Article review: The Transformation of NATO after the Cold War

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NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From collective defense toward collective security Richard Rupp a a Visiting Assistant Professor , Purdue University , Indiana Published online: 24 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Richard Rupp (2000) NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From collective defense toward collective security, Journal of Strategic Studies, 23:3, 154-176, DOI: 10.1080/01402390008437804

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8

NATO 1949 and NATO 2000: From Collective Defense toward

Collective Security

RICHARD RUPP

The decision to transform the NATO alliance and expand the organization's membership may well have been the most important US foreign policy initiative of the 1990s, if not the past 50 years. Cognizant or not of the ramifications, the Clinton administration has dramatically altered an alliance configured in 1949 to promote and defend selective US vital interests. NATO 2000 identifies no specific state as a threat. Rather, NATO is committed to engaging future and unspecified conflicts in many diverse countries. With little debate and with great difficulty in identifying US interests, the Clinton administration is gradually converting NATO from a collective defense organization (CDO), which permitted the United States to determine its interests, into a collective security organization (CSO) that allows little flexibility on the part of the nation's policymakers. When the history of US foreign policy in the 1990s is written, the decision to transform and expand NATO will be seen as a critical error.

NATO's transformation has been executed without fully appreciating and grasping the US national interests at stake. Dissecting interests, both in the abstract and in light of current events, will illuminate the dangers in converting NATO from the collective defense organization that emerged in 1949 and stood throughout the Cold War into a collective security organization that now seems NATO's fate. As new members join the alliance and NATO is called upon to engage an ever-growing array of crises and conflicts, the organization's credibility and effectiveness will be stretched - conceivably to breaking point. NATO still has a vital role to play in promoting US interests. But to serve those interests, it is a slightly

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modified NATO of 1949 that is required, not the radically altered organization of 2000.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

It is often noted that the Cold War containment strategy gave US foreign policy remarkable focus and purpose. While the implementation of containment was frequently flawed and led to waste in treasure and lives, the perceived threat of the Soviet Union created an environment in which American elites largely shared a common perception of the national interest. Nevertheless, identifying national interests, even when a state confronts a powerful enemy, is a complicated task. Identifying national interests when no state poses such a threat is an even greater challenge, and one that has been confronting the United States for nearly ten years.

A nation has a variety of interests, both foreign and domestic. Debating and deciding which interests are of greater import are at the heart of politics. Virtually all people would agree that a nation's survival tops its lists of interests, but deciding how best to secure even that goal is a complicated and difficult task. In the realm of foreign policy, Donald Nuechterlein, a former US State and Defense Department analyst, argues there are two key categories in which to consider interests: vital and major. According to Nuechterlein: 'An interest is vital when the highest policymakers in a sovereign state conclude that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the political, economic, and social well-being of their country that it could not be compromised - even if this conclusion results in the use of economic and military sanctions."

Compared to its major interests, a nation-state has relatively few vital interests. Certainly, the most paramount task a government confronts is assuring the survival and physical security of the nation, and responding to states, groups, or individuals posing serious threats. For example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the possibility that Great Britain would fall to the Nazis, were threats to US vital interests. At Pearl Harbor, the threat was stark. As to Great Britain, defeat by the Nazis would have constituted a threat to the survival of the United States because, with the resources of the British Empire in German hands, America would have confronted an extraordinarily powerful enemy state.

Beyond armed conflict, states have vital interests in maintaining their fundamental economic well-being. Most international economic issues a nation addresses - currency devaluations, import quotas, debt management - impact the nation's major interests. However, some economic interests are

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so crucial that they do affect a nation's vital interests. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 posed such a threat to the United States. Although it was not as directly dependent as its allies in Japan and Western Europe on Middle East oil, the prospect of Iraq setting oil prices and regulating the flow of vast amounts of oil challenged the fundamental stability of the international political economy, and consequently threatened US vital, not just major, interests.

Of course, not all interests a nation possesses are vital. Indeed, it was the inability of US policymakers to distinguish threats to vital interests from those to nonvital interests that took America astray in Vietnam, Nicaragua, and other regions during the Cold War. On a daily basis, a nation's policymakers are much more likely to be engaged in monitoring and advancing major rather than vital interests. Nuechterlein defines a major interest as:

One that a country considers to be important but not crucial to its well being. Major interests involve issues and trends, whether they are economic, political, or ideological, that can be negotiated with an adversary. Such issues may cause serious concern and even harm to.. .interests abroad, but policymakers usually come to the conclusion that negotiation and compromise, rather than confrontation, are desirable.2

Major interests are myriad. A partial list of US major interests would include: financial assistance to Ukraine, confronting drug trafficking, peacekeeping deployments in East Timor, the Arab-Israeli peace process and the general promotion of human rights and democratization. While all of these issues occupy the attention and resources of the American government, none of them threatens the physical security of the United States or its fundamental economic standard of living.

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

To promote and defend its vital and major interests, a nation devises strategies and tactics. In the realm of national security, states have frequently turned to collective security and collective defense as means of ensuring their military-security interests.

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the NATO expansion debate for this author has been the necessity to revisit the viability of collective security organizations. A valuable and important analytical concept, collective security has been subject to powerful and compelling theoretical

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and empirical criticism.3 Yet, despite this evidence, NATO heads of state spent the 1990s transforming the organization into an alliance that Woodrow Wilson would have praised and supported.

The term collective security is widely used in the lexicon of policymakers, journalists, and the general public. For specialists in international relations, collective security is also a central concept. Yet the term remains ambiguous to many. The notion of collective security can be traced back at least one thousand years, and has been a recurring feature in international politics since the Concert of Europe. In 1815, following the Napoleonic Wars, the major European powers were eager to devise an international institution that would regulate their relations and ideally reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. The result of their efforts was the Concert of Europe. For many, the Concert was Europe's first step at building a collective security organization.

Although competing usages exist, all modern versions of collective security draw from the thinking and words of Woodrow Wilson. Renouncing power politics, Wilson argued that human beings possessed the capacity and reason to alter the manner in which international relations had historically functioned. Wilson championed the establishment of an international organization - a league of nations - that would be based on a near universal membership of states, encompassing both the great and small nations of the world. He assumed that all member states would be desirous of peace, and would commit themselves to repel and punish aggressor states regardless of specific circumstances.

Wilson rejected the contention that states inevitably function in a self- help system in which they necessarily place their own national interests above all other concerns. He assumed that because states have 'clear interests in protecting an international order that they see as beneficial to their individual security, they will contribute to the coalition even if they have no vital interests at stake in the actual theater of aggression'.4 Wilson presumed that his collective security's 'all-against-one' formulation would serve as a deterrent to aggressor states because a potential violator of the international order would be subject to a massive and coordinated global response. Given that no state would possess the necessary resources to resist the combined military forces of the collective security organization, peace would become the norm in international politics.

Collective defense is far less ambitious than collective security. Whereas collective security seeks large-scale memberships, and seeks to unite diverse states against threats to peace, collective defense binds a limited number of states sharing the view that a particular state, or states, threatens

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the vital interests of each of them. Rejecting the idealist aspirations of Woodrow Wilson, advocates of collective defense, or military alliances, view states as parochial self-interested actors. Such nations do not join forces to confront unidentified future threats to a vague conceptualization of international peace and security. Rather, collective defense provides a home for states that identify a specific threat common to them all and agree to mount a mutual defense effort against that threat.

Collective defense has a long history in international relations. Many attempts have succeeded and many have failed, but they all share certain traits. Robert Art, Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University maintains that collective defense organizations:

qualify their commitments either by retaining national control over the decision to use force, or by clearly specifying the exact circumstances under which military aid shall be rendered, or by doing both. What an alliance gives up in certainty of response, however, should be more than compensated for by the strength and intensity of the interest its member states have in preventing a specific aggressor from attacking them. By narrowing its scope (the range of aggressions it seeks to prevent), an alliance thereby strengthens its deterrent power.5

Cato Institute scholars Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry have argued that the Clinton administration's NATO reforms are 'a confusing hybrid that ignores the fundamental differences between a collective security organization and a traditional military alliance'.6 To appreciate the magnitude of the administration's confusion and its policy implications, NATO's original collective defense mission must be reviewed.

NATO'S ORIGINS

By the time Nazi armies crossed into the Polish frontier in September 1939, the League of Nations and the concept of collective security had been thoroughly discredited. Throughout World War II, several military alliances were formed. Although not precisely collective defense as defined above, the wartime 'Grand Alliance' between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union approximated collective defense. Each state identified Nazi Germany as a threat to its survival and the three nations agreed to coordinate and combine their resources to destroy the Nazi regime. Few people during the war envisioned that this cooperation - or more accurately, a marriage of convenience - between the West and the Soviet Union would so quickly evaporate following the close of hostilities.

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In the period after the defeat of Germany and Japan, an array of events would occur that would cement hostile relations between East and West. The events are well known and include: the establishment of a Soviet puppet regime in Poland, Moscow's pressure on Iran and Turkey, Stalin's February 1946 address on the likelihood of war, Churchill's reply in Fulton, Missouri (the 'Iron Curtain' speech) a month later, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the division of Germany, and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. By March 1948, in a cable to Washington, General Lucius Clay, the US military governor of Germany, concluded that events might culminate in war with the Soviet Union.

Coupled to General Clay's telegram was his assessment of the West's military position on the ground in Western Europe. Millions of American troops had made their way back across the Atlantic by 1948, and only 200,000 remained on duty in Europe.7 Indeed, plans were afoot to continue demobilization, reducing the force to approximately 95,000 troops, most of whom would be committed to occupation duties, not maintaining a robust deterrence capability. Although US intelligence reports exaggerated the size of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union following the war, Soviet forces did considerably outnumber those of the Western countries.

The imbalance of forces can be captured best in a pithy cable Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery sent to his superiors in September 1948. Montgomery had been dispatched to France to preside over the Western European Union's Commander-in-Chief Committee. Upon surveying the military situation, Montgomery queried, 'My present instructions are to hold the line at the Rhine. Presently available allied forces might enable me to hold the tip of the Brittany peninsula for three days. Please instruct further.'8

Lacking Montgomery's irreverence, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) surveyed the same situation, and presented their conclusions in a document with the title 'Halfmoon'. The JCS asserted that if the Soviets chose to attack, the Red Army could quickly overwhelm Western forces in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. With regard to Europe, 'Halfmoon' 'predicted that in a matter of weeks, all of Western Europe likely would be lost and total US evacuation would be necessary.'9 'Halfmoon' and other JCS assessments anticipated the worst-case scenario. Over the years, critics of such forecasts have condemned the extreme pessimism and conclusions. For example, in his 1962 study on NATO, Robert E. Osgood, a prominent scholar of American foreign policy, concluded, 'There is no indication that Stalin wished to pursue his designs upon Western Europe by engaging Western forces in direct combat."0 While the debate will never be settled, it

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remains clear that most policymakers shared Secretary of State George C. Marshall's view that, 'European Communism threatens US vital interests and national security."1 More specifically, the widely held view in Washington in the late 1940s maintained that

if the Soviets overran Western Europe and harnessed the vast resources of that region to their own war machine, they could confront America as an equal in terms of military-industrial potential. If it were not for nuclear weapons, this great Soviet-dominated bloc might well be unconquerable, and indeed might in the long run be more than a match for the United States.12

The architects of the NATO alliance lived through the years spanning World War I, the interwar period, and World War II. Sobered by the events of that calamitous period, those men recognized the folly behind collective security. In designing the NATO Charter, US diplomats and their Canadian and European counterparts recognized that the glue holding any alliance together came in the form of a shared and specific threat. On 4 April 1949, representatives of 12 nations met in Washington, and created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In signing the NATO Charter, the North American and West European governments committed themselves to function in accordance with the concept of collective defense. The signatories did not forfeit the right to control the destinies of their foreign policies, nor did they radically alter the manner in which they defined and protected their national interests. Rather, the member states all agreed that, with regard to one aspect of their foreign policies, their interests coincided, and they agreed to establish a joint mechanism for advancing a shared goal. While the Soviet Union was not mentioned in the Charter, there was no doubt that Article 5, the key passage, spoke directly to the Soviet threat. As Article 5 read in 1949, and as it reads unchanged today:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self- defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

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In 1949, there was little doubt that the governments of the West believed that war with the USSR was possible, if not probable. Today, more than 50 years after the treaty's signing, the USSR no longer exists, and while Russia remains a concern to NATO, the current guardians of the alliance have made clear that the primary threat to NATO comes not from a specific nation, but from the unstable nature of the post-Cold War era. Through reforms adopted since 1991, including the Strategic Concept, Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the actual extension of membership, NATO is being modified so that it can confront threats, not from specified governments, but from an array of developments including nationalism, refugee flows and economic upheavals. To confront these new threats, NATO is being gradually transformed from a collective defense organization into a collective security organization.

NATO'S TRANSFORMATION

In many ways, the past ten years have witnessed more tumultuous change for the NATO alliance than did the decades of the Cold War. As the Soviet Union collapsed between 1989 and 1991, NATO took tentative steps to prepare for the impending post-Soviet period. NATO leaders met in London in July 1990 and instructed their governments to undertake a fundamental review of the organization's future purpose and goals. In November 1991, the organization's 16 members agreed upon a new Strategic Concept. Although the Soviet Union was little more than a question for historians to ponder by that time, the NATO heads of state recommitted themselves to collective defense. In light of the fact that the Soviet Union at the time had only one month's breath left, one wonders how serious the commitment to collective defense was. However, in a departure from NATO's traditional mission, the new Strategic Concept also identified conflicts and issues that would occupy the alliance's attention in the future. Declaring that 'the monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principle concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared',13

the NATO heads of state went on to assert their particular concern with the:

adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. This could, however, lead to

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crises inimical to European security and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, and have a direct effect on the security of the alliance.14

A vague statement to many, the Strategic Concept's reference to instabilities in Central and Eastern Europe was not lost on leaders in Prague, Warsaw, and the rest of the region. NATO's declaration that domestic turmoil in these states could threaten NATO itself was seen as an opening for national leaders, including Poland's Lech Walesa and Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel, to press the organization for more tangible commitments, which would be, after all, in NATO's own interest. Membership in all of the West's international organizations quickly became the central foreign policy goal of the new Central and East European governments, but NATO membership was the priority. Only NATO could provide the internal and external security that each new government sought.

Beyond the general statements found in the Strategic Concept and the public statements by NATO leaders, the alliance took concrete steps toward reform by creating new formal associations with the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the governments of republics that comprised the former Soviet Union. In December 1991, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which was designed to provide a formal but limited link between the 16-member alliance and the new governments to the east. In signing the NACC protocols, participants acknowledged that instability was a primary concern to Europe's future, and that NATO should play a decisive role in addressing and ameliorating that instability.

The NACC called on members to meet at regular intervals to discuss a broad array of issues - ranging from traditional human rights concerns to economic transitions. As to military ties and cooperation, the NACC declared, 'the focus of our consultations and cooperation will be on security and related issues, such as defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, civil-military coordination and air traffic management and the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes'.15

As NATO continued its search for a new identity in 1992, the alliance agreed to develop linkages with both the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations. With war raging in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, NATO agreed in June 1992 'to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise'.16 Six months later,

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NATO agreed to cooperate with the United Nations regarding international peacekeeping operations.

With those policy initiatives, NATO began the process of moving 'out- of-area'. To facilitate peacekeeping and peacemaking in out-of-area operations, NATO created the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in late 1993. Although the CJTF have had limited use since their founding, this US-led initiative continued the process of linking permanent NATO member-states to the concerns of non-NATO states and aspiring NATO states.

As time passed, the NACC proved unable to satisfy the needs and demands of its new members. With the NACC, the CJTF, the CSCE, and even the European Union perceived as virtual way stations to membership in NATO, stronger pressure was placed on NATO governments to increase the alliance's formal membership. During 1993, the question of NATO expansion found itself debated within the Clinton administration. With voices on both sides of the debate, the US government initially chose a middle road. Like most policy initiatives, Partnership for Peace (PFP) was born out of compromise. While some in Eastern Europe favored immediate extension of full NATO membership, few in the West were supportive of such a dramatic turn. However, as pressure and discussions continued, Washington decided to give the East a taste of what it had been seeking. Partnership for Peace was formally established at NATO's January 1994 summit meeting.

For many in the West, this was as far as the alliance could go in establishing formal relations with the East. Senior officials at the US Department of Defense, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were highly dubious of creating any new institutions or extending any assurances to Eastern European governments, particularly at a time when the United States was substantially reducing the size of its armed forces.17

But for the governments in Budapest, Prague, and even Bucharest and Tallin, PFP was a major step toward their ultimate goal of full NATO membership. While this was a major step, many in Eastern Europe, particularly those in Poland, expressed the view that NATO was moving too slowly and cautiously.

For critics of NATO's decision, Partnership for Peace was derided as 'Partnership for Postponement', 'Partnership for Procrastination', or 'Partnership for Prevarication'.18 One senior Polish official dismissed PFP with a historical reference to Britain's efforts to appease Germany at the 1938 Munich Conference, stating 'We have gone from Chamberlain's umbrella to Clinton's saxophone."9

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With PFP, NATO established institutional mechanisms linking the 16 permanent member-states to the governments of the East. Members of PFP, which would quickly include most of the states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, were pledged to work with the NATO members on five objectives:

• facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;

• ensuring democratic control of national defenses; • maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject

to the constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;

• the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of the Central and East European countries to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as might subsequently be agreed upon;

• the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.20

Although the PFP protocols did not afford Article 5 protections or identify any state or states that might threaten members of the alliance, some critics argued that the growing integration of permanent members with 'associate' members would lead to the emergence of de facto security guarantees. As John Duffield, political scientist at the University of Georgia, concluded, 'the more that NATO is involved with them and the more they restructure their forces and decision-making processes to be compatible with NATO, the harder it will be for NATO to refuse to act as if their security is endangered'.21

Indeed, since the inception of PFP, many states have endeavored to become model members of NATO's new club. Beyond participating in numerous PFP conferences, briefings, and training exercises, many PFP states deployed troops to Bosnia, where they participated in NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations. Although their involvement in these NATO operations has contributed to the effectiveness of the missions, it is unlikely that the primary motivation for participation was concern about the Bosnia situation per se; it was part of their concerted campaigns to move beyond membership in PFP. Their goals were, and remain, full NATO membership with Article 5 security

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assurances. Indeed, in signing the PFP protocols, the Eastern governments pressured the 16 permanent members to include the following passage:

We affirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of the other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.22

Those who had hoped that the East would be satisfied with PFP did not adequately appreciate the intense drive of East Europeans, or the power of their Western supporters. For as the train of Partnership for Peace pulled out of the station, the destination was clearly full NATO membership, and waving the train toward that destination was US President Bill Clinton. Indeed, with Clinton's public declarations in autumn of 1996 calling on NATO to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as full members by April 1999, there was virtually no turning back.

EXTENDING FULL MEMBERSHIP

When the original 12 states signed the Washington Treaty in 1949, there was widespread belief that an alliance was necessary to check Soviet power in Europe. Although motivations varied and threat perceptions differed, the North American and West European states concluded that they shared a vital interest in preventing Soviet hegemony over Western Europe. Each of these states possessed other concerns and foreign policy interests, but all agreed to support NATO in its paramount task.

In expanding the alliance in the absence of the Soviet Union, or any state resembling the threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, NATO was compelled to devise a rationale for retooling the organization. In September 1995, NATO published a study seeking to clarify what the mission and goals of an expanded alliance would be. The major points included:

• encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;

• fostering in new members of the alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current Allies;

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• promoting good-neighborly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non- members of NATO;

• emphasizing common defense and extending its benefits and increasing the transparency in defense planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defense policies;

• reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency toward disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;

• strengthening the alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security, including participation in peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions;

• strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic relationship."

In numerous instances, those points simply modified and built upon the functions and goals of PFP noted above. And just as the PFP protocols designated no specific state as a potential threat toward which alliance members could galvanize their policies, this document followed suit, identifying no likely aggressor state.

. In July 1997, NATO's permanent members and more than a dozen aspiring member-states gathered in Madrid, to witness the organization's formal invitation of membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. With the understanding that the three nations would comport with the organization's accession requirements, the states would become full members of NATO by April 1999. Throughout the summit, NATO officials were at pains to clarify that the offer to the three Central European states should not be interpreted by other governments as the final chapter in NATO expansion. Indeed, the 'Madrid Declaration' emphatically stated that 'The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years...'24 To allay the fears and address the disappointment of noninvited governments, the Declaration went on to assert:

With regard to aspiring members, we recognize with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia ... At the same time, we recognize the progress

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achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members."

In the two years following Madrid, the Central European states worked diligently toward meeting NATO's goal of a signing ceremony to coincide with NATO's 50th anniversary celebrations in Washington. On 12 March 1999 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic formally joined NATO. With great applause, the once-Warsaw Pact nations became full and permanent members of NATO, enjoying the full security guarantees found in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In ratifying amendments to the treaty admitting the new member-states, the US Senate declared, 'The invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or their destabilization arising from external subversion, would threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United States national security interests.'26

With high hopes, the new 19-member organization went forward. Its charter now called upon members to cooperate on a wide array of endeavors ranging from ameliorating ethnic conflict to promoting economic reforms. Although no specific state-based threat was specified, any one of the 19 members could call upon the entire membership to respond if it perceived a security threat. With threats to national security defined vaguely as 'instabilities', any number of events could trigger requests for support.

As new states have attained membership, attention now shifts to the future. Alain Pellerin, of the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS), quite rightly contends that three possible paths lie in NATO's future:

• stop the enlargement process after the first stage or after a relatively non-controversial second stage that could include Slovenia, Romania, and Austria; or

• expand the alliance to Russia's border to include the Baltic republics and possibly Ukraine; or

• pursue a broad engagement policy, which would include Russia.27

Some experts, including former ambassador Jonathan Dean and Yale University political scientists Bruce Russett and Alan Stam, have argued that the circle should be completed, and Russia should be made a member of NATO.28 That is not a likely possibility.

Others, including this author, maintain that NATO expansion should halt. A third group, dominated by policymakers, contend that while Russian membership is not likely for a great many years, expanding the alliance further east is desirable. The next stage of NATO expansion would include

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nations from the Baltics and/or the Balkans. Since the first invitations were made in Madrid, some US officials have quietly warned governments in these regions that second-round invitations will move much more slowly than the first round.

However, the Baltic states and some of the Balkan states can point to explicit statements from NATO that expansion into both regions is open and pending. For instance, six months after NATO's Madrid Conference, the presidents of the three Baltic states joined President Clinton in the East Room of the White House and signed the US-Baltic Charter of Partnership. That document devotes considerable attention to nation-building, the rale of law, and free market reforms, but it was also quite explicit on the question of NATO expansion:

The Partners believe that the enlargement of NATO will enhance the security of the United States, Canada, and all the countries of Europe, including those states not immediately invited to membership or not currently interested in membership ... The United States welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, to join NATO.29

Balkan states have also received assurances that NATO membership remains open. Romania was specifically singled out in the Madrid Declaration as a likely candidate. In February 1998, President Clinton met in Washington with Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov and signed the US- Bulgarian Partnership. Although that document was primarily an acknowledgement of Bulgaria's continuing reforms, the White House released a statement declaring 'President Clinton reaffirmed America's commitment to NATO's "Open Door" policy and welcomed Bulgaria's aspiration to NATO membership.'30 With Baltic and Balkan states eager to join NATO, the next round of expansion may result in an additional full NATO member, with Article 5 security protections, bordering Russia. (In granting Poland full NATO membership, the alliance has already extended its eastern presence to Russia's border at Kaliningrad.) To those consequences we now turn.

THE RUSSIAN REACTION

The architects of NATO expansion took a page from the Marshall Plan when considering Russia's likely reaction. Just as participation in the Marshall Plan was offered to the Kremlin in 1947, inclusion in NATO's eastward expansion has been offered to Moscow with each new policy

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initiative, save an actual invitation formally to join the organization. Although many in the Soviet Union would have welcomed Marshall Plan funds to rebuild the nation, only one voice spoke for the Soviet Union, and Joseph Stalin said no.

Today, there are many voices participating in the political debate within Russia, and while these voices are frequently at odds, on one question the Russians are united: the vast majority of Russian elites oppose NATO expansion. At each stage of NATO's eastward expansion, Russian policymakers have made their objections known. The Russian Duma termed NATO expansion the 'most serious military threat to our country since 1945'.3' Indeed, the leader of the Communist Party in Russia, Gennady Zyuganov, condemned the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which sought to institutionalize NATO-Russian interactions, as a 'complete and unconditional surrender'.32

The Russian military has repeatedly demonstrated that it views NATO's new institutions, the NACC, PFP, and even the Founding Act, as empty paternalistic gestures from the West. In 1995, Russia's Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, stated that Russia would take military initiatives to counter NATO's expanding membership: 'We might create necessary military groups in the most threatening directions and set up a closer cooperation with the other CIS states.'33

Many, if not most, international relations specialists contend that Russian objections to NATO expansion are well founded. Although many Western policymakers discount Russian concerns, the following list delineates possible developments if NATO expansion proceeds:

A rebirth of Russia's sphere of influence among the now independent states of the former Soviet Union, with particularly negative impact on Ukraine and the Baltic States; a strengthening of the non- democratic opposition, which would undercut those who favor reforms and cooperation with the West; an unwelcome nationalistic influence on internal Russian politics; an intensification of the relationship between Russia and China, to avoid mutual isolation; the annulment of the NATO-Russia Founding Act; encouragement of new militarism in Russia; and a resistance in the Duma to various arms control agreements.34

Even as they advocate NATO expansion, US policymakers assure their Russian counterparts that Russia has no legitimate fears of the once-Cold War organization. After all, as NATO's Strategic Concept asserts, the organization's key goal is to promote stability in Europe, and that goal

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should benefit Russia as well as all other European countries. But it is impossible for Russians to ignore the fact that a primary reason why the East Europeans and Baits seek NATO membership is as a security guarantee against a revanchist Russia.

The United States and its NATO allies are clearly sending Moscow a mixed message. In public statements and in NATO policy directives, Russia has been assured that the organization now functions to promote general European security. Quietly, though, depending on which Western or Eastern policymaker is speaking, NATO is touted as an insurance policy to deal with any future Russian threat to US and European security. As David Yost, Professor of International Relations at the US Naval Postgraduate School, has observed:

From the perspective of the Russians, NATO's rhetoric is contradictory: If NATO wants to build a relationship of partnership and cooperation with Russia, why are NATO governments extending collective defense commitments to nations that have expressed distrust and antagonism toward Russia?35

Just as it would be unwise to poke a stick at a sleeping rattlesnake, it is unwise to prod Russia with NATO expansion. No good can come from either proposition.

OPENING PANDORA'S BOX

It is not difficult to identify the adverse consequences of NATO expansion on Western-Russian relations. However, when one expands the focus to include the impact of NATO expansion on Eurasian security in general, and US interests in particular, the negative ramifications become overwhelming. Nations seeking or discussing NATO membership are remarkably diverse. They include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria. No matter how skillful NATO's public affairs department may be at arguing that common interests in peace and stability exist among states, the Baltics and Balkans simply do not have fundamentally common security interests. Indeed, in those regions, nations, like nations everywhere, have very particular vital and major interests. Baltic, Balkan, and Central European states are at varying levels of economic, social, military, and political development.

In addition, those nations, like all nations, have particular histories which have been shaped by geography, demographics, religion, language, race, and war. The assertion that the new NATO will be as effective in

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achieving its goals as the old NATO was in countering the Soviet threat is without historical precedent and defies contemporary logic.

The one interest that aspiring NATO states truly share is their desire to join the alliance and receive its security guarantees. These nations view NATO as the West's most prized, effective, and credible organization. Membership in such an organization would likely yield any number of benefits: economic assistance, political integration, social development, and, of course, a perception of enhanced security. Michael Mandelbaum, Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University, remains a prominent voice in the debate about NATO's future, and notes the understandable quest among non-NATO states to become NATO members:

It is the political elites in Central Europe who wish to join NATO, for reasons that are rooted in their histories. Theirs are small, weak, vulnerable countries ... The lesson they draw from history is that Europe may once again be divided between or among rival powers, in which case they will be forced to be part of a bloc dominated by those more powerful than they. In those circumstances, they understandably wish to have chosen their affiliation rather than having had it imposed on them, as it was after World War II and so often before.36

But simply because the states in the East perceive NATO membership as a major, if not vital, interest does not mean that the current NATO states should share that view. Indeed, NATO expansion is not in the best interest of the West, nor is it really in the interests of the states to the East.

It is difficult to persuade policymakers of Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltics, and the Balkans that NATO expansion is not in their interest. Beyond the issue of needlessly antagonizing Russia, if NATO expands as currently designed, the organization will be required to address security issues that no organization could effectively and successfully manage. Each new NATO state will bring to the organization known and unknown security issues that the organization may become treaty-bound to engage. The list of potential conflicts is myriad: Poland-Belarus, Kaliningrad-Lithuania, Hungary-Slovenia, Romania-Serbia, and Bulgaria-Macedonia, to note but a few. While efforts have been made to ameliorate these issues, many of these are age-old conflicts that rushed treaties designed to placate Brussels will not settle.37

New and aspiring NATO states have interests that differ from the organization's charter members and those states that joined during the Cold War. The new and aspiring members want a security guarantee, or a security blanket, that they believe will provide comfort in their present transitions, and

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afford them lasting security against a large, potentially aggressive Eurasian state. The states of the Cold War-era NATO want the organization to survive well into the new millennium. In that light they have recreated NATO.

Some Western policymakers genuinely believe in NATO's new collective security mission, but others simply want to maintain the alliance as an insurance policy vis-a-vis Russia. The new NATO is not focused on a common enemy state but on an enemy concept: instability. However, some would argue that the permanent members of NATO have taken steps to shield themselves from the instabilities emanating from the East. For instance, NATO has assured the Russians that NATO will not deploy sizeable numbers of troops in the new member states and will not deploy any nuclear weapons in the East. Yet for 50 years, NATO's credibility was based on the forward deployment of conventional forces and the deployment of tactical and strategic nuclear forces. Aspiring NATO members are seeking membership in the Cold War NATO. But that NATO no longer exists.

CONCLUSION

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO leaders began the process of gradually transforming the organization for the post-Cold War era. Several options were available. Some argued that the organization was no longer relevant in a world without the Soviet Union, but this remained the position of a distinct minority. Determined to maintain the alliance, policymakers began considering new missions and purposes. Urged on by East European leaders and domestic actors, the Clinton administration proceeded to advocate the expansion of NATO's traditional functions. The first steps at reform were promulgated in policy statements declaring NATO's intent to confront broadly defined instabilities in the emerging era. As time pressed on, the United States initiated structural and institutional changes including NACC, CJTF, PFP, and, ultimately, the extension of full NATO membership to some East European states. Throughout this process, NATO has been transformed from a collective defense organization into an organization that, at least on paper, more closely resembles a collective security organization.

Other options were available to NATO policymakers in the 1990s. Although the Soviet Union no longer existed, one of the reasons for NATO's original creation was still present, and will always be present: the potential threat posed by a large, aggressive Eurasian power. Just as the United States engaged in Europe to confront Germany and the Soviet Union, some argued that the United States should remain in post-Cold War Europe to stem any future threat to European and American security interests. This time-

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honored position has many champions. In 1982, Hans Morgenthau's study on national interests concluded that the United States has:

always striven to prevent the development of conditions in Europe which would be conducive to a European nation's interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere or contemplating a direct attack upon the United States. These conditions would be most likely to arise if a European nation, its predominance unchallenged within Europe, could look across the sea for conquest without fear of being menaced at the center of its power; that is, in Europe itself.38

In this light, the United States and its NATO allies might have chosen to maintain the alliance, though in the absence of any immediate or medium- range threat, at a substantially reduced scale. During the Cold War, American personnel commitments to NATO reached over 300,000. Currently, the United States maintains a force of approximately 100,000 in Europe. With no serious threat on the horizon, the United States could reduce these numbers even further. Indeed, it could be reasoned that US personnel in Europe should only reach levels necessary to facilitate the rapid deployment of a large-scale American-based force capable of engaging significant military threats that might materialize in the future.

Had that course been selected, there would have been other means available to address the general concerns for post-Cold War European security. For instance, considerable attention and resources could have been devoted to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.39 With its large membership and commitments to peacekeeping and other related operations, this institution could have served to advance the goals articulated in NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept without requiring substantial internal reforms to the alliance. A scaled down NATO, whose membership remained closed to newcomers, would have been a NATO held in abeyance. Its function would have been to monitor major shifts and events in Europe and serve as a credible check on any large state or states, seeking to decisively alter the balance of power in Eurasia.

Unfortunately, NATO did not choose that path. Rather, NATO has issued security guarantees to three new states and is poised to continue the process. Baltic and Balkan governments are working diligently within Partnership for Peace and are actively positioning themselves for second-round membership invitations. These nations, however, may find that the new NATO is a hollow shell of its previous incarnation. The Cold War NATO possessed great credibility. There remains little question that the alliance would have responded decisively to a Soviet attack on any of the permanent

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members. But one wonders how effectively NATO will respond in the future when called upon to address a conflict between two or more new members, or a new member and that nation's neighbor, that does not engage the vital interests of the other states in the organization.

And what of out-of-area operations? The new NATO is not concerning itself solely with issues limited to the old and new membership; NATO is now committed to addressing out-of-area conflicts. The lessons from NATO's experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo are still materializing. If one reads the pages of the NATO Review and listens to NATO officials in Brussels, the organization has been highly effective in implementing its role under the Dayton Accords. In Bosnia, the dismal record on refugee relocation and at-large war criminals has not deterred NATO officials from declaring, 'In contrast to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which preceded it, IFOR is a model of military efficiency, and command and control. It has written itself into the history books and textbooks. Only NATO, with its well-established political and military arrangements could have done it.'40 Time and space do not permit a point- by-point refutation of this statement. Suffice it to say, had NATO truly been that effective in Bosnia, it might have established the necessary credibility to deter Slobodan Milosevic from ravaging Kosovo.

One might trust that the conflict in Kosovo would give policymakers pause as they consider Balkan candidacies for the future rounds of expansion. However, NATO initiatives during the crisis indicated that some in the alliance may be more determined than ever to expand NATO membership into the troubled region. On 24 March 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana wrote to the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Romania that the alliance would view as 'unacceptable' any military strikes against the five nations by Serbia. Each of the five countries is a member of Partnership for Peace and all have expressed their desire to become full members of NATO. In his message of 24 March, Solana wrote, 'The alliance has repeatedly made clear that the security of all NATO member states is inseparably linked to that of the partner countries ... Your security is of a direct and material concern to the alliance.'41

It could plausibly be argued that this NATO communique served as a functional equivalent of an Article 5 security guarantee without corresponding Article 5 obligations having been undertaken by the Balkan states. This communique was also issued without the approval of the parliaments or congresses of NATO's existing members. The implications of this action are quite unsettling. In future times of crisis, NATO leaders in Brussels may unilaterally extend guarantees and commitments to states that only NATO

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governments can legally undertake. Such a development would only serve to widen NATO's sphere of responsibility and require the organization to respond to events that may wholly overtax NATO's interests, resources, and capabilities.

Sharing the view that NATO 2000 ill-serves the interests of old or new members, Robert Art has argued that aspiring members 'must be made to understand that their security is better off with a viable NATO that they cannot join than one that is not viable but to which they belong'.42 NATO has long served the interests of the United States, its allies, and general European security. As NATO enters the new millennium, no state poses a serious threat to the present balance of power in Eurasia. Indeed, it will likely be many years before a possible challenger could materialize. But NATO has a role to play in assuring such a development is checked and confronted. NATO affords the United States considerable flexibility in the manner in which it interacts in European military-security affairs. Through its position in the alliance, the United States can shape and lead policy debates and decision-making.

At this stage in the debate, it will be difficult to reverse the trends of the past decade. But these trends must be questioned and prevented from going further. Senator Richard Lugar (Republican, Indiana) has argued that if NATO does not go out of area, it will go out of business. Some might simply view Bosnia and Kosovo as out-of-area. But to advocates of the 1949 NATO, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and all aspiring NATO states in the Baltics and the Balkans, are out-of-area as well. In its determination to expand its scope and missions, NATO has set itself on a course that may lead to its collapse. Senator Lugar is incorrect. The phrase should read: 'If NATO goes out-of-area it will go out of business.'

NOTES

1. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Reconstructed World (Lexington: UP of Kentucky 1991) p.28.

2. Ibid. pp.20-1. 3. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd

ed. (NY: Knopf 1964); Inis L. Claude Jr, Power and International Relations (NY: Random House 1962) John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', International Security 19 (Winter 1994/95), pp.5-49; and Richard Betts, 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', International Security 17 (Summer 1992) pp.5-43.

4. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', International Security 16/1 (Summer 1991) p.126.

5. Robert Art, 'Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy', Political Science Quarterly 113/3 (Fall 1998) p.395.

6. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (eds.) NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality (Washington DC: Cato Institute 1998) p.9.

7. Richard L. Kugler, Laying the Foundations: The Evolution of NATO in the 1950s (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1990) p.22.

8. Robert H. Ferrell, 'The Formation of the Alliance, 1948-49', in Lawrence Kaplan (ed.) American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance (Kent State UP 1991) p.14.

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9. Ibid. p.29. 10. Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (U. of Chicago Press 1962) p.29. 11. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement,

1945-1963 (Princeton UP 1999) p.85. 12. Ibid. p.96. 13. See 'The Alliance's New Strategic Concept', NATO Document, Rome, Nov. 1991,

http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911107a.htm. 14. See Trachtenberg (note 11). 15. See 'North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership And

Cooperation', Press Communique M-NACC-1(91)111, North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 20 Dec. 1991.

16. Cited in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington DC: US Inst. of Peace Press 1998) p.76.

17. Robert Kay, NATO and the Future of Europe (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1998) p.69.

18. Yost, NATO Transformed (note 16) p.98. 19. See Kay (note 17) p.72. 20. See 'Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation', NATO Press Release

N-1(97)81, Madrid, 8 July 1997. 21. John S. Duffield, 'Why NATO Persists', in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.) NATO and the

Changing World Order: An Appraisal by Scholars and Policymakers (Lanham, MD: UP of America 1996) p. 117.

22. See 'Partnership for Peace: Invitation', NATO Press Communique M-l(94)2, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 Jan. 1994.

23. Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO Office of Information and Press, Sept. 1996, p.2. 24. See 'The Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation', NATO Press

Release M-l (97)81, Madrid, 8 July 1997. 25. Ibid. 26. 'The Senate Resolution on NATO Expansion', Arms Control Today (April 1998) p. 14. 27. Alain Pellerin, 'NATO Enlargement - The Way Ahead' (Canadian Council for Int. Peace and

Security 14 Feb. 1998) http://www.fas.org/man.eprint/nato-calgary.htm. 28. See Jonathan Dean, 'NATO Enlargement: Coping with Act II', in Carpenter and Conry

NATO Enlargement (note 6) pp.121-8; Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam, 'Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China', Political Science Quarterly 113/3 (Fall 1998) pp.383-403.

29. A Charter of Partnership Among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania. Washington, DC (16 Jan. 1998) http://www usia.gov/regional/eur/baltics/tables/gendocs/charter.htm.

30. Rick Marshall, 'Stoyanov Hails US action Plan for Southeast Europe', USIA, 11 Feb. 1998, http://www.fas.org/,am/nato/national/98021102_wpo.htm.

31. Susan Eisenhower, 'Starting Cold War II?' Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1998) (note 6) http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PRO/eisenhower.htm.

32. Susan Eisenhower, 'Perils of Victory' in Carpenter and Conry, NATO Enlargement (note 6) p. 113. 33. Cited in Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman &

Littlefield 1998) p.95. 34. Pellerin (note 27). 35. Yost (note 18) p.133. 36. Michael Mandelbaum, 'NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century',

(Washington DC: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, June 1997) http://www.cpss.org/ nato/mandel97.htm.

37. William Odom delineates several bilateral agreements among new and aspiring NATO states. See 'Russia's Several Seats at the Table', International Affairs 74/4 (Oct. 1998) p.819.

38. Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: UP of America 1982) p.5.

39. See Richard E. Rupp and Mary McKenzie, 'The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Institutional Reform and Political Reality', in Mary McKenzie and Peter Loedel (eds.) The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation: States, Interests, and Institutions (Westport, CT: Praeger 1998) pp. 119-38.

40. Michael Ruhle and Nick Williams, 'View from NATO: Why NATO Will Survive', International Strategy 16/1 (1997) p.109.

41. Craig Whitney, 'Conflict in the Balkans: The Alliance', New York Times, 25 March 1999, p.25. 42. Art (note 5) p.400.

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