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Regulating the Body and the Body Politic American Sport, Bourgeois Culture, and the Language of Progress, 1880–1920

MARK DYRESON

Historians have charted the economic, technological, and social forces that transformed the nineteenth-century United States and challenged the republican tradition and bourgeois notions of order. By the late nineteenth century the old universe of bourgeois history and myth had disappeared. New technologies of social production, new forms of corporate and capitalist organization, new modes of market relations, and new political realities at the local, national, and international levels had destroyed the imagined "self-balancing" world of the old middle classes and brought bourgeois culture to a crisis that threatened its very existence.¹

Confronted with visions of disorder, American elites and middle classes transformed themselves and expanded their powers. Emerging new middle classes and their elite allies, committed to a historical conception of themselves as the foundation of the American republic, tried to choose a path through formidable obstacles and reconcile the revolutionary implications of technical civilization with the values and cultural logic they had inherited from their social ancestors. They demanded a national culture committed to their visions of progress. They sought to republicanize the processes of industrialization and urbanization, control and mold other social classes, and win the struggle to define modernity. They gave their national culture a dynamic if not always consistent logic, which they championed as universal and progressive.²

In an attempt to return to some semblance of balance, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American bourgeois culture turned to the regulation of body and mind through organized athletics in an effort to exert control over the processes of history. From the symbol of the well-regulated and disciplined body and mind of the archetypal athlete, bourgeois spokespersons soon spun new explanations and defenses of a well-regulated body politic—a

modern civilization that balanced corporate and social needs through the gospel of fair play.

"Few people realize how great is the part played by sport in the life of a nation," surmised Price Collier in an 1898 essay entitled "Sport's Place in the Nation's Well-Being." "Most of us think of the hour or two spent at some form of exercise as a pastime which has little or no bearing upon the political life about us," he asserted. But Collier argued that such a perception was drastically flawed. The sporting life, he insisted, produced precisely the type of citizen needed for national and individual success in the revolutionary conditions that characterized modern life. "It was no mere epigram of the Iron Duke about the playing fields of Eton, and Waterloo," Collier proclaimed. "There was a direct connection, just as there is a direct connection between that hardy, plain-living family of Deweys from Vermont, and Manila," he continued, heralding the hero of the American victory over the Spanish fleet in the 1898 war over Cuba, and implicating athletics as a key factor in the emergence of the United States onto the world stage near the beginning of the twentieth century.³

Collier's connection of the "hardy, plain-living" American folk to the practice of the "strenuous life" indicated an important innovation in American political culture. With increasing frequency during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, social commentators identified modern athletic practice with the production and reproduction of a national culture in the United States—a national culture modeled on the bourgeois norms of an emerging and self-conscious new middle class. Sport, in the hands of the architects of the new athletic ideology, was championed as an integral part of any modern and progressive nation's "well-being."

Who were the inventors of the sporting republic? Journalists, politicians, educators, social reformers, and scientists—they fit neatly into the ranks of the self-styled progressive elites who were determined to lead the new middle class in an efficient and, they hoped, painless shift from entrepreneurial to corporate capitalism. Boosters of the sporting republic dotted the progressive spectrum: Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Jane Addams and Jacob Riis, William James and G. Stanley Hall, Edward Ross and Simon Patten. They made sport a part of their language of progress, constructing a sporting republic around a set of symbols, ideas, and institutions that promoted organized athletics as an essential social force in their struggle to shape modernity. In scientific and technical studies of social problems, in political discourse, in educational theory, and in the daily constructs of the new mass media, the sporting republic represented both a political and a cultural ideal and a defin-

ition of the American role in the world. The founding fathers and mothers of the sporting republic insisted that modern nations should employ the regulation and training of body and mind through organized athletics for the production of civic virtue and national vitality.⁴

Organized athletics lent itself to the discourse on the nature of progress since at crucial semiotic junctures political and athletic culture overlapped. Fair play, competition, regulation: as social scientists like Ross used the metaphor of a game to describe the social "rules" of human interaction and politicians like Roosevelt employed the concept of sportsmanship in programs for reshaping the political economy, the symbology of the playing field increasingly shaped American perceptions of the patterns of modernity.⁵

The ideology of physical culture promulgated by Price Collier in articles like "Sport's Place in the Nation's Well-Being" and "The Ethics of Ancient and Modern Athletics" typified the new athleticism that linked the "strenuous life" to the reproduction of middle-class values, the realization of republican political ideals, and the creation of a virtuous citizenry. Indeed, Collier, with an optimism that rivaled the extravagant claims of patent-medicine salesmen, asserted that the creed of the sporting republic would steel its citizens to meet the challenges faced by the United States as it entered the twentieth century: "We have our colonies to govern; we have the poison of the fierce lust of money, for which a wholesome antidote should be provided; we have the rude jostling of the self-advertising social strugglers to beware of; we have in our midst the disease of political corruption, for which a remedy is sorely needed; we have a powerful press to tame; we have the fads in religion and in morals . . . to meet and vanquish; and, though we are taking matters rather gayly in these days of our youth and prosperity, it needs no prophet to foresee that our Hercules will need some hard training to accomplish all his labors successfully."⁶

Of course hard training, one form of the work ethic, was no stranger to the middle-class value system. But corporate capitalism and mass society had altered patterns of work and destroyed the traditional order of economy and society. The relationship of play, games, and sport to civic life attracted a host of commentators and the attention of the American bourgeois in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁷ Reconciled to the specialization required by industrialism, the new middle classes increasingly located their hopes for an egalitarian realm of social life in leisure, rather than in work. The "amusement problem" soon consumed the attention of social scientists and moral reformers, taking its place next to the "trust problem," the "labor problem," and other maladies of modernism perplexing bourgeois minds.

That perspective made the organization of leisure a central task in the drive to construct a national culture. "The things we do, when we do what we please, are vitally related not only to health, but also to morality, and the whole development of the finer self," proclaimed pioneering play theorist Luther Halsey Gulick to the members of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.⁸

In the formulations of Gulick and like-minded boosters of athleticism, the mere winning of one's daily bread, the drudgery of labor, had been rendered insufficient for making the complete person. Work became a restricted realm, required by modern conditions.⁹ "When released from the daily work, the mill we have to tread in order to live, then we strive to become what we would be if we could," surmised Gulick. Play became an arena for pursuing ideals, a fulcrum for building character, an avenue for inculcating ethics. In modern society, claimed Gulick, leisure had become a mass, rather than an aristocratic, reality. That fact, he claimed, was the truly revolutionary consequence of the industrial revolution. "The world has never before seen such equality of opportunity and the possibilities latent in this fact are stupendous," he declared.¹⁰ The ideology of the sporting republic reordered the political understandings of leisure and work in important ways. No longer did the "chosen people" labor in the earth; now they played in green fields.

The Hercules, to use Price Collier's term, which the boosters of the sporting republic promised would be spawned by a national conversion to the gospel of the strenuous life, faced a republic under siege by what appeared from many perspectives to be a host of threats. The new middle class that surged to the forefront of American civilization during the Progressive Era shared a commonality that had as much to do with acceptance of a constellation of ideas and beliefs as with similarities in its relation to the mode of production. As Loren Baritz indicated in a recent study of American bourgeois culture, "Becoming middle class required some accumulation of goods and resources of course. But an altered frame of reference was even more important."¹¹

The new middle class included in its frame of reference a historical role as the backbone of the American republic—and, indeed, of all republics and liberal forms of government in the history of Western civilization. *The Independent*, one of the great oracles of middlebrow sentiment in American life, argued that "many of the most important social habits, a great part of the stock which breeds the leaders of intellectual and practical life, and to a great extent that sound habit of mind which leads men to devote themselves to excellent work rather than to sacrifice all other considerations for money rewards, are identified with the middle class."¹² In such a formulation, quite common in progressive commentary, the middle class, unlike the selfish and

self-absorbed capitalist and labor interests, became both the "public" that manifested interest in the whole of the commonwealth and the cornerstone of moral civilization. Indeed, an editorial in *The Dial* on "The Middle Class Mind," which on one level condemned bourgeois taste and sentiment, also proclaimed that "the mechanism of society needs a 'governor' to save it from being torn to pieces by its internal energies, and this controlling influence is supplied by the middle class mind."¹³

The public, understood by most progressives in these middle-class terms, served as the congregation to which the "ministers of reform" preached their semi-secularized gospels of progressivism, and the group toward which social technologies that promised, like sport, the creation of a modern republican virtue were aimed. In such a climate social reformers easily transmuted their particular historical values into what they thought were universal values, and prescribed their brand of athleticism as a tonic for producing a classless and harmonious civilization. The vitalistic national culture that the advocates of the new athleticism promised would unite traditional and modern cultural patterns had immense appeal in an era of rapid change, when, as *The Independent* warned, "the middle class of today is by no means the middle class of yesterday," and the middle class of tomorrow faced extinction.¹⁴

The roots of the sporting republic lay in the same complex of factors that had given rise to the new middle class. The emergence of modern sport coincided with the transformation of American society by successive waves of industrialism. Peter Levine has charted the appearance in antebellum America of the conception of sport as a tool for revitalizing a society that seemed to be fracturing as modernizing forces threatened the foundation of the republican experiment—a seemingly constant, and historically well-founded, lament in republican jeremiads. Child-guidance advisers, health reformers, and Muscular Christians preached—in particular to an urban, middle-class audience—the necessity of athleticism for both individual self-improvement and national survival in an increasingly artificial world. The image of George Washington as an athletic founding father and the popular conception of Andrew Jackson as the personification of activist vigor stood as the symbols of the pre-Civil War connections between strenuousness and political virtue.¹⁵

From its roots in the antebellum reform movements that addressed the fears and hopes of the new bourgeois elements in American society, the sporting republic emerged forcefully in the late nineteenth century as the national bureaucratic structures that characterized corporate capitalism came increasingly into view and the urbanized, industrialized, professionalized middle class became increasingly self-conscious and powerful. The new economic structures created a curious conflict in bourgeois culture, in particular

amongst their progressive political leaders and theorists. They worshiped the material plenitude and comfortable lifestyles that the machine process promised, but they feared the commercial and artificial directions in which their world appeared to be heading. The new middle-class intellectuals, as they transformed the *laissez-faire* assumptions of classical economic philosophy and decried Adam Smith's invisible hand as a false God, increasingly identified an overly commercial spirit as a fundamental social evil.

Indeed, their fears of a bourgeoisie simplified into base economic creatures and cast adrift in a Hobbesian polity by modern capitalist forces predated the forceful critique of the modern spirit made by Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.¹⁶ Beneath their willing acceptance of progress and the corporate order lurked an uncontrolled fear that blurred for them the lines between social control and social justice.¹⁷ Progressives, middle-class champions of classlessness, argued that the selfish trusts and labor unions that threatened social war suffered from overly acquisitive and hypercompetitive sentiment, and worried about the infection spreading to the middle-class "public." In their search for ways to control the energies of modernization, they invented the sporting republic.¹⁸

As the progressives redefined the categories of competition, individualism, and regulation and sought to invent a new republicanism for controlling the economic and political conditions of the new order, the new sporting experts redefined athleticism. Modern sport, in progressive theories, offered a way to preserve competition and channel individual talent into socially efficient action. A society organized around industrial and corporate enterprise required the welding of individual striving to group effort. "Unselfishness must be practiced at every turn," preached athletic advocate Francis Tabor in an 1899 sermon on the conduct of true sport. "The strong must help the weak; and the weak must be aroused, that they may not be a drag upon the strong."¹⁹ That same social vision could be found in Lester Ward's sociology or Herbert Croly's political science.²⁰ The imagery of community employed by the new social scientists to explode the precepts of classical *laissez-faire* models and their derivatives in the cult of social Darwinism also found frequent display in the literature of the sporting republic. Theodore Roosevelt was unsurpassed in his mastery of the sporting sermonette. He resorted to such imagery frequently in his parables to his political congregation, urging the channeling of individual vitality toward the commonweal.²¹

The boosters of the sporting republic argued that the work ethic, innovation, and perseverance were rewarded on the playing field. But the energy expended in pursuit of excellence required subjugation to the needs of the

group in team sports, or to the demands of the event in individual competition. The same dynamic tension between individual energy and group stability forms the basic problem in republican political theory—the need to discover the proper balance between the individual and the community, between liberty and authority. The rigorous competition on the playing field was not, in the progressive conception, the brutal combat of the struggle for survival but the socially accepted striving for common goals. Indeed, John Corbin described sport as an antidote to Darwinian forces. "The bare struggle for existence exacts strength and masterhood," he wrote, "but to live in the fair name of a sportsman it is necessary to rise to spiritual heights."²²

The transcendental properties of athletics captured the attention of the professional, technical, and managerial leaders of the corporate order as they embraced the machine process and the new business dynamic, but at the same time the potential for an excessively artificial and "inauthentic" commercial civilization repelled them. T. J. Jackson Lears's conception of the antimodern features of the cultural patterns created by the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century American bourgeoisie offers important insights into the nature of modern sport.²³ The modernization paradigm employed to explain the characteristics of modern sport by Allen Guttman, Melvin Adelman, and others, while useful at some levels, does not come to grips with the hopes and fears that the new middle class brought to the practice of athletics. Guttman argues forcefully for the secular quality of modern—as opposed to traditional or classical—physical culture, theorizing that more recent versions of athleticism are "not related to some transcendent realm of the sacred."²⁴ But the ideology of the sporting republic was clearly related to the Christian—and, in particular, the evangelical Protestant—theology that informed the political and social outlook of the new middle class. As denominationalism and sectarianism, scientism and pragmatism increasingly eroded the cultural force of organized religion, the preservation of Protestant ideals and ethics through the process of what Robert Crunden calls "innovative nostalgia" transformed the Puritan ethic into a this-worldly struggle to engineer the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.²⁵ Morality, long the concern in an older America of local churches and congregations, found a regularized and nationalized conduit for transmitting religiously derived precepts to the middle-class public through the structures of the sporting republic.

Paeans to the moral power of sport, like the Reverend A. E. Colton's "What Football Does," appeared regularly in the Progressive Era popular press. Colton, field agent of the American Bible Society for the New England States, celebrated the education and training that his son received on Boston

High's football team, and stressed the virtues created by a devotion to the strenuous life. Patience, obedience, self-denial, self-control, submergence of self, alertness, the bigness of trifles, endurance, the joys of victory and the sorrows of defeat, courage, cleanliness, scholarship, and, finally, physical perfection—a litany of middle-class values—derived from football, the Reverend thought. "F. B. comes out of the season in prime condition for the hardest kind of tackling and protracted endeavor with languages, physics and mathematics," proclaimed Colton. "Thus we gladly pay our tribute to the great game which is doing so much for developing our young men physically and morally, preparing them for the hard grinding battles of coming days." Colton strikingly avoided direct references to religion, which were rife in the typical expressions of Muscular Christianity, yet his witnessing for the republican virtues produced by football blurred the line between the sacred and the secular. Clearly, he felt that football transcended the realm of the playing field, and taught important lessons for the conduct of life in a competitive world. His essay indicates the increasing appropriation of religious symbolism for secular situations, and the modernist warping of the distinction between the sacred and the profane.²⁶

Perhaps the clearest expression of the transcendently modern faith in sport was Princeton professor William Milligan Sloane's history of the ancient and modern Olympics. Indeed, the modern Games are, to use Lears's terminology, perhaps the ultimate example of the misappropriation of symbols for antimodernist purposes in the modern sporting world. Sloane, the original prophet of Olympic idealism in America, a compatriot of Baron Pierre de Coubertin, and the organizer of the first American Olympic expedition to Athens in 1896, contended in his interpretation of classical antiquity that "Greek civilization imposed itself upon the central world by an irresistible moral compulsion." The professor hypothesized that "no single factor so contributed to create this moral force as the Olympic Games."²⁷ Sloane argued that the modern Olympics had created the same moral force in the twentieth century that he imagined the classical Olympics had created in the ancient world. "The field therefore of the Olympic idea is not merely sportive and social, it is educational and sociological as well," he wrote. "The intercourse of athletes and their friends makes for reciprocal good will and international peace: but in its largest aspect the idea makes for the general uplift and personal purity of untold millions."²⁸ Sloane's use of language like "sociological" in conjunction with his faith in the transcendental power of Olympism illustrates the innovatively nostalgic thought-forms that underpinned progressivism. Virtue increasingly became the province of sociology rather than theology, and the paradoxes of mixing symbolic forms multiplied.

Of course, virtue and its production, as well as corruption and the battle to prevent it, had long been a stock theme in republican theorizing. The architects of the sporting republic promised that athletics would preserve American civilization from the selfishness of both the plutocrats and the labor radicals, from the increasing artificiality of life and "nervous" exhaustion, from the cities and decadence, and from non-republican ideologies. They also promised that a strenuous life would protect the nation against the usual litany of modern problems: crime and street gangs, illicit sex, alcohol and drug abuse, irresoluteness, and vice of all kinds. Thus the production of a modernized version of civic virtue became one of the key provisions of the sporting republic's constitution.

"A boy who learns to lie and cheat and to deal in subterfuge in football and baseball . . . will follow the same methods in business or professional life when he gets out into the world," admonished Caspar Whitney in an 1897 codification of the athletic ideal. "On the contrary, a boy who learns by his athletic life to do everything he can honorably to win, but to submit cheerfully to defeat rather than indulge in trickery and meanness, will carry the same spirit in all his recreation and work in after life."²⁹ Whitney recognized what athletic idealists, with the exception of many of the members of the American collegiate athletic establishment, have long admitted: that sport can be misused and perverted.

Still, Whitney and his compatriots had great faith in the power of athletic institutions. Progressive leaders and the middle-class public connected the sporting republic to education and social reform. Francis Tabor argued that athletics was the essential ingredient in a "moral education," and that a teacher could only truly inspire young charges when the lecturer was traded for the playing field. There, with the artificial barriers of the classroom removed, teachers could lead by example rather than "precept," and build character through pragmatic lessons. When the playing field became the center of the educational process, "manliness, energy, courage, endurance, all follow,—not because they are *said* to be good, but because they are *seen* to be good, and felt to be absolutely essential," insisted Tabor. "The code of honor among true sportsmen is so rigid that truth and fair-dealing become as important as a well-balanced bat or a sound ball."³⁰ Political and ethical concerns, read the sporting republic's creed, met on the playing field.

Price Collier summed up the virtuous implications of sport for the middle-class public. He claimed that athletics promoted "healthy democracy," and insisted that "every school-boy in these days is taught, not only by his masters, but by the overwhelming influence of schoolfellows, that he may succeed by fair means only." Collier felt that sport promoted healthy democracy by

teaching moral principles and a regard for justice "in days of commercial and social scrambling, when the Ten Commandments are mere rungs on the ladder of financial and social success." He considered it "something gained that thousands of our boys are being taught to play with all their might, to play fair, and to win, if they can. A lad who has ten years of such training can scarcely fail to retain something of that same spirit when he comes to take part in the real contests of life." Collier thought that athletic ethics were absolutely essential in the maintenance of American political culture: "Living in the richest and most unkempt country in the world, where standards are mostly tentative, and where the leveling of a democracy offers huge bribes to wealth, to notoriety, and to popularity, the man who holds that it is not everything to succeed, but that whatever happens he must continue his failures in good spirits, is well worth producing, even at the price, in time and money, of teaching him how to play his games."³¹

Such was the paradox of Collier's thought, making an argument against the overcommercialization of the American spirit by directing his logic toward the "cost" of preventive provisions. Cost, production, and efficiency contrasted with ethical considerations and the necessity of republican virtue. Such an ambivalence plagued the new middle classes as they attempted to adapt to, and to shape, the corporate order.³²

Well, how much does civic virtue cost? The dialectic between economic and moral motives was particularly evident in the public pronouncements and political career of Theodore Roosevelt. Although certainly not from a middle-class background himself, the patrician Roosevelt paradoxically led the new middle classes' seizure of American political culture. He tried, with curious logic, to mix his cost-benefit analysis of the new order—good trusts versus bad ones—with his romantic vision of nationalism and the will to power of the American people.³³

"Wealthy men who use their wealth aright are a great power for good in the community, and help to upbuild the material national prosperity which must underlie national greatness; but if this were the only kind of success the nation would be indeed poorly off," Roosevelt blustered. He placed the icons of the new middle class, the governors and servicers of the social order—statesmen, soldiers, sailors, explorers, historians, poets, and men of science—in a position much more essential to the "commonweal" than any "mere" businessman. Similar forms of "innovative nostalgia" helped to inform Roosevelt's peculiarly anticommercial corporate philosophy. Roosevelt's historicist sensibilities celebrated the republican tradition in typically middle-class fashion. Rome, in republican times, he much preferred to the Hellenistic

Greeks: the latter were too "mercenary"; the former were far more virtuous. He vigorously celebrated the American republican tradition, and worshiped the progressive demigod Abraham Lincoln. One of the founders of the sporting republic, Roosevelt made bodily vigor and the sporting life essential features of his neorepublican creed.³⁴

Roosevelt restated the classical idea of soundness in mind and body as the cornerstone of character building, arguing that republics required citizens of character in order to function and survive. Of course the equation between vigor and virtue was as old as the theory of republicanism in Western civilization. In the preindustrial world republicans had insisted that vigor and independence sprang from agrarian roots. They opposed the symbol of the healthy, moral yeoman farmer to the dissipated, venal city dweller. The republicans sought a middle ground between nature and artifice, a pastoral climate that would nurture physical, political, and moral strength.³⁵ Roosevelt, despite his nostalgia for the republicanism of tradition, was no mere reactionary. He believed that industrialism and the corporate economy offered an enticing future if the nostalgic features of republicanism could be preserved by progressive innovation. In his statist philosophy he imagined that "alike for the nation and the individual, the one indispensable requisite is character."³⁶ And, of course, he preached that the strenuous life produced the character required by modern political realities.

In the evolutionary and historical theories of modernity constructed by Roosevelt and contemporary prophets of progress, sport played a crucial role in preserving vitalistic and energetic modes of human action in forms that could be regulated and channeled toward the public good. Roosevelt and his fellow boosters of the sporting republic, like *Outing* editor and popular journalist Caspar Whitney, connected the sporting life to national vigor, and a lack of athletic institutions to national decadence and social malaise. The sporting republic's champions pointed to the nations that *fin de siècle* American perspectives generally regarded as despotic, decadent, and desperate—France, the perennial homeland of overcivilization in Anglo-American tradition; Spain, the country that the yellow press had by 1898 turned into the paradigm of Old World sloth and cruelty; and, of course, the "sick man" of China—as areas where the sporting life was conspicuously absent.³⁷

In Japan, Whitney discovered evidence that some Asians were more forward-looking than the dissolute Chinese. "It speaks highly of the sagacity of Japan's nineteenth century latter day sponsors that they should appreciate the peculiar need to Japan of implementing in her boys a taste for healthful and vigorous physical effort, so that when they grow to manhood there

should be a fresher and sturdier mental activity, with its corresponding elevation of ideals," noted Whitney in the course of a globe-trotting voyage of discovery in search of worldwide athletic practices. That Japan had taken what Whitney called "her progressive strides . . . one of the wisest features of modern civilization—athletics" confirmed for him the common assumption that the Japanese were on the correct path to modernity. As the United States moved toward the front rank of world powers, American commentators had decided that athletic culture was a necessary ingredient in the composition of modern states and looked to playing fields around the globe for confirmation of American ideas of power, race, and progress.³⁸

The American version of vitalism created by the architects of the sporting republic was designed to assuage fears that urban, industrial, and commercial forms of economy could lead, as the republican theorists in premodern conditions had always argued, to corruption, tyranny, and the extinction of rule by law. Would the new urban America inevitably suffer the same fate? Was the city still the symbol of evil? The mayor of Chicago, a young city in the early twentieth century whose mushrooming growth had come to symbolize agrarian fears of the death of traditional ways of life, told the nation that he had a method for making cities republican. "If it is desired that the next generation be a namby-pamby one then the boys and girls of to-day should leave athletics severely alone," warned Mayor Carter Harrison. "To neglect the body and train merely the mind is, in my judgment, little short of criminal. The time has come, in my opinion, when cities should officially recognize the absolute necessity for a broad and systematic plan of physical training for the children and youth of both sexes," argued Harrison, whose campaign promise to build more parks in Chicago had helped him gain office. He felt that "the neglect of this municipal duty in our American cities is really astounding," and urged, in the typical fashion of urban progressives, the creation of commissions of experts to advise America on how to best provide for the physical culture of its citizens.³⁹

Outing's editors portrayed an even more apocalyptic scenario. "Unless we can make bodily culture keep up with mind culture our civilization cannot possibly last," they warned. "From this point of view athletics are not the amusement of an idle hour—a way of killing a vacation—they are elemental duties, vital moral laws."⁴⁰ The vitalist doctrines of the sporting republic spoke to those in the new middle class most directly engaged in commerce. Modern athleticism, claimed William Frederick Dix, "is strengthening physically and broadening mentally these overworked American businessmen. It is

making them saner and better, cultivating their love of fair play and their interests in life." Dix imagined sport as a panacea for modern problems. "As we grow to be better citizens, we learn to ride straight and play fair and hit hard in life. The blood goes coursing through our veins with a new vigor, and the game of life becomes greater and finer and more worth the playing because we are learning the vast benefits of the manly and womanly idea of modern sport."⁴¹ And so the civic ethics of the new citizenship flowed from playing field and gymnasium into company office and corporate boardroom, or so read the manifestos of the sporting republic.

Athleticism, proclaimed the ideology of the sporting republic, produced manliness in men, womanliness in women—although there was much debate about what kinds of gender roles athletics prepared people for. The progressive historian Frederic L. Paxson argued that participation in sport had aided women in their effort to acquire the franchise.⁴² Other theorists, from less liberating perspectives, saw sport as an institution to breed healthy race bearers.⁴³ Price Collier, in rather chauvinistic terms, lumped the political virtues that sport produced under the heading of manliness and then announced: "If our more manly citizens could rule us, then, no doubt, we should be better off."⁴⁴ In the political culture of the Progressive Era, vigor and activism attracted votes and won elections. If sport built character in the public, why would the new middle class look to soft leaders? Theodore Roosevelt stood as proof of that political reality. The extremes between the robber barons and the proletariat that consumed so much attention helped camouflage the fact that the first decades of the twentieth century witnessed the triumph of the new middle class in political life. Roosevelt was the quintessential leader, in both the political and cultural realms, of the middle class's rise to power.⁴⁵

Roosevelt became the stock figure of the age of energy, the archetype of "muscular" executive leadership. A *New York Times* reporter once remarked, "ANDREW JACKSON could shoot as well and ride as well as Mr. ROOSEVELT but we doubt if he could have safely faced him with a tennis net between them," thereby elevating Roosevelt to the pinnacle of the list of vigorous presidents in American history.⁴⁶ After Roosevelt's election in 1904 to the office he had assumed after William McKinley's assassination, Caspar Whitney blustered from the "Sportsman's View-Point" to *Outing's* readers that Roosevelt had won the presidency not because Republicans elected him, but because "the clean-blooded, wholesome-minded, right-intended people of the country . . . sought the man rather than the elevation of the party." *Outing*, the foremost chronicle of the strenuous life in the turn-of-the-century

United States, commended the nation for choosing a chief executive who was "honest, and courageous, and virile," and committed to the visions of fair play that filled its pages.⁴⁷

But symbols in the political life of energy controlled and channeled toward socially productive ends through athletic endeavor came from both likely and unexpected sources. With the election of 1908 looming, the dynamo Roosevelt foresworn to abdicate his office, middle-class voters found in the unlikely person of 350-pound William Howard Taft a new figurehead for the sporting republic.

Taft, in William Allen White's campaign confessional, appeared as the archetype of the new middle class. Well off but not wealthy, a respected professional in the legal field, he became in White's rendition of his public career the typical American anti-aristocrat. "The independence of America is in that class," surmised White, "for the man who does not need a valet is not much awed by a king." White also believed that Taft was an important transitional figure between the old middle class and the new. "If Taft should be made President of this Republic he would never cease to be in the heart of him a stranger, a commuter, not of the city, with its crass wealth and biting poverty, nor of the country—but a suburban president, the first of his type." White thought Taft's suburbanism, his neopastoral origins, were a key to his leadership and character. Taft represented the "new type of American from the suburban community, who as a boy knew both swimminghole and pavement, who roamed the woods and fought the north-end gang, who was afraid of neither cows nor cars—that is a new type of man in American politics—a type that must become more and more prevalent as the country grows less and less rural and more and more urban."⁴⁸

Taft became, in White's hands, "a hewer of wood," a sturdy and active replacement for Rooseveltian strenuousness. But not only White, the Grand Old Party's vocal propagandist, thought that Taft would make a good leader for the sporting republic. On the eve of the election, *Outing* published a major essay implicitly endorsing Taft as the candidate to succeed Roosevelt. Entitled "Taft at Yale," Ralph D. Paine's article glorified the presidential candidate's character-building experiences at New Haven. "The Taft who ruled the Philippines, who made Cuba put her house in order, who said the right word at Panama, who was placed at the head of the War Department, who twice refused a seat on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, owes somewhat of his genius for doing the day's work with clear-sighted fairness to all men to the old Yale Fence and the democracy it inspired in all who lingered there," believed Paine.

The Yale Fence (the location of campus sporting life before organized athletics at Yale) symbolized the spirit of the playing field, rather than the classroom, at the ancient—by American standards—college. Paine recalled that the portly candidate had entered Yale as a strapping 225-pound freshman, and immediately earned the moniker "Solid Bill Taft." His cohorts at Yale included Walter Camp, future American Olympic Committee treasurer Julian W. Curtis, and the legendary rower Robert Cook. Although collegiate sport as it was known in 1908 did not really exist at the Yale of the late 1870s, Taft, in Paine's account, nevertheless excelled in the vigorous activities that enriched student life: the freshman "rush" against the sophomore class, the ritualized wrestling matches, and all the horseplay around the Fence. Paine and *Outing* thought Solid Bill Taft an adequate athletic replacement for Theodore Roosevelt, and a political leader who had imbibed deeply of the gospel of fair play.⁴⁹

It was in relation to the concept of fair play that the middle-class ideology of sport most clearly showed its connection to the political doctrines of progressive republicanism. The progressives hoped, in their naive fashion, that fair play would be transmitted from American playing fields into society at large, and they mistook their historical and cultural values for universal ethical principles.⁵⁰ They believed that the spirit of playing within the rules would apply not simply to sporting contests but to corporate endeavors, labor relations, commercial exchange, and the entire range of economic, social, and political processes that composed their historical environment.

"Let me mould the sports of my countrymen, and whomever frame their laws," quipped John Corbin in a bit of hyperbole typical of athletic boosters at the turn of the century.⁵¹ His outburst reflected both his faith in the power of sport to shape culture and the middle-class distrust of the contemporary legislative process that muckrakers and progressive gadflies had identified as seriously corrupted.⁵² His concern also reflected the analogical reasoning that related regulation of the body to regulation of the body politic, the rules and structures of modern athletic contests to the constitutionalism that underlay the American republican tradition.⁵³ That the Constitution and the enshrinement of the principles of rule by law provided equity for all citizens and factions was a central tenet of early-twentieth-century American political culture—in spite of Charles Beard's broadside into the myths that shrouded the American democratic faith.⁵⁴ As Woodrow Wilson put it during his bid for the presidency in 1912, he could easily solve American problems "if you will give me a fair field and as much credit as I am entitled to, and let the law do what from time immemorial law has been expected to do—see fair play."⁵⁵

The idea of life—its economic, political, and social features in particular—as a game, or games as representations of life, marked one of the central organizing principles of American thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁵⁶ From the Western novelist Owen Wister's cry "Let the best man win!" as the heart of the American creed to the sociologist Edward A. Ross's shorthand for the "scientific" understanding of social practice as "the rules of the social game," American thinkers used the language and imagery of the playing field to describe the workings of civil societies.⁵⁷ Laws and rules; legislators and referees; justice and fair play: the analogies indicated the structural levels at which the sporting republic connected the well-ordered body to the well-ordered body politic.

Woodrow Wilson was an especially deft weaver of athletic and political semiotics. "America was created to break every kind of monopoly and to set men free, upon a footing of equality, upon a footing of opportunity, to match their brains and their energies," he argued while running for president in 1912 in language that reduced the republican experiment to a sporting contest. "I know, and every man in his heart knows, that the only way to enrich America is to make it possible for any man who has the brains to get into the game. I am perfectly willing that they should beat any competitor by fair means; but I know the foul means they have adopted, and I know that they can be stopped by law," he asserted, reducing antitrust legislation to athletic jargon. "All the fair competition you choose, but no unfair competition of any kind," he promised the American electorate. "America stands for a free field and no favor," he shouted, determined to wed his ideology to the gospel of fair play.⁵⁸ Wilson, who was forced by the new corporate order to abandon the Jeffersonian world of free competition toward which he had led the nation in a nostalgic lust during the election of 1912 and to come to grips with new bureaucratic innovations, understood "regulated competition"—the capstone of the emerging consumer-based corporate economy—as "fair competition." His ideological confusion ironically helped adjust American attitudes to a new form of political republicanism that fused the antimodernism of his epoch into a new and "streamlined" liberal culture.⁵⁹

What was "sport's place in the nation's well-being"? If the question is viewed from a perspective that, as Clifford Geertz has advocated, conceives of social life as organized in terms of symbols, then from the vantage point of the American middle classes—and particularly the progressives who sought to define and represent their interests—the sporting republic had become a crucial institution in their struggle to regulate American civilization.⁶⁰ Once again, Woodrow Wilson leaves important clues. His 1911 speech to the first

National Conference on Civic and Social Center Development, a group committed to creating sites for athleticism, inculcation of progressive values, adult education, community involvement, and direct democracy, portrayed the progressive state as a team committed to common purpose. Liberty he saw in typically republican fashion: as the coordination of various interests into a communal whole, not by the classical method of an invisible hand or a self-regulating natural principle, but by a modern conception of team spirit. In Wilson's construction, progress flowed from the adjustment of civilization to the new rules of the game.⁶¹

During the Progressive Era the idea of a sporting republic played an important role in the revitalization of middle-class culture and the adjustment of the bourgeois frame of reference to the realities of corporate capitalism. Athletic analogies helped the concept of government regulation of the economy gain currency by linking political activism to the gospel of fair play and explaining economic theories through playing-field rhetoric. The vitalistic doctrines of the sporting republic combated fears that the urban-industrial environment would doom the nation. A middle-class ideology of strenuousness, designed in part by an elite leadership, shaped political dialogue and expectations, reinvigorated the cult of civic virtue, and placed athletic physical culture in a central position in modern American life. The tropological categories of the new republicanism linked the regulated body with the regulated body politic and defined the idea of economy as a form of game. But the symbolic logic of the new republicanism made one huge assumption: it expected that every social interest would, in the jargon of the strenuous life, play fair. Such a faith would be hard to match with experience. Indeed, such a faith would be hard-pressed to explain the realities of events within the world of modern athletics itself.

Notes

1. There is, of course, a voluminous historiography on the subject, dating from the beginning of the transformation itself as contemporaries sought to make sense out of the process by placing it into a historical context. The question of what it means to become modern has been one of the staples of political philosophy and social criticism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On modernization, industrialization, and the rise of a market economy in the United States, from both specific and broad angles of vision, see Richard Brown, *Modernization: The Transformation of American Life, 1600–1865* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); Diane Lindstrom, *Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region, 1810–1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Anthony F. C. Wallace,

Rockdale: *The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1978); Thomas C. Cochran, *Frontiers of Change: Early Industrialism in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Thomas Bender, *Toward an Urban Vision: Ideas and Institutions in Nineteenth-Century America* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975); Gunther Barth, *City People: The Rise of Modern City Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Organizational Revolution: A Study in the Ethics of Economic Organizations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1953); Samuel P. Hays, *The Response to Industrialism, 1865–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal and the Liberal State, 1900–1918* (Boston: Beacon, 1968); David F. Noble, *America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

On republicanism challenged and transformed, see particularly the work on political culture of Paul A. Carter, *Revolt Against Destiny: An Intellectual History of the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Dorothy Ross, "The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed," in *New Directions in American Intellectual History*, John Higham and Paul K. Conkin, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); Robert Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," *American Historical Review* 82 (June 1977), 531–62.

On the changing nature of political culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Richard L. McCormick, "The Discovery That Business Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins of Progressivism," *American Historical Review* 86 (April 1981), 247–74; David Thelen, *The New Citizenship: Origins of Progressivism in Wisconsin, 1885–1900* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972); and "Social Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism," *Journal of American History* 56 (September 1969), 323–41; John D. Buenker, John C. Burnham, and Robert M. Crunden, *Progressivism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1977); Arthur Link and Richard L. McCormick, *Progressivism* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1983).

On the crisis of bourgeois culture, see T. J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920* (New York: Pantheon, 1981); Howard Mumford Jones, *The Age of Energy: Varieties of American Experience, 1865–1915* (New York: Viking, 1970); Robert M. Crunden, *Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievement in American Civilization, 1889–1920* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984). See also Wiebe, *The Search for Order*; Noble, *The Paradox of Progressive Thought* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), and *The Progressive Mind* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970); Alan Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); John F. Kasson, *Amusing the Million: Coney Island at the Turn of the Century* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978).

2. The distinction between older and newer middle classes has been employed to chart a shift that is as much cultural as it is economic. Descriptions and explanations of the shift appear in most of the fundamental critiques of the modern social order, ranging from the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to that of Max Weber and Hannah Arendt, and even Alvin Toffler. In *American Social Science*, Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: Macmillan, 1899), and C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), greatly influenced the basic paradigm. For an interesting survey of the idea of class between the Civil War and the end of the First World War, see Glenn C. Altschuler, *Race, Ethnicity, and Class in American Social Thought, 1865–1919* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1982). The drive to construct a nationalized culture is hinted at in many of the works concerned with the American bourgeoisie, particularly Lears's *No Place of Grace* and Trachtenberg's *The Incorporation of America*. H. Wayne Morgan, in *Unity and Culture: The United States, 1877–1900* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971), offered a provocative essay on the effort to construct a national style in high culture. Less work has been done on the "search for order" in mass culture. One can gain a strong appreciation for the pervasiveness of the bourgeois effort to inculcate its standards from the writings of critics of middle-class efforts at constructing some sort of hegemony. See Randolph Bourne's provocative "The Puritan's Will to Power," *The Seven Arts* 1 (April 1917), 631–37.

Too often historians overemphasize the deterministic nature of modernization and forget the role that human agency played in the construction of industrial civilization. Too often they stress the economic, technical, and social aspects of modernization as somehow having a reality separate from culture and consciousness. And too often they dismiss ideas as rhetorical camouflage in their anxiousness to get at what people "do" rather than what they "say," forgetting that one of the things that human beings "do" is spend a great deal of their time and energy making systems of explanation in which to ground their behaviors. This study concerns the ideas of republicanism and athleticism and it assumes that ideas matter, that ideology can serve as an honest, if culture-bound, method for turning experience into meaning. The concern with cultural meanings—or, to use an anthropological metaphor, Clifford Geertz's infamous "winks"—debated in national communities of discourse has been nurtured by the reading of, among many others, Carter, *Revolt Against Destiny*; Gene Wise, *American Historical Explanations: A Strategy for Grounded Inquiry*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Dominick LaCapra, *History and Criticism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Edmund S. Morgan, *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988); Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), and *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

3. Price Collier, "Sport's Place in the Nation's Well-Being," *Outing* 32 (July 1898), 382-88.
4. Roosevelt enunciated his athletic gospel in numerous writings. Perhaps the seminal statement of the code, and its connection with nationalism, can be found in Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life," speech before the Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 10, 1899; in Herman Hagerdorn, ed., *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, Vol. XIII: *American Ideals, The Strenuous Life, Realizable Ideals* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), 331. See also Woodrow Wilson, "The Social Center," *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin Extension Division*, serial no. 470 (Madison, Wis., 1911), 3-15; Jane Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets* (New York: Macmillan, 1909); Jacob Riis, "Fighting the Gang with Athletics," *Collier's* 46 (February 11, 1911), 17, and *Battle with the Slum* (New York: Macmillan, 1902). William James sometimes sprinkled sporting metaphors like "second wind" and "warming up" in his essays on mental exertion. See "The Energies of Men," *Essays on Faith and Morals*, Ralph Barton Perry, ed. (New York: Longmans, Green, 1947), 216-37. G. Stanley Hall, who served with varying degrees of success as a teacher to both George Herbert Mead and John Dewey, influenced progressive conceptions of child psychology and its dynamogenic components with his "evolutionary theory" of play. See his *Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education* (New York: D. Appleton, 1904). See also Simon N. Patten, *Product and Climax* (New York: Huebsch, 1909); Edward A. Ross, *Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order* (New York: Macmillan, 1916).
- The literature on late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century sport is growing. See in particular Dominick Cavallo, *Muscles and Morals: Organized Playgrounds and Urban Reform, 1880-1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981); Allen Guttman, *A Whole New Ball Game: An Interpretation of American Sports* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), and *From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sport* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Don S. Kirschner, "The Perils of Pleasure: Commercial Recreation, Social Disorder and Moral Reform in the Progressive Era," *American Studies* 21 (fall 1980), 27-42; J. A. Mangan and James Walvin, eds., *Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940* (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); Donald Mrozek, *Sport and American Mentality, 1880-1910* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983); Steven Riess, *Touching Base: Professional Baseball and American Culture in the Progressive Era* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980).
- Of course the progressive ideology of sport had many critics and contestants in the struggle to define American physical culture. See in particular Elliott J. Gorn, *The Manly Art: Bare-Knuckle Prize Fighting in America* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Stephen Hardy, *How Boston Played: Sport, Recreation, and Community, 1865-1915* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1982); Roy Rosenzweig,

Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

5. Symbolic anthropologists have explored the idea that the body and its treatment can give important clues to social relations and cosmology. See Mary T. Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology* (New York: Pantheon, 1970); Victor Turner, *Dramas, Fields, Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974). Mrozek, in *Sport and American Mentality, 1880-1910*, discusses the connection between the modern desire to regulate energy and modern sporting forms. See also the insightful work of Roberta J. Park, "Biological Thought, Athletics and the Formation of a 'Man of Character': 1830-1900," *Manliness and Morality*, 7-34.
6. Price Collier, "The Ethics of Ancient and Modern Athletics," *Forum* 32 (November 1901), 317-18.
7. See the voluminous count of articles and books on the "amusement problem" offered to the public in Richard Henry Edwards, *Popular Amusements* (1915; rep., New York: Arno Press, 1976).
8. Luther Halsey Gulick, "Popular Recreation and Public Morality," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 34 (July 1909), 33.
9. Thorstein Veblen, *The Vested Interests and the Common Man: The Modern Point of View and the New Order* (New York: Heubsch, 1919).
10. Gulick, "Popular Recreation and Public Morality," 33.
11. Loren Baritz, *The Good Life: The Meaning of Success for the American Middle Class* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).
12. "The Changing Middle Class," *Independent* 79 (July 27, 1914), 117.
13. "The Middle Class Mind," *The Dial* 55 (August 16, 1913), 99-101.
14. "The Changing Middle Class," 117.
15. Peter Levine, "The Promise of Sport in Antebellum America," *Journal of American Culture* 2 (winter 1980), 623-34; Steven A. Riess, *City Games: The Evolution of American Urban Society and the Rise of Sports* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989).
16. See Hannah Arendt's chapter entitled "The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie" in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 123-57. On the reconstruction of American social thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries consult Sidney Fine, *Laissez Faire and the General Welfare State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956); David Noble, *The Progressive Mind* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970); Daniel Levine, *Varieties of Reform Thought* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Paul F. Boller, *Freedom and Fate in American Thought: From Edwards to Dewey* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1978); Henry Steele Commager, *The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and*

Character Since 1950 (New Haven: Yale, 1950); Henry F. May, *The End of American Innocence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959).

17. The concepts of social control and social justice are somewhat problematic since they arise in large part from the ideological arguments of historians who have debated about the nature and existence of progressivism, rather than from the historical context itself. Social control and social justice were intertwined categories in the discourse of the era, and progressives seemed untroubled by control in the name of what they considered justice. For discussions of the problem see Daniel T. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism," *Reviews in American History* 10 (December 1982), 113–32; Don S. Kirschner, "The Ambiguous Legacy: Social Justice and Social Control in the Progressive Era," *Historical Reflections* 2 (summer 1975), 69–88.

18. For a more detailed account see Mrozek, *Sport and the American Mentality*. See also Peter Levine, A. G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball: *The Promise of American Sport* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), for an insightful commentary on the ways in which entrepreneurs like Spalding turned the mainstream athletic ideology into a lucrative commercial enterprise.

19. Francis Tabor, "Directed Sport as a Factor in Education," *Forum* 27 (May 1899), 321.

20. See Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society* (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1906); Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1909).

21. For an enlightening portrait of the popular reception of Roosevelt's athletic gospel, see "The President's Ideas About Sports," *Ladies Home Journal* 23 (August 1906), 17. Classic pieces from the source himself include Theodore Roosevelt, "What We Can Expect of the American Boy," *St. Nicholas* 27 (May 1900), 571–74; "Commercialism, Hysteria, and Homicide," *Outlook* 99 (October 21, 1911), 409–10; "The Value of an Athletic Training," *Harper's Weekly* 27 (December 23, 1893), 1236.

22. John Corbin, "The Modern Chivalry," *Atlantic Monthly* 89 (April 1902), 601–11.

23. Lears, *No Place of Grace*.

24. Guttman, *A Whole New Ball Game*, 5. See also Guttman, *From Ritual to Record*, and Melvin L. Adelman, *A Sporting Time: New York City and the Rise of Modern Athletics, 1820–1870* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

25. Crunden, *Ministers of Reform*.

26. A. E. Colton, "What Football Does," *Independent* 57 (September 15, 1904), 605–07.

27. William Milligan Sloane, "The Greek Olympiads," *Report of the American Olympic Committee, 1920* (Greenwich, Conn.: Condé Nast Press, 1920), 59.

28. Sloane, "Modern Olympic Games," *Report of the American Olympic Committee, 1920*, 83.

29. "The Minister and Athletics: Mr. Caspar Whitney's Views," *Outlook* 55 (January 9, 1897), 181–83.

30. Tabor, "Directed Sport as a Factor in Education," 321–22.

31. Collier, "The Ethics of Ancient and Modern Athletics," 309–18.

32. For a fuller treatment of the cost of the strenuous life see Arthur Reeve, "What America Spends for Sport," *Outing* 57 (December 1910), 300–308.

33. See particularly John M. Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), and George E. Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958).

34. Theodore Roosevelt, "Character and Success," *Outlook* 64 (March 31, 1900), 725–27.

35. See, for instance, Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1955); and J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

36. Roosevelt, "Character and Success," 727.

37. Collier, "Sport's Place in the Nation's Well-Being," 382–88; Whitney, "Non-Athletic China," *Harper's Weekly* 42 (February 19, 1898), 189–90.

38. Whitney, "Athletic Awakening of the Japanese," *Harper's Weekly* 42 (February 12, 1898), 165–66.

39. Carter H. Harrison, "Municipal Athletics," *Independent* 53 (November 28, 1901), 2823–24.

40. "Editor's Open Window," *Outing* 4 (May 1884), 143.

41. William Frederick Dix, "The Influence of Sport in American Life," *Independent* 55 (September 3, 1903), 2094–95.

42. Frederic L. Paxson, "The Rise of Sport," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 4 (September 1917), 167–68.

43. See, for instance, Anne O'Hagan, "The Athletic Girl," *Munsey's* 25 (August 1901), 729–30; "Outing's Health Hints for Women," *Outing* 14 (August 1889), 395; "Editor's Open Window," *Outing* 12 (June 1888), 268; Dudley Sargent, "Are Athletics Making Girls Masculine?," *Ladies Home Journal* 29 (March 1912), 11; "Women's Sports: A Symposium," *American Review of Reviews* 22 (August 1900), 232; E. Atwood, "Mother's Part in Athletics," *American Homes* 9 (June 1912), 226–28.

44. Collier, "Sport's Place in the Nation's Well-Being," 382–88.

45. Jones, *The Age of Energy*, 413.

46. "Mr. Roosevelt and the Athletes," *New York Times*, September 2, 1908: 6.

47. Whitney, "The Sportsman's View-Point," *Outing* 45 (January 1905), 493.

48. William Allen White, "Taft, A Hower of Wood," *American Magazine* 66 (May 1908), 19–32.

PART 2

GENDER AND

THE BODY

49. Ralph D. Paine, "Taft at Yale," *Outing* 53 (November 1908), 135-50.
50. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944); Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.
51. John Corbin, "A Harvard Man at Oxford," *Harper's Weekly* 42 (February 26, 1896), 212.
52. McCormick, "The Discovery That Business Corrupts Politics."
53. Richard Lipsky, "Toward a Theory of American Sports Symbolism," *Games and Sports in Cultural Context*, Janet C. Harris and Roberta J. Park, eds. (Champaign, Ill.: Human Kinetics Publishers, 1983), 83.
54. Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1913). For the context of Beard's work and Constitution worship in early-twentieth-century America, see Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), and Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, 2nd ed. (New York: Ronald, 1956).
55. Woodrow Wilson, *The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People*, comp. William Bayard Hale (New York: Doubleday Page, 1914), 170.
56. An interesting foray into the semiotic relationship between game theory and cognition can be found in Theodore Roszak, "Forbidden Games," *Sport in the Socio-Cultural Process*, M. Marie Hart, ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1972), 91-104.
57. Owen Wister, *The Virginian* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1904), 147; Edward A. Ross, *Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 34-35.
58. Wilson, *The New Freedom*, 45, 114, 105-106, 131, 153.
59. See Lears's *No Place of Grace* for a discussion of the emergence of "streamlined modern liberalism."
60. Geertz argues that the general trend in recent cultural studies has been "toward conceiving of social life as organized in terms of symbols (signs, representations, *significants*, *Darstellungen* . . . the terminology varies), whose meaning (sense, import, *signification*, *Bedeutung* . . .) we must grasp if we are to understand that organization and formulate its principles. . . . The woods are full of eager interpreters" ("Blurred Genres: The Reconfiguration of Social Thought," *Local Knowledge*, 21).
61. Wilson, "The Social Center," 3-15.