Challenging the Myths of Conflict

Nationalism_and_Ethnic_Conflict_in_Nepal_Identitie..._----_7_In_pursuit_of_recognition_regionalism_Madhesi_identity_and_the_Madhe....pdf

Home >English homework help >Challenging the Myths of Conflict

7 In pursuit of recognition

Regionalism, Madhesi identity and the Madhes Andolan

Bandita Sijapati

Introduction

The People’s Movement of April 2006 and the events that followed in its wake are likely to be recognized as watershed events in Nepal’s political history. Not only was King Gyanendra forced to abdicate executive power and hand the nation’s sovereignty back to the people, the country also saw an end to the decade-long Maoist conflict. But despite the high expectations and optimism engendered by these developments, the unlikelihood of any major transfor- mation in the socio-political environment soon became clear when the poli- tical parties did all they could to wean the Maoists away from violence but shied away from addressing the concerns of Nepal’s marginalized groups who had been equal partners in the movement for the restoration of democracy.

Matters came to a head, literally, on 16 January 2007, when the Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum (MJF), translated into English as the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF), led protests in Nepal’s southern belt, particularly the Central and Eastern Tarai, against the Interim Constitution promulgated a day earlier for not addressing questions of federalism and realignment of electoral constituencies. This was the beginning of the Madhes Andolan, or the Madhesi Movement, which lasted for 21 days,1 during which 30 people were killed and some 800 wounded while government offices and private property were widely vandalized.2

In this paper, I seek to understand the Madhes Andolan by drawing upon literature on ethnic conflict and social movements. First, I provide a chronological overview of the Madhes Andolan, followed by a brief discussion on what con- stitutes Madhes and the Tarai. Second, based on existing literature on ethnic conflict, I locate the grievances of Madhesis within the broader structure of the extractive and exclusionary nature of the Nepali state. In particular, I argue that the paradoxical position adopted by the Nepali state vis-à-vis the Tarai, especially in its desire to exploit the region while refraining from integrating it into the national polity, created the conditions for Madhesis to harbour feelings of relative deprivation. This, I point out, propelled Madhesis to make claims of social justice and egalitarian redistribution as part of their discourse of the “politics of recognition.” Third, I employ theoretical insights from social movement

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nepal : Identities and Mobilization After 1990, edited by Mahendra Lawoti, and Susan I. Hangen, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unt/detail.action?docID=1024644. Created from unt on 2021-03-08 08:35:15.

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

literature to understand the circumstances, conditions and tactics that made it possible for Madhesis to emerge from being a disadvantaged and disenchanted group to mobilize collectively to advance Madhesi rights and interests.

Chronological overview of the Madhes Andolan

The trigger for the Madhes Andolan of 2007 was the draft Interim Constitu- tion prepared jointly by the ruling coalition of seven national parties (called the Seven-Party Alliance, or the SPA) and the CPN (Maoist), and made public in December 2006. Madhesi organizations and Madhesi members of parliaments (MPs) cutting across party boundaries objected to the draft, claiming that it failed to address the two major concerns of the Madhesis: federalism and delineation of electoral constituencies proportional to population for the planned Constituent Assembly elections.3

On 16 January 2007, during a protest organized by the Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum (MJF), which was then a loose network of Madhesi political and civil society leaders, 28 MJF leaders were arrested for burning copies of the Interim Constitution that had been adopted the day before. Subsequent to the arrest of its leaders, on 19 January 2007, MJF activists in Lahan in Siraha district of eastern Nepal organized a protest program during which an MJF activist was shot dead by a Maoist cadre. In the absence of any government action against the killer, and only a perfunctory apology from the Maoist leader- ship, Madhesi activists launched demonstrations and protests against both the government and the Maoists. The government responded with curfews and increased police presence, instigating the MJF, on 25 January 2007, to announce indefinite protests until the Interim Constitution was amended. Thus began what came to be known as the Madhes Andolan (Pathak 2007; ICG 2007).

The intensity of the Madhes Andolan and the support it generated from different segments of the Madhesi population caught most, including the Madhesi leaders themselves, by surprise. The protests, which were initially limited to Lahan and Janakpur, the main towns in the contiguous Tarai dis- tricts of Siraha and Dhanusha, quickly spread to all the major urban centers in the central and eastern Tarai. Nearly two weeks into the disturbances, on 31 January 2007, the Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala, invited protestors for talks while also promising to increase the number of electoral constituencies in the Tarai and affirming his commitment to federalism (ICG 2007).

However, Madhesi protesters rejected the prime minister’s conciliatory moves on the grounds that his address did not “empathize” with their movement nor give due recognition to Madhesi demands as “rights that were due to them.” As the agitation continued, Koirala was compelled to make a second attempt to reach out a week later, i.e., 8 February 2007, when he made sig- nificant concessions, including endorsement of a federal system of governance by amending the Interim Constitution, increase in the number of electoral districts in the Tarai, a system of proportional representation in the electoral system, and inclusion of marginalized groups in the state apparatus.4

146 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Following the prime minister’s second address, the MJF suspended protests but cautiously put forward some conditions for talks: resignation of the home minister; action against those responsible for the killings in the Tarai; and setting up of a judicial commission to examine the government’s reaction during the Madhes Andolan.5 Having placated the Madhesis, however, the government ignored the MJF and continued to back the home minister,6

delayed the formation of a judicial commission and did not even take up seemingly non-political issues like providing compensation to victims and their families. Needless to say, this was a missed opportunity whereby the government not only went back on its promises but also failed to adopt any confidence-building measure that could have provided grounds for a mean- ingful dialogue between the Madhesi leadership and the government. Ten days later, i.e., on 19 February, the MJF began fresh protests.7

In the meantime, Madhesi MPs of the mainstream political parties also continued to pressure the government to amend the Interim Constitution and the Nepal Sadbhavana Party8 (Anandi Devi), or NSP(A),9 even threatened to walk out of the SPA. With mounting pressure from all sides, on 9 March 2007, the government amended the constitution, created an Electoral Con- stituency Delimitation Commission (ECDC) and provided guarantees to convert Nepal from a unitary state to a federal one.10

Meanwhile, tensions between the MJF and the Maoists continued to rise in the months of February and March 2007 and culminated in the Gaur Mas- sacre of 21 March in Rautahat district in which more than two dozen Maoist cadres were killed by MJF cadres (OHCHR 2007).11 The Gaur incident has been described as signifying Madhesi attempts to deter the “emerging trend of left dominance in national politics,” but the casual attitude adopted by the law-enforcement agencies and by the Nepali state despite clear signs of vio- lence erupting there is also noteworthy (Hachhethu 2007).12 The government’s subsequent decision to ban MJF protest rallies in the Tarai set the MJF up for further confrontation with the government.

The stalemate was finally broken after a meeting between the Minister for Peace and Reconstruction, Ram Chandra Poudel, and MJF leader Upendra Yadav on 10 May 2007. In subsequent negotiations, the MJF presented a list of 26 demands to the government, ranging from issues such as compensation to the victims of the Madhes Andolan to regional autonomy in the Tarai (Gautam 2008a). However, the 22-point agreement eventually signed between the government and the MJF on 30 August 2007 dealt with the original demands of the MJF only perfunctorily, and this, as I will discuss below, has been a continuing source of Madhesi disenchantment with both the MJF and the government.13

Tarai/Madhesi politics in perspective

Before moving on to the specifics of the sources of Madhesi grievances and demands articulated during the Madhes Andolan, a brief discussion on

In pursuit of recognition 147

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Madhes and the Tarai in terms of its population and its location vis-à-vis other marginalized groups of Nepal would be in order.

Tarai, Madhes and Madhesi

The people in the Tarai, a narrow strip of territory that extends east to west in the southern part of the country along the Nepal-India border, can be divided into three broad categories: 1) non-pahadi (i.e. non-hill origin) caste groups, commonly referred to as “Madhesis”; 2) non-caste groups like the Tharus who claim to be indigenous to the Tarai; and 3) hill migrants belonging to both caste and non-caste groups referred to as pahadis who generally migrated from the hills to the Tarai in the second half of the twentieth century (Gaige 2009; Guneratne 2009).

For the purposes of the paper, I reserve the term “Madhesi” to refer to the caste-based groups in the Tarai who are of non-pahadi origin, while terms like “Tarai inhabitants,” “people of Tarai-origin,” and “Tarai dwellers” are used to refer to the non-pahadi population groups that include Madhesis, indigenous nationalities from the Tarai, known as Tarai Janajatis, and Tarai Muslims. While using these terms, I am acutely aware of the distinct political meanings that the terms “Tarai” and “Madhes” now have come to signify. In general, Madhesi political leaders and activists insist on a singular “Madhesi” identity to denote all the non-pahadi residents of the Tarai.14 They claim that the internal divisions in the Tarai were “manufactured” by the Panchayat regime to divide Tarai dwellers (Jha 2007). However, while many non-caste Tarai groups in the eastern Tarai are comfortable with being included within the broader category of Madhesis, many of their brethren, especially Tharus in the far-western Tarai, reject the Madhesi label and instead claim an independent identity as the original inhabitants of the Tarai. Similarly, some segments of the Muslim population in the Tarai have also contested being identified as “Madhesi” and have recently begun to assert their separate identity as a religious minority, comprising Muslims from the hills as well as the Tarai.15

Madhesis vis-à-vis other marginalized groups

Scholars seeking to understand nationalism and ethnic conflict generally base their analyses of the underlying causes of conflict along four different axes: structural; political; economic/social; and cultural/perceptual (Brown 2001). These factors, as I will describe in the next section, emerge as one of the major sources of Madhesi grievances. However, many of these underlying causes of the Madhesi movement are not peculiar to the Madhes/Tarai alone. Instead, because of the Nepali state’s continued domination by upper-caste hill elites, an “ethnicization of the state” has been underway since the restoration of democracy in 1990 with hitherto marginalized groups time and again mobilizing to articulate their demands against the centralized and

148 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

exclusionary nature of the Nepali state (Lawoti 2005; Hangen 2007; Pfaff- Czarnecka 1997; Gellner 2007).

Insofar as there are multiple ethnic groupings seeking egalitarian repre- sentation and recognition in the Nepali state apparatus, I find it useful to broadly define Madhesis as an ethno-political group that swings between being what can be called “ethnonationalists” and “communal contenders” (Harff and Gurr 2004: 19–29). That is, as “ethnonationalists,” Madhesis constitute an identity group that is regionally concentrated in Nepal’s south- ern belt, the Tarai, and clamors for greater autonomy, and as “communal contenders,” they are one of the many identity groups seeking a greater share of political power in the existing political establishment.

It is beyond the scope of the paper to analyze the precise reasons why the Madhesi movement, an unexpected development that took the country by surprise, was successful while those launched by other groups, mainly indi- genous nationalities, i.e. Janajatis, and Dalits, have been less so.16 But the lurking question that any attempt to understand the Madhesi movement has to address is the issue of how the Madhes Andolan took the momentous turn it did in January 2007 despite the common experience of being one of the many aggrieved groups in Nepal and structurally located in a similarly dis- advantaged position. To arrive at an answer, I find it useful to complement the existing understanding on the underlying causes of ethnic conflict with the literature on the “politics of recognition” and “relative deprivation.”

Situating the broad contours of Madhesi demands and grievances

Drawing on the Hegelian idea, proponents of the “politics of recognition” argument point out that identity is constructed through a dialogical process that hinges on mutual recognition and reciprocal relations (Taylor 1994; Moore 2001; Young 1990; Fraser and Honneth 2003). Taylor (1994: 25), for instance, argues that our “identities are shaped partly by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others,” such that “a person, or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confusing or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.”

In the case of the Madhesis, too, the historical progression of their ethnic discontent shows that the Madhes Andolan did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it is a manifestation of historical marginalization and alienation experienced by Madhesis at the hands of a succession of ruling elites of Nepal. The policy of systematically exploiting the Tarai, while withholding integration of the region and its people on an equal footing, produced deep- seated resentment, a sense of “relative deprivation,”17 and “misrecognition” of Madhesis. The feeling of relative deprivation and the resultant absence of recognition of Madhesis as Nepali citizens and their exclusion from national life, I argue, was one of the main factors that precipitated the Madhes Andolan.

In pursuit of recognition 149

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Early rulers and the Tarai/Madhes

In seeking to understand the rise of identity-based movements in Nepal, it is not uncommon to locate ethnic grievances to the formation of the Nepali nation- state. In particular, many scholars and commentators have contested the notion of “unification” that led to the founding of Nepal in the mid-eighteenth cen- tury, claiming that it was an out-and-out military conquest as opposed to any genuine effort to “unify” (Pandey 2007; Lawoti 2010). The manner in which the Tarai region was annexed is particularly telling. In the early 1770s, when Prithvi Narayan Shah turned his attention to the conquest of eastern Nepal, his instructions to one of his generals in the field clearly specified the value he placed on the Tarai: “It is no use giving up revenue-yielding better land [Tarai] and retaining the land of inferior quality [hill] … Do not give up the plains” (Pradhan 2009: 122). This set in place the practice of using the Tarai as a source of revenue and distributing it to the ruler’s family, courtiers and military officers in return for their support (Gaige 2009; Regmi 1988; Adhikari, Dev, and Dhungana 2005; Shrestha 1990).

This legacy of treating the Tarai like an “internal colony,” that is, appro- priating resources from the region without considering it as a constituent element of the Nepali nation-state, continued into the Rana regime. In parti- cular, the Rana rulers viewed the Tarai as their “personal estate,” whereby they successfully appropriated and allocated much of the revenue collected from the export of timber and conversion of forests into agricultural land into their personal coffers or used it to dispense patronage.18 Like their Shah pre- decessors, over the long term, the Ranas also refrained from developing the region for the fear that it would attract the attention of the British, and also invite revolutionary ideas from neighboring India (Gaige 2009; Whelpton 2005; Regmi 1976, 1988; Shrestha 1990; Guneratne 2002).

The result of the Rana rulers’ refusal to treat the Tarai inhabitants as anything but revenue-generating subjects, as Guneratne (2009: xviii–xix) poignantly observes, meant that “while the hill people had had centuries to work out their relations with each other, and a hill culture had developed as a consequence of the centralizing activities of the state … the Tarai people remained alien to those who held power in Kathmandu.” The limited centralizing activities of the state also meant that the Tarai population remained highly fragmented, undermining any possibility of a collective identity from taking firm root.

Panchayat rule and emergence of regionalism

The Panchayat regime that succeeded the Ranas, with a brief quasi-democratic interlude from 1951 to 1960, was presented with two major challenges. First, following India’s independence, it had become imperative for Nepal to forge a national identity and a sense of nationalism distinguishing it from its neigh- bour; and, second, to garner support for its autocratic regime, especially against the “democratic forces” backed by India, the monarchy also had to

150 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

embark on a process of modernization and development (Guneratne 2009; Joshi and Rose 1966; Gaige 2009). Of the two types of state policies that Brass (1974) points out are available to multiethnic states during the process of nation-building, namely, integrative and pluralistic, the Panchayat regime adopted the “integrative” option.

In particular, under the aegis of “Ek desh, ek bhesh, ek bhasa” (“one country, one dress, one language”), the Panchayat rulers systematically sought to homogenize its diverse groups while casting ethnic affiliations as being counterproductive to modernization and development (Hangen 2007). How- ever, the pillars of nationalism, conceived as consisting of the monarchy, Hinduism, and the Nepali language, were not “neutral” either. Instead, they were derived exclusively from the culture and norms of upper-caste Hindus from the hills. Such an imposition meant that not only did the Panchayat regime fail to recognize the distinctiveness of Madhesis and the Tarai region but, to use Taylor’s terms, “misrecognized” them by privileging traditions and norms they could not completely identify with.19

The aggressive promotion of Nepali nationalism by the Panchayat govern- ment was coupled with two policies that further marginalized Madhesis and created deep resentment amongst them against the state. First, facilitated by the malaria eradication programs of the 1950s, the government pursued a policy of “pahadization” of the Tarai through various government-sponsored resettlement programs that encouraged large-scale hill migration to the Tarai (Gaige 2009; Guneratne 2002).20 While these resettlement programs were rationalized by the Panchayat government as an economic need, the political motivation behind the implementation of such policies is undeniable. In particular, the rulers considered it imperative to curtail the possibility of India using the Tarai, and the Madhesis, who the rulers perceived as being sympathetic towards India, to gain influence and even take over Nepal (Gaige 2009; Shrestha 1990; Guneratne 2002, 2009; Krauskopff 2000). Whatever the motive, the successful outcome of this policy of “pahadization” of the Tarai through resettlement programs is evident in the five-fold increase21 in the proportion of the pahadi population in the Tarai between 1951 and 2001, with pahadis even constituting the majority in seven of the 20 Tarai districts by 2001 (Shah 2006).22

In addition to land resettlement, the other policies that disenfranchised, and hence denied recognition to Madhesis as Nepali citizens were the various citizenship laws promulgated by the Panchayat system.23 When citizenship laws were being reframed by the Panchayat regime, the Nepali Congress, then in exile, was operating mostly in the Tarai and the border areas of India. The royal government viewed the Nepali Congress and India as being the main threats to the territorial integrity of the Nepali state as well as to its own rule, and hence included provisions that made it difficult for people of Tarai origin to obtain citizenship. In particular, there were two stipulations in the 1964 Citizenship Act that discriminated against Tarai-dwellers: the requirement to speak and write the national language of Nepal, i.e., Nepali; and the require- ment of having resided in Nepal for not less than a period of two years in the case

In pursuit of recognition 151

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

of a person of “Nepalese origin,” and for not less than a period of twelve years in the case of a “person other than of Nepalese origin” (Gaige 2009:91–107).

In terms of the former, the requirement of fluency in spoken and written Nepali placed Madhesis at a distinct disadvantage because regional languages, namely, Maithali, Bhojpuri and Awadhi, were and continue to be much more widely spoken in the Tarai than is Nepali.24 Similarly, while the precise meanings of “Nepali-origin” was not specified in the clause on descent, “Nepali-origin” was generally interpreted to mean “pahadi-origin” in con- trast to “non-Nepali origin,” which was used to identify Madhesis, who were largely perceived as being Indians.25 The differential criterion of descent was carried over to the 1990 constitution. As a result, until 2007, of the nearly 3.5 million people estimated to be without citizenship certificates, the majority of them were from the Tarai (Gurung and Paulsen 2007). This tactic of denying citizenship to Madhesis, which had been initially designed to exclude them from the political process, created fertile ground for Madhesi resentment.

Status of Madhesis after 1990

The restoration of democracy in 1990 generated optimism and, barring a few changes, mainly the transition from an authoritarian regime to a multiparty system, there was very little in terms of a genuine shift to an inclusive democracy (Hangen 2007; Hoftun et al. 1999; Lawoti 2005; Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999; Whelpton 1997; Gellner 2007). Insofar as the two upper-caste groups, namely, Bahuns and Chhetris, continued to dominate Nepal’s political land- scape, Lawoti (2008) has described the democratic years in Nepal as a form of “exclusionary democratization.”

In this regard, it is but obvious that Madhesis are not the only social group to have been under-represented in Nepal’s polity, until the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections that is (see Table 7.1).26

However, the relatively low representation of Madhesis needs to be under- stood in the context of many political parties, especially the Nepali Congress, having used the Tarai as entry points to launch various political struggles as well as to maintain a presence in Nepal while in exile in India. While this heightened political activity in the region should have resulted in a higher number of Madhesis in Nepal’s political apparatus, the fact is otherwise, leading to a sense of relative deprivation amongst Madhesis.27

In addition to low representation in the parliament, Madhesis were also under-represented in other state institutions as well (see Table 7.2). In parti- cular, the representation of Madhesis in the security forces, mainly the mili- tary, has been almost non-existent compared to other excluded groups like the hill Janajatis. This is mainly due to the Nepali elites’ perception that Madhesis are not loyal to the Nepali state and would act in the interests of India along with the commonly held belief that Madhesis are “less martial.”28

This low representation of Madhesis and other groups in the state appara- tus, especially in the years after the restoration of democracy in 1990, brings

152 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Table 7.1 Representation of various caste/ethnic groups in national legislature (prior to the Constituent Assembly)

Caste/Ethnic Groups

National Legislature (a) Total Population (b)

Proportional Share Index (PSI) (Ratio of a/b)

1959 1981 1991 1999 2007 2001 1999 2007

Bahuns 27.5 13.3 38.1 39.6 32.8 12.7 3.12 2.58 Chhetri/Thakuri 31.2 36.3 18.2 17.3 17.9 17.3 1.0 1.04 Newar 3.7 8.1 8.3 8.3 7.3 5.5 1.51 1.33 Sub Total 62.4 57.7 64.6 65.2 58.0 35.5 1.84 1.64 Tarai1 22 18.5 19.6 17.4 21.9 33 0.53 0.66 Hill Social Groups2

15.6 23 14.7 14.7 20.1 29 0.51 0.69

Others – 0.7 1.2 1.5 – 2.5 0.6 – Sub Total 37.6 42.2 35.5 33.6 42.0 64.5 0.52 0.65 Total 100 99.9 100.1 98.8 100.0 100

Source: Adapted from Yadav 2007. Notes 1 Includes Madhesi caste groups, Tarai Janajatis and Muslims. 2 Includes Hill Janajatis and Hill Dalits.

Table 7.2 Representation of various caste/ethnic groups in different sectors 2005

Upper-caste hill Bahun/ Chhetri

Janajati Madhesi Dalit Newar Others Total

Sector Public 82 7 9 2 14 0 114 Political 93 20 11 1 14 0 139 Private 21 3 30 0 42 0 96 Civil Society 94 9 18 1 19 0 141 Total 290 39 68 4 89 0 490 Percentage (a) 59.2 7.9 13.9 0.8 18.2 0.0 100.0 Percentage of Total Population

30.9 23.1 31.5 7.9 5.5 1.2 100.0

PSI (Ratio of a/b) 1.9 0.3 0.4 0.1 3.3 0.0 6.0

Source: Neupane 2005; UNDP 2009. Note: Public sector includes Supreme Court, constitutional bodies, cabinet of minis- ters, members of lower and upper houses of parliament; political sector includes lea- ders of political parties; private sector includes individuals holding leadership positions in Federation of Nepali Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) and Chamber of Commerce; civil society includes heads of different professional groups and media houses.

In pursuit of recognition 153

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

to mind Giddens’ (1998: 71) argument about the need for “democratization of democracy,” particularly the notion that the “crisis of democracy comes from its not being democratic enough,” especially in the face of “the demand for individual autonomy and the emergence of more reflexive citizenry.”

The exclusion of Madhesis is, however, not limited to political life. On the con- trary, Madhesi resentment has also found fertile ground in the socio-economic disparity between Madhesis and the rest of the population. More specifically, with the exception of the small group of Tarai Brahman/Rajputs,29 other Tarai populations fare lower in terms of socio-economic indicators, particularly compared to Bahuns and Chhetris from the hills (see Table 7.3). The low levels of socio-economic indicators amongst people from the Tarai needs to be understood in light of the fact that such disparity persists despite the fact that the Tarai is considered to be Nepal’s breadbasket and industrial heartland, having more than 60 percent of the total agricultural land and contributing over two thirds of Nepal’s GDP (Shah 2006).30 But, despite its economic potential, the government has paid only scant attention to developing the region, resulting once again to a sense of relative deprivation amongst Madhesis.

Table 7.3 Human development by major case and ethnicity, Nepal 2006

Per Capita Income in US$

Human Development Index

Life Expectancy Index

Educational Attainment

Income Index

All Bahun/Chhetri 2,027 0.552 0.633 0.522 0.5022 Hill Bahun 2,395 0.612 0.718 0.586 0.5301 Hill Rajput 1,736 0.514 0.594 0.471 0.4763 Tarai/Madhesi Brahman/Chhetri

2,333 0.625 0.648 0.701 0.5257

Tarai/Madhesi Other Castes

1,119 0.450 0.616 0.330 0.4031

All Dalits 977 0.424 0.601 0.292 0.3804 Hill Dalits 1,099 0.449 0.598 0.349 0.4001 Tarai/Madhesi Dalits 743 0.383 0.604 0.209 0.3348 Newar 3,097 0.616 0.717 0.558 0.5730 All Indigenous Groups Excluding

Newar

1,405 0.494 0.632 0.410 0.4410

Hill/Mountain Indigenous Groups

1,490 0.507 0.644 0.427 0.4509

Tarai Indigenous Groups

1,224 0.470 0.609 0.383 0.4180

Muslim 890 0.401 0.600 0.238 0.3648 All Hill/Moutain Indigenous Groups

1,846 0.531 0.635 0.471 0.4866

All Tarai/Madhesi Groups

1,094 0.448 0.610 0.335 0.3993

Other (Unidentified) 2,227 0.559 0.689 0.469 0.5180 All Nepalis 1,597 0.509 0.645 0.421 0.4624

Source: Adapted from UNDP 2009.

154 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Notwithstanding the dismal representation as well the low socio-economic status of Madhesis, it is not uncommon to find Madhesi activists and intel- lectuals often making the claim that Madhesis need “recognition and not just representation.” In many regards, as I have presented in this section, this is the consequence of the social distance that the various ruling elites of Nepal have created between Madhesis and the state, causing Madhesis to assert that a simple redressal of Madhesi grievances such as by increasing their repre- sentation in the state apparatus or implementing development-related policies and projects in the Tarai is not enough. In their discourse of seeking recog- nition, Madhesis, to use Habermas (1998: 215), seek autonomy and want to see themselves as “authors” of legislative processes, not simply “addressees of the law.” This form of regionalism is not uncommon either because, as noted by scholars on ethnic conflict, when cultural differences coincide with differences in development between the core and the periphery, in this case, between Kathmandu and the Tarai, cultural and economic exploitations become mutually reinforcing, leading to ethnic regionalism (Ragin 1977; Newman 1996; Gellner 2006).

While the factors described in this section help in understanding how the strong sense of collective deprivation experienced by Madhesis helped form the basis of their mobilization as an identity group, these by themselves do not provide answers to questions about the conditions, events and mechanisms that precipitated and sustained the Madhes Andolan of 2007. By drawing on the social movement paradigm in the next section, I will turn my discussion to the specifics of the Madhes Andolan.

Dissecting the Madhes Andolan: ethnic mobilization or spontaneous movement?

Social movement scholars generally base their analyses of collective mobili- zation by considering three main factors: 1) the structure of political oppor- tunities and constraints; 2) mobilizing structures, both formal and informal; and 3) framing, strategies and tactics for mobilization. While this body of literature has seldom considered ethnic or nationalist movements,31 I do believe that the framework presented in this literature is useful in helping understand the Madhesi movement which was, in fact, a form of collective action. More specifically, by using social movement literature, I will examine the catalytic factors or political opportunities that sparked off the Madhes Andolan; the resources available to Madhesi activists that allowed them to recruit participants, especially by making identity-based claims; and the stra- tegies and tactics that the leaders and supporters used to make demands on the Nepali state as well as mobilize Madhesi participation.

Political opportunities: promises, agreements and deceit

According to scholars of identity-based movements, collective protests, including ethnic conflicts, often erupt during periods of regime change and or

In pursuit of recognition 155

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

shifts in political alliances since such periods are often followed by a break- down of authority, thus creating favourable conditions and opportunities for activism (Barany 2002; Brown 2001; Brown et al. 2001; Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994; McAdam et al. 2001). In the case of the Madhesi movement, there were three different shifts in political structures that created opportunities for Madhesi activism.

First, the sidelining of the King and the subsequent entry of the Maoists into the political mainstream created a political vacuum and a period of uncertainty, leading Madhesi and other groups to use it as an opportunity to acquire new rights and resources, ensure greater accommodation in the new political dispensation, and seek political avenues for greater participation in national life.

Second, as early as 2003, different political parties, in an effort to garner support against King Gyanendra’s “creeping coup” that had begun in 2002, had affirmed their commitment to working towards the upliftment of different marginalized groups in Nepal, underscoring the legitimacy of identity-based claims and their impending accommodation in the new state structure.32 But, after their return to power in 2006, the ruling parties showed interest only in continuing talks with the Maoists and seemed little interested in fulfilling the demands and grievances of different marginalized groups. In fact, as men- tioned earlier, federalism, which had emerged as one of the major demands of all Madhesi groups, including the armed outfits that had emerged by then, was ignored in the Interim Constitution, causing a great deal of disenchant- ment amongst Madhesis. This disjuncture between promises of increased accommodation, combined with the evidently lackadaisical attitude of the government, hinted at the possibility of permanent subordination and exclu- sion in national life, leading Madhesi and other groups to press for a change in the status quo.

Third, the recent memory of the Nepalgunj33 riots provided an opportunity for Madhesis to mobilize participation by using rhetoric aimed against pahadi domination. Following a strike called for by one of the constituents of the SPA, the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandi Devi), NSP(A), on 26 December 2006, to protest against the Interim Constitution, the government had tried to use force to suppress it. Instead, it had sparked off communal riots between Madhesis and pahadis. In particular, pahadis had attacked Muslim/Madhesi- owned shops in the heart of Nepalgunj while the police watched from the sidelines. Civil society at large, including human rights groups, remained quite mute while the national media provided less than full coverage of the Nepalgunj incident. But the violence wrought by pahadis and seemingly “permitted” by the pahadi police was captured on video and widely circulated on DVDs throughout the Tarai (Gautam 2008b). This incident not only deepened Madhesi antagonism against pahadis and the pahadi-dominated state appa- ratus, but also helped Madhesi activists and leaders garner support by using anti-pahadi rhetoric.

156 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Resources for mobilization

In addition to grievances and opportunities for collective action, social movement theorists also claim that resources and mobilizing structures, both formal and informal, are necessary to get the movement off the ground and sustain it over a period of time. Commonly included as resources are financial assets, social and human capital, and organizations (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Diani and McAdam 2003; McAdam 1999; McAdam and Snow 2010). In the case of the Madhes Andolan, too, visible organizations like the MJF that called for the uprising and organized some of the demon- strations as well as others less so such as the Tarai Samrakshan Samiti (TSS), played a significant role during the Andolan. In fact, it is often argued that while the MJF has come to represent the face of the Madhes Andolan, the movement itself was sustained by local Madhesi organizations and groups like the TSS that organized demonstrations, coordinated different protests and demonstrations, mobilized people, provided support to the injured, and so on (ICG 2007). However, of the resources available and generated during the Madhes Andolan, the most instrumental ones that eventually led to its success were not those that were strategically mobilized or generated during the course of the movement but which were simply circumstantial such as the long history of Madhesi activism and plurality of organizations, demographic factors, ascriptive nature of Madhesi identity, and strategic significance of the region.

History of activism and plurality of organizations

Existing literature on identity movement suggests that if an ethnic community has had prior experience in political activism it would not only bolster its ethnic identity but also allow opportunities for learning from its mobilizational his- tory and accordingly increase its chances of successful mobilization (Barany 2002: 283). In the Tarai, the discriminatory policies of the Nepali state have almost always been followed by forms of resistance, leading to a “tradition of regionalism” in the area (Hoftun et al. 1999: 331). To cite an example, sub- sequent to the anti-Rana revolt, an identity-based political party, the Tarai Congress was established to press for greater representation of Madhesis in national life. In many regards, the current Madhesi demands can be traced to the Tarai Congress’s own charter of demands: 1) establishment of an auton- omous Tarai state; 2) recognition of Hindi as a national language; and 3) adequate employment of Madhesis in the Nepali civil service (Joshi and Rose 1966: 138). In a manner reminiscent of the present-day state of affairs, the government at that time had rebuffed any kind of overture and instead adopted antagonistic policies such as the October 1957 announcement requiring schools in the Tarai to use Nepali as the medium of instruction in order to qua- lify for government aid and recognition. That had resulted in a series of clashes and protests between “nationalists” and leaders of the Tarai Congress.34

In pursuit of recognition 157

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Another political actor that has played a significant role in the Tarai poli- tics is the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP), which, since its establishment as proto-party in 1983 and formally as a political party after 1990, had served as the only Tarai regional group for more than a decade. Since its inception, the NSP has been demanding recognition of Hindi as an official language, a federal system of government, reservations for Madhesis, a liberal policy on citizenship, and a separate Madhesi battalion in the army. However, the NSP was neither very successful electorally nor was it able to articulate Madhesi interests in any effective manner primarily because it was regarded as an elite-based party.35

The cause of Madhesis was further championed by the CPN (Maoist), which established the Madhesi Rashtriya Mukti Morcha (MRMM), or Madhesi National Liberation Front, in 2000 as part of its larger strategy to promote the rights of marginalized groups as well as expand its support base among them. Notwithstanding the political calculation of the Maoists in setting up a regional front in the Madhes, the establishment of the MRMM is sig- nificant at least on two accounts. First, most of the demands put forth by the MRMM such as proportional representation of Madhesis in state institu- tions; guaranteed protection of cultural rights of the Madhesis; full distribution of citizenship certificates to Madhesis; and reinvestment of tax revenues from the Madhes in the region itself, formed the basis for the demands raised during the Madhes Andolan.36 Second, the CPN (Maoist) is the first national party to systematically raise the concerns of the Madhes even though parties such as the Nepali Congress have always had a strong presence in the Tarai.

In addition to these “mainstream” Madhesi groups and organizations, there has also been a proliferation of dozens of armed groups in the Madhes.37 Of these Tarai/Madhes armed groups, almost 60 of them are “political” organi- zations that have geared their activities against pahadis, mainly pahadi chau- vinism, with more than 20 even endorsing violence to achieve secession of the Tarai-Madhes from Nepal (Pathak and Uprety 2009).38

In the context of the Madhes Andolan, the most important force that has emerged is the Madhesi Janaahikar Forum, MJF, particularly because it spearheaded the movement in 2007.39 Most of the demands raised by the MJF, such as declaration of a federal democratic republic with an undivided, autonomous Madhes; a proportional electoral system; citizenship certificates for all Madhesis, etc., are also ones that had been advocated by other groups earlier.40 This raises the puzzling question how and why the MJF was able to launch a movement never witnessed before in Nepal despite the history of regionalism and presence of multiple organizations. The answer, I argue, rests on a combination of many factors, including as discussed above, the nature of political opportunities that became available in 2007 but which were not present earlier, the support that MJF enjoyed among Yadavs, who are numerically and politically dominant in the Tarai,41 and, as I will discuss in the next section, the tactics and strategies the MJF adopted for mobilization, namely, a call for an “uprising” that reflected the will of the Madhesis.

158 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

In many regards, the Madhesi movement is not unique in that most ethnic movements are composed of multiple organizations with distinctive goals, ideol- ogies and leadership orientations. Whether or not this “plurality of organizations” hinders or facilitates an identity-based movement is a difficult question (Esman 1994). However, in the context of the Madhesi movement of 2007, it is safe to assume that the presence of multiple groups clamoring for repre- sentation and recognition of Madhesis was essential in lending legitimacy to Madhesi concerns. Further, it also made it easier to garner support as reflec- ted in the mass outpouring witnessed during the Madhes Andolan wherein inter-party differences became less important than the call for Madhesi solidarity.

Demographic factors

In terms of demographics, there are two factors that aided the Madhes Andolan to distinguish it from other ethnic movements in Nepal. First, is the sheer number of Madhesis and their strong geographic concentration in central and eastern Tarai. The 10 districts from Parsa in the central Tarai to Morang in the eastern Tarai that were most affected during the Madhes Andolan is home to more than a quarter of Nepal’s population, with Madhesis comprising nearly 80 percent within that population.42 The influence that such a critical mass can have in any uprising is unmatched. In fact, political commentator C. K. Lal (2003) had warned quite early, “In a society where nearly half the popu- lation is nursing grievances against the establishment in silence, this is a potential flashpoint of even more ominous proportions than the Maoist war.”

Second is the fact that the land resettlement programs initiated by the Panchayat regime did not occur uniformly and neither did they always lead to pahadi domination (Gaige 2009; Shrestha 1990; Guneratne 2002; Regmi 1976, 1988; Krauskopff 2000). Instead, as pointed out by Gaige (2009), in areas where large numbers of upper- and business-caste groups from the Tarai were already dominant, pahadis were unsuccessful in penetrating and gaining influence (see also Krauskopff and Meyer 2000; McDonaugh 1997). In such areas, namely, the central and eastern Tarai, the Yadavs and Tharu landlords have a history of competing with pahadis not only as rural landlords but also for political power at the local and national level (Hatlebakk 2007).

In many regards, the Madhes Andolan 2007 is a continuation of this his- toric tension between the pahadis and Madhesi caste groups such as Yadavs, who are numerically, politically and economically very powerful. But, notably, during the movement, this localized power, mainly the feudatory relationships between the Yadav and Tharu landlords and other Madhesis, made it rela- tively easy for Madhesi leaders, comprising mostly the Yadavs, to mobilize the rural population (Hatlebakk 2007).

Ascriptive identities and mobilization

As scholars on ethnicity and nationalism have argued, “the ascriptive nature of ethnicity has crucial implications that lead to a more accommodating

In pursuit of recognition 159

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

recruitment environment” (Eck 2009: 372; Jervis 1978; Gates 2002; Tsutsui 2004; Rothschild 1981; Hechter 1987; Hechter et al. 1982). The main advantage of ethnic identities in aiding collective action, Rothschild (1981: 60) argues, is that unlike other “emblems of personal identity, … it [has the] capacity to arouse and to engage the most intense, deep, and private emotional sentiments.”

When the MJF announced indefinite strikes in the Tarai, “ethnic belonging” amongst the Madhesis could easily be established because of deep-rooted grievances, discontent and sense of deprivation that Madhesis had been cul- tivating, both against the pahadis and the pahadi-dominated state. This form of collective experience of marginalization and alienation served as social capital so that when the MJF called for an uprising, it immediately resonated with the Madhesi populace and the outpouring of popular sentiment caught everyone off guard, including the MJF leadership (see Horowitz 1985; Lichbach 1995; Gurr 1970 on the issue of social capital and collective action). To cite an example, a district-level leader admitted:

We didn’t know how to handle the movement. We had four to six leaders and about 20 to 30 activists in each district, who had to suddenly deal with thousands of protestors. We had neither the organization nor the leadership to channel this energy for the benefit of our party or to keep in touch with people who might have turned into longterm supporters.

(ICG 2007: 13)

Thus, because of personal and collective grievances among the Madhesis, the MJF was able to garner support with very little, if any, effort.

The Madhes Andolan is also not different from other ethnic protests against discrimination in that it provoked reactive violence from the state, not to mention counter-movements by competing groups. In particular, as the Madhes Andolan took off, the Maoists dubbed it a “conspiracy” hatched by the palace and associated “reactionaries”, while pahadis in the Eastern-Central Tarai set up the Chure Bhawar Ekta Samaj to protect pahadi interests against increasing Madhesi mobilization. As Eck (2009) and others have pointed out, such reactive violence often leads to a situation where even if ethnic leaders or ethnic group organizations are unable to mobilize participation and recruit- ment, individuals may nevertheless choose to enlist in the movement simply because of their shared identities (see also Gates 2002; Hechter et al. 1982; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Tsutsui 2004; Jervis 1978; Kriesi 1995; Koopmans 1995; Olzak and Olivier 1998; Olson 1971; Tilly 1978). This is because the fact that a protest group is mobilized along ethnic lines means that the entire community becomes a target of counter movements and government repression.

During the Madhes Andolan, too, the government refused to recognize Madhesi demands and grievances as genuine for a long time, and hesitated in engaging with Madhesi leaders and activists as equal partners. Instead, the disregard of their grievances and demands amidst the continued policy to treat the protests in the Tarai as a law-and-order problem and suppress it

160 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

using force and intimidation only drew in more Madhesis into the Andolan. As the security forces arbitrarily took action against anyone who was visibly a Madhesi on the grounds that they were “Forum” people, i.e., MJF affiliates, led to a hardening of identity boundaries and provoked more Madhesis into joining in the protests. Instead of impeding the ability of Madhesis to mobi- lize because of the risk of participation – for the consequences of the violence was significant (as indicated by the death toll of approximately 30 individuals and injuries to 800) – the fact that government repression was viewed as being illegitimate served as a resource for Madhesi activists to galvanize further support and recruit more people for mass action.

Strategic location of the Tarai

Finally, perhaps the most important resource available to Madhesis, not by design but which nevertheless is lacking in the case of other marginalized groups in Nepal, is the strategic location and economic significance of the Tarai. With the region contributing to over two-thirds of Nepal’s GDP, approximately 67 percent of manufacturing production, 22 out of 29 transit and customs posts being situated along the Nepal-India border, and the only highway from east to west cutting across the Tarai region, the economic dependence of the Nepali state on the Tarai is undeniable. While it is difficult to arrive at precise figures of the economic losses the government might have suffered during the 21 days of protests in the Tarai, it was clear that the incessant closure of the highway and Tarai towns was slowly drawing the whole country to a standstill. The enormous pressure on the government to address the issue quickly was evident in the prime minister himself addressing the agitators publicly in two consecutive weeks.

Framing of Madhesi demands and issues: the role of the MJF

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the Madhes Andolan did not happen in a vacuum. Instead, there were a number of factors, including the presence of multiple groups seeking to address Madhesi grievances and issues, and a multitude of agreements signed between different political entities con- firming the commitment to addressing the grievances of marginalized groups, including the Madhesis. Having said that, a central conundrum that remains is, how did the MJF manage to embody Madhesi aspirations, especially when there were many different political organizations that had for long been championing the cause of Madhesis and Madhes? One simple answer often offered is that the leaders of the MJF simply did not realize or envision that their movement would take the kind of momentous turn it did (ICG 2007).

While there is a significant basis for this line of argument, especially since the MJF was a loose structure at the time of the Andolan, the particular strategies, mobilizational tactics, and framing of issues that the MJF adopted during the Andolan are also significant. This is because, as Snow and Benford

In pursuit of recognition 161

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

(1988) argue, how movement organizers frame the goals of the movement is important since the collective meanings and beliefs that the framing process provides, help “mobilize potential adherents and constituents, … garner bystander support, … [and] demobilize antagonists.”

In the case of the Madhes Andolan, as pointed out by Gautam (2008), the reason the MJF was able to garner so much support in 2007 was simply because of its mobilizational tactics: it called for an “uprising” of the Madhesi masses against pahadi domination by using slogans such as “down with hill administration” and “Pahadis out of Madhes.” This form of contention, i.e., a call for a mass uprising, was different from the tactics adopted by other groups like the NSP which had limited their oppositional activities to a handful of leaders within the party structure. In fact, even during the course of the movement, the MJF made use of the same slogans and demands as had been done by different groups like the Tarai Congress, the NSP, and even the CPN (Maoist). To cite one example, popular slogans like Maago Madhes, Jaago Madhes (Ask for Madhes, Rise Madhes), or Samagra Madhes, Ek Pradesh (All of Madhes, One Region) are slogans that were used in the past by NSP, MRMM and the Tarai Congress. While the framing of issues through repetition might have given historical continuity to Madhesi concerns and highlighted in particular the unchanged conditions for Madhesis over the decades, the credit for effectively representing Madhesi issues and demands goes to the MJF, primarily because it led an uprising at the right time.

But the issue of tactics and framing of movement goals also begs the question why the MJF chose a “violent,” or rather a confrontational, strategy as opposed to legislative means to make demands? At many levels, violent tactics have emerged as an important method for contentious political action in Nepal (Lawoti 2007). In fact, not even considering the overtly violent Maoist insurgency, even the supposedly more peaceful ones like the people’s movements of 1990 and 2006 had employed violent tactics such as burning of tyres, vandalizing public property, using force to enforce shutdowns, etc., making violence a significant part of Nepal’s contentious repertoire (see Tilly 1992 for more information on repertoires of contention). In this respect, the Madhes Andolan was not any different in adopting violent strategies. Second, in many regards, Madhesis were also drawn into violence particularly because of the way in which government and other political interests responded to their grievances, that is, by unleashing violence as already discussed earlier (the harbinger were episodes such as the riots that took place in Nepalgunj and the killing of the MJF activist in Lahan). The cycle of violence and counter-violence instigated by the security forces thus automatically led Madhesis to embrace confrontation as one of their movement tactics.

Conclusion

The analysis presented here shows the truth in the much-quoted statement, “MJF or Upendra [the leader of the Madhes Andolan] did not create Lahan

162 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

[the epicentre of Madhes Andolan] but Lahan created Upendra” (ICG 2007: 13). In many respects, when the Madhes Andolan took off, it did not enjoy “mobilizational prerequisites” such as leadership, organizational capacities and financial resources considered important for an ethnic movement (Barany 2002). On the contrary, as has been argued in this paper, the Madhes Andolan was propelled mostly because of deep-seated grievances, relative deprivation, and a sense of “misrecognition” that had been simmering for long amongst Madhesis, especially due to the persistence of extractive, centralized and exclusionary institutions and policies that have characterized the Nepali state vis-à-vis the Tarai. This is, however, not to say that the Madhesi movement appeared out of nowhere; instead, it indicates that in an environment where ethnic grievances are at their apex, and there is a history of some form of articulation of those grievances, political openings have the potential to fuel an ethnic movement.

In terms of the impact of the Madhes Andolan, the movement itself and subsequently the 22-point agreement signed between the MJF and the gov- ernment have been criticized on different accounts. Some have termed the agreement as being a personal pact between Upendra Yadav and the govern- ment, or a wish-list of the MJF, others have pointed to the nature of agree- ment itself, including its failure to include the demands and grievances of other Madhesi groups, particularly the armed outfits, and its deficiencies over issues like proportional representation, regional autonomy for Madhesis, etc. Despite these criticisms and shortcomings, I would argue that the Madhes Andolan should not and cannot be judged exclusively by the stipulations contained in the agreement. The Madhes Andolan is pivotal because it sig- nifies a momentous turning point in Nepal’s political history, not to mention Madhesi politics. Because the Madhes Andolan served as a powerful expres- sion of Madhesi identity, both in terms of its demands for egalitarian repre- sentation and for recognition, it has placed Madhesis as a significant force to reckon with. No longer will the Nepali state be able to ignore Madhesi con- cerns by claiming that these have been incited by India, without jeopardizing its own territorial integrity, and no longer will the Madhesis feel that they have to endure in silence, to use Taylor’s (1994) words, the “demeaning and contemptible picture of themselves” that the pahadi-dominated state has been portraying to them.

Instead, the challenge lies in how Madhesi leaders and the broader com- munity itself deal with the gains of the Madhes Andolan. Of particular importance is the fact that in asserting dignity and recognition and recovery from exclusion through demands for egalitarian representation, identity boundaries have hardened. Not only has this elicited a reactive ethnicity that is inflammatory in its anti-pahadi rhetoric but perhaps, more importantly, it has lead to inter-elite cleavages amongst Madhesis. With Madhesi leaders from different political interests making moral claims over leadership of the Tarai/Madhes and its inhabitants, there is an impending threat of diluting the Madhesi voice and solidarity. By the same token, while the Madhes Andolan

In pursuit of recognition 163

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

was to a large extent successful in its struggle for inclusion and recognition vis-à-vis pahadis and the pahadi-dominated state, issues of intra-group differ- ences, particularly in terms of caste and class hierarchies that plague Madhesi solidarity, cannot be ignored either.

For the Nepali state, the Madhes Andolan can only be an indication of what is to come if there are no transformative changes in its institutions, national narratives and state ideologies. As Nepal undergoes a new phase in its history, especially with the Constituent Assembly charged with the task of writing a “people’s constitution,” there is an urgent need than ever before to frame a national ideology and narrative grounded on the idea of multiple histories and multiple narratives founded on the ideals of inclusion, equality, recognition and popular sovereignty.

Notes 1 Even though protests and strikes were at their peak for 21 days, the 22-point agreement signed between the MJF and the government, which effectively brought the Madhes Andolan to an end, did not happen until 30 August 2007.

2 The number of people killed remains unclear. Human rights organizations speak of 27, while Madhesi leaders say 40 or 42. Most Madhesis accept the higher figures, although around a dozen deaths may have resulted from clashes between Madhesi activists themselves rather than police firing.

3 Article 63(3) of the Interim Constitution provided for a 425-member constituent assembly with 205 elected through a first-past-the-post system, 204 through pro- portional representation, and 16 “distinguished persons” to be nominated by the interim council of ministers.

4 It was decided that the 20 districts in the Tarai with 48.4 percent of the country’s population would get 49 percent seats in the CA, while 51 percent seats would be divided among the 55 hill and Himalayan districts that have 51.6 per cent of the population. Source: “49 percent seats for Tarai in CA,” eKantipur.com, 8 February 2007.

5 “Agitating Madhesi Forum suspends protests for 10 days,” eKantipur.com, 9 February 2007.

6 On 15 February, Home Minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula, while apologizing for the government’s high-handedness, during the Madhes Andolan, rejected the possibility of resigning.

7 “Demands Madhesi administrators in Tarai: MPRF to launch fresh protests,” The Kathmandu Post, 20 February 2007.

8 Translated as Nepal Goodwill Party. 9 The Nepal Sadbhavana Party was the only Madhesi party at that time though it was at that time divided into two factions – Nepal Sadbhavana Party and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandi Devi).

10 Chatra Karki, “Rananiti ki Pratibaddhata [Strategy or Commitment],” Samaya, 24 Magh 2064.

11 The clash occurred when both the MJF and the Madhesi front of the Maoists, the Madhesi Rastriya Mukti Morcha (MRMM), decided to organize their respective programs at the same venue and at the same time, though the MJF’s decision predated the MRMM’s by a week (OHCHR 2007). Given the history of antagon- ism between the two groups, the government should have taken this as a warning signal but the local government and the security forces did little to avert the violence that ensued.

164 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

http://eKantipur.com

12 “Adhikar ko nam ma Aparadh [Crime in the name of Rights]” Himal Khabarpatrika, 16–30 Chaitra 2063.

13 Some of the points in the 22-point agreement between the government and the MJF include: compensation to the families of all those killed during the Madhesi movement; withdrawal of cases filed against MJF leaders and their cadres; setting up of an industrial security force; national recognition of Madhesi languages, cul- tures and customs; balanced and proportional representation of marginalized communities, including Madhesi, indigenous/nationalities, disabled, minorities and Muslims in all state structures; autonomy in a federal system of governance while restructuring the state; immediate dispatch of citizenship distribution teams; pro- portional distribution of revenue income to Madhes and the remote areas of the country; return of properties and personal arms seized by the Maoists to the respective owners, etc., “Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Madhesi People’s Right Forum, Nepal,” Unofficial translation by United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), downloaded from www.unmin.org.np/downloads/ keydocs/2007–8–30–Agreement.SPA.Govt.MJF.ENG.pdf

14 According to this understanding, the term “Madhesi” includes caste-group Hindus, Tarai indigenous groups and Muslims.

15 Muslims became more assertive about their separate identity as a religious minor- ity especially after the Maoist-led government announced a public service ordi- nance in early 2009 that provides 45 percent reservations to marginalized groups, including Madhesis, indigenous groups, women, Dalits, and residents of backward regions. Claiming that the ordinance failed to recognize Muslims as a separate group, and instead placed them in the same category as Madhesis, some Muslims, through the United National Muslim Struggle Committee (UNMSC), announced a series of protest programs together with other Tarai indigenous groups like the Tharus, to demand amendments in the Interim Constitution and the ordinance. In particular, the Committee demanded that the government’s decision to categorize Muslims as Madhesis be changed by incorporating the word “Muslim” in Article 13(3) and Article 33 of the Interim Constitution and hence provide constitutional recognition to Nepali Muslims. The protests ended on 16 March 2009 when the government and representatives of the Muslim community signed a six-point agreement to fulfill all the demands put forth by the UNMSC, with the exception of the implementation of Sharia law which, as was argued at the time, required more information and discussion.

16 Lawoti (this volume) presents a comparison of the Madhesi, indigenous national- ities and Dalit movements and addresses the question of the relative success of the Madhesi movement.

17 Using Gurr’s (1970: 24) definition, for the purposes of this paper, “relative depri- vation” is defined as “actors perception of discrepancy between their value expec- tations and their value capabilities,” that is, the gap between what “people believe they are rightfully entitled” to and what “they think they are capable of getting and keeping.” Important to note here is Gurr’s emphasis that deprivation is not based on wants or needs alone, but on the wants and needs that are perceived as what ought to be or deserve.

18 To cite an example, the Rana rulers distributed almost a third of the forests, especially in the Tarai, to their families and clients (Adhikari et al. 2005).

19 Contrary to Hachhethu’s (2007) argument that Madhesis seemingly conformed to the first two principles but resisted the imposition of the Nepali language, broad historical trajectories indicate that Madhesis did not identify closely with any of these three instruments. First, the support for the monarchy, as was conceived by the Panchayat regime as unquestionable, falls thin in light of broad Madhesi sup- port for democratic struggles beginning with the 1951 armed struggle and the fact that in the 1979 referendum on the Panchayat system, support for multiparty

In pursuit of recognition 165

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

http://www.unmin.org.np/downloads/keydocs/2007%E2%80%938%E2%80%9330%E2%80%93Agreement.SPA.Govt.MJF.ENG.pdf

democracy was higher in the Tarai districts (Hoftun, Raeper and Whelpton 1999). Similarly, despite the common religion that caste Madhesis share with their coun- terparts in the hills, the pahadi-dominated cultural traditions and practices enshrined in the notion of Hinduism have done little in way of fostering a sense of belonging among Madhesis. For instance, when the Bibah Mandap was erected by the Panchayat government adjacent to the Janaki Mandir in Janakpur, Madhesis viewed the pagoda style of the temple as an imposition of a hill cultural symbol in the plains (Burkert 1997). Finally, Madhesi resistance to the imposition of the Nepali language in the Tarai can be ascertained by the fact that the percentage of people speaking the plains languages has remained almost constant from 1952 until 2001 (e.g. the percentage of Maithali-speakers has been constant around 12 percent from 1952 until the 2001 census) (Harka Gurung 2003; CBS 2001).

20 While resettlement of pahadis were also encouraged by the Shah and Rana rulers, large-scale migration from the hills did not take place, mainly because of the per- ceived inhospitable living conditions in the Tarai. Instead, migratory patterns into the Tarai mostly took the form of immigrants from northern India moving into the Tarai.

21 This figure needs to be treated with caution since it does not take into considera- tion the effects of the redrawing of district boundaries (from 32 districts to 75) in 1963 when hill areas north of the Siwaliks was included in the Tarai, thus leading to an obvious increase of the pahadi population in the Tarai (Hachhethu 2007; Shah 2006).

22 These include Jhapa (74 percent), Morang (50 percent), Chitwan (87 percent), Nawalparasi (58 percent), Dang (63 percent), Kailali (51 percent) and Kanchanpur (70 percent) (CBS 2001).

23 It should be noted that the Citizenship Act passed by the first democratic govern- ment of 1959 was comparatively very liberal. As noted by Gaige (2009), conform- ing to the standards applied in other countries, it declared anyone who was born in Nepal, anyone permanently settled in Nepal with at least one parent born in Nepal, anyone who had lived in Nepal for at least five years, and any woman married to a citizen, as being eligible for Nepali citizenship.

24 In November 2006, the citizenship law was amended, making anyone born in Nepal before 1990 and had been a permanent resident, eligible for citizenship. Similarly, naturalization has also been made possible for people who can speak or read any language used in Nepal.

25 The notion that Madhesis are “Indians” is not limited to the state but percolates all the way to everyday interactions amongst people. In fact, Madhesis have always been victims of pahadi prejudice and hence been derisively called madhise (as opposed to the more acceptable Madhesi), dhoti, marsya or bhaiya, to mark their “Indianness.”

26 The representation of Madhesis has changed significantly with the 2008 Con- stituent Assembly elections. More specifically, Madhesis (excluding Tarai Janajatis and Muslims) constitute approximately 21 percent of the total 601 CA members.

27 There are several reasons for the low representation of Madhesis in national poli- tics. First, political parties are known to have been nominating pahadi candidates in Tarai constituencies where they are likely to win. Second, in 2002, the Deuba government with the acquiescence of all the major political parties, overrode the constitutional provision requiring delimitation of constituencies for the next 25 years despite the 5 percent increase in proportion of the Tarai population from 43 percent in 1991 to 48 percent in 2001 (Hachhethu 2007).

28 Guneratne (2009) notes the peculiarity of the fact that Nepali Madhesis are not recruited into the Indian Army’s Gorkha battalions even though their ethnic kin in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh face no such discrimination in the Indian military service because of their ethnicity.

166 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

29 The elite amongst the Madhesis, Madhesi Brahmans, Rajputs, Kayasthas and Nurangs, constitute 5.6 percent of the total Madhesi population and enjoy high status because of their ranking in the Hindu caste system. They are economically better off, are relatively better educated and have generally been better represented in Nepali state mechanisms.

30 Though Madhesi activists use these statistics widely to make a case for the con- tinued “internal colonization” of the Tarai, it is important to note that one of the reasons why the Tarai region contributes so much to Nepal’s GDP is the fact that most of Nepal’s transit points, the major sources of tax revenue, are located in the Nepal-India border, which happens to be in the Tarai region.

31 Examples of scholars who have used social movement framework to understand ethnic movements include: Esman 1994; Tsutsui 2004; Bélanger and Pinard 1991.

32 To cite a few examples, shortly after the dissolution of the House of Representa- tives and the subsequent ‘soft’ takeover by the king, in the 18-point Common Agenda for Progressive Reforms, the five agitating parties, among other things, agreed to eliminate “the discriminatory practices on religion, language and cul- ture,” formulate special policies to “to protect, preserve and develop all castes, race, people’s religions, languages and cultures,” introduce special laws and pro- grams to uplift “the economic, social and cultural status of marginalized and oppressed people,” etc. In addition, special mention was made of the endemic problem of the citizenship issue in the Tarai, including solving the problem by “deciding on a threshold year adopting constitutional and other possible mea- sures.” Similarly, in the eight-point agreement signed between the SPA and the Maoists in 16 June 2006, the signatories had agreed to the “restructuring of the state so as to resolve the class-based, racial, regional and gender-based problems.”

33 Nepalgunj is a regional urban center in the western Tarai. 34 In the 1959 general elections, the Tarai Congress, however, failed to secure any

seat, leaving Tarai-based regional politics at a standstill for a long time to come. 35 The NSP was formed by Gajendra Narayan Singh, formerly a member of the

Nepali Congress, who, citing discrimination against Madhesis by mainstream par- ties, resigned from the Nepali Congress to form his own organization in 1983, the Nepal Sadbhavana Parishad [Council], renamed the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP), after the restoration of democracy in 1990. Following Singh’s demise in 2001, leadership squabbles has splintered the party into a number of parties. Notably, even in 1993, a splinter group, the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Ram Janam Tiwari), had been formed following differences within the party leadership.

36 Other demands raised by the MRMM included: recognition of Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi as official languages; “revolutionary land reforms”; and an end to social discrimination and women’s exploitation, including prohibition of the dowry system and practices of untouchability (Gautam 2008a).

37 The exact number of these outfits cannot be ascertained since there are constant realignments among these groups and newer ones keep appearing on the scene.

38 Among these, the two main ones are the two factions of the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha headed by Jay Krishna Goit and Jwala Singh. Jay Krishna Goit, who previously headed the Maoists’ MRMM, split from the Maoists to form the JTMM in 2004, and Jwala Singh’s faction is an offshoot from JTMM (G). Toge- ther, the two factions of the JTMM claim that the problems in the Tarai have resulted from the colonization of the region by the Nepali state and hence endorse violence to achieve an independent Tarai.

39 The MJF was established in Biratnagar in 1997 as a “cross party intellectual plat- form” to discuss and spread awareness about Madhesi concerns by conducting research, publishing research papers and books, holding seminars and training programs. The MJF at the time of the Madhes Andolan consisted mainly of lea- ders and cadres who were disenchanted with the mainstream parties, particularly

In pursuit of recognition 167

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

the Maoists (ICG 2007). However, after having spearheaded the Madhes Andolan, the MJF registered itself as a political party with the Election Commission in April 2007 and emerged as the fourth largest party in the Constituent Assembly, and the largest among the Madhes-based parties. The MJF has since undergone more than one split – the first, with MJF (Biswas) led by Kishor Biswas, a Tharu leader from eastern Tarai, and later, MJF (Democratic) led by Bijay Kumar Gachhedar, another Tharu from the same area.

40 The MJF considers “internal colonization” and regional and racial discrimination against the Madhes as its key concerns and has accordingly demanded the declaration of a federal democratic republic with an undivided, autonomous Madhes; a proportional electoral system; citizenship certificates for all Madhesis; recognition of Hindi as the lingua franca of the Tarai; an end to internal migration of Pahadis to Madhes; investment in Madhes of a substantial proportion of taxes raised in the region, etc. In addition, the MJF has also sought to situate the Madhesi agenda within larger issues of national concern such as secularism, an end to Maoist violence, etc., and simultaneously sought to address the issues of internal differences within the Tarai/Madhesi population such as an end to discrimination against Nepali Muslims, special schemes for Dalits and other oppressed Madhesi castes, etc. (Gautam 2008a).

41 Despite being a vocal advocate of Madhesi rights and grievances, the failure of the NSP in establishing a strong presence even in the Tarai is often attributed to Gajendra Naryan Singh’s own caste status as a Rajput and hence the party’s inability to garner support from the Tarai middle castes like the Yadavs. The latter, according to the 2001 census, constitute approximately 43 percent of the Tarai/ Madhesi population. Similarly, with regard to the Maoists, it is often argued that while their demands for Madhesi rights and representation resonated with different sections of Madhesis, their insistence on class being the primary source of inequality resonated well with Tarai Dalits but not as much with the Yadavs and upper-caste Tarai groups.

42 The 10 districts are: Parsa, Bara, Rautahat, Sarlahi, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Siraha, Saptari, Sunsari and Morang. Notably, the Madhesi population in these calcula- tions includes Tarai Janajatis who reject being identified as Madhesis, albeit less strongly so compared to Tarai Janajatis from western Nepal. However, the Tarai Janajatis are also in significantly smaller numbers in the eastern part of the Tarai compared to the west (derived from Sharma 2008).

References

Adhikari, Jagannath, Dev, Om Prakash and Dhungana, Hari (2005) ‘State and Forest: a Historical Analysis of Policies Affecting Forest Management in Nepal Tarai’, in Nepal Tarai: Context and Possibilities. Kathmandu, Nepal: Social Science Baha.

Barany, Zoltan (2002), ‘Ethnic Mobilization without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies’, World Politics, 54: 277–307.

Bélanger, Sarah and Pinard, Maurice (1991) ‘Ethnic Movements and the Competition Model: Some Missing Links’, American Sociological Review, 56:446–57.

Brass, Paul R. (1974) Language, Religion and Politics in North India. London: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Michael E. (2001) ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Brown, Michael E., Coté, Owen R., Lynn-Jones, Sean and Miller, Steven (eds) (2001) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

168 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Burkert, Claire (1997) ‘Defining Maithil Identity: Who is in Charge?’, in Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics and Culture of Contemporary Nepal, edited by David N. Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John Whelpton. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Harwood Publishers.

CBS, Central Bureau of Statistics (2001) Rastriya Janagadhana: 2058 B.S. [National Census 2001]. Kathmandu, Nepal: National Planning Commission.

Diani, Mario and McAdam, Doug (eds) (2003) Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eck, Kristine (2009) ‘From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict Intensification’, International Studies Quarterly, 53:369–88.

Esman, Milton J. (1994) Ethnic Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Fraser, Nancy, and Honneth, Axel (eds) (2003) Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange. London: Verso.

Gaige, Frederick H. (2009) Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal. 2nd edn. Kathmandu, Nepal: Himal Books and Social Science Baha.

Gates, Scott (2002) ‘Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46:111–30.

Gautam, Bhaskar (ed.) (2008) Madhes Bidrohako Nalibeli [Contours of Madhesi Revolt]. Kathmandu, Nepal: Martin Chautari.

Gautam, Bhaskar (2008a) ‘Madhes Kendrit Rajnitik Dal Haru ko Maag [Demands of Madhes-Centered Political Parties]’, pp. 184–87, in Madhes Bidrohako Nalibeli [Contours of Madhesi Revolt], Chautari Book Series, edited by Bhaskar Gautam. Kathmandu, Nepal: Martin Chautari.

——(2008b) ‘Madhesi Bidroha: Naurashyako Rajniti [Madhesi Revolt: Politics of Despondency]’, pp. 1–36, in Madhes Bidrohako Nalibeli [Contours of Madhesi Revolt], Chautari Book Series, edited by Bhaskar Gautam. Kathmandu, Nepal: Martin Chautari.

Gellner, David N. (2007) Resistance and the State: Nepalese Experiences. Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books.

Gellner, Ernest (2006) Nations and Nationalism. 2nd edn. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Guneratne, Arjun (2009) ‘Introduction’, pp. xvi–xxviii in Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Himal Books and Social Science Baha.

——(2002) Many Tongues, One People: The Making of Tharu Identity in Nepal. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gurr, Ted Robert (1970) Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gurung, Harka (2003) Social Demography of Nepal: Census 2001. Lalitpur,

Nepal: Himal Books. Gurung, Nini and Paulsen, Eric (2007) Nepal Moves Mountains. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Habermas, Ju?rgen (1998) The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hachhethu, Krishna (2007) Madheshi Nationalism and Restructuring the Nepali State. Kathmandu, Nepal: Center for Nepal and Asian Studies, MIDEA Project and ESP-Nepal.

Hangen, Susan (2007) Creating a “New Nepal”: The Ethnic Dimension. Washington, DC: East-West Center.

Harff, Barbara, and Gurr, Ted Robert (2004) Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. 2nd edn. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

In pursuit of recognition 169

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Hatlebakk, Magnus (2007) Economic and Social Structures that May Explain the Recent Conflicts in the Tarai of Nepal. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI).

Hechter, Michael (1987) ‘Nationalism as Group Solidarity’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 10: 415–26.

Hechter, Michael, Friedman, Debra and Appelbaum, Malka (1982) ‘A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action’, International Migration Review, 16: 412–34.

Hoftun, Martin, Raeper, William and Whelpton, John (1999) People, Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Mandala Book Point.

Horowitz, Donald L. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

ICG (2007) Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region. Kathmandu/Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Jenkins, J. Craig (1983) ‘Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements’, Annual Review of Sociology, 9: 527–53.

Jervis, Robert (1978) ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30: 167–214.

Jha, Prashant (2007) ‘Calling all Moderates’, Nepali Times, September 14. Joshi, Bhuwan Lal, and Rose, Leo E. (1966) Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Koopmans, Ruud (1995) Democracy from Below: New Social Movements and the Political System in West Germany. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Krauskopff, Gisèle (2000) ‘From Jungle to Farms: A Look at Tharu History’, pp. 25–48, in The Kings of Nepal and the Tharu of the Tarai, edited by Gisèle Krauskopff and Pamela Deuel Meyer. Los Angeles, CA: Rusca Press.

Krauskopff, Gisèle and Meyer, Pamela Deuel (eds) (2000) The Kings of Nepal and the Tharu of the Tarai. Los Angeles, CA: Rusca Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter (1995) ‘The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Move- ments: Its Impact on their Mobilization’, pp. 167–98 in The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, Social Move- ments, Protest, and Contention, edited by J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Lal, C. K. (2003) ‘The Tarai Cauldron’, Nepali Times, March 28. Lawoti, Mahendra (2007) ‘Contentious Politics in Democratizing Nepal’, in

Contentious Politics and Democratization in Nepal, edited by M. Lawoti. New Delhi and Thousand Oaks: Sage.

——(2008) ‘Exclusionary Democratization in Nepal, 1990–2002’, Democratization, 15: 363–85.

——(2010) ‘It Ain’t So’, Kathmandu Post, February 18. ——(2005) Towards a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a Multicultural Society. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Lichbach, Mark Irving (1995) The Rebel’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

McAdam, Doug (1999) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. 2nd edn. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, Doug and Snow, David A. (eds) (2010) Readings on Social Movements: Origins, Dynamics and Outcomes. 2nd edn. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney G. and Tilly, Charles (2001) Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

170 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

McCarthy, John D., and Zald, Mayer N. (1977) ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, The American Journal of Sociology, 82: 1212–41.

McDonaugh, Christian (1997) ‘Losing Ground, Gaining Ground: Land and Change in a Tharu Community in Dang, West Nepal’, in Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics and Culture of Contemporary Nepal, edited by David N. Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John Whelpton. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Harwood Publishers.

Moore, Margaret (2001) The Ethics of Nationalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Nagel, Joane and Olzak, Susan (1982) ‘Ethnic Mobilization in New and Old States: An Extension of the Competition Model’, Social Problems, 30: 127–43.

Neupane, Govinda (2005) Nepalko Jatiya Prashna: Samajik Banot ra Sajhedariko Sambhawana (The Caste and Ethnicity Question: Caste and Ethnicity Structure and Possibility of Partnership). Kathmandu, Nepal: Center for Development Studies.

Newman, Saul (1996) Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies: Mostly Ballots, Rarely Bullets. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

OHCHR (2007) Findings of OHCHR-Nepal’s Investigations into the 21 March Killings in Gaur and Surrounding Villages. Kathmandu, Nepal: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Nepal.

Olson, Mancur (1971) The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Olzak, Susan and Olivier, Johan L. (1998) ‘Racial Conflict and Protest in South Africa and the United States’, European Sociological Review, 14: 255–78.

Pandey, Birendra (2007) ‘Towards Culture of Rhetoric(s)’, The Kathmandu Post, March 10.

Pathak, Bishnu (2007) Madhes Violence: Identity Clash in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Conflict Study Center.

Pathak, Bishnu and Uprety, Devendra (2009) Tarai-Madhes Searching for Identity. Kathmandu, Nepal: Conflict Sutdy Center.

Pfaff-Czarnecka, Joanna (1999) ‘Ethnicization of Politics in Nepal – A Position Paper’, in Ethnic Futures: The State and Identity Politics in Asia, edited by Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, Ashis Nandi, and Edmund Gomez. New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

——(1997) ‘Vestiges and Visions: Cultural Change in the Process of Nation-Building in Nepal’, in Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics and Culture of Contemporary Nepal, edited by David N. Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John Whelpton. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Harwood Publishers.

Pradhan, Kumar (2009) The Gorkha Conquests: The Process and Consequences of the Unification of Nepal, with Particular Reference to Eastern Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Himal Books and Social Science Baha.

Ragin, Charles (1977) ‘Class, Status, and Reactive Ethnic Cleavages: The Social Bases of Political Regionalism’, American Sociological Review, 42: 438–50.

Regmi, Mahesh C. (1988) An Economic History of Nepal, 1846–1901. 1st edn. Varanasi, India: Nath Publishing House.

——(1976) Landownership in Nepal. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Rothschild, Joseph (1981) Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Shah, Shree Govind (2006) Social Inclusion of Madheshi Community in Nation Building. Kathmandu, Nepal: Social Inclusion Research Fund.

In pursuit of recognition 171

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .

Sharma, Pitamber (2008) Unravelling the Mosaic: Spatial Aspects of Ethnicity in Nepal. Lalitpur, Nepal: Himal Books.

Shrestha, Nanda R. (1990) Landlessness and Migration in Nepal. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Snow, David A. and Benford, Robert D. (1988) ‘Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization’, International Social Movement Research, 1: 197–217.

Tarrow, Sidney G. (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, Charles (1994) ‘The Politics of Recognition’, pp. 25–74 in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Tilly, Charles (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. ——(1992) How to Detect, Describe, and Explain Repertoires of Contention. New York: Center for Studies of Social Change, New School for Social Research.

Tsutsui, Kiyoteru (2004) ‘Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary World’, Sociological Forum, 19: 63–87.

UNDP (2009) Nepal Human Development Report 2009: State Transformation and Human Development. Kathmandu, Nepal: United Nations Development Programme.

Whelpton, John (2005) A History of Nepal. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

——(1997) ‘Political Identity in Nepal: State, Nation, and Community’, in Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics and Culture of Contemporary Nepal, edited by David N. Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John Whelpton. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Harwood Publishers.

Yadav, Ram Prakash (2007) Social Exclusion. Kathmandu, Nepal: Social Inclusion Research Fund.

Young, Iris Marion (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

172 Bandita Sijapati

C o p yr

ig h t ©

2 0 1 2 . T

a yl

o r

& F

ra n ci

s G

ro u p . A

ll ri g h ts

r e se

rv e d .