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The Federal interagency community has developed fifteen all-hazards planning scenarios (the National Planning Scenarios or Scenarios) for use in national, Federal, State, and local homeland security preparedness activities. The Scenarios are planning tools and are representative of the range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters and the related impacts that face our nation. The objective was to develop a minimum number of credible scenarios in order to establish the range of response requirements to facilitate preparedness planning.

Since these Scenarios were compiled to be the minimum number necessary to develop the range of response capabilities and resources, other hazards were inevitably omitted. Examples of other potentially high-impact events include nuclear power plant incidents1, industrial and transportation accidents, and frequently occurring natural disasters. Entities at all levels of government can use the National Planning Scenarios as a reference to help them identify the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of potential major events. Entities are not precluded from developing their own scenarios to supplement the National Planning Scenarios.

These Scenarios reflect a rigorous analytical effort by Federal homeland security experts, with reviews by State and local homeland security representatives. However, it is recognized that refinement and revision over time will be necessary to ensure the Scenarios remain accurate, represent the evolving all-hazards threat picture, and embody the capabilities necessary to respond to domestic incidents.

This document, National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summary, includes executive summaries for the fifteen Scenarios, and the National Planning Scenarios core document contains the main text for all of the Scenarios.

How to Use the National Planning Scenarios:

Capabilities-Based Planning

In seeking to prepare the Nation for terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies, it is impossible to maintain the highest level of preparedness for all possibilities all of the time. Given limited resources, managing the risk posed by major events is imperative. In an atmosphere of changing and evolving threat, it is vital to build flexible capabilities that will enable the Nation, as a whole, to prevent, respond to and recover from a range of major events. To address this challenge, DHS employs a capabilities-based planning process which is a planning process that occurs under uncertainty in order to identify capabilities suitable for a wide range of challenges and circumstances, while working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice. As a first step in the capabilities-based planning process, the Scenarios, while not exhaustive, provide an illustration of the potential threats for which we

1 A severe incident at a nuclear power plant, whether or not it is terrorist-initiated, could result in a release of radioactive materials to the environment with adverse consequences to public health. Scenarios for such severe incidents have not been included in this scenario set because: (1) current Federal regulations from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) mandate robust emergency planning and preparedness for each nuclear plant to include the full range of response organizations; and (2) scenarios for nuclear plants cannot be generically extrapolated to other types of facilities (e.g., chemical plants).

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National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries

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Introduction

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must be prepared. The Scenarios were designed to be broadly applicable; they generally do not specify a geographic location, and the impacts are meant to be scalable for a variety of population and geographic considerations.

HSPD-8 Implementation

The Scenarios will be used in the implementation of HSPD-8, “National Preparedness,” including the development of the National Preparedness Goal and the National Exercise Program. In helping to develop the National Preparedness Goal, the Scenarios provide the foundation for identifying the capabilities across all mission areas and the target levels of those capabilities needed for effective prevention, response and recovery to major events, such as those outlined in the Scenarios. Examination of the Scenarios leads to certain common functions that must be accomplished. The need for response organizations to move quickly and in a coordinated manner and the requirements to quickly treat mass casualties and to assist displaced residents are examples. This commonality implies flexible, adaptive, and robust capabilities to cope with diverse events and hazards.

In addition, the Scenarios will be used as the design basis for exercises in the National Exercise Program. As a common foundation for exercise development, the Scenarios reduce the possibility that agencies exercising the same basic type of event will exercise greatly different consequences which may lead to vastly different capability requirements and preparedness expectations. While not meant to be all-inclusive, the scenarios provide a basic set of common homeland security events and their related impacts that can be employed at the national level or by States and localities. Although certain areas have special concerns – for example, continuity of Government in Washington, DC; viability of financial markets in New York; and trade and commerce in other major cities – the Scenarios have been developed in a way that allows them to be adapted to local conditions. Agencies will not be limited to this set of Scenarios, and they will continue to be able to exercise scenarios that are not specifically included in the planning set. However, when exercising the basic events included in the Scenario set, the Scenarios provide a mutual starting point.

General Considerations for the Scenarios:

Future Development of Prequels –

The goal of the current Scenarios is to flesh out response capabilities and needs, not threat-based prevention activities. However, for the terrorist attack Scenarios, DHS is working with the Federal interagency community to develop detailed prequels to the scenarios, including information on the perpetrator, the “Universal Adversary”, to help further prevention related planning and preparedness efforts. The UA prequels will be included in future iterations of the Scenario set.

Scenario Outline –

Each scenario in the National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries follows the same general outline, which is as follows:

· Scenario General Description

· Planning Considerations

· Geographical Considerations/Description

· Timeline/Event Dynamics

· Mission Areas Activated

· Key Implications

Intelligence Disclaimer –

While the scenarios developed generally reflect possible terrorist capabilities and known tradecraft, neither the Intelligence Community nor the law enforcement community is aware of any credible specific intelligence that indicates that such an attack is being planned, or that the agents or devices in question are in possession of any known terrorist group.

Relative Grouping of Scenarios –

Depending on the ultimate use, various schemes have been used in the past to rank scenarios based on probability, number of casualties, extent of property damage, economic impact, and social disruption. Because the Scenarios in this set were developed to test the full range of response capabilities and resources – and to assist Federal, State, and local governments as well as the private sector in preparedness – they have not been ranked.

Multiple Events –

As there is a possibility that multiple incidents will occur simultaneously or sequentially, organizations should always consider the need to respond to multiple incidents of the same type and multiple incidents of different types, at either the same or other geographic locations, in preparedness planning efforts. These incidents will invariably require the coordination and cooperation of homeland security response organizations across multiple regional, State, and local jurisdictions.

Mission Areas:

The following Mission Areas were used to assist in scoping the response requirements generated by the scenarios.

Prevention/Deterrence – The ability to detect, prevent, preempt, and deter terrorist attacks

and other man-made emergencies

Infrastructure Protection – The ability to protect critical infrastructure from all threats and

hazards

Preparedness – The ability to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise homeland security personnel to perform their assigned missions to nationally accepted standards – this mission area includes public education and

awareness

Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis – The ability to achieve and maintain a common operating picture,

including the ability to detect an incident, determine its impact,

determine its likely evolution and course, classify the incident, and make government notifications

Emergency Management/Response – The ability to direct, control, and coordinate a response; manage

resources; and provide emergency public information – this outcome

includes direction and control through the Incident Command System (ICS), Multiagency Coordination Systems, and Public Information Systems

Hazard Mitigation – The ability to control, collect, and contain a hazard, lesson its effects, and conduct environmental monitoring – mitigation efforts may be implemented before, during, or after an incident

Evacuation/Shelter – The ability to provide initial warnings to the population at large and

at risk; notify people to shelter-in-place or evacuate; provide

evacuation and shelter support; and manage traffic flow and ingress and egress to and from the affected area

Victim Care – The ability to treat victims at the scene; transport patients; treat patients at a medical treatment facility; track patients handle, track, and secure human remains; provide tracking and security of

patients’ possessions and evidence; and manage the worried well

Investigation/Apprehension – The ability to investigate the cause and source of the incident and

identify, apprehend, and prosecute those responsible for terrorist

attacks and other manmade emergencies

Recovery/Remediation – The ability to restore essential services, businesses, and commerce;

cleanup the environment and render the affected area safe;

compensate victims; provide long-term mental health and other services to victims and the public; and restore a sense of well-being in the community

Executive Summary

Scenario General Description:

In this scenario, terrorist members of the Universal Adversary (UA) group plan to assemble a gun-type nuclear device using highly enriched uranium (HEU) stolen from a nuclear facility in another country. The nuclear device components are smuggled into the United States, and the device is assembled near a major metropolitan center. Using a delivery van, terrorists plan to transport the device to the business district of a large city and detonate it.

Planning Considerations:

Geographical Considerations/Description –

This scenario postulates a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device (IND) detonation in a large metropolitan area. The effects of the damage from the blast, thermal radiation, prompt radiation, and the subsequent radioactive fallout have been calculated, based on a detonation in Washington, DC (details are not provided in this executive summary but are presented in the National Planning Scenarios core document in Appendix 1-A). However, the calculation is general enough that most major cities in the United States can be substituted in a relatively straightforward manner. If the incident happened near the U.S. border, there would be a need for cooperation between the two border governments. Additionally, the IND attack may warrant the closure of U.S. borders for some period of time. If the detonation occurs in a coastal city, the fallout plume may be carried out over the water, causing a subsequent reduction in casualties. On the other hand, the surrounding water will likely restrict the zones that are suitable for evacuation. Bridges and tunnels that generally accompany coastal cities will restrict the evacuation, causing delay and an increase in the radioactive dose that evacuees receive. This delay may be substantial and the resulting dose increase may drive a decision to shelter-in-place or evacuate-in-stages.

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Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation – 10-kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device

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Timeline/Event Dynamics –

The response timeline will begin the instant the detonation occurs. Initially, only survivors in the immediate area will conduct rescue and lifesaving activities. Later (minutes to hours), rescue teams will begin to arrive and provide assistance. With the current state of education, training, and equipment, it is likely that many of these responders will subject themselves to very large (perhaps incapacitating or fatal) doses of radiation. As various command posts are set up (which may take hours to days), the response will become more coordinated.

For a nuclear detonation, the actual occurrence of injuries does not stop when the immediate blast effects have subsided. The most critical components of the post-detonation response may not be the lifesaving efforts that assist the victims directly injured by the detonation. Instead, it is likely that the most effective lifesaving activities will be those that address the evacuation or sheltering-in-place decisions for the potential victims in the immediate fallout path, the effective communication of instructions to the affected population, and the efficient decontamination of the evacuated population.

Mission Areas Activated –

Prevention/Deterrence: Law enforcement attempts will be made to prevent development and

detonation of the device. Site boundaries must be protected and

surveyed after the detonation. Officers must respond to any additional threats or looting/theft issues.

Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis: The detonation will be easily recognized as nuclear. Actions

required include dispatching response units; making incident scene

reports; detecting and identifying the source; establishing a perimeter; collecting information; making hazard assessments and predictions; coordinating hospital and urgent care facilities; coordinating County and State response requests; and coordinating monitoring, surveying, and sampling operations.

Emergency Management/Response: Evacuation/shelter-in-place decisions must be made immediately.

Required actions include alerting the public, providing traffic and

access control, protecting at-risk and special populations, supporting requests for assistance, directing and controlling critical infrastructure assets, and directing public information activities. Location and removal of injured and disabled people will be a significant undertaking that will be greatly complicated by the need to keep the radiation dose of the individual workers as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Initial emergency workers will likely receive high doses of radiation and must be trained on how to avoid as much as possible.

Hazard Mitigation: Self-evacuation should occur in the short-term, and the greatest factor impacting the reduction of the effects of the detonation on the general population will remain the speed and appropriateness of the

decisions that are made and the effectiveness of the dissemination of this information (e.g., evacuation/shelter-in-place instructions). Evacuees must be promptly decontaminated.

Evacuation/Shelter: Evacuation and/or sheltering of downwind populations will be required. Actions of the incident-site, local-area, and EOC personnel should include monitoring and decontaminating evacuees, protecting

schools and day care facilities, and providing shelter/reception

facilities.

Victim Care: Tens of thousands will require decontamination and both short-term and long-term treatment. Due to a high number of casualties, the level of care may be significantly lower than normally expected.

When overwhelmed with victims who need care, decisions must be made based on the fact that the sooner the onset of the symptoms, the higher the dose received and the less likely the victim is to survive (even with medical intervention).

Investigation/Apprehension: Attribution activities at the detonation site will rely largely on

scientific forensic techniques and will be provided by specialized

national teams. Actions of incident-site personnel will include site control and criminal investigation. Federal authorities or the military will probably conduct “apprehension” activities.

Recovery/Remediation: Expected radiation levels will limit the total time workers can spend

in the affected area, quickly leading to a shortage of willing,

qualified, and trained workers. The volume of contaminated material that will be removed will overwhelm the national hazardous waste disposal facilities and will severely challenge the Nation’s ability to transport the material. This effort will be the most expensive and time-consuming part of recovery and will likely cost many billions of dollars and take many years.

Key Implications:

A full description of the fatalities and injuries for a nuclear detonation is difficult and complicated. There will be casualties directly associated with the blast, which will cause “translation/tumbling” (the human body being thrown) and subsequent impacts of people and other objects. A nuclear detonation will also produce a great deal of thermal (heat) energy that will cause burns to exposed skin (and eyes). There are two general “categories” of nuclear radiation produced in a detonation. First is the so-called “prompt” nuclear radiation, arbitrarily defined as being emitted within the first minute – it is actually produced as the device detonates or shortly thereafter. For a 10-kiloton blast, this radiation may expose unprotected people within a distance of a few kilometers (a couple of miles) to extremely large gamma ray and/or neutron doses. In addition, a detonation of a nuclear device near the surface of the ground will result in a great deal of fallout (in the form of dirt particles) that is radioactively contaminated. This fallout will settle out of the radioactive cloud over a period of time, mostly in the first weeks. By far, the most dangerously radioactive fallout will be deposited near the detonation site and will happen within the first couple of hours after detonation. Radioactive fallout will exponentially decay with time, but may expose many people to large doses and will certainly contaminate large areas of land for years. Many fatalities and injuries will result from a combination of these various effects.

The largest radiation concerns following an IND incident will be the “prompt” radiation (gamma ray and neutron) and the gamma dose received from the “ground shine” (radioactive particles deposited on the ground) as people are evacuated from the fallout areas. These effects are likely to have significantly larger impacts on the population than internal doses. Internal doses tend to expose the body to relatively small radiation doses over a long period of time, which produces different effects than large radiation doses received during a short period of time.

As the distance from ground zero increases past 20 kilometers (~ 12 miles), the injuries due to acute radiation exposure (i.e., from prompt radiation and the subsequent fallout) will decrease, and lower level contamination, evacuation, and sheltering issues will become the major concern. In general, at distances greater than 250 kilometers (~ 150 miles) from ground zero of a 10- kiloton nuclear detonation, acute health concerns will not be a significant issue. However, contamination of people and the environment will still be a concern.

Years later, there will still be health consequences in the form of increased probabilities of cancers in the exposed population. The number of these cancers will likely run into the thousands and will extract a large human, social, and financial cost.

It is likely that the blast and subsequent fires will destroy all buildings in the immediate area of the detonation. Historically, decontamination of sites involves the removal of all affected material, so most buildings in the immediate downwind fallout path will likely have to be destroyed in the decontamination effort. As the distance from the detonation site increases, the contamination level will decrease. At some distance, the buildings will not have to be destroyed and removed but will still require decontamination of all affected surfaces. This decontamination process will take years and will be extremely expensive. The decontamination will produce a far greater challenge and cost much more than the actual rebuilding of the destroyed structures. Up to approximately 8,000 square kilometers (~ 3,000 square miles) of land will have to undergo varying degrees of decontamination. This effort will last for many years and will cost many billions of dollars to complete.

Service disruption will be extensive in the area near ground zero and in the fallout path for several miles downwind. Services in these areas will not be restored for years because the land affected will not be returned to use until the decontamination is complete and the structures rebuilt. Service disruption will be much less dramatic in areas that are less severely contaminated or not contaminated at all.

The electrical power grid is likely to be damaged by transients produced by the destruction of substations, as well as other power production and distribution installations, and perhaps by the EMP of the detonation. It is likely that the grid damage may cause power outages over wide areas, perhaps over several States, but these outages should be repaired within several days to a couple of weeks. The communication systems in the area will suffer similar damage and will likely be repaired within similar timeframes.

City water mains will likely survive without major damage. The city water supply is unlikely to become substantially contaminated with radiation via water main breaks; however the effects of radioactive and non-radioactive contamination may enter the lines and impact the water supply.

To varying degrees, all Government services will be impacted over some geographical area. The national economy will be significantly impacted. Decontamination, disposal, and replacement of lost infrastructure will cost many billions of dollars. Replacement of lost private property and goods could add billions more to the cost. Additionally, an overall national economic downturn, if not recession, is probable in the wake of the attack.

Note: For more information, there are two appendices – available only in the National Planning Scenarios core document – that provide more detailed information regarding results. Appendix 1-A contains a consequence report for a 10-kiloton nuclear detonation in Washington, DC, that describes a set of possible consequences calculated for a 10-kiloton nuclear blast including its prompt effects (occurring within the first minute) and fallout. Appendix 1-B, Estimated “Realistic” Results, reflects a set of possible results from the 10-kiloton detonation described in this scenario. The results provided in Appendix 1-A are very conservative, and the results provided in Appendix 1-B are less conservative and are intended to be more realistic.

Executive Summary

Scenario General Description:

Planning Considerations:

Geographical Considerations/Description –

Timeline/Event Dynamics –

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Scenario 2: Mass Attack-Active Shooter

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Mission Areas Activated –

Prevention/Deterrence:

Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis:

Emergency Management/Response:

Hazard Mitigation:

Evacuation/Shelter:

Victim Care:

Investigation/Apprehension:

Recovery/Remediation:

Key Implications

References

Reference Page

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