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Phenomenology and Strategic Thinking Robert Schmidle “Strategic thinking is a mental process, at once abstract and rational, which

must be capable of synthesizing both psychological and material data. The

strategist must have a great capacity for both analysis and synthesis; analysis is

necessary to assemble the data on which he makes his diagnosis, synthesis in

order to produce from these data the diagnosis itself--and the diagnosis in fact

amounts to a choice between alternative courses of action”

General Andre Beaufre

Strategic thinking entails understanding the larger integrated whole of the

problem set that I am addressing, it is a perspective whose horizon is necessarily

flexible, from rational and objective to irrational and subjective. It is a holistic way

of thinking that seeks to connect seemingly unconnected objects and

experiences. Strategic thinking is always temporal and encourages analogy and

metaphor in order to explain and contextualize problems in both time and space.

It focuses first on setting a problem in an experiential and historical context

before trying to develop potential solutions to that problem.

Phenomenology is the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective,

most specifically consciousness and the content of conscious experiences. It is

 

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the study of how ‘sense’ gets conferred on an object. According to its first and

most well know advocate, Edmund Husserl it does not study consciousness from

the perspective of clinical psychology or neurology. Instead, according to

Husserl, phenomenology seeks through systematic reflection to determine the

essential properties and structures of experience. This method of studying the

structures of experience is one, which I will explore in this lecture and illustrate a

potential relationship to strategic thinking.

To begin, there are several assumptions that are foundational to the concept

of phenomenology as I am applying it to strategic thinking. These assumptions

are:

1. Phenomenology rejects the concept of objective, purely scientific

research, while providing an objective rigor to the study of traditionally

subjective topics. Instead of this strictly scientific view,

phenomenologists attempt to discover the essences of an object

through a pure “seeing” of the object without predispositions or

prejudice. A phenomenologist would do this by excluding from the

description of an object the empirical qualifiers that mask the essence of

the intended object of study. For example, instead of a description from

the science of physics that describe a star as a superheated gaseous orb

one would instead, in the phenomenological reduction simply “see” a star

as a point of light. This type of description that Husserl calls the epoche or

 

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“bracketing of existence” instructs us to suspend our belief in the

independent existence of the star. Instead Husserl proposes that we

simply focus on what we “see,” which is a point of light, free from the

value-laden description of an overheated gaseous orb.

2. Persons should be explored in their daily human behavior because

people can be best understood through the unique ways they reflect

the society they live in. In order words, trying to understand the behavior

of people as embodied persons in a sterile clinical environment

unencumbered by the context and ritual of their daily lives will never yield

a true picture of the essence of a person.

3. Phenomenology is oriented on discovery, the discovery of

essences. The important idea here is the fact of discovery and not the

end state. Because of this focus on discovery the methods of

phenomenology are directed toward the existence of objects as they are

presented in consciousness to a subject. In other words the essence of an

object comes from the consciousness that “constituted” it as an object for

that consciousness. So in order to understand essences one needs to

examine not just the objects themselves but also the consciousness that

constituted them, apart from the object itself. Understanding this essence

is only possible through an understanding of the necessary structures

that make an object an experience for me, as a subject. Those

necessary structures are the a priori lens, i.e. our prejudices and

 

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predispositions, through which we interpret the object as

constituting my experience of it.

4. If we wish to discover the essence of a thing we should begin by looking

first at the context in which I experienced the object. Within that

experience I will first identify the intentional object and then the a

priori structure that is fundamental to the experience of any

phenomenon. Examining that fundamental a priori structure, within the

totality of my experience, will then yield the insight into essences that I am

seeking. All the while taking into account that those structures are also

responsible for forming the context in which an object is constituted in

consciousness and therefore becomes a part of the totality of my

experience.

Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience through an

analysis of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena, which appear in

acts of consciousness. It is a method of philosophical inquiry that rejects the

rationalist bias that has dominated Western thought since Plato. It is the

suspension of prevailing judgments while at the same time reaching out to grasp

knowledge free from presuppositions.

The phenomenological method is rooted in intentionality, which is in

the idea that our consciousness is always focused on or directed towards

something. It is also empathetic, meaning that we experience another human

 

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being as another, not as a reflection of ourselves. In this sense it is also inter-

subjective in that the method relies on a world-view, which comes from an

unreflective belief. That belief informs my conviction that another human being

who looks and behaves like me will generally perceive things from an egocentric

view point similar to mine.

This point of view is known as a horizon in Husserl’s phenomenology. His

concept of horizons should be placed within the context of my previous

illustration of the role of intentionality structures in the process of how we come to

experience the world. Husserl talks about two kinds of horizons, internal and

external. These horizons are the possible future properties of the object.

Examples of these future properties might be those properties that are not

immediately observable from one perspective, such as the color of leaves on the

backside of a tree that is not immediately observable when I am viewing the front

side of the tree. In spite of not being able to see the backside of the tree I believe

that there will be leaves on the backside of the tree and that they will be similar in

color and texture to those on the front side of the tree. This internal horizon

includes properties of an object that could be given in further perceptions

including non-observable properties.

Husserl contends that things (objects) are never perceived as solitary or

individual entities against a clean and sterile backdrop, they are always perceived

in a certain context. That context is the external horizon of a natural world and

therefore related to everything else in that world. The tree, used as an example in

 

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the preceding paragraph, is perceived by the subject (me) as a tree in the context

of the other trees in the forest in which it grows. Even when my attention is

drawn to one particular tree and it becomes the object of my intentionality

the external horizon of the other trees in the forest remain constitutive of my

experience of that individual tree. While internal horizons are focused on

the possible future properties of an object, external horizons are concerned

with an object’s possible relations to other things.

To the extent that these horizons are predetermined they prescribe or

constitute the object in an act of consciousness and as such transcend our

experience of the physical world. In other words we constitute the world of

physical objects as transcendent of our experience of them and independent of

our consciousness of that experience. This process of constituting the world

is dependent on the structures of intentionality that give meaning to an

experience.

These structures are influenced by the beliefs that we as subjects bring to an

experience. These beliefs make up the background against which an act’s

meaning is presupposed. These same beliefs have a normative affect in that they

impose ‘rules’ on the constitution of objects and on the horizons against which

they become ‘our’ experiences.

Husserl believed that we (as subjects) experience objects in the way that

we do because we organize those experiences according to certain categories or

rules. These rules are influenced by the conceptual and experiential beliefs that

 

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we hold. The structures that hold and reflect these rules are the structures of

intentionality. To summarize, objects are constituted in consciousness

according to certain rules and are experienced by us as subjects. Through

the structures of intentionality objects and experiences are made coherent

and meaningful.

In Husserl’s system these intentionality structures must provide a stable

foundation although their content could be and likely will be unstable and

unpredictable. The necessary relationship between temporality and identity in

terms of enabling our experience of objects is dependent on the stability of the

intentionality structures, if not their content. In other words there must be an

expectation of sameness in a structure in order for it to provide temporal

context for an act. I must expect that the next act will be similar in some sense

to the one preceding it if I am to put that act in a temporal context. The abstract

structures of intentionality themselves must posses an external stability of form

while at the same time exhibiting an internal instability of content reflecting the

continuous change in the beliefs that constitute those structures.

A common life-world as a system of meaning requires a common

language. This is the way people perceive their world and themselves in it –

through the intentionality structures provided by language. In order to put

myself in another’s shoes I must presuppose that some common spatial-temporal

objects exist independently of my subjective perspective—they constitute an

objective reality.

 

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The concept of phenomenology leaves open space for the power of

associative thinking and the influence of analogies of memories of past or similar

experiences. The understanding of the origins and influences of external

horizons and the associated intentionality structures has applicability to

strategic thinking in the sense of understanding the experience the

strategist is trying to create from the standpoint of the object of the

intentionality of the strategy. The object on which we are trying to confer

meaning is only relevant in the context of a common horizon or perspective. This

is because a common context is necessary in order to understand an experience

as it uncovers itself and makes its meaning evident to me.

Strategic thinking as a phenomenological process changes and creates a

new, possibly novel, representation of the competitive space in which the

strategist desires to create an experience. This is the objective reality I outlined

earlier, which is a necessary component of a shared consciousness that must

exist if the experience is to be common to all. For example, a strategist attempts

to create a condition of victory or defeat that is accepted by all who are the

objects of his intentionality. In other words they all experience the results of the

strategy similarly as an object or experience presented to consciousness.

What are the implications for strategic thinking? To begin with it

involves reframing a strategic problem as a phenomena in order to see it in

terms of a human experience. For example suppose we were attempting to

develop a strategy to address the problem of Russian cyber hacking. Using the

 

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phenomenological method we would first ‘see’ the problem not through the

depiction of the technical mechanics or digital attributes of attacking a network

but rather we would ‘see’ the object for what it is, the electronic penetration at a

certain point of access.

In other words we would bracket out the value laden descriptions of

the hackers or the Russian government and focus on the problem of

penetration through a particular point of access. We would then envision the

world of the “patriotic hacktivists” through their eyes. We would experience the

hacking from their perspective not ours. We would also look at the hacktivists

within their own life-world and through their own daily activities; such as they are

known to us. Next we would attempt to identify the essence of the problem by

investigating the intentionality structures that form the rules that guide the

behavior of these hackers.

Importantly, we must discover the sameness of those intentionality

structures (as they relate to our own intentionality structures) in order to

put the problem in a temporal context. For example, let’s say that we

discovered that the on-line gaming community held similar beliefs about the

desirability of certain techniques for interactive experiences. That

knowledge would in turn provide a useful context in which to create a strategy to

deal with the Russian hackers.

That temporal context will also be influenced by the unreflective belief

systems that constitute the hacktivist consciousness of their experience. The

 

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stability of those intentionality structures is also examined as a way to help us

determine the potential for changes in the meaning of those hacktivist

experiences and our potential role in altering those experiences by creating

instability in their intentionality structures. In other words, we might develop a

strategy with associated technical options designed create doubt among

the hacktivist community about their anonymity, thereby raising their level

of anxiety and risk of exposure.

Another example of the application of the phenomenological method might

be that of a particularly difficult strategic problem – dealing with an

insurgency in a developing country. The phenomenological methodology is

the same as we applied to problem of the patriotic hacktivists. Fundamentally we

are trying to develop a strategy through the lens of the insurgents and the

general population. That strategy must keep the insurgents from, as Moa Zedong

said about the guerillas— moving among the people as a fish swims in the sea.

In this case, metaphorically at least, the strategist could personify the body of

water in order to empathize with the experience of the water as the fish were

swimming by. He should feel the experience of being at once pushed aside and

then pulled through the vortices made by the fish as they swim through the water.

The strategist would then design a strategy that would enable the

continuous collection of data related to the experience of the insurgency

seen through the eyes of the ‘others’, the insurgent and the local

populous. He must be careful, however, not to fall prey to confirmation bias –

 

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interpreting the data in ways that reinforce and support whatever preconceptions

the strategist brings to the development of possible options. Informed by this data

they would continue to peel back the outer layers of the problem looking for

root causes.

As always, they should know the character of the thing from which they are

metaphorically stripping away the outer layers. This so as not to fall into the trap

that Ludwig Wittgenstein spoke of when he said that expecting to find an

objectifiable essence is like trying to find the real artichoke by peeling

away its leaves. With this in mind we could expect to find the experience of

the insurgency in the leaves (of the artichoke) and understand that the more

we search for the pit the more likely we are to fail in our desire to create a

coherent and effective strategy.

“Our perceived world is structured by a plurality of over-lapping

perspectives within which different aspects are somehow seen together as

aspects of just one world.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty

The goal of strategic thinking is to discover that one world and understand

the extent to which it is structured by the horizon of our expectations.