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3 9 2 P A R T T H R E E : J U S T I c E t s s u E S

Five Faces of Oppression Iris M. Young

I I

rll ties and a can be rression al 'en one

Many people in the United States would not choose the term "oppression" to name injustice in our society. For contemporary emancipatory social movements, on the other hand-socialists, radical feminists, American Indian activists, Black activists, gay and lesbian activists-oppression is a central category of political discourse. Entering the political discourse in which oppression is a central category involves adopting a general mode of analyzing and evaluating social structures and prac- tices which is incommensurate with the language of liberal individualism that dominates political discourse in the United States.

A major political project for those of us who identify with at least one of these movements must thus be to persuade people that the discourse of oppression makes sense of much of our social experience. We are ill prepared for this task, however, because we have no clear account of the meaning of oppression. While we find the term used often in the diverse philosophical and theoretical literature spawned by radical social movements in the United States, we find little direct discussion of the meaning of the concept as used by these movements.

In this [essay] I offer some explication of the concept of oppression as I under- stand its use by new social movements in the United States since the 1960s. My starting point is reflection on the conditions of the groups said by these movements to be oppressed: among others women, Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, American Indians, Jews, lesbians, gay men, Arabs, Asians, old people, working-class people, and the physically and mentally disabled. I aim to systematize the meaning of the concept of oppression as used by these diverse political movements, and to provide normative argument to clarify the wrongs the term names.

Obviously the above-named groups are not oppressed to the same extent or in the same ways. In the most general sense, all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings. In that abstract sense all oppressed people face a common condition. Beyond that, in any more specific sense, it is not possible to define a single set of criteria that describe the condition of oppression of the above groups.

Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics oJ Difference, pp. 39-40, 48-65. Copyright O 1990 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

Consequently, attempts I or the essential causes c fruitless disputes about' contexts in which memb injustices of their situati cepts and conditions, wt tion, powerlessness, cult

THE FACES OF OPPRES Exploitation The central function ol structure can exist in the tinctions. In precapitalis directly political means appropriate the product these societies legitimat and inferiority.

Capitalist society, on class distinctions and pr, freely contract with emp or custom force them to ' of capitalism arises: whe n a t i o n ? W h y d o c l a s s d i s of production, and the mr tion answers this questio

Profit, the basis ofcap the market goods exchar mystery. Every commodi production. Labor power sumed produces new val the labor performed and chases. Profit is possible ized surplus value. . . .

Marx's theory of ex1 though the judgment tha descriptive power in that theory of exploitation in ist society consists in the control, according to the vate ownership of the me and the ability to buy goc persons to others, thereb, transfer of powers, accorr tains an ability to extrac from workers to capitalis

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lon: They all heir capacities and t of criteria can be Rather, oppression ress, cultural sence of even one ;ed.

.erm "oppression" to name social movements, on the

n activists, Black activists, ory of political discourse. I central category involves ,ocial structures and prac- liberal individualism that

' with at least one of these ourse of oppression makes red for this task, however, ression. While we find the "ical literature spawned by Itle direct discussion of the

t of oppression as I under- tates since the 1960s. My s said by these movements s, Puerto Ricans and other lesbians, gay men, Arabs, ally and mentally disabled. pression as used by these e argument to clarify the

d to the same extent or in :ople suffer some inhibition i and express their needs, ;ed people face a common Ls not possible to define a ssion of the above groups.

),48-65. Copyright O 1990 by Lversity Press.

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Consequently, attempts by theorists and activists to discover a common description or the essential causes of the oppression of all these groups have frequently led to fruitless disputes about whose oppression is more fundamental or more grave. The contexts in which members of these groups use the term oppression to describe the injustices of their situation suggest that oppression names in fact a family of con- cepts and conditions, which I divide into five categories: exploitation, marginaliza- tion, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. . . .

THE FACES OF OPPRESSION Exploitation The central function of Marx's theory of exploitation is to explain how class structure can exist in the absence of legally and normatively sanctioned class dis- tinctions. In precapitalist societies domination is overt and accomplished through directly political means. In both slave society and feudal society the right to appropriate the product of the labor of others partly defines class privilege, and these societies legitimate class distinctions with ideologies of natural superiority and inf-eriority.

Capitalist society, on the other hand, removes traditional juridically enforced class distinctions and promotes a belief in the legal freedom of persons. Workers freely contract with employers and receive a wage; no formal mechanisms of law or custom force them to work for that employer or any employer. Thus the mystery of capitalism arises: when everyone is formally free, how can there be class domi- nation? Why do class distinctions persist between the wealthy, who own the means of production, and the mass of people, who work for them? The theory of exploita- tion answers this question.

Profit, the basis of capitalist power and wealth, is a mystery if we assume that in the market goods exchange at their values. The labor theory of value dispels this mystery. Every commodity's value is a function of the labor time necessary for its production. Labor power is the one commodity which in the process of being con- sumed produces new value. Profit comes from the difference between the value of the labor performed and the value of the capacity to labor which the capitalist pur- chases. Profit is possible only because the owner of capital appropriates any real- ized surplus value. . . .

Marx's theory of exploitation lacks an explicitly normative meaning, even though the judgment that workers are exploited clearly has normative as well as descriptive power in that theory. C. B. Macpherson (1973, chap. 3) reconstructs this theory of exploitation in a more explicitly normative form. The injustice of capital- ist society consists in the fact that some people exercise their capacities under the control, according to the purposes, and for the benefit of other people. Through pri- vate ownership of the means of production, and through markets that allocate labor and the ability to buy goods, capitalism systematically transfers the powers of some persons to others, thereby augmenting the power of the latter. In this process of the transfer of powers, according to Macpherson, the capitalist class acquires and main- tains an ability to extract benefits from workers. Not only are powers transferred from workers to capitalists, but also the powers of workers diminish by more than

3 9 4 P A R T T H R E E : J U S T T c E r s s u E S

the amount of transfer, because workers suffer material deprivation and a loss of control, and hence are deprived of important elements of self-respect. Justice, then, requires eliminating the institutional forms that enable and enforce this process of transference and replacing them with institutional forms that enable all to develop and use their capacities in a way that does not inhibit, but rather can enhance. sim- ilar development and use in others.

The central insight expressed in the concept of exploitation, then, is that this oppression occurs through a steady process of the transfer of the results of the labor of one social group to benefit another. The injustice of class division does not consist only in the distributive fact that some people have great wealth while most people have little. Exploitation enacts a structural relation between social groups. Social rules about what work is, who does what for whom, how work is compensated, and the sociai process by which the results of work are appropriated operate to enact relations of power and inequality. These relations are produced and reproduced through a systematic process in which the energies of the have- nots are continuously expended to maintain and augment the power, status, and wealth of the haves. . . .

Feminists have had little difficulty showing that women's oppression consists partly in a systematic and unreciprocated transfer of powers from women to men. Women's oppression consists not merely in an inequality of status, power, and weaith resulting from men's excludine them from privileged activities. The free- dom, power, status, and self-realization of men is possible precisely because women work for them. Gender exploitation has two aspects, transfer of the fruits of material labor to men and transfer of nurturing and sexual energies to men.

Christine Delphy (1984), for example, describes marriage as a class relation in which women's labor benefits men without comparable remuneration. She makes it clear that the exploitation consists not in the sort of work that women do in the home, for this might include various kinds of tasks, but in the fact that they perform tasks fbr someone on whom they are dependent. Thus. for example. in most sys- tems of agricultural production in the world, men take to market the goods women have produced, and more often than not men receive the status and often the entire income from this labor.

With the concept of sex-affective prodr.rction, Ann Ferguson (1984; 1989, chap. 4) identifies another form of the transference of women's energies to men. Women provide men and children with emotional care and provide men with sexual satis- faction, and as a group receive relatively little of either from men. The gender socialization of women makes us tend to be more attentive to interactive dynamics than men, and makes women good at providing empathy and support for people's feelings and at smoothing over interactive tensions. Both men and women look to women as nurturers of their personal lives, and women frequently complain that when they look to men for emotional support they do not receive it. The norms of heterosexuality, moreover, are oriented around male pleasure, and consequently many women receive little satisfaction from their sexual interaction with men.

Most feminist theories of gender exploitation have concentrated on the institu- tional structure of the patriarchal family. Recently, however, feminists have begun to explore relations of gender exploitation enacted in the contemporary workplace

and through the state. Ca from responsibility for chi for subsistence as they co (Brown, 1981). This creat, labor mediated by state in

In twentieth-century ca entering in increasing nur tion. David Alexander (lt based tasks requiring sexu over workplace tensions. I enhance the status of, pleal labors of waitresses, cleri, ticed and undercompensat

To summarize, women are wage workers. Some I a form of capitalist class r family receives. As a gro exploitation in which thei unacknowledged, usually creative work, enhancing I them with sexual or emott

Race is a structure of t then, racially specific fo groups in the United Statr capitalist superexploitatio reserve skilled. high-payir about whether such supen capitalist class and I do nr

However one answers t groups, is it possible to cc on analogy with the gende of menial labor might su1 "menial" designates the I assumption, more or less r or ought to be servants of white racist societies thts n domestic servanls. and in structuring of private hous labor has gone public: any servants. Servants often al tives, government officiall remains strong cultural pt busboy, and so on-with energies whereby the serv

Menial labor usually r, unskilled, low-paying wr

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rial deprivation and a loss of ; of self-respect. Justice, then, le and enforce this process of rms that enable all to develop . but rather can enhance. sim-

:xploitation, then, is that this transfer of the results of the justice of class division does :ople have great wealth while :tural relation between social what for whom, how work is sults of work are appropriated These relations are produced rich the energies of the have- gment the power, status, and

women's oppression consists'powers from women to men. :quality of status, power, and rrivileged activities. The free- s possible precisely because $pects, transfer of the fruits of ;exual energies to men. marriage as a class relation in able remuneration. She makes of work that women do in the rut in the fact that they perform rus, for example, in most sys- <e to market the goods women : the status and often the entire

Ferguson (1984; 1989, chap.4) en's energies to men. Women rrovide men with sexual satis- either from men. The gender t e n t i v e t o i n t e r a c t i v e d y n a m i c s pathy and support for people's Both men and women look to rmen frequently complain that lo not receive it. The norms of le pleasure, and consequently xual interaction with men. ve concentrated on the institu- rowever, feminists have begun n the contemporary workplace

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and through the state. Carol Brown argues that as men have removed themselves from responsibility for children, many women have become dependent on the state for subsistence as they continue to bear nearly total responsibility for childrearing (Brown, l98l). This creates a new system of the exploitation of women's domestic labor rnediated by state institutions, which she calls public patriarchy.

In twentieth-century capitalist economies the workplaces that women have been entering in increasing numbers serve as another important site of gender exploita- tion. David Alexander (1987) argues that typically feminine jobs involve gender- based tasks requiring sexual labor, nurturing, caring for others'bodies, or smoothing over workplace tensions. In these ways women's energies are expended in jobs that enhance the status of, please, or comfort others, usually men; and these gender-based labors of waitresses, clerical workers, nurses. and other caretakers often go unno- ticed and undercompensated.

To summarize, women are exploited in the Marxist sense to the degree that they are wage workers. Some have argued that women's domestic labor also represents a form of capitalist class exploitation insofar as it is labor covered by the wages a family receives. As a group, however, women undergo specific forms of gender exploitation in which their energies and power are expended, often unnoticed and unacknowledged, usually to benefrt men by releasing them for more important and creative work, enhancing their status or the environment around them, or providing them with sexual or emotional service.

Race is a structure of oppression at least as basic as class or gender. Are there, then, racially specific forms of exploitation? There is no doubt that racialized groups in the United States, especially Blacks and Latinos, are oppressed through capitalist superexploitation resulting fiom a segmented labor market that tends to reserve skilled, high-paying, unionized jobs for whites. There is wide disagreement about whether such superexploitation benefits whites as a group or only benefits the capitalist class and I do not intend to enter into that dispute here.

However one answers the question about capitalist superexploitation of racialized groups, is it possible to conceptualize a form of exploitation that is racially specihc on analogy with the gender-specific forms just discussed? I suggest that the category of menial labor might supply a means for such conceptualization. In its derivation "menial" designates the labor of servants. Wherever there is racism, there is the assumption, more or less enforced, that members of the oppressed racial groups are or ought to be servants of those, or some of those, in the privileged group. In most white racist societies this means that many white people have dark- or yellow-skinned domestic servants, and in the United States today there remains signihcant racial structuring of private household service. But in the United States today much service labor has gone public: anyone who goes to a good hotel or a good restaurant can have servants. Servants often attend the daily-and nightly-activities of business execu- tives, govemment officials, and other high-status professionals. In our society there remains strong cultural pressure to hll servant jobs-bellhop, porter, chambermaid, busboy, and so on-with Black and Latino workers. These jobs entail a transfer of energies whereby the servers enhance the status of the served.

Menial labor usually refers not only to service, however, but also to any servile, unskilled, low-paying work lacking in autonomy, in which a person is subject to

'L

3 9 6 P A R T T H R E E : J U S T T c E r s s u E s

taking orders from many people. Menial work tends to be auxiliary work, instru- mental to the work of others, where those others receive primary recognition for doing the job. Laborers on a construction site, for example, are at the beck and call of welders, electricians, carpenters, and other skilled workers, who receive recog- nition for the job done. In the United States explicit racial discrimination once reserved menial work for Blacks, Chicanos, American Indians, and Chinese, and menial work still tends to be linked to Black and Latino workers. I offer this cate- gory of menial labor as a form of racially specific exploitation, as a provisional cat- egory in need of exploration. . . .

Marginalization Increasingly in the United States racial oppression occurs in the form of margin- alization rather than exploitation. Marginals are people the system of labor cannot or will not use. Not only in Third World capitalist countries, but also in most Western capitalist societies, there is a growing underclass of people permanently confined to lives of social marginality, most of whom are racially marked-Blacks or Indians in Latin America, and Blacks, East Indians, Eastern Europeans, or North Africans in Europe.

Marginalization is by no means the fate only of racially marked groups, however. In the United States a shamefully large proportion of the population is marginal: old people, and increasingly people who are not very old but get laid off from theirjobs and cannot find new work; young people, especially Black or Latino, who cannot find first or second jobs; many single mothers and their children; other people involuntar- ily unemployed; many mentally and physically disabled people;American Indians, especially those on reservations.

Marginalization is perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression. A whole cat- egory of people is expelled from useful participation in social life and thus poten- tially subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermination. The material deprivation marginalization often causes is certainly unjust, especially in a society where others have plenty. Contemporary advanced capitalist societies have in prin- ciple acknowledged the injustice of material deprivation caused by marginalization, and have taken some steps to address it by providing welfare payments and services. The continuance of this welfare state is by no means assured, and in most welfare state societies, especially the United States, welfare redistributions do not eliminate large-scale suffering and deprivation.

Material deprivation, which can be addressed by redistributive social policies, is not, however, the extent of the harm caused by marginalization. Two categories of injustice beyond distribution are associated with marginality in advanced capitalist societies. First, the provision of welfare itself produces new injustice by depriving those dependent on it of rights and freedoms that others have. Second, even when material deprivation is somewhat mitigated by the welfare state, marginalization is unjust because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and recognized ways. I shall explicate each of these in turn.

Liberalism has traditionally asserted the right of all rational autonomous agents to equal citizenship. Early bourgeois liberalism explicitly excluded from citizenship

all those whose reason wa independent. Thus poor per were explicitly excluded fi tutions modeled on the mo

Today the exclusion of barely hidden beneath the r fbr support or services, th, are subject to patronizing, cies and people associatec society implies being legiti ity of social service provi enforce rules with which tl over the conditions of thei: the aid of social scientific d selves. Medical and social serve, and the marginals an know what is good for ther liberal societies. a sufficien individual choice.

Although dependency p ency in itself need not be c people would not need to dren, sick people, women r frail. depressed or otherwi depend on others for subsi

An important contribut deeply held assumption thz be autonomous and indepe p r o p r i a t e l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c i relations, which values cot of social relations. arising ties and from the kinds o dependence as a basic hur society would as much as the feminist model envisio sionmaking to those who i Dependency should not be of the oppression many mr alistic model of rights prel

Marginalization does r food. Many old people, fr but remain oppressed in t a comfortable material lil dignity, injustices of marg dom, and lack of self-res1 activities take place in contr

be auxiliary work, instru- ve primary recognition for rle, are at the beck and call orkers, who receive recog- racial discrimination once Indians, and Chinese, and r workers. I offer this cate- tation. as a provisional cat-

: u r s i n t h e l b r m o f m a r g i n - the system of labor cannot

)ountries, but also in most lass of people PermanentlY re racially marked-Blacks lastern Europeans, or North

lly marked groups, however. : population is marginal: old rt get laid off from their jobs :k or Latino, who cannot find ren; other peoPle involuntar- d people: American lndians.

of oppression. A whole cat- n social lif'e and thus Poten- extennination. The material njust, especially in a societY i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s h a v e i n P r i n - n caused by marginalizalion. :lfare payments and services. lssured, and in most welfare listributions do not eliminate

l i s t r i b u t i v e s o c i a l p o l i c i e s . i s ralization. Two categories of inality in advanced capitalist :s new injustice bY dePriving :rs have. Second, even when lfare state. marginalization is :apacities in socially defined 1 turn. I rational autonomous agents tly excluded from citizenshiP

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all those whose reason was questionable or not fully developed, and all those not independent. Thus poor people, women, the mad and the feebleminded, and children were explicitly excluded from citizenship, and many of these were housed in insti- tutions modeled on the modem prison: poorhouses, insane asylums, schools.

Today the exclusion of dependent persons from equal citizenship rights is only barely hidden beneath the surfhce. Because they depend on bureaucratic institutions for support or services, the old, the poor, and the mentally or physically disabled are subject to patronizing, punitive, demeaning, and arbitrary treatment by the poli- cies and people associated with welfare bureaucracies. Being a dependent in our society implies being legitimately subject to the often arbitrary and invasive author- ity of social service providers and other public and private administrators, who enforce rules with which the marginal must comply, and otherwise exercise power over the conditions of their lives. In meeting needs of the marginalized, often with the aid of social scientific disciplines, welfare agencies also construct the needs them- selves. Medical and social service professionals know what is good for those they serve, and the marginals and dependents themselves do not have the right to claim to know what is good for them. Dependency in our society thus implies, as it has in all liberal societies, a sufficient warrant to suspend basic rights to privacy, respect, and individual choice.

Although dependency produces conditions of injustice in our society, depend- ency in itself need not be oppressive. One cannot imagine a society in which some people would not need to be dependent on others at least some of the time: chil- dren, sick people, women recovering from childbirth, old people who have become tiail, depressed or otherwise enrotionally needy persons, have the moral right to depend on others fbr subsistence and support.

An important contribution of feminist moral theory has been to question the deeply held assumption that moral agency and full citizenship require that a person be autonomous and independent. Feminists have exposed this assumption as inap- propriately individualistic and derived from a specifically male experience of social relations, which values competition and solitary achievement. Female experience of social relations, arising both from women's typical domestic care responsibili- ties and from the kinds of paid work that many women do. tends to recognize dependence as a basic human condition. Whereas on the autonomy model a just society would as much as possible give people the opportunity to be independent, the feminist model envisions justice as according respect and participation in deci- sionmaking to those who are dependent as well as to those who are independent. Dependency should not be a reason to be deprived of choice and respect, and much of the oppression many marginals experience would be lessened if a less individu- alistic model of rights prevailed.

Marginalization does not cease to be oppressive when one has shelter and food. Many old people, for example, have sufficient means to live comfortably but remain oppressed in their marginal status. Even if marginals were provided a comfortable material life within institutions that respected their freedom and dignity, injustices of marginality would remain in the form of uselessness, bore- dom, and lack of self-respect. Most of our society's productive and recognized activities take place in contexts of organized social cooperation, and social stmctures

398 PARTTHREE: JUSTTcE rssuES

and processes that close persons out of participation in such social cooperation are unjust. Thus while marginalization definitely entails serious issues of dis- tributive justice, it also involves the deprivation of cultural, practical, and insti- tutionalized conditions for exercising capacities in a context of recognition and i n t e r a c t i o n . . . .

Powerlessness As I have indicated, the Marxist idea of class is important because it helps reveal the structure of exploitation: that some people have their power and wealth because they profit from the labor of others. For this reason I reject the claim some make that a traditional class exploitation model fails to capture the structure of contemporary society. It remains the case that the labor of most people in the society augments the power of relatively few. Despite their differences from nonprofessional work- ers, most professional workers are still not members of the capitalist class. Professional labor either involves exploitative transfers to capitalists or supplies important conditions for such transfers. Professional workers are in an ambigu- ous class position, it is true, because . . . they also benefit from the exploitation of nonprofessional workers.

While it is false to claim that a division between capitalist and working classes no longer describes our society, it is also false to say that class relations have remained unaltered since the nineteenth century. An adequate conception of oppression cannot ignore the experience of social division reflected in the collo- quial distinction between the "middle class" and the "working class," a division structured by the social division of labor between professionals and nonprofession- als. Professionals are privileged in relation to nonprofessionals, by virtue of their position in the division of labor and the status it carries. Nonprofessionals suffer a form of oppression in addition to exploitation, which I call powerlessness.

In the United States, as in other advanced capitalist countries, most work- places are not organized democratically, direct participation in public policy decisions is rare, and policy implementation is for the most part hierarchical, imposing rules on bureaucrats and citizens. Thus most people in these societies do not regularly participate in making decisions that affect the conditions of their lives and actions, and in this sense most people lack significant power. At the same time, domination in modern society is enacted through the widely dis- persed powers of many agents mediating the decisions of others. To that extent many people have some power in relation to others, even though they lack the power to decide policies or results. The powerless are those who lack authority or power even in this mediated sense, those over whom power is exercised with- out their exercising it; the powerless are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them. Powerlessness also designates a position in the division of labor and the concomitant social position that allows persons little opportunity to develop and exercise skills. The powerless have little or no work autonomy, exercise little creativity or judgment in their work, have no tech- nical expertise or authority, express themselves awkwardly, especially in public or bureaucratic settings, and do not command respect. Powerlessness names the

A

oppressive situations St working-class men.

This powerless statur the authority. status. anl privilege of professional for nonprofessionals.

First, acquiring and p acter. Being professioni of a specialized knowl Prolessional s experiencr course of professional a sional by comparison is the progressive developr

Second, while many 1 many decisions or the ar day-to-day work autonor moreover---€ilher over r Nonprofessionals, on tht their consumer-cl ient liv,

Though based on a d distinction between "mi only in working life, bu nonprofessionals belong lend to live in segregate mediated by planners, z have different tastes in f ent health and educatior part with others in the s belween generations. fo fessionals and the childr

Thus, third, the privil whole way of life. l call is to be prepared to lister they have some authoritr society are associated r speech, tastes, demeanor and receive respect from many other such publi< receive more respectful sionals seeking a loan ot fessional" and "respecta

The privilege of this of racism and sexism. I their respectability. At I distance or deference. ( man is a collese teacher

r such social cooPeration Lils serious issues of dis- t u r a l . p r a c t i c a l . a n d i n s t i - ontext of recognition and

because it helps reveal the er and wealth because theY re claim some make that a structure of contemPorarY le in the society augments rm nonprofessional work- :s of the capitalist class. s to capitalists or supplies vorkers are in an ambigu- refit from the exploitation

italist and working classes I that class relations have r adequate conception of ;ion reflected in the collo- 'working class." a division sionals and nonprofession- ,ssionals, by virtue of their . Nonprofessionals suffer a ;all powerlessness. list countries, most work- icipation in public policY he most part hierarchical, t p e o p l e i n t h e s e s o c i e t i e s t affect the conditions of lack significant power. At rd through the widely dis- Ls of others. To that extent even though they lack the : t h o s e w h o l a c k a u t h o r i t y n power is exercised with- that they must take orders a l s o d e s i g n a t e s a P o s i l i o n rsition that allows persons oowerless have little or no n their work, have no tech- 'ardly, especially in public . Powerlessness names the

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oppressive situations Sennett and Cobb (1912) describe in their famous study of working-class men.

This powerless status is perhaps best described negatively: the powerless lack the authority, status, and sense of self that professionals tend to have. The status privilege of professionals has three aspects, the lack of which produces oppression for nonprofessionals.

First, acquiring and practicing a profession has an expansive, progressive char- acter. Being professional usually requires a college education and the acquisition of a specialized knowledge that entails working with symbols and concepts. Prol-essionals experience progress first in acquiring the expertise, and then in the course of professional advancement and rise in status. The life of the nonprofes- sional by comparison is powerless in the sense that it lacks this orientation toward the progressive development of capacities and avenues for recognition.

Second, while many professionals have supervisors and cannot directly influence many decisions or the actions of many people, most nevertheless have considerable day-to-day work autonomy. Professionals usually have some authority over others, moreover----€ither over workers they supervise. or over auxiliaries, or over clients. Nonprofessionals, on the other hand. lack autonomy. and in both their working and their consumer-client lives often stand under the authority of professionals.

Though based on a division of labor between "mental" and "manual" work, the distinction between "middle class" and "working class" designates a division not only in working life, but also in nearly all aspects of social life. Professionals and nonprofessionals belong to different cultures in the United States. The two groups tend to live in segregated neighborhoods or even different towns, a process itself mediated by planners, zoning officials, and real estate people. The groups tend to have different tastes in food, decor, clothes, music, and vacations, and often differ- ent health and educational needs. Members of each group socialize for the most part with others in the same status group. While there is some intergroup mobility between generations. for the most part the children of professionals become pro- fessionals and the children of nonprofessionals do not.

Thus, third, the privileges of the professional extend beyond the workplace to a whole way of life. I call this way of life "respectability." To treat people with respect is to be prepared to listen to what they have to say or to do what they request because they have some authority, expertise, or influence. The norms of respectability in our society are associated specihcally with professional culture. Prot-essional dress, speech, tastes, demeanor, all connote respectability. Generally professionals expect and receive respect liom others. In restaurants, banks, hotels, real estate offices, and many other such public places, as well as in the media, professionals typically receive more respectful treatment than nonprofessionals. For this reason nonprofes- sionals seeking a loan or a job, or to buy a house or a car, will often try to look "pro- fessional" and "respectable" in those settings.

The privilege of this professional respectability appears starkly in the dynamics of racism and sexism. In daily interchange women and men of color must prove their respectability. At first they are often not treated by strangers with respectful distance or deference. Once people discover that this woman or that Puerto Rican man is a college teacher or a business executive, however, they often behave more

4 O O P A R T T H R E E : J U S T I c E I S S U E S

respectfully toward her or him. Working-class white men, on the other hand, are often treated with respect until their working-class status is revealed. . . .

Cultural lmperialism Exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness all refer to relations of power and oppression that occur by virtue of the social division of labor-who works for whom, who does not work, and how the content of work defines one institutional position relative to others. These three categories refer to structural and institutional relations that delimit people's material lives, including but not restricted to the resources they have access to and the concrete opportunities they have or do not have to develop and exercise their capacities. These kinds of oppression are a mat- ter of concrete power in relation to others-of who benefits from whom, and who is dispensable.

Recent theorists of movements of group liberation, notably feminist and Black liberation theorists, have also given prominence to a rather different form of oppression, which following Lugones and Spelman (1983) I shall call cultural imperialism. To experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one's own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one's group and mark it out as the Other.

Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group's experi- ence and culture, and its establishment as the norm. Some groups have exclusive or primary access to what Nancy Fraser (1987) calls the means of interpretation and communication in a society. As a consequence, the dominant cultural products of the society, that is, those most widely disseminated, express the experience, values, goals, and achievements of these groups. Often without noticing they do so, the dominant groups project their own experience as representative of humanity as such. Cultural products also express the dominant group's perspective on and inter- pretation of events and elements in the society, including other groups in the soci- ety, insofar as they attain cultural status at all.

An encounter with other groups, however, can challenge the dominant group's claim to universality. The dominant group reinforces its position by bringing the other groups under the measure of its dominant norms. Consequently, the differ- ence of women from men, American Indians or Africans from Europeans, Jews from Christians, homosexuals from heterosexuals, workers from professionals, becomes reconstructed largely as deviance and inferiority. Since only the dominant group's cultural expressions receive wide dissemination, their cultural expressions become the normal, or the universal, and thereby the unremarkable. Given the nor- mality of its own cultural expressions and identity, the dominant group constructs the differences which some groups exhibit as lack and negation. These groups become marked as Other.

The culturally dominated undergo a paradoxical oppression, in that they are both marked out by stereotypes and at the same time rendered invisible. As remarkable, deviant beings, the culturally imperialized are stamped with an essence. The stereo- types confine them to a nature which is often attached in some way to their bodies,

and which thus cannot ea that they are not noticed i around the sun, so every( are alcoholics, and that v hand, insofar as they escz

Those living under cu side, positioned, placed, arising from elsewhere, fi identify with them. Consr ized images of the group extent that they are forced This creates for the cultur "double consciousness"- eyes of others, of measu amused contempt and pit arises when the oppresser fied, stereotyped visions c as human, capable of act dominant culture only the

The group defined by 1 culturally different from t ates specific experiences I oppressed groups also an in the social division ofla experiences and interpretr uating their own culture. one's being defined by tw they can affirm and recog spectives on social life, pe a sense of positive subjec

Cultural imperialism i at the same time that one when dominant groups fa expressions as a perspec have little place for the t referring to them in stere of cultural imperialism: tl tion of social life finds li that same culture imposes of social life. . . .

Violence Finally, many groups suffe groups live with the knou their persons or property, '

-I-

n, on the other hand, are i s r e v e a l e d . . . .

to relations of power and lf labor-who works for l defines one institutional itructural and institutional but not restricted to the

iities they have or do not ; of oppression are a mat- fits from whom. and who

rtably feminist and Black rather different form of 983) I shall call cultural s to experience how the lerspective of one's own group and mark it out as

dominant group's experi- ) groups have exclusive or sans of interpretation and inant cultural products of :ss the experience. values. . noticing they do so, the sentative of humanity as i perspective on and inter- ; other groups in the soci-

nge the dominant group's position by bringing the Consequently, the differ- ns from Europeans, Jews :kers from professionals, '. Since only the dominant their cultural expressions :rnarkable. Given the nor- ominant group constructs I negation. These groups

;sion, in that they are both invisible. As remarkable. th an essence. The stereo- some way to their bodies.

CHAPTER 8: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 401

and which thus cannot easily be denied. These stereotypes so permeate the society that they are not noticed as contestable. Just as everyone knows that the earth goes around the sun, so everyone knows that gay people are promiscuous, that Indians are alcoholics, and that women are good with children. White males, on the other hand, insofar as they escape group marking, can be individuals.

Those living under cultural imperialism find themselves defrned from the out- side, positioned, placed, by a network of dominant meanings they experience as arising from elsewhere, from those with whom they do not identify and who do not identify with them. Consequently, the dominant culture's stereotyped and inferior- ized images of the group must be internalized by group members at least to the extent that they are forced to react to behavior of others influenced by those images. This creates for the culturally oppressed the experience that W.E.B. Du Bois called "double consciousness"-"this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity" (Du Bois, 1969 [1903], p. 45). Double consciousness arises when the oppressed subject refuses to coincide with these devalued, objecti- fied, stereotyped visions of herself or himself. While the subject desires recognition as human, capable of activity, full of hope and possibility, she receives from the dominant culture only the judgment that she is different, marked, or inferior.

The group defined by the dominant culture as deviant, as a stereotyped Other, ls culturally different from the dominant group, because the status of Otherness cre- ates specific experiences not shared by the dominant group, and because culturally oppressed groups also are often socially segregated and occupy specific positions in the social division of labor. Members of such groups express their specific group experiences and interpretations of the world to one another, developing and perpet- uating their own culture. Double consciousness, then, occurs because one finds one's being defined by two cultures: a dominant and a subordinate culture. Because they can afhrm and recognize one another as sharing similar experiences and per- spectives on social life, people in culturally imperialized groups can often maintain a sense of positive subjectivity.

Cultural imperialism involves the paradox of experiencing oneself as invisible at the same time that one is marked out as different. The invisibility comes about when dominant groups fail to recognize the perspective embodied in their cultural expressions as a perspective. These dominant cultural expressions often simply have little place for the experience of other groups, at most only mentioning or referring to them in stereotyped or marginalized ways. This, then, is the injustice of cultural imperialism: that the oppressed group's own experience and interpreta- tion of social life finds little expression that touches the dominant culture, while that same culture imposes on the oppressed group its experience and interpretation of social life. . . .

Violence Finally, many groups suffer the oppression of systematic violence. Members of some groups live with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or property, which have no motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy

4 0 2 P A R T T H R E E : J U S T I C E I S S U E S

the person. In American society women, Blacks, Asians, Arabs, gay men, and les- bians live under such threats of violence, and in at least some regions Jews, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and other Spanish-speaking Americans must fear such violence as well. Physical violence against these groups is shockingly frequent. Rape Crisis Center networks estimate that more than one-third of all American women experience an attempted or successful sexual assault in their lifetimes. Manning Marable (1984, pp. 23841) catalogues a large number of incidents of racist violence and terror against Blacks in the United States between 1980 and 1982. He cites dozens of inci- dents of the severe beating, killing, or rape of Blacks by police officers on duty, in which the police involved were acquitted of any wrongdoing. In 1981, moreover, there were at least five hundred documented cases of random white teenage violence against Blacks. Violence against gay men and lesbians is not only common, but has been increasing in the last five years. While the frequency of physical attack on mem- bers of these and other racially or sexually marked groups is very disturbing, I also include in this category less severe incidents of harrassment, intimidation, or ridicule simply for the purpose of degrading, humiliating. or stigmatizing group members.

Given the frequency of such violence in our society, why are theories of justice usually silent about it? I think the reason is that theorists do not typically take such incidents of violence and harrassment as matters of social injustice. No moral the- orist would deny that such acts are very wrong. But unless all immoralities are injustices, they might wonder, why should such acts be interpreted as symptoms of social injustice? Acts of violence or petty harrassment are committed by particular individuals, often extremists, deviants, or the mentally unsound. How then can they be said to involve the sorts of institutional issues I have said are properly the sub- ject ofjustice?

What makes violence a face of oppression is less the particular acts themselves, though these are often utterly horrible, than the social context surrounding them, which makes them possible and even acceptable. What makes violence a phenom- enon of social injustice, and not merely an individual moral wrong, is its systemic character, its existence as a social practice.

Violence is systemic because it is directed at members of a group simply because they are members of that group. Any woman, for example, has a reason to fear rape. Regardless of what a Black man has done to escape the oppressions of marginality or powerlessness, he lives knowing he is subject to attack or harrassment. The oppression of violence consists not only in direct victimization, but in the daily knowledge shared by all members of oppressed groups that they are liable to vio- lation, solely on account of their group identity. Just living under such a threat of attack on oneself or family or friends deprives the oppressed of freedom and dig- nity, and needlessly expends their energy.

Violence is a social practice. It is a social given that everyone knows happens and will happen again. It is always at the horizon of social imagination, even for those who do not perpetrate it. According to the prevailing social logic, some circumstances make such violence more "called for" than others. The idea of rape will occur to many men who pick up a hitchhiking woman; the idea of hounding or teasing a gay man on their dorm floor will occur to many straight male college students. Often sev- eral persons inflict the violence together, especially in all-male groupings. Sometimes

violators set out looking f and often premeditated cl

Group violence approi Often third parties find i constant possibility at th caught, those who perper receive light or no punisl

An important aspect ol violence differs from the violence has a rational, a tain their power. Many ac explain its motivation as r doubt that fear of violencr I do not think xenophobic ple, violence against stril

On the contrary, the women, people of color hatred of those groups. Sr timize those marked as r violence. If so, this motiv tice of group violence. \ involves insecurities on unconscious processes iu

Cultural imperialism, imperialized may reject tJ jectivity, or the fact ofthr ture's implicit claim to u to the hegemonic cultura

APPLYING THE CRITERII Social theories that cons leave out groups that ev tant ways in which grou theorists have argued pe oppressions to class opp Blacks and women. By p in this [essay,] social the such reductionism.

I have avoided pluraliz structing an account of l racism, sexism. classism. lem with considering eac tem. On the one hand, th similarities and overlaps it falselv reoresents the s

l.

s, Arabs, gay men, and les- : some regions Jews, Puerto s must fear such violence as ingly frequent. Rape Crisis \merican women experience :s. Manning Marable (1984, f racist violence and terror )82. He cites dozens of inci- y police ofllcers on duty. in gdoing. In 1981, moreover, Ldom white teenage violence s not only common, but has i of physical attack on mem- rps is very disturbing, I also rent, intimidation, or ridicule ;matizing group members. . why are theories of justice ts do not typically take such :ial injustice. No moral the- unless all immoralities are interpreted as symptoms of are committed by particular lnsound. How then can they 'e said are properly the sub-

e particular acts themselves, I context surrounding them, t makes violence a phenom- moral wrong, is its systemic

rs of a group simply because lle, has a reason to fear rape. ; oppressions of marginality attack or harrassment. The :timization, but in the daily s that they are liable to vio- iving under such a threat of pressed of freedom and dig-

iveryone knows happens and limagination, even for those ial logic, some circumstances re idea of rape will occur to ofhounding or teasing a gay e college students. Often sev- l-male groupings. Sometimes

C H A P T E R 8 : S O C I A L A N D E C O N O M I C J U S T I C E 4 0 3

violators set out looking for people to beat up, rape, or taunt. This rule-bound, social, and often premeditated character makes violence against groups a social practice.

Group violence approaches legitimacy, moreover, in the sense that it is tolerated. Often third parties find it unsurprising because it happens frequently and lies as a constant possibility at the horizon of the social imagination. Even when they are caught, those who perpetrate acts of group-directed violence or harrassment often receive light or no punishment. To that extent society renders their acts acceptable.

An important aspect of random, systemic violence is its irrationality. Xenophobic violence differs from the violence of states or ruling-class repression. Repressive violence has a rational, albeit evil, motive: rulers use it as a coercive tool to main- tain their power. Many accounts of racist, sexist, or homophobic violence attempt to explain its motivation as a desire to maintain group privilege or domination. I do not doubt that fear of violence often functions to keep oppressed groups subordinate, but I do not think xenophobic violence is rationally motivated in the way that, for exam- ple, violence against strikers is.

On the contrary, the violation of rape, beating, killing, and harrassment of women, people of color, gays, and other marked groups is motivated by fear or hatred of those groups. Sometimes the motive may be a simple will to power, to vic- timize those marked as vulnerable by the very social fact that they are subject to violence. If so, this motive is secondary in the sense that it depends on a social prac- tice of group violence. Violence-causing fear or hatred of the other at least partly involves insecurities on the part of the violators; its irrationality suggests that unconscious processes are at work. . . .

Cultural imperialism, moreover, itself intersects with violence. The culturally imperialized may reject the dominant meanings and attempt to assefi their own sub- jectivity, or the fact of their cultural difference may put the lie to the dominant cul- ture's implicit claim to universality. The dissonance generated by such a challenge to the hegemonic cultural meanings can also be a source of irrational violence. . . .

APPLYING THE CRITERIA Social theories that construct oppression as a unified phenomenon usually either leave out groups that even the theorists think are oppressed, or leave out impor- tant ways in which groups are oppressed. Black liberation theorists and feminist theorists have argued persuasively, for example, that Marxism's reduction of all oppressions to class oppression leaves out much about the specific oppression of Blacks and women. By pluralizing the category of oppression in the way explained in this [essay,] social theory can avoid the exclusive and oversimplifying effects of such reductionism.

I have avoided pluralizing the category in the way some others have done, by con- structing an account of separate systems of oppression for each oppressed group: racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, ageism, and so on. There is a double prob- lem with considering each group's oppression a unified and distinct structure or sys- tem. On the one hand, this way of conceiving oppression fails to accommodate the similarities and overlaps in the oppressions of different groups. On the other hand, it falsely represents the situation of all group members as the same.

4 0 4 P A R T T H R E E : J U S T I C E I S S U E S

I have arrived at the five faces of oppression-exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence-arihe best way to avoid such exclusions and reductions. They function as criteria for determining whether indi- viduals and groups are oppressed, rather than as a full theory ol oppression. I believe that these criteria are objective. They provide a means of refuting some peo_ ple's belief that their group is oppressecl when it is not, as well as a means of per_ suading others that a group is oppressed when they doubt it. Each criterion can be operationalized; each can be applied through the assessment of observable behav- ior, status relationships, distributions, texts and other cultural artifacts. I have no illusions that such assessments can be value-neutral. But these criteria can never- theless serve as means of evaluating claims that a group is oppressed, or adjudicat_ ing disputes about whether or how a group is oppressed.

The presence of any of these five conditioni is sufficient for calling a group oppressed' But different group oppressions exhibit different combinations of thes-e forms, as do different individuals in the groups. Nearly all, if not all, groups said by contemporary social movements to be oppressed suffer cultural imperialism. The other oppressions they experience vary. working-class people are exploited and powerless, for example, but if employed and white do noi experience marginaliza- tion and violence. Gay men, on the other hand, are not qru guy exploited or pow- erless, but they experience severe cultural imperialism uni uiol.n.". Similarly, Jews and Arabs as groups are victims of culturai imperialism and violence, though many members of these groups also suffer exploitation or powerlessness. old peop-le afe oppressed by marginalization and cultural imperialism, and this is also true ofphysically and mentally disabled people. As a group women are subject ro gender- based exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperiilism, and violence. Racism in the United States condemns many Blacks and Latinos to marginalization, and puts many more at risk, even though many members of these groups

"t"up" that condition;

members of these groups often suffer all five forms of op=pression. Applying these five criteria to the situation of groups makes it possible to com_

pare oppressions without reducing them to a common essence or claiming that one is more fundamental than another. one can compare the ways in which a particular form of oppression appears in difrerent groups. For .*u-pi", while the operations of cultural imperialism are often experienced in similar fashion by differeni groups, there are also important differences. one can compare the combinations of oppr"r_ sions groups experience, or the intensity of those oppressions. Thus with these cri- teria one can plausibiy claim that one group is more oppressed than another without reducing all oppressions to a single scale. . . .

REFERENCES Alexander, David. 1987. "Gendered Job rraits and women's occupations.,'ph.D. disserta_tion, Economics, University of Massachusetts. Brown, Carol. 1981. "Mothers, Fathers and Children: From Privare to public patriarchy." In

Lydia Sargent, ed., Women and Revolutiolr. Boston: South End. Delphy' Christine. 1984. Ctose to Horne; A Materiali.yt Analysis of Women,.s oppressiort.

Amherst: University of Massachusetts press.

Du Bois, W.E.B. 1969 [1903] Ferguson, Ann. 1984. "On Cr

Approach." In Joyce Trebii Rowman and Allanheld.

1989. Blood ar the R, Fraser, Nancy. 1987. "Social i

Social Needs." CHS Occas of Minnesota.

Lugones, Maria C., and Elizr Feminist Theory, Cultural Wome n's S ttulie s I r t te rnati(

Macpherson, C. B. 1973. Demt Press.

Marable, Manning. 1984. Rac, America, 1945-82. Jacksor

Sennett, Richard, and Jonath Vintage.

QUESTIONS I How do stereotypes reinfor( 2 ls marginalization the most 3 Can social institutions that

ered just?

The African-America and the Question of V Howard McGary

McGary addresses the questior their underclass status? In his \ ( I ) the mindset of members of design of the basic structure of discussing the views of liberal citizensltip and explains the kir full citizenship. He then advan of the underclass have good re explains how having reasonabl mindset, and hence the motiva

Reprinted from Howard McG lront Tlu' Urulenluss Quesrion Universitv Press. O 1992 bv Ten