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Entrepreneurs, Organizations, and the Sports Marketplace

STEPHEN H. HARDY

The Sport Industry: New Questions and New Approaches

Last year the *Chronicle of Higher Education* ran a feature story explaining that sport history has gained "new respectability." As noted in this article, no longer will the chancellor of the University of Wisconsin at LaCrosse suspect that sport historians spend their time trading baseball cards! Such veiled praise notwithstanding, these are heady times for the field. Quality articles and monographs on sport and leisure are on the increase. New lines of research have branched out to such an extent that Nancy Struna recently characterized the literature as a "glorious disarray."[1]

While I agree with the thrust of Struna's perceptive essay, on closer inspection one finds that most of the recent work may be synthesized under the rubric of social history. This has resulted in publications that focus on two, often complementary, elements of interpretation: long-term *social forces* that have nudged sporting practices in certain directions and the *social functions* of sport within this context. Among the former one finds the rise of cities, technological revolutions, immigration, the changing roles of women, and the maturing of capitalism. Among the latter, status, ethnic identity, social control, and boosterism.[2]

The result of this research has been a greater appreciation of both the context and the significance of baseball, football, hockey, tennis, horse racing, boxing, and other sports as they were experienced in history. At the same time, however, it is important to remember that the social history of sport does not constitute the totality of sport history. As this essay attempts to outline, a number of important topics demand attention from perspectives that are closer to business and economic history. These topics require a shift in attention from the significance of consumption to the structures of production, from the broad sweep of social forces to the minute elements of decision-making. In general, they focus on the ways in which entrepreneurs have developed a special, perhaps singular, industry that has produced a particular part of the past. They demand a closer look at why certain organizational forms have grown to dominate the production and distribution of games and sports to their consumers; how these organizations have merged into systems of interdependence, wherein some units clearly dominate others; and, finally, what rules, resources, and practices have constituted the structure or logic of the sport industry over time. In short, they call for an appreciation of sport as a special industry, like agriculture, steel, or medicine.[3]

Naturally, such analysis must pay close attention to social and cultural developments in the wider environment of suppliers, creditors, consumers, and critics. Yet this will be important not only to clarify the sport industry's submission to some wider *mentalité*, but also to explore the ways in which entrepreneurs may have insulated themselves from outside forces and thereby either filtered, misread, or distorted the arguments of their constituents. Indeed, even the most successful entrepreneurs like Albert Spalding faced endlessly complex decisions about game rules, contract negotiations, stadium leases, and interleague wars. As simple as Spalding tried to paint reality, he and his colleagues could not hope to understand or control the full consequences that their steady stream of decisions would have on the patterns of sport production and consumption. Neil Harris has made similar observations about the organizers of cultural institutions like libraries, museums, and universities. As Harris maintains, one cannot easily pigeonhole their motives into compartments of "social control" or "nationalism," because they were too often consumed with a struggle to understand, if not govern, their complex organizations. The same may be said about the sport industry. To use Harris's words, historians will not appreciate its development until they begin to "clearly reconstruct the old alternatives" and "suggest the kinds of choices [these] institutions represented." Only by reconstructing the old alternatives that decision-makers faced can historians begin to understand how and why baseball, football, golf, tennis, hockey, and other sports developed along the lines they have, and why the industry's system and structure took on its particular shape and logic.[4]

Reconstructing the history of sport as a productive industry will, first, require an inversion of the dominant process of inquiry. Instead of analyzing sport from the outside in, the researcher must consider developments from the inside out. In other words, the starting point will not be the broad processes that concern social historians—developments in social class, urban life, or racism. Rather, the initial focus will be on the central issues as the sport

organizations defined them. While only greater research can clarify these, it is a reasonable assumption that they center upon the acquisition and maintenance of facilities, supplies, and players; the staging of events, the minimization of costs, the garnering of publicity: in short, the concerns of a business. In turn, these will probably revolve around the key functions of management—planning, coordinating, and controlling human, material, and financial resources in order to reach some objectives, either clear or hazy. The historian's questions then become woven less around changing issues in the social environment and more around standard, ongoing issues within the sport industry. Seen in this light, Jules Tygiel's masterful study of the integration of major-league baseball is as much an analysis of problems in strategic planning, talent acquisition, and public relations as it is a thorough if specialized study of American racism. The brilliance of Tygiel's book lies in its ability to do both.[5]

What follow are suggestions for historical research into the development of the sport industry. These revolve around three main topics: 1. the sport product; 2. the role of entrepreneurs and investors in developing the product; 3. the types of individual organizations and networks of organizations that entrepreneurs created. Scholars in economics and sport management have already provided important insights into the contemporary industry. Their work, however, often lacks historical perspective.[6] While historians have uncovered considerable evidence about the past business of sports, especially baseball, their research needs synthesis. But this essay seeks not to supplant any approach to research. Rather, it offers a supplemental framework for analysis. Readers will note its limitations: a focus on team sports and, more particularly, team sports in America. At the same time, some of the discussion and sources suggest the potential for wider applications.

The Sport Product: A Triple Commodity

Sport history, from the "inside out," begins with an analysis of the sport product, since a particular product's nature usually influences the organizations that produce it.[7] On close inspection, the sport product unfolds as a triple or three-part commodity, and the sport industry divides into segments that generate or distribute one or more of the parts. These parts, which can exist in isolation but which reach full expression in combination, are as follows: the activity or game form, the service, and the goods.

The term "commodity" demands some consideration here since it must be understood historically. A commodity, as Marx noted, is "in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another." But all products are not necessarily commodities. "To become a commodity," Marx explained, "a product must be transferred to another whom it will serve as a use-value, by means of exchange."[8] Sport, then, becomes a commodity when its producers transfer it, via exchange, to a separate group of consumers. Clearly, even today not all sports exist in commodity form. Stickball flourishes largely as use-value, consumed only by its producers. But even here, components of the activity—balls, special bats—may be commodities if they are purchased at Woolworth's or K-Mart. The job of historians is to uncover the process by which the sport product evolved and by which its triple components edged ever closer to pure commodities.[9]

Now, if one considers the game form first, one can sense the subtlety of this evolution. As a game form, the sport product consists of activities embodied in the rules defining the way the game is played, or the "game occurrence," to use John Loy's phrase.[10] Of course anyone can make up a game, as Professor Naismith demonstrated. But this is of little consequence until rulemaking is organized and controlled by particular groups who regulate the game form's distribution, or who try to regulate it. Can game forms ever exist as a commodity? Indeed they can and they do, especially at the level of high-performance sport. For while sandlotters animate their competition with arguments about unwritten rules, organized leagues resort to published rule books, purchased annually by officials, administrators, coaches, players, and fans. This is no mere cottage industry. *Beadle's Dime Base-Ball Player* sold 50,000 copies annually in the 1860s, and it receives due credit for its part in making the New York game the national pastime. A few years later, "guides" (including rules and statistics) for all sports constituted a substantial segment of Albert Spalding's empire, both netting him vast profits and supporting the influence of governing bodies whose rules he published. Sales of this commodity continue to be strong. In 1984, NCAA Publishing alone sold approximately $50,000 worth of rule books for college sports.[11]

Sandlotters of course play on, in blissful ignorance of technicalities; but the game form has been a commodity for some time. Rule-making itself has become more and more difficult, subject to pressures from lobbies like the American Medical Association. Obviously, the particular forms of any sport, in any historical period, are hardly inevitable derivatives of some *zeitgeist*. They are the products of conscious decision-making that cries out for more historical investigation.[12]

If rulemakers create a special product—the game form—that may exist as a commodity, it is also true that their product seldom exists in isolation. Without disregarding sandlotters, it is clear that game forms are usually played in a situation that involves more than simple, expressive use-value for the players. Some utility beyond competition—not expressed or implied in the rules—is appended to the game performance. This utility is the sport service, the second component of the triple commodity.[13]

Sport services have existed historically in many aspects, including education, status, military preparation, urban boosterism, political propaganda, and, most extensively, entertainment. Those familiar with the literature quickly recognize the complex histories of these different service utilities: slow and steady accretions over centuries (recognition of games as military preparation and education dates to the ancients) coupled with flashing, revelatory episodes of growth (the use of the Modern Olympics as political propaganda). Further confounding this history, several services have often wrapped around the same game form. Indeed, one could easily argue that the most popular team games have been fertile ground for every conceivable service. And of course this provides a clue to their popularity.[14]

While historians have chronicled and interpreted sport services for some time—usually as "social functions"—a reconsideration will be valuable on several theoretical grounds. For instance, it appears that special organizations have emerged to promote and capture the service utilities, and that these service organizations are often distinct from those controlling the game form. This may result in pressure tactics, negotiations, and accommodations between organizations. A case in point would be the 1905–6 football controversy. At one level, this episode became a power struggle between the old rules committee and the emerging organization, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, whose avowed mission was to shape both the game form and the educational service. The results of these and other conflicts and their consequences for the contemporary sports product can only be understood through careful historical reconstruction of decision-making from the inside out.[15]

Such research may also explain more clearly the movement of sport services toward commodity forms. Social functions are not always free. If we want to enjoy the status value associated with the game of tennis, we pay for membership in an exclusive club. If we want the (sometimes dubious) educational values of soccer for our children, we pay the registration fee for the youth league. If we want entertainment from football, we pay for a Steeler ticket. But this all is not the result of a natural or inevitable process. Every sport has experienced a period of discovery when players, sponsors, and promoters have recognized that others might pay to watch or play a game, in essence exchanging money for the chance to derive their personal use-value from their own form of involvement. Historians are especially equipped to uncover the effects of this discovery on the production of the sport product and on the structure of the sport industry.

The third component of the unified sport product involves the goods, the physical objects necessary to the game form that are recognized or regulated in the rules. Balls, goals, sticks, bats, protective equipment, and uniforms normally fall into this category. So do facilities that are requisite to the contest or exercise, such as swimming pools, or lined fields, or running tracks. Nonessential facilities like bleachers, grandstands, or press boxes fall under the province of services. Although this segment of the sport industry has received almost total neglect from historians, it appears that sporting goods reached full-blown commodity status faster than either the game form or the service. The consequences of this sprint are considered later in this essay.[16]

As this brief excursus on the sport product reveals, simple definitions of "sport" run a risk of distorting historical reality. This is especially true since different segments of the sport industry must combine to fuse multiple components into a laminated product that embraces a game form, services, and goods. Such orchestration between organizations has never been smooth, nor has it been static. Indeed, it is the dynamic nature of the industry and its products that renders simple definitions of sport historically hazardous.

Entrepreneurs and Investors

This complexity has intensified in the last two centuries, not surprisingly the same time period that saw the movement of the sport product ever closer to a pure commodity. In reassessing these developments, it will make sense to focus initially on the activities of entrepreneurs, whose role was first outlined by Arthur Cole, Fritz Redlich, and Sebastian DeGrazia. All three suggested that profit-seeking entrepreneurs had altered the direction of leisure and sport in the nineteenth century. As Cole put it. "One man's curiosity may become another man's profit." Or as Redlich argued, "What was originally an autonomous trend favorable to business was consciously developed by business so that in the end business domination of leisure time activities was the result." What these authors emphasized was the commercialization of sport and leisure in the increasingly urbanized culture of nineteenth-century America. A logic that promoted spectacle and profit overwhelmed an earlier, more rural ethos of home-backed, wholesome fun.[17]

While there is much to learn by rereading these still-insightful works, there is too easy a sweep to their interpretations. Their speculative nature and their

limited sources do not allow for a clear investigation of the motives of entrepreneurs in sport or leisure. And while the profit motive has surely nudged sport in certain directions, one cannot say that it has dominated or even controlled the industry's structure. Sports entrepreneurs have often been like Robert Wiebe's version of the Robber Barons: "Yet as shrewdly as some of them pursued the main chance, they were also trapped by the present, scurrying where they appeared to stalk." One only needs to think of Chris Von der Ahe or Andrew Freedman to see a scurrying sports magnate.[18]

Indeed, one senses that profit-seeking and risk-taking—normally central dimensions of entrepreneurship—have not always been so pivotal in an industry whose production process has often been heavily subsidized by state and philanthropic agencies (think of high-school athletics or YMCAs). Although profit and risk have been and remain important, the hallmark of the sport entrepreneur has more likely been the innovative activity that Joseph Schumpeter emphasized in his *Theory of Economic Development*. This includes: 1. the introduction of a new good or new quality of a good (or service); 2. the introduction of a new method of production or a new way of handling a commodity; 3. the opening of a new market; 4. the acquisition of a new source of raw materials or unfinished goods; 5. the crafting of a new organizational structure. Any of these activities results in a "new combination" of production. The parallels in the sport industry are instructive.[19]

In Schumpeter's sense, Walter Camp was an entrepreneur, not because he sought profits for Yale, but because he aggressively created and introduced a new game form, resulting in a product that was attractive *and* profitable. Naismith's creation of basketball was similarly an entrepreneurial activity; but so also was Senda Berenson's introduction of a new quality to the sport. Further, she opened a new market. Along this last line, massive research is needed to identify the obscure entrepreneurial figures who introduced eastern-born football and baseball to new southern and western markets in the nineteenth century. Easier to assess are the entrepreneurial efforts of Branch Rickey, whose minor-league system represented a new source of supply, or William Hulbert, who helped effect a radical reorganization of the baseball industry in 1876. Hulbert's accomplice, Albert Spalding, was thereafter an entrepreneur in all phases of Schumpeter's definition. Indeed, one of the many strengths of Peter Levine's splendid biography of Spalding is its focus on the many moments of innovation that "A. G." orchestrated in all three components of the baseball product. If historians are to uncover the development of the sport industry as a special, perhaps unique, system and structure, it will be necessary to outline the key moments of innovation and the key innovators in any given segment or activity. And doubtless these will diverge from commonplace notions about "great moments" or "great heroes" in sport.

While innovation may be a useful starting place, there are other activities often associated with entrepreneurs—risk-taking and profit-seeking. After all most innovative projects involve risk and financing, and risk-takers usually expect some utility or profit if the project is successful. Who have been the risk-takers and financiers of the sport industry?

In his new book, Richard Mandell claims that one foundation for the rise of American sport was "the country's banking system," which he says "was flexibly capable of supplying venture capital."[20] Unfortunately, Mandell does not support this assertion, and it is extremely doubtful that banks were assuming the risks for ventures as tenuous as nineteenth-century sports. Nonetheless, Mandell does prompt a useful question: When did banks begin to accept some risk in financing sport organizations, wherein they recognized as collateral an organization's franchise values or expected profits and not simply its tangible assets? This would mark a significant moment of legitimacy for individual firms, for networks of firms, and for the industry as a whole.

Although historians have not examined bank financing, they have uncovered the early investors and risk-takers for many sports and recreations. Basically they may be sorted into three groups: private sponsors, commercial promoters, and the state. Of the three, it appears that private sponsors played the crucial role early in the history of most sports. This term denotes individuals or groups primarily and initially interested in pursuing games as pure fun or as services unrelated to gate receipts. White-collar and elite groups come quickly to mind: Knickerbocker ball-players, Harvard footballers, New York Athletic Club leaders, members of the Country Club. As baseball historians demonstrate, however, petit bourgeois, working-class, and ethnic groups were also early sponsors of sport.[21]

While private sponsors soon recognized the financial benefits of gate receipts and concessions, and thus often contributed to the "commercialization" of sports, they must be distinguished from commercial promoters as long as their central concerns lay in areas other than profits. For the commercial promoter, on the other hand, sport (in any of its commodity forms) has principally been a means to personal or corporate profit. As one might expect, the distinction between private sponsor and commercial promoter has often been hazy. The motivations of magnates like Henry V. Lucas of St. Louis, Deacon White of Edmonton, or the young Art Rooney, Sr.—owners of sports operations that were marginally (if at all) profitable—surely included civic duty, egotism, and a love of sport as well as a concern for some profit. Other historical figures however, are more clearly painted as commercial promoters: John I. Rogers of the Phillies, who swindled his fellow owners out of gate receipts; Cadwallader Colden, who first tried in 1829 to run the Union Course and horse racing on the basis of gate receipts: or Horace Bigelow, who transformed Lake Quinsigamond into a showcase of salable sports and recreation.[22]

The third major investor in sport development has been the state in its many forms of legislative bodies, appointed commissions, and regulatory agencies. Beginning with its mid-nineteenth-century investments in public parks and, later, playgrounds, the state slowly grew (often through public education) to control stadiums, arenas, vast equipment inventories, leagues of teams, and playing and eligibility rules. At its heart, the state's interest in sport has always been its contribution to social order. As recent works on public recreation suggest, however, although state-controlled sport and recreation have probably served the interests of dominant social groups, it is by no means clear that this occurred to the exclusion of the interests of subordinate groups. Workers and ethnic communities found the play areas to be a fertile ground for contention over the control of leisure, if not of work.[23]

Several questions arise about the relationship of special investor and interest groups to the developing sport product. To begin, have private sponsors, commercial promoters, or the state imposed their own particular *stamp* on game forms, services, or goods under their control? What happens to football, for example, when commercial promoters borrow its form from private and state sponsors (colleges and schools) in order to establish their own venture (ultimately, the NFL)? Are there major alterations in the game form, in associated services, or in goods? Are the tendencies similar in other sports? How have investor groups opposed or accommodated each other's interests? One intersection of interests in need of greater research is the expansion of sports facilities in the first half of the twentieth century. Here was a fertile ground for tradeoffs between private or commercial sponsors and the state. Here began the precedents that make public subsidy of private gain a contemporary expectation.[24]

Besides the interaction between investor groups, what about the social composition *within* them? Has this changed over time, with corresponding effects on sport? Ted Vincent has raised this important issue in his provocative (if lamentably unfootnoted) book *Mudville's Revenge*. According to Vincent, the early years of professional baseball and basketball were a "democratic and pluralistic era . . . in which a grocer or saloon keeper had as much chance as a millionaire of producing an event that grabbed headlines in the national sporting magazines."[25] Without providing closely detailed evidence, Vincent suggests that the earliest owners of professional teams tended to be petit bourgeois—liquor dealers, pawnbrokers, attorneys, and the like—who had much closer, organic ties with their communities of fans and players. This group was gradually squeezed out by the higher capital requirements of larger, more permanent facilities, by players' demands for higher salaries, and by the design of rivals. Similarly, Steven Riess has shown that by the early 1900s big-league baseball was controlled by "new men of affluence," the owners of traction companies, large breweries, and construction firms. Lyle Hallowell maintains that a similar process occurred in ice hockey, particularly after 1912, when the advent of artificial ice rinks brought both higher capital requirements and higher potential profits to those wishing to try the big-league game. Petit bourgeois would be hereafter relegated to investing in the minor leagues.[26]

Did social and economic backgrounds affect the work "styles" of entrepreneurs and investors? Were "new men of affluence" apt to be more conservative or innovative with the sport product? More exploitive with labor? Clearly, more detailed prosopography is needed across sports, but it appears that the greatest innovations (for better or worse) came from the petit bourgeois. This certainly occurred in track and field, if one can believe the account of James Brendan Connolly, America's first Olympic gold medalist. In 1910, Connolly wrote an exposé called "The Capitalization of Amateur Athletics" in which he accused the AAU—purportedly the guardian of amateurism—of leading the wave of commercialization that threatened pure sport. Connolly traced the problem to the material interests of the printers, jewelers, and politicians who ran various regional and local branches of the AAU. Ultimately, Connolly claimed, all of them were beholden to Albert Spalding and his employee, James Sullivan, who doubled as the president of the AAU.[27]

Connolly's article challenges a commonplace notion about the control of track and field by elite gentlemen. But it reinforces the idea that any one entrepreneur, investor, or group could not hope to achieve unopposed mastery of any part of the sport industry. "Interlopers," to use the language of baseball, regularly have sought their own share of the market through some innovative combination in game form, service, or good. Their challenges were often the seeds of change.

Organizational Change: Shaping Firms for Expanding Markets

Innovative entrepreneurs have developed salable sport products through countless disputes, decisions, and deals. At the same time, however, they have nurtured extended networks of organizations that produce and distribute these products. Unfortunately, historians have not yet begun to investigate systematically the types of organizations that germinated from the seeds of entrepreneurial decisions. This must be remedied, since organizations are often more enduring than the individuals who create them. Indeed they are the skeletons of the industry (although sometimes only in fossil form). As such, they provide an obvious framework for analysis.

Alfred Chandler and others have demonstrated that organizational forms and structures in any industry are influenced by the nature of the product, the nature of the market, and what Chandler aptly calls the "visible hand" of strategy.[28] If any sport is, in fact, a tripartite product composed of a game form, associated services, and associated goods, one may begin by examining the different types of organizations operating in the three product segments.

Although there is considerable overlap between the organizations producing and controlling game forms and services, there are also important historical distinctions that await clarification. Thus, while both game forms and services tend now to be controlled by regional or national regulatory agencies (e.g., NCAA, NAIA, NFSHSA, NFL), this has not always been true. As noted earlier, Walter Camp's Rules Committee was concerned with the game form. Its successor, the NCAA, is concerned with both game forms and services. The growth patterns of other regulatory agencies demand scrutiny. Has expansion typically been local to regional to national? Has control extended in a regular fashion from game rules into services and ultimately into goods? Promising research already exists in these areas, but it has not been synthesized.[29]

One thing, however, is historically certain. In team sports, the production of the consumable game form or service has always been tied to a local firm, which is tied in turn to a basically local market. Sport, as we know it, exists as a "joint inverted product"—a single product (the game and its associated services) that is the result of interaction between two separate firms (each team). This fact alone distinguishes football, hockey, baseball, and the like from other commodities. Even more distinctive are the firms producing the game. They have remained essentially local firms, even as their once strictly local markets have sometimes extended to regional or national dimensions. Teams like the Dallas Cowboys and the Pittsburgh Steelers, which compete to create the most commercialized and modernized games, have persisted as what Alfred Chandler calls "traditional" firms—consisting usually as a single unit or single office, with a single owner or small group of owners, with a single product line, in a single geographic area. One can't stress locality enough, despite the wider distribution of broadcasts and novelties.[30]

For historians interested in examining the production of sport, a central question now emerges. Is it natural or inevitable that the game should have persisted as a by-product of competition between distinct, local, traditional firms? Was there no logical alternative? Of course there was, and it may be credited with spreading the popularity of virtually every modern sport. This was the barnstorming model, in which the competing teams were part of the same "firm" that viewed an entire region, nation, or, in Al Spalding's case, the world as its market. Most team sports have experienced barnstorming along these lines, yet this model of product ownership and distribution has never thrived or endured.[31]

But why not? Single or common ownership of multiple teams, even if they are anchored in different localities, makes greater economic sense than the wasteful competition between separate firms that has long dominated the team-sport industry. Surprisingly, however the great "concentration movement" that swept American industry in the late nineteenth century never seriously threatened the structure of team sports. Sports magnates have suffered severe public scorn when they have been caught investing in more than one franchise in the same league. Andrew Freedman's ill-fated though eminently logical attempt to form a major-league baseball trust stands in virtual isolation. Albert Spalding led the fight against Freedman and he had the press and the public on his side. But neither the press nor the public cared much about the "Freedmanism" that Spalding pursued in sporting goods. Why all the concern about a *team's* autonomy?[32]

While only detailed historical analysis across sports can answer this question, it is likely that the persistence of the traditional firm in team sports is the result of historical conditioning over centuries. As entrepreneurs developed rounders, stoolball, and baseball, or soccer, rugby, and American football, they extended the logic of team competition so that these games became "representational" as well as "recreational." That is to say, the actual competitors not only enjoyed a form of recreation, but they often bore the burden of representing the interests of a larger group of patrons and general followers. Now, this is not simply a nineteenth-century phenomenon. Descriptions of folk football in fourteenth-century Britain or *calcio* in sixteenth-century Italy reveal the deep roots of representational sports. The frequent manipulation of modern games by urban or other community boosters in the last century has been a matter of degree, not revelation.[33]

Indeed, it appears that the very structure of modern team sports is in important ways "premodern," imbued with a communal or community logic that has supported the persistence of the traditional firm. Even at the most commercialized levels, where homegrown talent is a rarity, there is a sense of suspicion about the absentee owner, but little concern about players hired from the outside. The whole firm, not just the collection of players, has become the representative of community interests. It *must* remain separate and distinct from its competitors or it can no longer be truly representative. Therefore, although it might have been eminently logical for ownership of multiple teams to have concentrated into the hands of a few, the longer history of sport itself included a premodern sense of community that sometimes rebuffed the modern logic of capitalism.[34]

Rather than a consolidation of firms, there developed *networks* of separate, traditional firms attempting to create, control, and apportion networks of local markets. This evolution has occurred at all levels of game forms and services, from the pee-wee to the professional. It has occurred both vertically within a single sport (Pop Warner Football, the NFL) and horizontally across sports (the NCAA, NFSHSA).

At least three areas merit attention as historians examine the interaction of firms and the tensions between capital and community that lay therein. The first concerns the disputes over product and market control between firms and between networks of firms. As Guy Lewis and Ronald Smith have ably demonstrated, the 1905–6 football controversy was more than a general question of violence in the game form. It was also a question of who would control the game form: the entrenched eastern interests so well symbolized in Walter Camp, or the emerging Midwest. The well-documented battles between rival leagues in professional baseball, football, and basketball have similarly been part of long-lasting wars for market control.[35]

The results of these struggles present the second subject that merits attention. This consists of the stratification or layering of firms and markets. It appears that every sport has undergone a "shakeout" by which firms have been layered into sets or networks of relatively equal strength. As Edward Gross argues in his seminal paper on the subject, this process is a necessity if the weaker firms are to survive at all, because it allows the chance for victory that is so demanded in representational sport.[36]

But while the outcomes are manifest now—competitive divisions in school, college, and amateur sports; layers of minor leagues in professional sports—the decisions that drove these shakeouts largely lie hidden in the shrouds of history. To what extent has stratification been the result of the "invisible hand" of the market, by which entrepreneurs succumb to the odds of population density, per capita wealth, existing modes of transportation, alternative services, or entrenched tasks? To what extent has stratification been forced by the "visible hand" of power and manipulation? The quiet death of the Canton Bulldogs or the Syracuse Nationals reflects the former. The flashing birth of the National League in 1876 exemplifies the latter. Economists often compare sports leagues to cartels. This can be a useful model, but cartels are only one product of a larger process of stratification that will be fully understood only when historians examine it through the lens of local sources in a variety of locales: small towns, regional entrepots, dominant metropolises.[37]

At the same time, as the National League's endurance prompts, scholars may profit from a closer look at the third and related subject of stratification studies. This is the creation and growth of the central administrative offices that coordinate the activities of individual firms in a given network. As Robert Stern outlines in his brilliant studies of the NCAA, the history of such offices has often involved a quest for autonomy from the network of firms that gave them birth. Eugene Murdock's recent study of Ban Johnson provides an excellent glimpse of the central administrator thirsting, groping, and battling for control of the network. One of Johnson's important contributions was his strengthening of the central umpire's bureau, an important source of autonomy and a hallmark of administrative power. His ultimate pathetic demise reflects how fleeting network control can be. For every Judge Landis there are ten Happy Chandlers.[38]

Despite their apparent weaknesses, the central offices of the myriad leagues, conferences, and associations dotting the historical landscape of sports have helped to bring order to the marketplace. Without stable systems of competition, sports firms generally die a-borning, a baseball's graveyard amply demonstrates. The structure of firms producing game forms and services is largely composed of complex molecules—benzene rings of compatible atoms. Free-floating atoms like the Harlem Globetrotters are exceptions that prove the rule.

Sporting goods present something different. Rather than networks of traditional, local firms, one finds instead the rapid emergence of what Chandler calls the "modern" firm: multiunit, multifunction, multiproduct, multimarket. Whereas thousands of tiny organizations compete to produce and distribute game forms and services, a relative handful of firms supply the material components of that competition. While individual communities feel a special, sometimes-passionate attachment to their local team, there is no such sentiment for the sporting-goods manufacturer or dealer. Why has this occurred and with what consequences for the integrated sport product?[39]

To date, few historians have considered the sporting-goods industry in any depth or breadth. A quick glimpse at the sources, however, suggests that production and distribution were traditional and slow until after the Civil War. Athletes and sportsmen often fashioned their own utensils or balls. Some equipment—largely for hunting and fishing—was imported or manufactured

by specialized firms. More frequently, however, one probably found production in the hands of local artisans in metal, leather, or woodworking, who crafted sporting goods as a sidelight. Indeed, one current product leader, Hillerich and Bradsby Co. of "Louisville Slugger" fame, began this way. J. Frederich Hillerich started his woodturning business in 1859, making bedposts and handrails as well as some tenpins and bowling balls. Only his son Bud's affection for baseball got the firm slowly involved in the turning of bats, and even then (1880) the elder Hillerich resisted such frivolity because he saw better profits in the current market for butter-churn booms![40]

While larger-scale manufacture of baseball goods appears to have risen in the late 1860s, football remained at a primitive stage. As one annalist tells us, the first Yale-Princeton game (1873) "was delayed an hour and a half because of the failure to obtain a ball. Another delay occurred during the game when the precious ball burst and had to be repaired."[41] These conditions would change rapidly, however, as entrepreneurs saw the potential for profits in supplying and fueling the demand for sports. The surge of participation in the next decade was the result of as much as the cause of concentrated ownership in sporting-goods production and distribution.

Peter Levine's recent biography of Albert Spalding provides important information on this process, as Spalding's firm represents a classic example of expansion and integration. Spalding opened his first store in Chicago in 1876. By 1899 his empire had extended worldwide, his company had integrated both backward into manufacturing and horizontally into marketing and retail. Along the way he had gobbled up numerous competitors. He had 3,500 employees toiling in five large manufacturing plants around the country, each with product specialties: bicycles and steel products in Massachusetts, boats and canoes in upstate New York, uniforms in New York City and Chicago, bats and wooden materials in Chicago, balls and leather goods in Philadelphia. At the other end, he had dispensed with jobbers and begun selling directly to retailers under what his brother called the "Spalding one-price policy." The 20,000 accounts now dealing with Spalding could not cut Spalding prices or they would risk losing their supply of these popular goods. The empire was fully integrated, from Michigan lumber mills to retail outlets. It paralleled the developments in other industries.[42]

While Spalding's was perhaps the dominant company, buying out Reach, Wright & Ditson, and others, it was not a monopolist. Competitors developed by a similar process of horizontal and vertical integration. The Rawlings Brothers began a retail store in St. Louis in 1888, acting as "exclusive agent" for distribution of Reach products in the South and West. Even before reorganizing in 1898, Rawlings moved into manufacturing. On the other hand, P. Goldsmith and Sons started in the Cincinnati area in 1875, making toys and baseball goods. Steady expansion in manufacturing, marketing, and acquisitions created the firm now known as MacGregor. Wilson began its operation turning out goods from a little red schoolhouse in Chicago. These were capable competitors for Spalding in the team-sports field, but rivals were even stronger for the bicycle market of the 1890s. Here Spalding was an also-ran to the giant Pope and Western manufacturing works.[43]

Much more research is needed before we can safely say that the production and distribution of sporting goods was oligopolistic. Intense competition by newcomers eroded Pope's bicycle profits in the later 1890s. The combination of severe price cutting and high capital costs was ruinous: the attempt at a trust failed. Developments in team sports are even less clear. Nevertheless, it appears that considerable concentration of control occurred there in the five decades after the Civil War. (This of course has continued so that several sporting-goods giants are now owned by even larger conglomerates.)

The effects were enormous. Manufacturers, retailers, and the networks between them formed the vast material foundation for the rise of sport. By 1899, the Reach plant in Philadelphia produced an estimated 18,000 baseballs a day. Machines cut and shaped twenty brands of balls for handstitching, including a "Deadball," a "Bounding Ball," and "Out of Sight Ball," a "King of the Field Ball," and a "Cock of the Walk Ball." Similar scales of manufacturing existed for other sports products. As the British magazine *Field* explained in 1904, American golf clubs began to dominate the British market, probably because of "the painstaking care with which the American balances, finishes, and constructs the club according to a standardized average pattern in lie, weight, and form." Standardization and mass production were important aspects of the growing industry, but so was marketing. Companies didn't simply meet demand, as Betts has maintained, they created demand.[44]

As Albert Pope wrote in 1895, bicycle manufacturers knew "at the outset" that they must "educate the people to the advantage of this invigorating sport, and with this end in view, the best literature that was to be had on the subject was gratuitously distributed." Bicycle advertising included colorful posters and witty copy distributed through dozens of general and trade magazines. Albert Spalding went a step further, with the creation of the American Sports Publishing Company, through which he published and distributed guidebooks on dozens of sports. These guides included not only the rules of the leading governing bodies but also important statistics on the participation and records of individuals and teams around the country. Throughout, Spalding's editors sprinkled reminders that Spalding products were the "official" products of the sport in question. When one remembers that by 1899 Spalding claimed to have 20,000 retail accounts, it is clear how significant this distribution system was for the total sport product. Basketball historian Albert Applin is doubtless correct in crediting Spalding's marketing arrangement for much of the dramatic spread of basketball in the 1890s.[45]

If the sporting-goods industry influenced participation rates, it is equally probable that their innovations in equipment influenced styles of play and, hence, the rules themselves. In 1902, Rawlings ran advertisements for their new line of football equipment designed by their product genius William P. Whitley. Aptly named, "Whitley's Football Armor" included an "armor" jacket "reinforced with cane ribs which, when struck, equally distributes the force of the blow, thus preventing injury to the player." But as with the boxing glove, protective equipment might equally result in more brutal play. This seems to have occurred in football. Lyle Hallowell has made a similar suggestion about hockey, for which protective equipment was developed in the early 1900s, the same period as the slashing, hard-checking "Ottawa" style of play. The precise relationships between sporting goods, playing styles, and playing rules await detailed research, but it is clear that playing styles and rules don't always determine the goods. The sporting-goods industry, especially the manufacturers, has had greater capital investments and greater stakes involved than most franchises. The manufacturers have seldom been passive observers.[46]

Conclusion: The Sport Industry and Its Impact

I have covered a fair amount of ground in this essay, all in order to offer a framework for research into the development of sport as an industry. Whether the sport is football, hockey, golf, or boxing, my framework focuses on the decisions of entrepreneurs who developed organizations to produce and distribute three-part commodities.

If I have argued for the need to reconstruct sport industry through the perspective of entrepreneurs—or from the "inside out." This is not to say that these men or women have ever enjoyed autonomy from the forces and issues in the environments that swirl around them. As one historian of entrepreneurs has argued, even the most powerful magnates like Rockefeller and Carnegie "made history only within those external constraints they could not change." Given these constraints, however, entrepreneurs have achieved much. I conclude with some questions and propositions about their achievements in sport.[47]

To begin, there appears to be a process of structural development—for products and organizations—that is unique to sport and that may be common to all sports. Loy, Ingham, and Gruneau have all offered important theoretical suggestions about the transformation of *a* set of rules to *the* set of rules. Gruneau has recently extended his model (based on Canadian history) to include stages of bourgeois, corporate, and state control. Guttmann, Ingham, and Adelman had earlier offered notable insights into the organizational differences between premodern or folk sports and their modern, rationalized counterparts.[48]

But while these authors capture much of the larger framework of development, there is need for much closer morphology. For instance, have all sports developed initially under the aegis of private sponsors—often the players themselves—who have been concerned chiefly with noncommercial utilities? Has each sport experienced a transition in which players have lost control of both the process and the product of their labor? Has this transition come before, after, or simultaneous to the moment of commercialization?[49] Has every sport had a "shakeout" and subsequent stratification of firms and markets into sets of similar power and capacity? Have these sets regrouped into even more compatible networks of markets, and have they then fashioned central offices to regulate their activities?

It appears that similar life cycles have prevailed. Since these life cycles have been staggered, however, historians may have to rethink their periodizing of the "rise of sport." For instance, professional baseball had assumed much of its modern structure by 1903, at the very time when football, hockey, and basketball were still very much at a primitive stage of development. And despite the presence of the baseball model, the other sports spent decades working through or replicating similar struggles in the marketplace. At what stage, then, is it appropriate to call any of these sports "modern," to use Adelman's term?[50]

Even as one recognizes the distinct chronologies that have accompanied the life cycles of sports networks, one must also recognize a more pervasive process at work: the concentration of control over the product itself. Thus, although the marketplace has remained formally free (anyone can invent a game), the nature of the product (particularly game forms and goods) has since the early 1900s been determined by a narrow range of firms. A handful of rules committees controls the game forms played by most people; a few manufacturers supply the goods at all levels; a limited number of professional groups establish guidelines on coaching, training, playing, and management techniques. As Raymond Williams describes this phenomenon of product convergence, "The general effect is of a relatively formed market, within

which the buyer's choice—the original rationale of the market—has been displaced to operate, in majority, within an already selected range."[51]

Ultimately, then, one must ask to what extent the rise of an integrated industry of sport, encompassing both production and distribution, has limited our choices of consumption, both in terms of the range of sports we play and in terms of the way we play that limited range. Has the rise of sport as a commodity meant the strangulation of sport as play? Have the fleeting or enduring "alternatives"—sandlot activities, governance by women, the Labor Sports Union—had any impact on this process?[52]

All of these questions merit further attention from historians. For some time we have recognized the outlines of modern sport and we have learned much about its social and cultural significance. But we still need more detailed research in many areas, including rules formation, the life cycles of teams and leagues, and the introduction of new goods and services. Many of these topics may be profitably explored by concentrating on the activities of entrepreneurs and, following Neil Harris's advice, reconstructing their alternatives and the choices they made.

Notes

1. Nancy Struna, "In Glorious Disarray: The Literature of American Sport History," *Research Quarterly* 56 (1985), 151–60; Karen J. Winkler, "A Lot More Than Trading Baseball Cards: Sport History Gains a New Respectability," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 5, 1985, 5, 9. For an opposite view—that serious analysis obfuscates the essence of sport—see Michael Hirschorn, "Eggheads Strike Out: Why Intellectuals Miss Baseball's Pitch," *New Republic*, September 9, 1985, 8–10.

2. The social history perspective is evident in the best surveys and in literature reviews. See Benjamin Rader, *American Sports: From the Age of Folk Games to the Age of Spectators* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1983), v; John Lucas and Ronald Smith, *Saga of American Sport* (Philadelphia, 1978), vi; Donald Mrozek, *Sport and American Mentality, 1880–1910* (Knoxville, 1983), xvi; Melvin Adelman, "Academicians and American Athletics: A Decade of Progress," *Journal of Sport History* 10 (spring 1983), 80–106; Stephen Hardy, "The City and the Rise of American Sport, 1820–1920," *Exercise and Sport Sciences Review* 9 (1981), 183–219. For an earlier treatment of this issue, see Jack Berryman, "Sport History as Social History?" *Quest* 20 (June 1973), 65–73.

3. My orientation in this essay has been especially influenced by several readings of Raymond Williams, *The Sociology of Culture* (New York, 1982); Thomas Cochran, *Business in American Life: A History* (New York, 1972); Louis Galambos, "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History," *Business History Review* 44 (autumn 1970); idem, "Technology, Political Economy, and

Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational Synthesis," ibid. 57 (winter 1983), 471–93; Melvin Adelman, *A Sporting Time: New York City and the Rise of Modern Athletics, 1820–70* (Urbana, Ill., 1986).

4. Neil Harris, "Cultural Institutions and American Modernization," *Journal of Library History* 16 (winter 1981), 38–39. For a similar argument, see David C. Hammack, "Problems in the Historical Study of Power in the Cities and Towns of the United States," *American Historical Review* 83 (1978), 323–49.

5. Jules Tygiel, *Baseball's Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson and His Legacy* (New York, 1983). For comprehensive views on management and sport management see Peter Drucker, *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (New York, 1974), and Guy Lewis and Herb Appenzeller, eds., *Successful Sport Management* (Charlottesville, Va., 1985).

6. Economic analysis includes Roger Noll, ed., *Government and the Sports Business* (Washington, D.C., 1974); idem, "Major League Sports," in *The Structure of American Industry,* 6th ed., ed. Walter Adams (New York, 1982); Ralph Adreano, *No Joy in Mudville: The Dilemma of Major League Baseball* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Jesse Markham and Paul Teplitz, *Baseball, Economics, and Public Policy* (Lexington, Mass., 1981); Henry Demmert, *The Economics of Professional League Sports* (Lexington, Mass., 1971). Studies from sport management include Guy Lewis, "The Sports Enterprise," *Arena Newsletter* 4 (October 1980), 1–11; idem, "Characteristics of Sport Marketing," in Lewis and Appenzeller, *Successful Sport Management,* 101–24.

7. Drucker, *Management,* 61–65, 77–78; Arthur Thompson and A. J. Strickland, *Strategy Formulation and Implementation* (Plano, Texas, 1983), 16.

8. Karl Marx, *Capital,* vol. 1, ed. Friedrich Engels (1887; reprint, Moscow, 1954), 43, 48; "Commodity," *Dictionary of Marxist Thought,* ed. Tom Bottomore et al. (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 86.

9. I am indebted to the pioneering effort of Richard Butsch, "The Commodification of Leisure: The Case of the Model Airplane Hobby and Industry," *Qualitative Sociology* 7 (1984), 217–35. See also Chris Rojek, *Capitalism and Leisure Theory* (London, 1985), ch. 5, which summarizes earlier work by the Frankfurt School on this question, and Robert Goldman, "We Make Weekends: Leisure and the Commodity Form," *Social Text* 8 (1984), 84–103.

10. John Loy, "The Nature of Sport: A Definitional Effort," *Quest* 10 (May 1968), 1–15; see also Allen Guttmann's chapter on definitions in *From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports* (New York, 1978), 1–14.

11. On the Beadle book see Harold Seymour, *Baseball: The Early Years* (New York, 1960), 44. On Spalding see Peter Levine, *A. G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball* (New York, 1985).

12. See Richard Gruneau's comments on the social construction of rule-making in *Class, Sports and Social Development* (Amherst, Mass., 1983), 19–52. For two interpretations of one rule change—baseball's "fly rule"—see Adelman, *A Sporting Time,* 129–31, and Warren Jay Goldstein, "Playing for Keeps: A History of American Baseball, 1857–1876" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1983), 80ff.

13. On utilities and services see Max Weber, *Economy and Society,* ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, 1978), 68. On recreation and sport as a service see Louis Mariciani, "A New Era in Recreation Marketing," *Athletic Business* 9 (October 1985), 31.

14. Fine studies of sport services include J. A. Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981); Greg Lee Carter, "Baseball in St. Louis, 1867–1875: An Historical Case Study in Civic Pride," *Missouri Historical Society Bulletin* 34 (July 1975), 253–63; Richard Mandell, *The Nazi Olympics* (New York, 1971).

15. See Guy M. Lewis, "Theodore Roosevelt's Role in the 1905 Football Controversy," *Research Quarterly* 40 (1969), 717–24. Ronald Smith has corrected Lewis on several points in "Harvard and Columbia and a Reconsideration of the 1905–6 Football Crisis," *Journal of Sport History* 8 (winter 1981), 5–19.

16. John Rickard Betts gave scattered attention to sporting goods in *America's Sporting Heritage* (Reading, Mass., 1974), and Peter Levine has excellent material on Spalding in *Spalding,* but in general this subject has been neglected.

17. See Arthur Cole, "Perspectives on Leisure-Time Business," *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History,* 2nd ser. 1 (summer 1964), 6; Fritz Redlich, "Leisure-Time Activities: A Historical, Sociological, and Economic Analysis," ibid. 3 (1965), 3–24; reprinted in idem, *Steeped in Two Cultures* (New York, 1971), 299. See also Sebastian DeGrazia, *Of Time, Work, and Leisure* (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), 189–211.

18. Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1930* (New York, 1967), 18. Indeed, the centrality of the profit motive has been questioned in Carl Betke, "Sports Promotion in the Western Canadian City: The Example of Edmonton," *Urban History Review* 12 (October 1983), 47–56, and Wray Vamplew, "The Economics of a Sport Industry: Scottish Gate-Money Football, 1890–1914," *Economic History Review* 35 (1982), 549–67. American magnates may have been more profit-oriented, but their activities demand closer scrutiny.

19. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *The Theory of Economic Development* (1934; reprint, Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 66. For discussion of Schumpeter and other theorists, see Jonathan Hughes, "Entrepreneurship," in *Encyclopedia of American Economic History,* ed. Glenn Porter (New York, 1980), 214–28; Joseph C. Pusateri, *A History of American Business* (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1984), 182.

20. Richard Mandell, *Sport: A Cultural History* (New York, 1984), 182.

21. See Adelman, *A Sporting Time,* chs. 6, 7; Stephen Freedman, "The Baseball Fad in Chicago, 1865–1870; An Exploration of the Role of Sport in the Nineteenth-Century City," *Journal of Sport History* 5 (summer 1978), 42–64.

22. On Rodgers, see Seymour, *Baseball* 293. On Colden, see Adelman, *A Sporting Time,* 51, 53. On Bigelow, see Roy Rosenzweig, *Eight Hours for What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870–1920* (New York, 1983), 172–83.

23. The best introduction to questions on sport and the state is Hart Cantelon and Richard Gruneau, eds., *Sport, Culture, and the Modern State* (Toronto, 1982).

24. For an excellent investigation into the question of state-supported facilities, see Alan Metcalfe, "Urban Response to Demand for Sporting Facilities: A Study of Ten Ontario Towns/Cities, 1919–1939," *Urban History Review* 12 (October 1983), 31–45. See also Judith Davidson, "The Federal Government and the Democratization of Public Recreational Sport: New York City, 1933–1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1983); Steven A. Riess, "Power Without Authority: Los Angeles Elites and the Construction of the Coliseum," *Journal of Sport History* 8 (spring 1981), 50–65.

25. Ted Vincent, *Mudville's Revenge: The Rise and Fall of American Sport* (New York, 1981), 13.

26. Riess, *Touching Base: Professional Baseball and American Culture in the Progressive Era* (Westport, Conn., 1980), 76; Lyle Hallowell, "The Political Economy of Violence and Control: A Sociological History of Professional Ice Hockey" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1981), 106–10.

27. James B. Connolly, "The Capitalization of Amateur Athletics," *Metropolitan Magazine*, July 1910, 443–54, cited in Levine, *Spalding*, 172. For a model useful to sport historians, see Lary May's analysis of early movie moguls in *Screening Out the Past: The Birth of Mass Culture and the Motion Picture Industry* (Chicago, 1983), 167–99. DeGrazia, *On Work, Time, and Leisure*, 148, suggests that the leisure industry had special appeal to immigrants.

28. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass, 1977); Glenn Porter and Harold Livesay, *Merchants and Manufacturers: Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth-Century Marketing* (Baltimore, 1971).

29. See, for instance, Robert N. Stern, "The Development of an Interorganizational Control Network: The Case of Intercollegiate Athletics," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24 (June 1979), 242–65; idem, "Competitive Influences on the Interorganizational Regulation of College Athletics," ibid. 26 (March 1981), 15–31; Alan Metcalfe, "Sport and Athletics: A Case Study of Lacrosse in Canada, 1840–1889," *Journal of Sport History* 3 (spring 1976), 1–19; Richard Gruneau, "Elites, Class, and Corporate Power in Canadian Sport: Some Preliminary Findings," in *Sociology of Sport*, ed. F. Landry and W. Orban (Miami, 1978), 201–42; Don Morrow, "The Little Men of Iron: The 1902 Montreal Hockey Club," *Canadian Journal of History of Sport* 12 (May 1981), 51–65.

30. Chandler, *Visible Hand*, 3. On the nature of the market, see Philip Kotler, *Marketing Management*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1984). For a useful introduction to mainstream economic theory of sports see Noll, "Major League Sports," 348–87.

31. Besides the standard histories of baseball, see Donn Rogosin, *Invisible Men: Life in Baseball's Negro Leagues* (New York, 1983), which outlines the continued importance of barnstorming to black players. Ronald Ladwig, "A History of Public Entertainments in Ada, Ohio, 1850–1920" (Ph.D. dissertation, Bowling Green State University, 1978), shows the importance of barnstorming from the viewpoint of the small town.

32. On the concentration movement see Naomi R. Lamoreaux, *The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), which contains an excellent bibliography. On the baseball "trust" and on the duplicity of magnates like Spalding, see Seymour, *Baseball*, 317–22, and Levine, *Spalding*, 66–69.

33. A valuable and well-written introduction to early representational sports is William J. Baker, *Sports in the Western World* (Totowa, N.J., 1982), 43–98; see also his excellent bibliographic essay.

34. On the importance of long-term structures, see Fernand Braudel, *On History*, trans. Sara Matthews (Chicago, 1980). Alan Ingham and I have argued for the centrality of a tension between capital and community in the history of modern sport. See our "Sport: Structuration, Subjugation and Hegemony," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 2 (1984), 85–103.

35. On football, see Lewis, "Theodore Roosevelt's Role," 717–24; Smith, "Harvard and Columbia," 5–19; Lucas and Smith, *Saga*, 229–49. Sources for the baseball wars are Seymour, *Baseball*, 135–61, 221–62, 307–24; David Q. Voigt, *American Baseball: From Gentlemen's Sport to the Commissioner System* (Norman, Okla., 1966), 121–69. On basketball, see Albert Applin, "From Muscular Christianity to the Marketplace: The History of Men's and Boy's Basketball in the United States, 1891–1957" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1982).

36. Edward Gross, "Sports Leagues: A Model for a Theory of Organizational Stratification," *International Review of Sport Sociology* 14 (1979), 103–12.

37. An excellent study of the need for networking is Morris Mott, "The first Pro Sports League on the Prairies: The Manitoba Baseball League of 1886," *Canadian Journal of History of Sport* 15 (December 1984), 62–69. See also Harold Evans, "Baseball in Kansas, 1867–1940," *Kansas Historical Quarterly* 9 (May 1940), 175–92. Myron Cope has material on the NFL's shakeout in *The Game That Was* (New York, 1974).

38. Stern, "The Development of a Control Network"; idem, "Competitive Influences"; Eugene Murdock, *Ban Johnson: Czar of Baseball* (Westport, Conn., 1982). *The Sporting News* had regular stories on the umpiring problem; the paper also editorialized at times on important administrative skills. See *The Sporting News*, June 25, 1887, on qualities needed for the presidency of the association.

39. On the nature of the "modern firm," see Chandler, *Visible Hand*, 3, 347, 373–74.

40. "Hillerich & Bradsby Co. Incorporated" (unpublished, undated release from H & B, in author's possession). For comments on the early days of home and artisan crafting, see John Krider, *Krider's Sporting Anecdotes* (1853; reprint, New

York, 1966), foreword, 70 ff; Seymour, *Baseball*, 7–8, 18; William Clarke, *Boy's Own Book* (New York, 1864), 17, 264; Patricia Click, "Leisure in the Upper South in the Nineteenth Century: A Study of Trends in Baltimore, Norfolk, and Richmond" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1980), 187. One exception to this antebellum situation was the billiard industry, dominated by Michael Phelan; see Adelman, *A Sporting Time*, 220–29.

41. Alexander Weyand, *American Football* (New York, 1926), 4.

42. See Levine, *Spalding*, 71–96. Levine found articles of use to me in *The Sporting News:* March 30, 1895; March 31, 1896; July 1, 1899.

43. *The Sporting Goods Dealer*, a trade journal, had histories in the following issues: July 1948 (Rawlings), September 1946 (Wilson), February 1951 (Spalding). On the bicycle industry see David Hounshell, *From the American System to Mass Production, 1800–1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States* (Baltimore, 1984), 189–216. The Brunswick Company has recently published a history: Rick Kogan, *Brunswick: The Story of an American Company from 1845 to 1985* (Skokie, Ill., 1985). I would like to thank Mr. Grant Burden and Miss Alice Flint for help in gathering material on the sporting-goods industry.

44. Betts, *America's Sporting Heritage*, 76; Reach plant statistics in *Sporting Goods Dealer*, October 1899, 4–5; 1904 *Field* article reprinted in special 75th anniversary issue of ibid., October 1974, 110. On the technical meaning of mass production, see Hounshell, *American System*.

45. Applin, "From Muscular Christianity to the Marketplace," 55; Levine, *Spalding*, 75–78; Albert A. Pope, "The Bicycle Industry," in *One Hundred Years of American Commerce*, ed. Chauncey M. DePew (New York, 1895), 551. On the relationship between manufacturers, advertising, and American culture, see Daniel Boorstin, *The Americans: The Democratic Experience* (New York, 1973), 89–164, 307–448, 525–56; Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Roots of American Consumer Culture* (New York, 1976); Richard Wightman Fox and T. J. Jackson Lears, eds., *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980* (New York, 1983).

46. *The Sporting News*, September 22, 1902; Hollowell, "Political Economy of Violence and Control," 131. On the brutalizing aspects of boxing gloves, see Elliott Gorn, "The Manly Art: Bare-Knuckle Prize Fighting and the Rise of American Sports" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1983), 480–81. For comments on exercise equipment and physical culture, see Mrozek, *Sport and American Mentality*, 84–88.

47. Hughes, "Entrepreneurship," 214. For an excellent look at how the political environment could constrain as well as enable cagey promoters, see Riess, "In the Ring and Out: Professional Boxing in New York, 1896–1920," in *Sport in America*, ed. Donald Spivey (Westport, Conn., 1985), 95–120.

48. Guttmann, *From Ritual to Record;* Alan Ingham and John Loy, "The Social System of Sport: A Humanistic Perspective," *Quest* 19 (1973), 3–23; Gruneau, *Class, Sports and Social Development;* Alan Ingham, "Methodology in the Sociology of Sport: From Symptoms of Malaise to Weber for a Cure," *Quest* 3 (1979), 187–215; Rob Beamish, "Sport and the Logic of Capitalism," in Cantelon and Gruneau, *Sport, Culture and the Modern State*, 141–98; Adelman, *A Sporting Time*, 3–10.

49. The links between commercialization and the erosion of player control are quite complex. Beamish and Hallowell provide suggestions about hockey, while Adelman and Goldstein consider baseball.

50. Adelman, *A Sporting Time*, 115. On the notion of life cycles, see John Kimberly and Robert Miles, *The Organizational Life-Cycle* (San Francisco, 1980); Henry Mintzberg, "Power and Organization LIfe Cycles," *Academy of Management Review* 9 (1984), 207–24.

51. Williams, *Sociology of Culture*, 105. Limited space prevented me from exploring here the emergence of professional organizations. Their role in the industry has been significant in the twentieth century, since professional organizations have had much to say about playing styles, rules, and equipment. For useful works on professions see Burton Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism* (New York, 1976); Thomas Haskell, ed., *The Authority of Experts* (Bloomington, Ind., 1984). For interpretations of the sport professions see Mrozek, *Sport and American Mentality*, 67–102; Hal Lawson, "Problem Setting for Physical Education and Sport," *Quest* 36 (1984), 48–60.

52. The question of freedom versus constraint in sport has been ably outlined in the dialogue between Richard Gruneau and Allen Guttmann in the *Journal of Sport History* 7 (winter 1980), 68–86, and ibid. 11 (spring 1984), 97–99. Works dealing with alternatives include Rob Ruck, "Sandlot Seasons: Sport in Black Pittsburgh" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1983); Joan Hult, "The Governance of Athletics for Girls and Women: Leadership by Women Physical Educators," *Research Quarterly* 56 (centennial issue, 1985), 64–77; Mark Naison, "Righties & Lefties: The Communist Party and Sports During the Great Depression," *Radical America* 13 (July–August 1979), 47–59.