

First published 2006
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 2006 Editorial matter and selection Lam Peng Er; individual chapters
the contributors

Typeset in Times New Roman by
RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Biddles Ltd, King's Lynn, Norfolk

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Japan's Relations with China : Facing a rising power / edited by Lam
Peng Er.

p. cm. – (Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-415-37217-8 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Japan – Foreign
relations – China. 2. China – Foreign relations – Japan. 3. Japan –
Foreign relations – China – Case studies. 4. China – Foreign relations
– Japan – Case studies. I. Lam, Peng Er, 1959– II. Title. III. Series.

DS849.C5J37 2005

327.52051'09'045 -- dc22

2005013137

ISBN10: 0-415-37217-8

ISBN13: 9-78-0-415-37217-6

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4 National mythmaking and the problems of history in Sino-Japanese relations

He Yinan

The Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 was unparalleled in either country's history of external conflicts given its enormous scale, brutality and destructiveness. However, for thirty-seven years after the war's end, the historical interpretation of that war was never a serious political issue between Japan and China. The turning point came in 1982 when a bilateral dispute erupted over Japan's history textbooks. Since then, acrimonious disputes over perspectives of history have remained unabated. Since the 1990s the rise of Chinese economic power has been accompanied by rapidly increasing bilateral economic cooperation, and yet their political relationship is strained periodically by the problems of history.¹

That the legacy of history continues to bedevil Japan-China relations into the twenty-first century defies two conventional wisdoms. First is the hope that time heals all wounds: the more distant the trauma, the more likely that painful memories would fade away. Second is the belief that increasing diplomatic, economic and social interactions between both nations would mitigate historical grievances. Why did China and Japan quarrel over history only from the early 1980s and not immediately after the war?

This chapter addresses the question by introducing the concept of historical mythmaking. It first outlines the key assumptions of historical mythmaking. Next, it examines the origins and evolution of historical myths in Japan and China before the 1980s. Following that is an explanation of how mythmaking patterns in both countries have shifted profoundly since the 1980s leading to disputes about history and casting a shadow over bilateral relations. I argue that the divergence of national memories created by elite historical mythmaking perpetuated and reinforced the problems of history in Japan-China relations. Throughout the postwar period, mythmaking about the history of the war has been prevalent in both countries. But before the 1980s, the mainstream historical narratives of both countries conflicted less with each other. The problems of history were subdued because both governments were willing to put aside emotional issues in order to concentrate on attaining some immediate geo-strategic interests against the backdrop of the Cold War. When the domestic political contexts changed in the early 1980s, flagrantly nationalistic historical myths flourished and the gap

between the two countries' war memories widened, causing serious political disputes over the issue of history. The hope of resolving the problems of history through bilateral ties hinges on joint and honest efforts to "de-mythify" national histories and work towards a shared transnational memory.

The concept of historical mythmaking

National myths are half-truth narratives and beliefs about the origins, identity and purposes of a nation. They form an integral part of the ideological and spiritual foundation for nation and nationalism. Anthony Smith writes: "what gives nationalism its power are myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritage and the way in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias."²

Three types of national myths are particularly harmful to interstate harmony.³ The first is the self-glorification myth that inflates or fabricates claims of national virtue. Besides, past achievements, perceptions of victimization can also fuel self-glorification because they create a "cult of national martyrdom" that bestows upon the nation moral superiority and legitimizes national missions and aspirations.⁴

The second is the self-whitewashing myth which denies or rationalizes past wrongdoing against others. The third is the maligning-others myth which denigrates others as culturally inferior, and accuses them of malicious intent or holds them responsible for past trauma. The political élite can create and nurture these myths in order to meet political needs such as enhancing regime legitimacy, mobilizing mass support or winning factional competition.⁵ If purveyed widely and perpetuated through textbooks and the media, these myths can shape the national collective memory and identity significantly.

Basing mainstream historiography on harmful historical myths often leads to bilateral disputes over historical "facts" and historical "responsibility." Specifically, the two sides disagree on "who bears what kind of responsibility to whom for having done what during the past conflict."⁶ Myths that glorify their own states' beneficent behaviour and fine qualities, deny guilt for committing wrongdoing, and blame others for all the suffering create a chasm between two nations' interpretations of the past. Such profound disagreement over the past undermines the obligation to fulfill one country's historical responsibility to the other. This includes acknowledging and apologizing for past wrongs, offering material compensation, and bringing culpable actors to justice. Unfulfilled obligations will then harden the perpetrator's claim of its own innocence and the victim's demand for payment of historical debts. So mythmaking begets mythmaking and the gap between national memories becomes wider, perpetuating bilateral conflict over the issue of history.

However, mythmaking does not automatically result in historiographic

clashes. It is possible that states, under certain political circumstances, may create national myths that converge with one another; two sides may agree on a false narrative of the past conflict. States may also expediently shelve their disagreement on historical interpretation in favour of more imminent political interests. In both cases, the problems of history became latent but not eliminated. When mythmaking patterns change in a new political environment, dormant problems might well erupt.

To resolve these problems and foster mutual understanding and trust, states should avoid historical mythmaking and build shared memories honestly about their past conflict. H. Richard Niebuhr notes: "where common memory is lacking, where people do not share in the same past, there can be no real community, and where community is to be formed common memory must be created . . . the measure of our unity is the extent of our common memory."⁷ Shared historical memory should first be established through joint research and dialogue between independent historians of the relevant countries. Historical collaboration will not only help to set the record straight, but also bridge the gap between nationally bounded interpretations of history. Collaborative writing will help settle the past between former enemy states and foreclose further disputes over history.

Constructing historical myths in the pre-normalization years

The aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war saw both countries trying to come to grips with their traumatic wartime experiences. In the process of remembering and forgetting their national past, political élites harbouring special political-ideological goals and interests constructed historical myths that tried to glorify or whitewash the actions of one's own nation while blaming others for causing the tragedy. Owing to the structural imperative of the Cold War, the war memories of both countries converged on some interpretations while divergences were intentionally downplayed or side-stepped. Consequently, despite historical mythmaking by both countries and the non-settlement of the historical burden during this period, bilateral conflict over war historiography was by and large absent.

Myths in Japanese war memory

After the war ended, three political goals topped the immediate agenda of the Japanese ruling élite: to consolidate conservative control of state power in the face of the leftist challenge, to mobilize public support for economic recovery, and to justify collaboration with the United States. Reinventing history to boost the prestige and influence of conservative powers became an important political instrument in order to achieve these goals.

Specifically, the conservative élites created three main national myths that embodied a minimalist approach to Japanese war guilt. First was the "myth of the military clique" which held only a small group of military warmongers

responsible for the war of aggression and claimed that the rest of the nation (including the Emperor, the majority of the conservative ruling class, and ordinary Japanese people) were innocent victims of the war. Second was the Western-biased approach that held Japan responsible for opening hostilities against the Western powers but ignored its actions of aggression and its atrocities in Asian countries. Third is the notion of "sacrifice as heroic" that gave imperial soldiers special honour because they sacrificed themselves for the nation. From the end of war until the end of American occupation, Japanese the conservative elite took control of some important institutional tools in order to disseminate these self-glorifying and self-whitewashing myths. They were successful largely because their intention of historical mythmaking coincided with the American strategy of supporting a stable conservative government in Tokyo, first to use it to achieve occupation objectives and, second to ensure that Japan would be an important anti-communist ally in Asia. The occupation authorities promoted a so-called Pacific War View of History (*Taiheiyō Sensōkan*) that emphasized the overwhelming superiority of American military power as the main cause of Japanese defeat and held only the Japanese military clique accountable for the war.⁸ Designed to dismantle the ideological foundation of wartime militarist politics and set the parameters of Japanese public discourse on the history of the war, the Pacific War View of History also satisfied the Japanese conservatives' need to tone down the issue of war responsibility.⁹

First of all, the postwar punishment of individuals bearing responsibility for the war perpetuated the conservative historiography through legal measures. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial of 1946–48 did not indict Emperor Hirohito and ascribed war responsibility to only Tōjō and a few top army officers. Moreover, the Trial focused on Japanese "crimes against peace" in the war with the Western powers while downplaying the atrocities committed mostly in Asian countries.¹⁰ The trial ended after convicting only twenty-five officials of the imperial government and sentencing seven of them to death, all seven being former army officers, except Tōjō. Thereafter, no further trials were carried out and all the other suspects were released immediately.¹¹

In the realm of history education, supported by the occupation strategy of "indirect rule," the Japanese government gradually regained central control of educational content through the textbook certification system and publication of teaching guidelines.¹² As a result, Japanese textbooks in the 1950s and 1960s purveyed "the myth of the military clique" and emphasized Japanese victimhood and pacifism, while accounts of Japanese atrocities in the Asian nations were omitted.¹³ The institutional framework forged by the government to "bring settlement to the postwar" (*sengo shori*) also sustained the conservative historiography. The government took swift action to pay generous compensation to war victims associated with the Japanese military but dragged its feet in providing relief to the general Japanese victims of war, and its compensation to domestic victims by far exceeded its reparations to Asia victims.¹⁴ As for war commemoration, an official ceremony dedicated to

those who had sacrificed their lives for the country has been held annually on 15 August since 1963, and the government gave tacit support to the enshrining of the war dead at the Yasukuni Shrine.¹⁵ Other commemorative activities highlighted Japanese victim consciousness and unique pacifism, such as the museums and memorial activities dedicated to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.¹⁶

Myths in Chinese Communist historiography

In the first few years after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) had to address a politically unstable environment. Domestically, anti-Communist guerrilla forces supported by the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan and the US government still operated in various parts of the mainland; internationally, the United States appeared to be containing China by either direct military invasion or military encirclement in China's surrounding countries. To enhance the legitimacy of the CCP regime and rally mass support against "American imperialism," communist ideologues conducted a propaganda campaign extolling the CCP while blasting the KMT and the United States as the worst enemies of the Chinese nation. Thus, the national identity of the PRC was anchored on the "defining fundamental fissure" between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists (and their American ally), rather than the antagonism between the Chinese and Japanese nations.¹⁷

Chinese historiography praised the CCP as the sole leader of the "Great Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression" and highlighted the heroic PLA (People's Liberation Army) and underground resistance campaigns led by the CCP. It accused the KMT of kowtowing to and actively collaborating with the Japanese aggressors; it branded the United States as a major threat which backed the KMT government in order to suppress Chinese communism. In school textbooks of the 1950s and 60s, the policies of the KMT and CCP were compared and contrasted to drive home the fundamental difference between the traitorous, reactionary KMT and the patriotic, progressive CCP.¹⁸ Besides textbooks, the government built various memorials to the Chinese revolution. The anti-Japanese war was not singled out for special commemoration but treated as one part of China's hundred year struggle against foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary forces that ended with the CCP's victory over the KMT in 1949.

Unlike its outright demonization of the KMT and United States, Chinese official historiography drew a clear line between "the small handful of Japanese militarists" and the ordinary Japanese people, who were considered as the Chinese people's fellow victims of the militarists. This "militarists versus people" theme was consistent with Beijing's diplomatic strategy toward Washington's Western allies. Chinese leaders saw the world as not merely dominated by two superpower blocs, but also riven by contradictions between superpowers and smaller powers. If China could build a revolutionary

United Front with socialist countries and smaller Western powers, it would erode international support for the US-led containment against China. Being the most important ally of the United States in Asia, Japan was treated as an important target of the United Front strategy. Differentiating Japanese militarists and ordinary people in remembrance of the war was deemed useful by the Chinese leaders in order to enhance a favourable impression of Communist China in Japanese society and to encourage Tokyo to abandon the US-Japan security alliance.

Therefore, compared to the vivid, detailed description of the roles played by the KMT and CCP during the war, textbook treatment of Japanese policies and actions was rather cut-and-dried, rarely providing concrete data or examples. It did not mince words in condemning Japan for its long-held ambitions of imperialist expansion. But most textbooks focused their attack not on the Japanese nation as a whole, but on *ridi* (Japanese imperialism), *rijun* (Japanese military), or *rikou* (Japanese invaders). And Chinese official statements throughout this period held that ordinary Japanese people were not responsible for the war because they did not want it and suffered tremendously themselves. Chinese propaganda urged the Japanese people to unite with the Chinese people to oppose Tokyo's alliance with Washington, which might well drag Japan into another disastrous war.¹⁹

Noticeably, China's differentiated approach to the question of war responsibility largely overlapped with the "myth of the military clique" in Japanese conservative historiography. Apart from this convergence, however, Chinese official historiography diverged from the other two Japanese historical myths, the glorious image of the imperial army and the denial of Asian victimization due to Japanese aggression. To avoid engendering national hatred against Japan that would have confused it with China's true archenemies, the KMT and the United States, the Chinese government chose to set aside its disagreement with Japan over history. One thing it did was to suppress domestic truth-telling about Japanese war crimes and Chinese suffering. Textbooks rarely mentioned Japanese atrocities and, when they did, blamed the failure of the KMT defense strategy just as bitterly as their condemnation of Japanese barbarism. Academic research on this topic was suppressed. In the early 1960s, historians at the History Department of Nanjing University had already conducted a comprehensive investigation of the Nanjing Massacre but it remained unpublished until 1979 when it was only printed for internal circulation. When the Chinese Judge at the Tokyo Trial, Mei Ruao, called for more historical research of the Nanjing Massacre in the 1960s, he was accused of "stirring up national hatred and revenge" against the Japanese people.²⁰ Movies on the Sino-Japanese war conspicuously avoided showing Japanese atrocities and the tremendous suffering of Chinese people because otherwise they would be disseminating sentimentalism and capitalist humanitarianism that would "dilute our hatred of imperialism" and "lower our morale" against the enemies.²¹

Externally, Beijing was exceptionally generous when handling historical legacies with Japan. The CCP Central Committee decided in late 1955 on two principles of dealing with war criminals: no single war criminal should be executed or sentenced to life in jail, and verdicts of imprisonment should be limited to a very small number of people.²² By then about 1,000 Japanese war criminals were detained in China, of whom only forty-five were sentenced to prison in the 1956 war criminal trials while all the others were pardoned and quickly repatriated. And all those sentenced war criminals, except one person who died during the prison term, were released by March 1964.²³

Regarding Japanese war reparations, although officially reserving the right to demand war reparations after Chiang Kai-shek renounced it in the 1952 Japan-ROC peace treaty, Beijing never made reparations a precondition or bargaining chip in order to establish good relations with Japan. In 1957, a member of a visiting Japan Socialist Party (JSP) delegation asked Premier Zhou Enlai if the Chinese government could adopt a generous policy on the reparations issue. This incident triggered an internal policy debate over reparations among the top leaders who subsequently decided that China would waive demands for reparations as a gesture of friendship to the Japanese people.²⁴

The 1970s: tacit cover-up of the history issue

Towards the end of the 1960s, Sino-Soviet confrontation escalated while China and the United States sought political rapprochement. Such profound changes in the US-USSR-PRC triangular relations compelled Beijing to forge a strategic alignment with Japan against the common threat from Moscow. Japan also found the alignment beneficial because its confidence in the US defense commitment weakened after President Nixon issued the Nixon Doctrine signifying American retrenchment in Asia. In order to obtain these immediate strategic gains, both China and Japan were willing to paper over differences on historiography.

Symbolic gestures of contrition were not rare in Japanese diplomacy toward China in the 1970s. Even before becoming Prime Minister, Tanaka believed that Japan's apology for the war was the first precondition for a Sino-Japanese diplomatic breakthrough.²⁵ During his visit to Beijing to sign the joint communiqué of diplomatic normalization, he spoke of the "unfortunate period" of bilateral history over which he expressed "deep reflection." Nevertheless, such an apology was too ambiguous to settle the issue of history. In fact, Tanaka did not regard Japan's actions clearly as aggression. At a 1973 Diet session, he said that whether the war with China was aggressive or not had to be left for future evaluation.²⁶ Nor did the Japanese government intend to pay war reparations at the time of normalization.

But Beijing quickly accepted Tokyo's superficial apology and conceded claims for war reparations in exchange for early diplomatic recognition. Shortly before Tanaka's visit to China, Chairman Mao Zedong issued an internal policy instruction that Sino-Japanese normalization would

"contribute to the struggle against the American and Soviet hegemonism, especially the Soviet revisionism," but was also useful for opposing a Japanese militarist revival, liberating Taiwan, and mitigating tensions in Asia.²⁷ So at the first of the three Zhou Enlai-Takeiri Meetings, the preparatory meetings before reaching the joint communiqué, China had already offered to forgo war reparations.²⁸ Disagreements on the history problem did emerge when China took issue with the phrase that Prime Minister Tanaka used at the welcoming banquet, "Japan caused trouble to the Chinese people," when referring to the war. While Zhou managed to have the joint communiqué include a more serious expression than Tanaka's, he pointed out generously right away that both the Chinese and Japanese people were traumatized during the war.²⁹

These goodwill gestures brushed aside the history issue and placed political factors such as the problems of Taiwan and anti-hegemony clause at the centre of normalization negotiations. Strategic interests continued to dictate the subsequent peace treaty negotiations. At the end of the 1970s, the Ōhira administration decided to extend low-interest yen loan programmes to China. While some Chinese perceived Tokyo's economic aid as in lieu of reparations, geo-political and economic interests were the important considerations that prompted Ōhira to extend aid to China.³⁰ Moreover, Tokyo did not make any official statement explicitly linking the aid programmes to Japanese aggression. So the Chinese public tends to believe that Japan has never compensated Chinese war victims at all.

1982 and beyond: the problems of history erupted

Shifting strategic agendas and domestic power struggles since the 1980s led to a reconstructed collective memory in both Japan and China. This process involved not only the ruling élite who shaped ideology but also dissident intellectuals, grass-root social groups and even ordinary people who subverted the standard state historiography with their own recollections and understandings of history. The easing up of Cold War tensions weakened the political incentives for both nations to cap private memories and restrain disputes over history. In Japan, the domestic debate over war history interpretation evolved into a focal point of international attention. In China, the grip of communist ideology on the public memory slackened gradually. More and more Chinese people have come to hold belligerent emotions about the entire Japanese nation rather than just the small military clique. Therefore, bilateral historiographic divergence escalated dramatically and became an outstanding source of bilateral political disputes and tensions.

Re-negotiating Japanese national identity

Contending forces from both the political left and right emerged and challenged the dominance of the old myths in Japanese collective memory. First,

the progressive view of history held by the political left urged the Japanese people to face up to Japan's wartime atrocities in Asia. Although many Japanese had been guilt ridden with regard to China since the end of World War II, it was not until the 1970s that Japanese society saw an outpouring of first-hand testimony of Japanese war crimes in the mass media. Most notably, *Asahi Shimbun* reporter Honda Katsuichi published his book *Chōgoku no Tabi* (The Journey in China) based on his visits to many areas in China where he interviewed surviving Chinese victims of the Japanese army's war crimes.³¹

Honda's writings were soon followed by the publication of other private war memoirs that presented candidly both Japanese suffering and atrocities. By the late 1980s, such activities had evolved into organized truth-telling campaigns spearheaded by citizens' groups that involved testimony by not only Japanese people but also war victims in other Asian countries.³² By highlighting the long neglected Japanese individual and state responsibility to Asian victims and calling for genuine atonement, progressive historians sought to debunk the conservative myths that only a small number of militarists were guilty, that Japan was sorry to Western countries but not Asian countries, and that Japanese soldiers were heroes.

Domestic left-wing actions were reinforced by protests against Japanese conservative historiography by other Asian countries like China and South Korea, bringing the issue of renegotiating the Japanese national identity to a wider international audience. This was how the 1982 textbook controversy broke out. Under concerted domestic and international pressure, the Japanese government took some conciliatory steps in allowing greater coverage of Asian victimization in school education. At the end of the textbook controversy, the Japanese government agreed to revise the problematic textbooks and promised to "pay full heed to this criticism (from Asian countries about descriptions in Japanese textbooks) in promoting friendship and good will with the nearby countries of Asia."³³

The second challenge to the mainstream conservative historiography was the right-wing, neo-nationalist view of history which emerged as a backlash to both the progressive and conservative narratives. Since the 1980s, the right-wingers have fiercely attacked the government for bending to foreign countries so as to include accounts of Japanese war atrocities in history textbooks. They believed that such a "masochistic" view of the nation's history would hurt national pride and vitality. The past two decades also saw many neo-nationalist politicians making Freudian slips which glorified Tokyo's war of aggression in Asia, claiming that Japan fought a good war to liberate the Asian colonies from the West. The right-wingers also advocated a revisionist perspective on the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, calling it victor's justice and arguing that Japan should not be singled out for condemnation because other Western countries had done the same in wars.

As far as the Japanese government is concerned, it did not try to hold back the right-wing influence on historical interpretation. To be sure, Tokyo's confidence on the US defense commitment to Japan had gradually recovered

towards the end of the 1970s when there was a renewal of East-West confrontation. The US-Japan security alliance was particularly strengthened after Prime Minister Nakasone and President Reagan exchanged visits in 1983. With its geo-strategic interests reassured, Tokyo's top priority now was to instill pride in Japan's national identity and seek a leadership role for the nation in international affairs commensurate with its economic power. In support of such internationalist diplomacy, some conservative leaders like Prime Minister Nakasone even propagated the neo-nationalist view of history. In his view, the humiliating defeat in World War II, seven years of foreign occupation, and Japan's long-time status as a junior partner of the United States stripped a strong sense of national purpose away from the post-war generation. So Nakasone advocated "a transformation of national consciousness." He remarked: "The first necessity is a change in our thinking. Having 'caught up,' we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek out a new path for ourselves and open it up ourselves."³⁴

To challenge symbolically the post-war taboos that were supposed to have shackled Japan, Nakasone became the first postwar Japanese leader to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in an official capacity on 15 August 1985, the anniversary of the war's end. Shortly before the visit, Nakasone openly expressed his disagreement with the Tokyo War Crimes Trial which he believed had "spread throughout Japan a self-torturing belief that our country was to blame for everything." He asserted: "whatever happens, the state must continue to exist. It is the people who inevitably either bask in glory or are exposed to disgrace, because they are the people. Casting disgrace aside, advancing forward in the pursuit of glory—this is the essence of the nation and of the people."³⁵

In the 1990s, stung by the lack of international appreciation for its substantial financial contribution to the US-led Gulf War, Tokyo sought to play a more active international role, including deploying its military abroad for UN peacekeeping. Given the political culture of pacifism that emerged in Japan after its defeat in World War II, the conservative élites have glossed over Japan's past militarism to win public support for this new international activism. In this decade, many Japanese cabinet ministers and Diet members visited the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August. Hashimoto Ryūtarō even repeated the Prime Minister's visit in July 1996, a decade after Nakasone's last visit. In recent years, Monbushō (Ministry of Education) has retreated from a limited tolerance of the progressive historiography in school education. Textbooks approved in 2000 markedly deleted or watered down descriptions of military atrocities.³⁶ In 2001, Monbushō approved the textbook compiled by the ultra-nationalist Japan Society for History Textbook Reform. Not surprisingly, China and the two Koreas have vociferously denounced the new neo-nationalist inspired textbook.

Old and new myths in Chinese historiography

The Cold War constraints on Chinese foreign policy waned since the early 1980s. At the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982, Beijing formally endorsed an "independent foreign policy" that sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union, maintain good relations with the United States (but to avoid getting too close to it), and reinvigorate solidarity with the Third World. Although the continuing Soviet threat prevented China from becoming truly independent of US strategic support, at least rhetorically Beijing vowed to disengage from the superpower struggle and focus on domestic economic programmes. Deng Xiaoping and his protégés gave top priority to economic modernization, the success of which is largely hinged on a general strategy of reform and opening up to the West, including Japan. But the reform-oriented strategy confronted resistance from communist old guards. Economically, Party conservatives like Chen Yun questioned the wisdom of encouraging enterprise autonomy, free market mechanisms and private sectors, especially when the negative side effects of reform and openness such as unemployment and inflation, commercialism and higher crime rates materialised.³⁷ In the political domain, conservative old guards within the CCP blamed the reform leaders for a laxity in ideological indoctrination that had given rise to increasingly dangerous intellectual demands for political reforms. They found political allies among senior military leaders, who criticized Deng's military modernization programme for mistakenly emphasizing "pragmatism over ideology" and undermining the role and prestige of the PLA (People's Liberation Army).³⁸

To build a broad support base for the general strategy of reform and openness, Deng compromised with conservative communist leaders, especially on certain political and ideological fronts. Deng's move was not merely a tactical retreat because Deng himself was afraid that too much freedom in the ideological domain would undermine the Party's power. Although Deng accepted international economic interdependence, he also insisted on protecting China from excessive foreign influence, especially if such influence seemed to threaten the ruling foundation of the CCP regime. Thus, the government began to foster a mixture of what Michel Oksenberg calls "confident nationalism" and "assertive nationalism".³⁹ It was more or less confident and affirmative in the economic sphere but remained rigid and assertive in the ideological and cultural spheres where it depicted Western powers as a negative out-group whose interests conflicted with those of the in-group, the Chinese nation.

This "assertive nationalism" was not only useful in appeasing communist hard-liners who opposed open-door economic reform, it could also strengthen national cohesion and divert public attention away from the negative side effects of economic reforms such as social inequality, corruption, and lack of social welfare. With the inexorable decline of ideological appeal following the crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen movement, assertive nationalism now

underpins the communist regime's legitimacy. State propaganda accentuated the differences between China and other nations, trying to rally public support to the socialist state and keep out Western styles of democracy.⁴⁰ Reflecting this transformation in the political environment, official historiography changed considerably. The new historiography no longer centred on the ideological and political conflict between the CCP and KMT. Now that national unification with Taiwan had become a lofty cause, the KMT (which represented the anti-independence constituency in Taiwan) became regarded as an ally rather than enemy of the mainland government. Rather, the "fundamental fissure" defining Chinese national identity now shifted to the conflict between the Chinese and those foreign nations that had invaded and humiliated China in the past, especially Japan.

Since the mid-1980s, the government has implemented patriotic education using the past history of resisting foreign aggression in Chinese schools.⁴¹ The war of resistance against Japan was an indispensable source material of this education campaign. Rather than being buried in the long history of "revolutionary struggle," the war was singled out as China's most important external conflict because "China could claim its first complete victory against foreign invaders."⁴²

While praising the leading role of the CCP in winning the war, the new narrative also eulogized Chiang Kai-shek for not abandoning military resistance and even affirming the common ground of the KMT and CCP in opposing foreign aggressors. Textbooks published according to the 1986 Teaching Guideline for the first time introduced detailed treatment of the conventional military campaigns fought by KMT troops. New war movies also portrayed the Nationalist government in an unprecedentedly positive light. The movie *Xuezhān Taierzhuang* (The Bloody Battle of Taierzhuang) particularly stood out as the first film made in the mainland that broke the taboo on military campaigns by KMT troops against the Japanese invaders.⁴³

The new historiography substituted the "vicious Japanese imperialist aggressors" for the erstwhile KMT villains. Since the late 1980s, textbooks have covered a more comprehensive range of Japanese war crimes than before, providing vivid descriptions, concrete statistics, pictures, and even naming individual villages or persons victimized by Japanese atrocities.⁴⁴ War movies made since the 1980s have also highlighted Japanese brutality and Chinese suffering.⁴⁵

At the same time, war commemoration in China brought Japanese brutality into the centre of national memory. A memorial for victims of the Nanjing Massacre was completed on the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. On the front wall was inscribed "VICTIMS 300,000" (Beijing's official estimate of fatalities) in Chinese, English, and Japanese, and on the inner wall of the museum was written in large character "Never Forget National Humiliation" (*wu wàng guochí*). Many other museums have also been constructed since mid-1980s at the various sites of Japanese atrocities, and almost all of them were designated as sites of patriotic education for school children, the youth, and

soldiers.⁴⁶ Academics also conducted deeper investigations of Japanese atrocities in the mainland. The past two decades have seen an enormous amount of academic works, government documents released, and many international conferences held on the subject of the Nanjing Massacre.⁴⁷

Societal challenges to official myths

The new official focus on Japanese brutality and Chinese misery during the war stimulated victim consciousness among the Chinese public with regard to Japan. Ironically, many ordinary Chinese resented their government's previous cover-up of Japanese atrocities and were disgusted by state propaganda on Sino-Japanese friendship. Although official historiography still distinguishes between Japanese militarists and ordinary Japanese people, Chinese popular understanding of the war has blurred this divide. Best-selling books, Internet chat rooms and other private discussion forums on war history commonly attributed the invasion to the Japanese national character and traditional culture including Emperor-worship and the bellicose samurai spirit of Bushido. Many Chinese now believe that it was not just the small group of militarists but the entire Japanese nation that was brutal, aggressive, and unrepentant.⁴⁸

Besides mass cynicism towards official historiography, an avant-garde cultural élite has also rejected state propaganda. An early controversial film on the war was the internationally acclaimed *Hong Gao Liang* (Red Sorghum) adapted from Mo Yan's novel. Mo based his novel on orally transmitted stories in his hometown. It was indeed a ground-breaking work which successfully conveyed private memories of the war that had been expunged from the official narrative. The main characters in the novel were ordinary men and women living in the countryside who "do not consider themselves to be part of any organized fighting force, nor do they consider themselves to be fighting on the side of righteousness. . . . For these fighters there is no PLA, no Communist Party, no Chairman Mao. They fight to survive, they fight for their land, their native soil (*xiangtu*). To be a hero is to fight the Japanese."⁴⁹

Similar stories in other literary works include the trilogy of novels by You Fengwei⁵⁰ (one of which, *Shengcun* or "Survival" was later made into a movie), and *Guizi Lai Le*, or "Devils at the Doorstep", by a vanguard Chinese actor-director, Jiang Wen.⁵¹ Adding his sarcastic touch, Jiang turned the original story to a farce that mocked the stupidity of those Chinese people who held to the illusion of peaceful negotiation with the Japanese invaders without realizing that the Japanese had no conscience but only greed and barbarism. You and Jiang's works exemplified a society-based intellectual attempt to smash the half century-long national myth about an honourable and triumphant war. Their narratives also challenged the politicized dichotomy between Japanese militarists and the Japanese people, and between Chinese patriots and traitors.

Conclusion

Since the 1980s, the war memories of the two countries have collided. While the Japanese and Chinese governments still maintain the "myth of the military clique", public support in the mainland for this interpretation had crumbled. In the mid-1980s waves of anti-Japanese student demonstrations erupted in Beijing and many big cities. Although also motivated by public resentment against official corruption and social inequality, student demonstrations revealed that genuine anti-Japanese sentiments were deeply entrenched among ordinary Chinese people. In fact, anti-Japan mass demonstrations routinely became a political concern for both governments on anniversaries of the war or at times of bilateral diplomatic disputes, such as during the 1996 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands incident. Also, societal demands for Japanese official restitution, especially grass-roots campaigns demanding Japanese compensation of individual Chinese war victims, have grown since the early 1990s.

When the public was agitated, the government faced a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, Beijing attempted to restrain anti-Japanese popular nationalism in case it jeopardized the key interests in Sino-Japanese cooperation. On the other hand, the government has to maintain a hard-line policy towards Japan lest the public criticize its "soft-kneed" diplomacy and challenge regime legitimacy. For instance, during the Asian Cup soccer tournament held in China in summer 2004, driven by the deep-rooted sense of historical grievances against Japan, Chinese soccer fans aimed raucous booing at the Japanese team. When Tokyo lodged formal protests, Beijing replied that some Japanese media and politicians tried to politicize the issue by overreacting to the behaviour of a small number of radical fans. However, Beijing simultaneously urged Chinese fans to exercise self-restraint and deployed a large number of riot police outside the stadium during the final game between China and Japan.⁵² So far the government has managed to suppress large-scale anti-Japanese mass movements, but doing so will be less and less successful with the bilateral problems of history erupting frequently and anti-Japanese popular nationalism brewing widely in Chinese society.

Both countries have yet to take any significant steps to promote a shared historical memory honestly that would help mitigate the problems of history. Moreover, increased bilateral exchanges did not necessarily forge a common understanding of history between the two neighbours. For example, the education exchanges held between the Chinese Teacher's Union and the Japanese Teacher's Union since the mid-1980s were mostly confined to class visits and teachers' meetings while critique of textbooks focused on Japanese textbooks only.⁵³ The Chinese side insisted on Japanese soul-searching as the solution to bilateral history disputes but declined to reflect on its own distortion of historiography.⁵⁴ Neither did the Japanese government feel obliged to incorporate results of such exchanges by authorizing new school textbooks.

The burden of history will continue to weigh heavily in contemporary Japan-China relations in the twenty-first century. Against the backdrop of China's vibrant economy and Japan's stagnation, the current nationalistic mythmaking patterns in both countries will only aggravate the Japanese perception of the "China threat" and Chinese suspicion of Japan's jealousy and desire to stunt its growth. Without the two states abandoning mythmaking in national historiographies, bilateral relations are unlikely to improve significantly even if Japan were to recover. It takes both vision and commitment to genuine reconciliation for China and Japan to take real steps in researching and writing about their common past in war and peace honestly.

Notes

- 1 Students of Sino-Japanese relations regularly cite the history factor as a serious point of concern in the 1980s and 1990s. See Allen S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 5 (1996); Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6 (1998); Michael Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996).
- 2 Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.9.
- 3 In conceptualizing historical mythmaking, I draw on a number of studies that link hyper-nationalism (poisoned by mythologized national history) and war and conflict. They are Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991), pp.23-4, idem, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), David A. Mendeloff, *Truth-Telling and Mythmaking in Post-Soviet Russia: Pernicious Historical Ideas, Mass Education, and Interests Conflict*, Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001), Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000); Ben Kiernan, "Myth, nationalism and genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001).
- 4 On Japanese victim consciousness, see James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of peace and national identity in postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); Kiichi Fujiwara, "Imagining the past, remembering the future," *Social Science Japan* (April 1995), pp.3-5. On Chinese victimhood and nationalism, see Neil Renwick and Qing Cao, "China's Political Discourse towards the 21st Century: Victimhood, identity, and political power," *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter 1999).
- 5 Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War", pp.30-2.
- 6 On war responsibilities, by progressive Japanese intellectuals, see Ishida Takeshi, *Kioku to Bōkyaku no Seijigaku* [The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting] (Tokyo: Akiishi Shoten, 2000), p.165; Ienaga Saburō, *Sensō Sekinin* [War Responsibility] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), pp.29-35; Mochida Yukio, "'Sensō Sekinin' Sengo Sekinin' Mondai no Suiiki [The Water Area of the Question of 'War Responsibility, Postwar Responsibility']," in Awaya Kentarō, *Sensō Sekinin & Sengo Sekinin* [War Responsibility and Postwar Responsibility] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1999).
- 7 Quoted in Donald W. Shriver Jr., "The Long Road to Reconciliation: Some Moral Stepping Stones," in Robert L. Rothstein, *After the Peace: resistance and reconciliation* (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1999), p.210.

- 8 For a succinct summary of the content of the Pacific War View of History propagated by the American occupation authorities, see Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan* [The Japanese Views of the War] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1998), pp.31–3.
- 9 It is worth pointing out that the above-mentioned national myths created by conservative élites were not entirely coherent and mutually supportive. The first two aspects of mythmaking fit the Pacific War View of History nicely because they acknowledged the aggressive nature of the war. But the last point inherently contradicted the American indoctrination: if Japan had launched an unjust war, those who fought the war on behalf of Japan could be anything but glorious. Nevertheless, the occupation authorities tolerated the notion of a glorious imperial army told to Japanese domestic audiences, as long as Japanese government acknowledged externally that the war was wrong.
- 10 Yasuaki Ōnuma, *Tōkyō Saiban kara Sengo Sekinin no Shisō e* [From the Tokyo Trial to Postwar Thoughts on War Responsibility] (Tokyo: Toshito, 1993); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), Chapter 15.
- 11 All those sentenced to imprisonment were also set free with the agreement of the Western allies after the San Francisco Peace Treaty. George L. Hicks, *Japan's War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment?* (Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield: Ashgate, 1997), p.13.
- 12 See John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1979), pp.348–56.
- 13 Robert Fish, “From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages: The Pacific War as Seen in Postwar Japanese High School History Textbooks,” in Edward Beauchamp (ed.), *Education in Modern Japan: Old Voices, New Voices* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, forthcoming, 2005); Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, pp.80–3.
- 14 Tanaka Hiroshi, “Nihon no Sengo Seikinin to Ajia: Sengo Hoshō to Rekishi Ninshiki [Japan's Postwar Responsibility and Asia: Postwar Compensation and Historical Consciousness],” in Mitani Taichirō (et al. eds), *Ajia no Reisen to Tatsu shokuminchi ka* [The Cold War in Asia and Decolonization] (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1993); idem. “Why Is Asia Demanding Postwar Compensation Now?” *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Sciences*, No. 28 (1996), p.9; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, Chapter 6.
- 15 Tanaka Nobumasa et al., *Izoku to Sengo* [War Bereaved Families and Postwar] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); Ōe Shinobu, *Yasukuni Jinja* [The Yasukuni Shrine] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986); Itagaki Tadashi, *Yasukuni Kōshiki Sanpai no Sōkatsu* [An Overview of Official Worship of Yasukuni Shrine] (Tokyo: Tenden Sha, 2000).
- 16 See Ubuki Satoru, *Heiwa Kinen Shikiten no Ayumi* [The Steps of Peace Memorial Ceremony] (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, 1992); Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
- 17 Rana Mitter, “Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987–1997,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 161 (2000), p.283.
- 18 The compilation of Chinese textbooks is subject to strictly centralized control by the government. The government exercises direct authority over the educational content through Curricular Standards, or called Teaching Guidelines, which are drafted by the State Education Commission (SEC) and updated every few years. The SEC then entrusts the People's Education Press to organize textbook authors to prepare official textbooks based on the Teaching Guidelines. The discussion in this section is based on an examination of the four editions of official textbooks for both junior high and high schools produced in the 1950s and 60s.
- 19 See, for example, *People's Daily* Editorial on “Japan Being Dragged to the Path of Militarist Revival”, 27 November 1959; *People's Daily* Editorial on No More Manchuria Incident in Asia, 18 September 1961; *People's Daily* Editorial on “The Living Ambition of the Japanese Militarism”, 19 February 1965. See Tian Huan, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji* [Documents on Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1996–1997), Vol. 1, pp.469–72, pp.590–3, pp.780–2.
- 20 Yang Daqing, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rapes of Nanjing,” *American Historical Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 1999), p.858.
- 21 Chen Bo, “Genggao di Juqi Mao Zedong Sixiang Hongqi, Wei Chuangzuo Gengduo Genghao de Geming Junshi Ticao Yinbian er Nuli [Lifting Higher the Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thoughts, Striving for producing More and Better Revolutionary Military Movies],” *Dianying Yishu* (The Film Arts), August 1960, pp.5–6.
- 22 Jin Yuan, *Qiyuan: Yige Zhanfan Guanli Suozhang de Huiyi* [Unusual Destiny: Reminiscences of A Director of War Criminal Prison] (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1999), Chapter 25.
- 23 Jin, *Qiyuan*, Chapters 25–27; Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 1, pp.716–18.
- 24 The decision-making process of Chinese reparation policy from late 1950s to the 1960s is recollected by Zhang Xiangshan, an important member of Zhou Enlai's inner group on Japan policy, in his anthology published in 1998. See Zhang Xiangshan, *Zhongri Guanxi: Guankui yu Jianzheng* [Sino-Japanese Relations: My Humble Opinions and Testimonies] (Beijing: Dandai Shijie Press, 1998), pp.66–70.
- 25 Tanaka made this point in his speech at a Diet hearing in March 1972. See Hayasaka Shigezō, *Seijika Tanaka Kakuei* [The Politician Tanaka Kakuei] (Tokyo: Shueisha, 1999), pp.400–1.
- 26 Yoshida, *Nihonjin no Sensōkan*, pp.138–40.
- 27 Mao Zedong, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao* [The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the Nation] (Beijing: Central Documents Publishing Company, 1987–1990), Vol. 13, p.316.
- 28 The minutes of these meetings, the Zhou-Takeiri Memo, are included in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxian Ji*, Vol. 2, pp.89–95.
- 29 Wang Taiping (ed.), *Xingzhongguo Waijiao Wushinian* [Fifty Years of Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999), pp.443–5.
- 30 Tanaka Akihiko, *Nitchū Kankei 1945–1990* [Sino-Japanese Relations: 1945–1990] (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1991), pp.110–13.
- 31 Honda Katsuichi, *Chūgoku no Tabi* [The Journey in China] (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1994).
- 32 A noted example was the Osaka-based Association of Remembering and Sympathizing with the War Victims in the Asian Pacific Region, which holds public hearings on Japanese war atrocities throughout Asia and has put out twelve volumes of these hearing records from 1988 to 1999. See The Association on Remembering War Victims (ed.), “The Voice of Asia” book series (Tokyo: Toho Shuppan).
- 33 Caroline Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A case study in political decision-making* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.113–15.
- 34 Quoted from Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and purpose in a new era* (Washington, AEI Press, 1992), pp.90–1.
- 35 Nakasone believed that once the apology was made, no further actions of historical settlement were necessary. As he said in a newspaper interview in 1997, “we have been apologizing, and the act of contrition has been performed. It is all over and done with.” For quotes of Nakasone's statements, see Wakamiya Yoshibumi, *Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the political right delayed Japan's coming*

- to terms with its history of aggression in Asia (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998), p.171, p.182.
- 36 *Asahi Shimbun*, 10 September 2000. Many of these changes were caused by the so-called "voluntary restraint" of textbook publishers during the textbook screening process, which was actually the result of political coercion by Monbushō and the Office of the Prime Minister. See Tawara Yoshifumi, "Junior High School History Textbooks: Whither 'Comfort Women' and the 'Nanking Massacre'," *Sekai* (November 2000).
 - 37 On the intense rivalry between different strategies of economic reform in the 1980s, see Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp.77–90. Among those most dissatisfied with the economic reform in the 1980s were many urban workers, who felt that reforms had generated highly unequal opportunities for them, reflected in official corruption, striking income disparity between workers in private and foreign-owned firms and those in state-owned enterprises, and the rise of job insecurity after companies began to introduce layoff as a management means. Another widely complained issue was inflation. The inflation rate jumped from 2.8 per cent per year during 1978–84 to 12 per cent during 1985–88. Although their living standard considerably improved since the reform began, urban wage earners saw the price hikes eating away a big part of their nominal income increase. A 1986 national sample shows that official corruption and inflation were the two issues that citizens were most upset about. See Andrew G. Walder, "Urban Industrial Workers: Some Observations on the 1980s," in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, *State and Society in China: The consequences of reform* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
 - 38 Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*, pp.72–7.
 - 39 Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1987).
 - 40 It is worth noting that during the 1980s and 1990s the Chinese government did not intend to provoke anti-West xenophobia among the general public, which would undermine its economic programs and even jeopardize the political stability. The agenda of the official discourse of nationalism is primarily domestic. Nevertheless, in order to foster the official nationalism the Chinese ruling élites resorted to the construction of pernicious national myths, including those that highlighted the conflict between the Chinese and Japanese nations. As illustrated later in this article, such a new pattern of historical mythmaking inadvertently stimulated an outburst of anti-Japanese popular nationalism. On the distinction between official nationalism and popular nationalism in China, see Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations* (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 5, "The Official Discourse of Nationalism: Patriotism and the Constraints of Nationalism."
 - 41 For an overview of the government policy on patriotic education in Chinese schools since the 1980s, see Pu Weizhong et al., *Aiguo Zhuyi Yu Minzu Jingshen* [Patriotism and National Spirit] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000), pp.75–84.
 - 42 See "Jiang Zeming's Speech at the Veterans' Symposium Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, August 25, 1995," in Tian, *Zhanhou Zhongguo Guanxi Wenxianji*, Vol. 2, p.939.
 - 43 Yang Guangyuan and Zhai Junjie, "'Xuezhan Taierzhuang' Daoyan Yishu Zhongjie [Summary of Director Art on Xuezhan Taierzhuang]," *Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian* [China Film Yearbook] (Beijing: China State Administration of Radio and Television, 1987), pp.3–12 to 3–16.
 - 44 See the junior high school textbook 9 *Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu 4 Nianzhi Chuji Zhongxue*

- Jiaokeshu Zhongguo Lishi* (Beijing: People's Education Press, 1992), Vol. 4; the high school textbook *Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Jindai Xiandai Shi* (Beijing: People's Education Press, 1992), Vol. 2.
- 45 For example, a number of films made in this period were particularly dedicated to the Nanjing Massacre, including the documentary film *Nanjing Datusha* [Nanjing Massacre] released in August 1982, and feature films *Tucheng Xuezheng* [Bloody Testimony of Massacre in A Captured City] and *Nanjing Datusha* (Nanjing Massacre) produced in 1987 and 1995 respectively. The Chinese government also partially subsidized the production of a horror film that was shown to the public around 1988, *Hei Taiyang 731* [Men Behind the Sun], on the germ warfare conducted by the secret Japanese Unit 731 in mainland China during the war.
 - 46 See Yang Daqing, "Contested History: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar Japan and China," in Fujitani Takashi (et al. eds), *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific Wars* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001); "Yizhi, Jiuzhi, Jinian Sheshi [Ruins, Old Sites, and Memorial Facilities], in Zhang Shaosi (et al. eds), *Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Dacidian* [The Dictionary of Chinese War of Resistance against Japan] (Wuhan: Wuhan Chubanshe, 1995).
 - 47 For examples, see The Committee for Compiling Historical Records of the Nanjing Massacre, *Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao* [Historical Narratives on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1987); Zhu Chenshan (ed.), *Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Xincunzhe Zhengyanji* [Testimonies of the Survivors of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China] (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1994); Chinese Second National Archives in Nanjing (ed.), *Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Dangan* [Archives on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China], (Nanjing: Jiansu Guji Chubanshe, 1997); Chen Anji (ed.), *Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shi Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui Lunwenji* [The Anthology of the International Symposium on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China], (Hefei: Anhui Daxue Chubanshe, 1998).
 - 48 For some examples of best-selling books with a sweeping anti-Japanese view, see Song Qiang et al., *Zhongguo haishi nengshuo bu* [China That Still Can Say No] (Beijing: Chinese Wenlian Press, October 1996); Sun Keqin, *Ezhi Zhongguo* [Containing China] (China Yanshi Press, 1996); Xiao Jiwen, *Riben: Yige Bukeng Fuzui de Guojia* [Japan: A Country that Refuses to Admit Its Crimes] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1998).
 - 49 Peter Li, "War and Modernity in Chinese Military Fiction," *Society*, Vol. 34, No. 5 (July/August 1997), p.86.
 - 50 For You Fengwei's war trilogy, see Xu Peifan, *Cong "Shengcun" dao "Guizi Laile"* [From Novel "Survival" to Film "Devils at the Doorstep"] (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 1999).
 - 51 A movie made in 1999 that won the Grand Prix at the Cannes Film Festival, "Devils at the Doorstep" has been banned in China ever since it was completed.
 - 52 "Chinese riot after Japan victory," *BBC News*, 7 August 2004; "In Soccer Loss, a Glimpse of China's Rising Ire at Japan," *The New York Times*, 9 August 2004.
 - 53 Hitaka Rokurō, *Nihon to Chūgoku: Wakamono-tachi no Rekishi Ninshiki* [Japan and China: The Historical Views of the Youth] (Tokyo: Nasunokisha, 1995); Wang Hongzhi, "Zhongguo Lishi Jiaokeshu de Jiaoliu [Sino-Japanese History Textbook Exchange]," *Lishi Jiaoxue*, No. 1 (1999).
 - 54 Amako Satoshi, *Nitchū Kōryū no Shihanseki* [A Quarter Century of Japan-China Interaction] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinpōsha, 1998), pp.122–3.

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