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MultiracialismandMeritocracy-SingaporesApproachtoRaceandInequality.pdf
Review of Social Economy ISSN 0034-6764 print/ISSN 1470-1162 online © 2000 The Association for Social Economics
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY, VOL. LVIII, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2000
Multiracialism and Meritocracy: Singapore’s Approach to Race and Inequality
R. Quinn Moore Ann Arbor, USA
Abstract This paper characterizes Singapore’s efforts to tackle the problem of per- sistent racial inequality in terms of the notion of fair meritocracy. Singapore’s race policy attempts to level the playing field through its unique race-based self-help organizations and a comprehensive, racially integrated, public housing program. Individuals are then sorted by the ostensibly objective mechanism of a standardized test based educational system. The social and economic implications of this policy are examined and, using summary data from the 1980 and 1990 censuses, the extent to which Singapore has been successful in creating a fair multiracial meritocracy is assessed.
Keywords: Inequality, meritocracy, race, Singapore, education, housing
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout much of the world, there has been a strong ideological attachment to the desirability of procedural equality. The logic runs that if the rules are not the same for everyone, the system is simply “not fair.” However in multiracial, multi- ethnic, or otherwise diverse societies, procedural equality often has come under fire when it has not yielded equality of results. Fair meritocracy is an ideological attempt to reconcile these two notions of equality. Proponents of fair meritocracy argue that unjust inequality is endemic to strict procedural equality, given the inherited advantages of privileged groups. Inherited wealth, educational advantages, nepotism, and benefits from discrimination against other groups, create a “cruel meritocracy” that does not truly reflect the talent and hard work of all individuals.
To counter this meritocratic distortion, fair meritocracy dictates that societies should strive for “fair” equal opportunity in which inherited advantages or dis- advantages are compensated for. In other words, efforts should be made to level
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the playing field for all individuals before competition begins. The resulting merit- ocracy should yield what is deemed a justly stratified society, and simultaneously reflect both equality of results and procedural equality. Although this approach is ideologically appealing, there are significant obstacles to its practical application, namely the difficulty of removing the socially entrenched advantages of the privi- leged and the difficulty in assessing when stratification is truly merit based given that any privileged group is likely to claim that the wealth distribution is fair.
Singapore represents a practical, if imperfect, attempt at applying “fair” merit- ocracy to a multiracial society. Throughout its independence and dramatic econ- omic growth, Singapore has maintained a strict adherence to the ideal of a procedurally equal meritocracy, while simultaneously promoting multiracialism as a fundamental national ideal. The struggle to maintain these occasionally con- flicting ideals has yielded an interesting mix of policies that seek to sort indi- viduals objectively while allowing racial groups to compensate for their perceived social and economic disadvantages. Singapore is somewhat unique in actively seeking to achieve a fair meritocracy. However, this system is hampered by the seemingly universal problem of ethnic favoritism and entrenched social advantage. While it would be difficult to claim that Singapore has achieved fair multiracial meritocracy, their efforts provide a valuable example.
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGAPORE’S RACIAL GROUPS
Before discussing the specifics of Singapore’s racial policy, it is useful to outline the economic and social characteristics of each racial group and to discuss the ideological roots of Singapore’s philosophy toward race and meritocracy.
Singapore was originally inhabited by a small group of Malays engaged in agricultural pursuits. The early nineteenth-century decision by the British to con- vert Singapore into a port to rival Jakarta initiated a huge influx of workers from throughout the region and around the globe. This migration has yielded a diverse society, which has had a stable mix of 75 percent Chinese, 15 percent Malay, 7 percent Indian, and a small population of other groups commonly referred to as Eurasians.1 This “other” category is relatively small and has undergone dramatic shifts in make up due to in and out migration, thus this discussion will focus on the
1 This diversity is multiplied greatly by extensive diversity within each group. The Chinese popu- lation is about 30 percent Hokkien, 17 percent Teochew, 15 percent Cantonese, 5 percent Hainanese and 5 percent Hakka (Clammer 1985: 91). The “Indian” category reflects all of the national, religious, and ethnic diversity of South Asia. Malays are not marked by religious or linguistic diversity. Despite the name, the small Eurasian group consists of the eclectic group of Portuguese, British, Arab, South- east Asians, and mixed-race individuals that used to be referred to as “other.”
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Chinese, Malay, and Indian groups. The economic hierarchy in Singapore can be characterized in terms of race,
with the Chinese on the top, the Malays on the bottom, and the Indians straddled in the middle. This hierarchy is reflected in income, education, housing and virtually every other social and economic category.2
Since attaining self government in 1959, Singapore’s stated development philosophy has posited that economic growth would produce improvement for all segments of the population, and with such improvement, interracial disparity eventually would dissipate. However, the 1980 Census showed that the dramatic economic boom of the 1970s had not affected all racial groups equally. Malays were severely underrepresented in both the upper levels of the educational system and in the high prestige, economically dynamic occupations (see section VI below). As a result, Malay household income was only 74 percent of Chinese income (Table 1).
Despite efforts to ameliorate interracial disparity, the household income gap between Malays and the Chinese actually worsened to 70 percent of Chinese income during the 1980s.3 However, it is perhaps encouraging that Malays were not excluded entirely from the 1980s growth as Malay income increased by 150 percent. In addition, Malays no longer dominate the lowest income categories according to the 1990 census, which shows that Malays actually have the lowest percentage of workers earning less than S$500 per month.4 Moreover, the Gini coefficient for Malay household income decreased fairly significantly from .399 in 1980 to .347 in 1990, which suggests that Malay economic development is spread across Malays as a group rather than within a Malay elite.5
The 1980s also saw a more significant gap develop between the Chinese and Indian household income, as the Indian to Chinese ratio fell from 93 percent of Chinese to 89 percent (Table 1). This is even more disturbing since the Indian labor force participation rate, and hence the workers per household, already was
2 Note that race is not the only important category along which disparity exists. Within the Chinese and Indian groups there is strong division along linguistic and religious lines. An exploration of Singapore’s religious and linguistic hierarchy also would be useful; however, since the focus of government programs and popular sentiment is on race, so too is the focus of this paper.
3 Reporting income by household hides some of the interracial income gap for Malays, as the mean household size for Malays was 4.7 in 1990 versus 4.2 for both Chinese and Indians (Department of Statistics 1994, 4: xv).
4 See Department of Statistics 1994, 2: 69–78. Table 1 does not show the under $500 per month category because the 1980 census did not report income by race and the 1990 census only reported the 1980 figures given.
5 Indian and Chinese Ginis also dropped (from .490 to .423 and from .477 to .423 respectively) (Department of Statistics 1994, 2: 10).
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the highest among all ethnic groups in 1980 and increased more than any other group during the intercensal period.6 This suggests that the actual gap between wages earned by Indian and Chinese workers is even greater than the household income data suggests.7 Thus, in a society that places great value on the cultivation of the elite, the Chinese are strengthening their position at the top of the social hierarchy and becoming increasingly dominant in the upper echelons of the economy.8
The persistence of this economic hierarchy has led to strong social stigmas and stereotypes associated with race. There is a pervasive belief that the Chinese are more intelligent, hardworking, and economically astute than other racial groups. Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the indisputable Singaporean leader from independence until 1990 whose opinion still commands considerable respect, claimed that the Chinese are a “race [with an] intense and exacting civic culture . . . [which] is conducive to economic development and commercial ability” (Lee as quoted in Tamney 1996: 102).9 In contrast, Malays specifically are considered to be generally lazy, unintelligent, and unambitious. One cabinet member recently explained that poor Malay economic performance was “the result of a feudalistic consciousness and from not having the spirit of hard work” (Tamney 1996: 98).10
Similarly, Lee explained that Hindus are the victims of a “relaxed culture that is incongruent with the values that make economic development possible” (Lee as quoted in Tamney 1996: 102). South Asians in general are considered to be disloyal, overly individualistic, and untrustworthy when compared with the Chinese.11
6 The Indian labor force participation rate was 70.4 percent in 1990, up from 67.6 percent in 1980. The Chinese rate increased from 62.6 percent to 65.1 percent while the Malay rate fell from 64.7 to 62.9 percent (Department of Statistics 1994, 4: xvi). The drop in Malay labor force participation makes their rise in household income even more impressive.
7 Income per worker is available in the 1990 census, but it includes nonresident migrant workers, which exaggerates the gap between Indian and Chinese wages.
8 This also is shown more clearly with the complete income data available in the 1990 census reports, which provide categories up to $7000 per month. These tables show that the proportion of Chinese households increases in each ascending income category (Department of Statistics 1990, 2: 69–78). The 1980 census did not report income by race and the 1990 census only reported the 1980 figures given.
9 This is reinforced by the belief that the economic success of the Chinese is based on genetic superiority. This belief has manifested itself in several eugenics programs (Tamney 1995), led to the dysfunction of numerous ostensibly race-neutral policies, and is undoubtedly a source of economic discrimination against Malays and Indians.
10 See Tremewan (1994: 95), Hill and Lian (1995: 84), Clammer (1985: 144), Li (1989: 108), etc. 11 See Vasil (1995: 119) and Tamney (1996: 102) among others.
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III. IDEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR SINGAPORE’S MULTIRACIAL MERITOCRACY
Because Singapore originally was made up of immigrants from diverse origins, the inhabitants had no conception of a Singaporean nation. Thus the government felt that its constituents would have no loyalty to a Singaporean state because “[there is no] deep connection with the territory or [among population groups] through a common, primordial ancestry, [or] pre-colonial past” (Ang and Stratton 1995: 74). When this lack of national identity was viewed in the context of differ- ing economic and social statuses of racial and ethnic groups, rivalry among them, regional ethnic tension, and past incidents of communal violence, doubt among early leaders about Singapore’s viability as an independent political state was con- siderable.12
The key to defusing Singapore’s ethnic tension was an emphasis on multi- racialism and meritocracy. Each racial group was cast as an equally important, distinct part of a nation that would strive to ensure that success came on the basis of merit, rather than racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural favoritism. Emphasizing that groups should maintain their distinctiveness was crucial to the success of Singapore’s multiracial nationalism, particularly since there was no basis for claiming any intrinsic unity in the Singaporean population. The government decided that “rather than seeking harmony through the abolition of ethnicity . . . it [would] set about not only enhancing ethnicity as a primary social identification, but extend this principle to making ethnicity the main form of sociocultural classi- fication” (Clammer 1985: 142). In short Singapore would become a multiracial society with the intention of preventing racial discord. This multiracialism would then become the ideal around which a sense of nationhood could be cultivated.
However, Singapore’s devotion to meritocracy as a path to economic develop- ment dictated that multiracialism would not include any affirmative action or compensatory discrimination measures, despite that fact that at the time of inde- pendence, the Other/Eurasian category (then primarily British) was vastly wealthier than either the Chinese or Indians, and the Malays were much poorer than all the groups. The ideal that each culture was an equally important part of the nation and that each individual would be rewarded solely on the basis of merit was pre- sumably enough to unite Singapore’s disparate groups.
Given interracial disparity, maintaining the balance between multiracial har- mony and meritocracy has required some degree of compromise. In broad terms,
12 Severe racial tension surrounded separation from the Federation of Malaya. In the resulting incidents of racial violence in 1950, 1964, and 1969, Singapore experienced what the government classifies as race riots. For more on the riots see Hill and Lian (1995).
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this compromise can be characterized using the framework of fair equal oppor- tunity. The government has recognized that difference in initial or inherited con- ditions may prevent certain worthy individuals from rising through a meritocracy established by the educational system and the labor market. In response, a set of policies has been instituted to mitigate disadvantages before entering the pro- cedurally equal “playing field” of meritocratic equal opportunity.
Singapore’s fair equal opportunity is manifested in three ways. First, the government allows each racial group to create a community-based self-help group to address its cultural, educational, and social deficiencies. Second, massive government subsidized housing projects provide people of all income levels rela- tively similar living conditions to ensure that the rich do not have large environ- mental advantages over the poor. Finally, after entry into the “playing field” has been equalized by self-help and housing policy, the procedural equality of the meritocracy is supposed to be guaranteed by the educational system, in which success is determined “objectively” by standardized testing. The hierarchy estab- lished by this system is deemed fair as all enter the social game at similar levels and all determinations of ability are uniform and, therefore, considered unbiased.
IV. COMMUNITY-BASED SELF-HELP ORGANIZATIONS
Independent Singapore’s only explicit policy response to racial disparity has been the establishment of community-based self-help groups for each of the principal racial groups. These organizations are designed to help members of a racial group overcome potential social and economic hardships through the activities of the members of the racial group itself. Self-help groups receive funding from private donations, automatic payroll deductions, and from government matching funds up to a threshold amount. The philosophy behind this system is that the members of a racial group will best know what problems their group is facing and how to solve these problems most efficiently. By decentralizing responsibility for the ameli- oration of disparity, it is also expected that the development of dependency tend- encies, thought to be inherent in state-supported welfare systems, will be prevented.13
The Formation of Mendaki
After the scope of the interracial economic gap was illustrated by the 1980 census, the government concluded that policy action was necessary, as extreme inequality
13 For discussions related to this decentralization see Li (l989), Brown (1993), Tamney (1996), and Lai (1995).
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could jeopardize the multiracial harmony so fundamental to the national ideology. However, this should not be interpreted as an admission of a flaw in the economic system, since the most widely accepted explanation for this gap is the alleged Malay cultural inferiority discussed above. Because racial disparity is considered to be the result of cultural deficiencies, government officials feel no need to make structural or policy adjustments to alleviate this disparity. Instead efforts have focused on encouraging Malay leaders to induce fundamental changes in Malay culture.
Pursuant with this approach, in 1981 the government allowed the Malay community to form Mendaki, the first government sponsored self-help group.14
Although many social problems were to be addressed by this organization, it was felt that the best way to achieve development was through education and changing the habits of Malay children. Accordingly, Mendaki focused on tutorial programs, scholarships, and strengthening the Islamic cultural values that were considered conducive to promoting hard work and economic success.15
The government provided Mendaki assistance in several forms. First, Mendaki was allowed to use the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a government sponsored required savings social security program, to collect one dollar donations monthly from the paychecks of all Muslims.16 The government then agreed to match these donations up to a certain threshold. Mendaki also was given access to government staff, training, and accommodation for its tutorial programs. Government assist- ance was structured carefully in an attempt to avoid the development of welfare- like dependency and to encourage Malays to help themselves. The amount of assistance and the form that the assistance took was to be determined entirely by the community itself. Mendaki was meant to improve Malay education, but, more important, it was meant to instill a sense of self-reliance that would enable Malays to become more productive and successful members of society.
Addressing persistent economic disparity without compensatory discrim- ination allowed the government to attempt to generate greater interracial equality without compromising its belief in meritocratic procedural equal opportunity. Self- help policy also shifted responsibility for resolving disparity from the government to the racial group, effectively shifting blame for intergroup disparity away from the economic and social system.
14 The precursors to community-based self-help organizations emerged in the late 1960s, soon after Singapore separated from the Federation of Malaya in 1965. See Tan (1995: 343).
15 For a more complete discussion of Mendaki’s history and current projects see their web site (Mendaki 1999). Information in this discussion was also drawn from Lai (1995), Tan (1995), Vasil (1995), and Li (1989).
16 These donations are technically voluntary since workers can have the deductions stopped.
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By refusing direct involvement, the government implicitly reinforced the notion that the current economic order is fair, and the meritocratic sorting process is functioning well and objectively. The underlying suggestion is that the only thing preventing equality of results is some set of deficiencies individuals possess when entering the system. Of course, this notion corresponds to fair equal opportunity, with one critical difference. In Singapore, nonmeritocratic/unjustified disparity is not considered to be the result of inherited advantages possessed by the well-off. Rather it is attributed to a set of inherent disadvantages possessed by the under - performing group, presumably resulting from culture or some other exogenous source. Moreover, the elimination of these deficiencies is not considered the responsibility of the government or society as a whole but of the under-performing group itself.
Expansion of Self Help
By the late 1980s, the Mendaki experiment was declared a success. The period since Mendaki’s formation coincided with dramatic improvements in relative Malay educational performance (see section V) and absolute economic outcomes. Although a direct causal relationship has not been established, Mendaki was given a great deal of credit for this change in fortune. As a result, Mendaki was en- couraged to expand beyond its educational focus to include economic and social development at all levels of the Malay community.17 Thus, Mendaki recast itself as a sort of comprehensive race-specific welfare organization.
Because of the seeming success of Mendaki and the philosophical opposition to differential treatment for the components of Singapore’s multiracial society, the government felt pressure to form self-help organizations for all racial groups. Although the Malays’ relative economic position had worsened during the 1980s, it was felt that the Malay improvements in the lowest income brackets could be extended to other under-performing groups, such as dialect speaking Chinese. Accordingly, the Eurasian Association (EA) was activated in 1989, followed
17 Because of reorganization, Mendaki now has three divisions: Education, Social and Cultural Affairs, and Economic Development. One significant change is that responsibility for the free tertiary education program, a relic from the Federation of Malaya years, has been transferred to Mendaki. A one-time sum was given to Mendaki by the government, which was then used to set up the Tertiary Tuition Fee Subsidy. Instead of giving free education to all Malays, this subsidy pays 100 percent of fees for families whose monthly income is below $2000 and 70 percent of fees for families whose monthly income is between $2000 and $3000 (Mendaki 1999). This transfer represented the next step in eliminating perceived Malay dependence and in fostering community responsibility. It also allowed the government to shed itself of a pre-independence political anachronism that had become increasingly expensive with growing Malay tertiary enrollment.
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by the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) in 1990, and the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) in 1992. All groups are funded much like Mendaki, through monthly CPF deductions from members of the racial group and by a limited government matching plan.18
Providing self-help assistance to all racial communities completed the shift to fair equal opportunity as the disadvantaged (yet meritorious) individuals of each group would, theoretically, be given the start needed to compete. The government believes that this decentralized, almost privatized, form of welfare is the most efficient way to deal with intergroup inequality, as it harnesses the racial com- munities desire to help itself while preserving procedural equality. Of course, this approach also represents a shift away from ameliorating intergroup disparity directly and toward using racial affiliation as the medium for addressing more general inequality. A decrease in general inequality presumably is assumed to have positive implications for interracial parity. However, the structure of self- help groups may prevent this from being the case.
Although the three new self-help organizations have programs and philos- ophies similar to those of Mendaki, a difference in program quality already has begun to emerge. Although CDAC is the youngest self-help organization, it is quickly overtaking Mendaki as the most comprehensive development program. The combination of monthly automatic payments from a much greater percentage of the population and a much larger pool of rich potential donors has given CDAC a substantial resource advantage over the other self-help groups. This advantage is readily visible in the breadth and quality of programs CDAC already offers.19
Assuming that self-help is indeed an efficient and effective means of improv- ing performance within Singapore’s racial groups, CDAC’s success may prove dangerous for the goal of intergroup economic parity. The tremendous resource
18 For example, SINDA’s total budget in 1997 was S$5,529,511, of which 59.6% came from CPF deductions, 27.1% came from government subvention, 11.0% cam from tutorial fees, and 2.3% came from other sources (SINDA 1999).
19 The educational program, which is generally considered to be the most important function of self help groups in terms of alleviating future disparity, serves as a good point of comparison. CDAC’s educational program revolves around its seven Student Service Centers (SSC), all estab- lished between November 1993 and November 1996. These centers now serve 12,695 students and offer arts and craft classes, planned outings, homework clinics, and tutorial programs at all levels in all subjects. In addition to the SSCs, tutorials are available at public schools for those who are failing or nearly failing a subject or for those whose household monthly income is less than $2000. Neither Mendaki nor SINDA have SSCs. The tutorial programs offered by Mendaki and SINDA, which are comparable to CDAC’s school based tutorial program, serve 9,500 and 2,800 students respectively. It is both impressive and suggestive that in three years CDAC established the facilities to serve more students in its SSC program alone than even Mendaki, which has conducted tutorial programs since 1981.
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advantages that CDAC enjoys could transform it into a much more powerful and effective organization than Mendaki, SINDA, or the EA. If this corresponds to greater improvements in the Chinese economic status relative to Malays, Indians, and Eurasians, it could mean even wider interracial economic gaps.
V. HOUSING POLICY
Although housing policy was not explicitly designed as a social equalizing mea- sure, it does have a powerful leveling effect, particularly when viewed within the context of a fair meritocracy. After being ousted from Malaya, Singaporean policy was driven by survival and fear of cultural, political, and economic non-viability. Because Housing and Development Board (HDB) policy was a means of solving the diverse problems of eliminating Singapore’s slums, improving its inter- national image, decreasing the chance of racial or political unrest, creating a sense of national loyalty, and engineering a strong work ethic, HDB housing became a cornerstone of the ruling Political Action Party’s (PAP) plan for Singapore’s development. Presently, 87 percent of Singapore’s population lives in one of the monolithic high-rise HDB estates, while the remaining 13 percent live in exclusive, extremely expensive private dwellings.
While HDB policy does involve some degree of wealth redistribution, the intent is not the benevolent creation of general equality; rather the goal is to create the conditions under which Singapore could survive and prosper.20 More specifi- cally, HDB policy was a social investment that was designed to break up dis- ruptive central-city slums, eliminate racial enclaves, generate a sense of national loyalty, and mold people into what the PAP considered to be the ideal work force.21
This investment did have a cost, notably the potential for the feared welfare- like dependency tendencies that the PAP believed could result from public housing. Although the PAP did not intend HDB policy as a welfare measure, it
20 For further discussion of the political reasoning behind HDB policy, see Hill and Lian (1995). 21 HDB policy offered a solution to the lack of inherent national loyalty by facilitating the pur-
chase of a home. The government felt that “if one owns an asset in the country, one would stand to defend it” (Wong and Yeh 1985: 231). Moreover, the PAP felt that Singapore must develop a thoroughly disciplined work force that would both attract foreign capital and encourage domestic capital formation. An efficient way to encourage this discipline was to encourage the population to place itself in debt to the government (Tremewan 1994: 58, Hill and Lian 1995: 121). This long-term financial commitment also ensured a strong incentive to seek and maintain full-time wage labor. After all, “the painless road to property ownership ties a family into debt and credit relations that require them to work steadily for years to come” (Salaff 1988: 243). In addition to creating a commitment to working, the PAP felt that giving people something concrete to work toward would give them focus, drive, and a greater capacity for hard work. A stable, high-quality living environment also was believed to have a positive effect on worker attitudes.
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recognized that it could have welfare-like side effects. Thus the government made a strong effort to structure HDB policy to avoid such outcomes. This effort included making apartments an asset to be purchased and not a right, differentiating quality (in terms of number of rooms) and cost, and encouraging mobility among quality levels.22 These measures were intended to make the public housing market similar to the free market while allowing the government to pursue the goals associated with public housing.
Public housing has had an undeniable positive effect in eliminating sub- standard housing and achieving a degree of environmental equality across racial and social groups. Recent HDB subsidy programs have been structured cleverly to assure that all Singaporeans have the opportunity to secure housing while those who do not need subsidies do not receive them. In addition to the subsidy provided on all apartments purchased directly from HDB, subsidized loans are available for both direct and open market HDB purchases.23 Low-income families have access to HDB rental subsidies, and subsidized three room apartments.24 All programs have household income ceilings, and most require that applicants apply with their family nucleus and not own any other private property.25 No person can receive more than two housing subsidies in their lifetime.
These programs seem to be having their desired effect as HDBs have attracted an increasing percentage of the population (Table 2). Moreover, HDB subsidies have allowed home ownership to increase dramatically. Malays, in particular, seem to have benefited from these subsidies. Today, 92.3 percent of Malay households own their homes while less than 50 percent did in 1980. Malays do tend to have larger families and live in smaller apartments (Table 2), but the increase in home ownership is indicative of the success of HDB policy none the less.
22 Hill and Lian 1995: 135. 23 This subsidy only applies to new flats as only new flats are purchased directly from HDB. It is
difficult to assess the amount of this subsidy as HDB flats cannot be sold on the open market until the owner has occupied the flat for at least five years. For a rough approximation, the market valuation for flats at the most recently built HDB estate in which owners can sell their property averaged S$293,400 for four room flats and S$413,800 for five room flats in the third quarter of 1998. The average HDB selling price for new flats ranged from S$137,900 to S$158,500 for four room flats and from S$233,500 to $270,300 for five room flats (HDB 1999). A much smaller subsidy is available for open market purchases. This subsidy is set at S$39,000 for families or S$49,000 for families using the subsidy to move near parents or children. In addition to these subsidies, loans are available up to 80 percent of the purchase price (HDB 1999).
24 Three-room flats are being phased out by HDB, as no new HDB estates have three room flats. The subsidized three room flat program involves HDB repurchasing three room flats on the open market and then reselling them to low-income families at a subsidized rate.
25 With the exception of low-income programs, the household income ceiling is set at the relatively high rate of S$8,000 per month. This ceiling applies to families purchasing flats on the open market as well.
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In addition to providing the opportunity for secure housing, HDB estates are racially integrated. HDB policy requires that each building be no more than 87 percent Chinese, 25 percent Malay, or 13 percent Indian and Other.26 If a group exceeds this percentage, the building is deemed a racial enclave and housing unit sales to the over represented group are restricted.27 This integration ensures that people of all racial groups and economic classes grow up in relatively similar environments in terms of housing quality, services provided, cultural opportuni- ties, and, to a lesser extent, primary school quality.28 If one believes in the primacy of nurture over nature in human development, this environmental equality is per- haps the most important means of leveling the societal playing field. The leveling effect seems even more powerful when this system is compared to other countries (the U.S., Brazil, India, etc.) where disadvantaged groups tend to live and remain in deteriorating, service-deficient, crime-ridden neighborhoods.
VI. THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
After the proverbial playing field has been leveled by ethnic self-help groups and the public housing program, the educational system ostensibly streams indi- viduals to the appropriate socioeconomic position by assessing their level of merit objectively. The educational system is the primary engine driving Singapore’s meritocratic sorting process. The other fundamental national ideal, multi- racialism, is also deeply imbedded in the system, since schooling is the means of establishing multilingualism and insuring that the appropriate “cultural ballast” is imparted to all citizens.
Although establishing a fair meritocracy and a harmonious multiracial society have been constant underlying goals of the educational system since inde- pendence, it is questionable whether these goals have been met. As a result of certain structural inequalities in the educational system and a general social bias
26 There is also a requirement that no neighborhood be more than 84 percent Chinese, 22 percent Malay or 10 percent Indian and Eurasian.
27 See Lai (1995: 122). The restriction operates by allowing members of the over represented group to sell their housing unit to anyone, while members of the other groups can sell only to the non- over represented groups. Thus the ethnic makeup is not permitted to worsen. The policy structure can make it more difficult for minorities living in a Chinese enclave to find a buyer since they are restricted to selling only to non-Chinese. It should be noted that the policy of racial housing quotas also serves to break up the minority electorate and also could be seen as part of a government effort to prevent the development of Malay-led opposition. See Tremewan (1994:143) for further discussion of the government stance toward minority opposition.
28 Location is one of several factors that play a role in determining which school a child attends. Test scores play perhaps the most important role.
MULTIRACIALISM AND MERITOCRACY
353
toward the Chinese, Chinese students seem to enjoy an educational advantage that contributes to their disproportionate economic success.
Streaming Exams and Pass Rate Differences
The government has used the educational system to foster multiracialism through multilingualism and to instill a national ideology through a standardized state approved curriculum. However, Lee also saw education as an avenue towards establishing an ideal economic culture where the talented and hard working were to be identified, carefully developed, and given the incentive to achieve maximum production. A very strong emphasis was placed on cultivating an elite, since it was felt that these individuals would lead development.
Consistent with this ideology, the educational system began a system of sorting in 1960. A streaming exam, the Primary School Leaving Exam (PSLE), was to be given at the end of six years of schooling, after which the top 20 percent were identified as the elite, and sent on to the academic stream where they could be molded into economic and political leaders.29 The remaining students were channeled into a much less prestigious vocational stream.
As the educational system has evolved, additional streaming exams have been added. Currently, streaming takes place four times, once after three years of primary school, the PSLE after an additional three to five years of primary school, the O Level (and N Level for lower stream students) after secondary school, and finally the A Level after the pre-university stage. These exams place students in a stream deemed appropriate to their intellectual level. Thus they ostensibly allow schools to cater to students’ specific needs and keep them in the educational system longer. In addition, they allow the government to focus disproportionate educational resources on the students identified as the nation’s elite at an earlier age.30 Elite-oriented funding continues at all levels of the system and is par- ticularly concentrated on tertiary education, which is, for practical purposes, only available to those initially channeled to the high streams.
Study of streaming exam pass rates illuminates many characteristics of the educational system and of Singaporean society. The most glaring feature is the pattern of stark differences in pass rates by race (Table 3).31 The O Level pass rates
29 See Tremewan (1994: 84). 30 See Tremewan (1994: 111). 31 PSLE rates can be broken down by subject. Although gaps have narrowed remarkably in
English over the past decade, Chinese students receive by far the highest scores in math and science, followed by Indians and then Malays. Since these subjects are the focus of the educational system and become increasingly more so as students progress, pass rate gaps may illuminate significant skill differentials belied by the convergence of ethnic qualification for secondary school.
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354
T ab
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MULTIRACIALISM AND MERITOCRACY
355
are particularly disturbing, since they show that 91.6 percent of Chinese students qualified to move on to pre-university or a polytechnic, while nearly 25 percent of Malay students did not even earn their secondary school certificate.
The PSLE scores provide some hope, as they indicate some convergence in scores. However, such hope may be specious as the Malay student cohort that generated a rise in PSLE pass rates in 1991, generated a fall in the three O Level pass rate in 1995. Moreover, these results only show overall qualification for sec- ondary school (with the PSLE) and pre-university (with the O Level). They do not show the stream students are tracked into within an educational level. This is significant because the educational system is specifically designed to provide a higher quality education for high performing students, which may explain why a rise in PSLE rates does not necessarily later translate into a rise in O Level pass rates.
Sharply unequal interracial performance on streaming exams ultimately mani- fests itself in the tertiary level of the educational system, where Chinese students are grossly over represented. In 1990, Chinese students constituted 90.4 percent of the university population while Malays and Indians made up 3.5 and 4.8 per- cent respectively (Department of Statistics 1994, 4: xvi).32 Since university gradu- ates earn 227 percent more than upper secondary graduates (Department of Statistics 1994, 3: 19), the overrepresentation of Chinese students in the university undoubtedly will continue to have negative effects on the future interracial distribution of income.
Explanations
In a fair multiracial meritocracy, the premise is that a social hierarchy is necessary and desirable. Fairness does not lead to egalitarianism but to what is believed to be a justly stratified society. Thus, the educational system’s focus on the cultivation of the elite must, for the moment, be taken as a necessary and correct policy. Since stratification is the goal of the educational system, the real question in assessing the success of sorting mechanisms from the Singaporean perspective is: “Does the system assess merit fairly and objectively, regardless of class and ethnicity?” If the answer is no, the implications go far beyond the educational system, casting doubt on whether the Singaporean economy is truly fair, multiracially oriented, or meritocratic.
Evidence presented in the previous section showed that the Chinese signifi- cantly outperform Indians and Malays in streaming exams, resulting in Chinese
32 It is also worth noting that Malays and Indians that do go to university in Singapore are over represented in the much less prestigious Arts and Social Sciences faculty. See Department of Statistics (1994, 5: 15).
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overrepresentation in tertiary education. These differentials could be explained using Lee’s distasteful genetic arguments or, more logically, by the environmental/ nurture argument that well educated, more affluent parents are able to give educational advantages to their children. Of course, the latter argument would be inconsistent with the ideal of fair meritocracy, where individuals are judged and rewarded on their achieved merit rather than inherited advantage or disadvantage.
The environmental argument is undoubtedly a part of the explanation for dis- proportionately high Chinese education performance given the system’s emphasis on early streaming. However, there are other structural characteristics of the edu- cational system that favor the Chinese and the relatively rich, including the extra educational opportunities available to the affluent, the trend toward privatization of education, the Special Assistance Plan (SAP), and the unavoidable effects of racial stereotypes on economic performance.
Advantages of the Rich
Perhaps the greatest bias in Singaporean education comes from the advantages available to the rich. Although these advantages are not unique to Singapore, and indeed, may be a universal social characteristic, they are worth mentioning since they affect the extent to which the system is truly fair and meritocratic. Since the Chinese on average are disproportionately more advantaged than Malays or Indians, and these advantages have implications for the racial distribution of opportunity.
One of wealth’s tangible educational advantages in Singapore arises from the emphasis on private, extracurricular tutorial services. Because the educational system has become so competitive and economic success is almost wholly deter - mined by educational success, there has been an ever -increasing demand for extra instruction outside of school. Presently, private tuition is so common that it is almost expected. In securing high quality tuition, the rich have an obvious advantage— money—that gives their children an advantage in school performance. However, recently this advantage has been partially countered by the emergence of tutorial programs sponsored by self-help groups. All of these tutorial programs have some provision that allows low-income families to send their children at no or low cost.
Another serious educational advantage of wealth comes from insufficient uni- versity seats and the increasing trend toward reducing educational subsidies. The first advantage is explained simply. There are more qualified students than positions at the national universities, particularly in high-paying fields.33 The high
33 The information on funding of tertiary education comes from Shantakumar (1996).
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achieving students that are turned away are faced with three options—attend one of the considerably less prestigious Polytechnics, attend Singapore Institute of Management (a new, small private university), or leave Singapore. The third option is quite popular as 34 percent of all university students are studying outside of Singapore, the vast majority of whom are Chinese students.34 Since there is no public assistance for overseas or private study, these options are available only to the rich. Given the substantial financial reward for university education, an insufficient supply of university seats is a serious problem and a serious dis- advantage for those who cannot afford alternate university education.
Even if more university seats were created, it is possible that the effects would be nullified by another trend—reducing educational subsidies and bringing fees closer to the actual cost of education. Like housing, government subsidies to education were never intended as a form of welfare. Instead they were meant as a means of achieving national goals and increasing production to the point that subsidies were no longer necessary. Because of the high returns to university edu- cation, the government has decided that the time is right to reduce subsidies and increase university fees. The argument is that it is unfair for those who are going to be making the highest incomes to receive a subsidy financed by the general taxpayer. This sound argument has even greater validity in the context of a multi- racial society where most of those tracked into the universities are affluent Chinese.
The problem with this otherwise logical trend comes when poor students make it through the system and are faced with these new, higher fees. To mitigate this, the government has set up a Tuition Loan Fund that defers interest payment until after graduation, but these loans only cover 50 percent of fees at maximum. The rest of the fees and expenses usually come from personal funds, private loans, or loans from the family’s CPF account. These sources are likely to be negligible or non-existent to poor families. However, self-help group loans and bursary pro- grams and other loan sources recently have emerged as an encouraging response to this problem.
Advantages Specific to Chinese Students
In addition to being disproportionately rich and thus receiving a disproportionate amount of the advantages of the educational system associated with affluence, the Chinese have two other unique advantages in the educational system, namely the
34 Department of Statistics (1994, 3: 21). Chinese students make up 85.3 percent of the popu- lation studying in universities abroad.
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Special Assistance Plan (SAP) and the stereotypes associated with being Chinese in Singapore. The SAP is the only exception made to equal treatment of the races in the educational system. Established in 1980, the SAP converted some secondary schools into very prestigious bilingual Mandarin and English schools that place a strong emphasis on instilling Chinese culture. The schools are extremely well funded and accept only the top 8 percent of Chinese performers on the PSLE.
The existence of elite Chinese schools enhanced Malay and Indian fears of a culturally Chinese, rather than a multiracial, Singapore. As a part of the engine of meritocracy, SAP schools also call into question the interracial fairness of the educational system, particularly within the context of an explicitly elitist edu- cational system. It is very difficult to justify different treatment of the aca- demically elite Chinese from elite Indian or Malay students, particularly in a multiracial meritocracy. SAP schools are not even billed as “separate but equal,” as the SAP schools are unarguably better funded and more prestigious than regular schools. Moreover, similar Malay and Tamil schools were not created.
The other advantage enjoyed by Chinese students is that of the positive Chinese stereotype in Singapore. As noted above, the Chinese are generally considered to be intelligent and hard working, a fact that undoubtedly provides Chinese students with self-confidence and a bonus in educators’ assumptions about their capa- bilities. In contrast, Malay students must deal with stereotypes that they are lazy and unintelligent. Li (1989) provides examples of the salient effects stereotypes have on educational opportunities, such as scheduling high level courses at the same time as mandatory Malay language courses, thus forcing Malay students to take lower track courses regardless of their scores. Although it is difficult to assess the extent to which these stereotypes affect treatment of Malay students, their effects cannot be dismissed. Malay students have a dif ferent “starting line” in the eyes of educators, which impedes the process that determines order in the meritocracy.
VII. NET EFFECT OF EDUCATION AS A FAIR SORTING MECHANISM
Now that the structure and characteristics of the educational system have been described, we can evaluate the question at hand: “Does the Singaporean multi- racial meritocratic system sort individuals fairly and objectively solely on the basis of merit?” Given the various educational advantages of being wealthy, the bias of the SAP, and institutional racism, the answer seems to be “No.” But before con- demning Singapore’s efforts at creating a fair multiracial meritocracy altogether, it is necessary to place the educational system in the context of Singapore’s other social policies and to compare this sum package with other systems in the world.
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When combined with self-help groups and housing policy, many of the obvious shortcomings of the educational system are mitigated at least partially. Public housing, particularly since HDB complexes have been racially integrated, serves to counter many of the environmental advantages of the wealthy. Although the wealth and education level of the parents assuredly has an effect on their children’s performance, most children are raised in very similar physical environ- ments as a part of a very diverse community. Children of poor, less educated families are not isolated in deteriorating neighborhoods to the extent that they would be in the U.S., Brazil, or virtually any other country in the world. Rather they live in well-integrated, well-maintained, well-served communities.
Self-help groups also counter the inequalities of the educational system by providing tutorial programs, extracurricular academic and social activities, as well as education bursaries and loan programs. It is difficult to assess the effective- ness of these programs, but it is perhaps not coincidental that Malay students have been closing the sizable PSLE score gap since the mid-1980s, shortly after the establishment of Mendaki. Both Malay and Indian PSLE pass scores have begun to converge with Chinese scores since the early 1990s, shortly after the expansion of self-help group policy. If this convergence continues in the PSLE and extends to the upper streaming exams as minority high scorers are tracked into higher streams, the educational system could have a much different face in the coming years, provided that CDAC’s funding advantages do not give Chinese students an additional advantage.
Of course, there are still serious flaws in the fairness of the educational system. Self-help groups and housing policy cannot compensate for all of the system’s inequities, nor are these policies without inequities of their own. Racism and the advantages of being rich have impeded and will continue to impede the truly fair functioning of Singapore’s meritocratic sorting process.
But is there anywhere where wealth and race do not affect levels of success and opportunity? It seems unlikely. Singapore is no exception, but it has proved itself to be unusual, if not unique, in taking concrete policy action to try to level the playing field and objectively determine merit. When compared with the United States’ half-hearted attempt at affirmative action and grossly inequitable edu- cational system, Malaysia’s failed attempt at generating equality of results through racial preference, and other unsuccessful or nonexistent attempts to redress racial inequality, Singapore’s flawed efforts at creating a fair multiracial meritocracy begin to look more impressive.
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