenau and Hylke Tromp (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1989), pp. 13–30. John Mueller rehabilitates some of Angell's arguments in *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

12. *The Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), pp. 69–70.

13. "Blood and iron have been not only the historical instruments of every state for the assertion of its will among its neighbors, but they have been as well the instruments within the state by which political institutions have come into life and maintained themselves throughout the centuries." (James T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy* [New York: Garland Publishing, 1974], p. 9.)

14. Ibid., pp. 36–37. Shotwell's capsule summary of the significance of World War I as total war is excellent: "[I]t is not so significant that the war involved so many peoples as that it involved them so completely" (p. 34).

15. Ibid., pp. 27–28; James T. Shotwell, *On the Rim of the Abyss* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p. 42.

16. For an early statement of hope on the power of public opinion, see James Bryce, *International Relations* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1966), p. 264.

17. Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), p. viii.

18. William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now* (London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991), pp. 81, 69–70.

19. On this emigration and political theory, John G. Gunnell comments that the émigrés were "in sharp conflict with the values of American social science." (*The Descent of Political Theory,* p. 185.

20. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904–1932," in *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans Morgenthau,* edited by Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers (Washington, DC: New Republic Book Company, 1977), pp. 1–17.

21. Morgenthau's antiliberal and antirational stance is clearest in *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946): "Our civiliza-

tion assumes that the social world is susceptible to rational control conceived after the model of the natural sciences, while the experiences, domestic and international, of the age contradict this assumption" (p. 2).

22. Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 180–181.

23. Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, p. xiii.

24. On the importance of Merriam in efforts to construct a "science of politics" in the 1920s, see Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 110–113.

25. William T.R. Fox, "Pluralism, the Science of Politics, and the World System," *World Politics* 27, 4 (July 1975):597–611. See also Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau, *Journeys Through World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 237. Brian C. Schmidt notes in "Lessons from the Past" the reaction of these protopluralists against the earlier concentration within political science on the juristic theory of the state.

26. Kenneth W. Thompson, "Philosophy and Politics: The Two Commitments of Hans J. Morgenthau," in *Truth and Tragedy*, ed. Thompson and Myers, p. 24. Thompson notes that although Quincy Wright did not oppose Morgenthau they were not close, and that Morgenthau's chief supporters were not to be found among his faculty colleagues in the department of political science (pp. 22–23).

27. Edith E. Ware, ed., *The Study of International Relations in the United States: Survey for 1934* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), pp. 12–13.

28. For an account of Shotwell's work with the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Social Science Research Council's Advisory Committee on International Relations, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, see Harold Josephson, *James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975), pp. 99–115, 188–193.

29. The Yale Institute of International Studies was founded in 1935; similar research centers were founded around the same time at Princeton and Johns Hopkins Universities.

30. The emphasis on "intelligent planning" was pervasive in this era. John Foster Dulles, for example, argued (along lines strikingly parallel to E. H. Carr) that planning and accommodation with the "energy" of Japan, Germany, and Italy could have reduced the possibility of violence later. (*War, Peace, and Change* [1939; reprint with an introduction by Charles Chatfield, New York: Garland Publishing, 1971], pp. 143–147, 155).

31. Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, pp. 463–467; Somit and Tanenhaus, *Development of American Political Science*, pp. 117–118.

32. Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), pp. 4–5.

33. See Fox's harsh review, "Interwar International Relations: The American Experience," *World Politics* 2, 1 (October 1949):67–79. Fox's review is in turn cited by Dwight Waldo, *Political Science in the United States* (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), pp. 55–56. The loop was then closed when Fox misquoted Waldo, stating that "genuine 'anti-realists' are hard to find," in William T.R. Fox and Annette

Baker Fox, "The Teaching of International Relations Research in the United States," *World Politics* 13, 3 (April 1961):343.

34. Waldo, *Political Science*, p. 56.

35. Novick, *That Noble Dream*, p. 332.

36. William T.R. Fox, "E. H. Carr and Political Realism: Vision and Revision," *Review of International Studies* 11, 1 (January 1985):7.

37. Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 470.

38. On American interpretations of Ranke, see Novick, *That Noble Dream*, pp. 27–29; on the Americanization of political science, see Somit and Tanenhaus, *Development of American Political Science*, pp. 87–88; on "pragmatic meliorism," see William T.R. Fox, "A Middle Western Isolationist-Internationalist's Journey Toward Relevance," in *Journeys Through World Politics*, ed. Kruzel and Rosenau, pp. 239–240.

39. John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

40. Quincy Wright, "Realism and Idealism in International Politics," *World Politics* 5, 1 (October 1952):116–128.

41. Harold Lasswell, "Introduction," in *Dynamics of International Relations,* edited by Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. xix.

42. One example of postwar idealism is Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, *Power Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954). On weariness with the great debate, see Waldo, *Political Science*, p. 61.

43. Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propoganda?" *World Politics, 5*, 4 (July 1953): 442–447.

44. On this issue, see Christopher Hill, "1939: The Origins of Liberal Realism," *Review of International Studies* 15, 4 (October 1989):319–328.

45. John Gange, *University Research on International Affairs* (Washington, DC: American Council on Education, 1958), p. 112; Claude E. Hawley and Lewis A. Dexter, "Recent Political Science Research in American Universities," *American Political Science Review* 46, 2 (June 1952):113.

46. Olson and Groom, *International Relations Then and Now*, pp. 96–97.

47. Stephen Krasner makes this point in "Fortune, Virtue, and Systematic Versus Scientific Inquiry," in *Journeys Through World Politics*, ed. Kruzel and Rosenau, pp. 417–428.

48. Novick, *That Noble Dream*, p. 332.

49. *Institutes and Their Publics* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1953), p. 97.

50. Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950).

51. According to John Gange: "[I]t seems that value-directed research focused on preserving peace and preventing war will be less than effective (and hence ought to have a lower priority) until the basic elements of international affairs and human conduct have been more adequately explored." (Gange, *University Research*, p. 128).

52. On the unwillingness of international relations theorists to discuss the range of choice, see Fox, "E. H. Carr and Political Realism," p. 10.

53. Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, p. 388.

54. The principal exchange of arguments is included in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). On the rise of behavioralism in political science, see Somit and Tanenhaus, *Development of American Political Science*, pp. 183–201.

55. Somit and Tanenhaus, *Development of American Political Science*, pp. 186–187.

56. Marion Levy, "'Does It Matter If He's Naked?' Bawled the Child," in *Contending Approaches*, ed. Knorr and Rosenau, pp. 87–109, quotation on p. 106.

57. On neo-Grotianism and the problems with Bull's rendition of it, see A. Claire Cutler, "The 'Grotian Tradition' in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 17, 1 (January 1991):41–65; on connecting Bull to the study of "fundamental" international institutions, see Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s,* edited by Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989).

58. Hedley Bull, "International Relations Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," in *Contending Approaches*, ed. Knorr and Rosenau, p. 37.

59. For an excellent critical account of the successive waves of deterrence theory, see Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* 31, 2 (January 1979):289–324.

60. The methodology and assumptions of deterrence theory could point in different policy directions, of course, spawning alliances or divisions within the community of strategists. On this question, see Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization* 46, 1 (Winter 1992):109–124.

61. On the peace research movement, see Peter Wallensteen, ed., *Peace Research: Achievements and Challenges* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).

62. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert O. Keohane describe their own feeling that the field of international organization had failed to grapple with these changes, spurring the project that produced a seminal volume in international political economy, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). Other key early contributions included C. Fred Bergsten and Lawrence B. Krause, eds., *World Politics and International Economics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975); Richard Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1968); and Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

63. Edward Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Free Press, 1976), especially chapter 5.

64. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).

65. Novick, *That Noble Dream,* pp. 445–455.

66. Robert Jervis explicitly calls into question assumptions of unmediated systemic compulsion on states as well as the "deterrence" model of the Cold War in

Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Graham Allison introduced organizational process and bureaucratic politics models in *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972).

67. On the sources of developmental pessimism among dependency theorists, see Joseph L. Love, "The Origins of Dependency Analysis," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22, 1 (February 1990):154–157.

68. Joseph A. Kahl, *Three Latin American Sociologists* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 136.

69. Love, "Origins of Dependency Analysis," p. 167.

70. Among the indicators of this wide acceptance was a special issue of *International Organization* [32, 1 (Winter 1978)] devoted to dependency theory.

71. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*, pp. 87–89, 100. It should be noted that Holsti's sample included only texts published before 1981.

72. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979). Surprisingly, Robert O. Keohane, a leading neoliberal, was one of those who endorsed a modified structural realist approach as the core for a research program in international relations. See "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in *Neorealism and Its Critics,* edited by Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 158–203.

73. See, for example, John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983).

74. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "*Power and Interdependence* Revisited," *International Organization* 41, 4 (Autumn 1987):737.

75. Peter Evans, a leading North American interpreter of dependency theory, has both contributed to and commented on these developments. See *Dependent Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); "After Dependency: Recent Studies of Class, State, and Industrialization," *Latin American Research Review* 20 (1985):149–160; and "Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia: Lessons for Latin Americanists," in *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism,* edited by Frederick Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 203–226.

76. On the addition of rational-actor foundations, see Keohane, "Theory of World Politics," pp. 40, 46.

77. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics*, 40, 2 (January 1988); Richard W. Mansbach, "The Realists Ride Again: Counterrevolution in International Relations," in *Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics*, ed. Rosenau and Tromp, p. 220.

78. Robert G. Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (London: Allen Lane, 1973).

79. Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1975).

80. Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*, p. 473.

81. On the think tanks, see I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), and R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 22, 3 (September 1989):563–578.

82. An excellent summary of this debate is provided in David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

83. The philosopher Michael Ruse has noted that "[t]oo frequently the term [paradigm] is used as a propaganda tool, bolstering the pretensions of some supposed major breakthrough. Paradigm founder today. Nobel Prize winner tomorrow. Burial at Westminster Abbey the day after that." "Is the Theory of Punctuated Equilibria a New Paradigm?" in *The Dynamics of Evolution,* edited by Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 139.

84. Of course, some could find, even in the end of the Cold War, a likely return to older, realist patterns of international behavior; see, for example, John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, 15, 1 (Summer 1990):5–56. More typical were claims that the Cold War's end forced a rethinking of international relations theory.

85. For a more optimistic, though critical, assessment, see David Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" *International Studies Quarterly* 37, 4 (December 1993):459–489.

86. For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

87. For example, Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

88. Pauline Marie Rosenau, *Post-modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

89. Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in *Global Changes*, ed. Czempiel and Rosenau, p. 54.

90. For a summary of the institutionalist research program in sociology, see Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism and Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

91. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline*, pp. 130–131.

92. Ibid., p. 131.

93. Two examples of such questioning from a constructivist and a neorealist, respectively are: Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992):391–425; Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," *International Security* 20, 3 (Winter 1995/1996):115–151.

94. One enterprise of this kind, based on a strategic-choice approach, is David Lake and Robert Powell, *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).

95. One recent effort to revise structural realism and incorporate a broader notion of system is Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

96. The other link is socialization, which explains the persistence of behaviors, not their change.

97. A further elaboration of evolutionary models is provided in Miles Kahler, "Evolution, Choice, and International Change," in *Strategic Choice and International Relations,* ed. David Lake and Robert Powell, (forthcoming).

98. For recent examples of such models, see Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41, 3 (Summer 1987):371–402; Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship," *Comparative Politics* 24, 3 (April 1992):273–292; and Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," *Comparative Politics* (forthcoming).

99. See, for example, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," *Review of International Studies* 17, 3 (July 1991):225–250.