Organization

International Negotiation 7: 235–260, 2002. © 2002 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.

235

Lambs Among Lions? The Impact of Ethical Ideology on Negotiation Behaviors and Outcomes

JOSEPH T. BANAS∗ & JUDI MCLEAN PARKS† Olin School of Business, Washington University at St. Louis, Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA

Abstract. Relationships between individuals’ ethical orientations (classified on dimensions of idealism and relativism), their negotiation strategies, their views of ethically “marginal” tactics, and their outcomes in dyadic negotiation are examined. Results indicate a relation- ship between ethical orientation and negotiation strategy. Specifically, absolutists (high on idealism, low on relativism) tended to employ more assertive negotiation strategies than did those of other ethical orientations. Individuals in no one category of ethical ideology outper- formed those in any other category in terms of integrativeness of agreements or outcomes. Absolutists viewed ethically questionable tactics as less acceptable, whereas subjectivists found them more acceptable. We found that individuals less accepting of questionable tactics (“lambs”), who negotiated against those more accepting of such tactics (“lions”), were able to achieve better outcomes and a greater percentage of joint outcomes.

Keywords: deceptive bargaining tactics, ethics, ethical ideologies, negotiation

Introduction

“We should not check American ideals at the door when we engage in discussions with other nations.”

George J. Mitchell, 1990

“To accomplish almost anything worthwhile, it is necessary to compromise between the ideal and the practical.”

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1936 ∗ Joseph T. Banas is finishing his doctorate in organizational behavior at the John M. Olin

School of Business at Washington University in St. Louis, where he is a visiting assistant professor in 2002–2003. He was formerly an analyst in the Department of Defense and worked subsequently as a lecturer/consultant in southern Africa under the auspices of the Peace Corps. His research interests include individual and organizational identity, diversity and conflict, and organizational change.

† Judi McLean Parks is the Reuben C. Taylor, Jr. & Anne Carpenter Taylor Professor of Organizational Behavior at the John M. Olin School of Business at Washington University in St. Louis. Her research interests include negotiation and conflict resolution, the psychological contract and its violation, organizational identity, and revenge in the workplace.

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Numerous adages and quotes, such as those scattered throughout this article, provide evidence of a general belief that while morals and ethics should be guidelines to behavior, oftentimes, for the sake of agreement, those morals and ethics may not be rigidly followed. While Mitchell advocates following American ideals in discussions (and negotiations) between the United States and other nations, Roosevelt suggests that those ideals are subject to compromise in order to reach an agreement. Whether the ends justify the means is a central question to American business. American busi- ness is results oriented and, at times, employees stretch ethical or moral standards to “make numbers” while managers turn a blind eye. A further complicating factor is that no single universally recognized moral standard nor any one universally recognized ethical standard exists. While most, if not all, large organizations admonish employees to act ethically (e.g., IBM 2002), multiple moral and ethical standards exist. By which specific moral and ethical standards should behavior be judged?

When individuals interact with one another, different moral and ethical standards frequently come into play – a situation more likely in an era of workforce diversity and globalization. Negotiations are a particularly important type of business interaction, where different operating standards of morality and ethics have great potential to affect processes and outcomes. What determines whether a negotiator will view a behavior as appropriate or inappropriate for use in a negotiation? Some negotiators judge the acceptab- ility of a behavior from a utilitarian perspective (cf. Brady and Wheeler 1996), simply by the desirability of the outcome that results from its use. Others may view certain tactics to be inappropriate under any circumstance, emphasizing the process over the outcome. Further, some negotiators may believe that when one “plays by the rules” one can always achieve an optimum or desired outcome. Such negotiators may be more likely to play by those rules because they believe so strongly in them. In contrast, others believe that playing by the rules does not always pay off and that, sometimes, one must bend, twist, or even break the rules in order to achieve the best outcome. Moreover, when individuals with different beliefs about the appropriateness of negotiation tactics sit across from each other at the negotiating table, their belief differ- ences can result in one side being advantaged and the other disadvantaged. In other words, will individuals having differing assessments of the acceptability of negotiating tactics (behaviors) fare equally well in negotiations? Common “wisdom” dictates that negotiators holding different ethics are more likely to select different sets of negotiating tactics, resulting in differential outcomes. When “lambs” sit across from “lions” at the negotiating table, are the results a “bloodbath” or a fair negotiation? These are among the questions we seek to examine in this article. Due to the dearth of research examining links between

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ethical orientations and negotiating behaviors, this research is best considered exploratory in nature.

Negotiation and Negotiation Behaviors

Negotiations involve serial communication between parties to exchange information and attempt to influence or persuade one’s counterpart. Fisher and Ury (1981: ix) present negotiation as a basic means of getting what you want from others and a back-and-forth communication designed to help parties arrive at an agreement when they have some shared and some opposing interests. Lax and Sebenius (1986: 11) define negotiation as “a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly-decided action than they could otherwise.” Choi and Kelemen (1995: 23) view negotiation as the ability to accomplish long-term outcomes that both parties have mutually agreed to reach.

Parties in a negotiation may expect, at least to some extent, that their interests are diametrically opposed (e.g., Thompson and Hastie 1990). They may believe also (1) that the other party recognizes this fact, and (2) that the other party therefore will act opportunistically. Accordingly, the parties may conclude that they will be disadvantaged in the negotiation unless they too act opportunistically. Once the negotiation begins, parties engage in behaviors selected to influence or persuade one another. A wide range of behaviors is available in both verbal and non-verbal varieties. Moreover, these beha- viors may be categorized according to social acceptability or appropriateness. Some actions may be considered appropriate under all circumstances, some may be considered appropriate only in certain specific contexts, and some may be viewed as inappropriate in all situations (e.g., physically attacking your negotiating counterpart).

Ethics and Morality

In common usage, the words ethics and morality are often employed inter- changeably (Boatright 1997: 22), yet there are important differences. Rahim (2001) mentions that morality applies to rules and standards of conduct in a society at a certain point in time, focusing on defining practices as either right or wrong. In contrast, ethics is often restricted in reference to rules and norms pertaining to behaviors and practices of members of more specialized, professional groups.

While the historic professions are law, medicine, divinity, and the military, over time other groups have gained professional status. McDowell (1991) lists management as a borderline profession, as it lacks the professional character-

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istics of state licensing and a code of ethics. In business, the predominant code of ethics arises from the repeated practices of managers. What managers do, and what others come to accept, may define what is considered as ethical in the practice of management and management negotiations.

“Nothing is illegal if 100 businessmen decide to do it.” Andrew Young, 1978

McDowell (1991) notes that current society in the West values the charac- teristics of ambition, competitiveness, desire for material gain, and high social status. Society also values fair play. Balancing these potentially conflicting values is left to the individual. Moreover, society allows that “all’s fair in love and war.” Interestingly, many business organizations adopt military meta- phors, so employees “in the trenches” may come to view business as being equivalent to war or combat. In such circumstances, to achieve “victory,” employees may be asked or required to adopt the organization’s ethics in place of their own (cf. Choi and Kelemen 1995: 149).

Characterizing Ethics

Forsyth and his colleagues (e.g., Forsyth 1980, 1981, 1985; Forsyth and Pope 1984) posit four ideologies characterizing ethical positions based on relativism and idealism. Relativism refers to the extent to which universal moral rules are used to evaluate actions or decisions. Idealism refers to the extent to which one believes that desirable consequences always can be obtained without violating moral guidelines. At one extreme, the relat- ivist questions the value of universal moral principles, while others believe that there is an ultimate right or wrong (Forsyth 1980). In other words, the relativist may see things in shades of gray, while others see moral issues as black or white. The extreme idealist believes that desirable consequences are always obtainable, provided that the “right” steps are taken. A less ideal- istic person believes that, even given best efforts, at least some undesirable consequences are inevitable, making it necessary to accept the bad with the good (Forsyth 1980).

Juxtaposing these two dimensions results in four ethical ideologies (see Table 1). Situationists and subjectivists are both relativists, believing that each event should be examined individually to determine the appropriate action. In other words, the event must be taken in context. The situationist’s idealism is tempered by pragmatism, recognizing the need to occasionally sacrifice idealism and find a middle-ground solution. The subjectivist recog- nizes his/her own personal values and needs, perhaps ignoring the need to find a middle ground. In contrast, absolutists and exceptionists rely primarily

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Table 1. Taxonomy of ethical ideologies

Relativism

High Low

sees things in shades of gray sees things in terms of black & white

Idealism High Situationist Absolutist

Advocates individualistic ana- lysis of each act in each situation; what is right or wrong “depends” on act in context

Assumes the best possible outcome can always be achieved by following universal moral principles to the letter

Low Subjectivist Exceptionist

Makes appraisals based on per- sonal values and perspectives rather than universal moral rules

Allows moral absolutes to guide judgments, but is willing to make exceptions when necessary

Note. Adapted from Forsyth (1980).

on universally-accepted, moral “rules” in determining appropriate and inap- propriate actions or policies. The absolutist is idealistic and simultaneously rule-bound, meaning that only if the rules are followed will the ideal be obtained. The “ends” do not count if the means used to achieve those ends are compromised. In contrast, the exceptionist, while believing in universal moral rules, recognizes the need for deviations from those rules at times. Both idealistic, situationists and absolutists believe that the best consequences can be obtained without violating moral guidelines. Subjectivists and exception- ists are much less likely to believe this possible (low idealism). Similarly, on the relativism dimension, individuals vary in the degree to which they question the existence of universal moral rules or principles.

Forsyth and Pope (1984) found that of the four categories, only the exceptionists expressed concern over the practice of lying (in the context of rationales given to human subjects) and the use of manipulative procedures. Their moral judgments were most closely related to concern over perceived harm to test subjects. Forsyth (1985) found that situationists and absolut- ists, both groups high on idealism, discount conformity to social norms when consequences are extremely positive or extremely negative. We believe that ethical ideology is likely to affect employee motivation to think about complex issues and to impact employee decisions concerning behavior, in this case, in a negotiation. Based on Forsyth’s (1985) findings, we expect situationists and exceptionists to recognize the idiosyncratic needs of other parties, while subjectivists will recognize the idiosyncratic needs of the situ- ation. In contrast, absolutists will be less likely to recognize others’ personal

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needs or situational needs and, hence, may be particularly uncomprom- ising. Similarly, since subjectivists are sensitive both to the needs of others and to the situation, we would expect that subjectivists would demonstrate greater concern for their negotiating partners, and thereby achieve desirable outcomes through their choice of more cooperative negotiation strategies.

Hypothesis 1: Absolutists will use more assertive negotiation strategies than will subjectivists, situationists and exceptionists. Hypothesis 2: Subjectivists will use more cooperative negotiating strategies than will absolutists, situationists and exceptionists.

Forsyth (1980) draws a connection between absolutism and deontology, a philosophy of duty-based ethics espoused by Immanuel Kant (ref. Cavalier 2002). In such a philosophical system, the ends never justify the means, and an action is viewed as being right if it is motivated by rational principled reasons. This suggests that absolutists tend to be: (a) convinced that their moral principles are correct and that they know the correct way to proceed; (b) convinced that their best outcome is achievable; and (c) somewhat rigid in their beliefs and behavior, with a strong sense of duty to do what they view as being right. These tendencies suggest the use of more assertive and less compromising negotiation styles. It follows that absolutists may be less likely to promote a “problem-solving” orientation, a critical factor in achieving integrative agreements (Pruitt 1983: 35) which are able to “expand the pie.” Further, given their uncompromising nature, absolutists are likely to be hard bargainers and hence may receive relatively more in the way of outcomes than their colleagues. Based on this logic, we predict:

Hypothesis 3: Absolutists will negotiate less integrative agreements. Hypothesis 4: Absolutists will achieve better individual outcomes.

Lewicki and Litterer (1985) note three major dimensions of ethical conduct that account for most of the questions arising in negotiation. The first dimension concerns the debate on the relationship between means (behaviors) and ends (outcomes). Some individuals hold the view that means justify the ends while others take the position that some behaviors are inappropriate regardless of the outcome. This latter alternative implies the existence of some type of guideline or rule concerning the appropriateness of a behavior, yet does not indicate the source of that rule, be it an individual, organizational, or even societal belief or value. The second dimension concerns the ethical views of the negotiators themselves: whether they see a certain universal set of ethics as being applicable in all negotiation situations or whether they feel that ethics are basically situationally-determined. This dimension appears to be the negotiation-specific case of Forsyth’s relativism dimension. The third dimension addresses truth telling, such as what is truth and whether truth should be told in all situations regardless of the consequences. Again, this

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Table 2. Scale descriptive statistics

Scale Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Coefficient

deviation α

Ethical Ideology

Relativism 4.27 1.24 1.00 7.00 0.56

Idealism 3.77 1.25 1.00 7.00 0.67

SINS

Traditional competitive bargaining 5.88 1.03 2.33 7.00 0.63

Attacking opponent networks 2.41 1.21 1.00 6.00 0.65

Information misuse 3.60 1.59 1.00 7.00 0.66

False promises 2.32 1.27 1.00 7.00 0.78

Misrepresentation 3.65 1.34 1.00 7.00 0.73

Note. N = 136. Means were calculated on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 = not at all appro- priate, and 7 = very appropriate. SINS data adapted from Robinson, Lewicki and Donahue (2000).

dimension seems to be a very specific case of Forsyth’s relativism dimension concerning the maxim, “never tell a lie, always tell the truth.” Lewicki (1982) sees deception and disguise, in the forms of bluffing, misrepresentation, and falsification, as playing important roles in negotiation.

Robinson, Lewicki, and Donahue (2000) developed and validated a 16- item, five-factor scale, the Self-Reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies (SINS) scale, of bargaining tactics that are considered “marginally appro- priate.” The five categories concern the control and manipulation of infor- mation for purposes of deception. The categories, with exemplar tactics, are: (1) traditional competitive bargaining (e.g., making an unreasonably large or small opening offer); (2) attacking your opponent’s network (e.g., attempting to get one’s counterpart fired); (3) making false promises to your opponent (e.g., promise that which you know will never be delivered); (4) misrepresenting information to both your opponent and your constituency (e.g., denying the validity of information you know to be valid); and (5) inappropriate information gathering (e.g., recruiting one of your opponent’s subordinates to provide inside information). The sixteen tactics comprising this scale appear in the Appendix. In a study of 762 students, Robinson et al. (2000) found that tactics associated with traditional competitive bargaining were considered generally to be acceptable for use in negotiation (mean = 5.88 on a 7-point response scale), while those related to the other categories were found to be generally unacceptable (see Table 2).

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Arranging the scores obtained by Robinson, et al. (2000) in order of “appropriateness” suggests, at least intuitively, that traditional competitive bargaining is the least questionable tactic, while misrepresentation is among the most questionable. We believe that one’s personal ethical ideology (as just discussed) is likely to predict the acceptability of “marginal” negotiation tactics, suggesting a relationship between ethical ideology and SINS scores:

Hypothesis 5: Ethical ideology and acceptability of SINS tactics will be correlated.

More specifically, the focus of the absolutist is on achieving good (in the current context, achieving a favorable negotiated agreement) by conforming to universal moral principles. Absolutists, high in idealism and believing in universal moral rights, represent one extreme in terms of the ethical ideo- logies. At the opposite extreme are subjectivists, who believe neither in universal moral principles nor that good results can always be obtained. We expect that absolutists would be the least comfortable with using even a hint of a questionable tactic and, therefore, troubled with the more question- able tactics. Similarly, subjectivists are likely to be more comfortable with questionable tactics overall. Based on these two extremes, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 6: Absolutists will find the five SINS tactics less acceptable than those who subscribe to one of the other ethical ideologies; subject- ivists will find the five SINS more acceptable than those who subscribe to one of the other ethical ideologies.

Finally, we consider the two individuals composing the negotiation dyad. If both participants view the propriety of negotiating tactics similarly, one would expect them to employ similar tactics in their quest to negotiate an agreement. However, if one party views a limited number of questionable tactics as acceptable, and the other party views a broader range of tactics as acceptable, we might expect one party – perhaps the one who accepted a larger range of tactics – to have an advantage. Restated in the SINS context, will those with low SINS (i.e., having a low acceptance of questionable tactics) be disadvantaged?

The metaphor we introduce is that of the lamb and the lion. When the lamb and the lion meet, the common wisdom is that the lamb is devoured. Similarly, a negotiator willing to employ a broad range of questionable tactics (the lion) may be expected to best a negotiator restricted to “taking the high road” and employing only a limited set of socially acceptable tactics (the lamb). Moreover, “lambs” may be more likely to believe that both parties can benefit from a negotiation. Hence, they may be more likely to compromise and less willing to use questionable, or potentially divisive (assertive), tactics. “Lions” may be more inclined to see negotiations in distributive terms (dinner or not), believing that one negotiator may triumph at the expense of the other,

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and, if this is the case, then it is better to profit at the other’s expense (eat dinner).

An alternative view of the meeting between the lamb and the lion is one in which both sides prevail or even one in which the lamb triumphs over the lion. Stated more commonly, it may be possible that “nice people finish first.” The lamb may stubbornly persist in the face of challenge, following high moral principles to achieve the best possible and fair outcomes for both sides, refusing to fall prey to negotiators’ “dirty tricks.” What comes to mind is the motto attributed to Captain William McDonald of the Texas Rangers law enforcement organization: “No man in the wrong can stand up against a fellow that’s in the right and keeps on a-comin’.”1 These two views lead to two final, competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 7: Lions will take advantage of lambs, and, hence, will do relatively better than their counterparts in terms of their negotiated outcomes.

Conversely, Hypothesis 8: Lambs’ outcomes will equal or surpass those of lions.

Methods

Sample and Procedures

Data were collected from 136 MBA students as part of their classroom assign- ments in a negotiation class. Most of these students were full-time managers enrolled in a part-time MBA program; the remaining students had full-time work experience and were enrolled in a full-time MBA program. As part of the experimental procedures, students participated in a scoreable negoti- ation exercise, New Recruit (Neale 1997), and were randomly assigned either to the role of the recruiter or the job candidate. The New Recruit exercise includes two purely distributive issues, two completely compatible issues (in which each side has exactly the same preference), and four issues that are weighed differently by the various players, providing the potential for integ- rative agreements. All responses were collected as part of classroom exercises or simulation scores throughout the term.

Measurement of Key Variables

Ethical Ideology was assessed using modified and shortened versions of Forsyth’s (1980) relativism and idealism scales.2 Each modified scale included four items, to which respondents indicated how strongly they disagreed or agreed (high numbers indicated high agreement). The scores,

244 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS

Table 3. Mean idealism and relativism scores, by ethical-ideology category

Category Mean I-score Mean R-Score

Exceptionist 2.68 3.45

(N = 33)

Subjectivist 2.88 5.15

(N = 36)

Absolutist 5.01 3.18

(N = 34)

Situationist 4.58 5.24

(N = 33)

Total 3.77 4.27

(N = 136)

Note. Means represent responses made on a 7-point Likert scale; 1 = low idealism/relativism, and 7 = high idealism/relativism. Scale items adapted from Forsyth (1980).

ranging from 1 to 7, position the issues on the idealism and relativism scales. Means were 3.77 and 4.27, while medians were 3.75 and 4.50 for the idealism and relativism scales, respectively. Each participant was classified as an exceptionist, a subjectivist, an absolutist or a situationist based on a median split of the two scales. This resulted in 33, 36, 34, and 33 respondents in each ethical classification, respectively.3 Descriptive statistics for the idealism and realism scales are provided in Table 2. Mean idealism and relativism scores for each ethical ideology category appear in Table 3.

Acceptability of Questionable Tactics was measured with the SINS scale (Robinson, et al. 2000), resulting in five questionable negotiation categories: traditional competitive bargaining, opponent network attacks, false prom- ises, misrepresentation, and misuse of information. Participants were asked to indicate how inappropriate or appropriate it was to use each of sixteen tactics, responding to a point scale ranging from 1 (not at all appropriate) to 7 (very appropriate). Descriptive statistics for these measures also are displayed in Table 2. A list of tactics comprising the SINS categories appears in the Appendix.

Negotiator Outcomes were computed by totaling the scores attained by each negotiator from the scoreable negotiation, New Recruit (Neale 1997). In New Recruit, possible scores for each of the roles range from –8,400 to 13,200 points. Scores in our sample ranged from –600 to 10,200 points, with an average of 5,481 points and a median of 5,600 points. Negotiators unable to reach agreement (impasse) received 0 points. A less skillful negotiator

LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 245

might also receive 0 points based on the agreement negotiated. The negative value resulted from the only individual who lost points in the New Recruit negotiation exercise.

We operationalized Integrativeness of a negotiated agreement as the agreement’s efficiency. Integrative agreements are “win-win” agreements, the result of integrative bargaining activity where both parties share information and collaborate in an effort to maximize both of their individual outcomes (i.e., their joint outcome). During the course of integrative bargaining, all possible means of maximizing outcomes may be explored. When such a thorough process occurs, little, if any, money is left “on the table.” In the context of a dyadic negotiation exercise, an integrative agreement is one in which all possible points are distributed between the two parties. A less integrative agreement is one in which the joint outcome is less than the maximum possible points. We view integrative agreements by definition as being more efficient, where the efficiency of an agreement is the extent to which all possible points have been allocated between the two parties (in the case of a dyadic negotiation). Integrativeness of an agreement was computed by dividing the actual joint outcome from the negotiation exer- cise by the maximum possible joint outcome (13,200 points). Integrativeness values ranged from 50% to 100%, with a mean of 82% and a median of 86%.

Perceived Preferred negotiation strategies were measured using Kindler’s (1981) Management of Differences Inventory (MODITM).4 These data were collected by having each participant’s negotiating counterpart assess the participant following the New Recruit negotiation in terms of the strategies they believed the participant was using. The MODITM captures the perceived relative preference given to each of nine different negoti- ation strategies, which can be characterized through behaviors representing emphasis on one’s own outcomes versus the other party’s outcomes (see Table 4). Counterparts were asked to respond to 36 pairs of statements and divide three points between the statements, each representing a different strategy, indicating the extent to which they observed the behaviors in the other negotiator. In theory, scores could range from 0 to 24 on a given strategy. Descriptive statistics for each of the different strategies are given in Table 4. From the scores generated by the counterparts on the MODITM, we deter- mined which strategies were most and least enacted by the participants (in the eyes of their negotiating counterparts). If the participants’ highest score was duplicated, the participant was counted twice.

The four “corners” of the MODITM represent the most extreme strategic behaviors (see Table 4). Specifically, the most assertive and least cooperative behavior is Dominate/Compete. Collaborate is assertive and cooperative, Avoid is unassertive and uncooperative, while Accommodate is unassertive

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Table 4. Preferred negotiation strategies with exemplar behaviors (with ranges followed by means in parentheses)

Concern for other’s outcomes

low high

(uncooperative) (cooperative)

Concern high Dominate/Compete Bargain Collaborate

for own (assertive) e.g. asserting own e.g. trading e.g. joint problem-

outcome position concessions solving

0–22 8–24 6–23

(10.69) (16.13) (14.64)

Smooth Compromise Release

e.g. point out e.g. splitting the e.g. agree to disagree

similarities, difference on some points

not differences 6–19 3–19

5–18 (13.27) (11.16)

(11.36)

low Avoid Decision by Rule Accommodate

(unassertive) e.g. time outs to let e.g. using a fairness e.g. giving in on

emotions cool rule to decide some points

2–19 4–22 2–20

(9.91) (11.95) (8.90)

Note. Negotiation strategies from Kindler (1981) Management of Differences InventoryTM.

and cooperative. As the polar ends of the MODITM dimensions, these four strategic behaviors are the focus of our hypotheses relating to negotiating strategies.

LambLion scores were computed as one’s relative SINS compared to that of one’s negotiating partner. Those who find the SINS tactics less acceptable are defined broadly as lambs (low SINS scores), while those who tend to find the SINS tactics more acceptable may be defined broadly as lions (high SINS scores). Yet our main interest was the relative differences between one’s own SINS and the SINS of one’s negotiating partner. We reasoned that if one’s counterpart views the SINS tactics as more acceptable than oneself, the counterpart would be in position to take advantage by playing “fast and loose.” Similarly, if one views the SINS tactics as more acceptable than his or her counterpart, a broader range of tactics is available, enabling one to take advantage of that counterpart. Thus, LambLion was derived by

LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 247

first computing the average SINS score for each participant excluding the Traditional Competitive Bargaining scores (SINS2, which ranged from 1.00 to 7.00, with a mean and median of 3.00 and 2.96, respectively).5 After computing this average, we calculated a LambLion score for each individual by subtracting the opponent’s SINS2 score from the individual’s own SINS2 score. The larger the negative difference in average SINS acceptability, the greater one is conceived of as being in a “lamb” situation. The larger the positive difference between averages, the more one is conceived as being in a “lion” situation. Small differences in either the negative or positive direction would constitute a more neutral situation wherein the two negotiators are more evenly matched in terms of tactic acceptability.

RelativeShare was computed as the relative percentage that an indi- vidual negotiator received of the total “pie” (i.e., sum of the two individual outcomes) that the two parties negotiated. The greater one’s share of the total pie, the greater his or her relative share compared to that of the partner. RelativeShare ranged from –0.06 to 0.92, with a mean and median of 0.50.

Results

Tests of the Hypotheses

Hypotheses 1 and 2 addressed the impact of ethical ideology on a negotiator’s choice of strategy, while Hypotheses 3 and 4 dealt with negotiated outcome and integrativeness of the negotiation agreement (efficiency). Hypotheses 5 and 6 examined relationships between ethical ideology and one’s accept- ance of questionable negotiation tactics. Finally, Hypotheses 7 and 8 were offered as competing hypotheses addressing the relative negotiated outcomes of individuals categorized as lions and lambs.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that absolutists would use relatively more assertive strategies than would subjectivists, exceptionists, or situationists. We tested this hypothesis by comparing the proportion of absolutists whose dominant strategy was assertive (as reported by their negotiating counterparts) to those proportions for the other groups. We used the statistical test for the differ- ence between two population proportions (α = 0.05). These tests indicated that absolutists used more assertive strategies than exceptionists (t = 2.09), but they did not indicate a significant difference with either subjectivists or situationists (t = 1.02, 1.43, respectively).

We next examined the relative frequencies of negotiating styles, specific- ally the relative frequency of the most assertive strategies (Dominate/ Compete, Bargain, and Collaborate) and the relative infrequency of the least assertive strategies (Avoid, Decision by Rule, and Accommodate). Table 5

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Table 5. Frequency of strategy use by negotiator ethical-ideology category, as reported by negotiating counterpart

Exceptionists Subjectivists Absolutists Situationists

Most used strategy

More assertive strategies

Dominate/Compete 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.09

Bargain 0.33 0.45 0.52 0.51

Collaborate 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.09

Sum: 0.60 0.74 0.84 0.69

Less assertive strategies

Avoid 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06

Decision by rule 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03

Accommodate 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.03

Sum: 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.11

Intermediate strategies

Smooth 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00

Compromise 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.06

Release 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.14

Sum: 0.27 0.10 0.10 0.20

Least used strategy

More assertive strategies

Dominate/Compete 0.17 0.32 0.24 0.17

Bargain 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00

Collaborate 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02

Sum: 0.22 0.35 0.24 0.20

Less assertive strategies

Avoid 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.22

Decision by Rule 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.05

Accommodate 0.33 0.26 0.36 0.32

Sum: 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.59

Intermediate strategies

Smooth 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.05

Compromise 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00

Release 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.17

Sum: 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.22

Note. Numbers may not add due to rounding. Strategies reported by 118 negotiating counterparts. Cell numbers represent percentages of individuals employing a particular strategy.

LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 249

reveals that Dominate/Compete – the most assertive style – was used by 19% of the absolutists, more than twice as high as situationists (9%), and considerably higher than either the exceptionists (13%) or the subjectivists (10%). Bargaining, also assertive, was reported as the most used style by 33–52% of all ethical ideology categories, a result not surprising given that the task, and class, focused on negotiations. Collaborate, the third assertive strategy, was reported as the most used style for 13% of the absolutists and 13% of the exceptionists, while it was reported as the most used style for 19% of the subjectivists and 9% of the situationists. Viewing assertive strategies as a group, the most frequent users of the most assertive strategies were reported to be absolutists (84%), followed by subjectivists (74%), situation- ists (69%), and exceptionists (60%). In parallel, Table 5 depicts the styles reported as least used. The table reveals that individuals negotiating against absolutists reported Accommodate – one of the least assertive strategies – to be that style least used by absolutists. Considering all three less assertive strategies (i.e., Avoid, Decision by Rule, Accommodate) as a group, absolut- ists and exceptionists had the highest least-used rates (both at 61%), followed by situationists (59%), and subjectivists (56%). Overall, the data provide mixed support for our first hypothesis. Absolutists were reported as using more assertive strategies, but the difference was only significant over the exceptionists. The absolutists also used flexible (non-assertive) strategies the least.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that subjectivists would be concerned with the outcomes of others and, hence, would employ more problem-solving negoti- ation strategies (Accommodate, Release, Collaborate). We used the same test here as in Hypothesis 1 but compared subjectivists to absolutists, exception- ists, and situationists. These tests were not significant (e.g., with respect to subjectivists and absolutists, t = 1.47). Table 6 reveals major differences in the collaboration strategy. Subjectivists’ collaborative tendencies (19%) were considerably greater than those of exceptionists and absolutists (both at 13%) and more than twice that of situationists (9%). Again, the least-used style is also revealing. As seen in Table 6, subjectivists were regarded as less likely to use the Dominate/Compete style than any other ethical ideology (reported as the least used strategy for 32% of the subjectivists). When all of the less problem-solving strategies are considered conjointly, absolutists were most likely to use these strategies least (61%), followed by subjectivists (50%), situationists (44%), and exceptionists (33%). Overall, while some indicators are promising, these mixed results do not support our second hypothesis.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 proposed that absolutists would negotiate the least integrative agreements (Hypothesis 3), but that they would achieve better individual outcomes (Hypothesis 4). Mean agreement integrativeness and

250 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS

Table 6. Use of more and less problem-solving strategies

Exceptionists Subjectivists Absolutists Situationists

Cited as most used: More Problem-Solving strategies

Accommodate 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.03 Release 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.14 Collaborate 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.09

Sum: 0.27 0.31 0.16 0.26

Cited as least used: Less Problem-Solving strategies

Avoid 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.22 Smooth 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.05 Dominate/Compete 0.17 0.32 0.24 0.17

Sum: 0.33 0.50 0.61 0.44

Note. Numbers may not add due to rounding. Strategies reported by 118 negotiating counterparts.

Table 7. Mean integrativeness of negotiated agreement and agreement outcome by ethical ideology category

Category Agreement Outcome Integrativeness (points earned)

Exceptionists (N = 33) 0.839 5,394 Subjectivists (N = 33) 0.815 5,200 Absolutists (N = 33) 0.809 5,327 Situationists (N = 33) 0.850 5,767

Total (N = 132) 0.828 5,422

Note. Integrativeness is joint outcome for the negotiating dyad divided by total possible points (13,200).

outcomes by ethical ideology category appear in Table 7. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were tested using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a priori contrast (absolutists versus all others). Results indicated neither significant differences in integrativeness nor in individual outcomes (number of points) between categories. Examination of Table 7 reveals that situationists nego- tiated the most integrative agreements and received the highest outcomes, although these differences are not significant. In sum, neither Hypothesis 3 nor Hypothesis 4 was supported by the data, although the means were in the hypothesized directions.

LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 251

Table 8. Relationships between negotiator tactics

Zero-order correlations among acceptability of negotiator tactics

TCB NA IM FP

Traditional competitive bargaining (TCB) —

Network attacks (NA) 0.35 —

Information misuse (IM) 0.37 0.56 —

False promises (FP) 0.22 0.39 0.38 —

Misrepresentations (MIS) 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.49

Note. N = 136. All correlations significant at p < 0.01 with the exception TCB with FP, which was significant at p < 0.05.

Hypotheses 5 and 6 examined the relationships between the negotiator’s ethical ideology and the acceptability of the five tactical categories repre- sented by the SINS. Overall, the SINS acceptabilities were significantly correlated (see Table 8), thus we examined the impact of ethical ideology on the SINS acceptance using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The results of the analysis were significant (multivariate F15,390 = 2.42, p < 0.01). The data revealed that ethical ideology does predict the acceptability of questionable negotiator tactics (SINS), supporting Hypothesis 5. Among the five questionable tactics, univariate analyses revealed highly signifi- cant differences for False Promises (p < 0.001), significant differences for Misrepresentation, Traditional Competitive Bargaining, and Network Attacks (significant at p < 0.005, 0.020, and 0.038, respectively) and non-significant differences for Misuse of Information (p < 0.161).

The more precise hypothesis 6 predicted: (a) that absolutists would find the five questionable strategies less acceptable overall; and (b) that subjectivists would find the five strategies more acceptable overall than negotiators in other categories. In general, absolutists found the questionable negotiator strategies less acceptable (overall mean of 3.10), while subjectivists were the most accepting of questionable negotiator strategies (overall mean of 3.97). A one- way ANOVA determined these differences in average acceptability among the four categories to be significant (F3,132 = 6.74, p < 0.001). The mean acceptability for each questionable strategy by ethical ideology is displayed in Table 9.

In planned comparisons, we compared the overall mean acceptability for absolutists to non-absolutists, and repeated the same test for subjectiv- ists. These tests revealed that absolutists were significantly less accepting (t59.11 = –3.72, p < 0.001, unequal variances assumed), while subjectivists were significantly more accepting than their colleagues in other categories (t58.56 = 3.07, p < 0.01, unequal variances assumed). Thus, Hypothesis 6

252 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS

Table 9. Acceptability of negotiator tactics by ethical ideology

Exceptionists Subjectivists Absolutists Situationists

Traditional competitive 5.77 6.04 5.49 6.22

bargaining

Network attacks 2.36 2.85 2.03 2.35

Information misuse 3.64 4.03 3.17 3.56

False promises 1.94 2.86 1.69 2.78

Misrepresentation 3.42 4.08 3.10 3.98

Mean across all tactics 3.43 3.97 3.10 3.78

N 33 36 34 33

was supported. Post hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that significant differ- ences existed between most of the categories in their acceptance of False Promises. The only post hoc contrasts that were not significant were the Exceptionists-Absolutists and Subjectivists-Situationists.

Interestingly, these pairs are alike on the Relativism scale (i.e., Excep- tionists and Absolutists are both low in Relativism, while Subjectivists and Situationists are both high in Relativism; see also Tables 1 and 2). This suggests that relativism differences may drive the acceptability of SINS.

Finally, Hypotheses 7 and 8 were competing hypotheses concerned with the relative share of the negotiated pie received by lambs and lions. The two competing hypotheses were tested using regression. LambLion was significantly related to both Points (F1,110 = 4.47, t = –2.12, p < 0.05) and RelativeShare (F1,110 = 6.35, t = –2.52, p < 0.05). The lower the LambLion value (i.e., the greater the extent to which one is more of a lamb compared to one’s negotiating partner), the greater the points received by that negotiator and the greater the percent of the negotiating “pie” he or she is able to capture. These results support Hypothesis 8 rather than the competing Hypothesis 7. The meek may not necessarily inherit the earth, but in this case they did seem to earn more points and larger relative share pieces of the negotiating pie. It appears that perhaps nice people do finish first. Table 10 summarizes the results of our hypotheses tests.

Discussion

In this exploratory study, we examined relationships between ethics, beha- viors, and outcomes within the context of negotiation. Beginning with Forsyth’s (1980) typology of ethical ideologies, we found that absolutists,

LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 253

Table 10. Results of hypothesis tests

Impact of ethical ideology on negotiator strategic negotiation styles

Hypothesis 1 Absolutists will use more assertive negoti- ation strategies

mixed support

Hypothesis 2 Subjectivists will use more problem-solving strategies

not supported

Negotiator outcomes

Hypothesis 3 Absolutists will negotiate less integrative agreements

not supported, although means in hypothesized direction

Hypothesis 4 Absolutists will achieve higher individual outcomes

not supported, although means in hypothesized direction

Ethical ideology and acceptability of SINS

Hypothesis 5 Ethical ideology and SINS are related supported

Hypothesis 6 Absolutists will find SINS less acceptable Subjectivists will find SINS more acceptable

supported

Lambs vs. Lions (competing hypotheses)

Hypothesis 7 Lions will do better than Lambs not supported

Hypothesis 8 Lambs will do better than Lions supported

those believing in a single framework whereby optimal outcomes can be achieved, are inclined to favor assertive negotiation strategies. Perhaps the combination of an assumed universal moral framework assumed to lead to optimal outcomes provides absolutists the confidence and motivation to press forward against whatever resistance they encounter. Ambiguity seems not to characterize absolutists. Examples of such behavior are evident in various social movements within the past decades. Absolutists seem to believe that they have the means toward achieving that perfect goal, and they appear willing to assert themselves against those who they feel may not be as “enlightened.”

The absolutist nature contrasts considerably with that of subjectivists, who tend to assess situations less simplistically and see more shades of gray. Subjectivists may be more inclined to believe that the best of efforts do not always lead to the best outcomes. Subjectivists demonstrated, albeit qual- itatively, a tendency to favor more cooperative, problem-solving strategies and tended to avoid more assertive and competitive strategies. As managers, subjectivists may be more open to different perspectives and more willing to

254 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS

collaborate with counterparts rather than dictate to them. This approach to negotiation may prove more fruitful, as counterparts find their active involve- ment welcome. Involvement may lead to a greater sense of ownership of both problem and solution and thereby, to more lasting agreements. Our data concerning strategies selected by situationists and exceptionists lends itself less to clear conclusions. Just as absolutists and subjectivists are somewhat polar opposites, so are situationists and exceptionists. Yet we find no dramatic differences. It appears that the interaction between relativism and idealism – where the absolutists and subjectivists define the extremes – is where we see the most pronounced differences.

We found no significant difference in the outcomes achieved by abso- lutists and their efficiency in producing integrative agreements. The lack of support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 may be attributable in part to the fact that the study participants were students enrolled in negotiation courses where the New Recruit negotiation occurred relatively early, perhaps before their nego- tiating skills were finely tuned. Hypothesis 3 which predicted that absolutists would negotiate less efficient agreements implies a corollary hypothesis that the other three ideologies (situationists, subjectivists, exceptionists) would negotiate more efficient agreements. We may not have had the extreme differences required to detect actual differences in negotiated outcomes, the most distal variable in our causal chain (ideology → negotiation strategies → outcomes/integrativeness of agreements). Future research should more closely examine these issues, including negotiator/dyad characteristics and potential moderating effects of negotiator experience.

Our results establish a clear linkage between ethical ideology and accept- ability of SINS, providing additional evidence of the validity of the SINS scale. The questionable tactic False Promises appeared clearly to distinguish the ethical ideologies. The lowest scores were those of exceptionists and absolutists, the two groups lowest on the relativism scale, who tend to view situations in terms of black or white, right or wrong. To the extent that False Promises constitute lies, these scores may reflect a strong negative reac- tion consistent with the social maxim, “don’t tell lies.” Misrepresentation, Traditional Competitive Bargaining, and Network Attacks also distinguished ethical ideologies. Reitz, Wall, and Love (1998) point out that no ethical model justifies lying in negotiations, which is consistent with the low scores obtained on False Promises and Misrepresentation.

Looking more closely at ethical ideologies, absolutists tended to find these tactics less acceptable than did any of the other categories, while subjectivists found them more acceptable than did individuals in any other ethical category. One envisions absolutists as taking a moral “high road,” while subjectivists may do whatever is acceptable to “get the job done.” We also examined the

LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 255

relationships between one’s views of SINS and outcomes achieved. The vari- able left unexamined was the extent to which individuals actually used SINS tactics in the course of their negotiations. More fine-grained analyses will be required to better understand how different ethical orientations employ each of the different SINS tactics in their negotiations.

Our final conclusion is that lambs best lions in our sample, a conclusion that should warm the hearts of parents. To the extent that negotiators differ in their attitudes towards SINS behaviors, those preferring the moral “high road” did better in achieving a greater percent of the joint outcome negotiated. This result supports the position espoused by Reitz and his colleagues (1998) that those who are more likely to abide by ethical rules are more likely to gain higher outcomes.

Study Limitations

Like all studies, this research has limitations. One cost of laboratory research is the possible loss of external validity and mundane realism. In the field, external validity is frequently obtained with costs to internal validity, which result from the loss of control and a potential loss in the precision in the measurement of variables of interest. Without the control of the laboratory, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the effects of the factors and potential confounds on the behaviors of interest. Consequently, laboratory research is a justified and complementary tool to the findings of field research. As Campbell (1986: 278) suggested, perhaps a preference for either a labora- tory or a field setting is merely a straw issue, and what we should attempt to do is to “find some way to stimulate people to use multiple methods.” We hope our findings are intriguing enough to encourage researchers to replicate our study in the field. By using experienced managers as our participants, we hoped to minimize the potential loss of generalizability of a laboratory study due to possible naïveté of MBA participants. We selected an exercise with content familiar to our participants – negotiating a job contract. And, because their negotiated outcomes in the class were an important part of their grades, they had the motivation and incentive to do well in the exercise, providing both mundane and experimental realism (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968).

We believe these limitations are counter-balanced by the strengths of our study. Specifically, we used multi-source measures of key variables. SINS and ethical ideology were self-reported. Assessments of one’s perceived negotiation strategy were reported by negotiation counterparts. Finally, the negotiated outcomes and relative share assessments were based on actual objective agreements reached by the parties. In addition, the measurement of SINS and ethical ideologies were separated by a period of weeks from the

256 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS

measurement of the negotiated outcomes and fairness, as well as the reporting of perceived negotiation strategies.

Conclusions

This study contributes to our understanding of negotiator ethics in several important ways. First, by testing the relationship between ethical ideologies and the acceptability of SINS, this study provides additional evidence of the validity of the SINS scales. Second, by exploring the relationship between ethical ideology and tactics – whether those tactics are “SINSful” or are standard negotiation strategies – we provide evidence for how negotiator ethics manifest themselves in the negotiation process. Finally, by examining the ideologies’ different acceptance levels of SINS, we were able to explore the issue of whether good guys do finish first, providing evidence for how negotiator ethics affect outcomes.

Although ethical ideology clearly predicted reactions to SINS, the rela- tionship between ethical ideology and strategic behaviors used is less clear. Perhaps this is the difference between a hypothetical (how acceptable is this questionable tactic to you) and knowing one really does have something on the line (a scoreable negotiation where scores count towards a course grade). In other words, egocentric interpretations of fairness (Babcock et al., 1995; Messick and Sentis 1983; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel and Bazerman 1996) may extend themselves into the domain of egocentric interpretations of the legitimacy of a given negotiation strategy. Perhaps, when all is said and done, even absolutists become pragmatists when their own outcomes are on the line.

Notes

1. In Edward J. Conry, “The indivisibility of ethics”, New York Times, March 3, 1991. 2. In the interest of parsimony we reduced Forsyth’s (1980) 20-item scale to two four-

item scales, retaining those items with the least apparent social desirability, the clearest wording (some original scale items seemed overly complex, containing independent clauses and ambiguous wording), and which were the least context- dependent (the context of Forsyth’s original scale concerned the treatment of human subjects in research). The resulting four-item scales achieved internal consistency reliability of 0.67 and 0.56 for Idealism and Realism, respectively.

3. By using median splits within our sample population, our assignment of subjects to ideological categories is relative within our sample. For readability, we refer to parti- cipants’ categories using the sample medians as Absolutists, Situationists, etc. rather than as sample relative assignments.

4. The Kindler (1981) scale produces nine negotiation strategies and, hence, a more complete set than either the Thomas-Kilmann (1978) scale or the Rahim (1983) scale. In addi- tion, the Thomas-Kilmann (1978) scale focuses on specific intentions (1978: 1144)

LAMBS AMONG LIONS? 257

and goals, while Rahim’s (1983) scale focuses on one’s concerns. Because negotiating strategies were reported by one’s negotiating partner, we considered the behavioral focus of Kindler’s (1981) scale to be more appropriate. Behaviors are easier for negotiating partners to observe and report than what is “inside the head” of the other negotiator in terms of intents, goals, and concerns.

5. We excluded Traditional Competitive Bargaining scores because one can argue that most individuals considered Traditional Competitive Bargaining tactics to be much more acceptable for use in a negotiation than tactics in the remaining four tactic categories. Provis (2000) notes that academic writers have come to view deception and bluffing as mainstream, and, hence, more generally acceptable bargaining tactics. He quotes Lewicki (1982: 427): “there seems to be general agreement that some forms of bluffing, conceal- ment, and distortion are both appropriate and necessary to the bargaining process” (2000: 148). Provis (2000: 148) also quotes Friedman and Shapiro (1995: 244): “negotiators can practice integrative bargaining effectively, even when this strategy includes decep- tion.” Empirically, the data of Robinson et al. (2000) (ref. Table 1) and those collected in this study (ref. Table 2) tend to support the proposition that traditional competitive bargaining behaviors are viewed more positively than other tactics generally considered to be deceptive. And, in fact, with a mean rating of 5.88 out of 7 points, traditional competitive bargaining behaviors can be argued to be acceptable, rather than question- able or marginal, as implied by “SINS”fulness. Hence, in recognition of this argument, we excluded Traditional Competitive Bargaining from the average SINS used for our LambLion measure. As might be expected, the SINS2 measure and the average of the SINS score including Traditional Competitive Bargaining were highly correlated (r = 0.980).

Appendix

Factors Comprising the SINS Scale and Associated Items

Factor 1: Traditional Competitive Bargaining (TCB)

Make an opening demand that is far greater than what you really hope to settle for.

Convey a false impression that you are in absolutely no hurry to come to a negotiated agreement, thereby trying to put time pressure on your opponent to concede quickly.

Make an opening demand so high/low that it seriously undermines your opponent’s confidence in his/her ability to negotiate a satisfactory settlement.

Factor 2: Attacking Opponent’s Network (ONA)

Attempt to get your opponent fired from his/her position so that a new person will take his/her place.

Threaten to make your opponent look weak or foolish in front of a boss or others to whom he/she is accountable, even if you know that you will not actually carry out the threat.

Talk directly to the people who your opponent reports to, or is accountable to, and tell them things that will undermine their confidence in your opponent as a negotiator.

258 JOSEPH BANAS AND JUDI MCLEAN PARKS

Factor 3: Making False Promises (FP)

Promise that good things will happen to your opponent if he/she gives you what you want, even if you know that you cannot (or will not) deliver these things when the other person’s cooperation is obtained.

In return for concessions from your opponent now, offer to make future concessions which you know you will not follow through on.

Guarantee that your constituency will uphold the settlement reached, although you know that they will likely violate the agreement later.

Factor 4: Misrepresentation of Information (MISREP)

Intentionally misrepresent information to your opponent in order to strengthen your negoti- ating arguments or position.

Intentionally misrepresent the nature of negotiations to your constituency in order to protect delicate discussions that have occurred.

Deny the validity of information which your opponent possesses that weakens your negotiating position, even though that information is true and valid.

Intentionally misrepresent the progress of negotiations to your constituency in order to make your own position appear stronger.

Factor 5: Inappropriate Information Gathering (INMGT)

Gain information about your opponent’s negotiating position by paying your friends, associates, and contacts to get this information for you.

Gain information about an opponent’s negotiating position by cultivating his/her friendship through expensive gifts, entertaining or “personal favors.”

Gain information about an opponent’s negotiating position by trying to recruit or hire one of your opponent’s teammates (on the condition that the teammate bring confidential information with him/her).

Note. Source: Robinson, Lewicki and Donahue (2000).

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