extra credit

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013)

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834 N.W.2d 64

Melissa NELSON, Appellant,

v.

JAMES H. KNIGHT DDS, P.C. and

James Knight, Appellees.

No. 11–1857.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 12, 2013.

Rehearing Denied July 19, 2013.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for

Webster County, Thomas J. Bice, Judge.

A former employee appeals from the district

court's grant of summary judgment to an

employer in a sex discrimination case.

AFFIRMED.

Paige E. Fiedler and Emily E. McCarty of

Fiedler & Timmer, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for

appellant.

[834 N.W.2d 65]

Stuart J. Cochrane and James L. Kramer of

Johnson, Kramer, Good, Mulholland,

Cochrane & Driscoll, P.L.C., Fort Dodge, for

appellees.

MANSFIELD, Justice.1

Can a male employer terminate a long-

time female employee because the employer's

wife, due to no fault of the employee, is

concerned about the nature of the

relationship between the employer and the

employee? This is the question we are

required to answer today. For the reasons

stated herein, we ultimately conclude the

conduct does not amount to unlawful sex

discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil

Rights Act.

We emphasize the limits of our decision.

The employee did not bring a sexual

harassment or hostile work environment

claim; we are not deciding how such a claim

would have been resolved in this or any other

case. Also, when an employer takes an

adverse employment action against a person

or persons because of a gender-specific

characteristic, that can violate the civil rights

laws. The record in this case, however, does

not support such an allegation.

I. Facts and Procedural Background.

Because this case was decided on

summary judgment, we set forth the facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

Melissa Nelson.

In 1999, Dr. Knight 2 hired Nelson to

work as a dental assistant in his dental office.

At that time, Nelson had just received her

community college degree and was twenty

years old.

Over the next ten-and-a-half years,

Nelson worked as a dental assistant for Dr.

Knight. Dr. Knight admits that Nelson was a

good dental assistant. Nelson in turn

acknowledges that Dr. Knight generally

treated her with respect, and she believed him

to be a person of high integrity.

On several occasions during the last year

and a half when Nelson worked in the office,

Dr. Knight complained to Nelson that her

clothing was too tight and revealing and

“distracting.” Dr. Knight at times asked

Nelson to put on her lab coat. Dr. Knight later

testified that he made these statements to

Nelson because “I don't think it's good for me

to see her wearing things that accentuate her

body.” Nelson denies that her clothing was

tight or in any way inappropriate.3

During the last six months or so of

Nelson's employment, Dr. Knight and Nelson

started texting each other on both work and

personal matters outside the workplace. Both

parties initiated texting. Neither objected to

the other's texting. Both Dr. Knight and

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013)

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Nelson have children, and some of the texts

involved updates on the kids' activities and

other relatively innocuous matters. Nelson

considered Dr. Knight to be a friend and

father figure, and she denies that she ever

flirted with him or sought an intimate or

sexual relationship with him. At the same

time, Nelson admits that a coworker was

“jealous that we got along.” At one point,

Nelson

[834 N.W.2d 66]

texted Dr. Knight that “[t]he only reason I

stay is because of you.”

Dr. Knight acknowledges he once told

Nelson that if she saw his pants bulging, she

would know her clothing was too revealing.

On another occasion, Dr. Knight texted

Nelson saying the shirt she had worn that day

was too tight. After Nelson responded that

she did not think he was being fair, Dr.

Knight replied that it was a good thing Nelson

did not wear tight pants too because then he

would get it coming and going. Dr. Knight

also recalls that after Nelson allegedly made a

statement regarding infrequency in her sex

life, he responded to her, “[T]hat's like having

a Lamborghini in the garage and never

driving it.” Nelson recalls that Dr. Knight

once texted her to ask how often she

experienced an orgasm. Nelson did not

answer the text. However, Nelson does not

remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to text

her or telling him that she was offended.

In late 2009, Dr. Knight took his children

to Colorado for Christmas vacation. Dr.

Knight's wife Jeanne, who was also an

employee in the dental practice, stayed home.

Jeanne Knight found out that her husband

and Nelson were texting each other during

that time. When Dr. Knight returned home,

Jeanne Knight confronted her husband and

demanded that he terminate Nelson's

employment. Both of them consulted with the

senior pastor of their church, who agreed with

the decision.

Jeanne Knight insisted that her husband

terminate Nelson because “she was a big

threat to our marriage.” According to her

affidavit and her deposition testimony, she

had several complaints about Nelson. These

included Nelson's texting with Dr. Knight,

Nelson's clothing, Nelson's alleged flirting

with Dr. Knight, Nelson's alleged coldness at

work toward her (Jeanne Knight), and

Nelson's ongoing criticism of another dental

assistant. She added that

[Nelson] liked to hang around after work

when it would be just her and [Dr. Knight]

there. I thought it was strange that after being

at work all day and away from her kids and

husband that she would not be anxious to get

home like the other [women] in the office.

At the end of the workday on January 4,

2010, Dr. Knight called Nelson into his office.

He had arranged for another pastor from the

church to be present as an observer. Dr.

Knight, reading from a prepared statement,

told Nelson he was firing her. The statement

said, in part, that their relationship had

become a detriment to Dr. Knight's family

and that for the best interests of both Dr.

Knight and his family and Nelson and her

family, the two of them should not work

together. Dr. Knight handed Nelson an

envelope which contained one month's

severance pay. Nelson started crying and said

she loved her job.

Nelson's husband Steve phoned Dr.

Knight after getting the news of his wife's

firing. Dr. Knight initially refused to talk to

Steve Nelson, but later called back and invited

him to meet at the office later that same

evening. Once again, the pastor was present.

In the meeting, Dr. Knight told Steve Nelson

that Melissa Nelson had not done anything

wrong or inappropriate and that she was the

best dental assistant he ever had. However,

Dr. Knight said he was worried he was getting

too personally attached to her. Dr. Knight told

Steve Nelson that nothing was going on but

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013)

-3-

that he feared he would try to have an affair

with her down the road if he did not fire her.

Dr. Knight replaced Nelson with another

female. Historically, all of his dental

assistants have been women.

[834 N.W.2d 67]

After timely filing a civil rights complaint

and getting a “right to sue” letter from the

Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Nelson

brought this action against Dr. Knight on

August 12, 2010. Nelson's one-count petition

alleges that Dr. Knight discriminated against

her on the basis of sex. Nelson does not

contend that her employer committed sexual

harassment. See McElroy v. State, 637

N.W.2d 488, 499–500 (Iowa 2001)

(discussing when sexual harassment amounts

to unlawful sex discrimination and restating

the elements of both quid pro quo and hostile

work environment sexual harassment). Her

argument, rather, is that Dr. Knight

terminated her because of her gender and

would not have terminated her if she was

male.

Dr. Knight moved for summary

judgment. After briefing and oral argument,

the district court sustained the motion. The

court reasoned in part, “Ms. Nelson was fired

not because of her gender but because she

was a threat to the marriage of Dr. Knight.”

Nelson appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the district court's summary

judgment ruling for correction of errors at

law. Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672

N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa 2003). We view the

factual record in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, affording that party all

reasonable inferences. Id. Summary

judgment is proper only if the record, so

viewed, entitles the moving party to judgment

as a matter of law. Id.

III. Analysis.

Section 216.6(1)( a ) of the Iowa Code

makes it generally unlawful to discharge or

otherwise discriminate against an employee

because of the employee's sex. Iowa Code §

216.6(1)( a ) (2009). “When interpreting

discrimination claims under Iowa Code

chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including

Title VII of the United States Civil Rights

Act....” Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772

N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2009). Generally, an

employer engages in unlawful sex

discrimination when the employer takes

adverse employment action against an

employee and sex is a motivating factor in the

employer's decision. See Channon v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 861 (Iowa

2001).

Nelson argues that her gender was a

motivating factor in her termination because

she would not have lost her job if she had

been a man. See, e.g., Watson v. Se. Pa.

Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 213, 222 (3d

Cir.2000) (affirming a jury verdict in a Title

VII case because the charge, taken as a whole,

adequately informed the jury that sex had to

be a but-for cause of the adverse employment

action). Dr. Knight responds that Nelson was

terminated not because of her sex—after all,

he only employs women—but because of the

nature of their relationship and the perceived

threat to Dr. Knight's marriage. Yet Nelson

rejoins that neither the relationship nor the

alleged threat would have existed if she had

not been a woman.

Several cases, including a decision of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit, have found that an employer does not

engage in unlawful gender discrimination by

discharging a female employee who is

involved in a consensual relationship that has

triggered personal jealousy. This is true even

though the relationship and the resulting

jealousy presumably would not have existed if

the employee had been male.

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013)

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Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., like the

present case, centered on a personal

relationship between the owner of a small

business and a valued employee of the

business that was seen by the owner's wife as

a threat to their marriage.

[834 N.W.2d 68]

446 F.3d 903, 905–06 (8th Cir.2006). In that

case, unlike here, the plaintiff had pinched

the owner's rear. Id. at 906. She admitted that

the owner's wife “could have suspected the

two had an intimate relationship.” Id.

Further, the plaintiff acknowledged she wrote

“notes of a sexual or intimate nature” to the

owner and put them in a location where

others could see them. Id. In the end, the

owner fired the plaintiff, stating that his wife

was “ ‘making me choose between my best

employee or her and the kids.’ ” Id.

Reviewing this series of events, the

Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary

judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at

911. The Eighth Circuit first noted the

considerable body of authority that “ ‘sexual

favoritism,’ where one employee was treated

more favorably than members of the opposite

sex because of a consensual relationship with

the boss,” does not violate Title VII. Id. at

908–09. The court distilled that law as

follows:

[T]he principle that emerges from the

above cases is that absent claims of coercion

or widespread sexual favoritism, where an

employee engages in consensual sexual

conduct with a supervisor and an

employment decision is based on this

conduct, Title VII is not implicated because

any benefits of the relationship are due to the

sexual conduct, rather than the gender, of the

employee.

Id. at 909.

The Eighth Circuit believed these sexual

favoritism precedents were relevant. The

court's unstated reasoning was that if a

specific instance of sexual favoritism does not

constitute gender discrimination, treating an

employee unfavorably because of such a

relationship does not violate the law either.

Yet the court acknowledged that cases

where the employee was treated less favorably

would be “more directly analogous.” Id. The

court then discussed a decision of the

Eleventh Circuit where an employee had been

terminated for being a perceived threat to the

marriage of the owner's son. Id. (discussing

Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc.,

908 F.2d 902, 903–05 (11th Cir.1990)). It

also cited three federal district court cases,

each of which had “concluded that

terminating an employee based on the

employee's consensual sexual conduct does

not violate Title VII absent allegations that

the conduct stemmed from unwelcome sexual

advances or a hostile work environment.” Id.

(citing Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int'l, 86

F.Supp.2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y.2000);

Campbell v. Masten, 955 F.Supp. 526, 529

(D.Md.1997); Freeman v. Cont'l Technical

Serv., Inc., 710 F.Supp. 328, 331

(N.D.Ga.1988)).

After reviewing these precedents, the

Eighth Circuit found the owner had not

violated Title VII in terminating the employee

at his wife's behest. As the court explained,

“The ultimate basis for Tenge's dismissal was

not her sex, it was Scott's desire to allay his

wife's concerns over Tenge's admitted sexual

behavior with him.” Id. at 910.

In our case, the district court quoted at

length from Tenge, stating it found that

decision “persuasive.” However, Nelson

argues there is a significant factual difference

between the two cases. As the Eighth Circuit

put it, “Tenge was terminated due to the

consequences of her own admitted conduct

with her employer, not because of her status

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013)

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as a woman.” Id. The Eighth Circuit added a

caveat:

The question is not before us of whether

it would be sex discrimination if Tenge had

been terminated because Lori [the owner's

wife] perceived her as a threat to her marriage

but there was no evidence that she had

engaged in any sexually suggestive conduct.

[834 N.W.2d 69]

Id. at 910 n. 5. Nelson contrasts that situation

with her own, where she claims she “did not

do anything to get herself fired except exist as

a female.”

So the question we must answer is the

one left open in Tenge—whether an employee

who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct

may be lawfully terminated simply because

the boss's spouse views the relationship

between the boss and the employee as a

threat to her marriage. Notwithstanding the

Eighth Circuit's care to leave that question

unanswered, it seems odd at first glance to

have the question of whether the employer

engaged in unlawful discrimination turn on

the employee's conduct, assuming that such

conduct (whatever it is) would not typically be

a firing offense. Usually our legal focus is on

the employer's motivation, not on whether

the discharge in a broader sense is fair. Title

VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act are not

general fairness laws, and an employer does

not violate them by treating an employee

unfairly so long as the employer does not

engage in discrimination based upon the

employee's protected status.

In some respects, the present case

resembles Platner. There a business owner

chose to terminate a female employee who

worked on the same crew as the business

owner's son, after the wife of the business

owner's son became “extremely jealous” of

her. Platner, 908 F.2d at 903. The district

court found that the son was “largely to blame

for fueling [the wife's] jealousy,” and that the

plaintiff's conduct was “basically blameless

and no different from that of the male

employees.” Id. Nonetheless, the Eleventh

Circuit found no unlawful discrimination had

occurred:

It is evident that Thomas, faced with a

seemingly insoluble conflict within his family,

felt he had to make a choice as to which

employee to keep. He opted to place the

burden of resolving the situation on Platner,

to whom he was not related, and whose

dismissal would not, as firing Steve obviously

would, fracture his family and its

relationships. It is thus clear that the ultimate

basis for Platner's dismissal was not gender

but simply favoritism for a close relative.

Id. at 905. Significantly, although Dr. Knight

discusses Platner at some length in his

briefing, Nelson does not refer to the decision

in her briefing or attempt to distinguish it.4

[834 N.W.2d 70]

Nelson does, however, have three

responses to Dr. Knight's overall position.

First, she does not necessarily agree with

Tenge. She argues that any termination

because of a supervisor's interest in an

employee amounts to sex discrimination:

“Plaintiff's sex is implicated by the very

nature of the reason for termination.” Second,

she suggests that without some kind of

employee misconduct requirement, Dr.

Knight's position becomes simply a way of

enforcing stereotypes and permitting

pretexts: The employer can justify a series of

adverse employment actions against persons

of one gender by claiming, “My spouse was

jealous.” Third, she argues that if Dr. Knight

would have been liable to Nelson for sexually

harassing her, he should not be able to avoid

liability for terminating her out of fear that he

was going to harass her.

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013)

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Nelson's arguments warrant serious

consideration, but we ultimately think a

distinction exists between (1) an isolated

employment decision based on personal

relations (assuming no coercion or quid pro

quo), even if the relations would not have

existed if the employee had been of the

opposite gender, and (2) a decision based on

gender itself. In the former case, the decision

is driven entirely by individual feelings and

emotions regarding a specific person. Such a

decision is not gender-based, nor is it based

on factors that might be a proxy for gender.

The civil rights laws seek to insure that

employees are treated the same regardless of

their sex or other protected status. Yet even

taking Nelson's view of the facts, Dr. Knight's

unfair decision to terminate Nelson (while

paying her a rather ungenerous one month's

severance) does not jeopardize that goal. As

the Platner court observed, “ ‘[W]e do not

believe that Title VII authorizes courts to

declare unlawful every arbitrary and unfair

employment decision.’ ” Id. at 905 (quoting

Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 825–

26 (4th Cir.1989)).

Nelson's viewpoint would allow any

termination decision related to a consensual

relationship to be challenged as a

discriminatory action because the employee

could argue the relationship would not have

existed but for her or his gender. This logic

would contradict federal caselaw to the effect

that adverse employment action stemming

from a consensual workplace relationship

(absent sexual harassment) is not actionable

under Title VII. See, e.g., Benders v. Bellows

& Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 768 (7th Cir.2008)

(holding that allegations that an employee's

termination was based on the owner's desire

to hide a past consensual relationship from

his wife were “insufficient to support a cause

of action for sex discrimination”); see also

Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., No.

10–3696, 2012 WL 3553499, at *3 (6th

Cir.2012) (affirming summary judgment for

the employer where the employee presented

evidence that she was treated unfairly due to

her supervisor's jealousy of her relationship

with another employee, and noting that such

“personal animus ... cannot be the basis of a

discrimination claim under federal or Ohio

law”); West v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 205

F.Supp.2d 531, 544–45 (E.D.Va.2002)

(granting summary judgment to an employer

when an employee was removed from a

project because of a

[834 N.W.2d 71]

supervisor's animosity toward the employee

over her termination of their consensual

relationship but there was no evidence the

supervisor had made unwanted advances to

the employee following the termination of

that relationship).

Nelson raises a legitimate concern about

a slippery slope. What if Jeanne Knight

demanded that her spouse terminate the

employment of several women? Of course, a

pretext does not prevail in a discrimination

case. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2751–52, 125

L.Ed.2d 407, 421–22 (1993) (discussing how

a plaintiff can prove that an employer's

reason for a firing was not legitimate, but a

pretext for discrimination). If an employer

repeatedly took adverse employment actions

against persons of a particular gender, that

would make it easier to infer that gender and

not a relationship was a motivating factor.

Here, however, it is not disputed that Jeanne

Knight objected to this particular relationship

as it had developed after Nelson had already

been working at the office for over ten years.

It is likewise true that a decision based

on a gender stereotype can amount to

unlawful sex discrimination. Price

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251,

109 S.Ct. 1775, 1791, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 288

(1989) (“As for the legal relevance of sex

stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an

employer could evaluate employees by

assuming or insisting that they matched the

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013)

-7-

stereotype associated with their group, for

[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate

against individuals because of their sex,

Congress intended to strike at the entire

spectrum of disparate treatment of men and

women resulting from sex stereotypes.”

(Citation and internal quotation marks

omitted.)), superseded by statute, Civil Rights

Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat.

1071, 1075–76, as recognized in Univ. of Tex.

Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, –––U.S. ––––, –––

–, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2526, 186 L.Ed.2d 503, –––

– (2013); see also City of L.A., Dep't of Water

& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, 98

S.Ct. 1370, 1375, 55 L.Ed.2d 657, 664–65

(1978) (“It is now well recognized that

employment decisions cannot be predicated

on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the

characteristics of males or females.”);

Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202

(9th Cir.2000) (“Discrimination because one

fails to act in the way expected of a man or

woman is forbidden under Title VII.”). If

Nelson could show that she had been

terminated because she did not conform to a

particular stereotype, this might be a different

case. But the record here does not support

that conclusion. It is undisputed, rather, that

Nelson was fired because Jeanne Knight,

unfairly or not, viewed her as a threat to her

marriage.5

The present case can be contrasted with

another recent Eighth Circuit decision. In

[834 N.W.2d 72]

Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C., a

female front desk employee at a hotel claimed

she lost her job because she did not have the

“Midwestern girl look.” 591 F.3d 1033, 1037

(8th Cir.2010). As the court explained, “The

theory of [Lewis's] case is that the evidence

shows Heartland enforced a de facto

requirement that a female employee conform

to gender stereotypes in order to work the A

shift.” Id. In fact, the evidence showed that

motel management later procured video

equipment so they could observe the

appearance of front desk applicants prior to

hiring. Id. at 1042. The Eighth Circuit

reversed the district court's grant of summary

judgment to the employer and remanded for

trial. Id. However, the critical difference

between Lewis and this case is that Nelson

indisputably lost her job because Dr. Knight's

spouse objected to the parties' relationship.

In Lewis, by contrast, no relationship existed.

Nelson also raises a serious point about

sexual harassment. Given that sexual

harassment is a violation of

antidiscrimination law, Nelson argues that a

firing by a boss to avoid committing sexual

harassment should be treated similarly.6 But

sexual harassment violates our civil rights

laws because of the “hostile work

environment” or “abusive atmosphere” that it

has created for persons of the victim's sex.

See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 786–90, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283–84,

141 L.Ed.2d 662, 675–78 (1998). On the other

hand, an isolated decision to terminate an

employee before such an environment arises,

even if the reasons for termination are unjust,

by definition does not bring about that

atmosphere.7

As a Michigan appellate court observed

regarding a male employee's claim that he

had been subjected to sex discrimination:

We do not read the [Michigan Civil

Rights Act or CRA] to prohibit conduct based

on romantic jealousy.... Interpreting the

CRA's prohibition of discrimination based on

sex to prohibit conduct based on romantic

jealousy turns the CRA on its head. The CRA

was enacted to prevent discrimination

because of classifications specifically

enumerated by the Legislature and to

eliminate the effects of offensive or

demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and

biases. It is beyond reason to conclude that

plaintiff's status as the romantic competition

to the woman Vajda sought to date places

plaintiff within the class of individuals the

Legislature sought to protect when it

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013)

-8-

prohibited discrimination based on sex under

the CRA.

Plaintiff proceeded to trial on a theory of

discrimination based on romantic jealousy.

Plaintiff did not claim and the evidence did

not establish that plaintiff was required to

submit to sexually-based harassment as a

condition of employment. Nor did the

evidence presented at trial support a theory of

gender-based discrimination. Plaintiff

established, at most, that Vajda's alleged

adverse treatment of plaintiff was based on

plaintiff's relationship with Goshorn, not

plaintiff's gender. Vajda may have had a

romantic purpose in initially pursuing

Goshorn and may, as the trial court surmised,

have intended to eliminate plaintiff so that he

could pursue Goshorn's affections. However,

Vajda's alleged harassment was not conduct

that is proscribed

[834 N.W.2d 73]

by the CRA because it was not gender-based.

Indeed, if Vajda's motive was to win the

affection of Goshorn, it would not matter if

the person Vajda perceived to be standing in

his way was male or female. As such, it is

evident that plaintiff's gender was not the

impetus for Vajda's alleged conduct, but

rather was merely coincidental to that

conduct.

Barrett v. Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 245

Mich.App. 306, 628 N.W.2d 63, 74 (2001)

(citations omitted); see also Huffman v. City

of Prairie Vill., 980 F.Supp. 1192, 1199

(D.Kan.1997) (“Plaintiff suggests that the

actions taken by Lt. Young as a result of Lt.

Young's beliefs concerning plaintiff's

relationship with another police officer

constitute gender discrimination because

such actions would not have been taken

against plaintiff but for her gender. We

cannot agree with plaintiff's expansive

definition of discrimination based upon

sex.”); Bush v. Raymond Corp., 954 F.Supp.

490, 498 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (“[P]laintiff's

discriminatory discharge claim fails insofar as

it asserts that plaintiff was discharged

because of Rusnak's perception that plaintiff

and Sawyer had a sexual relationship.”). Our

decision today is consistent with these

authorities.

IV. Conclusion.

As we have indicated above, the issue

before us is not whether a jury could find that

Dr. Knight treated Nelson badly. We are

asked to decide only if a genuine fact issue

exists as to whether Dr. Knight engaged in

unlawful gender discrimination when he fired

Nelson at the request of his wife. For the

reasons previously discussed, we believe this

conduct did not amount to unlawful

discrimination, and therefore we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.