Sociology Homework Assignment

The State System and the State Elite

i

There is one p relim in a ry p rob lem a b o u t the state w h ich is v e ry seldom considered, y e t w h ich requires attention i f the discussion o f its nature and role is to b e p ro p e rly focused. T h is is the fact that ‘the state* is n o t a th ing, th at it does not, as such, exist. What ‘the state’ stands for is a n u m b er o f p a rtic u la r institutions Which, together, constitute its reality, and w h ich in te ra ct as parts o f w h at m a y b e called th e state system.

T h e point is b y no m eans acad em ic. F o r the treatm en t o f one part o f the state - u su ally the g overn m en t - as the state itse lf introduces a m ajor elem ent o f confusion in the discussion o f the nature and in cid en ce o f state power; a n d th a t confusion can have large p olitical consequences. T h u s, i f it is b elieved th a t the government is in fact the state, it m a y also be believed th at the assumption o f g o vern m en ta l p o w er is eq u iva len t to the a c q u i­ sition o f state p ow er. S u ch a belief, restin g as it does on vast assumptions a b o u t the n a tu re o f state p ow er, is fra u g h t w ith great risks and disappointm ents. T o understand th e n a tu re o f state power, it is necessary first o f a ll to distinguish, and then to relate, the various elem ents w h ich m ak e u p the state system.

It is not very surp rising th a t g overn m en t a n d state should often ap pear as synonym ous. F o r it is the govern m en t w hich speaks on the state’s behalf. I t w as the state to w h ich W e b er was referring w h en he said, in a fam ous phrase, th at, in o rd er to be, it must ‘successfully c la im the m on op oly o f the legitim ate use o f p h ysical force w ithin a g iv en territory’ . B u t ‘the state’ cannot claim a n y th in g : o n ly th e govern m en t o f th e d a y , o r its duly em pow ered agents, can. M e n , it is often said, give their

50 The State in Capitalist Society

allegia n ce n o t to the g overn m en t o f the d a y b u t to the state. But 7 the state, from this p o in t o f view , is a nebulous e n tity ; and - w h ile m en m a y choose to g iv e their a llegia n ce to it, it is to the ' g o vern m en t th a t th e y are req u ired to g ive th eir obedience. A defian ce o f its orders is a defiance o f the state, in whose name’' the g o vern m en t alon e m a y speak and for w hose actions it m usr assume u ltim a te responsibility.

T h is, h ow ever, does n o t m ean th a t the g o vern m en t is neces- - sarily strong, e ith er in relation to oth er elem ents o f the state ' system or to forces outside it. O n the con trary, it m a y be very w eak, and p ro vid e a m ere fa ca d e for one or o th er o f these oi her elem ents a n d forces. In oth er words, the fa c t th at the govern- m ent does speak in the nam e o f the state a n d is formally invested w ith state p ow er, does n o t m ean th a t it effectively controls th a t p ow er. H o w far governm ents do control it is one of the m ajor questions to b e determ ined.

A second elem ent o f the state system w h ic h requires investi-' g a tio n is the adm in istrative one, w h ic h n o w extends far beyond the tra d itio n a l b u re a u c ra cy o f th e state, and w h ich encompasses^ a larg e v a r ie ty o f bodies, often related to p a rtic u la r ministerial dep artm en ts, or en jo y in g a gre a te r or lesser degree o f autonomy - p u b lic corporations, cen tra l banks, re g u la to ry commissions, etc. - a n d concerned w ith the m an agem en t o f the economic, social, c u ltu ra l a n d o th e r activities in w h ic h the state is now" d ire ctly o r in d ire c tly in vo lved . T h e ex tra o rd in a ry grow th of this adm in istrative and b u rea u cra tic elem ent in a ll societies, in clu d in g a d van ced cap ita list ones, is o f course one o f the most ob vious features o f con tem p orary lif e ; a n d the relation o f its ~ le a d in g m em bers to the g overnm ent a n d to society is also c ru c ia l to the determ in atio n o f the role o f th e state.

F o rm a lly, officialdom is a t the service o f the political executive, its ob ed ien t instrum ent, the tool o f its w ill. In actual' fa c t it is n o th in g o f the kind. E veryw h ere a n d in ev ita b ly the a d m in istrative process is also p a rt o f the p o litical process; ad m in istration is a lw ays p o litical as w ell as e xecu tive, at least at the levels w h ere p o licy-m a k in g is relevan t, th a t is to say in the u p p e r layers o f adm in istrative life. T h a t this is so is not neoesv? sarily due to adm inistrators’ desire th a t it should be so. O n the " co n tra ry , m a n y o f them m a y w ell w ish to shun ‘politics’"., a lto g eth er and to le a v e ‘p o litica l’ m atters to the politicians;^

The State System and the State Elite 5i

or alternatively to ‘dep oliticise’ the issues under discussion. K a r l jviannheim once noted that ‘the fu n d am en tal tend ency o f a ll Bureaucratic th ough t is to tu rn a ll p roblem s o f politics into problems o f adm in istration ’ . 1 But this, for the most p a rt, m erely flieans that p o litical considerations, attitudes a n d assumptions Pit incorporated, consciously o r not, in to the ‘problem s o f administration’ , and correspondin gly affect the n atu re o f administrative a d vice and action . O fficia ls and adm inistrators cannot divest themselves o f a ll id eological clo th in g in the advice w hich th e y tender to their p o litical masters, or in the independent decisions w h ich th ey are in a position to take. T h e power w hich top c iv il servants a n d oth er state adm inistrators possess no dou b t varies from c o u n try to coun try, from d e p a rt­ ment to departm en t, a n d from in d iv id u a l to in d iv id u a l. B ut nowhere do these m en not con trib u te d irectly and a p p re c ia b ly to the exercise o f state p ow er. I f the regim e is w eak, t?@th a rapid#-' ministerial turnover, a n d w ith no p ossibility o f sustained ininisterial direction, as h ap p en e d u n d er the F ren ch F ourth Republic, civil servants w ill step into the v a cu u m and p la y an often dom inant p a r t in decision-m aking. B u t even w here the political execu tive is strong and stable, top adm inistrators are Still able to p la y a n im p orta n t role in c ritic a l areas o f p o lic y b y tendering a d vice w h ic h governm ents often find it v e ry difficult, for one reason or another, to discount. H o w ev er m uch a rg u ­ ment there m a y be over the n a tu re and extent o f b u rea u cra tic power in these societies, the ra n g e o f possibilities m ust exclu d e the idea th at top civil servants can b e red u ced to the role o f m ere instruments o f p o lic y . A s Professor M e y n a u d notes, ‘ the establishment o f an absolute separation betw een the p olitical and adm inistrative sectors has n ev e r represented m u ch m ore than a sim ple ju r id ic a l fiction o f w h ic h the id eological conse­ quences are n o t n e g lig ib le ’ .2

Some o f these considerations a p p ly to a ll other elem ents o f the state system. T h e y a p p ly for instance to a third such elem ent, namely the m ilitary , to w h ich m ay, for present purposes, be added the p ara -m ilita ry , secu rity and p olice forces o f the state, and w hich together form th a t b ran ch o f it m ain ly concerned with the ‘m an ag em en t o f violen ce’ .

1 K . M an n h eim , Ideology and Utopia, 1952, p. 105. 2 M ey n a u d , La Technocratic, p. 68.

52 Tke State in Capitalist Society

In m ost cap italist countries, this coercive a p p aratu s con-;- stitues a vast, sp ra w lin g a n d resourceful establishm ent, whose professional leaders are m en o f h ig h status and grea t influence! inside the state system a n d in society. N ow h ere has the inflation o f the m ilita ry establishm ent been m ore m arked since the second w o rld w a r th an in th e U n ited States, a co u n try w h ich h a d p revio u sly b een h ig h ly civ ilia n -o rie n ted .1 A n d m u ch the sam e kind o f inflation has also occu rred in the forces o f ‘internal se cu rity’ , not o n ly in the U n ite d States; it is p r o b a b ly the case: th a t never before in a n y cap italist cou n try, save in Fascist Italy a n d N a z i G e rm a n y, has such a larg e proportion o f p eop le been! em ployed on p olice an d repressive duties o f one kind o r another.

W h a te v e r m a y be the case in p ractice, the form al constitu. : tional position o f the adm in istrative a n d coercive elements is tQ: serve the state b y serving the govern m en t o f the day. In contrast, i t is n o t a t a ll the fo rm a l constitution al d u ty o f ju d g es, at least! in W estern -typ e p o litic a l systems, to serve the purposes o f their governm ents. T h e y are con stitution ally in d ep en d en t o f the! p o litic a l ex e c u tiv e a n d p rotected from it b y security o f tenure a n d oth er guarantees. Ind eed, the con cep t o f ju d ic ia l in­ dep en dence is deem ed to en tail n o t m erely the freedom of ju d g es from responsibility to th e p olitical executive, b u t their a ctiv e d u ty to p ro te ct the citizen against the p o litica l executive or its agents, and to act, in the state’s encou nter w ith members o f society, as th e defenders o f the la tte r’s rights an d liberties. T h is, as w e sh all see, c a n m ean m a n y different things. But in a n y case, the ju d ic ia r y is an integral p a rt o f the state system, w h ic h affects, often p rofou n d ly, the exercise o f state pow er.

So too, to a g rea ter or lesser degree, does a fifth elem ent o f the state system, n am ely the various units o f sub-central govern-- m ent. In one o f its aspects, sub-cen tral g o vern m en t constitutes an extension o f cen tral g overn m en t a n d adm inistration, the la tte r ’s a n ten n ae o r tentacles. In som e p o litic a l systems it has' indeed p r a c tic a lly no o th er function. I n the countries o f ad­ va n ced cap italism , on the oth er h an d , sub -cen tral government is ra th er m ore th an a n adm in istrative device. In addition to b e in g agen ts o f the state these units o f g o ve rn m en t h a v e also tra d itio n a lly perform ed another function. T h e y h a v e not only- been the ch an nels o f co m m u n ication a n d adm in istration from-

1 S e e M ills, The Power Elite, ch a p te r 8.

T he State System and the State Elite 53

the centre to the p erip h ery, b u t also the v o ice o f the p erip h ery, or o f p a rticu la r interests a t the p e rip h e ry ; th ey h a v e been a means o f o verco m in g lo ca l p articularities, b u t also platform s for their expression, instrum ents o f cen tra l con trol a n d o b ­ stacles to it. F o r a ll the centralisation o f p ow er, w hich is a major feature o f g o vern m en t in these countries, sub-central organs o f governm ent, n o ta b ly in federal systems such as th a t o f the U nited States, h a v e rem a in ed p ow er structures in their ow n right, and therefore a b le to a ffe ct v e r y m arked ly th e lives o f the populations th ey h av e g overned . ■ M uch the sam e p o in t m a y be m ad e a b o u t the representative

assem blies o f a d v a n c e d capitalism . N o w m ore th an ever their life revolves a rou n d the g o vern m e n t; a n d even w here, as in the United States, th e y are fo rm a lly indep en dent organs o f constitutional an d p o litic a l p ow er, their relationship w ith the political execu tive can n o t be a p u rely c ritic a l or ob structive one. That relationship is o n e o f con flict and cooperation. : ■ Nor is this a m atter o f division b etw een a pro-governm ent side and an a n ti-go vern m en t one. Both sides reflect this d u a lity. For opposition p arties can n ot b e w h o lly u n coop erative. M e re ly by taking p a rt in the w o rk o f the legislature, th ey h elp the government’ s business. T h is is one o f the m ain problem s o f revolutionary parties. A s th e y enter existin g p a rliam e n ta ry bodies, so are th ey also com p elled , h o w ever relu c ta n d y , to take a:share in their w ork w hich can n o t be p u re ly ob structive. T h e y may ju d g e the p ric e w o rth p a y in g . B u t b y en terin g the p a r­ liamentary aren a th ey m ak e a t least a p a rtic u la r p o litic a l g am e possible, and m ust p la y it a cco rd in g to rules w h ich a re not o f their ow n choosing.

As for g overnm ent parties, th ey are seldom i f e ver single- minded in th eir sup p ort o f th e p o litic a l e xecu tive a n d a lto ­ gether subservient to it. T h e y in clu d e p eop le w ho, b y virtu e o f their position a n d influence m ust b e persuaded, cajo led, threatened o r b ou gh t off.

It is in the constitution ally-sanctioned perform ance o f this cooperative and c ritic a l fu n ctio n th at legislative assemblies h av e a share in the exercise o f state p ow er. T h a t share is rather less extensive and exalted th an is often claim ed for these bodies. But, as w ill be fu rth er a rg u ed presently, it is not, even in an jepoch o f executive d om in an ce, a n u n im p ortan t one.

54 The State in Capitalist Society

T h ese are the institutions - th e go vern m en t, the administration the m ilita r y and the p o lice, the ju d ic ia l bran ch , sub-centra] g o vern m en t a n d p a rlia m e n ta ry assemblies— w h ich m ak e up ‘ the state’ , a n d w hose in terrelation sh ip shapes the form o f the state system. I t is these institutions in w h ich ‘ state p ow er’ lies- an d it is th ro u g h them th a t this p ow er is w ield ed in its different m anifestations b y the p eop le w h o o c c u p y the lead in g positions? in ea ch o f these institutions - presidents, p rim e ministers and th eir m inisterial colleag u es; h igh civ il servants a n d other state adm in istrators; top m ilita ry m en ; ju d g e s o f the h igh er courts- som e at least o f the le a d in g m em bers o f p a rliam e n ta ry as- sem blies, th ough these are often the sam e m en as the senior m em bers o f the p o litical e x ecu tive; and, a lo n g w a y behind, p a rtic u la rly in u n ita ry states, th e p o litical and administrative- leaders o f sub -cen tral units o f the state. T h e se are the people w h o constitute w h a t m a y be described as the state elite.

O f course, the state system is not synonym ous w ith the p o litic a l system . T h e la tte r in clu des m a n y institutions, fof instance parties a n d pressure groups, w h ic h are o f major im p o rta n ce in th e p o litic a l process, a n d w h ich v ita lly affect the o p eratio n o f the state system. A n d so do m a n y o th er institutions w h ic h are not ‘p o litic a l’ a t a ll, for instance, g ia n t corporations,: C h u rch es, th e mass m edia, etc. O b v io u s ly the m en w ho head: these institutions m a y w ield considerable p o w e r a n d influence, w h ich m ust be in tegrated in the analysis o f p o litical power in a d v a n c e d cap ita list societies.

Y e t w h ile there a re m a n y m en w h o h av e p o w e r outside the- state system an d w hose p ow er g re a tly affects it, th ey are not the a ctu a l repositories o f state p o w er; and for the purpose-of an a ly sin g the role o f the state in these societies, it is necessary to trea t the state elite, w hich does w ield state p ow er, as a distinct and sep arate en tity. c

I t is p a rtic u la rly necessary to do so in a n a ly sin g the relation­ ship o f the state to the econ om ically d o m in an t class. For the: first step in th a t analysis is to note the obvious b u t fundamental: fa c t th a t this class is in vo lve d in a relationship w ith the state, w h ich can n o t b e assumed, in the p olitical conditions w hich are ty p ic a l o f ad va n ced capitalism , to be th a t o f p rin cip a l to agent* I t m ay w ell be found th at the relationship is v e ry close indeed and th at the holders o f state p ow er are, for m an y different

The State System and the State Elite 55

reasons, the agents o f p riv a te econom ic p o w e r - th a t those w ho —eld that p o w er are also, therefore, a n d w ith o u t u n d u ly stretching the m ean in g o f w ords, an au th e n tic ‘ru lin g class’ . B ut tliis is precisely w h a t has to b e determined.

n

Writing in 1902, K a r l K a u ts k y o b served th a t ‘the cap italist eljss rules b u t does not g o ve rn ’ , th o u g h h e ad d ed im m ed iately that ‘it contents itse lf w ith ru lin g the g overn m en t’ . 1 T h is is the proposition w h ic h has to be tested. B ut it is o b viou sly true th at the capitalist class, as a class, does n o t a c tu a lly ‘g o v ern ’ . O n e liiust go b a ck to isolated instances o f the early history o f cap ital- ishi, such as the com m ercial p atriciates o f cities lik e V e n ic e and iilibeck, to discover d irect and sovereign rule b y businessm en.2 Apart from these cases, the cap italist class has g e n erally confronted the state as a sep arate en tity - even, in the days o f its rise to p ow er, as an alien an d often hostile elem ent, often under the con trol a n d in flu en ce o f a n established a n d la n d ­ owning class, w hose h old u p on the state p o w er h ad to be broken by revolution, as in F ran ce, o r b y erosion, as in E n g la n d in the nineteenth c e n tu ry ,8 th a t process o f erosion b ein g g re a tly facilitated, in the E nglish case, b y th e constitution al and political changes w ro u g h t b y violen ce in th e seventeenth century'.4

Nor has it com e to b e th e case, e ven in the. ep och o f a d va n ce d capitalism, th at businessmen h a v e themselves assumed the major share o f go vern m en t. O n the oth er h a n d , th ey h a v e generally been w ell represented in the p o litic a l ex ecu tive a n d in other parts o f th e state system as w e ll; a n d this has been p a r ­ ticularly true in the recen t h istory o f a d v a n c e d capitalism .

This entry o f businessmen in the state system has often been greatly underestim ated. M a x W eb e r, for instance, b elieved th a t industrialists h ad n eith er the tim e nor the p a rtic u la r qualities

1 K . K autsky, The Social Revolution, 1903, p. 13. 1 See, e.g. O . C . C o x , The Foundations o f Capitalism, 1959. * See, e.g. J . D . K in g sley, Representative Bureaucracy, 1944. ^ P n which see, e .g . B arrin gto n M o o re J r , Social Origins c f Dictatorship and

Democraty, chapter 1.

56 The State in Capitalist Society

re q u ire d fo r p o litic a l l i f e ; 1 and Sch u m p eter w rote o f the ‘industrialist an d m erch a n t’ th a t ‘there is surely no trace o f any m ystic g la m o u r a b o u t h im w h ich is w h a t counts in the ruling ni m en. T h e stock e xch a n g e is a p o o r substitute for the Holy G ra il ... A genius in the business office m a y be, and often is u tterly u n a b le outside o f it to say b oo to a goose - b oth in the d raw in g-room a n d on th e p latform . K n o w in g this h e wants to b e left alon e a n d to leav e politics a lo n e’ . 2 Less d ra m a tic a lly bm n o less defin itely, R a y m o n d A ro n has m ore rece n tly written of businessm en th a t ‘th ey h a v e govern ed neith er G erm a n y, n0r F ran ce, n o r even E n g la n d . T h e y ce rtain ly p la y e d a decisne role in th e m an agem en t o f th e m eans o f p rod u ction , in social life. B u t w h a t is ch aracteristic o f th em as a socially dominant class is th at, in the m ajo rity o f countries, th e y h a v e not them- selves w an te d to assum e p o litical functions’ .3 C

Businessmen themselves h av e often tended to stress their remoteness from , even th eir distaste for, ‘p olitics’ ; and they h a v e also tend ed to h av e a p oor view o f politician s as m en who, in the h allo w ed phrase, h a v e n ever h ad to m eet a p ayroll and w ho therefore-know v e ry little o f the real w o rld ■ y e t w ho seek to interfere in the affairs o f the h ard -h ead ed a n d p ra c tic a l men w hose business it is to m eet a p a yro ll, and w h o therefon do kn o w w h a t the w o rld is ab out. W h a t this m eans is th a t business m en, like adm in istrators, w ish to ‘dep oliticise’ h ig h ly < on tentious issues a n d to h a v e these issues ju d g e d a cco rd in g to the criteria fav o u red b y business. T h is m a y look like an avoidance o f politics a n d id e o lo g y : it is in fact their clandestin e importation- in to p u b lic affairs.

In a n y case, the notion o f businessmen as rem ote from p olitical affairs, in a d irect a n d p erson al w ay , g re a tly exagger-> ates th e ir relu cta n ce to seek p olitical p o w er; and equally/: underestim ates h o w often the search has been successful.

I n th e U n ite d States, businessmen w ere in fa c t the largest: single occu p a tio n a l grou p in cabinets from 1889 to 1949; o f the total n u m b er o f cab in et m em bers betw een these dates, more:: th an 60 p er c e n t w ere businessmen o f one sort or a n o th e r.4 Nor

1 R .B e n d ix , M ax Weber; An Intellectual Portrait, i960, p . 436. 3 J . S ch um peter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1950, pp. 137-8 . 3 R . A ro n , La Lutte das Classes, 1964, p . 280. * H . D . Lassw ell, et al., The Comparative Study o f E lite s, 1952, p. 30.

The State System and the State Elite 57

certainly w as the business m em bership o f A m e rica n cabinets jeSg marked in the E isenhow er years from 1953 to 1 9 6 1 .1 A s for members o f British cabinets betw een 1886 and 1950, close to one-third w ere businessmen, in clu d in g three p rim e ministers - jjbiiar L a w , B ald w in and C h a m b e r la in .2 N or a ga in h av e businessmen been a t a ll b a d ly represented in the C on serva tive cabinets w hich h eld office b etw een 1951 and 1964. A n d w h ile businessmen h ave, in this respect, done rath er less w e ll in some other ad va n ced cap ita list countries, n ow h ere has th eir rep re ­ sentation been negligible.

But the govern m en t itself is b y no m eans the o n ly p a rt o f the state system in w h ic h businessmen h a v e h ad a d irect say. Indeed, one o f the m ost n o tab le features o f a d v a n c e d cap italism is precisely w h a t m ig h t be called w ith o u t m uch e xagg eration their g row in g colon isation o f the u p p er reaches o f the a d ­ ministrative p a rt o f th a t system. ; State interven tion has gon e fu rth er and assumed m ore elaborate institutional form s in F ran ce than a n y w h e re else in the capitalist w o rld .3 B u t b oth in the elab o ra tio n o f the French Plans and in th eir execution, m en b elo n gin g to the w orld o f business, a n d p a rtic u la rly o f b ig business, h av e enjoyed a marked, alm ost a n o verw h elm in g p repon d eran ce o ver a n y other o ccu p ation al or ‘section al’ g rou p . A s M r Schonfield Ihotes, ‘ in some w ays, the d evelo p m en t o f F ren ch p la n n in g in the :1950s can b e view ed as an a c t o f v o lu n ta ry collusion betw een senior civil servants a n d the senior m anagers o f b ig business. The politicians a n d the representatives o f organised lab o u r .were both la rg e ly passed b y ’ .4 : M uch the sam e kind o f business p red om in an ce over other economic groups is to be foun d in the fin an cial and cred it

1 See, e.g. M ills, The Power Elite, pp. 232ft. ;:: * Lasswell, et at., The Comparative Study o f Elites, p. 30. See also G uttsm an , The British Political Elite, pp. g2ff.

s Even here, how ever, th e notion o f ‘ p la n n in g ’ ou gh t not to b e invested w ith too positive a m eaning: see, e.g., J. Sheah an , Promotion and Control o f Industry in Post-War France, 1963, w h o notes th at ‘ th rough ou t the 1950’s, the F ren ch technique o f planning used a m ild system o f differential favours to secure cooperation, but attached n o d irect penalties to th e refusal to coo pe rate ’ (p. 18 1); th e sam e auth or also describes F ren ch ‘ planners’ as a ‘gro u p o f w e ll intentioned an d intelligent people trying to help clarify altern atives for. go vern m en t an d business’

:{p .i8 c). 4 Schonfield, Modem Capitalism, p. 128.

institutions o f the sta te,1 a n d in th e nationalised sector.8 The * creation o f th a t sector has often been th o u g h t o f as rem ovin g an im p o rta n t a rea o f econom ic a ctiv ity from cap ita list con trol and influence. B u t q u ite a p a rt from a ll the o th e r forces which p reven t a subsidiary nationalised sector from b ein g ru n on ' oth er th a n o rth od ox lines, there is also the fa c t th a t business has c arv e d o u t an extrem ely strong p la c e fo r itse lf in the directing organs o f th a t sector; or rather, th a t business has b een invited I b y governm ents, w h a tev er th eir p o litic a l coloration , to assume a m ajor role in the m an agem en t a n d control o f the public sector.3 In com parison, representatives o f la b o u r h a v e appeared as v e ry p oor parents in d eed - not, it sh ould be ad d ed , th a t the e n try o f a grea te r n u m b er o f ‘safe’ trade u n ion leaders would _ m ake m u ch difference to the orientation o f institutions which - are, in effect, an in tegral p a rt o f the cap ita list system.

T h e notion th a t businessmen are n o t d ire c tly in volved in ’ g o vern m en t a n d adm inistration (and also in parliam entary assem blies1) is ob viou sly false. T h e y are thus in vo lve d , ever more closely as the state becom es m ore closely co n cern ed with econom ic life; w h erever the state ‘intervenes’ , there also, in an e xcep tio n ally strong position as com p ared w ith o th er economic groups, w ill businessmen be found to influ ence a n d even to determ ine the n a tu re o f th at intervention.

It m a y rea d ily be gran ted th a t businessmen w h o enter the \ state system, in w h a tev er c a p a c ity , m a y n o t th ink o f themselves as representatives o f business in gen eral o r even less o f th eir own industries or firms in p a rtic u la r.5 B u t even th ou gh the will to th ink in ‘n a tio n a l’ terms m a y w ell be strong, businessmen in vo lved in govern m en t and adm inistration are not v e r y likely, a ll the sam e, to find m u ch m erit in policies w h ich a p p e a r to run

1 F o r B ritain see, e.g. S. W ilson an d T .L u p t o n , ‘T h e S o cial B ackgroun d and C onnections o f “ T o p D ecision -M akers” in The Manchester School o f Economic-f and Social Studies, vol. 27, 1959.

2 See, e .g . Universities and Left Review, The Insiders ( n .d .) ; C . Jenkins, Power at the-: Top, 1959; an d J. H ughes, Nationalised Industries in the M ixed Economy, i960.

3 A ty p ic a l recen t exam ple bein g the appointm ent b y the W ilson government o f an e m in en t businessman, w ith no L a b o u r connections, to head th e newly- nationalised (or rath er re-nationalised) Steel C orporatio n .

11 See below , p . 66, 3 N o te , how ever, the conclusion reached b y a Senate investigatin g committee^)

th at, in the Secon d W o rld W a r, ‘d o ilar-a -year m en (as th ey w ere then called) w ere “ persons w ith axes to g rin d ” and “ lobbyists” ’ (D . G .B laisdell, AmeriaA-f Democracy under Pressure, 1950, p . 190),

58 The State in Capitalist Society %

a iW

S i

The State System and the State Elite 59

counter to w h a t th ey co n ceive to be th e interests o f business, niuch less to m ake them selves the ad vocates o f such policies, Since th e y are alm ost b y defin ition m ost lik e ly to believe such policies to be in im ica l to th e ‘n a tio n a l interest’ . I t is m uch easier for businessmen, w h ere requ ired , to divest them selves o f stocks an d shares as a k in d o f rite de passage in to g overnm ent service th a n to divest them selves o f a p a rtic u la r view o f the World, a n d o f th e p la c e o f business in it.

N otw ithstanding the substantial p a rticip a tio n o f businessmen in the business o f the state, it is h o w ever true that th e y h ave never constituted, a n d do not constitute now , m ore th an a rela tively small m in ority o f th e state e lite as a w h o le. I t is in this sense th a t the econom ic elites o f a d v a n c e d cap ita list countries a re not, properly sp eakin g, a ‘g o v e rn in g ’ class, co m p a rab le to pre- industrial, a ristocratic a n d lan d o w n in g classes. In some cases, the latte r w ere a b le, alm ost, to dispense w ith a distinct and fully a rticu la ted state m ach in e ry a n d w ere themselves p racti­ cally the s ta te.1 C a p ita lis t econom ic elites h a v e not ach ieved, and in the n a tu re o f cap ita list society co u ld never ach ieve, such a position.

H owever, the sign ifican ce o f this rela tive distance o f business­ men from the state system is m ark e d ly redu ced by the social composition o f the state elite proper. F o r businessmen b elon g, in economic and social terms, to the u p p e r and m id dle classes - and it is also from these classes th at th e m em bers o f the state ■elite are p red o m in an tly , n o t to say overw h elm in gly, d raw n . T h e p attern is m onotonously sim ilar for a ll cap italist countries and applies n o t o n ly to th e adm in istrative, m ilitary and judicial elites, w h ich are insulated from u niversal suffrage and political com p etition, b u t to the p o litical a n d e lective ones as

1 T hu s, Professor H a b b a k u k w rites o f E n glan d in the e ighteen th cen tu ry that ‘ the English landowners w ere the go vern in g class o f the cou n try. M inisters were draw n usually from the g r e a t fam ilies an d th ou gh th e p ro p erty qualifications imposed b y th e A c t o f 17 1 1 w ere easily eva d ed , the n orm al social an d p o litica l processes ensured th at most M P ’s cam e from lan d ed fam ilies. L o c al governm ent likewise was in th e hands, not o f a b u re a u cra cy, b u t o f Justices o f the P eace, who were generally landowners. T h e la n d ta x w as adm inistered b y th e sam e class, and even in those departm ents w h ich w ere staffed b y professionals, the m ore im po rtan t and dignified posts w ere often filled from lan d ow n in g fam ilies’ (H .J . H a b b a ku k, ■England’ , in A .G o o d w in (ed .), The European Nobility in the iSth Century, 1953, pp. I i - 1 2 ) . L a n d e d fam ilies, it should also be noted, predom in ated in the A rm y , the N a v y a n d th e C h u rc h .

6o The State in Capitalist Society

w ell, w h ich are not. E ve ryw h e re an d in all its elements the state system has retain ed, so cia lly speaking, a m ost markedly: u pp er- and m iddle-class ch ara cter, w ith a slow ly diminishing a ristocratic elem ent a t on e end, a n d a slow ly g row in g working^: class and low er-m iddle-class elem ent at the other. T h e area of recru itm en t is m uch m ore n arrow th a n is often suggested. As Professor D a h r e n d o r f notes, ‘ the “ m id d le class” th at forms the m ain recru itin g g rou n d o f the p ow er elite o f most European countries tod ay, often consists o f the top 5 p er cent o f the o ccu p a tio n a l h ie ra rch y in terms o f prestige, incom e and in flu en ce’ . 1

O n e m ain reason fo r this bourgeois p red om in an ce in the ap p o in tiv e institutions o f the state system has a lre a d y been discussed in relation to the econom ic a n d social hierarchies- outside th a t system, n a m e ly th a t ch ildren b o rn o f u p p er- antf m iddle-class parents h av e a va stly b e tte r ch an ce o f access than oth er c h ild ren to the kind o f ed u catio n a n d tra in in g w hich is- requ ired for the ach ievem en t o f elite positions in the state system . G re a tly u n eq u a l opportunities in ed u cation also find reflection in the recru itm en t to the state service, since qualifies,-: tions w h ic h are o n ly o b ta in ab le in institutions o f higher ed u cation a re a sine qua non for e n try into th a t service.

T h u s in F ran ce the m ain m eans o f entry to top administrative;: positions is the E cole N a tio n a le d ’A dm in istration . B u t Professor: M e y n a u d notes th a t in the y e a r 1962, fifty-six ou t o f seventy-one u niversity students w h o w ere successful in the exam inations for; adm ission to the E .N .A . belonged b y social origin to ‘la partiei la plus favorisee de la population*; and o f the twenty-two: successful can didates from the civ il service itself, ten belonged; to the sam e class. O f the university students w ho presented them selves, there w as not a single one w hose paren ts were: w orkers or peasants. ‘ D ans l’ ensem ble,’ M e y n a u d comments, ‘ la selection sociale de la h au te fonction p u b liq u e reste essen-; tiellem en t in eg alita ire. A u tre m en t dit, m algrć la reform e de: J945> “ đćm ocratisation ” dem eure tr£s lim itee.*2 T h e same

1 D ah ren dorf, ‘R e ce n t C han ges in the C lass S tru cture o f E u ropean Societies’, p . 238.

2 M e y n a u d , La Technocratic, p . 51. A n o th e r w riter notes th at for the years 1952-8, a b o u t 60 p e r cen t o f the 547 successful candidates for adm ission to the E.N .A. belonged to ‘ les m ilieu x it la fo b les moins n om breu x et les plus ćlevćs dans la; h ićra rch ie sociale, fonctionnaires des categories A t et 2, cadres et chefs d ’entreprisc'

The State System and the State Elite 61

alio true o f the F ren ch m ilita r y 1 a n d o f th e F ren ch ju d ic ia r y .2 ** Not o f course th a t F ra n ce is n o ta b ly m ore ‘ undem ocratic* in tjiis respect than oth er cap ita list countries. T h u s the b u lk o f British higher civ il servants has to a rem arkab le degree con- tinued to be d raw n from a n a rro w ly restricted segm ent o f the

ulation, m u ch o f it p u b lic school and O x b rid g e e d u c a te d ;3 the same m arked upper- and m iddle-class bias has

remained evident in the h igh er reaches o f the British a rm y 4 anti the ju d ic ia ry . 6

The picture is n o t a p p re c ia b ly d ifferen t for th e U n ite d States, where the kind o f in e q u a lity o f ed u catio n al o p p o rtu n ity which was m entioned in the last c h a p te r has also h elped to n a r ro w the area o f recru itm en t to the state service. A s Professor Matthews notes:

Those American political decision-makers6 for whom this informa­ tion is available are, with very few exceptions, sons o f professional men, proprietors and officials, and farmers. A very small minority yiere sons o f wage-earners, low salaried workers, farm labourers or tenants ... the narrow base from which political decision-makers appear to be recruited is clear.7

In the case o f the U n ite d States m ilitary it h as also been noted th a t: (A.Girard, La Rdussite Socials en France, 196 1, p . 308). See also F .B o n an d M . A . Burnier, Les Nouveaux Intellectuels, 1966; T . B. Bottom ore, ‘ H ig h e r C iv il S ervants in France', in Transactions o f tke Second World Congress o f Sociology, 1953; a n d P. Lalumićre, L ’ lnspsction des Finances, 1959. :; ? See; e.g. R . G irard et, L a Crise Militaire Franfaise 1945-1962 , 1964, pp. 39-46. Another writer notes, how ever, th at ‘ in regard to social origins the cen tre o f g ra v ity for the army officer corps as a w h ole, fo llo w in g a pattern typical fo r a period o f low military prestige, had p ro b a b ly sunk to th e low er-m id dle class b y the late 1930s. Yet in the higher grades the m id d le a n d u p pe r bourgeoisie, a n d to a lesser degree the noble aristocracy, w ere still w ell represented, th ough in d eclin e’ (J. S . A m b ler, ThtFrench Army in Politics 19 4 5-19 6 2 , p . 134). r 4 See, e.g. G ira rd , La Rettssiie Sociale en France, p . 336.

•See, e.g. R .K . K e l s a l l , The Higher Civil Servants in Britain, 19 55; W ilson an d Lupton, ‘T o p D ecision M ak e rs’ , in The Manchester Sdt 'vt o f Economics and Social Studies, vol. 27, 1959; a n d ‘R e cru itm e n t to the C iv il S ervice ’ , 6th R e p o rt o f the Committee on Estim ates, H . C . 308, 1964-3.

4 Sec, e.g. J . H a rv ey an d K . H o od, The British State, 1958, p p . 1 1 2ff. : ! No less than 76 p e r cen t o f ju d g e s in 1956 had been educated a t p u b lic schools

(Glennerster and P ryk e, The Public Schools, p . 17). S ee also ‘ W ell-B red L a w ’ in The Sunday Times, 18 A u g u s t 1963.

• ‘ Political decision-m akers’ here includes ‘high level c ivil servants’ . : 1 D .R , M atthews, The Social Background o f Political Decision-Makers, 1954, PP-23-4 (italics in text).

62 The State in Capitalist Society

... on the whole, the high officers o f the arm y and navy have beet men o f the upper-middle rather than truly higher or definite ̂ lower classes. O n ly a very small percentage o f them are o f working class origin.1

A s for Su p rem e C o u r t Justices, it has b een rem arked that; '

... throughout American history there has been an overwhelming tendency for presidents to choose nominees for the Supreme Conn from among the socially advantaged families ... In the e arije, history o f the C ourt he very likely was bom in the aristocratic gentry class, although later he tended to come from the professional upper-middle class.2 . f f

T h e sam e kin d o f upper- and m iddle-class preponderance is y e t a g a in en cou n tered in F ed era l G e rm a n y:

... while less than i per cent o f the present population of the Federal republic [one writer notes] carries a ‘von’ in the family name, the bearers o f aristocratic titles m ay actually have increased among senior civil, servants. Senior civil servants claiming descent from working-class families remain as conspicuous by their absence as ever.3

S im ila rly , Professor D a h r e n d o r f notes th a t:

... despite the break up o f the old monopoly and the consequent dwindling significance o f nobility, German elite groups from 1918 to the present [including the state elite] have been consistently recruited to a disproportionately great extent from middle and higher groups o f the service class and the middle class as well al from their own predecessors in elite positions.4

1 M ills, The Power Elite, p. 19a. Professor J a n o w itz also notes th at ‘American; m ilita ry leaders trad itio n a lly h a v e com e from the m o re priv ileged strata’ (M. J a n o w itz, The Professional Soldier, 1960, p. 69). H e also adds th at ‘ however, recent, trends in th eir so cial backgroun d su p p ly strikin g confirm ation o f the decline o f the re la tiv ely h ig h social origins o f the m ilitary, a n d its transform ation into a man so cially heterogenous g ro u p ’ (p. 89). B u t this ‘m ore so cially heterogeneous group' still leaves m en born in th e ‘ business, professional and m a n age ria l’ classes with 4 crushin g p repon d eran ce ov er those horn in the ‘ w h ite c o lla r’ an d ‘ worker* class (see ibid., table 14, p. 9 1).

2 J . R . Schm idhauser, ‘T h e Justices o f the S uprem e C o u rt - A Collect!« P o rtra it’, in Midwest Journal o f Political Science, 1959, vol. 3, p. 45.

8 L .J .E d in g e r , ‘ C o n tin u ity and C h a n ge in th e B ackgroun d o f G erm an Decision: M a k e rs’, in Western Political Quarterly, 1961, vol. 14, p. 27.

8 D ah ren dorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, p. 228.

The State System and the State Elite 63

And m u ch the sam e story is told fo r S w e d e n 1 a n d J a p a n .8 W hile in e q u a lity o f ed u catio n al o p p o rtu n ity , based on

social class, helps to a cco u n t fo r this p a ttern , there are o th e r factors w h ich co n trib u te to its form ation . H e re too, as in the case o f access to elite positions ou tside th e state system , there js also the m a tte r o f connections. C e rta in ly , the m ore sp ectacu ­ lar forms o f nepotism a n d favouritism associated w ith a n ^ re g e n e ra te aristo cratic a n d pre-in du strial a ge are n o t p a rt o f the contem porary, m iddle-class, co m p etitive state s e r v ic e : th e partial lib era tio n o f th a t service from the aristocratic grip w as indeed one o f th e c ru c ia l aspects o f the extension o f bourgeois power in the state and society. B u t it w ou ld , a ll the sam e, be highly unrealistic to th ink th a t even in a n exam ination-oriented epoch m em bership o f a r e la tiv e ly n a rro w segm ent o f the population is n o t a distin ct a d v a n ta g e , not o n ly in term s o f entry into the h igh er levels o f the state service, b u t also, a n d hardly less im p o rta n t, o f ch an ces o f u p w a rd m ovem ent inside iti Such m em bership affords links o f kinship a n d friendship, and generally enhances a sense o f shared values, a ll o f w h ich are Helpful to a successful career. T w o F re n ch auth ors p u t the p o in t well, and w h at th e y s a y c a n scarcely be th o u g h t to a p p ly exclusively to F ra n ce :

If a student o f modest origin has successfully negotiated his university course, the entrance examination o f the E .N .A . and even, why not, the final examination where the ‘cultural’ siftingis perhaps fflore severe than on entry, he w ill not, nevertheless, be on the same level as the offspring o f great bourgeois families or o f high officials: the spirit o f caste and personal family relations will constantly work against him when promotions are made (at the

“highest level, promotion is more uncertain than at lower ones) .*

L_- Those w ho control a n d determ ine selection a n d prom otion at the highest level o f the state service are themselves most lik e ly to he.members o f the u p p e r and m id dle classes, b y social origin or “by virtue o f th eir o w n professional success, and a re lik e ly to

. -l 'T he num ber o f workers’ sons am on g th e p o litico -b u reau cratic top echelons has diminished from ro p e r cen t in 1949 to 9 p e r cen t in 19 6 1, whereas th e p ercen ta ge of sons o f big businessmen w en t u p fro m 12 p e r cen t to 17 p e r cent (T h erb o m , Power vi the Kingdom o f Sweden, p. 59).

4 See, e.g. A begglen a n d M a n n a ri, 'L ea d e rs o f M od ern J a p a n : S o cial O rigin s and Mobility1.

* Bon and Burnier, Les jVouveaux Intellectuels, p . 165.

64 The State in Capitalist Society

c a r r y in th eir m inds a p a rtic u la r im a g e o f h ow a h igh -r c iv il servan t or m ilitary officer o u g h t to think, speak, behave a n d r e a c t; a n d th a t im a g e w ill b e d ra w n in terms o f the class to- w h ich th ey b elon g. N o d ou b t, the recruiters, a w a re o f th e pres, sures a n d dem ands o f a ‘m erito cratic’ a ge, m a y c o n sd to correct th eir b ias; b u t th ey are p a rtic u la rly lik ely to over.: com e it in the case o f w orking-class can didates w h o g iv e every sign o f readiness and c a p a c ity to ad a p t and conform to classi san ction ed p atterns o f b eh av io u r and th o u g h t.1 ‘ Rough diam on ds’ are n ow m ore a cce p ta b le th an in the past, b u t they should p re fe ra b ly show good prom ise o f ach ie vin g the right kin d o f smoothness.

M a x W e b e r claim ed th at the develo p m en t o f bureaucracy tended ‘ to elim in ate class p rivileges, w h ich in clu d e the appropria- tion o f m eans o f adm inistration and the ap p ro p ria tio n of a u th o rity as w ell as the o ccu p ation o f offices on a n honorary ■ basis or as an a vo ca tio n b y virtu e o f w ea lth ’ . 2 B ut this singularly underestim ates the degree to w h ich existing class privileges help to restrict this process, even th ough th ey do not arrest it a lto g eth er.

I t is u n d o u b te d ly true that a process o f social dilution has occu rred in the state service, and has b ro u g h t p eop le born in the w o rk in g classes, and even m ore com m on ly in the lower-middle classes, in to elite positions inside the state system. B ut to speak o f ‘ dem ocratisation ’ in this connection is som ew h at misleading^ W h a t is in vo lve d here is rath er a process o f ‘ bourgeoisification* o f the m ost able and thrusting recruits from the subordinate classes. A s these recruits rise in the state h iera rch y , so do they b eco m e p a rt, in every sign ifican t sense, o f the social class tpr w h ic h th eir position, incom e a n d status gives them access. As w as a lre a d y noted a b o u t w orking-class recru itm en t into the econ o m ic elite, this kind o f dilution does not m ate ria lly affect ; th e class c h a ra c te r o f the state service and m a y in deed strengths j en it. M o re o ve r, such recru itm en t, b y fostering the b elief that

to the talen ts’ usefully obscures the degree to w h ich they are not.

ca p ita list societies are ru n on the p rin cip le o f ‘ the career open

G iv e n the p a rtic u la r h ierarchies o f the existin g social order, it

1 S ee also ch a p ter 5, 2 M . W eb er, The Theory o f Sociai and Economic Organisation, 1947, p . 340. :

The State System and the State Elite 65

is all b u t in e vita b le th a t recru its from the su b ord in ate classes ihto the u p p e r reach es o f the state system should, b y th e v e r y fact o f th eir e n try in to it, becom e p a rt o f the class w h ich continues to d o m in a te it. F o r it to be otherw ise, th e present intake w ou ld not o n ly h a v e to be v a stly increased: the social order itself w o u ld h a v e to be ra d ic a lly transform ed as w ell, and its class h ierarch ies dissolved.

Social dilution o f a n even m ore p ronou nced k in d th a n in the appointive institutions o f th e state system has also occu rred in those o f its institutions w hose staffing depends, d ire c tly o r indirectly, on election, n a m ely the p o litical e x ecu tive and parliam entary assemblies. T h u s, m en o f w orking-class o r lower-middle-class o rigin h a v e n o t u n com m on ly m ad e their way into the cabinets o f a d va n ced cap ita list countries - some o f them have eve n b ecom e presidents a n d p rim e m in isters; a n d an enormous am ou nt o f person al p o w er has on occasion been achieved b y a lto g eth er declassi in divid uals lik e H itle r or Mussolini.

W hat significance this has h a d for the politics o f ad va n ced capitalism w ill be considered later. B u t it m a y be noted a t this stage that m en d ra w n from the sub ordin ate classes h a v e n ever constituted m ore th an a m in ority o f those w ho h av e reach ed high p olitical office in these coun tries: the larg e m ajo rity has always belonged, b y social origin and previous occu p a tio n , to the upper a n d m id d le classes.1

To a som ew hat lesser degree, y e t still very m arked ly, this has also been the p a tte rn o f the legislatures o f ad va n ced cap italist countries. T h e g ro w th in representation o f w orking-class parties ;:(save o f course in the U n ite d States) has b rou gh t into these assemblies, th o u g h still as a m in ority, m en (an d occasion ally women) w ho w ere not o n ly born in the w o rk in g classes but who, until th eir election , w ere them selves w orkers or at least closely in volved in w orking-class life ; an d e ven bourgeois

1 See Lasswell et a i , The Comparative Study o f Elites, p. 30; G uttsm an , The British Political Elite, pp. 7gfF; M atth ew s, The Social Background o f Political Decision-Makers, pp. 23-4; D .L e m e r , The N a vi Elite, 1951, p. 6; L .D .E d in g e r , ‘ P o st-T otalitarian Leadership: Elites in th e G erm an F ed era l R e p u b lic ’ , in American Political Science Review, i960, vol. 54, n o. 1, p . 70; A b c g g len and M a n a ri, ‘ Leaders o f M od ern Japan: Social O rigin s a n d M o b ility ’ in Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 9, no. r, P a rt a (O cto b e r i960), p. 116.

66 The State in Capitalist Society

p arties h ave u n d ergon e a certain process o f social dilution. N evertheless, these la tte r parties, w h ich h av e g en erally domin­ ated p a rlia m e n ta ry assemblies, h a v e rem ained solidly u p p er and; m id dle class in their social com position, w ith businessmen and others connected w ith various lands o f p ro p e rty ownership constitutin g a sizea b le and often a v e ry substantial p a rt o f them m em b e rsh ip .1 In terms o f class, national p olitics (and for that m atter, sub -n ation al p olitics as w e ll) 2 has continu ed to b e an ‘ a c tiv ity ’ in w h ic h the subordinate classes h av e p layed a d istin ctly sub sidiary role. M r G uttsm an w rites for B ritain th a tf

... i f we ascend the political hierarchy from the voters upwards, we find that at each level - the membership o f political parties, party activists, local political leaders, M .P .’ s, national leaders - the social character of the group is slightly less ‘representative’ and" slightly more tilted in favour o f those who belong to the middle and upper levels o f our society.3

T h e tilt is in fact m u ch m ore than slig h t; and the p oin t does- n o t a p p ly a n y the less to oth er countries th a n to B ritain.

W h a t the evidence con clu sively suggests is th a t in terms of social origin, ed u cation and class situation, the m en w ho have m an n ed all co m m a n d positions in the state system have la rg e ly , a n d in m a n y cases overw h elm in gly, been d ra w n from the w o rld o f business a n d p ro p erty, or from the professional7 m id d le classes. H e re as in e v e ry oth er field, m en a n d women' b o m into th e sub ordinate classes, w h ich form o f course the; vast m a jo rity o f th e p op u lation , h av e fared v e r y p o o rly - and n o t on ly, it must b e stressed, in those parts o f the state system, such as adm in istration, the m ilita ry a n d th e ju d ic ia r y , which dep en d on ap pointm en t, b u t also in those parts o f it w hich are: exposed or w h ich a p p e a r to b e exposed to the vagaries of universal suffrage a n d the fortunes o f com p etitive politics. In an ep och w h e n so m u ch is m ad e o f d em o cra cy, eq u a lity, social,

1 See, e .g . G uttsm an , The British Political Elite, pp. 9 7 S ; H . Berrington and S.E. F in er, ‘ T h e B ritish H ouse o f C om m on s1, in International Social Science Journal,* 1961, vol. 13, no. 4 , p p . 6 o iff ; J .B lo n d e l, Voters, Parties and Leaders, 1963, chapters; M .D o g a n , 'P o litic a l A sce n t in a Class S o ciety: Fren ch D eputies 1870-1958', in D .M a r v ic k (ed .), Political Decision-Makers, 196 1; G , B raunthal,' The Federativni/;- German Industry in Politics, 1961, pp. I52ff; T . F uku taki, Man and Society in Japan, 1962, p . 1 17 .

2 See below , pp. 171 IT. 3 G uttsm an , The British Political Elite, p. 27.

The State System and the State Elite 67

mobility, classlessness a n d th e rest, it has rem ain ed a basic fact o f life in a d va n ce d cap ita list countries th a t the va st m ajo rity o f men and w om en in these countries has been governed, represented, adm inistered, ju d g e d , a n d co m m an ded in w ar b y people d ra w n from oth er, eco n o m ica lly a n d so cia lly superior and r e la tiv e ly d istan t classes.

The Purpose and Role of Governments

1

T h e reason for atta ch in g considerable im p ortan ce to the social com position o f the state elite in ad va n ced cap italist countries lies in th e strong presu m ption w hich this creates as to its general ou tlook, id eo lo gica l dispositions and p o litical bias. I n the case of the governm ents o f these countries, h ow ever, w e can do m uch m ore th a n m erely p resum e: after all, h a r d ly a d a y goes b y in w h ich p o litic a l leaders in ch arge o f the affairs o f their coun try do- n o t press u p on th e p u b lic their ideas and beliefs. M u c h o f this m a y con ceal as m u ch as it reveals. B ut a g re a t d ea l remaiiis- w h ich , togeth er w ith m u ch other evidence, n o ta b ly what governm ents a c tu a lly do, affords a clear v ie w o f w h a t, in large terms, th ey are ab out.

A t first sight, the p ictu re is one o f endless diversity between succeeding governm ents, and indeed inside each o f th em ; as also b etw een governm ents o f differen t countries. Presidents;; p rim e m inisters a n d their colleagues h ave w o rn m an y different; p o litic a l labels (often w ild ly m islead in g), and b elon ged to many differen t p arties, o r occasion ally to none.

T h is diversity o f view s, attitudes, program m es and policies, on an infin ite n u m b er o f subjects, is certain ly v e r y striking a iii m akes for liv e p o litic a l d eb a te and com p etition . A n d the im pression o f diversity and conflict is furth er enh anced by the:: insistence o f p a rty leaders, p a rtic u la rly at election tim e, on the w id e and alm ost im passable, or a ctu a lly im passable, g u lf which separates them from th eir opponents a n d com petitors.

T h e assertion o f such profound differences is a m atter of g re a t im p ortan ce for the fun ction in g and legitim atio n o f the

The Purpose and Role o f Governments 69

political system , since it suggests th at electors, b y vo tin g fo r one 0r other o f the m ain com p eting parties, are m ak in g a ch oice between fu n d am en tal and in co m p a tib le alternatives, and th a t they a re therefore, as voters, d e cid in g n oth in g less th an the

: future o f th eir coun try. In a ctu al fact h ow ever, this p ictu re is in some cru cial w ays

highly superficial an d m ystifying. F o r one o f the m ost im p ortan t aspects o f the p olitical life o f ad va n ced cap italism is precisely that the disagreem ents between those political leaders who have

• generally been able to gain high office h av e ve ry seldom been o f the fundamental kind these leaders and oth er p eop le so often suggest. W h a t is re ally striking a b o u t these p o litical leaders a n d

■political office-holders, in relation to each other, is not their many differences, b u t th e extent o f th e ir agreem ent on tru ly

: fundamental issues - as th e y them selves, w hen occasion re­ quires, h ave been w o n t to recognise, a n d as larg e num bers o f people am on g the p u b lic a t larg e, despite the p o litica l rh etoric to which they are subjected, recognise in the phrase ‘p oliticians are all the sam e’ . 1 T h is is an exaggeration , o f course. B ut it is an exaggeration w ith a solid kernel o f truth, at least in relation to the kind o f m en w h o ten d to succeed ea ch oth er in office in advanced cap ita list countries. M arxists p u t th e sam e p oin t

; somewhat d ifferen tly w h en th ey say th a t these m en, w h a tev er : their p olitical labels or p a rty affiliations, are bourgeois p o li­

ticians. Th e basic sense in .which this is tru e is th a t the p o litical

office-holders o f ad va n ced cap ita lism have, w ith v e ry few exceptions, been agreed over w h a t L o rd B alfour, in a classical formulation, once called ‘the foundations o f society’ , m ean in g above all th e existin g econom ic and social system o f p riv ate

■ ownership an d p riv a te ap p rop riation - M a r x ’s ‘m ode o f ■production’ . B alfou r w as w ritin g ab o u t B ritain, and a b o u t the Whig and T o r y adm inistrations o f the nineteenth centu ry. B u t

: his point applies e q u a lly w e ll to oth er cap ita list countries, and to the tw entieth cen tu ry as w ell as to the nineteenth.

For it is no m ore th an a m atter o f p la in p o litical history th a t

1 As witnessed, for instance, b y th e n u m b e r o f p eop le in countries like B ritain and the U n ite d States w h o, w h en asked w h ether th ey b elieve that there a re im ­ portant differences betw een th e m ain com petin g parties, tend to answer in the

7o The State in Capitalist Society

th e governm ents o f these countries h ave m ostly been composed o f m en w h o b eyo n d a ll th eir p o litical, social, religious, cultural a n d oth er differences a n d diversities, h av e a t least h ad in com m on a basic a n d u su a lly ex p licit b e lie f in the v a lid ity and virtues o f the cap ita list system, th ou gh this w as not w h a t they w o u ld necessarily call it; a n d those a m on g them w h o h ave not been p a rtic u la rly concerned w ith th a t system, or even aware th a t th ey w ere h elp in g to ru n a sp ecific econom ic system, much in the w a y th a t th ey w ere n o t a w a re o f the a ir th e y breathed, h av e a t least shared w ith th eir m ore ideologically-aw are colleagu es o r com petitors a quite basic a n d unswerving h ostility to a n y socialist a lte rn a tive to th a t system.

T h e r e h a v e , it is tru e, been occasions, w hose significance will be considered presen tly, w h en m en issued from working-class a n d fo rm a lly socialist p arties h a v e o ccu p ied positions o f g o ve rn m e n ta l p o w e r, either a lo n e o r m ore com m on ly as: m em bers o f coalitions, in m an y cap ita list countries. B u t even- th o u g h these m en h a v e q u ite often professed anti-capitalist convictions, th ey h ave n e v e r posed - a n d in deed h ave for the m ost p a rt n ever w ished to pose - a serious ch allen g e to a cap ita list system (or rath er, as m ost o f th em w o u ld h ave it, a ‘ m ix ed eco n om y5) , w hose basic fra m ew o rk a n d essential features th ey h a v e acce p ted m u ch m ore re a d ily th an th eir pronounce­ m ents in opposition, a n d even sometimes in office, w o u ld have ten d ed to suggest.

In this sense, the p a tte rn o f executive p o w e r has remained m u ch m ore consistent th a n the a ltern ation in office o f govern-- m ents b ea rin g different labels and a ffectin g d ifferen t colorations^ has m ad e it a p p e a r: cap ita list regim es h a v e m ain ly been go vern ed b y m en w h o h a v e eith er g en u in ely believed in the virtu es o f capitalism , or w h o , w h a te v er th eir reservations as to this o r th a t aspect o f it, h a v e accep ted it as fa r superior to any possible altern ative econom ic a n d social system, a n d w h o have therefore m ad e it their p rim e business to defend it. Alterna­ tively, these regim es h a v e been governed b y m en w ho, even- th o u g h th e y m ig h t c a ll them selves socialists, h av e not found the com m itm en t this m igh t be th ough t to en tail in the least in­ co m p a tib le w ith the read y, even the eager, a ccep ta n ce o f all the essential features o f the system th ey cam e to administer. . -

In fact, it cou ld even b e said th a t this basic accep tan ce o f the

The Purpose and R ole o f Governments 71

capitalist order has been more p ronou nced in this cen tu ry th an in any previous ep och in the history o f capitalism . T h is is not

; 0nly because it is m a in ly conservative p oliticians w ho h ave dominated the p o litical ex ecu tive o f th eir c o u n try; or because formally socialist p o litican s w h o h ave o ccu p ied office h av e been content to w ork the system ; b u t also because the v irtu a l disappearance o f the lan ded interest a n d o f aristocracy as a powerful econom ic, social a n d p o litic a l force, and th eir assimilation into the ranks o f business, has rem oved one strongly discord an t vo ice from the councils o f governm ent. T h is does not m ean th a t aristocrats themselves h av e ceased to o ccu p y .office; but ra th er th a t w ith th e ‘ b ourgeoisification’ o f aristo­ cracy, a g reater degree o f basic consensus on the natu re o f the economic a n d social order th a n ever before b ecam e possible.

H owever, even i f w e leave o u t for the present the p a rtic u la r role o f form ally socialist pow er-holders, it m ust be stressed again th a t this basic consensus betw een bourgeois p oliticians does not p re clu d e genu in e a n d im p o rta n t differences betw een them, not on ly o n issues other th an the a ctu a l m an agem en t o f the econom ic system, b u t on th a t issue as w ell.

Thus, it has a lw a ys been possible to m ake an im portant "distinction betw een parties a n d leaders, h ow ever com m itted they m ight b e to the p riv a te enterprise system , w h o stood for a large m easure o f state in terven tion in econom ic and social life, and those w h o b elieved in a lesser degree o f interven tion; and

r the same distinction encom passes those parties a n d m en w ho > have believed th a t the state m ust assume a g reater degree o f responsibility for social a n d oth er kinds o f reform ; and those Who have w ished for less.

This q u a rrel betw een strong interventionists and th eir opponents has been a n d rem ains a p erfectly genuin e one. N o doubt, no serious p o liticia n - h ow ever bourgeois and con ­ vinced o f the virtues o f p riv a te enterprise - w ou ld now w ish or be able to dism antle the m ain structure o f state interven tion; and indeed it is often the m ost cap italist-oriented politicians

: who see most clea rly h ow essential th a t structure o f intervention has become to th e m ain ten an ce o f capitalism . E ven so, sufficient differences endure a b o u t the desirable extent, the ch aracter and the incidence o f intervention, to m ake the d eb ate around such questions (and around m an y oth er ones as well) a serious and

7 2 The State in Capitalist Society

m ean in gfu l one, upon w hose ou tcom e depends m uch which affects m an y aspects o f p u b lic p o licy a n d m an y in d iv id u a l lives. F ro m this p o in t o f view a t least, com p etition b etw een these men is b y no m eans a com p lete sham .

B u t the fa c t nevertheless rem ains th a t these differences and controversies, even a t th eir m ost intense, h ave never been" a llo w ed b y the p oliticians concerned to b rin g into question the v a lid ity o f the ‘free enterprise’ system itself; and even the mošt determ ined interventionists am on g them h a v e alw ays conceived th eir proposals a n d policies as a m eans, not o f eroding - let alon e su p p la n tin g - th e cap ita list system, b u t o f ensuring its:: g re a te r strength a n d stability. T o a m uch larg er extent than a p p ea ra n ce a n d rh eto ric h a v e been m ad e to suggest, the politics o f a d va n ce d cap ita lism h av e been a b o u t different conceptions o f h o w to ru n the same econom ic a n d social system, a n d not a b o u t ra d ica lly differen t social systems. This debate has: n o t so fa r com e h igh on the p o litical agenda.

T h is consensus betw een p olitical office-holders is clearly cru cia l. T h e id eological dispositions w h ich m ake the consensus possible m a y not, because o f various counter-pressures, finally d eterm ine h ow governm ents w ill a c t in every p a rticu la r situa-: tion. B u t the fa c t th a t governm ents a cce p t as b eyon d question11 th e ca p ita list co n te x t in w h ic h th ey op erate is o f absolutely fu n d am e n tal im p ortan ce in sh ap ing their attitudes, policies and actions in rega rd to the specific issues and p roblem s w ith which th ey are confronted, and to the needs and conflicts o f civil society. T h e g en eral com m itm en t deep ly colours the specifies response, an d affects n o t o n ly the solution envisaged for the p a rtic u la r p roblem p erceived , b u t the m ode o f perception itself; indeed, id eological com m itm en t m a y and often does p re ve n t p ercep tio n a t a ll, and m akes im possible not only p rescription for the disease, b u t its location.

H o w ev er, p olitical office-holders themselves do not a t all see th eir com m itm en t to c ap ita list enterprise as in v o lv in g any elem ent o f class p a rtia lity . O n the co n trary, th ey are the most a rd en t and eloqu ent exponents o f the view o f the state, and of them selves, as a b o ve the battles o f civil society, as classless, as concerned a b o ve a ll to serve the w hole nation, the national interest, as b ein g ch arg ed w ith the p a rtic u la r task o f subduing special interests and class-oriented dem ands for the supreme

The Purpose and Rote o f Governments 73

good o f all. In th eir thoughts a n d w ords, H e g e l’s exalted v ie w o f the state as th e em bod im en t a n d th e p ro te cto r o f the w ho le o f society, o f its h ig h e r reason, a n d o f its p erm an en t interests, lives a gain - p a rtic u la rly w hen th ey rath er than th eir opponents are in office. ‘ I b elon g to everyone a n d I b elon g to no o n e’ , General de G a u lle said sh ortly after co m in g to p o w er in 1958, and it w o u ld be absurd to d o u b t th a t this is in d eed h o w the general does see h im self - far, far a b o v e the interests o f lesser men, b e th e y cap italists, w age-earners, farm ers, shopkeepers, the sick, th e p oor, the y o u n g o r the old . O th e r p o litic a l leaders may not fin d it easy to present them selves in q u ite such g ra n ­ diose term s; b u t th ey do th eir best, and see them selves in m u ch the sam e guise as the general does, even w hen th ey a p p e a r to others to ex h ib it the m ost b la ta n t class bias in their policies and actions.

T h a t m ost p o litic a l leaders in positions o f p ow er do h old this v ie w o f their office, and o f them selves, w ith sincerity an d conviction need not, in g e n eral, be dou b ted . In d eed , to dis­ miss their proclam ation s o f freedom from class bias as m ere hypocrisy leads to a dangerous u nderestim ation o f th e d e d ic a ­ tion and resolution w ith w hich such lead ers are likely to p ursue a task o f w hose n o b ility th ey are u tte rly persu aded. M e n so persuaded are not easily deflected from their purpose b y appeals to reason or sentim ent o r evidence, p a rtic u la rly w hen matters o f g rea t m om ent are a t stake. ; O pponents o f cap italism believe it to b e a system w hose very nature n ow adays m akes im possible the o p tim u m u tilisation o f resources for r a tio n a l h u m a n ends; wrhose in h eren t ch a ra cte r is one o f com pulsion, dom in ation and p a ra sitic a l a p p r o p r ia tio n ; whose spirit and purpose fa ta lly corrode a ll h u m a n relations;

; arid whose m ain ten an ce is to d a y the m ajo r ob stacle to h um an progress.

: Bourgeois p oliticians and govern m en ts v ie w the system in -precisely opposite terms - as most closely con gru en t w ith Shuman n a tu re’ , as u n iq u ely c a p a b le o f co m b in in g efficiency, welfare and freedom , as the best m eans o f releasing h u m an initiative and energy in socially b eneficent directions, an d as

■ providing th e necessary and o n ly possible basis for a satisfactory : social order.

; A n yw ay, w h y sp eak o f ‘cap ita lism ’ a t a ll, w ith its em otive an d

The Purpose and R ole o f Governments 75

of lesser qualification s, oth er p o litical leaders and governm ents have taken th e sam e vie w , a n d seen cap italist enterprise as a necessary, desirable, to-be-assum ed elem ent o f th eir society, q b e y wish, w ith ou t a d ou b t, to pursue m an y ends, personal as well as p u b lic. B u t a ll other ends are con dition ed b y, a n d pass through th e p rism of, th eir a ccep ta n ce o f and com m itm en t to the existing econom ic system.

G iven their v ie w o f th at system , it is easy to understand w h y governments should w ish to h elp business in e ve ry possible w a y , yet do not a t a ll feel th a t this entails a n y degree o f bias tow ards particular classes, interests a n d groups. F or i f the nation al interest is in fa c t in e x trica b ly b oun d u p w ith the fortunes o f capitalist enterprise, a p p a ren t p a rtia lity tow ards it is not re ally partiality a t all. O n the co n tra ry , in serving the interests o f business a n d in h elp in g cap ita list enterprise to thrive, g o v e rn ­ ments are re a lly fu lfillin g th eir exalted role as g u ard ian s o f the good o f all. F ro m this standpoint, the m uch-derided phrase ‘What is good for G e n eral M otors is g o od for A m e ric a 5 is only defective in th a t it tends to iden tify the interests o f one p a r­ ticular enterprise w ith the n a tion a l interest. B ut i f G en eral Motors is taken to stand for the w o rld o f cap italist enterprise as a whole, the slogan is one to w h ic h governm ents in cap italist countries do subscribe, often ex p licitly . A n d th ey do so because they a ccep t the n otion th a t the econom ic ration ality o f the capitalist system is synonym ous w ith ra tio n a lity itself, a n d th at it provides the best possible set o f h u m an arrangem ents in a necessarily im p erfect w orld.

In this sense, the attitu d e o f p o litic a l office-holders to businessmen as a d ass or as a social ty p e is o f rela tively m in or importance. T h e ir c ir d e o f relations, friends, form er associates and a cq u aintan ces is m uch m ore lik e ly to in clu d e businessmen than, say, trade union lead ers; and the fav o u ra b le view th ey take o f cap italist enterprise is also lik ely to m ak e them ta k e a sympathetic v ie w o f the m en w ho ru n it. T h u s President Eisenhower in 1952:

V. I believe in our dynamic system o f privately owned businesses and industries. T h ey have proven that they can supply not only the mightiest sinews o f war, but the highest standard o f living in the

eWorld for the greatest number o f people But it requires someone to Take these things and to produce the extraordinary statistics that the

The State in Capitalist Society

United States with 7 per cent o f the world’s population produces 5(3 per cent o f the world’s manufactured goods. I f that someone Is to be given a name, I believe that his name is the American business­ m an.1

P o litical leaders in coun tries less steeped in th e business creed a re not often q u ite so n a iv e ly gu sh in g; a n d even in the United States, presidents h a v e on occasion taken a less enthusiastic v ie w o f those w h o m o n e o f th em (ad m itted ly lo n g ago , and not v e r y seriously) d en oun ced as ‘ m alefactors o f g re a t w ealth ’ . It m a y w ell be, indeed, th a t m an y p o litical leaders h ave taken a v e r y p o o r v ie w o f this or th a t section o f business, o r even considered business as a n inferior a ctiv ity, from w h ich they felt them selves far rem oved.

A ll this, h ow ever, is o f no serious consequence, given a fu n d am en tal com m itm en t to the system o f w h ich businessmen are a n intrinsic an d m ajo r p a r t .2 Because o f th a t commitment, a n d because o f th e ir b e lie f that the n a tion a l interest is in­ e x tr ic a b ly boun d u p w ith the h ealth and strength o f capitalist enterprise, governm ents n a tu ra lly seek to h elp business - and businessm en. T h o rstein V e b le n on ce w rote th a t ‘the chief - v ir tu a lly sole - con cern o f the constituted authorities in any d em o cra tic nation is a con cern a b o u t the p ro fita b le business of the n a tio n ’s substantial citizens’ .3 T h is is q u ite true, b u t not necessarily or at a ll because o f a n y p a rtic u la r p redilection o f the ‘ constituted authorities’ for substantial citizens. T h e concern goes w ith the gen eral com m itm ent.

1 S . E . H a rris, The Economics o f Political Parties, 196s, p . 5. O n com in g to office/ P resident John son p u t th e sam e p o in t som ew h at d ifferen tly b u t, it m a y be sur­ m ised, w ith no less feelin g: ‘ W e think w e h a v e the best system. W e think that w h ere a cap italist can p u t u p a d o lla r, he c an get a retu rn b n it. A manager can g e t u p e a rly to w o rk an d w ith m o n ey an d m en he ca n bu ild a better mousetrap.; A la b o re r w h o is w o rth y o f his hire stands a c h a n ce o f getting attention and maybe a little profit-sharin g system , an d th e highest m in im u m wages o f any nation inthe w o rld ’ (R . E van s a n d R .N o v a k , Lyndon B , Johnson: The Exercise < f Power, 1966. P- 347>- _ :

8 N o te, e.g. President K e n n e d y ’s la ck o f enthusiasm for businessmen in general ( A .M .S c h le s in g e r J r , A Thousand Days; John F.Kennedy in the While House, i§>$, p p . 6 3 i f f ) , b u t also his alm ost desperate concern to re a ch accom m odation with th e ‘ business co m m u n ity ’ , for w h ich see below , ch a p te r 6. \

8 T . V e b le n , Absentee Ownership, 1923, pp. 3 6 -7 .

The Purpose and Role o f Governments 77

I I

H e first and m ost im p o rta n t consequence o f the com m itm en t which governm ents in ad va n ced cap italist countries h ave to the orivate enterprise system and to its econom ic ratio n ality is that ft enormously lim its th eir freedom o f action in relation to a multitude o f issues a n d problem s. R a y m o n d A r o n has w ritten that (il va de soi q u ’en regim e fonde sur la propriety des m oyens de production, les mesures prises p a r les legislateurs et les ministres ne seront pas en opposition fon dam en tale a vec les interets des proprietaries’ . 1 T h is proposition, he com m ents, is too obvious to be instructive. I t should perhaps be obvious. B u t it does not a p p e a r to be so to m ost W estern p o litical scientists who view the state as free from the inherent bias in fav o u r o f capitalist interests w h ic h Professor A r o n ’s proposition im plies. - That bias has im m ense p o licy im p lications. F o r the resolution,

or at least the a llevia tio n o f a vast ra n g e o f econom ic and social problems requires p recisely th at governm ents should be willing to a ct in ‘fu n d am e n tal opposition’ to these interests. Far from being a trivial m atter, th eir extrem e relu ctan ce to do so is one o f the largest o f all facts in the life o f these societies. Were it to be said a b o u t a go vern m en t th at th ou gh faced w ith a iyast criminal organisation it could not b e exp ected to a c t in

f̂undamental opposition to It, the ob servation w ou ld not be thought uninstructive a b o u t its ch a ra cte r a n d role. T h e sam e is true of the proposition w h ic h Professor A ro n so casu ally puts forward and tosses aside. ,-0 n the other h an d , th a t proposition tends to obscure a basic aspect o f the state’ s role. F o r governm ents, actin g in the nam e o f the state, have in fa c t been co m p elled over th e years to a c t agamst some p ro p erty rights, to erode some m an ag eria l p rero g a ­ tives, to help redress somewhat the b a la n ce betw een cap ita l a n d labour,: between p ro p e rty and those w ho are subject to it. T h is is an aspect o f state in terven tion w h ich conservative w riters who lament the g ro w th o f ‘b u r e a u c r a c y ’ a n d w ho dep lore state

1 R.Aron, ‘ Classe Sociale, Classe P o litiq u e , Classe D irig ea n te ’, in Archixits fyfopttnnesdeSociolegie, ig 6 o , v o l. i , no. 2, p p . 2 72-3.

78 The State in Capitalist Society

‘interferen ce’ in the affairs o f society re g u la rly overlook B u re a u c ra c y is in d eed a p ro b lem and a dan ger, and the experj ence o f countries lik e the S o viet U n io n has a m p ly shown g re a tly unrestrained b u re a u c ra tic p ow er c a n h elp to obstruct the creation o f a socialist society w o rth y o f the name. con cen tra tion u p o n th e evils o f b u re a u c ra cy in capitalist countries obscures (an d is often inten ded to obscure) the fact th a t ‘b u re a u c ra tic ’ in terven tion has often been a means .of a llev ia tin g the evils p rod u ced b y u nrestrained p riv a te economic p ow er.

T h e state’ s ‘interferen ce’ w ith th a t p ow er is not in ‘funda. m en tal opposition’ to the interests o f p r o p e r ty : it is indeed part o f th a t ‘ ransom ’ o f w h ic h Josep h C h a m b erla in spoke in 1885 a n d w h ich , he said, w o u ld h av e to be p a id p recisely for the purpose o f maintaining the rights o f p ro p e rty in general. In insisting th a t the ‘ran som ’ b e paid , governm ents render p ro p e rty a m ajor service, th o u g h the la tte r is seldom grateful for it. E ven so, it w o u ld not do to ign ore the fa c t th a t even very con servative governm ents in th e regim es o f a d van ced capitalism- h a v e often been forced, m ain ly as a result o f p o p u la r pressure, to ta k e a ctio n a gain st certain p ro p erty rights and capitalist prerogatives.

A s against this, h o w e ver, m ust b e set the v e ry positive support? w h ic h governm ents h ave g e n e rally sought to g iv e to dominant eco n o m ic interests.

C a p ita lis t enterprise, as w as noted in ch ap ter I , depends to p e ver gre a te r exten t on the bounties and d irect support o( the state, a n d c a n o n ly preserve its ‘ p riv a te ’ character on I th e basis o f such p u b lic h elp. S ta te in terven tion in economic. I life in fact la r g e ly means in terven tion fo r the purpose, of h e lp in g cap ita list enterprise. I n no field has the notion of the ‘ w elfare state’ h ad a m ore precise a n d ap posite m eaning than” h ere: there are no m ore persistent and successful applicantsfor p u b lic assistance th an th e p ro u d giants o f the p riv a te enterprise system.

N o r need th a t assistance be o f a d irect kind to b e o f immense v a lu e to cap italist interests. Because o f th e im p erative require­ ments o f m odern life, the state m ust, w ith in the lim its imposed: u pon it b y the p re v a ilin g econom ic system, engage in bastard form s o f socialisation a n d assume responsibility for many

The Purpose and R ole o f Governments 79

■ c»j0ns and services w h ic h are b eyon d the scope and c a p a ­ c it ie s o f cap italist interests. A s it does so, h ow ever, w h a t J e a n

aud calls ‘ the bias o f the system ’ ensures th a t these =;. terests w ill a u to m a tica lly b enefit from state interven tion. Because o f the p riv a te ow nership a n d con trol o f a p red om in an t

"part o f econom ic life, Professor M e y n a u d w rites:

all the measures taken by the state to develop and improve the national economy always end up b y being o f the greatest benefit to those who control the levers o f command o f the production- distribution sector: when the state cuts tunnels, builds roads, opens

highways or reclaims swamps, it is first o f all the owners o f the -jiaghbouring lands who reap the rew ards...the concept o f the ‘bias

of the system’ makes it also possible to understand that the measures taken to remedy the derelictions, shortcomings and abuses o f

: capitalism result ultimately, where successful, in the consolidation ■ of the regime. It matters little in this respect that these measures -should have been undertaken by men sympathetic or hostile to

“ c ap ita list interests: thus it is that laws designed to protect the - workers and directed against their exploitation by employers w ill -- be found useful to the latter by inducing them to make a greater

e f f o r t to rationalise or mechanise the productive process.1

Governments m a y b e solely concerned w ith the b etter -running o f ‘ the e co n o m y ’ . B u t the description o f the system as

I ‘the economy’ is p a rt o f the id io m o f id eology, and obscures the T real process. F o r w h a t is b e in g im p ro ve d is a capitalist econ o m y; :,and this ensures th a t w h o ever m a y or m a y not g a in , cap italist

înterests are least lik ely to lose. ; ..The ‘bias o f the system ’ m a y b e g iv e n a gre a te r or lesser '-degree o f emphasis. B u t the id eo lo gica l dispositions o f govern - jnents have g en erally been o f a kind to m ak e m ore a cc e p ta b le Jo them the structu ral constraints im posed u p o n them b y the .system; and these dispositions h a v e also m ad e it easier for them to submit to the pressures to w h ic h th ey h ave b ee n subjected

'by dominant interests. Taxation offers a read y illustration o f the p o in t. A s w as

noted in chapter 2, the econ om ic system itself generates ex­ tremely powerful tendencies tow ards th e m ainten ance and

-enhancement o f the vast ineq ualities o f incom e and w e a lth . which are typ ical o f a ll a d va n ced cap italist societies. G iv e n th a t

1 J.M eynaud, Rapport sur la Ctasse Dirigeante Italisnne, 1964, p p . 190 -1.

8o The Stale in Capitalist Society

e conom ic system, n o g o vern m en t c a n a ch ie ve redistributive m iracles. B u t th e lim its o f its pow ers in this field are nevertheless not fin a lly fixed - despite the system ’s tendencies to inequality, an d the fierce opposition o f the forces o f w ealth to redistributive taxation . A n d the fa c t th a t ta x atio n has not, over the years, affected m ore d eep ly th an it has the disparities o f incom e an<j w ea lth in these societies m ust to a m ajor exten t be attributed to the a ttitu d e o f governm ents tow ards in eq u a lity , to the view they take o f the co n flictin g claim s o f the rich and the poor, and to th eir accep ta n ce o f a n econom ic o rth od oxy w h ich has, at any p a rtic u la r m om en t o f tim e, d e clared ad d itio n a l burdens on the rich to b e fata l to ‘ business confidence5, ‘in d iv id u a l initiative’ the propen sity to invest, etc.

T h e sam e considerations a p p ly to g overn m en t intervention in ‘in du strial relations’ , th e consecrated euphem ism for the p erm an en t conflict, n ow acu te, n ow subdu ed, b etw een capital" and lab o u r.

W h e n e ve r g overn m en t h a v e felt it in cu m b en t, as th ey have done m ore and m ore, to interven e d irectly in disputes between em ployers and w age-earners, the result o f th eir intervention has tended to be disadvan tageous to th e latter, not the former. On in n u m era b le occasions, and in a ll cap ita list countries, govern* m ents h a v e p la y ed a decisive role in defeatin g strikes, often by the in vo ca tio n o f the coercive p o w e r o f the state and the use of n a k ed v io le n c e ; and the fa c t th a t they h a v e done so in the name o f the nation al interest, la w and order, constitution al govern*- m ent, the p rotection o f ‘ the p u b lic 5, etc., rath er th an simply to' sup p ort em ployers, has n o t m ade th at in terven tion a n y the less useful to these em ployers.

M o reo ver, the state, as the largest o f all em ployers, is now ab le to influence the p a tte rn o f ‘ in dustrial relations’ by the; force o f its ow n exam p le a n d b e h av io u r: th a t influence can h a r d ly be said to h av e created new standards in the employer* em ployee relationship. N o r cou ld it h a v e been expected to do so, g iven the ‘ business-like’ spirit in w h ich the p u b lic sector is m an ag ed .

G overn m en ts are d eep ly in vo lved , on a p erm anent and: in stitution alised basis, in th a t ‘ routinisation o f con flict,’ which is an essential p a rt o f the p olitics o f ad va n ced capitalism . They enter th a t conflict in the guise o f a n eu tral and independent

The Purpose and. Role o f Governments 81

oarty, concerned to a ch ie ve n o t the o u trig h t defeat o f one side of the other b u t a ‘ reasonable* settlem ent betw een them . B u t the'state’s in terven tion in negotiations occurs in the sh ad ow o f its known a n d d e clared propen sity to invoke its pow ers o f coercion, against one o f the parties in the dispute ra th e r than the other, i f ‘ co n c ilia tio n 1 procedures fail. T h ese procedures fdrm, in fact, a n a d d itio n a l elem en t o f restraint u p o n organised labour, and also serve th e useful purpose o f fu rth er d iv id in g the trade union ranks. T h e state does interpose its e lf betw een the ‘two sides o f in d u stry1 - not, h ow ever, as a n eu tral b u t as a partisan.

jfo r is this n ow adays o n ly true w h e n indu strial disputes actually occu r. O n e o f the m ost n o tab le features in the recent evolution o f a d v a n c e d cap italism is th e degree to w h ich governments h av e sought to p la c e n ew a n d fu rth er inhibitions upon organised la b o u r in order to p re v e n t it from exercising ■what pressures it c a n on em ployers (and on the state as a m ajor employer) in the m atter o f w a g e claim s. W h a t th ey ten d to achieve, by such m eans as an ‘incom es p o lic y 1, or b y deflation ­ ary policies w h ich red u ce the d em a n d for lab o u r, is a general weakening o f the b a rg a in in g position o f w ag e-ea rn ers.1 H ere too, the policies a d o p ted a re p ro cla im ed to be essential to the national interest, the h ealth o f the econom y, the defence o f the currency, the good o f the w orkers, and so on. A n d there are always trade u nion leaders w h o can be found to endorse b oth ■the claims and the policies. B u t this does not ch an ge the fact that the m ain effect o f these p olicies is to leave w age-earners in a

. weaker position vis-a-vis em ployers th a n w o u ld otherwise be the case. T h e purpose, in the eyes o f p o litic a l office-holders, m ay be all that it is said to b e; b ut the result, w ith u n fa ilin g regu la rity, is to the detrim ent o f th e sub ordin ate classes. T h is is w h y the latter, in this as in m ost other instances, h ave good reason to beware w hen the p o litic a l leaders o f ad va n ced cap italist countries invoke the n a tio n a l interest in defence o f th eir policies - m ore lik e ly th an not they, the subordinate classes, are about to be done. W age-earn ers h a v e alw ays h a d to reck on with a hostile state in th eir en cou nter w ith em ployers. B ut now

1 See, e.g., K id ro n , Western Capitalism Since the War, p p . ig o ff; ‘ Incom es P o licy And the T ra d e U n ion s', in International Socialist Journal, 1964, v o l. I, n o 3 ; a n d ‘T h e Campaign A gain st th e R ig h t to S trike’ , in ibid., 1964, v ol. 1, n o. 1.

82 The State in Capitalist Society

m ore th a n ever th e y h a v e to reckon w ith its antagonism , i ̂ p ractice, as a direct, p ervasive, and constant fact o f economic life. T h e ir im m ediate a n d d a ily op p on en t rem ains the employer' b u t governm ents an d th e state are n ow m uch m ore closely in volved in the en cou nter th a n in the past.

Q u ite n a tu ra lly , th is p a rtia lity o f governm ents assumes Un­ even m ore specific, precise and organised ch ara cter in relation- to a ll m ovem ents, grou p ings and parties ded icated to the transform ation o f ca p ita list societies in to socialist ones. The m an n er in w h ich governm ents h a v e expressed this antagonism- has g re a tly va rie d o ve r tim e, and betw een countries, assuming here a m ild er form , th ere a harsher on e; b u t the antagonism itse lf has b ee n a p erm a n en t fa c t in the h istory o f a ll capitalist countries: I n no field has th e u n d erly in g consensus between p o litic a l office-holders o f different p o litic a l affiliations, and-- b etw een the governm ents o f different countries, been more substantial and n o ta b le - th e leaders o f a ll governmental parties, w h eth er in office o r in opposition, and including n o m in a lly ‘socialist* ones, h a v e a lw a ys b een d eep ly hostile tor" th e socialist a n d m ilita n t left, o f w h a tev er denom ination, and governm ents them selves h a v e in fact b e en the m ajor p r o ta g ­ onists a gain st it, in th eir role o f protectors a n d saviours of- society from the perils o f left-w in g dissidence.

I n this instance too, lib e ra l-d em o cratic a n d p lu ralist theorists, - in th eir celeb ra tion o f th e p o litic a l com p etition w h ich prevails in th eir societies, a n d in th eir insistence on the p o litica l neu tra lity o f th e state, q u ite overlook th e fa c t th a t the governments o f a d v a n c e d cap ita list societies, far from ta k in g a neutral view o f socialist com p etition, do th eir level best to m ake it m ore difficult; I n som e countries, for instance F ed era l G e rm a n y , Communist a n d o th er left-w in g parties a n d organisations are suppressed a ltogeth er, a n d m em bership m ad e a crim e p u n ish a b le b y law; i in others, such as the U n ite d States, left-w in g organisations, of w h ich the C om m u n ist P a rty is o n ly one, o p erate in conditions" o f such h arassm ent as to n a rro w rath er d rastically, in their “ case, the n otion o f free p o litical com petition.

N o r is the state's h ostility less m arked in o th e r countries, th o u g h it m a y assume different forms - for instance electoral m a n ip u la tio n as in F ran ce and I ta ly for the purp ose o f robbing their C om m u n ist parties o f the p a rlia m e n ta ry representauon to

The Purpose and R ole o f Governments 83

their electo ra l strength entitles th em ; the engineering of bias in the mass m edia, in so fa r as lies in the considerable a n d -■owing p ow er o f g overn m en ts; a n d also episodic b u t q u ite brutal repression o f left-w in g dissenters.

(jovernm ents, in o th er w ords, are d e e p ly concerned, w h a t­ ever their p o litic a l coloration , th at the ‘d em o cra tic process’ should operate w ith in a fra m e w o rk in w hich left-w in g dissent

jayS as w eak a ro le as possible. T he argum ent is n o t w h e th e r governm ents sh ould o r should

not be n eu tral as b e tw e e n con servative a n d anti-conservative ideologies, m ovem ents, p arties a n d grou ps. T h a t question is not susceptible to resolution in term s o f such im p eratives. T h e argument is rath er th a t the govern m en ts o f a d va n ced cap italist countries h ave never been thus n eu tral, a n d th a t th e y h a v e for

■ the most p a rt used th e state p o w e r o n th e conservative as against the anti-conservative side. A n d the furth er a rgu m en t is th a t ju so doing th ey h av e , w h a te v e r o th er purposes th e y m igh t h av e

- w ished to serve, afforded a m ost p reciou s elem ent o f p rotection to those classes a n d interests w hose p o w e r a n d privileges socialist dissent is p rim a rily in ten d ed to u n d erm in e and destroy. T h o se who believe in th e virtues o f a social o rd er w h ich includes such power and p rivileges w ill a p p la u d a n d support g o vern m en ta l partiality, and m ay even ask fo r m ore o f it. T h o se w h o do not will n o t T h e im p o rta n t p o in t is to see w h a t so m u ch o f p o litic a l analysis obscures, often from itself, n a m e ly th a t this is w h a t governments, in these coun tries, a c tu a lly d o .

The argum ent so fa r h as cen tered on som e o f the m ain internal ■ consequences w h ich flo w fro m the com m itm en t o f governm ents to the capitalist system . B u t the external consequences o f th a t ■commitment are no less d ire c t a n d im p ortan t.

Here, perhaps even m ore th a n in o th er fields, the purposes which governm ents p ro cla im th eir wish to serve a re often m ad e to appear rem ote from specific econom ic concerns, let alon e

■ Capitalist interests. I t is the n a tio n a l interest, national security, /national indep en dence, honour, greatness, etc. th a t is th eir : concern. B ut this n a tu ra lly inclu des a sound, h ealth y, th rivin g economic system ; and such a desirable state o f affairs depends in turn on the p rosperity o f cap italist enterprise. T h u s, b y the sam e mechanism w h ich operates in regard to hom e affairs, the

6 Imperfect Competition

■■■ '■ #

m

m

D e m o c ra tic a n d p lu ralist th eory could n o t h a v e gained the , d egree o f a scen dency w h ich it enjoys in a d va n ced capitalist societies i f it h a d n o t a t least b een based on one p la in ly accurate ob servation a b o u t them , n a m ely th a t th e y p e rm it and even e n co u ra g e a m u ltitu d e o f groups a n d associations to orga n s o p e n ly a n d freely a n d to com p ete w ith each oth er for the ad v a n c e m en t o f such purposes as th eir m em bers m a y wish. With exception s w h ic h m a in ly a ffe ct th e L eft, this is in deed the case.

W h a t is w ro n g w ith p lu ralist-d em ocratic th eory is not its insistence on the fa c t o f com p etition b u t its cla im (very often its; im p lic it assum ption) th a t th e m ajor organised ‘interests’ in these societies, a n d n o ta b ly c a p ita l a n d lab o u r, com pete on m o re or less eq u a l term s, a n d th a t none o f them is therefore able to a ch ieve a decisive a n d p e rm a n e n t a d va n tag e in the process of com p etition . T h is is w h ere id e o lo gy enters, a n d turns observa­ tion into m yth . In previous chapters, it was show n th at business; p a rtic u la rly large-scale business, did enjoy such an advantage! inside the state system , b y virtu e o f the com position and ideo­ lo g ic a l inclinations o f the state elite. In this ch ap ter, w e shall see th a t business enjoys a m assive superiority outside the state system as w e ll, in terms o f the im m ensely stronger pressures w h ic h , as co m p a red w ith la b o u r and a n y oth er interest, it iš a b le to exercise in the pursuit o f its purposes.

Im perfect Competition J47

I

One such form o f pressure, w h ic h p lu ralist ‘grou p theorists’ tendto ig nore> *s m ore im p o rta n t an d effective th an a n y oth er, and business is u n iq u ely p la c e d to exercise it, w ith o u t the need o f organisation, cam p a ig n s a n d lo b b y in g . T h is is th e pervasive and perm anent pressure u p o n governm ents a n d the state generated b y the p riv a te con trol o f co n cen tra ted industrial, commercial a n d fin an cia l resources. T h e existence o f this m ajor area o f indep en dent econom ic p o w e r is a fact w h ich no g overn ­

ment, w h a tev er its inclinations, c a n ign ore in the determ in atio n >0f its policies, n o t o n ly in re ga rd to econom ic m atters, b u t to most other m atters as w e ll. T h e ch a irm a n o f the editorial b oard of Fortune m ag a zin e said in 1952 th a t ‘ a n y president w ho w ants to seek a prosperous c o u n try depends o n the co rp o ra tio n a t least as m u ch - p r o b a b ly m ore th an - the corporation depends oil him. H is d ep en den ce is not u n lik e th a t o f K in g J o h n o n the

janded barons a t R u n n ym e d e , w h ere M a g n a C a r ta w as born’ . 1 The parallel m a y n o t be p erfect b u t the stress o n th e in d ep en ­ dent pow er o f business, a n d o n th e dep en dence o f g overn m en t upon it, is a ltogeth er ju stified , n o t on ly for the U n ite d States b u t for all other a d v a n c e d c ap ita list countries.

O f course, governm ents do h a v e the fo rm a l p o w e r to im pose ; their w ill u p on business, to p re v e n t it, b y the exercise o f legitimate a u th o rity, from d o in g certain things a n d to com p el it to do certain o th er things. A n d this is in fact w h a t governm ents have often don e. B u t this, th ou gh true a n d im p ortan t, is n o t a t all the p oin t a t issue. Q u ite o b vio u sly, governm ents are not completely helpless in th e face o f business p ow er, nor is it the case that businessmen, h o w eve r la rg e the concerns w h ich th ey run ,

jean openly d efy the state’s com m an d, disregard its rules and flout the law . T h e p o in t is rath er th at the control b y business o f large and c ru c ia lly im p o rta n t areas o f econom ic life m akes it extremely difficult for governm ents to im pose u pon it policies to which it is firm ly opposed. O th e r interests, it m a y w ell be said,

1 Vlilis, The Power Elite, p. :6 g. O r , as A lfred de G r a z ia puts it, ‘w h oever controls the grc it industries w ill have aw ful po litica l p o w er’ (Politics and Government, 1963, vol. 2, p. 56).

148 The State in Capitalist Society

are b y n o m eans helpless vis-d-vis th e ir govern m en t either* th too m a y oppose, sometim es successfully, th e purposes* policies o f the state. B u t business, in the v e ry nature of cap ita list system o f econom ic organisation, is im m easur^^ b etter p la c ed th an a n y oth er interest to do so effectively, and to cause governm ents to p a y m u ch g re a te r attention to its "wishes a n d susceptibilities th an to a n y b o d y else.

W ritin g a b o u t th e U n ite d States, Professor H ack er has noted in this co n n ection th a t:

... what Parsons and other liberals like to think o f as business regulation is, despite the predictable complaints o f businessmen ' more a paper tiger than an effective system o f economic controls in the public interest ... [and, he goes on] a few questions may be asked about these supposed powers o f the national government. Can any public agency determine the level o f wages, o f prices, o f profits? C an it perhaps, more important, specify the level and direction of capital investment? C an any government bureau allocate raw materials or control plant location? C an it in any w ay guarantee full employment or the rate o f economic growth ? Has any writ of the A nti-Trust Division actually broken up one o f our larger corpbra- tions in any appreciable w ay? T h e simple answer is that measures such as these are neither possible under the laws nor do we know w hat the reaction to them would be.1

E v e n for the U n ite d States this m a y w e ll underestim ate the in flu en ce w h ic h governm ents do h a v e, b y d ire ct a n d indirect in terve n tio n , on econom ic life ; and in m a n y oth er capitalist countries, w h ere a m ore positive p h ilosop hy o f intervention has g e n e ra lly com e to p re v a il, governm ents h a v e been ab le to do ra th er m ore th an w h a t is here suggested as possible.

N evertheless, the limits o f interven tion, at least in relation to business, a n d p a rtic u la rly against it, a re everyw h ere m uch more n a rro w and specific th an insistence o n th e form al powers of g o vern m en t w o u ld tend to suggest; and the a rea o f decision-;' m a k in g w h ic h is left to p riv a te enterprise is correspondingly g rea ter th a n is u su a lly co n v eyed b y the assiduously propagated im a g e o f a ‘ business co m m u n ity 5 c rib b ed and confined by b u re a u c ra tic a lly m eddlesom e governm ents and th eir agents. -

E v e n governm ents w h ic h are determ ined to ‘ co n trol5 private;:

1 A .H a c k e r , ‘ S ociolo gy an d I d e o lo g y ’ , in M .B la c k (ed.), The Social Theories <if Talcott Parsons, 1 9 6 1 , p . 3 0 a .

Im perfect Competition 149

nterpri®6 soon fin d th a t th e m echanism s o f in terven tion w h ich ^ ey seek to superim pose u p o n business a re extrem ely cum ber- oine and alm ost im possible to op erate w ith o u t the co llab o ra tio n

jjid help o f business itself. B u t th a t collab oration and h elp is unlikely to be forth com in g unless a p rice is p a id for it - the rice being th at governm ents should not be too determ ined in

|he p u rs u it o f policies w h ich business itse lf deem s detrim ental to it, and o f course to the ‘ n a tio n a l interest’ .

: £ What is in volved here is n o t necessarily or at a ll the active resistance o f the controllers o f econom ic p o w er to the law , or the d eliberate evasion o f d u ly p ro m u lg a ted regulations, though tliere m ay be th a t as w e ll. M o r e im p o rta n t than such defian ce, Which m ay be p o litic a lly d a m a g in g a n d even dangerous, is the 'inert power o f business, the failu re to do such things as are not positively com m an d ed b y the state b u t m erely asked for, and -the doing o f oth er things w h ic h are not strictly ille g a l. M u c h is ■possible on this basis, and w o u ld be sufficient to present a ■reforming g o vern m en t w ith form id ab le problem s, so lon g as it chose to operate w ith in the fram ew ork o f a cap italist regim e. As .professor M e y n a u d notes, in a reference to Ita ly w hich is o f more general ap p lica tio n , p riv a te ow nership and control

_ 1... makes it very difficult to undertake a policy of reform within the framework o f established economic structures. A ny government concerned to engineer a certain redistribution of economic power arid of the social product without bringing into question the founda­ tions of the system rapidly comes up, in the medical sense o f the word, against a kind o f intolerance o f the regime to such changes.1

* This ‘in toleran ce’ , it m ust be stressed, is not such as to p reven t any kind o f econom ic p o lic y o f w h ich business disapproves. T h e Veto pow er o f business, in o th er w ords, is not absolute. B u t it is very large, a n d ce rta in ly la rg e r than th a t o f a n y oth er interest in capitalist society.

It has som etim es been a rg u ed th a t governm ents h ave now come to possess one e x tre m e ly effective w e ap o n in relation to business, n am ely the fact th a t th e y are n ow b y fa r the largest Customer o f p riv a te enterprise and h a v e thus ‘ an im p o rta n t a n d speedy instrum ent for in flu en cin g th e decisions o f p riv a te indus­ try. and com m erce in such a w a y as to en a b le the govern m en t

1 M ey n a u d , Rapport sur la Classe Dirigeante Italitnm, p . ) 9 1.

to a ch ie ve on time its m ajo r n a tio n a l in d u strial objectives’-! Y e t it w as o n ly a few m onths before this w as w ritten th a t'x

L a b o u r G o vern m en t W h ite P a p e r on state purchasing hacl elicited from The Times the com m en t th a t ‘it is q u ite clear that a n y id ea o f w ie ld in g the b ig stick o f th e G overnm ent’s ch asing p o w e r to co m p el in d iv id u a l firm s or industries radically to ch an ge th eir m ethods as a n in strum en t o f long-term economic p o lic y has been co m p letely reje cted ’ .2 N o r is there m uch evi-' den ce th a t oth er governm ents h a v e been n o ta b ly effective in the use o f this p o w er in th eir relations w ith p riv ate enterprise. '

In the abstract, governm ents do in d eed h av e vast resources an d pow ers a t th eir com m an d to ‘w ield the b ig stick’ against business. I n p ractice , governm ents w h ich are m inded to use these pow ers and resources - an d m ost o f them are not - soon fin d, g iv e n the econom ic and p o litical co n tex t in w hich they o p erate, th a t th e task is fra u g h t w ith in n u m erab le difficulties an d perils. , -

T h ese difficulties a n d perils are perhaps best epitomised in the dreaded phrase ‘loss o f con fid en ce’ . I t is an im plicit testi­ m on y to the p o w er o f business th a t a ll governm ents, not least reform in g ones, h a v e alw ays been p ro fo u n d ly concerned to, g a in and reta in its ‘ confidence’ . N o r certain ly is there any other interest w hose ‘con fid en ce’ is deem ed so precious, or whose ‘loss o f confid ence’ is so feared.

T h e p residen cy o f Jo h n F . K e n n e d y provides some illumin­ a tin g instances o f this concern. Soon after he cam e to--office; P residen t K e n n e d y found h im se lf en gaged in a ‘spectacular p o w e r stru g g le’ w ith the Business A d v iso ry C ou n cil, ‘an ex­ clusive a n d self-p erp etuating c lu b o f top corporate executive th a t h ad enjoyed a p riv a te and special relationship with the g overn m en t since 19331 an d w h ich ‘from A dm inistration -to A d m in istra tio n ... h ad a continuous p rivileg e to participate in g overn m en t decisions w ith no p u b lic reco rd or review ’ .? The

1 R . M a x w e ll, ‘H o w to B u y a N e w Industrial E fficien cy’, in The Times, 3 October 1967 (Ita lics in text).

2 The Times, 35 M a y 1967, 3 R o w e n , The Free Enterprisers. Kennedy, Johnson and the Business Establishment

pp. 6 1 - 3 . A n o th e r w riter has described .the C o u n c il as fo llo w s: ‘A lth ou gh nominally a p riv ate organisation , th e B A C is p u b lic ly in fluential in a w a y in w h ich pressui? groups w ith o u t the sam e ease o f access to the fed eral governm ent can never be. I t is a pparen t, for in stan ce, th at it serves as a re cruitin g a n d placem en t agency for personnel in m a n y o f the fed eral agencies. M o re sign ifican tly, it prepares elaborate

150 The State in Capitalist Society V)

Imperfect Competition

Secretary o f C o m m e rc e , L u th e r H a rtw e ll H odges, th o u gh , rcjjy a fiery ra d ica l, e n te rtain ed the od d notion th a t the man*

0f appointm ent o f B A C m em bers, a n d its procedures, o u g h t to be modified. I n th e even t, the difficulties this p ro d u ced led the B A C itself to sever its official connections and to renam e ‘tself the Business C o u n c il. ‘ H odges d re w plans for a n ew B A C , oae that w o u ld in clu d e a b ro a d cross-section o f A m e ric a n business - b ig, m ed iu m and sm all-sized. I t w o u ld in clu d e representatives as w e ll o f lab o r, agricu ltu re and e d u cation 5. 1

But these plans never m ate ria lis e d : fa c e d w ith m a n y p roblem s which appeared to h im to requ ire business support, ‘ and sensitive to the g ro w in g insistence th a t h e w as “ anti-business” , the President tu rn ed fu ll circle from his earlier, firm and b o ld posture to w a rd the Business A d v iso ry C o u n c il’ . 2 A rap p ro ch e­ ment was engineered and arrangem en ts w ere m ad e for ‘sm all committees o f the B C to be assigned to e a ch o f several g o vern ­ ment departm ents a n d agencies - and to the W h ite H ouse itself.3 F or th eir p a rt, ‘la b o r leaders com p lain ed a b o u t the Kennedy ca m p a ig n aga in st “ in fla tio n a ry w a g e increases” , itself part o f K e n n e d y ’ s assurance to business th a t he w as playing no favorites. B u t the President w a n te d to restore a goo d working relationship w ith the Business C o u n c il regardless o f labor’s concerns’ . 4

It was o n ly a few m onths la te r th a t the P residen t found himself‘ at w a r ’ w ith no less a m em b er o f th e business establish­ ment than R o g e r B lo u gh , th e ch airm a n o f U .S . Steel, w ho announced a substantial increase in the p rice o f steel p roduced by his com pany a n d w h o w as soon follow ed b y oth er steel giants. -Qn this occasion, th e m obilisation o f variou s forms o f presiden­ tial-pressure,6 in c lu d in g a sp ectacu la r disp lay o f presiden tial anger on television, succeeded in cau sin g the rescinding o f the increases - th ou gh only for a y e a r H o w e v er, the episode w as no

;loss to business in g en eral, since it m erely enh anced the

"studies” and “ reports” . A lth o u g h th e specific im po rt o f such advisory reports is often hard to gauge, the J u stice D e p artm e n t has fou nd it necessary to in form the Secretary o f the In terio r th at “ fu n d a m en tal questions o f basic p o lic y ” are b ein g initially setded b y in du stry advisory com m ittees, w ith the result th at governm ent action amounts to no m ore th an g iv in g effect to decisions a lre ad y m ade b y such committees’ (K a rie l, The Decline o f American Pluralism, p. 99).

1 Rowcn, op c it., p. 70. 2 Ibid., p . 71. 3 Ibid., p. 71. 4 H>id., p. 73 (m y italics). 5 F or w h ic h see ibid., ch a p ter 6.

152 The State in Capitalist Society -Sifll =-3fcr

P residen t’s alm ost obsessional concern to earn a n d en joy*|S ‘con fid en ce’ . Ind eed, G o vern o r G on n ally, w h o w as riding irt P residen t’s c a r a t th e tim e o f th e assassination, has recaH«8jl th a t p a rt a t least o f K e n n e d y ’s purpose in undertaking the t r ill to Texas, w as to reassure its ‘ business co m m u n ity’ as to h i t inten tion s; ‘ I think it g a lled h im ’ , G o vern o r C o n n a lly w rite s ‘ th a t con servative business p eop le w o u ld suspect that he ^ w e a lth y p ro d u c t h im se lf o f o u r cap ita listic system, would d p a n y th in g to d a m ag e th a t system ’ . 1 . .„-g;

T h e ‘ confid ence’ o f business is also th a t elusive p rize which'th^- L a b o u r g overn m en t o f M r W ilson has pursued w ith unflagging z e a l ever since it first cam e to office - th o u g h to n o great avaif) T h u s, The Times rep orted in the au tu m n o f 1967 th at:

... leading industrialists are likely to be called on by the Prinie' Minister during the coming months for private talks aimed at convincing the business community that its views will be o f central importance in the Government’s planning o f its economic policies Labour came to power with a large fund of good-will among the" business community.2 It is perhaps a recognition of its subsequent disillusion that the Prime Minister is now ready to intervene in the' constant Whitehall-industry dialogue to restore confidence necessary for promoting higher investments and changing practice.3

T h e z e a l is not a m atter for surprise. G iv e n the degree of e conom ic p o w er w h ich rests in the ‘business com m unity’ and- th e decisive im p ortan ce o f its actions (or o f its non-actions) for m a jo r aspects o f econom ic p o lic y , a n y govern m en t w ith serious' pretensions to ra d ica l reform m ust eith er seek to appropriates th a t p o w e r or fin d its room for rad ica l a ction rig id ly circum­ scribed b y the requirem ents o f business ‘co n fid en ce’ . So far, no g overn m en t in a n y W estern -typ e p o litic a l system, w hatever its rh etoric before assum ing office, has taken up the first o f these options. Instead, reform -m inded governm ents h ave, sometimes relu cta n tly , sometimes not, cu rb ed their reform ing propensities (thou gh n ev er enough for the m en th e y sought to appease) or a d a p te d th eir reform s to the purposes o f business (as happened in the case o f the nation alisation proposals o f the 1945 Labour govern m en t), and tu rn ed themselves into th e allies o f the very:

1 J . C o n n a lly , ‘ W h y K e n n e d y w en t to T e x a s ’, Life, 24 N o ve m b er 1967, p. too. 2 T h is m a y w e ll be doubted. 3 The Times, 3 O c to b e r 1967.

Im perfect Competition 153

e rces they h ad prom ised, w h ile in opposition, to coun ter and . J ue. Politics, in this context, is indeed the art o f the possible.

t>ut what is possible is a b o v e all determ ined b y w h a t the ‘business co m m u n ity’ finds accep ta b le.

jtywadays, h ow ever, it is not o n ly w ith th e p ow er o f their ow n business class th a t reform -m in ded and ‘ left-w in g’ governm ents bjive to reckon, o r w hose ‘ confidence’ th e y m ust try and earn. Such governm ents m ust also reckon, n o w m ore than ever before, #ith the p ow er and pressure o f outside cap italist interests and forces - large foreign firm s, p ow erful a n d conservative foreign governments, cen tra l banks, p riv a te in tern ation al fin an ce, official international cred it organisations lik e the In te rn atio n al Monetary F u n d and the W o rld B ank, o r a form id ab le com ­ bination o f a ll these. E co n o m ic a n d fin an cial o rth od ox y, and a proper rega rd for the p rerogatives and needs o f the free enterprise system, is not o n ly w h a t in tern a l business interests ;£xpect and req u ire from th eir office-holders; these internal interests are n ow p o w erfu lly seconded b y outside ones, w h ich may easily be o f gre a te r im p ortan ce.

Capitalism, w e h a v e a lre a d y noted, is n ow m ore than ever an international system, w hose constituent econom ies are closely related and interlin ked. A s a result, even the m ost p ow erful capitalist countries dep en d, to a g reater o r lesser extent, u pon the good w ill a n d coop eration o f the rest, and o f w h a t has become, notw ith stan din g end uring and profound nation al c a p i­ talist rivalries, a n in terd ep en d en t in tern ation al cap italist ‘co m ­ munity’ . T h e d isa p p ro va l b y th at ‘co m m u n ity ’ o f the policies o f one o f its m em bers, a n d the w ith d ra w a l o f g o od w ill and cooperation w h ich m a y fo llow from it, are ob viou sly frau gh t with m ajor difficulties for the co u n try concerned. A n d so lon g as a country chooses to rem ain p a rt o f th e ‘ co m m u n ity’ , so long must the w ish not to in cu r its d isap p roval w e ig h v e r y h e av ily upon its p o lic y decisions and fu rth er redu ce the im pulses o f reform-minded governm ents to stray fa r from the , p a th o f orthodoxy. C e n tra l bankers, e n joyin g a h ig h degree o f a u to ­ nomy from their governm ents, h ave com e to assume e xtrao rd in ­ ary im portance as the g u ard ian s o f th a t orth od oxy, and as the representatives par excellence o f ‘sound fin an ce’ . A conservative government in a re la tively strong econom ic an d fin an cial

154 The State in Capitalist Society

position, such as th e g overn m en t o f President de G au lle Ioni enjoyed, m a y p la y ro gu e elep h an t w ith o u t u n d u e risk of retrib u tion . A ra d ica l govern m en t, on the oth er h an d , would be" u n lik ely to b e g iven m u ch shrift b y these representatives of in tern a tio n a l capitalism .

M o re o ver, ra d ica l governm ents, as w as also n oted earlier n o rm a lly com e to office in circum stances o f severe econom ic and fin an cia l crisis, an d fin d th a t credits, loans a n d gen eral fir ancial sup p ort a re o n ly a v a ila b le on condition th a t they pursue econom ic a n d foreign p olicies w h ic h are a cc e p ta b le to their" creditors a n d bankers a n d w h ic h are o n ly m arg in ally distin* g u ish a b le, i f a t a ll, from the conservative policies they had p reviously denounced.

A case in p o in t is th a t o f the L a b o u r govern m en t w hich was r elected in O c to b e r 1964 a n d re-elected in M a rc h 1966. I t was -- M r W ilson h im se lf w h o , in an o ften-q u oted phrase, warned the - T ra d e s U n io n Congress before the election o f 1964 th a t ‘you can g e t into p a w n b u t d o n ’ t then ta lk a b o u t an independent foreign p o lic y o r an in d ep en d en t defence p o lic y ’ . 1 T h is was w e ll spoken, a n d applies a t least as m u c h to an ‘independent* econom ic p o lic y . B u t M r W ilson did, a ll the sam e ‘get into p a w n ’ soon after h e cam e to office, a n d w en t deep er into pawn in subsequen t years. H is g overn m en t d u ly p ursued policies of a sufficiently con servative c h ara cter to ensure the continued, _ unenthusiastic, sup p ort o f cap ita list governm ents, c e n tra l; banks a n d in tern ation al fin an cial agencies. B u t th a t support- was n a tu ra lly con dition al u p o n the strict observance o f . econom ic a n d fin an cia l orth o d oxy, o f w h ich an ‘incomes p o lic y ’ m a in ly designed to keep d ow n w ages was a central elem ent; a n d the creditors h ad to be given the rig h t to assure them selves, b y a process o f continuous surveillance, th at the L a b o u r g o vern m en t d id pursue the req u ired policies.

T h is kind o f dep en dence and surveillance has alw ays been c h ara cteristic o f the relations betw een the w o rld o f advanced c ap ita lism and those governm ents o f the ‘T h ir d W o rld ’ which h av e sought aid a n d credits from i t ; an d the p ric e o f such aid a n d credits has alw ays b een the pursuit b y the governments concerned o f policies designed to favour, or a t least not to hinder, foreign cap ita list enterprise, and the adoption in

1 T .U .C , Annual Report, 1964, p- 383.

Im perfect Competition 1 5 5

international affairs o f p o li c i « a n d attitudes not likely, a t the least, to g ive offence to the creditors a n d donors.

But these ex tern a l pressures d o not o n ly n ow a ffect the u n d e r­ developed countries o f the ‘T h ir d W o rld ’ . T h e y can also be directed, w ith considerable effect, u p on the governm ents o f advanced cap italist coun tries; and here, ob viou sly, is a g re a t source o f ad d itio n a l strength to nation al cap ita list interests faced w ith governm ents bent on policies u n a ccep ta b le to these interests. C lass conflict, in these countries, has a lw ays h a d an international dim ension, b u t this is n ow even m ore d irectly and specifically true th an in the past.

I I

fn the lig h t o f the strategic position w h ich cap italist enterprise enjoys in its dealin gs w ith governm ents, sim ply b y virtu e o f its Control o f econom ic resources, th e notion, w h ic h is basic to pluralist theory, th a t here is b u t on e o f the m a n y ‘veto grou p s’ :iri capitalist society, on a p a r w ith oth er ‘ veto groups’ , m ust appear as a resolute escape fro m reality.

O f these o th e r groups, it is la b o u r, as an ‘interest’ in society, whose p ow er is m ost often assum ed to eq u a l (w hen it is not claimed to surpass) the p o w e r o f c ap ita l. B u t this is to treat as an accomplished fa c t w h a t is o n ly an unrealised p oten tia lity, whose realisation is beset w ith im m ense difficulties.

For la b o u r has n oth in g o f the p o w e r o f ca p ita l in the d ay-to- day econom ic d ecision -m akin g o f cap ita list enterprise. W h a t a firm produces; w h eth er it exports o r does n o t e x p o rt; w hether it ■invests, in w h a t, and for w h a t p u rp o s e ; w hether it absorbs or is absorbed b y oth er firms - these a n d m a n y other such decisions are matters o ve r w h ic h la b o u r has at best an in d irect degree o f influence and m ore g e n e rally no influ ence a t all. In this sense, labour lacks a firm basis o f econ om ic p ow er, a n d has conse­ quently th a t m u c h less pressure p oten tial vis-a-vis the state. T h is is also one reason w h y governm ents a re so m u ch less concerned to obtain the ‘con fid en ce’ o f la b o u r th an o f business.

M oreover, la b o u r does not h a v e a n y th in g, b y w a y o f exer­ cising pressure, w h ic h corresponds to the foreign influences

156 The State in Capitalist Society

w h ic h are re a d ily m arsh alled on b e h a lf o f c ap ita l. T h e re are rus ' la b o u r ‘gnom es’ o f Z u ric h , n o la b o u r eq u iva le n t o f the 'VVorld- B an k, the In tern atio n al M o n e ta ry F u n d , or the O E C D , to ensure th a t governm ents desist from takin g m easures detri­ m e n ta l to w age-earners and favou ra b le to business, or to press fo r policies w h ich are o f a d v a n ta g e to ‘lo w e r in com e groups’ " and w h ich are opposed to the interests o f econom ic elites. For w age-earners in the cap italist w orld, in tern ation al solidarity is--1 p a rt o f a h allo w ed rh etoric w h ich seldom manifests itself con-- cre te ly an d e ffe c tiv e ly ; for business, it is a perm anen t reality.

T h e one im p o rta n t w eap on w h ich lab o u r, as an ‘interest* does h ave is the strike; an d w h ere it has been used w ith real d eterm in a tio n its effectiveness as a m eans o f pressure has often- been c le a rly dem onstrated. A g a in a n d again, employers and governm ents h ave been forced to m ake concessions to labour because o f the la tte r’s resolute use o f the strike w eapon , or even because o f th e cred ible th reat o f its use. O n innum erable, occasions, dem ands w h ich , th e unions and the w orkers were told, co u ld not co n c e iv a b ly be gran ted since th ey m ust inevitably ̂ m ean ruin for a firm or indu stry or inflict irre p a ra b le dam age to the n a tio n a l econom y, h ave som ehow becom e accep tab le when’ organised lab o u r has show n in p ra c tic e th a t it w o u ld not desist.

D eterm in a tio n , h ow ever, is the p ro b lem . F o r lab ou r, as a pressure gro u p , is extrem ely vu ln erab le to m a n y internal and - e xtern al influences calcu lated to erode its w ill and persistence. - Because o f the effectiveness o f these influences, governments- h a v e g e n e ra lly found it unnecessary to treat la b o u r w ith any­ th in g like the deference w h ich th ey h ave acco rded to business, T h e y h a v e sometim es trod on the la tte r’s toes, b u t never as- h e a v ily as th ey h a v e trod on the toes o f lab o u r — as M r Wilson’s” L a b o u r govern m en t, for instance, has done in pursuit o f an ‘incom es p o lic y ’ .

O n e im p o rta n t weakness w h ich affects lab o u r as a pressure g ro u p , as co m p a red to business, is th a t the latter’ s national organisations are able to speak w ith con siderab ly more a u th o rity th an c a n th eir la b o u r coun terparts.

T h e r e are a n u m b er o f reasons for this. O n e o f them is: that, business organisations c a n tru ly claim to ‘speak for business’, eith er because th ey in clu d e a v e r y h ig h p e rcen ta ge o f individual,. business units o r because the firms w h ich th ey do represent are

Im perfect Competition r57

^sponsible for a c ru c ia l p a rt o f econom ic activ ity. T h e e q u iv a ­ lent labour organisations on the other h a n d n ow h ere in clu d e a

“m ajo rity o f w age-earners, and m ostly in clu d e fa r less. Business associations, in this sense, are m u ch m ore representative th an trade unions.

Secondly, and m ore im p ortan t, business is now h ere as d ivid ed as labour. T h e p o in t has been m ad e before th a t business is neither an econom ic nor an id eo lo gica l m onolith , speaking always or even n o rm ally w ith one single vo ice on all issues. Indeed, its sep arate interests fin d everyw h ere expression in the different national associations w h ich represent different sectors of the ‘ business com m u n ity’ . T h e se divisions, n o ta b ly the division betw een large-scale enterprise a n d m edium or sm all

I business, are b y no m eans n eg lig ib le, either in specific or in general terms. B u t th ey do not p reven t a basic ideological consensus, w hich is o f fu n d am en tal im p ortan ce in the represen­ tation and im p a c t o f business. T h u s the policies ad vo ca ted b y the Diet o f G erm a n In d u stry and C o m m erce m a y w ell be m ore ‘moderate an d lib era l’ th an those o f the F ed eration o f G erm a n Industry;1 and sim ilar shades o f difference m a y also be found

".among nation al business associations in other countries. B ut these differences o b vio u sly o c c u r w ith in a fa irly n a rro w conservative sp ectrum o f a greem en t w h ic h p recludes m ajor

' conflict.' Business, it co u ld be said, is ta c tic a lly d ivid ed b u t strategically cohesive; o ve r m ost o f the larg e r issues o f econom ic policy, and over other large nation al issues as w ell, it m a y be

"expected to presen t a reason ab ly u n ited front. ’ This is ce rtain ly n o t the case for trade union m ovem ents anywhere. Their ou tstan ding ch aracteristic, in fact, is division, not u nity; an d the divisions from w h ic h th ey suffer, far from being tactical an d superficial, are m ore often th an n o t deep and fundamental. " Trade unions h av e o f course alw ays been d ivid ed from ea ch other (and often, indeed, w ith in themselves) in terms o f the particular functions and skills o f their m em bers, sometim es b y

„geography, often b y religious, ethnic o r racia l factors. B ut, whether because o f these factors or for oth er reasons, th ey are

"above all d ivid ed b y id e o lo gy a n d attitud es from each o th er and within themselves.

* B raunthal, The Federation o f German Industry in Politics, p . 27.

In some countries, for instance F ran ce and Italy, uf-!% divisions fin d institution al expression in the existence sep arate, distinct a n d often b itte rly antagonistic federations °IS C om m un ist, social-dem ocratic a n d C h ristian , whose con flitip are a p ro fo u n d ly in h ib itin g facto r in th eir encounter both w it ^ em ployers a n d w ith the state, a n d in their effectiveness pressure groups. N o w h e re does business suffer anythin’̂ rem o tely com p a rab le to these divisions.

M o re o ve r, even in countries w h ere id eological cleavages have- not found in stitution al expression, trade u n ion m ovem ents have = still been sub ject to p rofou n d divisions, w h ich m a y be contained^ w ith in one organisation, b u t w h ich are scarcely less debilitating-?'

T h is, for instance, has a lw ays been the case for the trade?- u n ion m ovem en t in B rita in , w h ere the divisions h ave often been? b ased on fu n ctio n a l differences b etw een the unions, upon which h a v e also, often co in cid en ta lly, been superim posed differences? a n d conflicts b etw een m ore m ilitan t and less m ilitan t unions- a n d this la tte r difference has also regu la rly occurred inside in d iv id u a l unions, w ith a m ore m ilitan t and left-w ing element a t odds w ith a g en e ra lly m ore ‘m o d erate’ and ‘responsible’ lead ersh ip a n d follow in g.

T h is division b etw een leaders a n d m em bers is also one which has not u su a lly affected business associations. T h e basic cause o f th a t division, from w h ich C om m un ist unions h a v e b y no means been im m u n e, lies in th e p ro fo u n d ly am bigu ou s role which" tra d e u n io n leaders tend to assume in cap ita list societies. For on the one h an d , these leaders are exp ected to defend the ‘section al’ interests o f their m em bers w ith the utm ost determina­ tion, b oth against em ployers and, w h ere occasion arises, as it often does, against the state; b u t on the oth er h an d, they are also exp ected b y ‘p u b lic op in ion ’ , and often requ ired by the state, to a c t ‘ responsibly’ , in the ‘n a tion a l interest’ , which; g e n e ra lly m eans th a t th e y should curb and subdue their m em bers’ dem ands rath er th a n defend and a d va n ce them.

T h is is p a rtic u la rly true in re g a rd to strike action . As Dr, V . L . A lle n has noted,

158 The State in Capitalist Society

Strikes take place within a hostile environment even though they,, are a common every-day phenomenon. T h ey are conventionally described as industrially subversive, irresponsible, unfair, against

Im perfect Competition * 5 9

interest o f the community, contrary to the workers' best wrests wasteful o f resources, crudely aggressive, inconsistent w ith democracy and, in any event, unnecessary.1

* t w h a t is im p ortan t a b o u t this is th a t tra d e u n ion leaders, articularly ‘reform ist’ ones, are them selves d e e p ly influenced

these notions. A s D r A lle n also notes,

Union officials are particularly prone to the anti-strike environ- ental influences because they are frequently made out to be oonsible for the behaviour o f their members ... O nce they are

committed to a strike call, union officials tend to become defensive, apologet10 an<* concerned about taking avoiding action. W hen they £0 actually engaged in a strike, they are frequently motivated b y a desire to end it quickly irrespective o f the merits o f the issue.2

T h e s e ‘ environ m en tal influences’ a re indeed form idable. They include not o n ly the mass m ed ia, w h ic h m a y b e relied on, almost unanim ously, to blast the ‘irresponsibility’ o f any m ajor (or even m inor) strike, w h a te v e r th e m erits o f the case, and similarly to condem n those w h o le a d it; th ey also in clu d e the government w h ich m a y e q u a lly be exp ected , w h a te v er its political lab e l, to use e ve ry a v a ila b le m eans o f influence and power at its co m m an d to erode the w ill and purpose o f the strikers, and p a rtic u la rly o f th eir trade u n ion lead ers.3 T h is m a y not always be successful; b u t it is at least alw ays tried.

Nor is it o n ly ‘ en viron m en tal influences’ o f this sort w h ich tend to cause u nion leaders to be c h a ry o f sustained m ilitan t

faction for the ad va n cem en t o f their m em bers’ interests. S u ch ■action is lik ely to in vo lve a serious d rain o f u nion resources. I t is ;also likely to strengthen the h a n d o f m ilita n t elem ents inside th e unions whose c h allen ge to th eir au th o rity tra d e u n ion leaders are naturally con cern ed to resist. M o re o v e r, the fe ar o f failu re, despite g re a t sacrifices, a lw ays looms larg e, a n d is en h an ced b y an unnerving awareness o f th e strength o f the forces a rra y e d

Against lab ou r. A n d w h ile the success o f m ilitan t action m ust ■often depend u p o n the solid a rity a n d sup p ort o f oth er unions, ithis is seldom easy to o b ta in ; even w hen it is o b ta in ed , it is not at all guaranteed to last the necessary length o f time.

V L. A llen, Militant Trade Unionism, 1966, p. 27. 8 Ibid., p . 27. - a;For a n otable re c en t exam ple, in vo lvin g th e L a b o u r govern m en t, see P. Foot, The S ea m en ’s S tru ggle ’, in B lackbu rn an d G ockbu rn (eds.), The Incom-

» S om e o f these weaknesses a re in h e re n t m th e position o f t ^ ! unions in c a p ita list society. B u t in this in stan ce too, structuS constraints m a y be m ore com p ellin g, o r less; a n d this is at I<S in p a rt d eterm in ed b y th e id e o lo g y an d o u tlook w hich ttaj u nion leaders b rin g to th eir task. j g

W ith the ex cep tio n o f F ra n ce a n d I ta ly w h e re the larg§ tra d e u n ion m ovem ents are ru n b y C om m un ists and otl ̂ M a rx is t socialists, th e tra d e u n ion m ovem ents in the countrie o f a d v a n c e d cap ita lism are led a n d d om in a ted b y m en who cal them selves socialists, or social-dem ocrats, o r C h ristian deral crats, or, as in th e case o f the U n ite d States, m ain ly pj^ D em ocrats. T h e s e d ifferen t lab els ob vio u sly betoken substanti- differences in a ttitu d es tow ard s th e cap ita list system. Whet som e tra d e u n ion lead ers, n o ta b ly in the U n ite d States, accgp th a t system as g iv en , a n d d o so v e r y g la d ly , others tend t subscribe to a b e lie f in th e u ltim a te ach ievem en t o f an altogetKe differen t social order. A n d w h ere A m e ric a n tra d e union leadei g e n e ra lly b elieve a n d p ro cla im th a t there exists a fundamenti id e n tity o f interests b etw een ca p ita list m an agem ent an la b o u r ,1 m ost tra d e u n io n leaders in oth er cap ita list count® are on the w h o le less a p t to believe this, o r a t least to prć cla im it.

O n the o th er h a n d , th e p r a c tic a l im p o rta n ce o f the idee lo g ic a l differences b etw ee n A m e ric a n and the vast majority c n on -C om m u n ist tra d e u n ion leaders and officials in othe ca p ita list coun tries c a n easily be e x a g g e r a te d .2 F or whfl A m e r ic a n tra d e u n io n leaders e x p lic itly a c c e p t capitals structures as b e y o n d ch allen ge, th eir coun terparts in oth« coun tries h a v e tend ed, in practice, to a ct on the sam e view , an to treat as irre le v a n t to tra d e u n ion strategy w h a te v e r commi m e n t th ey m a y h a v e to a n oth er social order.

T h is has g re a tly eased the relations o f trade u nion leadei w ith em ployers a n d governm ents an d p ro v id e d a firm basis for

5 T h u s , even a tra d e u nion lead er like W a lth e r R e u th e r, w h o is often thought as bein g to ‘ th e le ft’ o f m ost oth er A m e rican trad e union leaders, is a p t to prodat th at ‘ w e m u st sh ape policies in th e know ledge th at free la b or a n d free manag m en t are less a n tago n istic th an partners, that th ey h a v e m ore in com m on than; conflict. W e need to broaden areas o f u nd erstan din g an d m inim ise areas o f co. flic t’ (Q u o te d in K a r ie l, The Decline o f American Pluralism, p . 63).

2 In d eed, it ca n easily b e exa gg erated , as fa r as th eir trad e union activities a con cern ed, in r e g a rd to m a n y C om m u n ist trade union leaders as w e ll. 1

160 The State in Capitalist Society ĝ§

Im perfect Competition 16 1

ss 0f collab oration betw een th em w h ic h has turn ed these ̂ Hers int0 j uni ° r partners o f cap ita list enterprise. T h a t ocess has n ow assmned a m u ch m ore official ch ara cter th an in

Z past : trade unions are n ow re g u la rly ‘ consulted’ b y th eir = riunents, and th eir representatives are also to b e found in

Various organisms o f the state system . T r a d e u nion leaders h a v e found it e a s y to believe th a t, because th ey h a v e been recognised ^ a necessary elem ent in the op eration o f cap italism , th e y h a v e alš> achieved p a rity w ith business in the determ in atio n o f oiicy. In fact, th eir in corp oration into th e official life o f th eir

countries has m ain ly served to sad dle th em w ith responsibilities ffhich have furth er w eak en ed th e ir b arg a in in g position, a n d

"which has h elp ed to reduce th eir effectiveness.

'-There are, h o w e ve r, oth er a n d m ore specific reasons for dismissing as altogeth er u nrealistic the v ie w o f lab ou r as an interest group com p a rab le in strength to business.

Serious pressure g ro u p a ctiv ity , it is g e n e ra lly a greed, n o w "occurs m uch m ore a t ex ecu tive a n d adm in istrative, rather th a n atlegislative, level. A s th e state has in creasin gly com e to assume ĝreater powers in a ll fields o f econom ic a n d social a ctiv ity, so

"have the m ajo r ‘interests’ in society also n a tu ra lly com e to direct their pressure activities tow ard s g overn m en t a n d

-administration. T h is , as w ill be seen presently, does not m ean that legislatures are o f no consequence in this respect. B u t it does mean th at the m ost sign ificant p a rt o f pressure grou p .activity m ust n ow b ea r on the ex ecu tive p o w e r; it is n o w o n ly the1 weakest groups w h ich seek to w ield influ ence p rim a rily

"through legislatures, precisely because th ey h av e little o r no hold over the execu tive. T h e m ajo r ‘ interests’ use b oth m eans,

: with the grea ter em phasis on the g overn m en t a n d th e adm in i- ' stration. . But as has a lre a d y been a rg u ed a t len gth , business enters this competition on extrem ely fa v o u ra b le terms in com parison w ith

:labour or a n y oth er ‘interest’ . F or businessmen an d th eir -representatives n orm ally h ave a rapport w ith ministers, c iv il servants and oth er m em bers o f the state elite w h ich is v e r y different from th a t o f lab o u r a n d its representatives. G iv e n th e influences w h ich a ffect p o litica l office-holders a n d a d m in i­ strators, a n d w h ic h w ere noted in previous chap ters - social

The State in Capitalist Society

p ro ve n a n ce , personal ties and con n ection s,1 class situation, self interest, id eo lo g ic a l inclin ation s, conceptions o f the ‘national interest’ - business pressure groups m a y reason ab ly expect that th eir view s and dem ands w ill m eet w ith an initial degree o f com, prehen sion , sy m p ath y or a t least respect o f a kind entirely different from th a t a cc o rd e d to th eir la b o u r eq u iva len ts; a n d this is just as lik e ly to be the case w h en ‘left-w in g’ governm ents are in office as w h en la b o u r has to d e a l w ith con servative administration

A n a d d itio n a l a n d im p o rta n t reason for this difference is that la b o u r, as a pressure g rou p , a lw a ys appears as a v e r y m uch more ‘section al’ in terest th a n business. Its dem ands, h ow ever worthy in themselves, are easily c a p a b le o f b e in g construed as detri­ m en ta l to econom ic a n d fin an cia l v ia b ility , as inflationary, as in im ica l to th e efficient con d u ct o f in dustrial or oth er affairs, as dangerous to the m ain ten a n ce o f ‘ confidence’ , n o t least abroad, as certain to im p eril the com petitiveness o f hom e enterprise, as ‘selfish’ or ‘ u nrealistic’ o r ‘unsound’ - in short, as clea rly against the ‘ n a tio n a l interest’ .

T h e dem ands o f business, in contrast, are always claimed to b e in the ‘ n a tion a l interest’ . F o r one th ing, business opposition to la b o u r dem ands w h ic h c a n be, and are, ch aracterised in the: term s ju s t noted is, b y definition, con gru en t w ith th a t interest; F o r anoth er, business dem ands w h ich are designed to strengthen th e position o f in d iv id u a l firm s or o f p a rticu la r industries, or of cap ita list enterprise at larg e , can a lw ays be presented, with a: h ig h degree o f p la u sib ility , g iv en th e cap ita list co n text in which th e y are m ad e, as co n g ru en t w ith the ‘n a tion al interest’ .

T h is m a y not alw ays ach ieve the desired results, and it is ob vio u sly not th e case th a t a ll business pressure is always-' successful a n d lab o u r pressure alw ays in vain . I t is rather that govern m en ts a n d c iv il servants are v e ry lik e ly to feel that in end orsing the form er, th ey are in a ll conscience furthering the ‘ n a tion al interest’ ; and eq u a lly lik e ly to feel th a t this is not the case, or is v e ry m u ch less lik ely to be the case, in relation to lab o u r’ s dem an d s.2

1 O n e Ja p a n e se w rite r recalls the ra th e r ch a rm in g fact th a t ‘sh ortly after he took office late in 1954, P rim e M in ister H a to ya m a Ich iro issued an order to all govern­ m en t agencies forb id d in g c iv il servants to p la y g o lf an d m ahjo ng w ith businessmen (N . Ike, Japanese Politics, 1958, p . 160). F o r th e closeness o f th e relations of civil servants to business in J a p a n , see ibid., pp. i6 t ff .

* A F re n ch w rite r notes, in this connection, th at ‘ top c iv il servants prefer to deal

Im perfect Competition 163

1 ’his likelihood is fu rth er increased b y the v a st resources bich business interests a re a b le to m arsh all in the advance- ent o f their cause. G o ve rn m e n t departm ents a n d regu la to ry

nCies w h ich are concerned w ith m atters a n d policies affecting the m ajor interests a re stron g ly influenced b y the Information a n d evid en ce presented to th em b y these interests,

"and indeed often rely, in the determ in atio n o f th eir policies, u pon it Moreover, th e y are h ig h ly susceptible to th e w eig h t and intensity o f the pressures w h ich interests are able to g en erate,

-prom this p oin t o f view , business is infin itely better p la ce d th an labour, or a n y oth er interest, g iv e n its v a stly superior resources. Moreover, the largest and m ost p ow erfu l firms do not need to tely on a n y interm ediate b o d y to speak to governm ents and present their case on th eir b e h a lf - th ey do so for them selves, with the confidence b o rn o f th eir p ow er. A s Professor M e y n a u d also notes, ‘Siem ens, R h o n e -P o u le n c, M o n tec a tin i, C ou rta u ld s, General M otors, need no in term ed iary to d ea l w ith the au th ori­ ties’.1 But these interm ediaries are a ll the sam e o f no m ean importance in the p resen tation o f in d u stry ’s dem ands, in the pressures th ey a re a b le to gen erate, a n d in the degree to w h ich they are ab le, b y the d ep loym en t o f th eir resources, to h elp shape the official m in d, and also ‘p u b lic op in ion ’ . 2 A s Professor Ehrmann has observed for F ra n ce , ‘the large, w ell-organised economic interests in the n ation , esp ecially w h en they are represented b y com p eten tly staffed p eak associations, such as th e National E m p lo yers’ C o u n c il, a re in alm ost constant consulta­ tion w ith the M in istry ’s ta x section’ (i.e. the M in istry o f

with the top m en o f in du stry an d finance ra th er th an w ith the representatives o f small or m edium enterprises, or v in e or b e e t growers. T o the failin gs o f th e form er, the latter add a com plete lack o f u nd erstan din g o f econom ic life a n d an all too evidently exclusive con cern for th eir p a rtic u la r interests. M oreo ver, the interests

-,iof large em ployers a re in terlin ked w ith the n ation al interest. T h is creates a c o m ­ munity o f lan g u age betw een these em ployers and officials; an d though officials are aware o f a c ertain a m b ig u ity in the situation, th ey ap p recia te the know ledge

slhese men have, a n d th e fa c t th at th ey a re ab le to g iv e to th eir dem ands the polish of general ideas’ (B rin d illac, ‘ Les H au ts Fon ction n aires’, p . 8 7 1).

1 Meynaud, Nouvellts Etudes sur Us Croupes de Pression en France, p. 27. A n A m erican study also notes that am ong the 200 largest m an ufactu rin g concerns in the U n ite d States, ‘W ashington representatives are the ru le rath er th an the exception, p a rticu- larly among com panies m a k in g “ h a rd goods” fo r th e go vern m en t’ ( P .W . Chcrrington a n d R . L . G illen , The Business Representative in Washington, 1962, p . 1 V

a For w hich see ch a p ter 7.

164 The State in Capitalist Society

F in a n c e ).1 N o interest other th an business, anyw here, has the” sam e ease o f access to the m ost im p orta n t organs o f executiv p o w er, and none enjoys the sam e fam ila rity w ith its agents. is a n y oth er interest a b le to w ag e, w h en required, the kind of pressure c am p a ig n w h ic h business interests can Undertake T h u s, the L a b o u r-M a n a g e m e n t R elation s A c t o f 1947, better kn ow n as the T a ft-H a r tle y A c t, w as p rofou ndly detrimental ter A m e ric a n trade union interests, and th ey fough t h ard against it- b u t th eir struggle w as as n o th in g to the cam p a ig n which the N a tio n a l A ssociation o f M anufacturers was able to w age for fo- p rom u lgation . In a different context, it is ve ry difficult to think th a t a n y interest oth er th an business could m uster the kind of resources and sym pathies w h ich w ere m obilised in Britain to p ersu ade the g o vern m en t to establish com m ercial television an d it is e q u a lly difficult to believe th a t a tra d e union, or anjr oth er interest, w o u ld be ab le to com m and the resources requ ired to w ag e for th eir ow n purposes the anti-nationalisation cam p aig n s w h ic h British firms h av e w a g e d a t one time or another since the w a r .3 O n e A m e rica n w rite r has said, in regatd- to the U n ite d States, th a t ‘ the fla w in the plu ralist heaven is that the h e a v e n ly chorus sings w ith a strong upper-class accent' the system is skew ed, load ed and u n b ala n ce d in favour of a fra ctio n o f a m in o rity ’ .4 T h is is also tru e for other capitalist, countries. -, č_/

T h e argu m en t, it m a y be w o rth stressing y et again, is not that this im b a la n c e a u to m a tica lly ensures th a t business interests a lw ays a ch ie ve th eir purposes a n d necessarily impose their w ill u p on the state in regard to th eir e ve ry dem and. N or isitto suggest th a t oth er organised groups o f e v e ry sort h ave not often w a g e d h ig h ly successful cam p aigns, sometimes even against

1 H . W . E h rm an n , ‘F re n ch B u rea u cra cy an d O rgan ised Interests’, in Admms- trative Science Quarterly, 1961, vol. 5, no. 4, p . 541.

1 F o r w h ich see H . H . W ilso n , Pressure Group: The Campaign fo r Commercial T(k- vision in England, i960.

3 See, e .g . H .H . W ilson, ‘ T ech n iq u es o f Pressure’, in The Public Opinion Quarterly,̂ 19 5 1, vol. 15.

1 E .E .S c h a tts ch n e id e r, The Semi-Sovereign People, 1960, p. 31 . Som e thirty years a g o Professor Sch attschn eider m a d e the p o in t in terms w h ich rem ain: singularly a p p o site : ‘ Business m en colle ctive ly constitute the m ost class-conscious group m A m e ric a n society. A s a class th ey are m ore h ig h ly organised, m ore easily mobilised, ha v e m ore facilities for com m u n icatio n , a re m ore like-m in d ed , an d are more accustom ed to stand together in defence o f th eir privileges th an a n y other grou;l_ (E E , Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, 1935, p . 287).

Imperfect Competition

s t r o n g business opposition. H a d business predom in an ce been absolute, it w ou ld b e absurd to speak o f com p etition a t all. jjthere if com p etition, and defeats for p ow erful cap italist i n t e r e s t s as w ell as victories. A fte r all, D a v id did overcom e Goliath. B u t the p o in t o f the story is th a t D a v id was sm aller th an goliath and th a t th e odds were h e a v ily against him . 'T h is im b a la n ce betw een business a n d lab ou r as pressure

groups manifests itself also in the w orkings o f tw o other ele­ ments o f the state system, n a m e ly legislatures and the organs o f sub-central govern m en t, w h ic h m ust n ow b e considered.

I l l

legislative assemblies in ad va n ced cap italist countries now tend to play a subsidiary role in the decision -m akin g process. T h o u g h solemn tributes continu e to be p a id to them as th e u ltim ate repositories o f the ‘p o p u lar w ill’ , governm ents seek increasingly to insulate them selves from effective p a rlia m e n ta ry pressure.

Nevertheless, legislatures do retain a certain degree o f influence; and w h ile m ajor ‘ interests’ n ow tend to consider them as a u x ilia ry instrum ents in the ad van cem en t o f their purposes, th ey still fin d it w o rth w h ile to exert w h a t pressure they can th rough representative assemblies. In this instance too, however, business interests are m u ch b etter p la ced than th eir competitors.

For one thing, it is conservative p arties o f one den om ination or another w h ic h h av e continu ed, th rou gh ou t this century, to Idminate legislative assemblies. T h e r e h a v e been exceptions to this pattern, b ut the general situation has, in sim ple terms of iftajorities, been one o f conservative p redom in an ce. T h e Conservative m ajorities in these assemblies h ave for the m ost part been m ad e u p o f m en d ra w n from the u p p er and m id dle classes; and w h a tev er their social origin, th e m em bers o f these majorities h a v e in a n y case b een strongly disposed to take a favourable view o f capitalist a ctiv ity and a correspondingly unfavourable v ie w o f proposals and p olicies w h ich ap peared to them detrim ental to it. T h e extrem e case is ob viou sly th a t o f the IJnited States, w here m en w ith a strong bias in fav o u r o f p riv a te

enterprise h a v e a lw a ys form ed the overw h elm in g majority the H ouse o f R epresentatives a n d the Senate. A m erican laboiij=! l has alw ays h ad to d ep en d u p o n such legislators as it could enli^R to defend its interests and a d va n ce its claim s, w ith no greaf^ g u a ra n tee th a t these m en could be relied on to be its consistenf'- advocates, le t alone effective ones. B ut even in the legislative"' assemblies o f o th e r countries it is n orm ally interests associated ̂- w ith business and p ro p erty w h ic h h a v e h a d the b ig parlia- - m en ta ry battalions on th eir side.

M o reo ver, it w o u ld not do to forget th a t the parliam entary' groups o f social-dem ocratic parties, like social-democratic-* trade u nion leaders a n d officials, h a v e often acted, a t the behest^ o f their leaders, on a v iew o f the ‘n a tio n a l interest’ which req u ired them , not to advance w ork in g class interests b u t to help " subdue th em . M o st m em bers o f these groups h ave easily sue- - cu m b ed to a p a rlia m e n ta ry em b ra ce w h ich m arked ly affected such p o litical v irility as th e y possessed and caused them to see the w o rld th ro u g h a p a rlia m e n ta ry h aze not at a ll conducive to : the m ilitan t assertion o f a class consciousness w h ic h m any of th em in a n y case n ev e r h ad in the first p la ce . A n d those o f them, w h o did h ave it a n d w h o sought to a ct u p o n it h ave always found th a t th ey h a d to conten d w ith a v a riety o f p rocedural and oth er obstacles p recisely designed to cu rb th a t assertion. Even m ore im p ortan t, th e y h av e also re g u la rly found themselves at odds, often v e ry sh arp ly, w ith th eir p a rlia m e n ta ry and party- leaders a n d w ith th eir ‘lo y a l’ and ‘responsible’ co lleag u es: o f all the forces w h ic h h a v e con tain ed socialist parliam entarians in social-dem ocratic parties, none has been m ore effective than, th eir ow n leaders and fellow p a rliam en ta ria n s,1

F o r th eir p a rt, C o m m u n ist parliam en tarian s, p rotected by a. th ick er id eological c a r a p a c e ,’ h av e been rather less vulnerable to the d e b ilita tin g effects o f w h a t M a rx calle d ‘parliam entary cretinism ’ ; b u t th ey h a v e not b y a n y m eans been im m une to the. disease. I t is not necessarily true th a t ‘ there is m ore in common b etw een tw o parliam en tarian s one o f w h o m is a Communist : th a n betw een tw o Com m unists one o f w h o m is a parliamen­ ta r ia n ’ . N o r is it in e vita b le th a t the p a rlia m en ta ry groups of revo lu tio n a ry parties should assume the characteristics o f their bourgeois counterparts. Y e t, p a rliam en ta ry participation,

1 T h e P arlia m en tary L a b o u r P a rty is a classic exam ple o f this phenomenon.

166 The State in Capitalist Society

Im perfect Competition 167

K ici parties p led ged to re v o lu tio n a ry c h a n g e ca n n o t reason­ ably shun in th e p o litical conditions o f W estern -typ e regim es, does greatly en h an ce op p ortu n istic tendencies, a n d provides jriiich encouragem ent for the v ie w th a t politics is ab ove all a gutter o f p a rlia m en ta ry strategy, tactics a n d m anoeuvre, for the sake o f w h ich m uch in term s o f p rin cip le and purpose m a y be sacrificed.

Conservative m ajorities w o rk to the a d va n tag e o f business and related interests. B u t for m a n y o f th eir purposes, these interests rely not on nu m erical legislative superiority b u t on other favourable factors. : One o f these has to do w ith the im p o rta n t fact th a t p ow erful

aiid established interests often n eed do n o m ore, in order to remain, as it w ere, in possession, th a n to p re ven t the passage o f legislation and the p ro m u lg a tio n o f m easures w h ich adversely affect their p rivileges. A s Professor E hrm an n has noted, ‘ this negative effect o f p a rlia m e n ta ry action is fre q u e n d y a ll th a t matters, since to d efea t co m p etin g claim s is for organised business gen erally m ore decisive th an to secure n e w law s for which there is little need as lon g as business can coun t on a sympathetic adm in istration ’ . 1

Legislative assemblies len d them selves a d m ira b ly to this negative in h ibitin g a n d b lo ck in g p urpose, w h ich a n A m e ric a n writer has ch aracterised in an a p t p h rase as ‘p o licy-m a k in g b y default’ . 2 T h e H ouse o f L ords, in th e days w h en it enjoyed substantial pow ers, fulfilled this role to perfection, a n d its history has in fact been a sag a o f struggle against the erosion of privilege o f every kind. T h e U n ite d S tates S en ate is a n oth er body exception ally w e ll a d a p te d to w a g e this struggle. ‘ E ven one senator’ , one w rite r notes, ‘c a n m ake a nuisance o f h im ­ self; a h andful o f them in a w reck in g m ood c a n b rin g the executive b ran ch in to a co w e rin g state o f con tem p tible paralysis.’ 3 T h is is perhaps a little strong and tends to u n d er­ estimate the m eans o f pressure u pon re ca lcitra n t legislators

1 Ehrm ann, Organised Business in France, p . 218. ; 1 Blaisdell, American Democracy Under Pressure, p . 39. Professor Blaisdell also notes that ‘ the failu re o f Congress to d e a l resolutely w ith the issues involved in the control o f p ro perty th rough th e corporate form o f business organisation amounts to a tacit acceptan ce o f the situation as in th e p u b lic interest’ {ibid., p . 39).

* V . O . K e y , Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 1958, p . 4 7 6 ..

168 The State in Capitalist Society

w h ic h the ex ecu tive b ra n ch its e lf possesses, i f it is minded to use them , w h ich is a d m itted ly a large qualification. The im p o rta n t point, h ow ever, is th a t the ‘w reck in g mood* of senators o r o f m em bers o f the H ouse o f R epresentatives is most lik e ly to b e d irected against m easures o f w h ich the ‘business co m m u n ity ’ also disapproves, in clu d in g m a n y measures 0f w elfare w h ich m a y a ffect p ro p e rty rights and w h ich can con« ven ien tly be d en oun ced as ‘creep in g socialism ’ , or some such.V

S im ilarly, it is no sm all a d va n tag e to G erm a n business interests to h av e as ch a irm a n o f a n im p orta n t financial sub- - com m ittee o f the B un destag a m an w h o ‘ fran k ly asserted that he h im se lf w o u ld fav o u r no b ill th a t w as regard ed b y important segm ents o f indu stry as too h ea v y a b u rd en ’ . 2 I t is not very, lik e ly th a t a n y other g rou p in G e rm a n society could find so staun ch and ex p licit a defend er o f its interests in a position of eq u iva len t p o w e r .3

T h is kind o f pro-business bias, w h ic h is encountered in all the legislatures o f the cap italist w o rld , stems in p a rt from the unprompted inclinations o f legislators. A s in the case o f govern­ m ents and civ il servants, it w ou ld be n a ive to think th a t mem­ bers o f legislatures a re the u n w illin g instrum ents o f powerful business and oth er p ro p ertied interests. I f th ey defend these interests, it is because th ey fin d it easy to eq u a te th a t defence w ith the ‘ nation al interest’ .

1 A t the end o f 1967, the W ashin gton correspondant o f The Times was moved to w rite th at ‘ the fa c t th at there are some 35 m illion poo r p eop le in this, the richest cou n try in history, is sufficient evidence o f the m iddle-class interests o f Congress ' and its devotion to business needs . . A m edical rep ort o f th e southern regional c o u n c il spoke o f child ren lu ck y to e a t on e m eal a d a y , o f child ren afflicted with ch ro n ic d iarrh o ea, chron ic sores a n d deform ities, an d o f shacks w ithout running w a te r o r electricity.

M a n y fam ilies have a d ie t o f co m m ea l, flour, rice a n d non-fat dried milk. In C alifo rn ia, th e richest state in the union, m ig ra n t workers earn as little as S i,000 (ju st over £400) a«year. T h e se are the so-called “ invisible p o o r” , an d to these m a te ria l w ants m ust be added th e oppression o f Negroes, an d unpunished violence j a n d m urder. T h is is an old story for the U n ite d States, b u t W atts, N ew ark and - D etro it are om inous w arnings th at the p o o r are no longer invisible or quiescent; Y e t Congress m an aged to spend 340 days in session d o in g re m arkably little about it ’ (‘ C lo u d C u c k o o L a n d o f A m e rican Congress’, The Times ig D ecem b er 1967).,

2 B rau n thal, The Federation o f German Industry in Politics,-p. 172. ® Professor B rau n th al also notes th a t ‘ the B D I [Bundssverband der Deutseken ;

Industrie] is p rim a rily interested in th e w o rk o f th e E co no m ic A ffairs, Foreign Trade-,- an d F in an ce C om m ittee [ o f the B undestag]. B y an d large, it has been successful in “ colonising” these com m ittees w ith chairm en an d m em bers w ho tend to be. responsive to its aim s’ (ibid., p . 169).

Imperfect Competition

On the other h an d , pressure helps a n d m a y often be requ ired , < regard to specific policies and dem ands.

That pressure m a y b e v e r y diffuse. O n e A m e rica n stu d y notes that ‘most lobbyists b elieve th a t th e best argu m en t for jjjost senators m ost o f the tim e is a d v a n ta g e to the senator’s state’ .1 B ut it is also v e r y lik ely th at a S en a to r w ill believe th a t measures w hich are o f a d v a n ta g e to business a n d w hich are

ressed for b y business interests w ill be o f a d va n tag e to his state; £nd he w ill find fa r few er reasons for th in kin g so in regard to m e a s u r e s w hich are o f a d v a n ta g e to, a n d ad vo ca ted b y, lab o u r.

However, a person al elem ent also enters. F o r the sam e Senator also know s th a t election cam p aig n s are expensive: ‘... perhaps the “ n o rm al” expenditures, to strike a ro u g h average o f the v a ry in g reports o f experts, is in the n eigh bou r­ hood o f $500,000 a n d closely contested battles in larg e tw o party states often cost over a m illion d ollars’ . 2 T h e sam e w riter jdds that ‘ the b ulk o f his c a m p a ig n fund ... is lik ely to be m ad e up of a few large contributions from in divid uals and groups w ith a vital interest in his b e h a v io u r in office’ . 3 T h ese contributions will obviously m ain ly com e from business a n d w ill at least m ak e tiieir recipients attentive to the requirem ents o f the contributors.

But even w h e re the relationship betw een pressure a n d parliamentary b e h av io u r is not q u ite so obvious, business and pther p ropertied interests h av e im m easu rab ly gre a te r resources than any oth er interest to shape the legislative m in d and w ill, and to influence the legislative process. T h e pressure m a y be direct and personal, a n d take a m u ltitu d e o f fo rm s; o r it m a y be exercised v ia ‘p u b lic o p in io n ’ , b y m eans o f ‘grassroots’ cam ­ paigns, w h ich are vastly expensive, and w h ic h on this and other "grounds (for instance the con trol o f mass m edia) business interests are far b etter p la ced to u n d ertake e ffectively th an anyone else. M r R o w e n , for the U n ite d States, notes in regard to President K e n n e d y ’s ta x reform proposals in 19 6 1, p a rticu ­ larly the proposal for ta x w ith h o ld in g on d ivid en d a n d interest income, th a t ‘a lth ou gh the W a y s a n d M eans C o m m itte e approved w ith h old in g, the m a il c a m p a ig n inspired b y business­ men, bankers, an d savings and lo an associations, u ltim ately defeated the proposal. C ongress’ s suscep tibility to this kind o f

1 D , R . M atth ew s, U.S. Senators and Their World, i960, p . 182. t 2 Ibid., p . 72. 3 Ibid.

■ ' I P pressure is a sad com m en tary on th e A m e ric a n l e g i s l ^ S j process.’ 1 Su ch cam paigns m a y not alw ays succeed; and o tl^ J ' interests are often able to exercise considerable pressure u p6|§ legislatures. B u t th e fa c t rem ains th a t business groups aj|3> in fin itely b etter eq u ip p ed th an other econ om ic groups 'tS $ exercise effective pressure upon these bodies. ''ffil.

Professor A lm o n d has w ritten th a t w h a t is ‘striking’ about ... the structure o f business influence in German politics aii(£J

government is not the mere [!] fact that the business community^ has a degree o f influence disproportionate to its size. This is a p a ttff2 which is familiar in the United States, England, and indeed in any countrf j with a capitalist economy and a democratic government. W hat is unusnklž- in the German pattern, as compared to the American, is direct and massive involvement o f business pressure-groups hv-r representation in the Bundestag and in the financing o f the parties/ f B y virtue o f their penetration o f the middle-class parties and their'- delegations in the Bundestag, these pressure group organisations - acquire a crucial political importance, influencing in importanh- ways both the spirit and content of German politics.2 . ' "1 T h is is a curious em phasis. F o r w h a t is r e a lly striking is pxt~ \ cisely w h a t Professor A lm o n d dismisses so casu ally as a ‘mere! i fact, n a m e ly the ‘disp rop ortion ate’ influ ence w hich the'" ‘ business c o m m u n ity ’ exercises u p o n the p a rliam en ta ry assem-i- blies o f a d va n ced ca p ita list coun tries: the forms this assumes are-.- no d o u b t m atters o f g en u in e im p o rta n ce; b ut, it m ight be th ough t, ra th er less so th a n the fa c t o f p redom in an ce, however.-’, ach ieved.

W h a t th a t fa c t indicates is th a t the legislative elem ent o f the state system, lik e a ll the oth er elements w h ic h h ave been, considered p reviously, has n o rm ally rem ained, notwithstanding ■ u niversal suffrage and com p etitive politics, m u ch m ore thVN instrum ent o f the d o m in a n t classes th an o f the subordinate ones, even th ou gh i t is n ow rath er less e xclu sively th eir instru­ m ent th a n in form er days. L egislatures m a y h elp to attenuate

1 R o w e n , The Free Enterprisers, p. 54. 2 G . A . A lm o n d , ‘ T h e Politics o f G erm an Business’, in H .S p e ie r and W .P.’

D avid son (eds.), West German Leadership andForeign Policy, 1957, p . 2 1 1 (my italics).-; N o te also, in confirm ation o f this p a ttern , th at in 1958, 52 p e r cen t o f the Liberal- D e m o c ra tic P a r t y ’s m em bers o f the Japanese D ie t h a d associations o f one kind or % oth er w ith business ( R ,A .S c a la p in o an d J .M a s u m i, Parties and Politics in Cons'̂ temporary Japan, 196a, p . 63).

1 70 The State in Capitalist Society ^siPI

Im perfect Competition 1 7 1

j|j6 pattern o f class d om in a tio n ; b u t th ey also rem ain one o f

its means.

I V

Tust as legislative assemblies h a v e lost p o w er to the executive, so Jave local a n d region al units o f govern m en t in a d va n ced capitalist countries becom e ever m ore m arked ly dep en dent on central pow er a n d sub ordin ate to it. E v e n in the U n ited States, ^itb its pow erful tra d itio n o f decentralised pow er, w h a t H aro ld ĵ aski called in 1940 the ‘ obsolescence o f federalism ’ h a d steadily increased in the su cceed in g years.

y e t w hile the tren d tow ard s the nationalisation o f p u b lic power has been v e ry m arked , th e process is v e ry fa r from com ­ plete N ot o n ly h av e lo c a l a n d region al units o f go vern m en t retained m an y pow ers as agents o f the cen tre; in m a n y cases they have also, even th o u g h co n tin g en d y, retain ed a substantial degree o f indep en dent in itia tiv e a n d decision, m ost ob viou sly in the United States. E v e n as agents o f the cen tral governm ent, these units often h av e h a d a certain a m o u n t o f freedom as to the manner in w h ich th e y h a v e d isch arge d th eir functions, and this Bas been o f considerable im p o rta n ce to those w h o h a v e com e tinder their au th ority.

These are reasons en o u g h for a b r ie f consideration o f the character and distribu tion o f sub -cen tral p ow er in a d van ced capitalist societies, p a rtic u la rly in th e U n ite d States, w here inuch o f plu ralist th eo ry has used ‘lo c a l co m m u n ity p ow er’ as its context a n d sought to re b u t ‘ ru lin g class’ and ‘p ow er elite’ concepts b y reference to i t . 1

The main lines o f th e p lu ralist a rg u m en t in regard to ‘lo ca l community p o w e r’ a re essentially sim ilar to those em ployed for the more gen eral conten tion th a t p ow er in the U n ited States is 'dispersed, n o t con cen trated, d em o cra tic and not plu to- oligarchic.

The claim, it must be noted, is not that ‘ everybody’ in local

1 For a b ib liog rap h y o f relevan t m a te ria l up to 1962, see C . Press, Main Street Politics: Polity Making at the Local Level, 1962; for m o re recent references, see, eg. A. Rose, The Pouter Structure. Political Process in American Society, 1966,