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Moral Judgment, Crime Seriousness, and the Relations Between Them: An

Exploratory Study

Article  in  Crime & Delinquency · January 2012

DOI: 10.1177/0011128712466889

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Moral Judgment, crime seriousness and the relations between them:

An exploratory Study

Tomer Einat

Department of Criminology

Bar Ilan University, Israel

and

Sergio Herzog

Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

(Alphabetic order)

June, 2011

Address for correspondence:

Dr. Tomer Einat Dr. Sergio Herzog

Department of Criminology Institute of Criminology

Bar-Ilan University The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel Jerusalem, 91905, Israel

E-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

Introduction

Numerous theories have been suggested over the years in an attempt to explain the

acquisition and continuation of anti-social and criminal behaviors. One of the most

well-known attempts is Kohlberg's moral development theory (1972, 1981, 1984).

Kohlberg's theory (1964) asserts that there are six chronological stages of change,

within three levels of moral development (i.e. pre-conventional, conventional, and

post-conventional stages), which broadly characterize the way children, adolescents,

and adults view the world (Bartek, Krebs & Taylor, 1993; Jenks, 2000). Occurring in

sequence, each stage of moral development develops out of and subsumes its

predecessor, and also increases in cognitive complexity (Wolf, Ron & Walters, 1996).

Specifically, the first pre-conventional stage is representative of the child who

interprets cultural labels of good and bad in terms of their physical consequences, or

in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels of good and

bad. In addition, the second conventional level is representative of the child who

maintains the expectations and rules of her/his family group or nation, and perceives

them as valuable in their own right. S/he is concerned then not only with conforming

to her/his social order, but in maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order.

Finally, the third post-conventional stage is characterized by a seeking toward

autonomous moral principles that have validity and application apart from the

individual's identification with those persons or groups (Kohlberg, 1964).

Concordant with these ideas, Piaget (1932) reported that as children grow older,

they come to distinguish between the harmfulness of an act (or its "material

consequences") and its moral wrongness ("naughtiness"). Consequently, older

children, as opposed to younger children (above or under 12 years old respectively),

can consider an action as morally wrong even when it causes no concrete harm (i.e.

lying), as well as perceive an action that results in substantial harm (i.e. injury to a

parent) as morally blameless when, for example, it occurs by accident or is committed

under duress or in self-defense. 1

Furthermore, moral judgment was hypothesized to be correlated both with

perceptions of immorality of various behaviors and also (in specific relevance to this

study) with crime seriousness (i.e. Gibbs, 1979; Warr, 1989). For example, Durkheim

(1949) pointed out that various acts (i.e. violating food taboos, burning the flag,

working on the Sabbath, etc.) were considered criminal in many Western criminal

laws, even when they were devoid of objective harm, only due to their perception as

seriously immoral.

Going along the aforementioned line of reasoning, and while acknowledging the

theoretical, philosophical and empirical relationships between moral judgment and

antisocial or criminal conduct (i.e. Herzog, 2008a; Stevenson, Hall & Innes, 2004), it

could be hypothesized that individuals who are generally less morally developed than

controls will not perceive various (formal) immoral acts of conduct (i.e., criminal

offenses) as morally wrong, or will perceive them as criminally lenient (i.e., not

serious). Accordingly, these persons will have a better chance to engage in criminal

conduct compared to controls with higher levels of mental maturity.

Interestingly, although Kohlberg's theory of moral development, relationships

between moral development and criminal behavior, and perceptions of crime

seriousness among various populations and cultures, were examined extensively (e.g.,

Bandura & Walters, 1963; Einat & Herzog, 2010; Goldstein, Glick & Gibbs, 1998;

Herzog, 2006; Herzog & Oreg, 2008; Jenks, 2000), the relations between perceptions

of moral judgment and perceived seriousness of crimes have not received any

1 Similar reasoning is found throughout Western criminal law in such doctrines or concepts, as mens

rea, strict liability, negligence, and defense to crime (Warr, 1989).

academic attention up to date. Indeed, the authors of the current research have not

found even one empirical study that dealt directly with this subject. Given the

contribution of these research findings on the understanding of the social psychology

of crime (Herzog, 2008b; Veneziano & Veneziano, 1993; Warr, 1989), such study

seems particularly important.

The present research seeks to fill this gap in the understanding of the relationship

between moral judgment and crime seriousness. Specifically, the objective of the

study is to analyze whether moral judgment and perceived seriousness of various

criminal offenses are systematically and significantly correlated. Following several

research findings of inverse relationships between moral maturity and

delinquency, and between perceptions of crime seriousness and criminal behavior

(Bartek et al. 1993; Kuther & Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2000), the current research

hypotheses are:

1. When both seriousness perceptions of criminal offenses and moral judgments

toward moral dilemmas are collected, a significant relationship between both

variables will be found.

2. Within this relationship, respondents expressing higher levels of moral

judgment will tend to ascribe significantly greater seriousness to offenses and,

alternatively, respondents expressing lower levels of moral judgment will tend

to ascribe significantly lower seriousness to offenses.

Literature review

Moral judgment research

For decades, moral psychology was dominated by various developmental models

(i.e. psychoanalytic theories; social-learning theory; cognitive-developmental

theory, etc.) focusing on different socialization experiences in explaining and

interpreting individual's moral development and change (Dewey, 1930; Loevinger,

1966; Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1932, 1965; Sullivan, Grant & Grant, 1957; Walker,

Hennig & Kretteauer, 2000). Although different in essence, these developmental

models emphasize the role of reasoning and 'higher cognition', as opposed to

intuition, in the moral judgment of mature adults (Cushman, Young & Hauser,

2006; Gibbs & Schnell, 1985; Pizarro & Blum, 2003). Specifically, developmental

theories of moral reasoning maintain five common mutual principles: (1)

development involves modifications in cognitive structures or qualitative reasoning

patterns; (2) development takes place through an invariant sequence of stages, that

is similar for all human-beings; (3) development occurs across a continuum, in

which structures become gradually more complex; (4) the fundamental logic used

at each developmental phase appears to be akin across situations, and; (5) the

stages are hierarchical integrations, that enable persons to understand all stages

below and one stage above their diagnosed stage of reasoning (Kohlberg, Colby,

Gibbs, Speicher-Dublin & Power, 1977). As development can come to an end at

any point along the continuum, a cross-section of any sample of people would

theoretically show a distribution of persons at all stages.

Kohlberg's schema or moral stage theory (Kohlberg, 1972; Kohlberg & Candee,

1984) hypothesizes that (a) all individuals in all cultures progress in moral

reasoning through a sequence of six separate chronological stages; (b) moral values

and codes are developed from the interaction between the individual and the

environment, and (c) moral judgment is characterized in accordance to how a

person reasons her/his delinquent behavior rather than in accordance to what a

person thinks about its content (Bartek et al, 1993; Kohlberg, 1976; Lickona,

1983). According to Kohlberg (1981), the six successive stages of moral

development are: Stage 1: An individual's right course of action involves blind

compliance to authority in order to avoid punishment, defer to power or reputation,

and keep away from trouble. The wellbeing of other people is not acknowledged at

this stage; Stage 2: Moral decisions are predicated upon such instrumental concerns

as the prevention of punishment and the furtherance of one's own self-interests.

Yet, the achievement of these aims engages one in interactions and agreements

with other individuals. Consequently, others are important in an instrumental sense,

as parties to such deals; Stage 3: Moral reasoning is internally motivated by

faithfulness to other individuals and by a desire to live up to what is expected by

significant others; Stage 4: Decisions act in response to a wish to maintain various

social institutions, such as the family, the community, and the country. The norms,

regulations and roles of these systems are salient; Stage 5: Moral reasoning sticks

to the utilitarian concept of a social contract, that is to say, the necessity to weigh

certain rights, morals, and legal principles against the greatest good for the greatest

number of individuals; Stage 6: Moral decisions are generated by several ethical

ideologies of justice, such as the right to life and the respect for the dignity of other

persons, as ends rather than means. These values and ideologies are maintained to

exist in a consistent, cross-cultural and worldwide way, which is exclusive of rules,

conditions and laws (Kohlberg, 1981).

Kohlberg's moral stage theory was studied and analyzed by numerous studies

that generally supported it, revealing monotonic correlations between stage of

moral reasoning and performance of moral action (Conley, Jadack, Rosemary &

Shibley Hide, 1997; Walker, 1982) 2 . For example, Gavaghan, Arnold and Gibbs

2 These findings were revealed mainly with the use of Moral Judgment Interview (MJI).

(1983), Hains (1984), Hanson and Mullis (1984), and Kohlberg (1958, 1978),

found that criminals evidenced lower levels of moral development than their non-

criminal peers. Bandura and Walters (1963), Delorto and Cullen (1985), Fodor

(1972), and Musgrave and Stephenson (1983) revealed that delinquent individuals

(both adolescents and adults) score lower on moral maturity than non-delinquent

controls, and thus, concluded that the former are generally less matured in moral

judgment than the latter. Trevethan and Walker (1989) discovered that criminal

adolescents scored lower in moral reasoning than non-criminal youth, on both

hypothetical and real-life dilemmas. In addition, Veneziano and Veneziano (1993)

discovered that individuals at the lowest (pre-conventional) level (i.e., stages 1

and 2) of Kohlberg's moral reasoning model were most likely to approve the

deterrent items that represented formal sanctions, whereas individuals at the

middle (conventional) level (i.e. stages 3 and 4) were most likely to support the

deterrent items that represented informal sanctions involving family and friends.

Furthermore, those persons at the highest (post-conventional) level (i.e. stages 5

and 6) were most likely to endorse the deterrent items that represented abstract

ideals.

In this regard, Jennings, Kilkenny and Kohlberg (1983) proposed that

developmental fixation at the immature stages of reasoning (Kohlberg's stages 1

and 2), although not directly causal, was linked with aggressive and criminal

conduct. This level was related to antisocial behavior because social norms would

only be maintained when the consequences amplified self-interest and minimized

disadvantageous effects. The converse of this delay hypothesis was that mature-

level reasoning (stages 3 to 4) could act as a safeguard against antisocial stimulus.

The safeguard signifies the characteristics of mature-level reasoning, emphatic

concern for others and their welfare and the capability to understand the

consequences of own actions to others. For example, Groth (1979) revealed that

rapists participating in his study begun their treatment at a moral stage that was

characterized by little concern or consciousness of anyone but themselves (stages

1-2). However, as they were confronted with the consequences of their behavior,

they started considering some behavior change (stages 3-4) and begun developing

a modicum of empathy for their victims (see also Gondolf & Hanneken, 1987).

Moreover, Gibbs, Basinger and Fuller (1992) found that nearly all male and

female juvenile delinquents employed immature reasoning as the basis for their

moral decision making, whereas the majority of non-offenders used the mature

level. In addition, Blasi's (1980) and Thoma's (1985) meta-reviews of fifty-seven

and thirty studies (respectively) report a significant correlation between moral

development levels and anti-social behavior (for example: for drug and alcohol

abuse, Barker, 1995, Berkowitz, Guerra & Nucci, 1991; for spouse abuse,

Willens-Davis, 1990; for conscientious objection, Hay, 1982; for opinions on

abortion, Perez, 1994).

In spite of that, Kohlberg's moral theory – in particular and rationalist models

(Harrison, 1967) – in general, have received intense theoretical and empirical

criticism during the last three decades (Bernardi & Arnold, 1997; Cortese, 1987;

Delorto and Cullen, 1985; Edwards, 1986; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Guertin, 1986;

Humm, 1992; Morash, 1981; Simpson, 1974; Snarey, 1985; Snarey & Keljo, 1991;

Snell, 1996; Valsiner, 1989; Verhoef & Michel, 1997; Vine, 1986; Wilson-Oyelaran,

1989).

One important theoretical criticism relates to moral psychology current emphasis on

the role of intuitive and emotional processes in human moral judgment and decision

making (Haidt, 2001). Intuitionist approaches, by extension, say that moral judgment

is caused by quick moral intuitions 3 (including moral emotions) and is followed

(when needed) by slow, ex-post facto moral reasoning (Wilson, 1993). In view of

that, various intuitionist researchers maintain that moral judgments occur as intuitions

generated by automatic cognitive processes, and that the main role of conscious

reasoning is not to generate moral judgments, but to provide a post hoc basis for

moral justification.(Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Haidt, 2001; Simon, 1992).

Furthermore: numerous theorists (Blum, 1998; Gibbs & Schnell, 1985) have

maintained that rationalist models – in general and Kohlberg's moral developmental

theory – in particular, seem to imply the rejection of two mainstream psychological

theses about morality: The "societalism" thesis (Spiro, 1951) and the "emotivism

thesis" (Gibbs & Schnell, 1985). The former, preserves that morality is a matter of

accommodation of the individual to the values and requirements of society through

conformity and internalization techniques. As such, mature individuals refer to the

most appropriate kinds of moral judgment suitable for different social contexts or

purposes (Krebs & Denton, 2005). For example: students make different kinds of

moral arguments to impress different audiences (Gibbs & Schnell, 1985). The latter,

contends that morality is essentially a matter of feeling and that moral behavior owes

its motive power to affective socialization processes (Brandt, 1959). In this line of

reasoning, a number of "emotivists" maintain that moral development and ethical

reasoning are contributed by various emotional sides of experience, such as empathy,

care, love, and feelings of belonging (Blum, 1998; De Casterle, Roselens &

Gastmans, 1998; Gilligan, 1982; Snell, 1986).

3 Moral intuition can be defined as the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment,

including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having

gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion (Simon, 1992).

Moreover, several theoreticians (Blasi, 1980; Rothman, 1980) criticized Kohlberg's

(1969; 1981) assumption that moral reasoning, moral judgment, and moral behavior

are directly interrelated. According to Kohlberg's (1969; 1974) presupposition, the

way in which individuals reason in hypothetical dilemmas is directly related to their

actual moral behavior. To act according to high level of moral reasoning requires

understanding and believe in them. Rothman (1980) and Blasi (1980) analyzed this

assumption thoroughly and concluded that, although moral reasoning, moral

judgment, and moral behavior are interrelated, such relationships are less direct and

much more complex than Kohlberg assumes. Specifically, moral reasoning and moral

behavior seem to influence moral behavior, but in interaction with other situational

and personal dimensions.

In addition, considerable body of criminological theory has stated that moral

development (and moral stages) is irrelevant in explaining the incidence of crime

(Clarke & Homel, 1997). While it has been usual in psychology and criminology

(Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969) to think of moral commitment in developmental terms

(i.e. the product of early socialization), several theoreticians (Clarke & Homel, 1997)

have argued that people obey laws due to their moral commitment to the legal code.

Thus, violation of the law would create substantial embarrassment and significant

psychological and social discomfiture. Furthermore: These theoreticians and others

(Wortley, 1996) maintain that individual's decision whether or not to invoke a moral

rule on a given occasion often depends upon immediate contextual factors, and/or

comprehension of the full criminal nature of the contemplated behavior.

Finally, Kohlberg's (1969) moral development theory postulates that stage

development, whenever it takes place, should take place in order. On view of that, no

stages should be skipped, nor should development revert to earlier stages except

possibly in cases of brain injury or illness. Although individuals' growth may cease at

any stage in the sequence, development that occurs should do so toward the next

ordered stage. Various gerontological-developmental models (Salthouse, 1993) and

lifespan theories (Baltes, 1987) have pointed out that this model of moral

development is not the only one, indicating multidirectional change in some domains.

Parallel to the abovementioned theoretical criticism, Kohlberg's (1969) moral

development theory has received much empirical criticism (Berling, 1981).

Alexander & Langer (1990) have had difficulties examining the existence, nature,

and onset of post-conventional moral reasoning. These problems have led them to

doubt the existence, or 'truthfulness', of post-conventional moral staged 5 and 6. Pratt,

Pancer, Pratt and Hunsberger (1994) as well as Penticton and Markoulis (1994)

demonstrated that in contrast to Kohlberg's (1969) assumption that socio-moral

experience, regularly investigated in adulthood via higher education, is an important

perquisite of moral development, post-conventional reasoning remains elusive among

individuals who have completed advanced education. Moreover, these studies and

others (Commons, Armon, Richards, Schrader, Farrell, Tappan & Bauer, 1989; Nucci

& Pascarella, 1987; Rest & Narvaez, 1991) have found no higher education effects on

moral reasoning at all.

As a final note, and regardless of intense theoretical and empirical criticism, it

should be emphasized that Kohlberg's (1969) moral developmental theory has

endured to become an established psychological and philosophical paradigm (Jenks,

2000; Stevenson et al, 2004).

Crime seriousness research

The current study, as stated previously, attempts to explore and analyze the relation

between moral development and perceptions of crime seriousness. In this regard, it

should be stated that academic interest in the area of public attitudes toward the

seriousness of criminal offenses (Bondeson, 2003; Einat & Herzog, 2010; Herzog,

2006), and the impact of such attitudes on the formulation of the criminal law and the

criminal justice system (Golash & Lynch, 1995; Levi & Jones, 1985), had

significantly increased since the publication of Sellin and Wolfgang’s pioneering

work, The Measurement of Delinquency (1964), and has risen from that point on.

Among its contributions, this area of research shed light on various deep-seated

criminological issues among them, group or societal effect on the criminal

enforcement system's punitive policy (Golash & Lynch, 1995; Heller & McEwen,

1975), the culture or subculture fundamental moral systems and the role of law in any

given society (Blumstein & Cohen, 1980; Herzog, 2008b), and the extent to which

individuals are inclined to obey the law (O’Connell & Whelan, 1996).

Despite of various kinds of criticism applied to Sellin and Wolfgang's (1964) study

and its replications (Herzog, 2006; Miethe, 1984; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996), this

area of research has developed considerably, mainly in three different directions: the

type of criminal behaviors analyzed, the kind of populations researched, and the

applied research methods.

Generally, and regardless of different research goals, scaling methods, types of

samples, and research populations, concerning the education, social classes, gender,

and age of the respondents - both within the same nation and also cross-culturally

(Evans & Scott, 1984; Levi & Jones, 1985; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996; Sellin &

Wolfgang, 1964), most studies in this research area have supported the theoretical

framework of the consensus model (Cullen, Link, Travis and Wozniak, 1985; Levi &

Jones, 1985; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996; Rossi & Berk, 1997). According to this

theoretical model, a close match exists between the attitudes of several social groups

toward the relative seriousness of various criminal acts, their appropriate punishments

and their expression in the formal criminal law (Rossi & Anderson, 1982). In other

words, the criminal law tends to reflect social agreement of individuals within a given

society, concerning the definitions of forbidden types of behavior, their relative

seriousness, and the formal sanctions applied against their perpetrators (Warr, Gibbs

& Erickson, 1982).

Specifically, most seriousness studies have revealed a broad agreement in regard to

public’s ranking of criminal offenses, both nationally and internationally, when the

order of the offenses' types remained quite permanent. In essence, crimes of violence

are (i.e. homicide, rape, and interpersonal violence) usually perceived by respondents

as the most serious offenses (offenses that include a corporal injury are usually

perceived as the most serious ones). Only after these come (often in much the same

order) property offenses, white-collar offenses, and victimless crimes (Cullen et al,

1985; Herzog, 2008b; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996). Moreover, when a certain offense

is perceived as relatively more serious, its high seriousness mean is usually

accompanied by low standard deviations; hence the high consensus regarding the

perceived high seriousness of violent offenses (Cullen et al., 1985; Levi & Jones,

1985; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996).

These findings have vital importance for both theoretical and practical levels (Einat

& Herzog, 2010; Herzog, 2006). Theoretically-wise, it supports the tenets of the

consensus model (Jacoby & Cullen, 1999; Warr et al., 1982) which assumes a close

match between the attitudes of various social groups toward the definition of certain

acts as criminal offenses and their expression in the formal criminal law. In this

regard, similarity of rankings of crime seriousness among different and heterogenic

social groups may indicate that modern societies are functional unities. Practically-

wise, the apparently common public opinions lead to political justification of

differential levels of punishment against different offenses and to non-equal

distribution of resources by the criminal justice system. Consequently, more financial

and human resources are allocated to the investigation of serious offenses, in

comparison to victimless or moral offenses (Levi & Jones, 1985; O’Connell &

Whelan, 1996).

Nevertheless, some researchers (Cullen et al, 1985; Miethe, 1984) suggested that the

unambiguous determination of far-reaching consensus concerning the relative

seriousness of offenses is often a statistical artifact of high Pearson (correlative)

coefficients, resulting from the comparison of mean group values. These correlations

do not discern identical, similar, or different values assigned to individual scenarios

and, therefore, do not reveal real between-group variance. Moreover: these

correlations may be very high even when there is no absolute agreement between the

compared groups, that is, there are significant differences between the means of

seriousness values of compared groups. This typical disregard for between-group

variance is a common feature of cross-cultural and between-sample comparisons,

especially among subgroups within the same sample. As a result, despite similarity in

relative rankings, significant differences in mean scores in different groups have been

reported frequently.

Furthermore, some critics (Cullen et al, 1985; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996)

suggested that high levels of agreement among respondents are, in fact, a

methodological creation by which actual variability between offenses and groups of

respondents is usually ignored. On the one hand, it has been argued that many of these

studies over-emphasize violent offenses for evaluation, and that these offenses give

rise to relatively slight variation in perceptions of seriousness. On the other hand, it

has been argued that crime seriousness studies have mostly succeeded in

demonstrating consistent relative rankings of offenses, but simultaneously produce a

much smaller degree of agreement concerning their rating. Hence, differences in

average seriousness scores between respondents from different groups are often

reported (O’Connell & Whelan, 1996; Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, 1974). For

example, Evans & Scott (1984) reported that despite the similarity in the ranking of

offenses by respondents with various degrees of religiosity, highly religious

respondents provided absolute seriousness scores significantly higher than other

respondents. Other research (Curry, 1996) suggested that conservative Protestant

adults are more likely to support harsh penalties than respondents from other

denominations because they hold conservative religious beliefs that justify the use of

such penalties.

In general, most relevant research findings have supported the argument that it is too

early to speak of full consensus regarding public perceptions of crime seriousness

(Blum-West, 1985; Cullen et al, 1985; Miethe, 1984). This leaves open the question

whether it is conceivable for people from different social groups within a given

society or from different cultures to evaluate the seriousness of criminal offenses

identically, regardless of social, cultural, or personal variables. In the words of Hansel

(1987: 456): "…Social groups differ about education, religion, and a wide variety of

social objects. Thus, they ‘of course’ should also differ in their views on crime

seriousness." These differences may be due both to different cultural perceptions of

the seriousness of offenses and/or to the use of different numerical scales or ranges in

a given survey (O’Connell & Whelan, 1996).

Given the centrality of moral development and crime seriousness in the

psychological and criminological literature during the last four decades (Einat &

Herzog, 2010; Herzog & Oreg, 2008; Jenks, 2000; Petronio, 1980; Stevenson et al,

2004; Warr, 1989), and their contribution to the understanding of the social

psychology of crime (Einat & Herzog, 2010; Herzog, 2008b; Veneziano &

Veneziano, 1993), it might have been speculated that the relations between moral

judgment and the perception of crime seriousness have been studied thoroughly.

Unfortunately, and quiet surprisingly, this assumption has not been fulfilled. In view

of that, the present research seeks to examine the relationship between moral

judgment and perceptions of crime seriousness, and to analyze whether level(s) of

seriousness perceptions of various criminal offenses systematically and significantly

affected moral judgment.

Methodology

Data collection

This research was based on an analysis of 648 personal and anonymous

questionnaires, administrated by means of a telephone survey, gathered between

March and June 2010, in every region of Israel, within the limits of the 'Green Line'

(i.e. not in the Palestinian territories). The relatively large sample was randomly

allocated out of the adult Israeli population. Generally, the sample shows overall a

close fit with the official data on the Israeli adult population in the year when the

survey was conducted. The research sample was shown to be a fairly homogeneous

group with regard to ethnicity, religiosity, and status in the country. The majority of

the respondents were Jewish, secular, Israeli-born or veteran citizens, married persons

(50% male, 80% Jewish, 75% secular, 78% Israeli born or veteran, data on the

population: 53% women; 82% Jewish, 72% secular, 80% Israeli born or veteran). In

addition, about two thirds of the sample reported monthly family incomes of more

than 5,000 New Israeli Shekels (about US$1,000). This finding is compatible with

economic characteristics of the whole Israeli population (mean monthly family

income: 7,500 NIS). Finally, the sample was highly heterogeneous in terms of age

(mean age 37.15; SD = 12.96; range 16-83), and respondents' educational level was

relatively high (mean: 13.69 years; i.e., some post-secondary education). Compared

with the population in large, a bias is noted in the sample in the direction of older

(hence, more educated) respondents because of the exclusion of very young

respondents. In general, the main characteristics of the sample were closely matched

to the official characteristics of the Israeli adult population in the year in which the

survey was conducted (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010).

Each questionnaire was relatively short and included three different hypothetical

crime scenarios for evaluation - for reaching respondents' perceptions of seriousness -

the described moral dilemma included in the DIT (detailed later) – for reaching

respondents' moral judgments - and a number of questions about respondents’

demographical information. Each telephone interview lasted between seven and ten

minutes. The language of the questionnaire was kept as simple as possible and the

students who served as surveyors were carefully trained by the researchers to

minimize potential biases. These ultimately led to a high response rate of 63 percent.

Research variables

(a) Dependent variable: The dependent variable in this study was respondents'

moral judgments. According to the literature, the instrument most often used to

operationalize moral development and place individuals within one of Kohlberg's

development stages model is Rest's Defining Issues Test - DIT (Rest, Narvaez,

Bebeau & Thoma, 1999a; b). The DIT uses a Likert type scale to give quantitative

rankings to moral dilemmas, the data of which are then analyzed. The following

example is one of the various DIT dilemmas used in this study:

"In Europe, a woman was near death from a very unusual kind of cancer. The

doctors thought that one drug – a form of radium discovered by a druggist in the

same town – might save her life. The druggist paid $400 for the radium and charged

$4,000 for a small dose of the drug. Heinz, the sick woman's husband, went to

everyone he knew to borrow the money, and tried every legal means, but he could

only raise $2,000, half of the drug selling price. Heinz pleaded with the druggist,

explaining to him that his wife was dying. He presented several options to the

druggist: sell the drug to Heinz at a cheaper price, let Heinz pay for the drug in

installments, or let Heinz pay for it at a later date. But the druggist said, 'NO, I

discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it'. Heinz is now

considering breaking into the drug store and stealing for his wife."

All the respondents were asked: "Do you agree with this act?" The moral

perceptions were measured in this study on a “Likert-scale” of values from 1 to 11,

where 1 indicated “extremely agree with Heinz' consideration of stealing the drug,”

11 indicated “not agree at all,” and 6 constituted the middle value. In this study, the

DIT-2 (Rest et al., 1999 a; b) was applied. It was an updated and shortened version of

Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT), which was a written assessment based on

Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview 10 (MJI) (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs &

Liberman, 1983). The DIT-2 (incorporating Heinz's moral dilemma) had been used

for more than two decades, and researchers had accumulated results for more than

500,000 participants (e.g., Good & Cartwright, 1998; Griffore & Samuels, 1978; King

& Mayhew, 2002; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 2003; Rest, 1986; Rest et

al., 1999 a; b; Sandhu, 1997/1998; Watt, Frausin, Dixon & Nimmo, 2000; Young,

Cashwell & Woolington, 1998).

(b) Independent variable: Seriousness perceptions: Respondents were asked to

evaluate the seriousness of different criminal offenses, presented by means of criminal

scenarios (n=3,240). The following examples are three of the five crime scenarios

presented in this study:

1. "A 25-year-old Arab man suspects his 25-year-old Arab wife of cheating on him.

He therefore decides to kill her. Once they are alone, he kills her".

2. "Two acquaintances enter into a furious political argument during which one of

them, a 50-year-old Jewish man with a criminal record, kills the other, a 50-

year-old, Jewish man".

3. "A 25-year-old Jewish man with a criminal record breaks into an Arab woman's

apartment, and steals jewels and money worth NIS 10,000".

The seriousness perceptions were measured on a “Likert-scale” of values from 1 to

11, where 1 indicated “not serious at all,” 11 indicated “very serious,” and 6

constituted the middle value (Herzog, 2008a, 2008b; Herzog & Oreg, 2008).

In addition, control variables of the study were derived from two sources: (a)

respondents’ personal characteristics, collected at the end of the survey and, (b)

randomly assigned factorial variables within the crime scenarios. The factorial

technique used multidimensional hypothetical scenarios presented in a form that

combines the benefits of controlled, randomized experimental designs and

conventional surveys (Rossi & Anderson, 1982). According to this technique, the

scenarios that were presented were created by random selection of values (levels)

from each of several variables (dimensions; one level per dimension per scenario)

until the presentation of each dimension and the formation of complete scenario.

Thus, all scenarios considered in this study represent a random sample of all possible

scenarios available from the universe of all levels across the chosen dimensions.

Research Tool

Preference was given to telephone questionnaires as opposed to personal interviews

and/or questionnaires sent by mail due to their relatively short process of distribution

and collection, affordability, and relatively high response rates. Additional advantages

of telephone questionnaires relate to surveyors’ low probability of biases, short and

uncomplicated formulation of questions, high standardization of answers, researchers’

abilities of clarifications, and relatively easy access to large and diverse, and thus

representative, samples (including illiterate respondents) of all the country’s regions.

The most recent Israeli telephone directories at the time of the study (2010), covering

all geographical regions, provided the sampling framework, and the application of a

systematic random sampling method assured identical probability of inclusion of all

households listed (no other technique, such as interview schedule was applied). Given

that at least 95% of the Israeli population within the limits of the 'Green Line' has one

active telephone line at home (CBS, 2010) 4 , and that most telephone numbers appear

in the Israeli telephone directories, it could be assumed that this sampling frame was

appropriate for the purposes of this research.

The questionnaires were initially written in Hebrew, and have been translated into

Arabic and Russian for relevant minority groups (i.e. Israeli-Arabs and ex-Soviet

4 According to formal data of the Ministry of Communications, 98 percent of the households in Israel

have telephones, although among certain groups of the population (e.g., Israeli Arabs) this percentage

is a bit lower (around 95 percent). Based on these data, the percentage of people unlisted in the

directories seems to be fairly low.

Union immigrants). Furthermore, in order to verify that the content of the

questionnaires would be understandable to all interviewees from the abovementioned

minority social groups, Arabic- and Russian-speaking interviewers were employed.

The response rate was calculated on the basis of valid household numbers, excluding

businesses, fax connections, etc. Respondents who could not be reached at first were

contacted again up to three times. A household was replaced after three failed

attempts. Since the sample was representative of the adult Israeli population, it may

be assumed that no important groups were under-represented in it. Moreover, since

the household's owner, whose name appears in the telephone directory, was not

necessarily the person who answered the survey, the questionnaires remained

anonymous. Lastly, the questionnaires were pre-tested with a small number of

respondents, in order to both obtain an initial test of the measures’ reliability and test

any unexpected response patterns (none were found).

A probabilistic sampling approach was employed in this research, starting by a

stratum sampling, in order to offer similar representations for each geographic area in

Israel. In each layer, a simple random sampling of names from the telephone

directories was made so that the probability of each family appearing in the

directories to participate in the survey would be equal (the percentage of protected

numbers in Israel is relatively very small). Generally, it could be stated that a

comparison of the sample’s characteristics to data regarding the Israeli population

(CBS, 2010) reveals that the former largely represents the latter.

Every questionnaire included five different hypothetical scenarios of various

criminal offenses, based on the factorial approach, and a DIT moral dilemma. All

respondents were informed that the questionnaires were anonymous, their content was

confidential, and that their answers would serve only for research purposes. Later, the

respondents were asked to evaluate the seriousness of each and every scenario

presented to them, as well as to refer to the DIT moral dilemma. Finally the

respondents were asked to present some personal information or characteristics about

themselves. The purpose of the research, as presented to the respondents, was to attain

public opinion on the topic of criminal offenses.

Results

Table 1 presents 3 types of information: (a) the percentages of the seriousness

(independent) and the moral judgments (dependent) variables; (b) the Pearson’s

coefficient for the correlation between the independent and dependent variables (as

given by the whole sample respondents to all crime scenarios and all moral dilemmas

presented to them for evaluation), and; (c) the Pearson correlation between both

variables. In this regard, the percentages of the seriousness values of each crime

scenario were calculated in regard to each scenario. These values were correlated to

the judgment of the moral dilemma.

Table 1: Mean ratings of the seriousness of the crime scenarios and of the

moral dilemmas, by the entire sample

Value in the

seriousness variable

% Value in the moral

judgment variable

%

1 – not serious 1.9 1 – do not agree at all

with Heinz

2.9

2 1.7 2 2.9

3 3.3 3 3.6

4 3.2 4 3.8

5 6.4 5 4.5

6 – middle value 7.8 6 – middle value 7.2

7 6.9 7 7.0

8 10.

2

8 21.4

9 9.7 9 12.9

10 11.

6

10 15.2

11 – very serious 37.

4

11 – totally [very

much] agree with

Heinz

18.7

r = 0.39 *

* p < 0.01

As seen in this table, most of the respondents chose the highest values in both

variables. Specifically, the majority of respondents (approximately 70%) perceived

the various crime scenarios presented to them for evaluation as serious, and tended to

see the described action in the moral dilemma as non-acceptable (between value 8 and

value 11 - the highest value). In addition, the Pearson's coefficient for the correlation

between both variables was found as positive: as the seriousness of a scenario

increased, the moral judgment of the moral dilemma increased as well. Although the

Pearson’s coefficient for the correlation between the aforementioned variables was

found as medium in its strength, it showed statistical significance.

Table 2 presents the percentages of the moral judgments (dependent) variable of

both respondents who provided the scenarios with a mean value below the value of 3

(i.e., "non-serious") and those who provided the scenarios with a mean value of 9 and

higher (i.e., "serious"), as well as the Pearson’s coefficient for the correlation between

them.

Table 2: Mean ratings of the moral dilemmas, by respondents expressing both

"non serious" and "serious" values to the crime scenarios

Non serious respondents –

1 to 3 seriousness values

% Serious respondents

– 9 to 11 seriousness

values

%

1 –agree with Heinz 12.2 1 – agree with Heinz 22.0

2 12.5 2 15.8

3 12.2 3 13.1

4 16.6 4 20.4

5 11.3 5 5.8

6 – middle value 8.6 6 – middle value 6.6

7 2.3 7 3.7

8 3.6 8 3.8

9 7.1 9 3.3

10 7.7 10 2.6

11 – do not agree with

Heinz

5.9 11 – do not agree

with Heinz

2.9

r = 0.40 * r = 0.38 *

* p < 0.05

From Table 2 we can see that pretty similar distributions of values were found for

both groups of respondents, differentiated by the mean values they provided to the

various crime scenarios. Generally, relatively high percentages of respondents who

considered the crime scenarios both as non-serious (seriousness values of 1 to 3) and

serious (seriousness values of 9 to 11) tended to accept the execution of the criminal

conduct - as described in the moral dilemma. Moreover: the moral judgments values

in both distributions of serious and non-serious respondents were quite similar,

although a great number of respondents from both groups tended not to disagree or

not to accept the described criminal behavior in the moral dilemma.

In addition, the influence of the aforementioned seriousness perceptions of the crime

scenarios on the moral judgment variable were analyzed by a multivariate OLS

regression model, with controlling for both the scenario's seriousness and the

respondents' personal characteristics (control variables). Table 3 presents the

unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors of these variables on the

moral judgment variable. In this context of regression analyses, a potential response

bias in the respondents’ judgments could have been present due to both the response

of each of the respondents to five different scenarios and the treatment of the latter (in

this study) as units of analysis (Hox et al, 1991). To overcome this possible problem,

the regression analysis was also conducted by using a Hierarchical Linear Models’

software, which takes this possible difficulty into consideration. This latter analysis

yielded findings that were very similar to the former analysis. For matters of

convenience (i.e. conserving space), only the OLS data are presented.

Table 3: Unstandardized coefficients (and standard errors) for the moral

judgment of the moral dilemmas, by scenario variables and

respondents’ personal details, for the whole sample of respondents.

Variables Values Dependent

variable

Moral

judgment

Scenarios' variables

Seriousness 1 = not serious at all; 11 = very

serious

1.13 (.78) *

Respondents' variables

Respondent’s gender 0 = male; 1 = female 1.90 (1.75)*

Respondent’s age Interval .10 (.04)*

Respondent’s

education

Interval .37 (.20)**

Respondent’s income 0 = less than 5, 000 NIS ; 1 = more .71 (1.12)

Respondent’s

ethnicity

0 = Jewish; 1 = Arab -3.89

(1.62)**

Respondent’s

religiosity

0 = secular; 1 = traditional / religious 2.21 (1.06)*

Resp. status in the

country

0 = natives/veterans; 1 = immigrants -2.17

(1.11)**

Respondent’s familial

status

0 = married ; 1 = other -1.89

(1.18)*

Respondent’s occup.

Status

0 = full-time job ; 1 = other -.50 (1.05)

Model data

Valid n 647

R 2 23.8**

* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01

Table 3 reveals that seriousness perceptions (independent variable) continued to

show a significant positive coefficient even when the influence of the respondents'

characteristics on moral judgments of moral dilemmas (dependent variable) were

taken into account. That is, when respondents gave high serious values in the

seriousness variable to the crime scenarios, they also tended to disagree with the

described immoral behavior presented in the moral dilemma.

Nonetheless (as seen in the same table), and despite of the magnitude of this

variable, it should be noted that other control variables (i.e. respondents'

characteristics) have shown even higher statistical significant regression coefficients,

as compared to the previous independent coefficients. Among these variables,

ethnicity, education, and status in the country (i.e. natives, veterans [more than five

years] or immigrants) were found to be the most influential on the moral judgment of

the moral dilemmas. Generally, Israeli Jews, natives, veterans, and more educated

persons tended not to agree with the described immoral behavior in the dilemma, as

compared to Arab, immigrants and less educated persons.

Discussion and conclusion

The goals of the present study are two-folded: (A) to examine the relationship

between moral judgment and perceptions of crime seriousness among a random

sample of Israeli adults and juveniles, and (B) to analyze, within this relationship, the

connection between respondents' high levels of moral judgment and assignment of

greater seriousness to offenses and low levels of moral judgment and attribution of

lower seriousness to offenses. This analysis was done with special attention to

Kohlberg's theory of moral development (1972).

As stated, the first research hypothesis was that when both seriousness perceptions

of criminal offenses and moral judgments toward moral dilemmas are collected, a

significant relationship between both variables will be found. One important finding

of this research (see Tables 1 and 2), as regards to the first hypothesis, relates to the

seriousness perceptions of the crime scenarios and the immorality of the behaviors

portrayed in the moral dilemmas. The perceived seriousness values given by more

than two thirds of the research participants to all crime scenarios were high and,

correlatively, almost 70% of them considered the behaviors, presented in the moral

dilemmas, as unacceptable. In essence, these rankings are relatively similar to other

rankings found in other studies of crime seriousness, which revealed a significant

correlation between high levels of seriousness perceptions of various crimes and high

scores of punishments (Cullen et al, 1985; Herzog, 2006; Levi & Jones, 1985). In

view of that, these findings may be considered as supporting the consensus model

(O’Connell & Whelan, 1996; Rossi & Berk, 1997; Warr et al, 1982) that postulates a

close match between the attitudes of various social groups toward criminal acts and

the perceptions of crime seriousness (Einat & Herzog, 2010).

A second major finding of this study concerns the statistically significant correlation

between the level of the perceived seriousness of a crime scenario and the level of the

moral judgment of its moral dilemma: Specifically, most research participants

increased the level of moral judgment of the moral dilemma as the perceived

seriousness of a scenario increased. In addition, increase in the perceived seriousness

of the crime scenarios was found to be correlated to an escalation in the tendency to

disagree with the described immoral behavior presented in the moral dilemma.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that respondents' attitudes toward the various moral

dilemmas, were found to be influenced by their education, ethnicity and social strata

(status in the country) as well. For example: more educated, Jewish and natives or

veteran respondents tended not to agree with the described immoral behaviors in the

dilemmas than less educated, non-Jewish, Israeli-born respondents or youngsters.

Hence, the research findings make evident that personal characteristics, among other

factors, influence individual perceptions of moral judgment significantly.

The existence of significant correlations between perceived seriousness and moral

judgment values assigned by a random sample of 648 Israeli adults as regards to five

different hypothetical scenarios of various criminal offenses, tends to support

Stevenson, Hall and Innes's (2011) study, which revealed that mature-level non-

offenders endorsed more positive attitudes about the justice system, were less willing

to neutralize law violation, and had lower identification with criminal others than (two

control groups of) offenders.

The second research hypothesis was that within the relationship between moral

judgment toward moral dilemmas and seriousness perceptions of criminal offenses,

respondents expressing higher levels of moral judgment would tend to assign

significantly greater seriousness to criminal offenses compared to respondents

expressing lower levels of moral judgment who would tend to ascribe significantly

lower seriousness to criminal offenses. This research hypothesis was rejected by the

data. In general, high percentages of the research respondents, both among those

perceiving the crime scenarios as non-serious and those perceiving them as serious,

tended to morally judge the criminal behavior in the moral dilemma quiet similarly.

Furthermore: in addition to the great similarity of the levels of moral judgment of the

crime scenarios of the different samples' participants, numerous respondents from

both groups tended either to disagree or to agree to the criminal conducts presented in

the moral dilemmas. These findings stand in contrast to several research findings

revealing a correlation between moral judgment and perceptions of- (as well as

engagement in-) criminal behavior (Berkowitz et al. 1995; Kuther & Higgins-

D'Alessandro, 2000) and, conversely, strengthen both Bartek and his associates

(1993) and Tarry & Emler (2007) research findings that failed to reveal a relation

between low level of moral judgment and increase in immoral prescriptive judgments

(Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Accordingly, it could be concluded that according to this

study, the relationship between moral reasoning and perceptions of crime seriousness

is medium at best.

More generally, the findings of this study may indicate that mature-level socio-

moral development, as well as perceptions of crime seriousness might not necessarily

protect a person from identifying with criminal acts, and that law violations could be

rationalized regardless of socio-moral stage or crime seriousness' perceptions (Einat

& Herzog, 2010). In contrast to several theoretical proposals concerning the influence

of viewpoints and morals on involvement in criminal behavior (for example: the

Cognitive Developmental Theory, Aronson, 1995; Hirschi, 1969; Piaget, 1932;

Sutherland & Cressey, 1970) and to various empirical studies linking immature level

of socio-moral development to attitudes and values on involvement in delinquent and

criminal conduct (Jennings et al. 1983), our research findings may insinuate that

perceptions of both crime seriousness and moral judgment of criminal offenses, do

not necessarily act as a cognitive barrier against immoral prescriptive judgments of

(and possibly – engagement in) criminal behavior.

It is difficult to know precisely what to make of these findings given there is so little

extent literature that addresses the relationships between seriousness perceptions of

criminal offenses and moral judgment. Could they imply the stable and long-term

nature of criminal/noncriminal attitudes, where regardless of the occurrence of socio-

moral crime seriousness perceptions' development these sentiments remain embedded

within the belief system? Alternatively, could these research findings put in doubt the

likely efficacy of interventions intended to reform (young) offenders by raising their

moral reasoning level?

Whatever the conclusions will be, two arguments must be stated:

(A) The findings of this study show that moral judgment and attitudes toward

immoral behavior are correlated with crime seriousness perceptions, not that they are

casual influences. To demonstrate cause would require a different and inevitably more

costly kind of study, ideally a longitudinal design incorporating assessments at several

time points; (B) Growing skepticism that attitudes and perceptions of crime

seriousness could explain anything about deviant and/or criminal behavior (Hammond

& Nicholas, 2007; Kuther & Higgins-D'Alessandro, 2000; Stevenson et al, 2004)

concurs with the emergence of Kohlberg's cognitive structural analysis of moral

development, so it was perhaps inevitable that the latter should have been seen as a

more viable alternative to the former as a basis for explaining variations in moral

behavior. This concurrence, moreover, led to an almost complete disappearance of

research interest in the development of attitudes and values over the course of

childhood and adolescence. The picture now emerging, however, surely justifies some

rebalancing of research priorities and more attention being paid to development in the

attitudinal and values aspects of moral stances and the relations between the former

and crime seriousness.

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