Topic: No Wires Attached: Reversing Cultural Limitations Imposed on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilots

Reversing Cultural Limitations Imposed on RPA Pilots

Remotely Piloted Aircrafts are small unmanned aircrafts that are operated by highly skilled pilots. They are being used as a warfare tool by the military as a modern technique during covert mission. based on recent history, military planners have deduced that the nature of future wars will be restricted to intrastate and regional conflicts. And hence wars such as World War One and two where the military used balloons are definitely not going to be the war in the time to come. The RPAs have quality features of the modern combat [footnoteRef:2]. [2: Hardison, Chaitra M., Michael G. Mattock, and Maria C. Lytell. Incentive Pay for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Career Fields. RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE SANTA MONICA CA, 2012. Pp22]

Remotely Piloted Aircrafts play a vital role in the modern world due to their advanced features, sensors and capabilities such that they can perform a safe and secure mission in hostile or dangerous environments[footnoteRef:3]. Hence risking no human life which is very important in a mission. The question concerning implementation of the RPA are not so much about if they should be developed but how to assimilate them into the Air Force organization. The Air Force have made a point to develop top notch sensors which stress on reconnaissance (ISR) applications, intelligence and surveillance[footnoteRef:4]. This dissertation will address on the future improvement of the RPAs applications, this will increase the drone performance for future wars. [3: Menthe, Lance, Myron Hura, and Carl Rhodes. The Effectiveness of Remotely Piloted Aircraft in a Permissive Hunter-Killer Scenario. RAND Corporation, 2014. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR276/RAND_RR276.pdf. (accessed 17 Dec 15).] [4: Michaels, Jim. ‘Drones Change “Top Gun” Culture of Air Force’, USA Today. 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/30/drone-wars/1737991/. (Accessed 19th October 2018)]

During the First World War RPVs were used as drones. RPVs are basically a type of RPAs the difference is with RPVs the operator is not really protected but just relocated to a safe remote area unlike for the RPAs the operator is completely eliminated from harm’s way [footnoteRef:5]. Today with the help of advanceadvanced technology the RPVs are designed to carry equipment’s for counter measures such as jammers and also perform surveillance with the help of their highly quality Infra-Red cameras and imagers. [5: Ritt, Steven. ‘Drones: Recreational/Hobby Owners Web-based Registration Process’, The National Law Review, 3 (2), pp. 34-78. 2015.]

In the current world countries such as the United States of America, Israel, France and the United Kingdom have managed to embrace RPA development projects. It has been declared that in the near future the RPAs will fully replace mission assignments being carried out human beings. These will reduce casualties of human lives lost and will also be cheaper thus undertaking such a research is a good enough reason[footnoteRef:6] [6: Bartsch, Ron, James Coyne, and Katherine Gray. Drones in Society: Exploring the strange new world of unmanned aircraft. Taylor & Francis, 2016. Pp6]

RPAs has a lot of advantages as compared to their disadvantages. Some of them are they can destroy targets, jam enemy’s frequencies, provide real time intelligence, act as radio relays[footnoteRef:7]. On the contrary they are detected faster as they alert enemy’s electronic systems and also creates unemployment. This raises the question in regards to their capability to provide real time information. It is for these reasons’ researchers are in doubt whether the RPAs will be able to stand and fight alone or it would only supplement an Air Force [footnoteRef:8]. [7: Tang, Lina, and Guofan Shao. "Drone remote sensing for forestry research and practices." Journal of Forestry Research 26.4 (2015): 791-797. Pp4] [8: Pappalardo, Joe. ‘The Future for UAVs in the U.S. Air Force’, Popular Mechanics. Pp37]

Fundamentals of war clearly explicate that the element of surprise has made a huge contribution to success. Therefore, the denial of surprise is paramount to a potential intruder in a military context. Gaining intelligence is the key factor in a military operation, it was evident in the Second World War during the Arab Israel war between 1967 and 1973 where use of aerial reconnaissance was used which enabled the Israelite to use force multiplication through the acquired intelligence. This showed how aerial reconnaissance is important when it comes to winning wars. The RPAs have proved to be worth when it comes to surveillance and reconnaissance during war.

Research Question

1. How can the Air Force foster a positive culture that embraces RPAs and RPA operators in order to ensure they are used to their full potential?

2. How can the negative culture associated with RPA operators be eliminated from within the Air Force?

Research Aims and Objectives

The aim of the paper is to highlight some of the issues experienced the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilots as well how reversing the cultural limitations will impact their productivity. The objectives include;

1. To evaluate the elements that hamper the development of positive culture among RPA operators;

2. To evaluate the future of RPA operations and their use in warfare in future operations; and

3. To recommend feasible solutions for fostering positive culture for RPA Operations.

The USAF’s own projections anticipate a quickly evolving operational environment that by 2038 will require a much more sophisticated use of remote and autonomous systems to achieve mission objectives and balance risk appropriately.4 Future RPAs would be able to defeat enemy radar, carry out multiple mission sets, and use onboard sensors to prevent collision.5 Experts such as General Norman Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, believes the future of the USAF lies within unmanned assets, due to technology outpacing the capabilities of human beings, such as interface devices that have reached their logical limits [footnoteRef:10]. [10: Zacharias, Mark. ‘Operating Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft for Irregular Warfare’, United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. 2011.]

Unfortunately, fundamental issue of peer acceptance and conventional views regarding “humans in the cockpit” as somehow essential to the services identity have the potential to stall tactical advancement of RPAs. The 2014 Air Force Magazine article featuring Robert Gates, a former Secretary of Defense employee, highlighted that the USAF was restricted in terms of “high-tech air-to-air combat missions and strategic bombing against major nation-states”, and they seemed to envision the way those missions would be executed as exclusively one with people physically in the cockpit [footnoteRef:11]. As such, Gates felt that the USAF was not acting in the best interest of joint forces on the ground in combat zones. [11: Pappalardo, Joe. ‘The Future for UAVs in the U.S. Air Force’, Popular Mechanics. Pp37]

Perennially dismissed as merely video game operators, RPA pilots have faced an uphill battle since the beginning of the GWOT. Some critics have called RPA operators “less than true pilots”, and argue that “the very idea of a pilotless aircraft is dishonorable”.[footnoteRef:12] The root of the problem is a cultural gap between generations of traditional pilots and the modern generation of RPA operators that endure a different kind of stress. This failure is illustrated by the perception of one’s value. Pilots do not believe that the stress of, for example, flying an F-105 over Vietnam translates to what RPA pilots are facing today. [12: Woods, Chris. Sudden justice: America's secret drone wars. Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp179]

This perception could be part of the reason why RPA pilots are fighting such an uphill battle, when compared to traditional pilots in the USAF[footnoteRef:13]. However, practical experience showed time and again that there is no psychological distance between the actions of the aircraft and its operators. For example, Creech Air Force Base has implemented a program wherein a full-time psychologist is assigned to its wing. Crews are required to make contact after any kinetic activity, in an effort to mitigate stresses related to combat. [13: Cooke, Nancy J., et al. "Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: A Human Systems Integration Perspective." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting. Vol. 58. No. 1. Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014. Pp56- 165]

Many publications have identified problems in the RPA community. A 2011 report written by the USAF SAB identified pitfalls in the USAF RPA program that include, limited communications systems, training, crew selection, and sub-standard Ground Control Stations (GCS). Moreover, a 2014 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighted recruitment, development, and retention issues preventing the RPA enterprise from flourishing, potentially compromising a significant strategic air asset[footnoteRef:14]. Additionally, Air Force Magazine featured a report in 2014 highlighting former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in which he summarizes “next-war-itis” struggles he encountered with USAF senior leadership[footnoteRef:15]. [14: Government Accountability Office. Air Force: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned Aerial System Pilots. April 2014. GAO-14-316.] [15: Tirpak. John. ‘Gates Versus the Air Force’, Air Force Magazine. 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2014/March%202014/0314gates.aspx (Accessed 19th October 2018)]

Gates explained the misunderstanding among USAF senior leadership regarding conventional weapons, such as next generation fighters and bombers, dismissing the urgent requirement for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. In a recent (2015) Air & Space Power Journal article, Captain Michael Byrnes illuminated the negative cultural atmosphere RPA pilots are being forced to contend with, claiming fighter pilots have an unfair advantage, when stacked against their RPA counterparts for promotion[footnoteRef:16]. However, although these articles and reports identify cultural issues facing the RPA community, none of them address issues or solutions relating to the lack of synergy with regards to the USAF strike community and RPAs[footnoteRef:17]. [16: Blair, Maj David J., Helms, Capt. Nick. “The Swarm, the Cloud, and the Importance of Getting There First”, Air & Space Power Journal, July – August 2013. http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/digital/pdf/articles/Jul-Aug-2013/F-Blair.pdf. (accessed 10 Dec 15).] [17: Tirpak. John. ‘Gates Versus the Air Force’, Air Force Magazine. 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2014/March%202014/0314gates.aspx (Accessed 19th October 2018)]

This research will identify key limitations within the USAF strike community that hinder necessary RPA advancement. Not only will these findings become a force multiplier for the broader USAF strike community, it will serve as a playbook for the entire Department of Defense (DOD)[footnoteRef:18]. By providing an accurate sight-picture of gaps in the utilization of RPAs, and recommending solutions to remedy those issues, sister branches of service will be able to apply lessons learned from the experience and apply it to similar weapons platforms. Moreover, this research will provide senior leadership the necessary documentation of limitations affecting a significant weapon system within the USAF. The identification of these limitations, and the remedy for them, has the potential to foster tactical progress for current and future RPA operations. [18: No Author. USAF RPA Vector Vision and Enabling Concepts 2013-2038. 2013. http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts2013-2038.pdf. (accessed 22 Nov 15) ]

This study will give a unique elucidation on how the US Air Force can nurture a positive custom that adopts RPAs and RPA operators in order to guarantee that they are used to their ultimate potential.

Structure Outline

The dissertation paper consists of Section 1 which includes the introduction, research questions, research aims and objectives, problem background and significance and thesis. Literature review is the next section that deals with the background of the RPA history as it identifies aspects such as Inception of the RPA program and Global War on Terrorism that includes Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Unified Protector. Section III of the paper will look into the problems and key issues facing the RPA pilots whereas section IV will focus on the recommendations to dismantle the cultural barriers. Finally, section V will look emphasize on the conclusion based on overcoming Stigma’s placed on RPA operators.

Literature Review

Section II: Background

RPA History

In the past few years the interest for remotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs) commonly known as UAV or drones has really exploded and it is currently being used worldwide. This technology has widely spread from previously being mostly used by military to now the where the private sectors are also into operational.

In the July of the year 1849, there was the recording of the earliest use of an unmanned aerial vehicle in warfare, which served as a balloon carrier. This was the predecessor of the aircraft carrier in the first violent use of air power in naval aviation. The Austrian forces blockading the city of Venice endeavored to launch 200 inflammable balloons at the surrounded city. Mainly, the balloons were launched from land, whereas others were launched from the SMS Vulcano; an Austrian ship. Only about one bomb fell successfully in the city, while most of the other balloons, due to a change in the direction of the wind after launching, missed their target. In fact, some drifted back over the Austrian lines and some towards the launching ship Vulcano (Byrnes)[footnoteRef:19]. [19: Byrnes, Michael. ‘Dark Horizon: Airpower Revolution on a Razor’s Edge’, Air & Space Power Journal. 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2015-Sep-Oct/F-Byrnes.pdf. 38. (Accessed 19th October 2018)]

Innovations of UAV dates back to the early 1900s. They were originally for military personnel serving as practice targets. The development of UAV went on during World War I. It was the Dayton-Wright Airplane Company that invented an aerial torpedo that was pilotless and that was set to explode at a predetermined time[footnoteRef:20]. [20: Fahlstrom, Paul, and Thomas Gleason. Introduction to UAV systems. John Wiley & Sons, 2012. Pp15]

Despite balloons lacking for inclusion in the category of UAV in present day, it had been a technology that the Austrians had been attempting to develop many months before, which later

bred further advancements[footnoteRef:21]. In the year 1915, the British military used aerial photography in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and that would aid to award them with an advantage. They had been empowered to capture in excess of 1,500 sky-view maps of Germany’s trench fortifications in the territory.  [21: Dombrowski, Peter J., and Eugene Gholz. Buying military transformation: Technological innovation and the defense industry. Columbia University Press, 2006. Pp46]

In 1916 during World War I, the United States commenced the development of UAV technology creating the first pilotless aircraft. It would soon follow that the U.S Army made the Kettering Bug. As the development UAV technology went on, in 1930, the U.S Navy started experimentation on radio-controlled aircraft, which resulted in the building of the Curtiss N2C-2 drone, which took place in 1937[footnoteRef:22]. It was during World War II that Reginald Denny developed the initial remote-controlled aircraft named Radio plane OQ-2. It was the first mass produced UAV in the United States, and marked the breakthrough in the manufacture and supply of drones for the US military [footnoteRef:23]. [22: Keane, John F., and Stephen S. Carr. "A brief history of early unmanned aircraft." Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 32.3 (2013): 558-571.] [23: Jean, Grace V. “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Fuel Demand for Satellite Bandwidth.” National Defense Magazine, July 2011. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/July/Pages/RemotelyPilotedAircraftFuelsDemandforSatelliteBandwidth.aspx. (accessed 18 Nov 15)]

Previously, drones have been known to be expensive and unreliable toys, but then this attitude started changing[footnoteRef:24]. Part of the contribution to this change was the 1982 Israeli Air Force’s victory over the Syrian Air Force. Israeli forces used both manned aircraft and UAVs to destroy a dozen of aircraft owned by the Syrian military with negligible losses. Furthermore, in the 1980’s, the Pioneer UAV Program would be created by the US military to satisfy the need for cheaper unmanned aircrafts for their fleet operations. In 1986 a new drone was created from a joint project between the U.S and Israel militaries would in a combined project to create a new drone in 1986. This drone, the RQ2 Pioneer, was an average-sized aircraft for reconnaissance[footnoteRef:25].  [24: Michaels, Jim. ‘Drones Change “Top Gun” Culture of Air Force’, USA Today. 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/30/drone-wars/1737991/. (Accessed 19th October 2018) ] [25: Ronconi, Giordano Bruno Antoniazzi, Thaís Jessinski Batista, and Victor Merola. "The Utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for Military Action in Foreign Airspace." UFRGSMUN: UFRGS Model United Nations Journal (2014): 137-182.]

More recent case, such as in 1990, micro and miniature UAVs would be introduced into the field of weaponry. In the year 2000 in Afghanistan, the U.S forces deployed the Predator drone in a search mission for Osama Bin Laden. Initially, drones were only associated with the military, but the scene is starting to change. Amazon in 2014 projected using UAVs for package delivery to their customers, while some real estate organization have started using drones in shooting promotional videos. Globally, the use of drones has increased at a rapid rate [footnoteRef:26]. [26: Young, John. ‘Unified Multi-domain Decision Making: Cognitive Radio and Autonomous Vehicle Convergence’, Faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 2012 pp23]

i) Overview of ISR

The initials ISR signify the synchronized and unified acquisition, dispensation and facilitation of opportune, precise, appropriate, articulate and guaranteed info and intelligence to substantiate commander’s conducting of actions. Sea, air, space, and land platforms are assigned critical ISR roles and responsibilities to support military operations in general[footnoteRef:27]. By assembling all ISR assets, giving a period of engagement, cross-cueing and layering of the different sensors, the knowledge concerning a certain target, for instance, is clarified and broadened. ISR includes various activities that are related to the preparation and operation of the systems used in collecting, processing, and dissemination of data that supports the current as well as future operations conducted by the military [footnoteRef:28]. [27: D'Agostino, Davi M. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconaissance (ISR): Actions are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DoD's ISR Enterprise. DIANE Publishing, 2011. Pp19 ] [28: Haider, Major Andre, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre. September 2014. https://www.japcc.org/portfolio/remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-in-contested-environments-a-vulnerability-analysis/. (accessed 18 Nov 15). ]

The Department of Defense’s definition of intelligence is the knowledge and information that is obtained through observing, investigating, analyzing, or comprehending. The phrase surveillance and reconnaissance denote the means by which information is perceived. In practice, surveillance is a systematic observation conducted for the purposes of collecting whatever all available data. On the other hand, reconnaissance refers to a specific mission that is carried out for purposes of obtaining some specific information or data[footnoteRef:29]. In summation, numerous analysts uphold the notion that the United States is currently facing ‘asymmetric warfare’ in which mediums such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, and biological weapons are used to attack the interests of the public. [29: Dismukes, Tamilyn S. Surveillance versus Reconnaissance: An Entropy Based Model. No. AFIT/OR-MS/ENS/12-09. AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT, 2012. ]

In retaliation to the transformed threat, the U.S. military jointly with the society at large have undergone tremendous changes in the level of available technologies. The vast upsurges in both information processing technologies, being the collection of data and its storing, and communications processing technology like increased networking and bandwidth, seem to be capable to completely transform the way to equip, organize and employ military forces[footnoteRef:30]. [30: Prunckun, Henry. How to Undertake Surveillance and Reconnaissance: From a Civilian and Military Perspective. Pen and Sword, 2015. Pp42]

Fusion is a term used in the military referring to the harnessing of all intelligence types to create a fused picture of a certain threat. The intelligence community’s basic structure is made up of the various intelligence source[footnoteRef:31]. This is to say that each piece of intelligence is identifiable by the source that it came from, be it from human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), or measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). Additionally, these data are usually stored in distinct communications networks and databases whose designs support the unique characteristics of the data that has been collected [footnoteRef:32]. For example, a piece of image has different requirement from a communication intercept pertaining to software, bandwidth, and hardware for transmission. Also, they each fill entirely different field types in a database. [31: Smith, Roger D. "MI-SAF: SIMULATED INTELLIGENCE DATA FUSION FOR MILITARY TRAINING." Pp22] [32: Connable, Ben. Military intelligence fusion for complex operations: A new paradigm. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA, 2012. Pp34 ]

Still, the military cannot effortlessly use distinct SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and IMINT data. They require one fused analysis of the unique threat. Despite the truth in this statement, the rapidity and accuracy with which the changed force is anticipated to act sets this fusion aside making it more necessary, because the information about the enemy is presented in a timely and clear manner.

ii) Weaponizing RPAs

The national intelligence community supports that of the military intelligence. The national intelligence community was under tight scrutiny even before the September 11th attacks[footnoteRef:33]. Thus, those aspects relevant to the national intelligence community’s operations that Congress has direct interest in impact the military intelligence’s quality. Moreover, the DOD’s plans for increasing capabilities in ISR are a concern to Congress regarding the cost, the matching of possibly rival efforts for improving the data quality and the flow of intelligence, and the support of military leadership[footnoteRef:34]. [33: Benjamin, Medea. Drone warfare: Killing by remote control. Verso Books, 2013. Pp1] [34: Sandvik, Kristin Bergtora, and Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, eds. The good drone. Taylor & Francis, 2016. Pp26 ]

The initial testing of boosted, missile-equipped drones was concluded in the year 2001. It was not long after the attacks of September 11 that the foremost weaponized Predators, fortified with designated MQ-1L and Hellfire missiles, were seen flying over Kandahar and Kabul. The first drone firing Hellfire’s in combat was in Afghanistan. Cumulatively, it had flown 261 forays in Afghanistan, which totaled 2,700 hours. In 2003, the Air Force would donate it displaying it at the Air and Space Museum in the same year [footnoteRef:35]. [35: Swarts, Phillip. “F-35 Helmet Costs $400,000 – 4 Times That of Predecessor.” Air Force Times, 26 October 2015. (accessed 4 Nov 15).]

Despite the use of drones has triggering vigorous controversy, the technology itself can in theory greatly decrease the ratio of civilian to combatant casualties. Similar to all new weaponry systems, drones have posed some difficult questions. Some counterterrorism officials, the Members of Congress, and human rights lawyers have questioned exactly the way in which military and intelligence officials determine targeting decisions. They also ask how attacks conducted by drones affect the perception of civilian populations about the United States and how they comport with the international law [footnoteRef:36]. [36: Byrnes, Michael. ‘Dark Horizon: Airpower Revolution on a Razor’s Edge’, Air & Space Power Journal. 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2015-Sep-Oct/F-Byrnes.pdf. 38. (Accessed 19th October 2018) ]

b) The Developing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)

Despite that the US alliance in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is extensive, the outcomes are minimal. Since the 9/11, the fight against the Al-Qaeda group has brought about ‘a battle of ideas’ existing between the westerners and the jihadist value systems. With revolt and extremism on the rise, both Afghanistan and Iraq are far from reaching the goal of becoming liberal democracies. Moreover, the already enfeebled Alliance has begun fracturing, with chains of command that are jumbled and rules of engagement that are highly restrictive[footnoteRef:37]. [37: Pickup, Sharon. Global War on Terrorism: DoD Needs to More Accurately Capture and Report the Costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. DIANE Publishing, 2009. Pp3]

Al-Qaeda’s origin traces back to the Soviet–Afghan War that lasted from December of 1979 to February 1989. The UK, Pakistan, US, People's Republic of China, and Saudi Arabia nations were in support of the Islamist Afghan, mujahedeen guerillas, who were fighting against the military forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Several ‘Afghan-Arabs’ volunteered to join in the fight with the Soviets, who included Osama bin Laden. No evidence existed of the guerillas receiving any external assistance.

In May of 1996, a group called World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (WIFJAJC), under the sponsorship of bin Laden (and later re-formed as al-Qaeda), started clustering into a large operations’ base in Afghanistan, where the Islamist radical command of the Taliban had held power in early 1996[footnoteRef:38]. In August of the same year, Bin Laden avowed jihad targeting the United States. Osama bin Laden, in February 1998, signed a fatwa, being the head of the Al-Qaeda, declaring war on Israel and the West. In was later in May that the Al-Qaeda released a video showing the declaration of war the West[footnoteRef:39]. [38: Buzan, Barry. "Will the ‘global war on terrorism ‘be the new Cold War?" International affairs 82.6 (2006): 1101-1118. ] [39: Taylor, Meredith. "A Rhetorical Analysis of Messages to America by Osama bin Laden." (2013). Pp2]

It would later come to pass that on 7th August 1998, the Al-Qaeda organization orchestrated a strike on the US embassies based in Tanzania and Kenya. The attack killed 224 people, who included 12 American national. The then U.S. President Bill Clinton, in retaliation launched an operation dubbed Infinite Reach. It was a bombing campaign in Afghanistan and Sudan against some targets the U.S. proclaimed had associations with the WIFJAJC group, but some have questioned if a pharmaceutical plant that is found in Sudan was used in the capacity of a chemical warfare facility[footnoteRef:40]. The plant had been used for production of much of the territory's antimalarial drugs, along with approximately half of the pharmaceutical needs of Sudan. The strikes did not successfully kill any of the leaders of the WIFJAJC or the Taliban groups. [40: Rosthauser, Richard Craig. "Terrorism Conflict: How the United States Responds To Al Qaeda Violence and Expressed Grievances." (2010). Pp13 ]

a) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)

Operation Enduring Freedom refers to the official term the Bush administration used to refer to the War in Afghanistan, along with three other smaller military activities that are included under the umbrella of the Global War on Terror. These globally orchestrated operations are purposed to hunt for and terminate any fighters associated with Al-Qaeda or its affiliates[footnoteRef:41]. [41: Harrington Lamorie, Jill. "Operation Iraqi freedom/operation enduring freedom: Exploring wartime death and bereavement." Social work in health care 50.7 (2011): 543-563.]

i) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

In this case ISR is a vital component in contemporary military operations.  Whether operating at sea, on land, and in the air, ISR systems work best when they are capable of providing information that is actionable for guiding decisions during military missions[footnoteRef:42]. The person making the decision could be a squad leader, a theater-level commander, at, or any personnel that fall in levels in between. [42: Best, Richard A. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Acquisition: Issues for Congress. DIANE Publishing, 2010. Pp78 ]

There are essentially three primary modalities that today’s ISR uses while employing different electronic sensors’ types for capturing information. The first are the electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensors. These are basically very advanced (sets of) cameras, which form streams of thorough gigapixel imagery. The second is radar, which is commonly used during targeting along with other combat functions.

It is also used for ISR imaging, for instance, the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) that is used on airborne platforms for creating comprehensive images of the ground through the cover of clouds. Thirdly is the signals Intelligence (SIGINT) systems that use multiple antennas for detecting signals that are of interest and then determining the location of the signal origin, often prompted to detect and locate within a short time span.

Each of the modalities of ISR requires a rooted computing system, programmed to process their sensor data streams at the actual time.  Each of the sensor types has its unique processing requirements[footnoteRef:43]. However, some types of sensor applications are usually arrayed together in multi-mission loads.  Thus, for instance, a particular ISR payload may require supporting SIGINT, seeking for signals of interest, and the EO/IR capabilities to generate an image of the location of the signal source.   This form of application complexity can bring about challenges for designers of ISR system. [43: Wicks, Michael C., et al. Sensors Technology and Advanced Signal Processing Concepts for Layered Warfare/Layered Sensing. No. AFRL-RY-RS-TR-2010-100. AIR FORCE RESEARCH LAB ROME NY SENSORS DIRECTORATE, 2010.]

ii) Close Air Support (CAS)

In military operations, close air support (CAS) is definable as air action, such as air strikes, conducted by fixed or rotary-winged aircraft targeted towards hostile targets who may be in close proximity to some friendly forces. It may require a detailed incorporation of each air mission with movement and fire of these attacks with, aircraft cannons, glide bombs, aerial bombs, missiles, machine guns, rockets, and sometimes directed-energy artillery like lasers[footnoteRef:44]. [44: Matsumura, John, John Gordon IV, and Randall Steeb. Defining an Approach for Future Close Air Support Capability. RAND Arroyo Center Santa Monica United States, 2017. PP36 ]

iii) Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)

Time Sensitive Targets (TST) refers to those targets that in need of immediate response due to the danger they pose (or may pose shortly after) a danger to a friendly operation or may be highly lucrative, momentarily opportune targets[footnoteRef:45]. TST is highly prevalent during operations. It one which has evolved from what was called artillery spotting in the First World War era, to a hunt for V1 and V2 sites during World War II, to Scud-hunting during the Gulf War era, and ‘into current operations’ with the use of UAVs[footnoteRef:46]. [45: Kennedy, Caroline & Rogers, James I. ‘Virtuous drones?’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 19, (2), pp. 211–227. 2015. ] [46: Orban, TSgt Brian. "Time-sensitive targeting adds combat flexibility." Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Print News 18 (2003). Pp1]

In the course of this evolution, the time it takes to seek out a target and duly prosecute has lessened significantly, in spite of a marked increase in both the quantity of the information that is being transmitted and the range existing between the decision maker and the target. The two aspects to TST are prosecuting targets rapidly and doing so at the most opportune time in harmony with other relevant forces[footnoteRef:47]. [47: Cetinkaya, Orhan, and Yakup Yildirim. Architecture Considerations of Time Sensitive Targeting and NATO TST Tool. NATO COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION AGENCY BRUSSELS (BELGIUM), 2013]

iv) High Value Targets (HVTs)

The phrase a high-value target (HVT) is a military terminology used in the US Forces referring to resource or person that an enemy commander requires in order for a mission to be. The term is widely used in the news media to refer to, for example, Osama Bin Laden and other high-ranking officials of the Al-Qaeda group. These individuals are considered critical for their operations to be completed. The Former president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was referred to as High Value Target Number One before the US military captured him.

Often, soldiers are requested to capture an HVT alive. incase if that is impossible, they are given the clearance to shoot to kill the HVT. A number of tasked Joint Special Operations Task Forces including Task Force 121, Task Force 145, and Task Force 11 are established for the primary purposes to capture and/or kill these high-value targets. The forces that are assigned to these tasked forces often include units that are mainly from SOCOM and the Joint Special Operations Command. These could be from such groups as the US Army 75th Ranger Regiment, US Army Delta Force, US Navy SEALs, US Navy SEAL Team Six, and the British Army's Special Air Service (SAS). The term is also associated with secret US Department of Defense programs for capturing and interrogating leaders of terrorist groups [footnoteRef:48]. [48: Hennigan, J. ‘Air Force Proposes $3-Billion Plan to Vastly Expand its Drone Program’, Los Angeles Times. 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-drone-pilots-20151210-story.html. (Accessed 19th October 2018) ]

b) Operation Unified Protector (OUP)

Operation Unified Protector (OUP) is essentially an operation by NATO in 2011 that was used to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions of between 1970 and 1973 regarding the Libyan Civil War, and which was later adopted on 26th February and 17th March 2011, respectively[footnoteRef:49]. These resolutions aimed at imposing sanctions on some vital members of the Gaddafi government as they authorized NATO to implement a no-fly zone, an arms embargo, and short of foreign occupation as they protect the Libyan civilians and as well as areas they populate[footnoteRef:50]. [49: Mueller, Karl P., ed. Precision and purpose: airpower in the Libyan Civil War. Rand Corporation, 2015. Pp45] [50: Engelbrekt, Kjell, Marcus Mohlin, and Charlotte Wagnsson, eds. The NATO intervention in Libya: lessons learned from the campaign. Routledge, 2013. Pp17 ]

The gradual expansion started on 23rd March 2011, in the course of the following weeks, as they integrated more aspects of the multinational military intervention that had started on the 19th during the same month in response to the UN resolutions. As of 31st of March 2011, it incorporated all international operations that were in Libya. NATO’s support was vital if the rebel was to topple over those forces that were loyal to Gaddafi. An end to the operation was officially marked on 31st October 2011, once the rebel leaders had declared Libya a liberated nation on the 23rd of October as they had formalized in the National Transitional Council[footnoteRef:51]. [51: Chivvis, Christopher S. Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the limits of liberal intervention. Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp17]

i) Air Interdiction (AI)

Air interdiction (AI), also called deep air support (DAS), isentails using aircraft attacks on preventative basis against enemy targets, who may not necessarily be considered an immediate threat, so as to disrupt, hinder, or delay, enemy engagement of friendly forces that may occur later[footnoteRef:52]. It is considered a core capability of practically all military air forces, and has been conducted during war since the First World War [footnoteRef:53]. [52: Phifer, Michiko. A Handbook of Military Strategy and Tactics. New Delhi: Vij Books India Private Limited, 2012. Internet resource pp180] [53: Tirpak. John. ‘Gates versus the Air Force’, Air Force Magazine. 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2014/March%202014/0314gates.aspx (Accessed 19th October 2018) ]

ii) Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR)

SCAR is defined as a mission that is flown with the aim of detecting any targets and organizing and carrying out attacks or reconnaissance on the targets. SCAR operations are conducted in specific geographic area as it is characterized by elements of the command and control interface used in coordinating multiple flights, detecting and attacking targets, neutralizing enemy defenses and the provision of battle damage assessment.

iii) Successes and Significant Contributions

Based on the Operation Unified Protector its main aim is to enhance the chances for success during missions and other military related activities. The contributions especially in Libya are witnessed by the use of both military and civil companies who have embraced comprehensive approach as a means of attaining high levels objectives and goals [footnoteRef:54]. Furthermore, the successes and significance of the contributions can be effectively witnessed by the ability to ensure large numbers of individuals are evacuated as well as enhanced secure corridors to facilitated coordination within the area of operation. [54: Grant, T. J., ed. Network Topology in Command and Control: Organization, Operation, and Evolution: Organization, Operation, and Evolution. IGI Global, 2014. Pp2]

Section III. Problem and Key Issues Facing RPA pilots

Pilots have over the years been part of revolutionary technology that characterizes the aviation industry. Senior leadership have witnessed major changes throughout the industry that have managed to differentiate them from the current pilots. Experience, generational attributes and exposure are some the aspects that differentiate them from each other since they have individually managed to stand out as they pursue their careers in the field. According to[footnoteRef:55], the present economical transitional approaches have influenced the careers of a majority of the pilots such that it is more diverse and unique. [55: Chhokar, Jagdeep S., Felix C. Brodbeck, and Robert J. House, eds. Culture and leadership across the world: The GLOBE book of in-depth studies of 25 societies. Routledge, 2013. Pp 809 ]

In this case, the generational gap consists of senior leadership who proved their expertise and skill set by taking part in large-scale projects like technological advancements in either defense or space companies. They are characterized by their ability to exploit their influence on major decision-making forums as they utilize their bureaucratic connections to control the available resources. Moreover, a majority of the senior leadership group have managed to maintain their leading positions in the big industrial companies or the competitive corporations such as aviation, space and oil-gas industries.

On the other hand, the current pilots who are the new wave of experts have managed to follow a different route to success that is more liberal and flexible to the various changes around their surroundings[footnoteRef:56]. The generational gap has allowed both groups to learn from each other as they embrace the changes and new approaches. For instance, the current pilots are able to study history and understand how the senior leadership group managed to carry out their activities with the available resources while the senior leadership are able to appreciate and adjust to the new industrial changes as they mentor the current pilots[footnoteRef:57]. [56: Mills, Albert J., Jane Neal-Smith, and Donna Bridges, eds. Absent Aviators: Gender Issues in Aviation. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014. Pp291 ] [57: Cantwell, Lt Col Houston R. "Operators of Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Breaking Paradigms." Air and Space Power Jorurnal 13, no. 2 (Summer 2009).]

As an industry the pilots are governed by certain cultural norms that dictated how the operations will be managed to ensure the smooth flow of activities. For this reason, the generational gap was regulated by cultural perspective because the senior leadership was more focused on the present procedures with minimal human input whereas the current pilots are more innovative and willing to address issues that would make their operations more effective and affordable. The cultural perspective fundamentally controls how each group will address different issues within the industry. In current times, aviation is one of the industries that has managed to embrace for example technology in making their work easier.

Therefore, the current pilots have managed to operate beyond their cultural expectations as they are more flexible, innovative and goal driven rather than just task-oriented. Based on Harris, the cultural perspective results in option awareness whereby as the current pilot learn from senior leadership regarding general operations, they are also more aware of the possible changes that should be implemented to achieve maximum productivity[footnoteRef:58]. This form of awareness gives the pilots a holistic approach to situations as they make proper decisions under uncertainty or stress. [58: Harris, Don. Engineering psychology and cognitive ergonomics. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2007. Pp345]

Remotely Piloted aircrafts were initially dismissed until things changed such that the RPA pilots got more combat experience as compared to other pilots. Despite that the RPA is operated remotely it is regarded as a manned aircraft[footnoteRef:59]. The RPA operators and pilots are expected to focus traditional issues that affect pilots such as airspace de-confliction and altitude de-confliction. Thus, this is an issue facing the pilots because the RPA entails the management of multiple assets both manned and unmanned. General Mark Welsh III, as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated that the Air Force requires several platforms; manned or unmanned to achieve legitimate air supremacy [footnoteRef:60]. [59: Hoffman, Maj James C., and Charles Tustin Kamps. "At the Crossroads: Future 'Manning' for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." Air and Space Power Journal, Spring 2005.] [60: Force, US Air. "The US Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Strategic Vision." (2005). Pp3]

As the Senior leadership qualifications are focused on manned assets, they ignore fundamental skills that require them to possess the ability to manage and communicate information effectively as they handle different structures with other individuals as well as aircrafts. Both unmanned and manned assets help the RPA pilots’ strike a balance between building relationships even as they focus on their missions and tasks. Additionally, focusing the senior leadership skills on manned assets affects the pilot’s attitude towards personal risk since they lack a qualification that helps them transition from regular life and time during the mission. In this case this is an issue for the RPA pilots since focusing on one qualification denies the senior leadership the ability to analyze situations through a holistic perspective.

The cultural bias is another challenge faced by the RPA pilots because it restricts their effectiveness and overall productivity. As highlighted above sustainable air operations can only be achieved through incorporating both unmanned and manned assets. Traditionally, pilots were required to have basic skills that allowed them to communicate with others and the aircraft[footnoteRef:61]. However, the cultural bias limits mission flexibility that will only increase using unmanned assets since it has a higher level of risk, information operations assist in psychological activities through advertising or giving leaflets to their enemies. Recapitalization of F-35 / F-22 / KC-46 / LRS-B will give the pilots an edge during the missions because they are high tech weapons that are layered in nature but nonetheless short ranged. [61: Sweeney, James A. The Wave of the Present-Remotely-Piloted Aircraft in Air Force Culture. Air War College School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Maxwell AFB United States, 2010. ]

The F-35 has a combat radius of approximately six hundred miles which will also rely on fuel especially when the area of impact is beyond its stipulated range[footnoteRef:62]. Despite that F-22 and F-35 are costly and quite effective they are vulnerable to the attacks and detection by facilitating the long surface to air missiles as well as the long-range interceptors that are quite familiar with the enemies. Therefore, recapitalization will ensure the weapons have longer combat radius whereby the enemies during war will be unable to detect and make any unexpected attacks[footnoteRef:63]. [62: Cooke, Nancy J., et al. "Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: A Human Systems Integration Perspective." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting. Vol. 58. No. 1. Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014. Pp56- 165] [63: Rozsa, Jordan. Improving Standoff Bombing Capacity in the Face of Anti-Access Area Denial Threats. No. RAND/RGSD-363. RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL SANTA MONICA CA SANTA MONICA United States, 2015. Pp72 ]

The demand for Remotely Piloted aircraft pilots continues to grow every year yet the rates of promotion as compared to other pilots continues to mark a negative trend. The RPA pilots are originally from three backgrounds inclusive of air men, other pilots like air battle managers and traditional pilots who began their careers through flying manned crafts to drones. In spite that the Air Force trains more pilots to operate the remote-controlled Global Hawks, Predators and Reapers compared to the traditional bombers and fighters in a year, it requires approximately two decades for the promotion opportunities to strike a balance [footnoteRef:64]. [64: Hardison, Chaitra M., Michael G. Mattock, and Maria C. Lytell. Incentive Pay for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Career Fields. RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE SANTA MONICA CA, 2012. Pp22]

Kreuzer states that career progression of the RPA culture within the Force is yet to be normalized due to the current perceptions of the RPAs within the flying community and the rapid rate of expansion of the RPA pilots. The low promotion rates were first reported in 2012 after Senators Harry Reid and Carl Levin asked for an investigation which later indicated that the promotion rates for the RPA employees had decreased from 96% to 78% in comparison to 91-96% of the airmen in other different fields [footnoteRef:65]. The level of proficiency has an impact on the promotion rates whereby 42% of RPA pilots in 2013 were personnel who had acquired their traditional plot wings during an undergraduate training program and were required to return to a manned aircraft afterwards whereas 40% were traditional pilots who would not return to manned aircrafts [footnoteRef:66]. [65: Kreuzer, Michael P. Drones and the Future of Air Warfare: The Evolution of Remotely Piloted Aircraft. Routledge, 2016. Pp110] [66: Schultz, Timothy P. The Problem with Pilots: How Physicians, Engineers, and Airpower Enthusiasts Redefined Flight. JHU Press, 2018. Pp163]

This is a major issue for the pilots since as Stephen Rosen states innovation will only be experienced as fast as the junior officers are given opportunities to rise to the top. Furthermore, strong career development is crucial in normalizing new technologies as well as practices in the organization. In 1925, Billy Mitchell highlighted that pilot’s promotion ceilings are key elements of a liberal Air Force since such limitations will negatively impact effective airpower [footnoteRef:67]. The 2007 promotion data also indicates that the pilots considered by the promotion board while they are assigned to the flying drones were less likely to move to the next level. In every five promotion cycles pilots from the unmanned aircrafts have only twice had high promotion rates compared to other aviators. The management is well aware of this shortcoming and hence the focus should be on ways to ensure that RPA pilots receive an equal share of resources as they advance in their careers[footnoteRef:68]. [67: Lovelace, Douglas C. Autonomous and Semiautonomous Weapons Systems. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Print. Pp300 ] [68: Hardison, Chaitra M., Michael G. Mattock, and Maria C. Lytell. Incentive Pay for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Career Fields. RAND PROJECT AIR FORCE SANTA MONICA CA, 2012.]

Remotely Piloted aircraft pilots are considered as a unique set of personnel whose roles overtime are based on their assigned missions. As highlighted above, research has shown that the low promotion rates could be attributed to the people’s perception of the RPA pilots within the flying community. According to [footnoteRef:69], the misunderstandings about RPA operators is attributed by the fact that they are always secluded from the physical consequences of combat. The other officers also stated that the job should be made available to the next X-Box generation of young officers since according to them the issue with RPA operators was that they “fought the war through video conferencing which was not considered honorable”.”[footnoteRef:70]. [69: Fino, Steven A. Tiger Check: Automating the US Air Force Fighter Pilot in Air-to-Air Combat, 1950–1980. JHU Press, 2017. Pp277] [70: Bartsch, Ron, James Coyne, and Katherine Gray. Drones in Society: Exploring the strange new world of unmanned aircraft. Taylor & Francis, 2016. Pp6]

In understanding how, the RPA pilots work and their input within the aviation industry, theThe RPA operators are required to perform specific tasks that entail assisting the pilots throughout the different phases of the mission, conduct a reconnaissance and general surveillance on all areas of interest and the potential target grounds and filter between the invalid and valid targets via infrared video imagery, electro-optical, radar and electro-optical tracking systems [footnoteRef:71]. Based on their efficacy in the field, the senior leaders believe it has made remarkable contributions to the war because it has eliminated the financial and logistic burden of locating a support unit for the manned aircraft operational squadron. [71: Bowles, Stephen V., and Paul T. Bartone, eds. Handbook of Military Psychology: Clinical and Organizational Practice. Springer, 2017. Pp28 ]

Military education is vital to any officers who desires career progression as they enhance their technical skills in the field. Educating a larger force ensures that the Air Force is able to meet the daily demand for RPA pilots who are currently quite vital in overall mission success and progression[footnoteRef:72]. It will also help them understand their work description and how to carry out different activities that subsequently affect the overall outcome as well how they can integrate more technologies to achieve their set goals. The Air Force is thus having a great challenge because the pilots lack morale to carry out their daily duties especially when they lack military education and promotions [footnoteRef:73]. [72: Khine, Myint Swe, ed. Visual-spatial Ability in STEM Education: Transforming Research Into Practice. Springer, 2016] [73: Washuk, Charles M. Grounding the RPA Force: Why Machine Needs Man. AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AFB United States, 2016. Pp22]

Training is a characteristic feature that separates the pilots from each other in their different fields of expertise. For instance, pilots who have been trained to fly single-seat fighters are usually quite hesitant to volunteer for the UAV pilot duty. However, through cultural transition the Air Force realized that training the UAV operators directly other than utilizing the existing trained pilots to operate functions better as it creates clear career paths for the ever-growing staff of various UAVs [footnoteRef:74]. [74: Cook, Martin L. Issues in Military Ethics: To Support and Defend the Constitution. SUNY Press, 2013. pp73]

The training will also entail informing operators of the applicable peripheral weapon systems regarding their level of accuracy and the explosive yield. Furthermore, they are also trained on some of the intelligence procedures and how they identify their targets and some of the technical approaches used in weaponizing and targeting. The pilots will not be able be to achieve full productivity when the training doesn’t cover how to utilize the weapon systems and their effectiveness in different war zones and targets.

The aviatorsThey are required to learn and get maximum training on the capabilities of RPAs especially if it will be their tool of destruction during the war. Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems have managed to show their importance in present military activities especially during information gathering and surveillance. They are trained on RPAs ability to not only avail photographic data but also data types such as thermal data that depend on type and sensors and multispectral that has NDVI capabilities. As stated by [footnoteRef:75], RPA also has the ability to provide quality outputs that are tested for accuracy and quality for instance DSM and orthophoto. [75: Růžičková, Kateřina, and Tomáš Inspektor, eds. Surface Models for Geosciences. Springer, 2015. pp174 ]

During the training the pilots learn ways through which technology has an impact on civil applications lie firefighting, disaster management, infrastructure and surveillance. Additionally, through training the RPA pilots are able to learn about the growth synergies between member states who operate the large military RPAs, how military RPAs are integrated in the non-segregated airspace, the development of good technologies for future use and the harmonization of the national activities for RPAs certification and airworthiness.

[footnoteRef:76]. In order to maximize their potential, the RPA pilots are encouraged to embrace innovative tendencies since ethics education and training in the air force goes beyond the technical processes involved during war. The pilots are required to embrace individual moral attributes that are vital during the missions since the moral understanding gives them a different approach to issues. For example, the A-19 attack aircraft pilots and the AC-gunships continue to attack targets they choose which further gives the pilots a chance to use their moral choices that are not available or required in the attainment of required deliverables [footnoteRef:77]. The RPAs will give them analytical capabilities that allow them to make use of their individual potential besides everything they have been trained and educated to do during missions. [footnoteRef:78]. [76: Jorgensen, Erik D. Optimizing the Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilot Career Field. Air University, Air Command And Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base United States, 2011. ] [77: ] [78: Cook, Martin L. Issues in Military Ethics: To Support and Defend the Constitution. SUNY Press, 2013. pp73 ]

This form of teaching gives the pilot an overview of some of the capabilities and limitations and training approaches that ensure safe use of the weapons. The tactics could also entail learning about using unprepared landing spaces for servicing through facilitating the integration of ground and aerial combat for use. On the other hand, procedures are cheap yet effective ways of taking the pilots through an orientation process in the use of advanced aircrafts [footnoteRef:79]. The Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) are points are reference used by the Air Force to dictate how certain operations with be conducted within the field to enhance productivity[footnoteRef:80]. [79: Totten, Lindsay. Remotely Piloted Aircraft: An Integrated Domestic Disaster Relief Plan. No. ACSC-WFP-49. AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL, 2014. Pp 33 ] [80: Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1.B-1, Department of the Air Force. ]

Section IV. Recommendations to Dismantle Cultural Barriers

As a recommendation, controlled tours will eliminate cultural barriers since they will allow the RPA is function within the desired area of jurisdiction. The MAJCOMS have the responsibility of facilitating all the various phases in command and control aircraft, battle organization, rescue and management of safe operations. Controlled tours should be applicable to all levels of management and not bottom third from MAJCOM.

Currently there is a shortage of fighter pilots since when the total fighter pilot requirement should be 3758, there are only 3564 pilots. It continues to become a challenge for Air Force Personnel as the yearly requirements consists of fighter pilots in formal training institutions and in-resident professional military education units[footnoteRef:81]. The Air Liaison Officer is referred to as an attacker, bomber and fighter pilot whose responsibilities cut across the different missions. Therefore, it is recommended that the officers are only allowed to work as In Lieu of ALO for three years and back to Major Weapon System. This will act as a form of motivation to the officers especially when they are allowed to progress in different levels that challenge their skills and expertise. Further, the Air Space is looking towards physical fitness tests that have been customized to meet the demands for diverse job specifications. [81: Garner, Russell S., and Villem Paul A. Fighter pilot inventory and requirements model; A ten- year look with impact of UAV increase. No. AFIT/EN/TR-05-02. AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT, 2005. Pp3 ]

A majority of the Senior leadership are now more convinced that RPAs have revolutionized how operations are conducted within the military. Over the last two decades, new technologies have been discovered as the aircraft took up extra additional missions sets through moving beyond just automation. In this regard, the aircrafts should be manned by highly trained individuals who are well conversant with how the RPAs are controlled. The pilots should understand the form of communication used in particular and how they can be applied during combat.

The qualifications also require that the RPAs pilot understands how key mission sets are performed by the operators since it then allows them to coordinate and effectively communicate with others and the craft as well. Additionally, the pilots should look into the operationalsafety risks involved in the process to ensure they are well prepared for any eventualities during combat[footnoteRef:82]. As a requirement for Remotely piloted aircraft systems, the aviators should have RPA operations certificates that are an indication that the pilot has gone through specific educational courses that have enhanced their expertise management of the aircraft. [82: Wolf, Harrison G. Drones: Safety risk management for the next evolution of flight. Routledge, 2017.]

As highlighted throughout the paper RPAs pilots are misunderstood individuals whose perception in the community has affected their advancement in the industry. Hence as a recommendation, acknowledging their various contributions in the flying community goes a long way in improving their confidence levels and morale as they perform their activities. There is presently a shortage of RPA pilots because they are on demand yet they go through a series of misconceptions and judgements from the community. Appreciating their efforts will subsequently solve the issue of pilot shortages because majority of them will apply for different positions in the field.

The forms of appreciation should include awards and decorations in relation to the levels of achievement within the community. These awards would be given to those individuals who performed extraordinary heroic airstrikes especially in instances whereby they were quite difficult due to factors such as time sensitivity and operational surroundings.

b) Air Medals for Exceptional Performance

However, air medals should be awarded for exceptional performances that required awards that were higher than the Air Force Commendation or Meritorious Service Medal. Further, the junior officers could receive the Legion of Merit award because based on the RPA service structure, the first lieutenants have extreme combat encounters while the second lieutenants fly the combat air strikes.

a) Dedicated Training Block During B-Course with RPA’s

Extensive training is a requirement that ensures the pilots are prepared for any unforeseen outcomes during missions. The dedicated training will look into possible scenarios through a simulation exercise that gives the pilots a real-life experience and counter-measures to handle a particular problem. System breakdowns during missions, temperature limits, weather aspects that hinder clear vision and aircraft size entail some of the issues that can be addressed during the training.

Ethical issues are also likely to be challenged through a Dedicated Training Block During B-Course with RPA’s because the pilots are able to understand the extent of their level of jurisdiction. The use of RPAs raises few concerns regarding legal and ethical issues due to their ability to capture real-time aerial images and videos. Thus, the trainings should ensure the pilots understand that despite that they have the freedom to perform their duties, they are still bound by fundamental principles that protect individual’s privacy.

During the exercise’s segregation should be eliminatederadicated since it eliminates the concepts of team work. As indicated above during the simulation exercise the joint input of both fighters and bombers will give a clear outlook of the real battlefield and thus working separately will make them loose the full experience during the training. Moreover, they should train using the full range of capabilities without tactical limitation. As pilots there are endless possibilities on how the enemies might approach multiple situations during war, tactical limitations will hinder them from exhausting all the possible scenarios during the missions.

The pilots should in this case be required to practice with the same systems and equipment’s they will use during combat so that they can identify any problems. This will reinforce the role of team work and effective communication between the officers regardless of their position and area of proficiency in the flying community.

On the other hand, briefing and debriefing should be done by the leaders jointly as a way of showing that the different flying departments will go to war as one team that looks to achieve the same goal.

Also, through identifying the alignment points, a joint briefing gives a clear understanding on the various duties that will be performed. It also ensures that all the involved members are able to appreciate each individual and the role they play in overall success of the entire mission. This is because they are able to witness first-hand how they operate and deal with the emerging and expected challenges in the battle space. Regarding poor perceptions about the RPAs pilots, joint meetings and working together will give other teams a chance to appreciate what their do and consequent achievements.

Fighters accomplish their goals using fighter aircrafts which have been designed for air-to-air combat against other aircrafts. They are required to have higher standards because their work requires some level of accuracy that can only be attributed to proficiency and discipline. They engage targets who are sometimes beyond the piloted reconnaissance aircraft range, an aspect that needs high levels of discipline as they use their skills and moral choices. The recommendation will thus focus on ensuring that fighters are highly qualified and able to meet the desired targets and goals. The high standards should be enforced during the recruitment process where the leaders are able to identify skilled personnel fit for the position.

As stated by [footnoteRef:83], MQ-1B is defined as an unmanned, medium altitude, long endurance aerial vehicle used in risk areas as an intelligence collection agent as well as in execution of dynamic targets. Based on its remarkable loiter period, multi-mode communication, wide-range sensors and precision it performs strikes, coordination and reconnaissance against time sensitive and high value targets. Despite its good characteristics, the lack of use ultimately leads to its removal to conserve the fuel and reduce the weight. Its elimination has been beneficial since it allowed for the adoption of the MQ-9 reaper which has greater range and payload. [83: Callam, Andrew. "Drone wars: Armed unmanned aerial vehicles." International Affairs Review 18 (2015). Pp12 ]

The MQ-9 persistent attack asset was first deployed in October 2007 to Afghanistan for precision strikes has an operational ceiling of approximately 50,000ft, external payload of 3,000Ib and an internal payload of 800Ib. The sensor payload also consists of the General Atomics Lynx SAR which has the ground moving target indicator technology. It is a recommended model since it is a dually tested flight with the L-3 communications tactical common datalink. In comparison to the MQ-1B, the persistent attack model is more effective in terms of payload and range.

As the flying community success can only be achieved when they operate in diplomatic manner throughout regardless of one’s field of interest. This has been a keen concern especially for the RPA pilots whose work is considered less impactful as compared to other pilots. Equality should be embraced in every aspect and[footnoteRef:84] not treating one group as servant assets or slaves. As highlighted above everyone’s input during war affects the outcomes and thus, they should respect each other’s professions and area of jurisdiction. [84: ]

Avoiding the bad guy stigma fosters understanding such that all operators are clear on their roles and how to ultimately achieve them. Cultural stigmas can be overcome by creating mutual respect between each other whereby operators are aware of each other’s role in their surroundings.

ii)Creating Mutual Respect Working Together

Joint meetings as the foster team work also gives each pilot a glimpse into another’s work which eliminates aspects of ignorance. Mutual respect also helps establish clear boundaries whereby everyone within the community is considered equal as well the duties they perform to foster great success. Avoiding the bad guy stigma fosters understanding such that all operators are clear on their roles and how to ultimately achieve them.

Notes

1. Hardison , Incentive Pay for RPA, Career Fields, 22

2. Michaels, ‘Drones Change “Top Gun” Culture of Air Force’, USA Today. 2012

3. Ritt, Drones, 34-78

4. Bartsch, Drones in Society, 6

5. Tang, Drone remote sensing for forestry research and practices, 4

6. Pappalardo, The Future for UAVs in the U.S. Air Force, 37

7. Schogol, ACC adding thousands of airmen to fly, sustain drones

8. Bartsch, Drones in Society, 6

9. Zacharias, Operating Next-Generation RPA for Irregular Warfare

10. Pappalardo, The Future for UAVs in the U.S. Air Force, 37

11. Woods, Sudden justice, 179

12. Cooke, RPAS, 56-165

13. Government Accountability Office, Air Force, 14-316

14. Tirpak, Air Force Magazine

15. Blair, The Swarm, the Cloud, and the Importance of Getting There First

16. Tirpak, Gates Versus the Air Force

17. No Author. USAF RPA Vector Vision and Enabling Concepts, 2013-2038

18. Byrnes, Dark Horizon, 38

19. Fahlstrom, Introduction to UAV systems, 15

20. Dombrowski, Buying military transformation, 46

21. Keane, A brief history of early unmanned aircraft, 558-571

22. Jean, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Fuel Demand for Satellite Bandwidth

23. Michaels, Top Gun” Culture of Air Force’, USA Today. 2012

24. Ronconi, UFRGSMUN, 137-182

25. Young, Unified Multi-domain Decision Making, 23

26. D'Agostino, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconaissance (ISR), 19

27. Haider, RPS Systems in Contested Environments

28. Dismukes, Surveillance versus Reconnaissance, 12

29. Prunckun, How to Undertake Surveillance and Reconnaissance, 42

30. Smith, MI-SAF, 22

31. Connable, Military intelligence fusion for complex operations, 34

32. Benjamin, Drone warfare, 1

33. Sandvik, The good drone, 226

34. Swarts, F-35 Helmet

35. Byrnes, Dark Horizon, 38

36. Pickup, Global War on Terrorism, 3

37. Buzan, Will the ‘global war on terrorism ‘be the new Cold War, 1101-1118

38. Taylor, A Rhetorical Analysis of Messages to America by Osama bin Laden, 2

39. Rosthauser, Terrorism Conflict, 13

40. Harrington, Operation Iraqi freedom/operation enduring freedom, 543-563

41. Best, ISR Acquisition, 78

42. Wicks, Sensors Technology and Advanced Signal Processing Concepts for Layered Warfare/Layered Sensing, 100

43. Matsumura, Defining an Approach for Future Close Air Support Capability, 36

44. Kennedy, Virtuous drones, 211-227,

45. Orban, Time-sensitive targeting adds combat flexibility, 1

46. Cetinkaya, Architecture Considerations of Time Sensitive Targeting and NATO TST Tool

47. Hennigan, Air Force Proposes $3-Billion Plan to Vastly Expand its Drone Program

48. Mueller, Precision and purpose, 45

49. Engelbrekt, The NATO intervention in Libya, 17

50. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, 17

51. Phifer, A Handbook of Military Strategy and Tactics, 180

52. Tirpak, Gates versus the Air Force, 2014

53. Grant Network Topology in Command and Control, 2

54. Chhokar, Culture and leadership across the world, 809

55. Mills, Absent Aviators, 291

56. Harris, Engineering psychology and cognitive ergonomics, 345

57. Force, The US Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Strategic Vision, 3

58. Cooke, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, 56-165

59. Hardison, Incentive Pay for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Career Fields, 22

60. Schultz, The Problem with Pilots, 163

61. Lovelace, Autonomous and Semiautonomous Weapons Systems, 300

62. Fino, Tiger Check, 277

63. Bowles, Handbook of Military Psychology, 28

64. Washuk, Grounding the RPA Force, 22

65. Cook, Issues in Military Ethics, 73

66. Růžičková, Surface Models for Geosciences, 174

67. Cook, Issues in Military Ethics, 73

68. Totten, Remotely Piloted Aircraft, 33

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