2

The Social Work Vision: A Progressive View

We do not anticipate the world with our dogmas but instead attempt to discover the new world through the critique of the old.

—*Karl Marx (1818–83)*

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to present an argument that social work needs an alternative vision of society, one that is more in accordance with the social, emotional, cultural, physical, and spiritual well-being of all people (not just a privileged minority); and (2) to outline such a vision based on the espoused values of the social work profession. By itself, this twofold purpose is impossible to carry out because social work is not a unitary profession. There is no consensus within social work with respect to the ideal nature of society, or the nature and functions of the welfare state, or the nature and political consequences of social work practice. As the title of this chapter suggests, the analysis and discourse presented here are derived from the progressive wing of the social work profession as opposed to the conventional wing.

CONVENTIONAL AND PROGRESSIVE PERSPECTIVES WITHIN SOCIAL WORK

Modern-day social work has two traditions that date back to the latter part of the nineteenth century: the Charity Organization Society movement that began in 1877 in the United States and the Settlement House movement that began in 1884 in England (Chandler, 1995). Although both were products of industrialization and urbanization, each adopted a different view of and approach to the problem of poverty and those experiencing poverty.

The Charity Organization Society movement believed that a rational system of co-ordinated, private, and scientific philanthropy supplemented by an army of 'friendly visitors' would do much to diminish destitution, hardship, and begging. Co-ordination was seen as important because otherwise the poor might take advantage of a fragmented charity system and obtain duplicative goods and services. All decisions regarding this system were made by the 'right' people in the community (i.e., mainly white, middle-class businessmen) because the poor could not be trusted to make responsible decisions affecting their lives; their poverty, after all, was seen as evidence of this inability. (The United Way in Canada is the modern version of a Charity Organization Society.) The role of the friendly visitors (who were mainly volunteer women of high socio-economic status) was to visit the poor in their homes and teach them life skills, thrift, and moral behaviour. Obviously, the explanation for poverty was one of character defect and moral deficiency on the part of the poor, and the solution was to reform the individual. Out of this heritage came one of social work's primary methods (arguably, the primary method) of intervention, a type of casework with individuals and families that focused on coping, adjustment, and restoration of the poor rather than a change of social conditions.

The Settlement House movement's approach to the problem of poverty and to those experiencing it rested on a different assumption from that of the Charity Organization Society movement. Rather than seeing the poor as makers of their own misfortune, it believed that they were victims of an unjust social order that discriminated against large numbers of people so that a few might benefit. In other words, the capitalist system caused poverty, not poor people. People involved in the Settlement House movement established houses in slum neighbourhoods and worked directly with people in attempts to do something about poor sanitary conditions, slum housing, crime, poverty, sweatshop work conditions, and so on. Their focus was to reform society rather than to reform the person. Out of this heritage came another of social work's primary methods of intervention, a self-help model of community organization that focused on participation of the poor, community development, and social action.

BOX 2.1 BLEEDING HEARTS AND DO-GOODERS

Social workers are sometimes portrayed in negative stereotypes and called such names as 'bleeding hearts', 'busy bodies', and 'do-gooders'. In the early nineties I was teaching at St Thomas University in Fredericton, New Brunswick. Over the course of a few months there was a particular individual in the community who wrote a series of derogatory letters about social workers to the local newspaper, which were printed in the 'Letters to the Editor' page. Referring to social workers as 'do-gooders' was his major mantra. One day I had enough and wrote my own letter to the editor in response to his letters. The following is a modified version of my letter.

> Dear Editor:
>
> I wish to respond to the derogatory, uninformed, and prejudicial letters written by Mr Anti-Social Worker that have appeared in your paper over the past

few months. In those letters he constantly refers to social workers and other community-minded people as 'do-gooders'. It seems to me that the label 'do-gooder' suggests there are three kinds of people in the world: those who do good, those who do bad, and those who do nothing. Since Mr Anti-Social Worker is obviously not in the do-good group, I wonder if he could tell us which of the other two groups he belongs to.

A reply from Mr Anti-Social Worker did not follow, and no more social worker-bashing letters appeared from this person.

When social work emerged in the 1940s in Canada as a profession requiring a university-based education, it was faced with the task of trying to reconcile these two different approaches to social problems and to integrate them into the curricula of Schools of Social Work. For a variety of reasons (i.e., the theories of Sigmund Freud and the medical model were the dominant scientific bases of knowledge at that time, and the Schools of Social Work were established mainly by social agencies that were part of the Charity Organization Society system) the casework 'reform-the-person' approach became dominant. One only has to look at the disproportionate share of faculty and resources allocated to direct practice courses in most Schools of Social Work today, or to the existing social work literature, or to the current practices employed in most social agencies, to see the dominance of casework with its individual reform-the-person approach.[1]

From the above two traditions modern social work has always had two major competing views of society, social welfare, and social work practice[2]—the conventional view and the progressive or critical view. The conventional view, which has always been held by the majority, is influenced by and reflective of popular beliefs and attitudes about the nature of the individual, of society, and of the relationship between the two. According to this perspective our present social order, although not perfect, is the best there is and it ought to be preserved. Society is viewed as comprising social institutions that serve the individual as long as she or he makes full use of available opportunities for personal success. This view acknowledges that social problems do exist but defines them in terms of personal difficulties or immediate environmental issues that require social work intervention either to help people cope with or adjust to existing institutions or to modify existing policies in a limited fashion. Carniol (1979), a progressive Canadian social work scholar, points out that the conventional approach is adopted by those who believe that our social institutions are responsive to and capable of meeting people's needs. Obviously, the political function of conventional social work practice is such that by conforming to established institutions, it reinforces, supports, and defends the status quo. This is not to say that there is no disagreement within the conventional view. Most of the political debate about social welfare has been conducted within a liberal-conservative framework, with the former seeing more services as a good thing and the latter seeing fewer services as a good thing (Galper, 1975). Neither liberalism nor conservatism questions the legitimacy of the present capitalist social order, however.

In contrast to the conventional view, the progressive or critical view does not believe that our present social institutions are capable of adequately meeting human need. Social workers with this view are quick to point out that in spite of a social welfare state and social work interventions that have existed for most of this century, social problems are not decreasing but, on the contrary, appear to be worsening. Twenty-five years ago there were no soup kitchens or food banks in Canada, nor were there emergency shelters to feed and house any other than derelict populations. Today these residual means of meeting basic needs have become institutionalized. Progressive social workers will also point to the growing gap between rich and poor, to the worsening plight of traditionally disadvantaged groups, to the resurrection of conservativism, and to the social control functions of welfare programs and social work practice as proof that the present set of social arrangements does not work for large numbers of people. Although there has always been a progressive or radical contingent within social work it has been a minority voice. However, in recent years and in the face of the fiscal crisis of the state, its numbers have been growing as have their challenges to the conventional view.

Carniol (2005) has termed the present situation of a society with increasing inequalities, of a welfare state that has failed to bring about a just society, and of the alienation of social workers from their work 'the social work crisis' and calls for a social transformation. This is the ultimate goal of progressive/critical social work, and the pursuit of this goal is a major theme of this book. This is not to say that there are no disagreements within the progressive camp. For example, although the elimination of oppression and inequality may be a common goal, feminists, Marxists, social democrats, visible minorities, and so on have often disagreed on the fundamental source of oppression and on the strategies to overcome oppression and inequality. This is further discussed in Chapters 9 and 10.

Historical overviews of social work perspectives and approaches that have been used in Canada have been discussed elsewhere (Hick, 2002; Lundy, 2004) and, therefore, will not be reproduced here. Instead, some of the major theories or approaches of social work are grouped in Table 2.1 according to the main focus or unit of analysis and change of each. There are two schools of conventional social work. One focuses on the individual or individuals as both the source of and the solutions for problems, and has as its goal to help the individual cope with, fit into, and/or adjust to society. The other focuses on the goodness of fit between the individual and his or her environment. This approach seeks change in either the individual or in the individual's limited environment (i.e., within the family, the community, the school, the workplace, etc.). No thought is given to the possibility that maybe the system itself (i.e., society) is unjust and unfixable and that the solution might be to transform it fundamentally to one based on a different set of values and social dynamics.

It is important to note here that although the conventional approaches outlined in Table 2.1 have historically reinforced the status quo, they can be used in progressive

TABLE 2.1 SELECTED CONVENTIONAL AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL WORK PERSPECTIVES/APPROACHES

CONVENTIONAL (consensus-based)		**PROGRESSIVE** (conflict/change-based)
personal change	*person-in-environment* (personal change and/or limited social change)	*fundamental social change/transformation**
– psychodynamic	– general systems theory	– feminist social work
– behavioural	– ecosystems (ecological)	– Marxist
– client-centred	– life model	– radical
– psychosocial	– problem-solving	– structural
– clinical	– strengths perspective	– anti-racist
– family therapies		– anti-oppressive
– casework		– critical postmodern
		– post-colonial
		– indigenous (decolonization)
		– narrative therapy
		– just therapy

* Progressive social work today recognizes that fundamental social change cannot occur without fundamental personal change also occurring. Earlier versions of progressive social work tended to emphasize structural changes and psychological preparation to participate in social change activities, but gave little or no consideration to the impact of oppressive structures on oppressed groups and how to respond to them in a way that was meaningful.

ways, as will be discussed in Chapter 9. In fact, widespread agreement exists that social work has responsibility for both individual and structural (social change) interventions (Trainor, 1996). Today, countless social work bodies and publications assert the need for social work to be involved in broader political action and social change (Schneider and Lester, 2001). Social work codes of ethics in Australia, the US, and to a lesser extent Canada (see below) all include strong statements in favour of social justice. Many social workers have become involved in political and social action within formal structures of political parties (for example, the current Minister of Finance in the Manitoba provincial government is a member of the Faculty of Social Work at the University of Manitoba), within professional social work organizations, and most of all at the local agency level (Gray et al., 2002; Mendes, 2003). However, many (perhaps most) social workers do not participate in social or political action and many workers believe that activism is incompatible with professional practice (Wharf, 1991). Haynes and Mickelson (2003: xi) contend that the social work profession is too often characterized by 'its dispassionate, objective and apolitical stance' and 'lack of interest in or even antagonism to social action'.

Unfortunately, systems theory and ecological perspectives (under the 'person-in-environment' subheading in Table 2.1), which have now been around for over 30 years, are still presented as core social work theory in many Schools of Social Work in North

RESSIVE SOCIAL

ROGRESSIVE
lict/change-based)

mental social
e/transformation*

inist social work
xist
cal
ctural
racist
oppressive
cal postmodern
colonial
genous (decolonization)
ative therapy
therapy

hange cannot occur without
ressive social work tended to
ate in social change activities,
on oppressed groups and how

eement exists that social
al change) interventions
ications assert the need
ocial change (Schneider
JS, and to a lesser extent
cial justice. Many social
hin formal structures of
the Manitoba provincial
Iniversity of Manitoba),
at the local agency level
t) social workers do not
that activism is incom-
kelson (2003: xi) contend
dispassionate, objective
to social action'.
(under the 'person-in-
ound for over 30 years,
f Social Work in North

America. Box 2.2 outlines a number of serious limitations and flaws with this perspective that have been cited in the progressive literature for over two decades (see, e.g., Pease, 2003; Finn and Jacobson, 2003). These and other limitations are discussed more fully in Chapter 9.

BOX 2.2 LIMITATIONS OF SYSTEMS AND ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

- They are not theories because they are descriptive only and have no explanatory or predictive capacities.
- They are so vague and general that they offer little specific guidance for practice.
- They do not deal with or explain power relationships (i.e., power differentials).
- They do not accommodate or deal with conflict. All social units (or subsystems) are viewed as interacting in harmony with each other and with the larger system (i.e., society). The whole purpose of a systems approach is to eliminate any conflict that disrupts the system.
- They operate to maintain the status quo since the goal is to restore the system to normal functioning.
- Social problems are believed to be a result of a breakdown between individuals and the subsystems (e.g., family, school, peer group, welfare office) with which they interact.
- The focus on the here-and-now situation and possibilities for intervention contributes to a neglect of history.
- There is no recognition or analysis of oppressive social structures that produce inequality.

NEED FOR A PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL WORK VISION

We have witnessed in the past decade an increasing body of social science writings criticizing our present social order because of its failure to provide satisfying levels of living for large numbers of citizens. These criticisms are important for social work because they identify and illuminate the sources and reasons for many of our social problems and show us what we are struggling against. However, although critical analysis may show us what we are fighting against, by itself it does not show us what we are fighting for. As Galper (1975: 140) states, 'We need more.' We need a picture or a vision of alternative social arrangements that we can work towards. We need a goal—a conceptualization of 'a society in which every person is afforded maximum opportunity to enrich his or her spiritual, psychological, physical, and intellectual well-being' (Galper, 1975: 147). As Nevitte and Gibbons (1990: 140) note in their discussion of social change, 'A preference for social change in the abstract is meaningless.' Also, McNally (2002), in discussing anti-capitalist movements, argues that radical movements cannot change societies without a vision. It may be possible to resist dominant forces by engaging in the powerfully negative act of saying 'no'. But without a clear vision or alternative, that accomplishment of saying 'no', while immensely important in terms of building confidence and capacities for struggle, only postpones the battle. To shift from the defensive to the offensive requires a vision of a different kind of future.

We are passing through a period of history when societal visions or Utopian models of society have not been widely discussed. With the post-war welfare state in place and financed by an ever-growing economy, many believed that society by a process of evolution had reached its pinnacle (Galper, 1975). However, the fiscal crisis of the state and the calling into question of the welfare state have cast shadows of doubt on this notion. Presently, many of our comfortable and cherished assumptions about the nature of our society and its ability to respond genuinely to human needs are in doubt. We seem now to need visions of alternative societies. 'Given the dire [social] condition of the planet, it is . . . urgent that we formulate alternatives which are at once radical, comprehensive, and practical' (Wineman, 1984: 159). Without such alternatives or visions there is a danger that we will become victims of distorted notions of justice, well-being, and solidarity, thus denying many people their rightful place in society. Fortunately, given the apparent collapse of (or at least reconstituted) globalism, there is a beginning return to discussions of visions or ideas of a different type of world—one based on social justice—as evidenced by such works as Ferguson, Lavalette, and Whitmore's book, *Globalisation, Global Justice and Social Work* (2005) and Finn and Jacobson's article, 'Just Practice: Steps Toward a New Social Work Paradigm' (2003).

Because social work often deals with the casualties and victims of society, it, too, must become involved in questioning our present social arrangement. Given social work's belief in the inherent dignity and worth of the person, it must ask itself what type of society best promotes this ideal. Given social work's belief that people have a right to develop fully and freely their inherent human potential and to live productive and satisfying lives free from domination and exploitation by others, those in social work must ask what social arrangements best accommodate these values. In other words, what type of society best promotes the values, ideals, principles, and beliefs espoused by the social work profession? What is the vision that social work should pursue?

Unfortunately, it would be impossible to reach consensus among social workers on such a vision of society. A major obstacle to developing and articulating a universally accepted social work vision is the existence of the two incompatible views of current society, social welfare, and social work. Not even a common value base or a professional code of ethics is enough to unify the profession with respect to the coexisting conventional and progressive views. The Canadian Association of Social Workers' (CASW) *Code of Ethics*, as noted by Woodsworth (1984), consists of 'competing, even conflicting

7). As Nevitte and
:ference for social
sing anti-capitalist
vithout a vision. It
illy negative act of
ient of saying 'no',
cities for struggle,
'equires a vision of

or Utopian models
state in place and
a process of evolu-
is of the state and
ibt on this notion.
t the nature of our
ibt. We seem now
on of the planet, it
mprehensive, and
s there is a danger
ig, and solidarity,
given the apparent
urn to discussions
tice—as evidenced
tion, Global Justice
eps Toward a New

of society, it, too,
ent. Given social
sk itself what type
ple have a right to
ductive and satis-
social work must
words, what type
used by the social

social workers on
ting a universally
views of current
or a professional
existing conven-
Workers' (CASW)
, even conflicting

---

philosophies', and has been described by Lundy and Gauthier (1989: 192) as 'an amalgam of competing ideologies that are at times contradictory and even antagonistic to one another'. The contradictory nature of the welfare state (i.e., its social care and social control functions) is expressed within the *Code of Ethics* in that ideas of conservatism, liberalism, and collectivism are all represented. As indicated previously, the viewpoint taken here is progressive.

FORWARD TO THE PAST: THE 2005 CASW CODE OF ETHICS

If the espoused values of social work were to be used to formulate a social work vision, the nature and form of that vision would differ depending on whether a conventional or progressive view was used. For the past decade, I have used the 1994 CASW *Code of Ethics* as a point of departure for writing about progressive social work theory and practice and for contributing to progressive social work ideas, views, and visions. In spite of competing and conflicting ideas and ideologies within the 1994 *Code*, it contained sufficient progressive content to carry out these tasks. Thus, it was with considerable anticipation that I recently reviewed a copy of the new 2005 CASW *Code of Ethics*. I thought that it would be even more progressive than its 11-year-old predecessor. It is not. It reflects a 'liberal-humanist' approach to social work that seeks to comfort victims of social problems, rather than a critical approach that seeks fundamental social change (i.e., transformation).

Although in some regards there are a few improvements over the 1994 *Code*, such as the delineation of ethical responsibilities in its accompanying *Guidelines* (absent in the 1994 *Code*), the new *Code* has retreated to an era when there was no vision or articulation of what social work wanted, when no statement of social philosophy existed, and when the primary task of social work was to help people cope with, adjust to, and/or fit back into the very society that caused them problems in the first place. In other words, the new *Code* emphasizes residual ideas and regressive practices while it de-emphasizes or omits progressive elements from the 1994 version. Although space does not permit an exhaustive critique, a number of major limitations are presented here.

1. *No philosophical statement or vision*. The 1994 *Code* (p. 7) contained the following philosophical statement: 'The profession of social work is founded on humanitarian and egalitarian ideals.' These two social ideals provide a vision of a society (one characterized by humanitarianism and egalitarianism) for social work to pursue. Without such a vision, what type of society should social work have as its goal? What is it that gives social work a sense of direction? The new *Code* is silent on this issue. It does state in its preamble (p. 3) that '[t]he social work profession is dedicated to the welfare and self-realization of all people', but it does not offer an opinion on what type or kind of society would best promote this principle. Is it our current North American society with its value base of individualism and cutthroat competition? Or is it a society based on a different set of values that are more consistent with social work values? Humanitarianism and egalitarianism denote a society characterized by social, economic, political, and cultural equality where every person is of equal intrinsic worth. Without such social ideals, what is it that

THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF SOCIAL WORK

The following discussion of the values identified in the above statement of philosophy embodies that part of social work that challenges rather than supports our present social order. Values consist of beliefs, preferences, or assumptions about what is good or desirable for people. They are not assertions or descriptions of the way the world is, but rather how the world ought to be. Values do not stand alone but exist in systems of thought and are organized in such a way that they have a relative importance to other values. Fundamental or primary values represent ideals or goals that a profession attempts to achieve, that is, the end product. Secondary or instrumental values specify the means to achieve these goals or desired ends.

Because 'the profession of social work is founded on humanitarian and egalitarian ideals' (CASW, 1994: 7), these ideals must form the cornerstone of social work's ideal society. Fundamental values cannot be compromised by such notions as economic individualism and/or competitive capitalism. If we do not have a society based on humanitarian principles then we have a society based, in whole or in part, on principles of inhumanity. If we do not have a society based on egalitarianism then we have a society based, in whole or in part, on principles of inequality. If we have a society based, in whole or in part, on principles of inhumanity and inequality, then our secondary or instrumental values of social work—acceptance, self-determination, and respect (CASW, 1994)—are meaningless, since there must be consistency between our primary values and our secondary values.

Humanism

'Humanitarianism' tends to be used interchangeably in the social work literature with the term 'humanism'. While some writers contend that there are some differences in meanings between the two terms, other sources contend that the popular use of the term 'humanitarianism' means the practice of the doctrine of 'humanism' (*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1980). The latter usage will be adopted here, and henceforth the term 'humanism' will be used more generally since most of the reference material for this chapter employs this term.[3]

A definition supplied by the *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Saiflin and Dixon, 1984) describes humanism as 'a system of views based on the respect for the dignity and rights of man [*sic*], his value as a personality, concern for his welfare, his all-round development, and the creation of favourable conditions for social life'. This view of the person recognizes that the individual should be the focus of all societal decisions. A society based on humanism would not only recognize the universal nature of human need but would actively attempt to provide to everyone conditions conducive to physical survival, mental health, self-respect, dignity, love, a sense of identity, the opportunity to use one's intellect, and happiness (Hardy, 1981a). Such a commitment must be based on social equality, co-operation, and collective orientation (Gil, 1976a), and consideration of all economic decisions ought to be based on their implications for human welfare (Galper, 1975).

ent of philosophy
our present social
it is good or desir-
orld is, but rather
stems of thought
e to other values.
ssion attempts to
ecify the means to

n and egalitarian
ocial work's ideal
ons as economic
society based on
art, on principles
n then we have a
e a society based,
our secondary or
d respect (CASW,
rimary values and

rk literature with
me differences in
lar use of the term
n' (*Webster's New*
d henceforth the
ence material for

and Dixon, 1984)
dignity and rights
ll-round develop-
iew of the person
s. A society based
n need but would
l survival, mental
to use one's intel-
on social equality,
n of all economic
Galper, 1975).

Goroff (1981) has articulated his view of a society based on humanism as one in which: (1) each individual is seen as a person with inherent dignity and worth and not as an object with utility; (2) relationships among human beings are non-exploitative, co-operative, and egalitarian; (3) resources created by human beings through their labour are distributed so as to provide each person with the goods and services to meet his or her needs without denying others theirs; and (4) each individual has equal opportunities to develop his or her fullest human potential. There is consensus in the social welfare and social work literatures that our present North American society does not contain these humanistic characteristics.[4]

Because it has been suggested by some writers on the subject of the philosophy of social work that the values of social work are firmly rooted in humanism (e.g., Payne, 1997; Ife, 1997), we should be aware of the limitations of humanism. A common criticism of humanism is that it is ahistorical and does not consider the social context of people's lives—that is, it overlooks the implications of inequalities (Clark and Asquith, 1985; Rojek et al., 1988) and does not contain a structural analysis of oppression (Ife, 1997). Certainly, notions of 'acceptance' in social work have been influenced by humanism in that social work practice has often excluded concern for the material hardships of service users (Biehal and Sainsbury, 1991). Psychoanalytic, client-centred, and family therapies, for the most part, have focused on introspection, self-realization, and interpersonal dynamics rather than on the social context of people's lives. An example of overlooking material impoverishment and social context is the fact that poverty was rediscovered in the 1960s by people other than social workers.[5]

Another criticism of humanism comes from post-colonial writers (see Gandhi, 1998, for a discussion of this point), who point out that humanism is a Western concept that assumes a Western superiority over all other cultures and societies. As well, postmodernists criticize humanism (particularly radical humanism) for overlooking discourse, subjectivity, and subject position (Pease, 2003). However, the position adopted here is that there are different versions of humanism and that such forms as a critical humanism (Ife, 1997), or a radical humanism (Howe, 1987; Mullaly and Keating, 1991), which emphasize dominant ideology and consciousness, are essential for developing progressive forms of social work. I agree with Bob Pease (2003), who argues that radical forms of humanism can contribute to progressive forms of social work practice if they are supplemented by critical theory traditions of materialist perspectives emphasizing material conditions and lived experiences; Marxist and feminist Freudian views emphasizing the unconscious and repression; and postmodern perspectives emphasizing discourse, subjectivity, and subject position. Also, as I will be argue in Chapter 9, radical humanism must be accompanied by another perspective on social interpretation and social change, that is, radical structuralism. An elaboration of these ideas is presented in Chapter 9.

Egalitarianism

Although more than one meaning can be ascribed to the term 'egalitarianism',[6] the one that forms part of a progressive social work ideology is that of 'social equality'. David

Gil (1976a, 1998) has written eloquently and extensively on the notion of social equality from a social work perspective. He argues that if we wish to establish a society based on social equality we need to explicate the meaning of this overused, yet elusive, concept. The central value premise of social equality is that every person is of equal intrinsic worth and should therefore be entitled to equal civil, political, social, and economic rights, responsibilities, and treatment.

Implicit is the belief 'that every individual should have the right and the resources to develop freely and fully, to actualize his [or her] inherent human potential, and to lead as fulfilling a life [as possible] free of domination, control and exploitation by others' (Gil, 1976a: 4). Social equality is a correlate of humanism, as the dignity of the person cannot be achieved if some people have control over others, have preferred access to life chances, or have more power concerning public affairs: 'Genuine democracy, liberty and individuality for all are simply not feasible without social equality' (Gil, 1976a: 4). A society based on social inequality is based on the value premise that people differ in intrinsic worth and therefore are entitled to different rights and to as much power, control, and material goods as they can gain in competition with others. Humanistic ideals cannot be reached in such a society.

Social equality does not mean monotonous uniformity; rather, it aims at the realization of individual differences in innate potentialities, not at the division of available resources into identical parts for every member of society. The key element in arriving at a humanistic and egalitarian society is the development of a true collectivist spirit. This means taking seriously the fact that people form a social entity called a society when they live together. This does not mean uniform blandness or submission to the group, but it recognizes that decisions made in those areas affecting the whole must be subjected to collective thought and to collective action in the light of collective needs and resources.[7] Collectivism implies participatory decision-making, not hierarchical decisions made at the top and passed down. People should have a say in the decisions that affect any area of their lives—social, economic, political, work, the distribution of society's resources, and so on. This type of decision-making cannot occur in a society based on social inequality.

In sum, humanism (humanitarianism) and social equality must form the twin pillars of an ideal social work society. These fundamental values, and not inequality, rugged individualism, and cutthroat competition, support the dignity and intrinsic worth of people. To realize these fundamental values society must be arranged according to the principles of collectivism, participatory decision-making, and co-operation and not according to the practices of exploitation, distribution of resources according to economic profit rather than social need, and hierarchical, elitist decision-making. A social work vision of society is based on the premise that the present set of social arrangements is not a natural phenomenon but is, instead, the result of person-made decisions. 'People can be self-determining about social forms and can shape and reshape them to meet their current needs' (Galper, 1975: 151). In other words, given the political will, a society can develop a social order that promotes human welfare. In addition to meeting people's individual

otion of social equality
blish a society based on
d, yet elusive, concept.
of equal intrinsic worth
, and economic rights,

ht and the resources to
otential, and to lead as
itation by others' (Gil,
y of the person cannot
l access to life chances,
y, liberty and individu-
6a: 4). A society based
ffer in intrinsic worth
, control, and material
als cannot be reached

ather, it aims at the
t the division of avail-
. The key element in
t of a true collectivist
social entity called a
ness or submission to
cting the whole must
ht of collective needs
ing, not hierarchical
say in the decisions
, the distribution of
ot occur in a society

form the twin pillars
equality, rugged indi-
sic worth of people.
ling to the principles
and not according
to economic profit
ocial work vision of
ents is not a natural
'People can be self-
meet their current
society can develop
people's individual

needs, it is part of the progressive social work mission to promote this political will. Gil (1990: 20–1) reminds us that social work practice cannot be politically neutral: 'it either confronts and challenges established societal institutions or it conforms to them openly or tacitly. [Social work] practitioners should avoid the illusion of neutrality and should consciously choose and acknowledge their political philosophy.'

THE SECONDARY (INSTRUMENTAL) VALUES OF SOCIAL WORK

Social work's secondary or instrumental values stem from its fundamental values and contribute to the goals of humanitarianism and egalitarianism. 'They dictate the ways the [social] worker should interact with others in carrying out his [or her] professional activities so as to actualize the primary values, that is to achieve the desired ends or goals' (Pincus and Minahan, 1973: 39). Three secondary values highlighted in the preamble of the 1994 Canadian Association of Social Workers' *Code of Ethics* are respect, self-determination, and acceptance. The operationalization of these three values is assumed to contribute to the situation where the worth and dignity of people are realized. We affirm people's worth and dignity by showing respect for them, by allowing them maximum feasible self-determination, and by accepting their individualities.

Statham (1978: 34) argues that these instrumental values are meaningless in societies based on economic individualism rather than on social equality:

> Social workers affirm their belief in the worth of each person by virtue of their humanity and see them as having needs in common, but the society in which they operate distributes rewards unequally, not because of faulty mechanisms which can be remedied by social work or reform, but because the allocation of rewards is intended to operate in this way.

Do we not negate the respect we extend to clients in our interpersonal relationships with them if we accept a social order based on economic individualism with its inevitable consequences of poverty, homelessness, deprivation, and unemployment? By accepting a person's individuality are we also accepting her or his social and economic conditions? And how can we practice self-determination with people who do not possess the economic and social resources necessary for choices to be realized? Self-determination often has meaning only for those possessing the economic resources and social status necessary to implement choice. In a society based on inequality, self-determination is not possible for persons who are powerless 'to resolve, by their individual efforts, the problems created, for instance, by inadequate income, housing, or by unemployment' (Statham, 1978: 27).

It would seem, then, that social work's instrumental values are illusory if, as Biehal and Sainsbury (1991: 249) suggest, 'They are not seen in the context of people's lives—notably the context of differences in power.' It is not enough to show respect and acceptance for people and offer them choices restricted by their social position in society.

Cries for acceptance of rights for people are empty slogans if the reality of power (to exercise rights) is ignored. Social work must also be concerned with realizing a society that promotes social work values rather than one that negates or compromises them. It would seem that only a society founded on humanitarian and egalitarian ideals could accommodate these secondary values. Surely, an imperative for social work is to work towards the establishment of a social vision based on its own value position.

A PROGRESSIVE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL WORK IDEOLOGY

An ideology is a consistent set of social, economic, and political beliefs. It serves as the foundation and determines the nature and world view of particular social paradigms. Social work has historically been practised in an arena of conflicting beliefs. There has always been some degree of conflict between the social, economic, and political beliefs of the larger society and those espoused by the social work profession in general and by the progressive sector of the profession in particular. Social workers presently operate at the meeting place of the conflict between the dominant values of liberal capitalism and the dominant social work values of humanitarianism and egalitarianism.[8]

Many social workers also experience conflict within their own social, economic, and political beliefs. For example, social workers may subscribe to humanitarian social beliefs about the dignity and worth of people but also subscribe to our present capitalist economic system based on competition and exploitation, without realizing the inherent conflict between their humanitarian social beliefs and their capitalist economic beliefs. As well, many social workers may believe that self-determination is a laudable goal but will not question our present system of representative democracy where self-determination and meaningful participation are not options for large numbers of people.

Although social workers espouse many humanitarian and egalitarian beliefs, insufficient attention has been paid to integrate these beliefs in any consistent fashion. Thus, an articulation of social work ideology must entail a delineation of specific social beliefs, economic beliefs, and political beliefs that are consistent with one another. Otherwise, the present hodge-podge of beliefs will continue to present conflict, inconsistency, and uncertainty to social workers in their everyday practice, and will do nothing in terms of informing social workers of the nature and form that society would assume if it were to be congruent with social work ideology.

Social Beliefs

David Gil (1976a: 242) has described in humanistic and egalitarian terms the nature of the relationship between people and the society in which they live:

> All humans, everywhere, despite their manifest differences and their uniqueness as individuals, should be considered of equal intrinsic worth. Hence, they should be deemed entitled to equal social, economic, civil, and political rights, liberties and

ıe reality of power (to
vith realizing a society
compromises them. It
galitarian ideals could
social work is to work
ıe position.

K IDEOLOGY

beliefs. It serves as the
ular social paradigms.
ting beliefs. There has
, and political beliefs of
n in general and by the
resently operate at the
eral capitalism and the
ism.[8]
own social, economic,
to humanitarian social
o our present capitalist
t realizing the inherent
talist economic beliefs.
n is a laudable goal but
where self-determina-
ers of people.
alitarian beliefs, insuf-
nsistent fashion. Thus,
f specific social beliefs,
ne another. Otherwise,
lict, inconsistency, and
do nothing in terms of
uld assume if it were to

terms the nature of the

their uniqueness as
nce, they should be
rights, liberties and

> obligations. Societal institutions . . . should assure and facilitate the exercise of these equal rights, and the free, autonomous, and authentic development of all humans.

This view of people is one in which persons are considered to be social beings. John Friedmann (1973) contrasts this view of social beings with economic individualism, which perceives people as independent, gratification-maximizing individuals with no social responsibility for others. What distinguishes people as social beings from people as economic individualists is that the former view is based on the notion of community and the latter on the notion of the 'rugged individual'. Whereas the economic individualist equates public well-being with the mere aggregation of individual interests, the social view of persons recognizes public well-being as a more complex construct made up of not only the aggregate of its members but also the relationships among them.

Friedmann argues that the view of people as social beings is essentially moral whereas the view of people as economic individualists is essentially amoral. As a social being a person is a thinking and feeling animal who stands in relation to others as a person. His or her recognition of the other person as one like him or herself establishes the manner in which their relationship will be fulfilled. People will treat others as they themselves would want to be treated. A society built on the image of economic individualism would be simply 'a bundle of functional roles . . . superordinated, subordinated, or equal and either useful to you or not', a relationship based on a 'suspicion of mutual exploitation' (Friedmann, 1973: 6, 5). In the economic individualist view the notion of the public well-being is arrived at by summing the individual utilities in the marketplace. The worth of a person is judged mainly by what he or she earns and/or owns. Community, which is the cornerstone of civilized life, is not possible with such an amoral foundation. 'Without community, there can be no justice, and without justice, life becomes brutish and destructive of both the self and others' (Friedmann, 1973: 4).

In addition to its moral weaknesses, an economic individualist view ignores the realities of our modern industrial society (Mullaly, 1980). For example, specialization and division of labour require people to depend on one another for provision of those goods and services they cannot provide for themselves; some contingencies, such as accident, illness, inflation, and recession, are beyond the control of the individual; and if left on one's own, the individual tends to be overwhelmed by forces of which he or she is only dimly aware, which subjugate him or her to a role of decreasing importance and present problems with which the person has no means to cope (Ross, 1967).

Economic Beliefs

In *The Politics of Social Services* (1975), Jeffry Galper outlines a set of economic beliefs consistent with social work values. He contrasts these beliefs with the practices of competitive and capitalist economy, which is based on the criterion of profitability. Galper contends that if we are to be successful in creating a world conducive to human well-being, then we must find a way to dominate, rather than be dominated by, economics.

Neither the invisible hand of the marketplace nor the present partnership of government and big business ensure that social priorities will dominate economic decision-making.

Galper (1975: 142–3) argues that in our present economic system goods are produced, decisions made, and the number and nature of jobs available for people are determined on the basis of profitability. The consequences of this system are:

> an overabundance of goods that do not add up to a fundamental sense of well-being for most people, an absence of goods that we need but that are not profitable to produce, jobs that are destructive to people who hold them, a national psychology organized around competition and consumption, ecological destruction, and exploitation of large parts of the rest of the world to enable us to maintain our standards of material achievement. Human well-being is not, as it should be, the rationale for our actions.

Galper contrasts our present economic system with one where all decisions of production are based on the criterion of human need. In other words, decisions about what should be produced and in what quantities, as well as when, where, and how, should be made according to their impact on our overall well-being. Galper uses two examples: (1) the decision to produce cars would not be made exclusively on the basis of their saleability but on the basis of such social criteria as the relative emphasis to be given to private versus public transportation, pollution, use of raw materials, safety, and the nature of the work experience for people; and (2) a new factory would be located not just according to the availability of raw materials, labour, and transportation, or for political gain, but according to the development needs of the various regions of the country. An economic system consistent with social work ideals would assure each person full economic rights, and the distribution of wealth, goods, and resources would be much more equitable than presently exists.

In sum, to be consistent with social work ideals, the economic system must be rationalized from a social perspective. It must be viewed as the means to achieve those social goals to which social work aspires, not as an end in itself. Goods must be produced for their utility rather than their profitability, and consideration should be given to all the costs (social, economic, ecological, and so on) of production. Finally, the distribution of wealth, rather than following social Darwinian notions, must be made according to social determinations—those factors that contribute to the well-being of all citizens, not just to those who own the means of production. These principles are, of course, contradictory to and inconsistent with the laissez-faire principles of our present liberal-capitalist economic system.

Political Beliefs

Social work subscribes to the democratic ideals of self-determination, participation, and an equal distribution of political power. In fact, much of social work practice is directed

of government
sion-making.
are produced,
re determined

well-being
ofitable to
sychology
and exploi-
standards
tionale for

s of production
it what should
hould be made
amples: (1) the
heir saleability
iven to private
d the nature of
t just according
litical gain, but
y. An economic
conomic rights,
equitable than

n must be ratio-
eve those social
e produced for
given to all the
distribution of
ording to social
zens, not just to
contradictory to
italist economic

rticipation, and
ctice is directed

---

towards individuals and groups, helping them gain or regain autonomy and control over their lives. However, there are basically two methods by which democracy can be practised: representative democracy and participatory democracy.

We all are used to the representative form of government. Pateman (1970, cited in Hardy, 1981b: 17) describes and analyzes this system of democracy:

> The characteristically democratic element . . . is the competition of leaders for the votes of the people at periodic, free elections. Elections are crucial to the democratic method for it is primarily through elections that the majority can exercise control over their leaders through loss of office. . . . The decisions of leaders can also be influenced by active groups bringing pressure to bear during inter-election periods. 'Political equality' in the theory [of representative democracy] refers to universal suffrage and to the existence of equality of opportunity of access to channels of influence over leaders. . . . The level of participation by the majority should not rise much above the minimum level necessary to keep the democratic method working; that is, it should remain at about the level that exists in Anglo-American democracies.

Although this model of democracy is relatively efficient in terms of the time it takes to make decisions, its weaknesses have been well documented in the literature (Galper, 1975; Hardy, 1981b; Naiman, 1997; Wharf and Cossom, 1987). (1) Political elites at times make decisions that are not responsive to the wishes of the electorate. (2) Interest pressure groups may gain some sectional advantage at the expense of more general welfare. (3) Unorganized sections of society may be ignored or exploited by powerful, organized sections. (4) The right to vote every few years is inconsistent with the notion of democracy. (5) Such a system promotes and relies on a considerable degree of passivity in the majority of people. (6) In the absence of participatory principles, those who make decisions will be those who have benefited most from the system and, therefore, have the least commitment to changing it. 'Though democratic in the way it is chosen, representative government has been shown to be elitist in the way that it operates' (Lees, 1972: 39).

By way of contrast, participatory democracy would produce a very different world (Hardy, 1981b). It would permit and encourage greater popular participation in non-governmental bodies like industry, trade unions, political parties, corporations, schools, universities, and the like (Lees, 1972; Naiman, 1997). In addition, it would delegate a larger share of public power to local communities small enough to permit effective and meaningful general participation in decision-making:

> Participation in politics would provide individuals with opportunities to take part in making significant decisions about their everyday lives. It would build and consolidate a sense of genuine community that would serve as a solid foundation for government. The first and most important step is to recognize that personal self-development is the moral goal of democracy and that direct popular participation is the chief means of achieving it. When this is generally accepted, then society can get

> on with the largely technical job of thinking up new and better means for increasing popular participation. (Lees, 1972: 41)

Surely, given social work's values and ideals with respect to egalitarianism, self-determination, and so on, participatory democracy rather than representative democracy is the preferred form of democracy.

Summary of Social Work Ideology

The amalgam of the above social, economic, and political beliefs comprises social work's ideology. Social beliefs are based on the person as a social being. Economic beliefs are based on the notion that human well-being is the major criterion for economic decision-making. And political beliefs are based on people having the right and the responsibility to participate in those decisions that affect their lives. Taken together, these beliefs constitute social work's ideology for progressive social workers (see Table 2.2). This ideology comprises an interdependent, consistent, and mutually reinforcing set of ideas and ideals that should underpin the type of society that best promotes social work's fundamental values of humanism and egalitarianism.

SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

All social work activity is concerned with social problems, that is, with alleviating, eliminating, or preventing social problems and the deleterious effects they have on people. However, although poverty, mental illness, and deprivation may constitute objective phenomena, the analyses, interpretations, and explanations of these phenomena are subjective. In other words, a social problem may be seen as a set of objective circumstances but it includes a subjective interpretation. Such interpretations are defined largely in terms of ideology and group interests. For example, the existence of poverty will be explained differently by a conservative than by a Marxist, the former attributing poverty to a defective individual and the latter attributing it to a defective social arrangement (i.e., capitalism). The implication for social work is that the individual living in poverty would be treated in a punitive or remedial manner by a conservative social worker but would be treated as a victim of an oppressive social order by a progressive or critical social worker.

Although the values of social work are generally considered progressive and humanistic, its definitions or explanations of social problems have not always been progressive or humanistic. Because social work has been reluctant to elevate the discussion of its values to a societal level, there has been no agreed-upon goal or product with respect to the type and form of society social work is seeking. In the absence of a publicly articulated social vision, social work falls victim to the prevailing paradigm. That is, without a clear vision of itself and of the society within which it exists, social work has tended to accept as a given the current social order or paradigm. This means that social work 'theory and practice become accommodated only to that which is possible within existing ans for increasing

rianism, self-determi-
tive democracy is the

nprises social work's
Economic beliefs are
r economic decision-
nd the responsibility
, these beliefs consti-
le 2.2). This ideology
et of ideas and ideals
work's fundamental

th alleviating, elimi-
hey have on people.
constitute objective
ese phenomena are
of objective circum-
s are defined largely
e of poverty will be
attributing poverty
al arrangement (i.e.,
ng in poverty would
vorker but would be
itical social worker.
ressive and human-
ys been progressive
ne discussion of its
luct with respect to
of a publicly articu-
m. That is, without
al work has tended
ns that social work
ible within existing

TABLE 2.2 OVERVIEW OF PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL WORK IDEALS AND BELIEFS

Social Beliefs	Humanitarianism (humanism) Community Equality
Economic Beliefs	Government intervention Social priorities dominate economic decisions Equitable distribution of society's resources
Political Beliefs	Participatory democracy (self-determination) in both governmental and non-governmental areas
View of Social Welfare	An instrument to promote equality, solidarity, and community Ideal = social welfare state or structural model
Principles of Social Work Practice (taken from the 1994 CASW *Code of Ethics*)	Treat people with respect Enhance dignity and integrity Facilitate self-determination and self-realization Accept differences Advocate and promote social justice

organizational constraints' (Moreau and Leonard, 1989: 235). With no alternative social order defined or articulated, social work becomes part of the existing social order, helping people to adjust to it or cope with it or attempting to make small changes within the system rather than attempting to make fundamental changes that transform the system.

Social work, by being part of the present paradigm and in the absence of an alternative, tends to take on the prevailing definitions or explanations of social problems. In Canada and the United States, social problems have been defined mainly within conservative-liberal perspectives. Most internally derived social work theory-building has been in the methods or means of social work practice rather than in the goals or desired ends of social work practice. As long as social work avoids the task of articulating its desired ends or vision it will continue to treat objective social problems with the subjective prescriptions of the prevailing paradigm. To date in North America, most social work explanations of social problems and most social work interventions have been based either on 'individual pathology' (conservative ideology) or 'general systems/ecological' explanations (liberal ideology) of social problems. Such approaches, of course, do not guarantee that social problems experienced by large numbers of people will be dealt with adequately or effectively. Radical or critical explanations of social problems have only recently become part of the social work theory landscape, but these still occupy a minority position. This is because, to date, socialist/Marxist, feminist, anti-racist, anti-oppressive, anti-homophobic ideas and analyses have not been major parts of the prevailing paradigms in North America.

In sum, although social work espouses a set of values considered progressive, its approach to resolve social problems has not been progressive. In the absence of an articulated social vision or goal consistent with its value base, social work has accepted by default the mainstream definitions and explanations of social problems, which have come from the prevailing North American ideologies of conservatism and liberalism. The critical question arising from this situation is whether or not social work ideology is consistent with either conservatism or liberalism. Or is it more consistent with an ideology that does not prevail in North America? A related question is whether or not social work's progressive and humanistic ideology is consistent with or in conflict with its current theory base and practice.

THE IDEAL SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM: A PROGRESSIVE VIEW

Every industrial democracy in the Western world has developed a social welfare system to deal with the vagaries of the market economy. Although all states have policies of intervention, the forms of these interventions often differ, as do their purposes. Furniss and Tilton (1977) have aggregated the different forms of intervention into three models of social welfare states: the positive state, the social security state, and the social welfare state. These models are described below in terms of the type of intervention employed, the groups in society benefiting from the intervention, and the vision of society that inspires each model. The first two models correspond to Wilensky and Lebeaux's (1965) typology of the residual model (the positive state) and the institutional model (the social security state). The third model corresponds to Mishra's (1981) description of the structural model of welfare.

The Positive State or Residual Model of Welfare

The main goal of the positive state is to protect the interests of business from the difficulties of unprotected markets and from potential redistributive demands. The policy emphasis is on government–business collaboration for economic growth. Business yields much of its market decisions to government in return for financial assistance at home and political support abroad. The positive state aims at minimal full employment to keep consumption up, labour costs down, and labour unions weak. The current process of globalization is being driven, in large part, by values and principles of the positive state.

The preferred social welfare instrument is social insurance, which is consistent with economic efficiency and encourages 'proper' work habits. As well, it functions as social control by tying people's eligibility for social insurance benefits to their participation in the labour market. The beneficiaries of the positive state tend to be those who, under conditions of laissez-faire individualism, prosper most readily. The vision of the positive state is not at all similar to that of social work. Rather, it is one of rugged individualism within the context of balanced economic growth and protection of business interests (Mishra, 1981). It is the model of welfare favoured by neo-conservatives. The United States best typifies this model.

The Social Security State or Institutional Model of Welfare

The key concept of the social security state is that everyone who is a casualty of the industrial order has a right to a guaranteed minimum of social security. This collective responsibility for individual maintenance recognizes that a society based on competitive capitalism cannot provide universal security and that the state has a duty to fill this void. Theoretically, it is possible to eliminate poverty by establishing the national minimum income at an adequate level. The vision of a social security state is based on government–business co-operation where the guaranteed national minimum is financed by pursuing an economic policy of maximal full employment and public employment as a last resort. These economic and social policies are intended to be of direct benefit to every citizen and to overcome the limitations of social insurance provisions.

The social security state does not contain egalitarian social and economic ideals. The governing principle is 'equality of opportunity' where all are equal in status before the law but unequal in material resources, life chances, and political power. It represents what Furniss and Tilton (1977) call 'a modern and noble version of the Liberal ideal'. Great Britain (before Thatcherism) and Canada and Australia (before Howard), to a lesser extent, typify the social security state, although there has been a drift towards the positive state in all three jurisdictions

The Social Welfare State or Structural Model of Welfare

Unlike the goal of minimalist-full employment of the positive state or of maximalist-full employment of the social security state, the social welfare state has as its goal full employment. This requires government–union co-operation in the labour market. Equally important to the social welfare state are two other policies: environmental planning (in its most comprehensive form) and solidaristic wages. Environmental planning encompasses regulation of property to preserve amenities, prohibition of activities resulting in pollution, urban planning, and development of new communities. In short, this policy represents an effort to inject collective and social values into a society founded on the good life of the individual. The solidaristic wage policy counteracts the tendency towards concentration of assets and income, narrows differentials among groups of wage-earners, and extracts for labour a larger piece of the national income.

The social welfare state aims to promote equality and solidarity. It seeks more than a national minimum for citizens in attempting to achieve a general equality of living conditions. It substitutes public services, such as the public provision of health care, child care, and legal services, for social insurance programs. These services are available to all, not just to the under-privileged. The social welfare state envisions extending the locus of political and economic power and increasing citizen participation in all areas of living. It is similar to what Mishra (1981) calls the structural model of welfare. Although no country at present typifies the social welfare state, Sweden best approximates it among Western industrial democracies.

Social work must reject the positive state as a welfare system because it violates its fundamental values of humanism and egalitarianism and its corresponding set of social, economic, and political beliefs. The social security state contains some humanistic elements but lacks egalitarian ideals. The social welfare state, on the other hand, is most congruent with social work values, beliefs, and principles. Thus, progressive social workers must work towards and attempt to achieve this form of society if they are to remain true to their own ideals. However, the social welfare state or the structural model of welfare is not possible to achieve in our present society because it rests on a set of values contradictory to those of neo-conservative or liberal capitalism.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter the two major approaches to social work, the mainstream and progressive views, were presented. Using the progressive perspective as a point of departure, the argument here is that social work needs a progressive vision of society and social work practice if it is to be true to its primary values of humanitarianism and egalitarianism. The new 2005 CASW *Code of Ethics* contains little potential to develop such a view; indeed, the 1994 *Code* is a much more progressive document. Using the 1994 *Code*, elements of a progressive alternative vision of society were presented (see Table 2.2). The question for social work is, which of the major societal paradigms is most congruent with this alternative vision? In other words, is there a paradigm that approximates or is consistent with social work's primary values of humanitarianism and egalitarianism, as well as its secondary or instrumental values? These instrumental values include respect for the individual as a social being, the domination of economic decisions by societal decisions, participatory democracy, and a social welfare system that contributes to equality, solidarity, and community. The next four chapters will examine various social paradigms in an attempt to answer this question.

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

1. What does a 'progressive view' mean and why is it important to social work?
2. Why does social work need a code of ethics?
3. Why does social work need a professional association? Why doesn't social work organize itself into a union instead of a professional association?

ɜxtending the locus of
in all areas of living. It
ɜ. Although no country
ates it among Western

ɜm because it violates
corresponding set of
ontains some human-
, on the other hand, is
ıus, progressive social
society if they are to
r the structural model
ıse it rests on a set of
sm.

ream and progressive
ıint of departure, the
ciety and social work
ı and egalitarianism.
such a view; indeed,
94 *Code*, elements of
le 2.2). The question
congruent with this
ximates or is consis-
alitarianism, as well
s include respect for
ons by societal deci-
ıtributes to equality,
ıus social paradigms

ɔ social work?
ɜsn't social
ation?

4. How do you respond to the charge that social workers advocate for more spending on social programs only to guarantee themselves jobs?
5. Why has social work not been able to exert a significant influence on social policy decisions?
6. How and in what direction do the media influence people's opinions about social work and social programs?