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The Shifting Sands o f Peacemaking: Challenges of Multiparty Mediation

Chester A. Crocker Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Intercultural Center Room 801, Washington, d . c . 20057, USA

[E-mail: [email protected])

Fen Osier Hampson Centre for International Governance Innovation, 67 Erb Street West, Waterloo, o n N2L 6C2, Canada

[E-mail:[email protected])

Pamela Aall Centre for International Governance Innovation, 67 Erb Street West, Waterloo, o n N2L 6C2, Canada

[E-mail: pamelaaall@gmaiicom) Received 26 November 2014; accepted 22 February 2015

Abstract

Multiparty mediation, which occurs when two or more third parties cooperate or com­ pete in helping antagonists negotiate a conflict settlement, carries both risks and

Chester Crocker is James R. Schlesinger professor of strategic studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University and distinguished fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. A former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, he is preparing a forthcoming book with Pamela Aall on African conflict management capacity.

** Fen Osier Hampson is Chancellor’s Professor at Carleton University and Distinguished Fellow and Director of the Global Security & Politics Program at the Centre for International Governance Innovation. He is currently completing a book on Trust and Internet Governance.

*** Pamela Aall is Senior Fellow in the Global Security & Politics Program at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Senior Advisor for Conflict Prevention and Management at the u.s. Institute of Peace, and serves on the boards of the International Peace and Security Institute and Women in International Security.

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rewards as a conflict management strategy. Cooperating multiple third parties can increase the chances of crafting an agreement, band together to create greater pres­ sure on the conflict parties to reach agreement, and supply outside resources to help implement the negotiated agreement. Competing multiple third parties can undercut each other, prolonging the conflict and allowing antagonists to resist necessary com­ promises and negotiated concessions. This article examines the changing environ­ ment for multiparty mediation and the impact of five changes that affect the practice of mediation. It derives some interim conclusions about where the field is heading and offers some recommendations for making multiparty engagements more effective.

Keywords

mediation - multiparty mediation - collective conflict management - regional organizations - global polarization

The shape of world politics, especially in the area of conflict management, has changed since the more cooperative period of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War unleashed long-repressed identity antagonisms in Africa, Europe, Asia, and Central America. As difficult as these conflicts were, there was widespread support for the United Nations to act as m ediator and peacekeeper in many of these conflicts. Throughout the 1990s, the un Security Council legitimized un or state-led international interventions in a number of complicated conflicts, including such places as Bosnia and Kosovo, where the u s and Russia had dif­ ferent and potentially clashing interests. Today, the clashing interests between the two P-5 members have prevented Security Council action in Syria, and the deep division between the us and Russia threatens to paralyze the un on other conflicts as well. Other challenges in the international conflict environment arise from the fragmentation of conflict parties that might have shared an ini­ tial common goal - to overthrow a repressive regime - but subsequently spend valuable resources on vying for leadership roles (Themner & Wallensteen 2014). This is not a new phenomenon but as the painful examples of Syria and Libya show, the fractionalization of conflict parties makes fallow ground for negotiation. Another change has been the diffusion of power and agency away from the core (powerful states and the u n ), to regional organizations and other entities. This development may in fact lead to positive outcomes but it complicates the mediation task by introducing many actors into the mediation environment. Mediation has in fact become a crowded field (Svensson 2011; Lanz and Gasser 2013; Vukovic 2015).

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Most mediated interventions in civil and regional conflict situations now involve a broad range of actors in what is referred to as “multiparty media­ tion." This article examines the changing environment for multiparty media­ tion and explores the impact of five specific changes that affect the practice of mediation. It argues that while multiparty mediation will be the dominant peacemaking model in the future, the changes that are taking place in the international environment will have a strong impact on how, when and by whom it is practiced. Looking at specific challenges for mediators, the article concludes that these challenges will impede the ability of parties engaged in multiparty mediation to construct a unified position, which will have a nega­ tive impact on their collective leverage and capacity to help conflict parties to make peace. Finally, the article derives some interim conclusions about where the field is heading, and offers some recommendations for making these mul­ tiparty engagements more effective.

M ediation in a Changing Global Environment

While there is broad agreement that significant power shifts are affecting global politics, scholars are divided about the direction in which the world is moving. Some realists (Mead 2104) argue that “revisionist" powers like Russia, China and Iran are challenging key elements of the international order by attempting to forge in their own neighborhoods new spheres of influence that will ultimately erode the liberal, open international order established after the Second World War. In contrast, liberal scholars (Ikenberry 2014) contend that, although these states are “spoilers” that resent us leadership, they also believe that these emergent powers do not have the capabilities or sufficient "powers of attraction” to overturn existing global rules and institutions. That is because liberal international institutions and the embedded norms within them, as some constructivists argue, continue to exert a powerful attraction on the attitudes and behavior of most states (Avner & Laitin 2004; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Hopf 2011). Liberal and constructivist scholars assert that exist­ ing international institutions and prevailing norms, much like the sun and its gravitational pull, will keep the majority of states within their orbit, especially major emerging economic powers that are also democracies, such as Brazil and India.

W hether they view emergent powers as revisionists or spoilers, most schol­ ars regardless of this theoretical persuasion are in agreement that these states’ behavior has raised new questions about the future of global order. Questions are also raised about a geopolitical landscape that is being transformed as

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economic and military power becomes more diffused and powerful new non­ state actors challenge the sovereign authority of states, while also advancing new political norms of their own (Kupchan 2012, 2014). It is also undeniable that leading democratic powers, like the United States, are struggling to sustain their global roles because of waning public support, sluggish economic perfor­ mance, and shrinking defense budgets (Zoellick 20x2). International institu­ tions are not faring much better. The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria have not only marginalized the un, but also uncovered fundamental disagreements in the global community about how to manage these conflicts (Malone 2006; Mohamed 2012; Thompson 2010).

In broad strokes, this is the world in which current mediation takes place. While practitioners rarely cast their work in abstract terms, the approaches they chose to employ mirror the core theoretical debates described above. Mediation is often described in terms of a relationship between the conflict parties and the mediator, based on the mediator’s ability to help the parties come to agreement (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996; Zartman & Touval 2007). How the mediator helps conflict parties reach an agreement depends both on skill and strategy, but behind the strategy lies the mediator’s theory of change that both reflects his or her analysis of the problem and prescribes a course of action to address that problem and more specifically, to induce parties to move from violence to negotiation (Kleiboer 1998). The realist and liberal debates mentioned above show up in the mediators’ approaches and affect how they choose to engage with the parties.

Some mediators - following the realist school’s assumption that individuals and countries act largely to maximize their own interests - manipulate the cost-benefit ratio of the conflict parties to change their behavior. By raising the cost of continuing to fight and/or raising the benefit of reaching a negoti­ ated agreement, the mediator helps the parties to understand that they have more to gain from resolving the conflict than continuing to fight. This theory of change is premised on the belief that individuals and groups act rationally and will respond to carrots and sticks - the application of leverage - in a ratio­ nal manner. An example often cited is the carrot of promised aid that the US offered to both Israel and Egypt if they signed the 1970s Camp David Accords (Touval & Zartman 1982; Mandell & Tomlin 1991; Kurtzer & Lasensky 2008).

Other mediators, especially those involved in civil wars, focus on gover­ nance, generally in order to ensure that power is shared or distributed more equitably. The theory behind their approach is that the lack of recognition, inclusion and legitimacy is fundamental to most internal conflicts and that the best way to address these grievances is through the creation of representative

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institutions that give voice to all sectors of society or at least to those at the core of the conflict.

This approach reflects some of the same assumptions that lie behind the liberal theorists’ interpretation of the world. Still others - especially those in the non-governmental organization world - concentrate on changing the par­ ties’ perceptions of their own options, positions and perceptions of the other side. This approach is based on the assumption that the fundamental cause of the conflict is subjective and lies in how the parties view each other rather than in measurable inequities and lack of representation. Altering that per­ spective, through joint drafting, problem solving or other activities, helps the parties to compromise on contentious issues. In trying to bring all the Syrian parties to the table to negotiate a political transition in Syria, Lahkdar Brahimi used both of these approaches as the UN-Arab League mediator in 2012-2014.

The mediator’s arsenal usually combines elements of many approaches but generally concentrates more heavily on one or another, according to the medi­ ator’s preferences, available resources and world view. All of these approaches assume that mediators bring considerable leverage to the negotiating table, either through their ability to offer rewards and threaten punishment, or through their capacity to help the conflict parties resolve their differences peacefully. However, as noted above, the changes in the international envi­ ronment discussed in this article have a strong potential to eat away at those sources of leverage, leaving the outside third party in a weak position vis-a-vis the conflict parties and consequently weakening the mediation effort as well.

Mediation and Multiparty Mediation

Mediation comes in various forms and makes use of a wide array of tools and procedures. At its essence is a form of third party intervention in a negotiation when the parties themselves are deadlocked or have reached an impasse and need an interlocutor who can help to exchange messages, sustain communi­ cations, and carry negotiations forward (Greig & Diehl 2012). Mediators can also assist with the delicate task of ensuring that contingent agreements in a negotiation are kept by the parties and that they remain committed to nego­ tiations and agreed outcomes. Mediators who become third parties to what is essentially a triadic bargaining relationship are the agents of “triple talk” but also the surrogates for trust because the parties to the negotiation don’t trust their opponents (Hampson & Zartman 2012). They typically perform a wide variety of tasks in their respective trust-building roles - carrying trustworthy

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messages, bringing new ideas to the table, and even providing a range of inducements and/or sanctions to enhance the prospects for agreement.

The number of institutions that engage in mediation has increased over the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War era, the supply of intermediaries was limited because barriers to engagement were generally high. For those dis­ putes in which there was direct engagement by third parties, it was typically the superpowers themselves who did the mediating, as in the case of the us in the Middle East, or the Soviets when they helped forge a settlem ent between India and Pakistan following the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. In disputes where there was superpower mediation it was generally because warring parties sought mediators with “muscle” who could leverage their adversaries and pro­ vide the requisite security guarantees (Touval and Zartman 1982). Current con­ flicts, by contrast, attract a variety of different actors: large states, small states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and prominent individuals (Bercovitch & Schneider 2000; DeRouen 2015).

Andrew Mack and others have documented a steady rise in the frequency and magnitude of civil wars during the Cold War up until the late i98os-early 1990s when the trend reversed itself and intrastate conflicts experienced a steady decline (Mack 2005, Human Security Report Project 2014). That trend may now be changing as we see a leveling off and even as light uptick of con­ flict onset and frequency over the past several years relating to conflict in the Arab League countries (Marshall 2015). However, unlike civil wars in previ­ ous eras, the majority of conflicts over the past three decades have ended in a negotiated settlement, usually with the assistance of a third party in helping secure a negotiated outcome (Kreutz 2010).

One explanation for the preference for the negotiated resolution of con­ flicts in recent decades is that many of them fall into the category of what Roy Licklider refers to as “long civil wars.” As Licklider observes, “We have some evidence that long civil wars are disproportionately likely to be ended with negotiated settlements rather than military victory. This is plausible since a long civil war means that neither side has been able to achieve a military vic­ tory." (Licklider 2005:39)

The increase in mediation is also explained by international systemic change following the end of the Cold War, which witnessed greater engage­ m ent by the United Nations in conflict management, including the mediation and negotiation of international disputes (Myint-U 2006). The same is true more recently of regional and sub-regional organizations, which have also expanded their conflict management roles within their own neighborhoods, often with the direct support and backing of the wider international com-

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munity (Wallensteen & Bjurner 2015; Tuominen & Cristescu 2012; Haacke & Williams 2011).

A variety of state and non-state actors have also stepped in to offer their services in conflict management and resolution processes. For example, small and medium-sized powers, like Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, which had long been active in international peacekeeping opera­ tions, have offered their negotiation and intermediary services to warring parties (Princen 1992; Tuominen & Cristescu 2012.). From the Middle East to Central America to Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, these countries have played key roles in instigating negotiations between warring sides, back- stopping negotiations once they got underway, and ensuring that the parties remained committed to the peace process after a negotiated settlement was concluded. Prominent international nongovernmental organizations, like the Community of Sant’Egidio - a Catholic lay organization that has been active as a mediator in Mozambique, Algeria, and Kosovo - have also played key roles in bringing parties to the negotiating table and creating much-needed forums for dialogue, discussion, and negotiation, especially at the inter-communal and societal levels (Sengulane & Goncalves 1998; Bartoli 1999). The partner­ ship established between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has taken this process another step further by consciously developing global and regional mediator networks that include both official and non-officials practitioners.

These mediating institutions enter the global security and conflict manage­ ment space, either by offering direct military and humanitarian assistance to key parties in those conflicts, or via their own forms of diplomatic engagement and negotiated interventions. Multiparty mediation occurs when two or more of these third parties cooperate or compete in helping antagonists negotiate a settlement to a conflict. Multiparty mediation interventions can take place simultaneously as a variety of different mediators act together at the same time or sequentially as one mediator intervenes in a conflict on the heels of another. Conflicts may experience recurring attempts at mediation by differ­ ent actors over their life cycle. Multiparty mediation can be undertaken by a composite actor (international organization, regional organization, or some other collective body) - which presents its own unique, internal coordination challenges - and sometimes by more than one set of composite actors at the same time. Multiparty mediation is one of the defining characteristics of triple talk in today's world as different mediators step into conflicts in an attem pt to forge trust and sponsor negotiations (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2001; Hampson & Zartman 2012).

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The presence of multiple mediators working on a peace process marks a change over the past twenty years. In the early 1990s, there were only a handful of persons, outside the u n and a few powerful states, who had the necessary resources and backing to serve as intermediaries in interstate or intrastate con­ flicts. In 1997, the u.s. Institute of Peace held a meeting of mediators who had been engaged in a num ber of prominent peacemaking efforts in the previous decade - including Angola, the Balkans, Cambodia, Ecuador-Peru, El Salvador, Haiti, Middle East, Mozambique, Namibia, and Northern Ireland. Most of these mediators had never met each other, even though they were all practi­ tioners of multiparty processes (Crocker, Hampson, Aall 1999). Fifteen years later, the scene is very different. There has been a proliferation of mediators ready to take on the job of promoting talks between unwilling actors. There are annual meetings for mediators in Oslo as well as frequent regional meetings.1 The United Nations has established a Mediator Support Unit; organizations such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre ( k a i p t c ) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy regularly hold mediation classes to help practitioners navigate the complex world of mediation.

Multiparty mediation carries both risks and rewards as a conflict man­ agement strategy. On the plus side, multiple third parties that cooperate can increase the chances of crafting an agreement, as they band together to create greater pressure on the conflict parties to reach agreement, and supply out­ side resources to help implement the negotiated agreement. The availability of different mediators can open up new avenues for dialogue - as happened when Norway hosted the unofficial talks that led to the Oslo Accords in 1993, and when the n g o , the Community of Sant’Egidio engaged with the parties in Mozambique in the early 1990s - either by opening up a new track because all others have been exhausted or as serving as an informal, Track 11 prelude that helps to set the table for subsequent formal negotiations. This is all the more important when existing talks have run their course or have grown stale.

Different mediators bring different assets, skills, and capabilities to the bar­ gaining table (Fisher 2007). Together they can multiply the sources of leverage and influence over the parties while bringing additional external inducements to the table. Multiple mediators can also help spread the costs and risks of negotiation both to themselves and to warring parties. Depending on their relationship to the parties to a dispute, they can also work together to iso­ late spoilers or exercise joint leverage to bring them on board. An example is ‘friends groups’, created to support the mediator and offer useful connections to the warring sides. When properly structured, such groups can strengthen

1 These meetings are organized by the Centre for H umanitarian Dialogue w ith support from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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third party processes (Whitfield 2007). Nongovernmental organizations and mediators from civil society - so-called Track 11 mediators - can also assist by market-testing new ideas with conflict parties before they are introduced into formal talks. They have an important role to play with the vital task of constit­ uency-building (as in the case of Tajikistan where the non-official Inter-Tajik Dialogue, helped to make the peace process a multi-level one with different actors working in complementary ways) at the inter-communal level, which is vital for a viable peace process (Saunders 2001).

Mediators in a multiparty undertaking also often bring different resources and skills to triadic bargaining situations. The actual identity of any given mediator may also m atter a great deal to certain parties who will prefer that mediator to others. Different mediators may possess different resources such as ‘power,’ ‘expert knowledge,’ and procedural and negotiation skills that they bring to the table (Rubin 1981). One of the challenges of multiparty mediation is to harness the different skills and capabilities of different mediators so that the sum is greater than the individual parts.

However, multiparty mediation comes with its own unique liabilities. More is not necessarily better if the parties decide to go forum shopping, and start playing different mediators off against each other. Third parties may not agree on the best strategy to help the process along, and may intentionally or unin­ tentionally compete for the parties’ attention. Multiple third parties that com­ pete can undercut each other, prolonging the conflict and sparing antagonists the need to make the necessary difficult compromises and negotiated conces­ sions (Boehmelt 2011; Coordination and Liaison Office of the a u Panel 2014; Vukovic 2015). When mediators follow each other in sequence, unless there is a careful, well-scripted hand-off from one mediator to another, the ball can be dropped, sowing confusion and disrupting talks. If things start to go badly and begin to unwind in a peace process, the tem ptation for different mediators to pass the buck or blame others can grow unless there is strong leadership and a joint sense of unwavering commitment to a peace process. It is important to recognize, nonetheless, that a greater supply of mediators does not necessarily mean that enough mediators are involved in the mediation process, or that the mediator on the job is the most appropriate one.

M ediation and Leverage

Mediation, while still an art, is becoming more of a science, as institutions mine for lessons learned and best practices. A number of scholars and practi­ tioners have developed recommendations to address the challenges of multi­ party mediation and to make it more effective. These recommendations center

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around the need to build pressure on a process and a coordinated response around a lead mediator, with subsidiary actors providing support and leverage to the principal intermediary (Iji 2009; Boehmelt 2011).

Leverage comes in several variants. Zartman and Touval have argued that it comes from the parties’ own need for help as well as from a third party’s skill, persuasiveness, control of carrots and sticks, creative ability to build entic­ ing solutions by eliciting reciprocal moves from each side, and the ability to walk away (or as James A. Baker once put it, ‘they have my phone num ber’) (Zartman & Touval 2007; Baker 1999). To this list we might add: (a) the capacity to build up strong and unified negotiating sides with which to work; (b) the possibility of ‘borrowing’ leverage from other actors (states, international and regional organizations, and friends of the sides); and, (c) the capacity to foster a unified ‘external’ context that surrounds the conflict parties and which they cannot break apart or split. This inventory suggests that there are plenty of things that imaginative and well-resourced mediators can do to gain leverage and influence with the parties.

Our premise is that all mediators need to develop some type of leverage or base of power in order to become interesting and helpful to the conflict par­ ties. Such leverage comes in many forms (Bercovitch & Rubin 1992), including the possibility of borrowing leverage from other actors - official, inter-state, non-official, individual - to build a supportive coalition behind the mediation effort. Ideally, we argue, a mediator seeks to maintain (or build from scratch) a politically unified environment around the conflict parties. If, as Touval and Zartman have argued, ‘leverage is the ticket’ in mediation, we believe that coherence is the ticket to acquiring effective leverage (Touval & Zartman 2001). In the case of the multiparty mediation efforts that are an increasingly com­ mon feature of the modern diplomatic scene, such coherence is even more important and more challenging. In sum, multiparty mediation requires a full measure of both, internal and external coherence in order to be effective with the conflict parties.

In cases of mediation success, third parties have taken advantage of several of these leverage resources. In the Ecuador-Peru inter-state case of 1995-98, the mediators were the historic guarantors defined in a 1943 Rio Protocol, and they worked together closely, surrounding the conflict parties, coaching and planting ideas, and ultimately found themselves being asked to propose the solution (Einaudi 1999). A more arduous but eventually successful case occurred in El Salvador where a UN-designated mediator managed to m ain­ tain balanced pressures on the sides until the deal was concluded (De Soto 1999). A striking parallel took place in Mozambique where the Catholic lay

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group Sant’Egidio facilitated dialogue and handed a partial peace framework off to relevant state actors and the United Nations to complete the process (Bartoli 1999). The Cambodia settlem ent process also reflected a substan­ tial measure of external coherence enabling third parties to be successful (Solomon 2000). Civil war was narrowly averted in Macedonia in 2001 immedi­ ately following the Kosovo war through the coordinated diplomatic and mili­ tary actions of the e u , n a t o , the us, and o s c e and others (Bender 2013).

Given that multiparty mediation has become the norm in most conflict management situations, the questions surrounding how to initiate and keep a process moving forward become more complicated. The harnessing exer­ cise essential to effective multiparty mediation may be possible when there is a lead mediator capable of managing a complex, hybrid effort. However, the current international environment presents challenges that will not be easy to overcome. Some of the literature on mediation presupposes a relatively empowered central mediator backed by the United Nations or a powerful state, such as the United States. They look back to the lessons learned from the 1990s, when the rules of engagement for coordinated international action, especially in the humanitarian intervention sphere, were being written. These rules, which included u n Security Council authorization and the cooperation of key international actors, provided a model for managing multiparty media­ tion. The world, however, has gone in a different direction since that time. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at times marginalized the u n , uncovered fun­ damental disagreements in the global community, and brought new actors - some good and some bad - to the fore.

In this more complex and diffuse global environment, mediators will not be effective unless they can develop and maintain essential leverage and can overcome the variety of changes to which we now turn.

Changes in the M ediation Environment

A num ber of fundamental changes have affected the mediation space, includ­ ing the increasing activity of regional organizations and ad hoc groupings in conflict management, the rise of non-state actors as parties to conflict, the growing political polarization between and among key international actors, and the pressure to mediate even when there is little chance of success. All of these changes affect the mediator’s ability to develop traction and to maintain pressure on a process.

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Change #1 Growing Regional Self-assertion and Sense o f Empowerment in Regions

The growing involvement of regional organizations in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and mediation has introduced a new dynamic into the conflict management arena. The African continent has been particularly active in this regard. Over the past five years, the African Union has sponsored peacekeep­ ing missions in Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Burundi. Sub-regional organizations such as ecowas (Economic Community of West African States) and sadc. (South African Development Community) form the regional components of the continent-wide African Peace and Security Architecture. ECOWAS especially has had substantial experience in peace operations in its own region of West Africa. Hybrid operations, which pair African peacekeepers with un or state-based operations (usually French or British), have also become more frequent. In addition to the peace operations engagement, there is equal activity on the political side. In 2014 the African Union had on its list twelve special envoys (or their equivalents) to conflicts or on behalf of special issues or populations.

Other continents have also developed their own conflict management structures. In Latin America, conflict management is highly institutional­ ized (Herz 2011). The institutional web includes robust organizations as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements providing frameworks for the settle­ ments of disputes ranging from border disputes to disarmament. In Southeast Asia, the ‘asean way’ stresses the culturally important non-confrontational approach to problem-solving (Bitzinger & Desker 2011). In Europe the growth of regional conflict management institutions and aspirations has been nothing short of remarkable even recognizing that the resulting capacity falls short of the elaborate architecture (Bailes 2011).

The impact on mediation of this growth in regional conflict management is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, regional organizations act as legitimizers of further international engagement. As Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams point out, regional organizations are playing a role as ‘gatekeep­ ers,’ in un Security Council and national debates on how engagement with a regional conflict is framed and what options for its resolution emerge from the debate (Bellamy & Williams 2011). They draw this conclusion looking at the role that the Arab League played in the lead up to the international engage­ m ent in Libya and that which ecowas played in the UN’s role in Cote d’Ivoire. It also is apparent in the Arab League’s forceful position on the Syrian civil war and in a more muted example in the asean countries continuing attem pt to bring in countervailing forces (notably India and the United States) to China’s regional heft.

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On the other hand, the gatekeeper role is not consistent across regions or conflicts. If regional organizations can act to bring in outsiders and impart legitimacy to an international engagement, they can also attem pt to keep key international actors out. The African Union was vocal in its opposition to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, although in the end it had little impact on the conflict. In other cases, regional organizations are notably absent in dealing with serious conflicts in their neighborhoods. While regional actors including Venezuela, Chile and Cuba, are active in mediating talks between the Government of Colombia and the farc, neither the Organization of American States (oas) nor the Union of South American Nations (usasu r) has played a significant role in the Colombia conflict (Washington Office on Latin America 2013). At other times, regional organizations themselves have been locked out from an active role in a regional conflict or have been hampered by internal splits among their memberships, as happened with the osce in Georgia in 2009 (Robinson, 2009). At other times, a regional organization becomes the target of the conflict itself, as seems to be the case with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (o sc e ) in the current Ukrainian crisis (Bell 2014).

The variable but increasingly active role that regional organizations play raises the question of whether all peace processes will be required to have a regional organization sign-off in order to be perceived as legitimate. If regional approval in some form will be required, would it be sufficient to have the per­ mission of one regional organization or would all, or a majority of regional organizations need to approve? W hat if the regional organizations disagreed, as was the case with international engagement in Libya? Whatever the answer to these questions, it is clear that increasing regional engagement brings both advantages and disadvantages, adding much needed legitimacy while also adding another layer of decision-making complexity and potential discord to the mediation task.

Change #2: Rising Regional and Global Polarization A complicating factor for multiparty mediation - including mediation involv­ ing regional institutions - are the pressures flowing from rising regional and global polarization. This polarization in the geopolitical environment - glob­ ally and in certain regions - can make it more difficult for the mediator to borrow leverage and build external coherence in the conflict environment. Yet these resources may be of central importance in the ripening process. In the Western Hemisphere, the Venezuelan political crisis triggers dialogue appeals from Pope Francis, un Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and four former Latin American presidents. But the region is polarized over a range of socio-political

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issues and ideological divides. As mentioned in the previous section, this polar­ ization has taken the oas off the table as a peacemaker in a num ber of Latin American conflicts. With regard to Venezuela, the oas is divided and unable to act beyond adopting pro-regime platitudes expressing “appreciation, full sup­ port, and encouragement for the initiatives and the efforts of the democrati­ cally-elected Government of Venezuela and all political, economic, and social sectors to continue to move forward with the process of national dialogue towards political and social reconciliation, in the framework of full respect by all democratic actors for the constitutional guarantees of all.” (Organization of American States 2014).

Polarization flourishes in Middle Eastern councils. Admittedly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (with solid u n Secretariat support) was able to offer useful proposals for de-escalating the 2011 Yemen civil war and political cri­ sis, supporting the country’s transition to the post-Ali Abdullah Saleh era ( u n Department of Political Affairs 2014). But this is the exception to a pattern of regional polarities between Shia and Sunni, Iranians and Saudis, Qataris and several Gulf neighbors, Israelis and Palestinians (among others), and Syrians and several key neighbors - a pattern that defies coherent interna­ tional support for mediated solutions. In such an environment, local conflicts quickly become regionalized (and, in some cases internationalized), acquir­ ing additional dimensions of intractability that reduce a mediator’s lever­ age, and remove some potentially useful regional mediators from the scene (Kodmani 2011).

The challenge of borrowing leverage and building a unified external con­ text for mediation varies by region and by conflict type. Thus, in Southeast Asia there is sharp and growing geopolitical polarization over Chinese mari­ time claims, creating a cloud of division and security anxieties. However, in the internal conflicts in Myanmar/Burma, Philippines/Mindanao and Thailand this factor does not appear to have interfered with local conflict resolution ini­ tiatives. In South Asia, by contrast, the contested territorial status of Kashmir is an ‘impacted’ conflict that appears hostage to the broader India-Pakistan rivalry, and indirectly to the unresolved Sino-Indian differences. In Africa, sub­ regional polarization also affects deep-rooted differences in the Sudans, the Great Lakes states, the Maghreb, and, more recently, the Sahelian aftermath of Qadhafi’s overthrow. On the other hand, greater external coherence made it possible for third parties to mount effective conflict prevention or manage­ m ent efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique and even Somalia.

The case of Syria offers eloquent testimony to the potential for destructive interaction to develop between internal, regional and global cleavages creating

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an apparently insuperable barrier to mediation ripeness. The nominally unani­ mous international support for the UN/Arab League-based efforts of eminent mediators Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi in Geneva was not able to produce forward movement due in part to the levels of polarization that stood in its way (Crocker, Hampson, Aall & Palamar 2014).

The interesting question for mediators is whether disunity and polariza­ tion are gaining ground. A related - and perhaps more important - question to consider mediators is whether global sources of polarization will spill into regional conflicts to a greater degree. Several lines of cleavage have emerged since the mid-1990s and especially in the first decade of this century: the divi­ sion between market capitalism and state capitalism; the pattern of com­ petitive coexistence between the u s and China; periodic tensions between emerging b r i c s and o e c d states over governance of global institutions; the split between the u.s. and Russia over Russian claims to recognition of its spe­ cial interests in its ‘near abroad’; and, the place of Western-originated global norms relating to individual rights, internet freedom, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the role of the I C C in the justice and accountability field. In a more globally fragmented world, the notion of the international community will be increasingly put to the test (Lindberg 2014). Again, the question for mediation practitioners is to identify in what types of conflicts and in which regions will these sources of polarization complicate the creation of unified external con­ texts from which leverage can be borrowed.

Change #3: Ad Hoc Responses to Problems Another response to the ‘over-stretch’ experienced by the major conflict man­ agement providers has been the development of informal arrangements, such as groups consisting of ‘friends of the process’ which support a peace process or particular task in a peace process. These informal arrangements are temporary, organized around a specific problem, and tend to dissolve as the issue moves to resolution or becomes less salient. These arrangement form part of what we have called elsewhere ‘collective conflict management’ efforts (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2011). They are ad hoc, impermanent collectivities, which sometimes bring together unlike organizations to perform specific tasks. They are practical and often based on self-interest - i.e. addressing piracy offshore Somalia in the Arabian Sea - or to add a more robust element to an on-going peace process.

As such these collective arrangements do not involve enduring relation­ ships among collaborating organizations. They can be either unscripted arrangements or part of a collective mission statement. However, the coop­ eration is not treaty-based as in formal arrangements like collective defense

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and collective security. Membership can involve official and non-official actors and they may be organized around a single conflict and disbanded once that conflict is resolved. Such interventions, including those of the mediation vari­ ety, are motivated by organizational and/or national interests of those who do it. Intervention is based on the recognition that mediators have limitations in terms of their respective capacities, mandates and reach and that there is greater strength in numbers. The participants in these ventures don’t want exclusive ownership of the problem, but they also don’t want to pass the buck completely. These cooperative ventures present low barriers to engagement and relatively low transaction costs, but also low exit costs if things go badly. The International Contact Group (i c g ) for the Philippines peace process between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is an example of a grouping of various actors whose task is to pro­ vide mediation support to Malaysia, the principal mediator of the talks. The ICG’s membership includes Japan, Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation Resources, Muhammadiyah, and the Community of Sant’Egidio; in other words, four countries and four non-governmental organizations (Hopmann 2013). Not long ago, this would have been a very unlikely group, mixing differ­ ent nationalities and different (and sometime competing) organizations. This new model, however, seems to have helped the talks to proceed along.

It is not clear whether these current informal groupings make for an efficient model for conflict management dependent on problem-oriented temporary alliances rather than established institutional structures. Questions around their management, funding, ability to commit and effectiveness abound. Will these groupings need a dominant member, a hegemon, to lead the decision­ making and provide the monetary resources? Will they engage only where members have clear interests and clear objectives? Is it possible for horizon­ tally networked mediation actors to establish a collegial culture that may not require the presence of a dominant member? The answers to these questions will determine whether collective conflict management (c c m ) initiatives are able to muster sufficient leverage to engage on high politically polarizing con­ flicts or whether their relatively weak structures will confine their action to those forgotten crises, far from the spotlight of international attention.

Change #4: No Walk in the Woods: Difficulties o f Talking to Non-State Actors

As the share of conflicts involving an armed, non-state movement has grown, the questions facing mediators have multiplied. What is new here is not the challenge of how incumbent regimes should negotiate with armed insurgents

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(extremists or terrorists in some lexicons). That was the dilemma facing the British and French through much of the decolonization decades, the u s in Southeast Asia, the Israelis before and since Oslo, and the Russians in Afghanistan and the Caucasus. Those are bilateral policy challenges for incum­ bents facing armed rebels. The more recent challenge is when mediators are faced with the question of whom to include in a peace process and what limits or conditions to impose on such engagements. This raises two questions about third party tradecraft.

First, there is the issue of how to operate in a mediation environment heavily constrained by the shunning and proscribing of contact with armed extremist groups on one or more of the terrorism lists adopted by the u n , the us, or the e u . Or, to put it more positively, what can be done to work around these legal and policy constraints, and open up possibilities for engagement in appropri­ ate circumstances? More concretely, what lessons can be learned from recent cases where the constraints have been avoided and, alternatively, where they have blocked mediator engagement? These issues have been the subject of periodic discussion among practitioners as well as occasional efforts to seek relief or waivers from official government agencies (Dudouet 2010; Knopf 2011; Pettyjohn 2011; Berghof 2014). Each aspect of the problem - indiscriminate pro­ scription, legal constraint on engagement, obstacles to obtaining case-by-case waivers - warrants continued scrutiny and concerted effort to overcome the effect of decisions that risk producing a climate of unilateral disarmament in the field of mediation. Some estimates suggest that nearly fifty percent of the armed, non-state conflict actors are on one or more of the terrorism lists. The impact of the post-9/11 security environment on mediation and conflict resolu­ tion efforts can be seen in such conflict arenas as Spain, Sri Lanka, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Colombia - to name but a few examples. Mediation practitioners are focused on the challenge and discussing how to manage it. A parallel development with implications for peacemakers is the impact of ic c indictments of conflict actors (official and non-state) as in Sudan and Uganda (Africa Mediators’ Retreat 2013).

Second, there is the challenge of determining when to talk to such groups, what to talk about, and what conditions to place on the talk (Hampson & Zartman 2012). Advocates of lifting or removing constraints on mediating and negotiating with such groups need to make their case with reference to the advantages as well as the risks of doing so. Engagement does not mean con­ ferring legitimacy on the target; rather it involves exerting pressure, by rais­ ing questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing its assumptions and testing the possibility of moderation by raising awkward questions. In the mediation context, talking with armed rebels may be the only way to identify

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their real political constituency and political agenda (if these exist) and to explore the possibility of co-opting them away from the gun and into politics. Paradoxically, ostracizing and seeking to isolate these actors runs the addi­ tional risk of marginalizing the mediator.

But there are difficulties and risks in choosing to mediate with insurgent armed groups. Apart from political controversy, there is the challenge of con­ trolling the message one is sending so that legitimacy is not conferred and alternative non-violent political groupings are not undermined. A related issue is how to prevent the target from successfully exploiting its inclusion in a pro­ cess and then monopolizing the political space and dominating the negotia­ tion of a new order in order to entrench its position. An associated challenge is to devise ways of including insurgent rebels without threatening or scaring away government officials on the other side of the conflict (Crocker 2013).

These considerations underscore the substantial benefits that can flow from multiparty mediation mechanisms, especially those that reflect a composite structure of states acting in concert with other entities such as regional orga­ nizations and non-governmental groups. As discussed in the previous sec­ tion, the catalog of third parties engaged in the Philippines-Mindanao process could be an interesting harbinger, especially in cases that include politically controversial armed actors (Hopmann 2013).

Change #5: The Growing “Responsibility to Mediate” An early response to conflict on any continent in almost any circumstance is a call for mediation, for a political intervention to bring fighting parties to the negotiating table in the search for a mediated settlement. In the early days of the crisis over Crimea, there were attempts to establish a contact group con­ sisting of Russia, Ukraine, Britain, France and the u s in order to defuse the cri­ sis. The un itself called for mediation in the Central African Republic civil war in early February 2014 as fighting was raging between Muslim and Christian factions (un 2014). Syria has seen two separate mediation phases, both under the auspices of the un and the Arab League. As noted earlier, there seems to be a global preference for mediation over armed intervention or victory of one side over another, despite findings that suggest civil wars ending in political settlement face a great risk of re-erupting and that argue the most stable war termination strategy is victory (Toft 1999).

Mediation has always been on the table as a way to manage conflict. The drive toward mediation, however, increased dramatically in the past 25 years. In this way, it is similar to pressures on key international actors to provide human as well as global security. In 2005, at the u n World Summit, 191 coun­ tries endorsed the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). In so doing, the Summit agreed that if a state could not or would not protect its people

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from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, then the international community had a responsibility to provide that protec­ tion ( u n Outcome Document 2005). The sanctity of national sovereignty took a direct hit in that encounter. There seems to be a parallel development in the mediation field, with a tacit “responsibility to mediate” arising in cases in which states cannot or will not resolve their conflicts, especially in those cases of conflicts that threaten hum an security in and around their neighborhood.

In this regard, we need to be aware of the amplifying nature of social media - situations in which social media captures and broadcasts every move of every player, and at times produces evidence that is not real but is manufactured to support one party’s agenda. The introduction of social media into conflict situ­ ations is likely to result in many more conflicts that ramp up rapidly and then freeze into intractability. Due in part to the 24-hour news cycle, peacemakers have to be one step ahead of this social media wave - the slower, measured processes of the past may become challenged by technology and populist responses to it. Social media increases by an order of magnitude the voices that must be heard in a peacemaking situation, the urgency of demands to ‘do something’, and the pressure on official bodies to take peace initiatives and to be seen doing so, even if there is little prospect of having a positive impact. This drive to mediate regardless of the likelihood of success may serve to weaken the engagement, reducing it to a box that needs to be checked before the inter­ national community intervenes or - more likely - withdraws active support for a peace process.

Strengthening M ultiparty Mediation

As we have seen, today’s mediators face several challenging developments. The mediation field may be entering an era in which there are several classes of cases: those conflicts that are accessible to external help; conflicts that are impacted in a broader strategic stalemate because potential mediators are deeply committed to a regional ally; conflicts that fester on due to the fact that they are subsidiary to larger stakes of higher importance to external actors; and conflict orphans that fail to get the sustained attention of third parties and suffer from neglect (Abbink 2003; King 2008). Given the changes in the inter­ national environment, there is a strong possibility that more conflict cases will develop symptoms of external intractability - i.e., situations where the exter­ nal context undermines the mediation possibilities of the conflict itself.

In a more globally fragmented world, the notion of an international commu­ nity will be increasingly put to the test (Lindberg 2015). At the same time, the diffusion of conflict management capacity and the hesitation or withdrawal of

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the major providers of conflict management - the u n and a few large states - from the global conflict management arena will continue, either because of competing agendas or because of over-commitment issues. Increasing geopo­ litical and normative conflict will spur polarization, which can occur in the external context of a conflict at the sub-regional, regional and global levels. Global politics around containing terrorism will restrict the action of media­ tors, especially concerning non-state actors. Responding to a growing expec­ tation for mediation, multiparty mediators may join in collective conflict management arrangements, which resolve conflicts temporarily, but the long­ term commitments to a drawn-out peace process seems to be waning across states and institutions.

Given the changes outlined above, how can multiparty mediation become more effective? The answer lies in part in a commitment of powerful states and global organizations to support the peace processes that they do undertake. One of the major operational challenges in any institutional setting - be it a major international organization, a foreign ministry, or an n g o - is to ensure that those who have been charged with the task of mediation have the right tools and mandates to do their jobs and move the negotiation process forward. Mediators often operate in environments where they receive few resources, get either too little or too much political guidance, and are generally viewed as a distraction by their colleagues. Mediators need the requisite administrative, resourcing, and political backup to establish themselves as credible and legiti­ mate players, especially when they are working on a crowded playing field. Part of the requirement for powerful states, world leaders, experts and com­ mentators is to give support to the mediator on the job, rather than the media­ tor they wished they had. Political and opinion leaders should recognize that mediation takes place in a broad political environment, and its effectiveness is often determined by political events outside the control of the mediator. To illustrate, blaming the u n for the failure of the 2011-2014 mediation efforts in Syria is naive, as the root of the problem was the conflict between Russia and the West and between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Valuable leverage that could have brought movement to the Syrian talks was lost in the larger inter­ national dispute.

The Syrian example introduces a second aspect of improving the chances for mediation success. Instances in which a single mediator bears responsibility for the whole process - as was the case with Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi in the 2011-2014 Syria mediation - will be increasingly rare. Powerful states and international organizations need to accept that multiparty mediation and col­ lective conflict management will be features of most future peace processes. Accepting this situation will require governments, international institutions

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and n g o s involved in mediation to revise how they plan and operationalize their efforts, and how they communicate these objectives to their broader publics. Overcoming the current challenges to mediation will be difficult. It will demand major efforts to achieve cooperation, and the current challenges to mediation is to ensure cooperation between mediation and military inter­ vention missions, and among the different actors - the u n , regional organi­ zations, the governments involved, international n g o s and local civil society. This multi-level, multi-actor collaboration may seem awkward and inefficient, adding yet another layer of complexity to peacemaking, but it can help build the momentum required to help push peace negotiations to settlem ent and provide leverage and other key assets to a peace process.

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