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The Psychological Record, 2013, 63, 681–692
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jay Moore, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201; E- mail: [email protected]
DOI:10.11133/j.tpr.2013.63.3.020
Three ViewS of BehaVioriSm
Jay Moore University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
Three views of behaviorism are examined in an effort to clarify its meaning. The views are composites of what readers might hear or read in the professional literature of psychology. View 1 is un–self- consciously critical of behaviorism and might represent the view taken by a contemporary cognitive psychologist. View 2 appears to support behaviorism but actually represents only a methodological behaviorism and an epistemological dualism. View 3 represents a radical, thoroughgoing behaviorism. The radical behaviorism of View 3 regards any differences between Views 1 and 2 as superficial—both are mediational and mentalistic and therefore objectionable. In contrast to Views 1 and 2, radical behaviorism emphasizes the functional analysis of verbal behavior, which leads to a thoroughgoing, behavioral conception of knowledge and explanatory practices in psychology. Key words: methodological behaviorism, mentalism, epistemological dualism, radical behaviorism, explanation
Schneider and Morris (1987) suggested that John B. Watson was the first to invoke the term behaviorism. Moore (2008, 2011) recently argued that there is a lot of debate about just what behaviorism means and whether it is in fact a broadly monolithic viewpoint, appropriately understood in a majority of cases. The present article examines three views of behaviorism, in a further effort to clarify an understanding of behaviorism.
View 1 View 1 is openly critical of any form of behaviorism. It summarizes things one might
hear or read from researchers and theorists who identify themselves as contemporary cognitive psychologists. It is presented here as a vehicle to bring forth important issues, rather than as a “straw man” argument: Behaviorism is outmoded. It may have helped to make psychology more scientific in 1913, when Watson advocated replacing (a) a subjective and admittedly unreliable methodology based on introspection and verbal reports with (b) an objective methodology based on publicly observable data. However, it can contribute little if anything of value now to explanations of human behavior. Behavior analysis is nothing but another form of behaviorism. At best, it applies to simple, observable motor behavior of rats, pigeons, individuals with developmental disabilities,
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and small children in highly controlled, artificial, or contrived situations. Even if laboratory experiments show aspects of human behavior can be temporarily influenced by classical or operant conditioning processes (and even then there is the question that the results are attributable to awareness), there is no evidence that conditioning processes are involved when human behavior naturally occurs outside of the laboratory. Consequently, behavior analysis is merely an artificial, contrived methodology with limited generality. To explain such complex and in some cases uniquely human phenomena as language, thought, or memory, a viewpoint in psychology must engage underlying theoretical phenomena, such as acts, states, mechanisms, processes, entities, or structures in a mental, subjective, or cognitive dimension. Although these phenomena are themselves unobservable, they may be engaged as logical constructs or inferred, theoretical entities. The history of the sciences indicates how important it is to conceive of factors that may be unobserved at the time they are postulated but that nevertheless prove fruitful in understanding the subject matter of that science. A science should be theoretically liberated to entertain whatever richer concepts involving unobservables suit its explanatory or heuristic purposes. Cognitive psychology is quite naturally following in this same tradition. The explanatory appeal to unobservables is necessary because behavior in the observable dimension is not related in any obvious one- to- one way to environmental stimuli in the observable dimension. Therefore, a causal explanation of observable behavioral output must be in terms of something other than the direct input from observable environmental stimuli. This other “something” to which behavioral output is causally related, and in terms of which an explanation of behavior is appropriately sought, is the mind and the unobservable cognitive structures that “underlie” behavior. These structures are independent contributions of the organism. Nevertheless, cognitive predictions may be tested against experimental data to provide the necessary scientific rigor. Thus, behavioral data are useful insofar as they index underlying cognitive structures in such tests. Behavior analysis and its attendant philosophy of radical behaviorism exhibit the commitment to observables found in logical positivism, logical empiricism, operationism, and philosophical behaviorism. They are unwilling or unable to consider unobservable, theoretical phenomena—it really doesn’t matter which. As a result, behavior analysis cannot secure a genuine understanding of how the phenomena contribute to behavior. Consequently, behavior analysis cannot be seriously regarded as a meaningful viewpoint. As cognitive neuroscience develops, it will deploy cognitive theoretical concepts and complete the task of elucidating the causally effective antecedents that most appropriately explain behavior. Ultimately, viewpoints with a more explicitly cognitive theoretical orientation are preferable because (a) they deal with a much broader range of psychologically interesting issues and (b) they provide more theoretically appropriate explanations of those issues.
What can we say about View 1? For the present purposes, we can say that View 1 makes certain assumptions about a
particular intellectual position, which in generic form it takes to be behaviorism and in specific form it takes to be behavior analysis. In broad strokes, it assumes that any form of
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behaviorism is concerned with nothing but describing the relation between publicly observable stimuli and publicly observable behavior. It then contrasts cognitive psychology with the version of behaviorism it has painted and finds that version of behaviorism wanting. It further assumes that an explanation of behavior must explicitly include analytical concepts from another dimensional system (e.g., in the cognitive dimension of “mind”) as causally effective antecedents. It regards behaviorism as manifestly unable to do so and, therefore, as an inescapably inferior brand of psychological science.
Let us now consider View 2.
View 2 View 2 may appear to be more sympathetic to behaviorism. It is a composite of things
one might hear or read from researchers and theorists who identify themselves as behaviorists, albeit of a particular sort: Behaviorism is a scientific approach to psychology that is distinguished by its underlying logical- theoretical emphasis as it seeks to develop explanations of behavior. A theory is a provisional statement about relations among inferred logical constructs or theoretical entities that is intended to explain behavior. These constructs or entities are as necessary in psychology as they are in any other science. In addition, they serve a heuristic function. The inferred constructs or entities are operationally defined in terms of publicly observable environmental, physiological, and behavioral variables, to secure agreement. The operational definitions provide safeguards against admitting untestable introspective speculations, thereby preventing behaviorism from sinking into difficulties with trying to make a science out of something like mental life that may well exist but is inappropriate for science because it is not publicly observable. As a result of entertaining theoretical statements that incorporate the inferred but operationally defined constructs, researchers can generate predictions that can be tested empirically against the facts of experience; the more quantitative the theoretical predictions are, such as by being in a model or equation, the better they are. In no way is the data language linked directly to introspective reports or untestable speculations. Typically, the inferred constructs are construed as mediating, organismic variables in an S–O–R conception of behavior. According to the notion of mediation, environmental stimuli are viewed as activating some unobservable, inferred inner act, state, mechanism, process, structure, or entity that mediates the relation between stimulus (S) and response (R) and in a meaningful sense causes R. The mediator is regarded as the proper target for psychological theorizing because the organism is never in direct contact with stimuli in the environment, rather only with the mediator. Talk about theoretical constructs does not necessarily imply they are ontologically different from physical, material stuff. Even if they are, the position can remain silent about whether the constructs actually exist inside the behaving organism, in another dimension, and thereby avoid any criticisms that would otherwise apply because of dualism. The evidence for talking meaningfully about the constructs differs from the nature of the constructs themselves and does not commit researchers or theorists to any particular position regarding their ontology. The overall aim of the behaviorism described above is simply (a) to postulate theoretical constructs that can account for past, current, and future observations; (b) to invoke
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observable environmental, physiological, and behavioral variables as proxies or surrogates that operationally define the theoretical constructs in the theory; (c) to generate predictions concerning relations among observable environmental, physiological, and behavioral variables; (d) to subject these predictions to empirical test; and (e) to formulate the resulting relations among observable data and inferred constructs in abstract terms as theories and eventually laws, which can be taken as explanations of the behavior in question.
What can we say about View 2?
methodological Behaviorism At first glance, View 2 appears to differ from View 1, for example, because of an
explicit commitment in View 2 to empiricism, objectivity, theory development, and logical reasoning in support of analytical and explanatory concepts. Nevertheless, one thing we can say is that View 2 is merely a “methodological behaviorism.” Methodological behaviorism is a general orientation to establishing the meaning of analytical concepts that developed in psychology during the 1930s and continue to the present day. In its early form, methodological behaviorism held that the only things we can directly talk about (i.e., “mean”) in psychology are publicly observable data. A subsequent form circumvented this prohibition by admitting unobservables as “constructs.” The meaning of these constructs comes from operational definitions, through the publicly observable data and procedures entailed in their measurement. View 2 is of the subsequent form. View 2 is also called mediational neobehaviorism, by virtue of the appeal to unobservable, mediating organismic variables—the O in the S– O –R formulation—of this newer form of behaviorism that replaced the older S–R formulation of classical behaviorism. What is troublesome is that the constructs become proxies, or surrogates, that are held to justify talk about the same old mentalistic, if not dualistic, concepts. This move allows researchers and theorists to indirectly readmit mentalism while appearing to be scientific about it (Skinner, 1945). In the final analysis, very little separates View 2 from View 1.
An interpretation that cognitive psychology and methodological, mediational forms of behaviorism share important features is likely to be regarded with some skepticism, as typically they are considered not to overlap. For example, Fodor (1968), who favors a cognitive orientation, has stated, “As I am using the two words, the distinction between mentalism [i.e., cognitive psychology] and behaviorism is both exclusive and exhaustive” (p. 55). To further evaluate the present interpretation, readers are encouraged to consider the following quotations from both cognitively oriented scholars and methodological– mediational behaviorists. For example, on the cognitive side of the aisle, the historian of psychology Thomas Leahey coined the term behavioralism to characterize the relation between cognitive psychology and mediational forms of behaviorism as he sees it: “Behavioralists seek to predict, control, explain, or model behavior, and to do so may or may not refer to conscious or unconscious mental processes. Behavioralism is aimed at behavior; consciousness—the mind—is not the object of study, although it may be called upon to explain behavior” (Leahey, 1994, p. 138). Similarly, the Nobel laureate Herbert Simon stated that “the productions of information processing psychology are natural descendants of the familiar stimulus- response links of behaviorism (though not identical with them)” (Simon, 1992, p. 151). Finally, the philosopher of science Patrick Suppes observed that in his view, “The approach of cognitive psychologists or of psychologists interested in complex problem solving or information processing ... could be fit within a neobehaviorist framework if a proper amount of structure is assumed and not mastered from scratch. ... There is not a formal inconsistency between the two viewpoints” (Suppes, 1975, pp. 279–280).
Readers are now encouraged to consider the following two quotations from the methodological–mediational behaviorist side of the aisle. The first is from Gregory Kimble (1985):
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In a second way, the operational point of view did nothing more than insist that terms designating unobservables be defined in ways that relate them to observables. ... Obviously, there is nothing in this formula to exclude mentalistic concepts. In fact, the whole point of it is to admit unobservables. (p. 316)
The second is from Abram Amsel (1989):
It has never been debatable—certainly not among neobehaviorists—that explanations should involve constructs [representing nonbehavioral states and processes that go on inside organisms]. ... The fact is that for the present S - R theorist, as I think for Hull and certainly for Spence, the mediating machinery defined as hypothetical Ss and Rs are no more or less permissible, and no more or less observable, than are the cognitive constructs the “emergent behaviorists” are now willing to permit. (pp. 50–51)
Again, the point is that Views 1 and 2 have much in common, as evidenced in the words of the researchers and theorists themselves.
epistemological Dualism Another thing we can say is that View 2 constitutes an “epistemological dualism.”
Epistemological dualism is involved when researchers and theorists explain their own explanatory practices, such as theory development, logic, and hypothesis testing, in terms of constructs and general cognitive reasoning abilities from another dimension, rather than in behavioral terms. This is mentalism. For example, with regard to theorizing, epistemological dualism, and the scientific method, Skinner commented critically that
Unlike direct observation and description, the construction of a hypothesis suggests mysterious intellectual activities. Like those who are said to be capable of extrasensory perception, the hypothesis makers seem to display knowledge which they cannot have acquired through ordinary channels. That is not actually the case, but the resulting prestige is real enough, and it has had unfortunate consequences. ... The hypothetico- deductive method and the mystery which surrounds it have been perhaps most harmful in misrepresenting ways in which people think. (Skinner in Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 102)
In sum, if the behavior of either the research- theorist or participant is explained using mental terms, we have mentalism. As before, View 2 is not as different from View 1 as first thought.
Let us now consider View 3.
View 3 View 3 is a “radical,” thoroughgoing behaviorism. Unlike Views 1 and 2, View 3 may
be linked to identifiable sources (e.g., Moore, 2008, p. 431). Behaviorism is a viewpoint that assumes that it must be possible, in principle, to secure an adequate causal explanation of behavior, including verbal behavior in humans, in terms of present and past behavioral, physiological, and environmental variables, in ways that do not entail either a direct or indirect appeal to causally effective antecedents from a mental dimension. The conception of “causally effective antecedents” in this statement is of phenomena (e.g., acts, states, mechanisms, processes, structures, entities) that are held to
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be qualitatively distinct from the behavioral, physiological, and environmental variables of a behavioral dimension, and not just a subset of them. The conception of a “mental dimension” in this statement is of a dimension that is held to be qualitatively distinct from the behavioral dimension (e.g., mental, psychic, spiritual, conceptual, hypothetical), and not just a subdomain of the behavioral dimension. The mental dimension is rejected because when one appeals to mental phenomena, the talk is actually not occasioned by phenomena from another dimension. Rather, any appeal to this dimension and these sorts of causal phenomena is occasioned by (a) social–cultural traditions or spurious social factors; (b) physiological factors; (c) the relation between publicly observable behavior and present and past behavioral, physiological, and environmental variables; or (d) private behavioral events. In the case of (a) above, the talk is not functionally related to any factors in space and time that can be manipulated to influence behavior. Rather, the talk illustrates only unwarranted metaphors from language patterns, social–cultural traditions, or fictional distortions that are cherished for irrelevant and extraneous reasons, as in “explanatory fictions.” Mental talk that is attributable to social–cultural traditions and that exemplifies unwarranted metaphors and fictional distortions ultimately interferes with prediction and control of behavior by inducing us to look for the wrong things as causes. In the case of (b), the talk is functionally related to organized physiological systems that are the province of neuroscience and its methods. In the case of (c), the talk is functionally related to how various circumstances affect the probability of engaging in behavior. In the case of (d), the talk is functionally related to felt conditions of the body or covert operant behavior, as those conditions or behavior are situated in a context. The conditions of the body or covert operant behavior assume the form they do, and acquire the behavioral effect they do, by virtue of public relations.
What can we say about View 3?
Comparison with Views 1 and 2 A first thing we can say is that radical behaviorism regards both Views 1 and 2 as
objectionable because both are mediational and mentalistic, as noted earlier. Virtually every single sentence of View 1 is exactly wrong, if the view is intended to characterize radical behaviorism. View 2 may appear nonmentalistic and therefore similar to radical behaviorism, but any similarity is more apparent than real. Its embrace of mediational concepts and logical practices commits it to the inherent mentalism of methodological behaviorism and epistemological dualism.
functional analysis of Verbal Behavior Another thing we can say is that View 3 emphasizes the functional analysis of verbal
behavior. Verbal behavior is operant behavior, occasioned by antecedent circumstances and reinforced by its consequences. To establish the meaning of verbal behavior, we examine the conditions that cause its emission. We do not assume that verbal behavior is essentially a referential, symbolic form of activity, as implied in Views 1 and 2. There is no more reason to assume that a word refers to or symbolically represents something in another dimension than there is to assume that a rat’s lever press or a pigeon’s key peck refers to or symbolically represents something in another dimension. To assume verbal behavior essentially refers to or symbolically represents something somewhere else, in some other dimension, is mentalism.
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In light of a thoroughgoing behavioral conception of verbal behavior, we can usefully recognize that the predicting, explaining, and theorizing that are such an important part of science are at heart verbal processes. They are a matter of logic insofar as logic itself may be understood as a verbal process and embraced by verbal analyses. For example, we predict when we generalize, based on the extent to which variables and relations that have caused behavior in the past are currently present. We explain behavior when we specify the variables and relations that cause the behavior. We theorize when we make abstract, economical statements about the variables and relations that cause behavior. We confirm our theories when we produce data, for example, through experiments, that strengthen our statements.
To be sure, our verbal behavior sometimes reflects the influence of variables that are accessible to us alone. We may be the only ones who are in contact with our hunger pangs. We may be the only ones who can discern we are engaging in behavior at an incipient, inchoate, or otherwise reduced level. Nevertheless, to view such events as outside the bounds of psychology, or as requiring some fundamentally different mode of analysis, is incorrect. Accessibility is a concern about the vantage point of an observer, not a concern about causal processes. Events at the private, or covert, level acquire significance in our lives by virtue of their relations to events at the public, or overt, level. We feel hungry because we have been deprived of food. We may think before we act, in the sense that we may behave covertly before we behave overtly, but we need to account for what causes us to think. Then, given that we think, we need to understand whether that thinking actually influences our overt behavior. If the thinking does so, we need to account for what causes it to do so. Presumably, some conditions in our lives have promoted the form of covert behavior called thinking. If our behavior in the past was more effective when we took that covert behavior into account, we again do so. In no case is thinking a spontaneous mental act that initiates behavior. Thinking as a form of covert behavior has the same physical dimensions as forms of overt behavior (Skinner, 1953, 1957).
Complementary relation to Neuroscience A final thing we can say about View 3 concerns the relation between behavior analysis
and neuroscience (see also Skinner, 1969, p. 283; Skinner, 1972, pp. 269–270; Skinner, 1978, p. 123). Readers may recall that View 1 explicitly appealed to cognitive neuroscience, and View 2 might operationally define its mediating concepts in terms of physiological data. We often say we are interested in prediction and control of behavior. View 3 leads to the position that we can predict behavior if we know the past history of interaction with the environment and the extent to which current circumstances in the environment resemble those of the past. We can control behavior, in the sense of directly causing behavior to occur, by directly manipulating history and current circumstances. In short, we can predict and control behavior without knowing how our independent and dependent variables are physiologically connected.
Pragmatically, however, we need not conceive of an organism as literally empty or as a black box. For example, a behavioral account of an event has two gaps. One gap is within the event, from the time an organism encounters some environmental circumstance to the time it responds. A second gap is between events, from the time an organism has a given experience to the time the effects of that experience are reflected in its behavior. Physiological phenomena are undeniably associated with these gaps. Knowledge of the actual physiology that participates in behavioral events during these two gaps can expand the possibilities for prediction and control. We can predict behavior if we have independent knowledge of how an organism’s body has already been changed through its history of interaction with the environment. Similarly, we can control behavior if we can intervene to change an organism’s body directly, so that it responds differently to current features of its environment.
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Thus, behavior analysis and neuroscience are inherently and pragmatically complementary: The more knowledge we have in one domain, the less we need in the other to predict and control behavior. Importantly, however, knowledge in one domain (e.g., neuroscience) can never disprove or invalidate knowledge in the other (e.g., behavior analysis). In addition, knowledge in one domain is not regarded as inherently superior to knowledge in the other, or as necessary to justify knowledge in the other, as implied in Views 1 and 2. Rather, behavior analysis and neuroscience can work together in the cooperative venture of a science of behavior.
Summary and Conclusions We have examined three views of behaviorism. We noted earlier that Fodor (1968, p.
55) held behaviorism to differ significantly from the mentalism of cognitive psychology. That view is surely correct if View 3, radical behaviorism, is taken as the exemplar of behaviorism. It would not be correct if View 2 were taken as the exemplar. Indeed, legitimate questions arise as to (a) whether we should regard View 2 as substantially different from View 1, and indeed (b) whether we should therefore regard View 2 as a behaviorism at all.
The radical behaviorism of View 3 is a thoroughgoing scientific epistemology, in the sense that a causal account of the predicting, theorizing, and explanatory behavior of researchers and theorists uses the same behavioral analytical concepts from the behavioral dimension as does a causal account of the behavior of the participant. As Skinner (1957) once put it, “One of the ultimate accomplishments of a science of verbal behavior may be an empirical logic, or a descriptive and analytical scientific epistemology, the terms and practices of which will be adapted to human behavior as a subject matter” (p. 431).
The radical behaviorism of View 3 is further a thoroughgoing pragmatism. According to one interpretation, pragmatism means that the value of any statement is how well it promotes effective action in those who entertain it when they interact with nature. To be sure, some cognitive or mediational theories and explanations that appeal to non- behavioral causal elements from a non- behavioral dimension may appear to promote effective action and may therefore appear to be justifiable according to this criterion. At issue is the origin of such theories and explanations. Closer analysis indicates that if such theories and explanations appear to promote effective action, they do so because to some extent they are implicitly occasioned by contingencies at the levels of phylogeny, ontogeny, and the culture. We can make such theories and explanations even more effective by clarifying the extent to which they are so occasioned.
Table 1 gives an overview of the relations among analytical concepts from the standpoint of radical behaviorism, in an effort to further distinguish radical behaviorism from other outlooks in psychology. The “internal events” in question are those that are not accessible to others, in virtue of their private or covert status. For radical behaviorism, important aspects of an organism’s life are selected through interaction with the environment. Typically, however, the analytical concepts to which cognitive psychology and methodological or mediational behaviorism appeal are not among those aspects. As a result, cognitive or mediating concepts are typically taken to be causes of behavior that are “independent contributions of the organism” and largely unrelated to anything else. They encourage an attitude of “nothing can be done about it” when it comes to behavior. Given that behavior is caused, if we then ignore the causes, we fail to manage our lives as effectively as we might. Our welfare, if not our very survival, is at risk.
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Ta b
le 1
A n
O ve
rv ie
w o
f H ow
In te
rn al
E ve
nt s
A re
In co
rp or
at ed
In to
E xp
la na
tio ns
o f B
eh av
io r
Is su
e V
ie w
1 :
C og
ni tiv
e ps
yc ho
lo gy
V ie
w 2
: M
et ho
do lo
gi ca
l- m ed
ia tio
na l b
eh av
io ris
m V
ie w
3 :
R ad
ic al
b eh
av io
ris m
H ow
c an
in te
rn al
e ve
nt s
be in
cl ud
ed in
ps
yc ho
lo gi
ca l e
xp la
na tio
ns o
f b eh
av io
r? A
s in
fe rr
ed , t
he or
et ic
al te
rm s
an d
lo gi
ca l c
on st
ru ct
s fro
m a
no
nb eh
av io
ra l d
im en
si on
A s
in fe
rr ed
, t he
or et
ic al
te rm
s an
d lo
gi ca
l co
ns tru
ct s
fro m
a n
on be
ha vi
or al
d im
en si
on A
s be
ha vi
or al
c on
ce pt
s fro
m a
b eh
av io
ra l
di m
en si
on ; a
d is
tin ct
io n
be tw
ee n
ob se
rv at
io na
l a nd
th
eo re
tic al
te rm
s is
n ot
re co
gn iz
ed
W ha
t i s
th e
pr ov
en an
ce o
f i nt
er na
l e ve
nt s
in p
sy ch
ol og
ic al
e xp
la na
tio ns
o f b
eh av
io r?
In de
pe nd
en t c
on tri
bu tio
ns o
f t he
or
ga ni
sm ; p
os si
bl y
ev ol
ut io
na ry
In de
pe nd
en t c
on tri
bu tio
ns o
f t he
o rg
an is
m ;
po ss
ib ly
e vo
lu tio
na ry
D ev
el op
m en
ta l;
se le
ct ed
th ro
ug h
in te
ra ct
io n
w ith
th e
en vi
ro nm
en t a
t t he
le ve
l o f p
hy lo
ge ny
, o nt
og en
y, a
nd
th e
cu ltu
re
S ho
ul d
in te
rn al
e ve
nt s
in p
sy ch
ol og
ic al
ex
pl an
at io
ns o
f b eh
av io
r b e
un de
rs to
od in
te
rm s
of b
eh av
io ra
l c on
ce pt
s?
N o
N o
Ye s
S ho
ul d
on e
fu nc
tio n
of in
te rn
al e
ve nt
s in
ps
yc ho
lo gi
ca l e
xp la
na tio
ns o
f b eh
av io
r b e
un de
rs to
od a
s m
ed ia
tio n?
Ye s
Ye s
N o
S ho
ul d
on e
fu nc
tio n
of in
te rn
al e
ve nt
s in
ps
yc ho
lo gi
ca l e
xp la
na tio
ns o
f b eh
av io
r b e
un de
rs to
od a
s in
iti at
io n?
Ye s
U nc
le ar
N o
S ho
ul d
on e
fu nc
tio n
of in
te rn
al e
ve nt
s in
ps
yc ho
lo gi
ca l e
xp la
na tio
ns o
f b eh
av io
r be
u nd
er st
oo d
as d
is cr
im in
at iv
e co
nt ro
l, in
a w
ay th
at d
iff er
s fro
m m
ed ia
tio n
or
in iti
at io
n?
N o
N o
Ye s
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Historical and contemporary perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. CATANIA, A. C., & HARNAd, S. (EdS.). (1988). The selection of behavior: The operant
behaviorism of B. F. Skinner: Comments and controversies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
FOdOR, J. A. (1968). Psychological explanations. New York, NY: Random House. KIMBLE, G. (1985). Conditioning and learning. In S. Koch & d. E. Leary (Eds.), A
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NJ: Prentice- Hall. MOORE, J. (2008). Conceptual foundations of radical behaviorism. Cornwall- on-
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Study Questions 1. do any texts in contemporary cognitive psychology actually say anything like View 1? 2. How does the concept of epistemological dualism relate to View 2? 3. Briefly summarize the relation between radical behaviorism and neuroscience as it is
presented in View 3. Use the term complementary meaningfully in your answer. 4. When radical behaviorists interpret thinking as a form of covert behavior, do they
consider it to have the same physical dimensions as overt behavior, or different dimensions?
5. Briefly summarize what radical behaviorists mean by “methodological behaviorism,” for example, as represented in View 2. How does the early form of methodological behaviorism differ from the later, subsequent form?
6. Briefly summarize what radical behaviorists mean by “mediational S – O –R neobehaviorism,” for example, as represented in View 2. Cite one example of a mediating organismic variable from another textbook.
7. On the basis of the discussion of View 2, fill in the blank: “Radical behaviorism considers it troublesome that definitions were used as proxies or surrogates to indirectly readmit the same old mentalistic, if not dualistic, concepts but appear to be scientific about it.”
8. According to radical behaviorism, what do we examine to establish the meaning of verbal behavior, including scientific verbal behavior?
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