Negotiation/Conflict Resolution Assignment
NEGOTIATION SEVENTH EDITION
• ROY J. LEWICKI
• DAVID M. SAUNDERS
• BRUCE BARRY
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Chapter 2
STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
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THREE REASONS NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING
1. Independent situations require knowing how this works in order to do well
2. Need to know how to counter the effects of the strategies
3. Every situation has the potential to require skills at the “claiming-value” stage
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THE DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING SITUATION
• Goals of one party are in fundamental, direct conflict to another party
• Resources are fixed and limited
• Maximizing one’s own share of resources is the goal for both parties
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THE DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING SITUATION
Preparation—set a
• Target point, aspiration point
• Walkaway, resistance point
• Asking price, initial offer
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THE DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING SITUATION
Party B - Buyer
Party A - Seller
Walkaway Point Target Point Asking Price
Initial Offer Target Point Walkaway Point
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THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVES TO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT
• Alternatives give the negotiator power to walk away from the negotiation
If alternatives are attractive, negotiators can: Set their goals higher
Make fewer concessions
If there are no attractive alternatives: Negotiators have much less bargaining power
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THE DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING SITUATION
Party B - Buyer
Party A - Seller
Walkaway Point Target Point Asking Price
Initial Offer Target Point Walkaway Point
Alternative
Alternative
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FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIES
• Push for settlement near opponent’s resistance point
• Get the other party to change their resistance point
• If settlement range is negative, either: Get the other side to change their resistance point
Modify your own resistance point
• Convince the other party that the settlement is the best possible
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KEYS TO THE STRATEGIES
The keys to implementing any of the four strategies are:
• Discovering the other party’s resistance point
• Influencing the other party’s resistance point
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FOUR PROPOSITIONS THAT SUGGEST HOW THE KEYS AFFECT THE PROCESS
1. The higher the other party’s estimate of your cost of delay or impasse, the stronger the other party’s resistance point will be.
2. The higher the other party’s estimate of his or her own cost of delay or impasse, the weaker the other party’s resistance point will be.
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FOUR PROPOSITIONS THAT SUGGEST HOW THE KEYS AFFECT THE PROCESS
3. The less the other party values an issue, the lower their resistance point will be.
4. The more the other party believes that you value an issue, the lower their resistance point may be.
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TACTICAL TASKS OF NEGOTIATORS
• Assess outcome values and the costs of termination for the other party
• Manage the other party’s impressions
• Modify the other party’s perceptions
• Manipulate the actual costs of delay or termination
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ASSESS THE OTHER PARTY’S TARGET, RESISTANCE POINT, AND COSTS OF
TERMINATING NEGOTIATIONS
• Indirectly
Determine information opponent used to set: Target
Resistance points
• Directly
Opponent reveals the information
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MANAGE THE OTHER PARTY’S IMPRESSIONS
• Screen your behavior:
Say and do as little as possible
• Direct action to alter impressions
Present facts that enhance one’s position
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MODIFY THE OTHER PARTY’S PERCEPTIONS
• Make outcomes appear less attractive
• Make the cost of obtaining goals appear higher
• Make demands and positions appear more or less attractive to the other party – whichever suits your needs
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MANIPULATE THE ACTUAL COSTS OF DELAY OR TERMINATION
• Plan disruptive action Raise the costs of delay to the other party
• Form an alliance with outsiders Involve (or threaten to involve) other parties who can
influence the outcome in your favor
• Schedule manipulations One party is usually more vulnerable to delaying than
the other
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POSITIONS TAKEN DURING NEGOTIATIONS
• Opening offer
Where will you start?
• Opening stance
What is your attitude? Competitive? Moderate?
• Initial concessions
Should any be made? If so, how large?
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POSITIONS TAKEN DURING NEGOTIATIONS
• The role of concessions
Without them, there is either capitulation or deadlock
• Patterns of concession making
The pattern contains valuable information
• Final offers (making a commitment)
“This is all I can do”
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COMMITMENTS: TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
• Establishing a commitment
Three properties:
Finality
Specificity
Consequences
• Preventing the other party from committing prematurely
Their commitment reduces your flexibility
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WAYS TO CREATE A COMMITMENT
• Public pronouncement
• Linking with an outside base
• Increase the prominence of demands
• Reinforce the threat or promise
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COMMITMENTS: TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
• Ways to abandon a committed position
Plan a way out
Let it die silently
Restate the commitment in more general terms
Minimize the damage to the relationship if the other backs off
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CLOSING THE DEAL
• Provide alternatives (2 or 3 packages)
• Assume the close
• Split the difference
• Exploding offers
• Deal sweeteners
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DEALING WITH TYPICAL HARDBALL TACTICS
• Four main options:
Ignore them
Discuss them
Respond in kind
Co-opt the other party (befriend them)
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TYPICAL HARDBALL TACTICS
• Good Cop/Bad Cop
• Lowball/Highball
• Bogey (playing up an issue of little importance)
• The Nibble (asking for a number of small concessions to)
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TYPICAL HARDBALL TACTICS
• Chicken
• Intimidation
• Aggressive Behavior
• Snow Job (overwhelm the other party with information)
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SUMMARY
Negotiators need to:
• Set a clear target and resistance points
• Understand and work to improve their BATNA
• Start with good opening offer
• Make appropriate concessions
• Manage the commitment process
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