Lorem, ipsum

1

Principles of Strategic Thinking LtGen Robert Schmidle (ret) Ph.D.

This paper explores the relationship between the fundamental principles of

military thinking and the development of a comprehensive national strategy. In

particular I will show how the concept and process of Operational Design, used in

the development of military plans, is applicable and relevant to the development of

a national security strategy. In the course of making the case for this proposal I will

also take issue with the conventional wisdom that military strategy should be

“nested” in a higher-level national security strategy. I contend that war is now the

defining category of human interaction and because of that I will argue that the

relationship of military strategy to national strategy is best understood as symbiotic

in the sense of mutual interdependence and not that of a parent child relationship

where one is more dependent on the other. A coherent national strategy evolves in

consonance with a complimentary military strategy, the result of an active discourse

between the two.

This examination of the relationship between military strategy and national

strategy is laid out as follows. First, I articulate what I believe are the fundamental

principles of any coherent strategic thinking. Then I will explore the concept and

process of Operational Design, pointing out the appropriateness of design as a

necessary part of developing a comprehensive strategy. Second, I make the case for

understanding the relationship between military strategy and national strategy as

necessarily discursive and ultimately symbiotic. Lastly, I conclude by pointing out

2

the implications of the use of Operational Design and the act of reimagining the

aforementioned relationship for the education of higher-level military and civilian

professionals.

It is important to start with a common basis for understanding. I will do this by

articulating what I believe are the tenets of any strategic thought; in other words the

principles used to shape the development of a strategy.

- Accounting for the economic and resource influences that both enables

and constrains our strategy. This includes calculations of our position and

the adversary’s position in terms of available resources, keeping in mind

that all strategies are ‘resource constrained.’ A coherent strategy balances

the resources needed for a desired end state with the resources that are

available and then articulates the difference in terms of risk.

- Understanding the adversary is easy enough to say but what is important

and often overlooked is the extent to which this understanding is

dependent on the mental models used to frame ones view of the enemy. For

example, viewing the enemy through the lens of the rational actor model

may not be relevant or applicable when applied to adversaries that are

governed by large bureaucracies or adversaries that are terrorist

organization. This is because even in these two seemingly disparate types

of organizations, making decisions based on maximizing utility or value,

which the rational actor model is built on, may not be the driving force in

the decision-making calculus in those organizations. Another issue in this

area is the need for diverse and contrary views during strategy

3

development of the adversary’s motivations lest we risk mirror-imaging the

threat to suit our worldview.

- Understanding ourselves, which includes knowing about the tribes within

our own government, defense departments, and down to the different

warfare communities and parochial military service advocates. Without this

knowledge of ourselves we will not identify the forces that could support or

oppose the strategy we are developing and trying to implement. It is of

course possible for one tribe to support a particular strategy but have very

strong and contrary views on how to execute it.

- Taking the long view is essential to seeing strategic competition in ways

other than those involving military forces, for example the use of economic

sanctions, trade restrictions, etc. We should keep in mind however, that the

concept of imposing costs on an adversary (all the rage in the Pentagon

these days) is more than simply counting and comparing the number of

missiles or the amount of money an enemy possesses. Imposing cost is only

relevant based on how the adversary (not us) perceives and reacts to our

actions.

- Appreciating human behavior and realizing that it is at least

unpredictable and often seemingly irrational. This principle is applicable

more generally to guide us in a holistic understanding of all human

behavior, the adversaries and ours. Historically we find that wars are

caused by some form of behavior that is motivated by fear or honor or

hubris on the part of one or both of the belligerents. To describe these

4

behaviors as simply irrational is to miss the point that rationality exists in a

relative framework. It is more useful to understand human behaviors as

having common, enduring qualities especially in the context of thinking

about war as the defining social construct in human interaction.

- Realizing that the future is unpredictable and all we can really predict

with any certainty is that the future will hold many surprises. However, this

does not mean that we should become dubious of trying to predict any

future state of affairs. Rather, we should focus on identifying the more

experiential trends in technologies, weapons, and tactics while developing

scenarios and war-games to provide insight into the more conjectural

possibilities of human behavior.

In the next part of this paper I introduce the concept of Operational Design and

explore its applicability to the development of a coherent national strategy. In order

to understand this concept it is important to understand the distinction between

design and planning. Design can be described as problem setting – i.e. locating the

problem in a context, then identifying the problem and its underlying causes. It also

consists of identifying the structure and dynamics that undergird the problem in a

manner that allows potential approaches to solving the problem to be illuminated.

In other words the design phase is not focused on solving a particular problem but

rather it is focused on setting the problem in a context that enables potential

solutions to be evident to the designer. Planning, on the other hand, can be

described as problem solving – i.e. developing an executable series of actions (a

5

plan) to solve a specific problem. It is done within an a priori conceptual framework

created through the process of design.

In the design phase the focus is on learning about the nature of a problem,

whether it is a new problem or a reframing of an already existing problem. In the

planning phase the focus is on generating a plan – a series of executable actions in

the physical domain to address the problem that was explored during the design

phase. Design is conceptual, even abstract at times; planning is practical and always

concrete. Operational design is a process whereby design guides planning. At the

same time, however, in order for design to be fully realized it requires interaction

with planning to translate design’s understanding and conceptualization into

actions applicable in the physical world. I would contend therefore that design

precedes planning by providing the context that allows planning to proceed

coherently, if not sequentially.

The operational design process should initially be thought of as a discrete

phase of the planning process, one that is explicitly spelled out in order to focus the

commander on the importance of setting the problem in time and space before

trying to solve it. However, the process of design, of contextualizing and

understanding the problem from varied perspectives, is an ongoing activity in the

planning process and ultimately in the execution of any empirical actions. To

summarize, in the activity of planning, a problem is addressed within the

boundaries of an a priori conceptual paradigm. Whereas in the cognitive design

phase assumptions are questioned about the existing paradigm(s) and a new

paradigm is created for addressing the problem at hand.

6

In his book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” Thomas Kuhn makes the

point that old paradigms are discredited when they no longer adequately address

the problems facing a society at a given point in time. When an existing paradigm,

like Newton’s Classical Mechanics is no longer adequate to explain the behavior of

particles at the sub-atomic level, a new paradigm emerges, in this case - Quantum

Mechanics. In the same sense operational design could provide new paradigms to

address existing, unsolved problems or to address new and emerging problems.

It is evident today that any military operation also has a characteristic of social

complexity inherent in the design and execution of any plan. Social complexity is a

term that represents the many varied stakeholders who have influence on the

success of failure of a military operation. The more stakeholders who are engaged in

the process mean that there is a greater diversity of perspectives and levels of

involvement. The person leading the design and planning process must find a way to

engage all the stakeholders early on in the design phase if he hopes to understand

the complexity of the problem he is trying to solve. Any operational (military)

problem involves a degree of social complexity, therefore trying to solve an

operational problem using the design / planning process becomes fundamentally a

social process.

A social process also implies a higher degree of complexity than a purely

military process because of the additional unpredictable human variables involved.

Consequently the solution is likely to appear in a set of non-sequential, non-linear

actions. It is the purview of design to deepen a strategists understanding of this

complexity and illuminate potential approaches. In this case, when dealing with

7

increased social complexity it is useful to borrow from the thoughts of Gilles

Deleuze, articulated in his book “A Thousand Plateaus,” of the concept of rhizome.

On this view the designers (and eventually the planners) would start from the

middle and work toward the beginning and the end, all at once. This process yields a

non-linear perspective, illuminating the connections rather than simply identifying

the beginning and end points. Those specific points, anchored in time and space are

the basis of a more constricting process whereby one starts at a beginning point and

working apace, sequentially arrives at an end point.

A final point on design is that it is intended to result in a logic system that

permeates all operations by establishing a context for all planning and execution.

The rationale here is that designers will extract from the problem itself the logic

need to solve it, rather than trying to apply a predominated logic (i.e. an existing

paradigm) in the hopes of finding an effective solution.

In the next part of this paper I wish to develop the idea that war is the defining

category of human interaction. I develop this idea because it is the basis on which to

make the case that the development of military strategy is now an interdependent

compliment to the development of national security strategy. Today war has

become normalized into interstate and intrastate relations as the framework for the

discourse that both inheres in and contextualizes those relations. In fact, war is now

the defining metaphor in modern society and can be seen expressed in language

such as the “war on cancer”, the “war on drugs”, “trade wars”, etc. Viewing war in

this light does make it more difficult to determine a clear distinction between

‘winners’ and ‘losers’ since we seem to be continually at war with something or

8

someone. Any depiction of winners and losers in war ultimately has to be situated

in a particular time frame and in that sense it is clearly temporal. Such a depiction is

also relative to one’s perspective and subsequently is localized in time and place.

The characterization of winners and losers is also only germane as an insight

into the historical context of what I would suggest is the continuous process of war.

Even though, as I have proposed the characterization of victor or vanquished is

ephemeral, we can evaluate with increased confidence which belligerent became

stronger or weaker as a result of the tactical actions in battle. Our confidence in this

ability to evaluate relative strengths and weaknesses, however, should not cause us

to disregard the context of the long view. That view illuminates the inherent

difficulty of blowing away the fog, for even a minute, in an attempt to clearly see the

distinction between who won and who lost.

It is war, not peace that is the foundational nature of relations among and

within states. While war permeates every institution and most noticeably leaves its

mark on society through the military institutions and the industries that were

established to perpetuate war’s discrete rationality. It is not without irony that we

recall that President (General) Eisenhower was the one who, in the 1950’s, pointed

out the danger of the growing military-industrial complex. This growing complex of

power relations between military and economic institutions insures its continuation

and growth by fostering a never-ending, continuous state of war.

In light of this underlying logic of war in our society, it now becomes the

important to reimagine the relationship between military strategy and national

strategy. I would propose that the two strategies should be developed together,

9

holistically, and not sequentially. The defining logic of war also mandates that

military strategy look beyond the confines of military operations and peer into the

depths of social complexity. War is fundamentally about human struggle and

submission, think of Clausewitz’s wrestlers trying to pin each other to the mat.

Therefore any coherent military strategy should to be developed in the context of a

paradigm that illuminates all human, i.e. social relations, not just military relations

between opposing armies.

The final part of this paper focuses on the implications of employing the

concept of Operational Design in military planning and in a more comprehensive

national security planning process. Additionally I examine the implications of the

changing role of war, which has now become the defining category of human

interaction, on the relationship between a national security strategy and a military

strategy. Specifically the implications I will address are those that concern the

education of military officers and high-level civilian decision-makers. We take as an

assumption that civilian leadership is as much in need of professional education as

are high-ranking military officers. Civilian leadership that has not had the benefit of

formal education is history and strategy is likely to be less able to engage in a

meaningful discourse with a general staff of qualified military planners.

On the other hand the professional education of senior military officers should

expand beyond the confines of the box labeled “military operations.” The military

operational designers should be steeped in all aspects of history, not just military

history; they should also be exposed to psychology, sociology, philosophy and a

range of literature. Hans Gadamer was right when he said they we can only ever see

10

the world from where we stand, but having an expanded view of other’s

perspectives (developed through historical and cultural studies) is essential to

creating new paradigms through which to view emerging operational problems.

Ultimately however, professional education together with individual and

interdisciplinary study provides the context for decisions made in

strategic/operational design, planning and execution. For example, having a

grounding in history will also help us understand and contextualize the paradigm

shift that is occurring today. I would contend that this shift is toward a new logic of

speed. We are indeed moving from the imperative of a strategy based on geography

or space to one based on time or speed. Both the empirical speed of events and the

changing role of war in society are undermining the traditional logic of place that

captures our current strategic thinking.

The complexity and rapidity of historical events are now rendering human

comprehension of current events (and any possibility of control implied in the

minds of decision-makers) ever more problematic. The key to understanding the

implications of a new logic of speed vice one of space is through the process of

design. It is in the design phase that we set the problem in a relevant context (in this

case influenced by the shift in operational logic from geography to time) that

enables a holistic appreciation of the problem. This understanding, in turn enables

all the possible complexities to emerge from the fog in front of the designers.