Chapter 6

Migration: People on the Move

> The changes in migration patterns are not merely matters of individual choice but rather reveal structural factors beyond the control of individuals.
>
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> Thus, in the United States as well as in Mexico, the place of putative community—whether regional or national—is becoming little more than a site in which transnationally organized circuits of capital, labor, and communications intersect with one another and with local ways of life.
>
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There is nothing new about long-term, long-distance migration. At the turn of the 21st century, an estimated 100 million people live outside of their countries of original citizenship.[3] While this figure is impressive, it is less than 2% of the world's population, which means that, at any given time, 98% are staying home, or at least within their own national borders (Hammar and Tamas 1997: 1). Percentage-wise this is not historically unusual, nor is it exceptionally significant in regard to world structural change. Archeologists tell us that our prehistoric ancestors migrated out of Africa, spreading through Asia and Europe, crossing oceans to the Americas and Australia. History is replete with mass movements, often based in military action, such as Alexander's conquests, Rome's policy of colonization, the spread of Islam, and the migratory conquests of Genghis Khan and his followers. After 1500, with the Industrial Revolution and the emer-

gence of Europe as a world colonizing power, we see a relatively different emphasis of mass migration, based more on labor needs than on conquest. As many as 8 million slaves were transported from Africa to the New World and to Southeast Asia, decimating entire regions and plunging tribes and kingdoms into war. Between 1815 and 1914 alone, mass migrations included 60 million Europeans, 10 million Russians, 12 million Chinese, and a million and a half Indians (Mittelman 2000: 59). The United States is, of course, largely an immigrant nation, with more than 20 million legal migrants entering the country between 1900 and 1930 alone (Staring 2000: 204). Although impressive in sheer numbers, migration today does not usually involve the great structural changes of past diasporas: the settlement of continents, the decimation of whole populations through the spread of disease, such as was the case with Native Americans, or the depopulation of entire regions as with African slavery and the Irish potato famine. We need to keep this in mind when postulating migration as a key aspect of globalization.

This said, 100 million people is a lot, and that figure does not include the even greater numbers of migrants who travel within state borders. Displacements caused by World War II and its ripple effects were as large as the greatest migrations of the past, and migration has continued at a high rate. It is a truism that transnational migration today, like internal migration, follows patterns of unequal development, as people move in search of economic betterment. This truism, however, can be easily overstated; employment is *one* of many factors involved (Wilson 1994). We must also consider differences in fertility patterns, mortality rates, living conditions in different countries, age structure, and networks that extend from country to country (Castles 2000: 46). If movement from developed to underdeveloped were the primary variable, then we would expect First World countries to be more inundated than they are. On the receiving end, state policy and public attitudes play a significant role; Western Europe relied heavily on foreign labor in the three decades following World War II, but reaction against migrants set in by the mid-1970s with the result that highly restrictive laws closed the borders. This did not stop undocumented aliens from entering Europe any more than similar policies in the United States stopped Mexican *braceros*; indeed, illegal migration may have more than made up for the clampdown on legal immigration. The total volume of South to North migration has increased since 1965 at a rate of 2% per year (Vertovec and Cohen 1999: xiv–xv).

Nevertheless, most international First World migration is from one developed country to another, and by far most Third World migrants travel *within* the Third World. For example, more than 90% of South Asian mi-

grants travel to oil-producing nations, mainly in the Middle East, that actively recruit labor (Hammar and Tamas 1997: 3, 6). The country with the highest percentage of international migrants is the United Arab Emirates, with more than 90%, followed by Kuwait with more than 70% (UNDESIPA 2001). Overall, the greatest number of cross-border migrants, about 35 million at the turn of the 21st century, is in subsaharan Africa. About 20% of the world's migrants are involuntary, having been displaced by war, famine, or other disasters (Mittelman 2000: 59; Castles 1998: 180).

MIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION

Migrations in the current age of globalization exhibit different patterns from earlier migrations. For one thing, there seems to be a much greater diversification of types, motives, and networks. Often the same individual will shift from one type of migration to another over a single lifetime or even within a few years (Shuval 2000: 45). To some extent, migration today is more extensive and less intensive—that is, while routine distances may often be longer, proportionally the numbers of people involved in South to North migration, especially legal migration, may be fewer than at times in the past; in the United States, for example, migrants accounted for 15% of the total population in the early part of the 20th century, but only 10% today (Staring 2000: 204–205).[4] Although illegals continue to flow across porous borders in great numbers, with less need for what might be called railroad labor, the United States, Europe, Australia, and Japan have turned to encouraging elite migration, seeking highly educated people with specialized high-tech skills. Meanwhile, illegal migration tends to be focused either on seasonal agriculture or on the informal sector in cities: gypsy cab drivers, maids, nannies, prostitutes. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting loosening of constraints on travel brought 450 million potential migrants into the global pool, while at the same time creating a number of new ethnically ambiguous states that encourage movement in or out on the basis of religious or nationalist aspirations. As the Southeast Asian "tiger" countries approach full employment, there are new demands for imported factory labor at the same time that specialized workers may need to seek jobs outside, thus resulting in extremely complex migration patterns throughout the region (Van Hear 1998: 2–3, 24–37).

The time it takes to get from one place to another, especially over long distances, has decreased enormously during the last century, or even half century, with a concomitant reduction in cost. Combined with cheap and instantaneous global communications, this suggests a major change in the nature of elite migration, which may no longer be felt by the migrant as

between two vastly distant poles but as a continuum separated only by quick access to e-mail or a few hours on a jet plane. The huge growth in multinational corporations has created the need for a new breed of deterritorialized transient executive or highly specialized labor migrant that travels from country to country, from Singapore to New York or from Johannesburg to Moscow, as a routine part of the business week. A key aspect of postfordism within the First World has been the shift of factory production to a handful of Newly Developing Countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, and South Korea, with resulting internal migrations to urban centers and free-trade zones; this has several effects, such as bringing great numbers of women into the migration stream and reducing factory labor as a motive for South-to-North migration. Although well-paying industrial jobs are limited in the Third World, their very existence, along with advertising, modern shopping centers laden with purchasable goods, and word-of-mouth from friends and relatives abroad, has raised consumption standards and life expectations, increasing the draw of migration to more developed regions (Portes 2000).

Despite all this rushing about, the vast majority of people stay home. This simple fact, sometimes referred to as the immobility paradox, contradicts purely economic theories. Most people do *not* take advantage of migration possibilities even when these might appear from an outsider's standpoint to be indisputably beneficial. Indeed, migration patterns seldom conform to what might be predicted from an economic Rational Man model of decision making. Although an abstraction, Rational Man is an individual, but, as we will see, individuals do not normally make migration decisions. As much as statisticians would like a simple or predictable relationship between poverty and migration, no such relationship exists (except, perhaps, that the poorest are often the *least* likely to migrate). Another economic assumption has been that economic development that provides increased opportunities should reduce out-migration; mostly it does not (it may increase it). Finally, if purely economic motives stimulated migration, countries at the same economic level should have similar rates of emigration and immigration; actually, rates vary markedly among countries at the same economic levels (Malmberg 1997; Bjerén 1997).

Benefits and Deficits

Promoters of neoliberal globalization as an ideology point to the numerous benefits of migration: a flexible global job market that provides opportunities outside the country of origin, repatriated wages that can become a substantial part of a poor country's national income, realignment of popula-

tions with a concomitant reduction of economic and ecological pressures, and the transfer of skills from more developed to less developed regions (World Bank 2000). The economic assumption of comparative advantage underlies population equilibrium theories that hold that labor moves from regions that lack capital but have large labor forces to more developed regions that need labor.

While such benefits are real, the overall picture is more bleak, as economic and other developmental inequalities between rich and poor countries continue to widen at a rapid pace (World Bank 2001b: 51). Despite antimigrant prejudices and policies, wealthy countries profit greatly from the existence of a "disposable labor force" (Mittelman 2000: 67) that can be hired or fired at will, that will work for minimum wages, and that need not receive pensions or health insurance or, on the state's part, education or social security. When nearly all of the costs of reproduction of the labor force are borne by the home country, remittances may cover only a fraction of actual expense (Lawrence 2000). In the United States, undocumented immigrants are excluded from welfare or educational benefits and may be effectively confined to ghetto enclaves, a situation that is also true in some countries of Europe for legal migrants. A third of all immigrants in Western Europe are Muslim, which has given rise to fears of Islamic resurgence in some countries resulting in increasingly frequent attacks by skinheads and others seeking an outlet for frustrations (Mittelman 2000: 71). Immigrants, wherever, often suffer high levels of poverty, maltreatment, instability, insecurity, and stress.

Given the realities of unemployment and underemployment in the Third World, such considerations may seem academic to the migrant himself and to the authorities in the sending country. In the 1980s, a Thai migrant could earn abroad almost five times what he could earn in Thailand; by traveling to the Middle East, Filipinos could earn six times what they could in the Philippines, and Sri Lankans could bring in anywhere from five to fifteen times home country wages (Stahl and Arnold 1986: 900). Remittances are often considerable: In 1992, wages returned to Pakistan totaled U.S. $1.5 billion (down from almost $3 billion in 1973), about 3% of the country's total gross domestic product (World Bank 2001a). In 2000, $6 billion was returned to Mexico by migrants, placing remittances in the top four sources of national income (World News 2001). However, such remittances are usually spent on family needs and consumer purchases, with relatively little investment that would promote national development; studies in Pakistan showed that 62% was spent on consumption, 22% on real estate, and only 13% on investment, mostly in savings and local commercial activities (Stahl and Arnold 1986).

First World policies that encourage elite immigration contribute to a severe problem of brain drain, which has had a devastating effect on development in many poor countries, such as India or Indonesia, where not only are the talents of the best and brightest lost to the United States and Europe, but the quite considerable costs of upbringing and education are borne by the natal country. On the receiving end, migrants from developing countries help fill professional vacancies, often resulting in greater racial and ethnic disharmony. Although women also enter the transnational migration stream, comprising the larger percentage in certain regions such as the Caribbean, men are still predominant overall. In areas of Africa and Asia, male populations in some regions have been decimated, leaving wives in dependency status on their husbands' relatives; in India, symptoms of this "Dubai syndrome" include headaches, sleeplessness, seizures, and chest pains (Mittelman 2000: 66).

Classifying and Analyzing Migration

Migration tends to be so complex—individually, structurally, socially, politically—that generalizations must be tentative. However, it is possible to examine mass migrations within a common conceptual framework by examining: *extensity* (how far?), *intensity* (how many?), *velocity* (how long to get from place to place and how long the stay?), *impact* on both host and sending countries, *infrastructures* of transportation and communication, and *institutions* that direct and maintain labor markets and migratory flows (Held, et al. 1999: 283). *Social class* needs also to be considered (who goes?—the poor and uneducated or the elite?).

Another method of analysis focuses more on the causal, motivational aspects of migration. First, what are the *root causes?*—that is, the underlying factors such as a long history of colonial, postcolonial ties between certain countries or close contiguity between countries of unequal development such as Mexico and the United States or Turkey and Germany. Second, what are the *proximate causes?*—perhaps an economic downturn, ecological devastation, or long-term political turmoil. Third, we need to consider immediate *precipitating causes*, such as the loss of a job, having a family farm taken over by an agribusiness, warfare, or flood. Finally, *intervening factors* that constrain, facilitate, or accelerate migration must be specified—migration networks, available transportation, supportive organizations, and the like (Van Hear 1998).

Often such causes and factors are difficult to separate out; generally migration involves long-standing links stemming from colonization, trade, cultural ties, or established networks. It has become a commonplace that

households, not individuals, make migration decisions, but this has come under fire as ethnocentric, essentializing a cross-cultural concept of household. Actually, each culture has its own norm of household composition, and this norm may or may not concord with reality (in the United States, for example, the cultural norm is the two-parent household, but the reality is a multiplicity of forms). Also, not only the household but the wider kinship group and community may be involved (Bjerén 1997: 223). What seems clear is that migration is seldom the decision of the individual alone. Sometimes, out of years or even generations of such group decisions, a culture of immigration emerges in which such travel is normal and expected, so seeking out immediate precipitating factors may be difficult or futile (Castles 2000: 46).

Any attempt to classify migration runs into many types and subtypes, all with multiple exceptions and much overlap (Table 6.1). The apparently obvious classification into global, regional, and transnational is a case in point. While it is possible to easily differentiate internal (within border) migration from transnational (cross-border) migration, what might be the criteria for distinguishing a global migration from a transnational or regional one? The motivating forces for travel, such as employment, can be the same whether one is traveling from Yemen to Kuwait or from Thailand to the United States; both might take about the same amount of time, and both might involve similar networks. Money-costs, relative to the migrant's income, may not be that different for a peasant moving from one African nation to an adjacent country versus a professional engineer flying from Singapore to England. Nor, within a globalized economy, is it easy to disengage global forces from transnational forces. It is often possible to differentiate migration types by motivation: forced, voluntary, political, social, or economic. However, motivations are seldom only those of the individual migrant and are usually multiple and complex.

Mobility patterns do offer the possibility of classification if we follow the migrant over a long enough period of time (Malmberg 1997). We can differentiate permanent international migration from temporary migration and short-term migration from long-term, but it would be necessary to divide each into multiple subtypes. Permanent migration might involve never returning to the home country, or it might involve often returning and maintaining strong family and friendship networks in the old country. Temporary migration might be a once-in-a-lifetime thing, or it might be a yearly routine. *Step-migration*, in which either the individual or a kin network migrates in increments, stopping for years at each place, may ultimately become permanent migration. *Migratory chains*, or "network-mediated chain migrations," occur when someone opens a path of internal

Table 6.1
A Brief Glossary of Migration

Term	Definition
Internal Migrant	One who travels, usually for employment and often from rural to urban areas, for long periods within the country of citizenship.
International Migrant	A person who leaves his country of citizenship, often multiple times and to different countries, and returns without making a significant long-term social investment in the country or countries of destination.
Immigrant	One who leaves his country of citizenship to live permanently, or for a long term, in another country. Refers to the country of settlement. ("Emigrant" suggests the point of view of the home country.)
Transnational Immigrant	One who maintains multiple contacts—social, cultural, political, economic—with both the country of origin and the host country. This may involve the constant construction and reconstruction of a "nation" or diaspora community that transcends borders.
Diaspora	Dispersal from a homeland to multiple countries. Often implies forced dispersal. Sometimes extended to include groups from general regions, rather than a specific location, such as the African diaspora or the Caribbean diaspora. Usually suggests some sort of emotional relation to the homeland.
Refugee	One who is forcibly dispersed through war or political repression, and, by extension, famine, earthquake, etc. A refugee may be "internal" (within the country) or international.
Step-migration	When a community or kin group migrates in stages, usually from rural to urban, with individuals from each generation moving farther from the place of origin and establishing network links to the new location.
Migratory Chain	The formation of a complex network as individuals constantly carry the network forward, often to multiple locations, so that any migrant can follow the network at different times and to different end points.
Circular Migration	Migration away from and back to the home community. Often quite routinized, as in some forms of agricultural labor migration.

or cross-border migration that will be followed by other family, community, or tribal members, creating a network that increases in complexity over time. Typically, these start with an individual; in some countries military recruitment or conscription will take a young man away from a traditional community, and when he settles elsewhere he will provide the first link. As later migrants follow, the chain will evolve into a network, perhaps with multiple end points, and become self-sustaining. This may ultimately result in a "culture of migration," in which travel is expected as a rite of passage for young men or women. Such a culture may create a virtual "migration industry" of smugglers, agents, organizations, and lawyers (Castles 2000: 46; Wilson 1994).

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF MIGRATION

Migration was not a major area of research for anthropology until the late 1950s, when the conscripted, tightly bounded tribes, communities, and cultures described by structural-functionalists began to give way to more fluid conceptions. Early studies tended to focus on the movement of peasants into cities, creating a model of stage migration, in which each generation would move to a more populous area, ultimately ending up in big city shantytowns. This work, focusing on adaptive strategies, classified different types of migration and laid the groundwork for emphasizing social networks rather than individuals.[5] It was only from the early 1980s that international migration began to assume a dominant place in anthropology. However, as Gunilla Bjerén (1997: 220) observes, the "contentious, fragmented, and contradictory character of development and the dependence of migration on it are partial reasons why anthropology offers no grand theories of migration and development, despite the large number of empirical studies focusing on migration and development in the discipline."

Studies of migration might be classified roughly as classic, modern, and emergent. During anthropology's *classic* period, through the 1960s, the dominant models of migration were largely based on push and pull factors that either drove rural peoples out of the countryside or attracted them to cities. Once in the city or in another country, migrants would assimilate into the dominant culture, perhaps over a generation or two. The *modern* period is characterized by neo-Marxist models that focus on structural inequalities that siphon people from less developed to more developed regions in search of jobs. The recent period may be characterized as still *emergent:* Models focus less on general theories and more on the specifics of particular migrations. Migration is viewed as extremely complex, as are the motives and experiences of those who move. In contrast to "assimilation" and

"cost-benefit," the new vocabulary of migration is one of transnationalism, diaspora, multiculturalism, citizenship acquisition, social movements, and refugees (Heisler 1992).

Since the earliest studies, anthropological approaches to migration have been closely tied to economic development theory, because, almost invariably, movement was from a less to a more developed region. Because urban areas are the focal points of development, much of internal migration theory was tied to the rural base at one end and the city at the other. Anthropological research on international migration tended to follow the same underdeveloped-to-developed trajectory, but not necessarily with the urban focus, as in the much-studied Mexican migration of agricultural workers to the United States.[6]

Migration and Modernization Theory

As interpreted by Michael Kearney (1986), migration theory in anthropology has accompanied development theory through three key phases: modernization, dependency, and articulation. As we have seen in Chapter 3, modernization theory, which was closely conjoined to the structural functionalism that dominated anthropology until the mid-1960s, was based on a dualist model that contrasted traditional and modern and maintained the belief in a unilineal evolution toward a better world through industrialization, technological development, education, entrepreneurial values, and democracy. Migration would accelerate these beneficial processes as rural people, already enmeshed in what Robert Redfield (1941) termed a folk-urban continuum, moved to the cities where their repatriated wages would be used for development of the countryside. They would assimilate modern values: individualism, the desire for education, entrepreneurialism, and a taste for innovation and change. Returning migrants would bring these values back to the rural areas, along with their savings, thus breaking down the stultifying fatalistic traditionalism that kept peasants mired in their primitive ways. The flow of modernization was one-way, from urban to rural. Implicit in the modernization paradigm is an economistic Rational Man model, with its emphasis on individuals calculating the costs and benefits of various options. Motives for migration were reduced to pull and push factors: the enticements of urban jobs and bright lights versus rural overpopulation, land scarcity, and unemployment.

Unfortunately for the theory, already by the mid-1960s it was becoming evident that moving to the cities did not necessarily lead to the psychological transformation of the migrant, and it certainly did not result in development of the hinterland. "Peasants in cities" became a more or less perm-

anent status as migrants were marginalized, isolated from the modern sector within slums, shantytowns, and self-contained informal economies. Decision making turned out to be made by families and kin networks, not individuals, and external constraints often were so limiting that actions might be funneled in a single or just a few directions. For example, for the large majority of Aymara Indians of highland Peru, who lived almost entirely on subsistence agriculture until after midcentury, about the only truly accessible avenue of entrance into the money economy was through seasonal migrant labor in the commercial rice fields hundreds of miles away on the coast (Lewellen 1978). Whether in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, particular communities tended to migrate to particular sites and participate in particular occupations, even when economically preferential options might appear to be available. Social and cultural strictures—such as gender roles, kin and friendship relations, and concepts of appropriate work—played a larger part than individual decision making in determining who would leave and where they would go. The individualist approach, with its focus on psychological factors, simply did not work at the level of general theory.

Migration and Dependency Theory

Dependency theory brought a new and virtually opposite orientation to the study of migrants. Andre Gunder Frank (1967) and others reversed the focus of interest from development to *under*development, the latter conceived not as some primal condition to be outgrown by modernization, but as something created and maintained by the processes of modernization. The modern/traditional, urban/rural dichotomies were replaced by a unified system of domination and dependency. Far from migration diffusing modernization from the cities to the countryside, the new theorists saw the hinterland as being drained of its labor and raw materials through the process of internal colonialism. What the rural areas received was just enough to reproduce and exacerbate conditions of poverty that would maintain a sufficient supply of surplus labor to hold down urban wages.

Early, purely structural versions of dependency theory came to incorporate historical depth, relating dependency to core/periphery relationships established over hundreds of years of colonialism and imperialism (Brettell 2000: 103–104). The level of analysis was radically elevated from the individual or household to the state or international system. The state might be considered an appropriate level of analysis, since states contained comprador elites, such as European-educated managers of local subsidiaries of multinational corporations, that represented the core within the peripheral country. However, dependency theory was most comfortable analyzing

terms of trade, the spin-off effects of industrial versus primary production, and other relationships among core and periphery nations. This was a major problem for anthropologists who got little help at the community level from such a bird's-eye perspective. The anthropologist living for a year or two in a market town or a peasant community might be sympathetic to dependency theory, but would see little of it in day-to-day activities. Just as satellite photography may not be the appropriate tool for gathering data on the ratio of corn to beans sold by market women, so dependency theory did not provide much of practical use to the anthropological field-worker. The situation was hardly helped by the next stage in the evolution of theory, namely Wallerstein's world systems theory, which raised the level of analysis to a single *world* division of labor. Dependency and world systems theories had the effect of robbing anthropologists of their previous certainties without replacing them with much of value that was directly usable, except perhaps the negative value that individualistic, dichotomistic approaches were not viable.

Migration and Articulation Theory

The major postdependency migration-and-development perspective would be articulation theory (Kearney 1986: 341–345). Originally formulated by Marxist anthropologists in the early 1980s, this perspective starts with the recognition that precapitalist or simply noncapitalist modes of production continue to exist alongside capitalism. While global capitalism necessarily impinges on these alternative systems, forcing them to alter their structures and make multiple accommodations in unpredictable directions, they do not necessarily become capitalist; in fact, such systems may even be strengthened. Influence is not one-way; local systems must, of course, bear the brunt of whatever adaptation is necessary or desirable, but at the same time capitalism must also make adjustments. It is this articulation between the two systems—say, between capitalism and traditional African economies (Meillassoux 1981) or Chinese communism (Li 1996)—that provides the analytical focus of this perspective. In describing how the two systems communicate and interact, articulationists must define the relationships between various elements of the migrant system, especially the many dimensions involved in the movement between capitalist and noncapitalist economic spheres.

This orientation rejects the idea that there is a unitary world system; the periphery is more independent and dynamic than dependency theory would allow. This shift from the high-level determinism of dependency and world systems theory puts the ball squarely back into the anthropologist's court: it

is the community and household that anchors the migrant, whether at home or away. The recognition that migrants participate in two spheres of production—a capitalist wage labor sphere and a noncapitalist sphere, such as subsistence agriculture—is crucial. Both are reinforced and reproduced, with no logical or historical desiderata that capitalism wipe out alternative modes.

While both modernization and dependency theories tended to treat modes of production as historical sequences, the articulation orientation takes a more horizontal perspective, either allowing for or insisting on simultaneous economies acting in rough symbiosis. A circular migrant, with one foot in wage labor and the other in subsistence agriculture, is more flexible and, in some ways, more secure than an individual committed to only one or the other. Without denying the exploitative aspects of a capitalist system that demands a massive pool of surplus labor, the articulation perspective legitimizes the circular migrant as a permanent rather than transitory category. No matter how far they travel, such migrants never entirely leave the base of family, household, community, and culture. For the field anthropologist, articulation theory returns the focus of analysis to the level of the group that is actually studied. It also recognizes a basic fact, rediscovered by many anthropologists but antithetical to early modernization viewpoints: In most cases, as we have seen, returning migrants do *not* bring back money for transformative investment, *nor* do they bring back transformative skills (most skills learned in either industrial or agricultural labor have little or no relevance at home). Another important contribution of this perspective is its emphasis on the labor of women, who may be employed as wage laborers, but at the same time must toil as unpaid workers outside the capitalist sphere, that is, within the household, small-scale marketing, and subsistence agriculture.

MIGRATION THEORY AND GLOBALIZATION

> The internal dynamic and logic of international migration streams are set by the coordinates of gender, reproduction, and the search for livelihood, and played out in a whirlpool of thresholds and loopholes, opportunities and booby traps rigged and structured by forces beyond the reach and maybe beyond the vision of the individual migrant.
>
> Gunilla Bjerén[7]

As long as migration was tied to development and to theories drawn from economics, it tended to have a Marxian materialist bias, emphasizing the movements of labor and resources, and a strong focus on *internal* migra-

tion. Several factors tended to break down these linkages during the 1990s. Certainly, one of the most important was the emergence of postmodernism, which refocused attention on the symbolic, linguistic, and constructed aspects of society. A vehement discourse-analytic critique tended to delegitimize the very concept of development, while a "Writing Culture" school called into question the objectivity and self-confident representations of much ethnography. Reflexivity, subjectivities, alterity, agency, and discourse became the key terms of a major refocusing away from grand theory, especially materialist theory, and onto the experiences, expectations, and identities of the migrants. Paradoxically perhaps, globalization had a positive effect on anthropological positioning. With its focus on the global-local nexus and on culture, transformation, and the ways that time and space are experienced, globalization brought migration theory back down to earth from the empyrean heights of dependency and world systems theory, while at the same time shifting the focus away from in-country rural urban movements to cross-border research.[8]

Transnationalism

Transnationalism emerged less as a theory than as a set of ideas and conceptual tools of analysis. Such dichotomizations as beginning point/end point, push/pull, rural/urban, traditional/modern had been in a state of exhaustion and decline for some time; now they were finally abandoned altogether in favor of a continuum of space and time and of overlapping processes. With the increasing rapidity and ease of transportation and communications, place of resettlement, homeland, and everything in-between became points in a social field. The bounded community of traditional ethnographic fieldwork gave way to multiple, shifting, and interpenetrating spaces, perhaps most notably articulated in Arjun Appadurai's (1991, 1996) differentiation of *ethnoscapes*, *mediascapes*, *technoscapes*, *financescapes*, and *ideascapes* (see Chapter 5). Space was no longer an objective given, but something that was constructed in the process of migration. The communities, societies, cultures, and peoples of traditional anthropology were, for some, replaced by "imagined communities" (Anderson 1983) that were created in the act of migration. This required a new or revamped vocabulary for describing the fluid and undefined interaction zones characteristic of contemporary migrants: border theory, transculturation, transnationalization, creolization, hybridity, diaspora and diasporic communities, to name just a few. This shift was, to some degree, from a materialist economistic focus on labor to a more subjective, experiential mode of analysis: "What we are describing is, first and foremost, the

movement of peoples, not labor, even if, more often than not, labor has been key to their movements" (Held, et al. 1999: 283). Taking cues from both Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Michel Foucault (1973, 1995), power came to be understood as a key component of all social interactions; this power took on more complex and subtle forms than in conventional political analysis, embedded as it was in "discourse" (Foucault) or "field" and "habitus" (Bourdieu).

Both the commonalities and controversies of this new perspective were articulated in a 1995 conference on the anthropology of migration (Szanton Blanc, Basch, and Schiller 1995). The greatest conflict was over the role of the nation-state: whether its power or even its existence was in decline; the locus of power within the state and its effect on both legal and illegal immigrants; and whether the concepts of nation and state should be separated. However, some significant elements of a new analytical framework emerged. First, any comparison of migrations required historical depth in order to differentiate the present form, based on global capitalism, from past forms. Second, the idea of space needed to be rethought, including the ways that space is symbolically manipulated and contested. Third, regimes of power, both within and outside of governments, must be clarified and related to the abilities of people to determine their own fates and control their own identities. Finally, identity politics emerging from migration needs to be analyzed in relation to the restructuring of the global economy and other transnational processes.

Migration studies, perhaps more than any other aspect of the anthropology of globalization, have been a matrix for the introduction and elaboration of new concepts of space and identity.

Testing Migration Theories in Jalisco, Mexico

In Los Arboles, a relatively well-off *rancho* (roughly "community") in Jalisco, Mexico, three-quarters of the 152 male heads of household repeatedly migrate to the United States for work. Many of the residents are from surrounding *ranchos*, pushed off of share-cropped land by the mechanization of agriculture. Landlessness, or ownership of only a few hectares, plus a lack of permanent jobs in the area stimulate a high degree of transnational labor migration. This situation provided Tamar Diana Wilson (1994) with the data to test three standard theories of migration.

The first theory, the immigration market model, views potential migrants as economic cost-benefit analysts who rationally measure the advantages and disadvantages of various countries and regions in terms of wealth maximization. Because this theory focuses on legal, documented immigrants,

the selection process on the part of the target state is also important; education and particular skills will be advantaged. Migrants will be positively selected when high income earners in the home country also receive high incomes in the new country and negatively selected when low earners at home also receive low wages abroad. Thus, the crucial element is the amount of human capital that the migrant can bring to the table; those with the greatest abilities both can and do migrate.

When applied to Los Arboles, Wilson finds many problems with this model. It is not evident at all that the most able actually migrate. In Third World countries, even the most intelligent and ambitious may lack the opportunities to develop skills, and if one does, those skills most likely will not transfer across borders (or even within the country). Because this model focuses on the individual, it ignores the household, kin, and social networks that are actually the decision makers. Migrants will tend to follow established networks, only rarely venturing into areas where they will not have ready sources of information and a fall-back of group support. On the receiving end, pay will not be determined by the value of the work so much as by the degree of unionization, minimum wage legislation, and available and effective legal remedies for underpayment.

The second explanation, the stage migration model, postulates that migrants tend to travel short distances at first, perhaps to local towns, then farther, gradually moving toward and into the larger metropolitan industrial areas. As the earliest migrants move on, they leave a labor vacuum behind for new migrants to fill. This model dates back to studies in the late 19th century in the British Isles and has been applied extensively to peasants in Latin America, where a number of factors, such as poor labor conditions and seasonal work, encourage this type of temporary migration. This model has been largely dismissed as overly simplistic, failing to account for the variety and complexity of migrations. However, those moving into Los Arboles from poorer surrounding communities, then migrating outward in search of better conditions, do suggest just such a stage migration pattern, at least until they hook up with more developed networks.

The more useful theory of chain migration, which Wilson elaborates as "network mediated chain migration," views *relationships with previous migrants* as the primary variable. Complex networks provide information and support all along the line. Through such self-reproducing and self-expanding networks, the migrant learns where the best jobs are, how to get there, where to find housing, and how to get around in the new environment. Earlier migrants will arrange transportation and provide temporary housing while the new migrant gets established. Earlier theories assumed that the chain would link only two points. More recent research refutes this

bipolar model; there may be many destinations available as the network begins to look more like a spider web than a chain. Some of these networks are quite extensive; one study of migrants in a single *pueblo* in Mexico found no less than 110 destinations in the United States. Nor is what is considered the home community a stable concept; networks have multiple homes.

Migrants from Los Arboles reveal a "foraging pattern" of migration. They do not necessarily return to the same place each time they cross the border into the United States; one year an individual may follow the network to any of a number of sites in California and the next year may end up in Milwaukee, another nodal point of the network. The network itself grows through marriage, friendships, and *compadrazgo* (fictive kinship) relations, so it includes many people who are not from Los Arboles. Available destinations shift over time, opening new regions or cities while closing off others. Reasons for such shifts may have to do with job markets, but may be less predictable and even somewhat arbitrary, as new links are formed for reasons more personal than purely economic. Access to the network becomes a sort of cultural capital, perhaps the single most important capital that the migrant possesses.

GENDER AND MIGRATION

In India, where "pollution" is a primary determinant of caste and where women have traditionally been forbidden to speak with unrelated men, the profession of nursing is often considered "dirty"; yet nursing has emerged as a major path of upward mobility and independence for women. Given the low status, low pay, and dismal working conditions in Indian hospitals, many Christian nurses from the state of Kerala have migrated to the United States.

One effect of such migration is to reverse gender roles; because women move first, they become the breadwinners for husbands that follow. The husbands, who may have to relinquish high-status jobs in India for unemployment or low-status work in the United States, often find themselves taking care of children and doing other domestic tasks, unthinkable for married men in India. Deeply embedded Kerala cultural values are not left back in India, but follow the couple to the United States, constantly reinforced by trips and communications back "home." To the extent that the dirty nurse status is culturally retained, it reflects on the husband's already diminished sense of self-worth. In compensation, men often turn to religion; sympathetic Christian churches in transmigrant communities have readjusted their official positions to accommodate men who must seek authority and approval outside their homes. However, the multiplication of religious of-

fices has resulted in their devaluation, so the actual value may be minimal (George 2000).

This brief example reveals three important points: First, gender must be considered in analyzing the migratory experience; second, the issue of gender can be extremely complex; and, third, the term "gender" does not mean women (as it once did) but rather the relationship between men and women.

Until the 1970s, anthropological studies of migration tended to focus on internal movements, those within state borders. Research was mostly carried out by men who took an objectivist, functionalist approach that generalized all migrants, without considering gender. When gender was taken into account, it was to focus on marriage laws and alliances; women were viewed as appurtenances to men—as wives or daughters who either stayed at home or followed the family. The man was the sole or primary breadwinner and thus the obvious focus of attention. To a limited extent, this point of view was justified; most labor migrants at that time were men (Breger and Hill 1998: 2; Clifford 1994: 313).

Recent changes have brought about increasing research on the way that migration is gendered: more and more women are migrating, often independently of men, and more women anthropologists are studying migration. It is now recognized that women comprise the larger part of some migration streams. Women migrate in many different ways, as dependent wives, daughters, and mothers, to be sure, but also as workers and heads of households.

The wage work available to women is usually quite different from that available to men. Most work is in poorly paid jobs abandoned by citizens of the host country as too low-status, too boring, or too seasonal. Industrial enclaves created by globalization throughout the Third World are a primary source of in-country employment; the *maquilas* along the United States–Mexico border are the best known, but similar free-trade zones exist in numerous countries. Cross-border opportunities for women's migratory labor mainly follows a South-to-North trajectory, though not always. The oil boom in the Gulf states during the 1970s and 1980s coincided with a severe economic downturn in Sri Lanka. In desperation, more than a million young women accepted jobs as maids in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, often leaving children and unemployed husbands behind. Back home, men were culturally restricted from crossing gender lines, so responsibility for children and for domestic care fell to female kin (Bjerén 1997: 241–242).

The most common job for women is in domestic service, followed by health services and garment manufacturing. Employers prefer women because they are believed to accept lower pay (morally justified on the errone-

ous assumption that they are not primary breadwinners), work longer hours at more boring and routine tasks, and are more subject to authoritarian oversight without protest and without unionization. To some extent, such feminization of labor can be seen as liberating, in the sense that it can set women free of onerous patriarchies at home, but more often than not the tradeoff is weighted heavily in favor of exploitation by the employer (Mittleman 2000: 66).

Motivation for women's migration may not fit neatly into any set of categories. Pregnant Bangladeshi women may be sent to London to give birth; this provides legal residence rights for the child, who will then return home to be brought up in the proper social identity and religion. Similar transnational strategies have developed for women from Somalia who are also sent to London to give birth. The process is designed to establish a base in a high-income country while at the same time maintaining both physical and cultural links to the home country. In such cases, children with residencies or citizenship in both countries become an important bridge that maintains links between home and resettled kin (Bjerén 1997: 231).

Global Sex

The tendency for capitalism to turn everything into commodities certainly applies to the sex trade. The proverbial oldest profession commodified the female body long before capitalism came along, but globalization has tended to enormously increase prostitution and, to some degree, to change its very character. In the past, prostitution was mainly a local matter, though the movement of women across borders and over long distances probably dates back to the earliest slave trades. According to Dennis Altman, in *Global Sex* (2001),[9] what is different today is that it is not only the women who are crossing borders, but, more than ever before, the customers. Sex tourism has become an international industry of staggering proportions, often controlled by transnational mafias. Bangkok, Thailand, got into the sex business in a big way during the Indochina war, when 700,000 American GIs were briefly stationed there for R & R, rest and relaxation. Today, the city has achieved the dubious distinction as the archetypal global brothel. However, Bangkok is hardly unique. A single brothel in the port city of Narayanganj, Bangladesh, is said to have 16,000 workers. The International Labor Organization estimates that there are several million women workers in the sex trade in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Although sex is the foundation of the political economies of only a few cities, usually those near military bases, it is an important part of a number of large cities in the Third World, especially those

that are growing with great rapidity, luring uprooted, transient, and desperate people.

The influx of neoliberal capitalism and the relaxation of border restrictions have greatly increased the sex trade in communist and formerly communist countries. The economic and political crises in Russia brought about a national and international criminalization of the economy, as syndicated crime moved in to fill economic and power vacuums. Inevitably, a huge prostitution industry emerged throughout Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, much of it transnational in nature. The government of Ukraine estimates that 400,000 women have migrated west in various forms of prostitution. Similarly, but at a lesser scale, Cuba and China have seen a rise in commercial sex due to increases in tourism, relaxation of government intrusion in the economy, and reduced border restrictions. A flood of mainland Chinese women, known as *dalumei*, have joined the sex trade in Taiwan.

In the past, prostitution was treated within both the media and social sciences as a moral issue, rather than as a business. However, while there continues to be a great deal of sexual slavery or pseudoslavery, and many girls are sold by parents into the profession as children, the large majority of prostitutes "choose" the profession as a survival strategy. Actually, there may be little option given the poverty from which prostitutes usually emerge. Nevertheless, the women, and often men, prefer to view themselves as professionals, and this is increasingly the way that social science is looking at them. As a form of labor, "sex work"—a term increasingly preferred over "prostitution"—is subject to the economic and social analysis similar to that accorded other professions.

As a profession rather than a hidden shame, the sex trade has been more free to organize for better working conditions, health benefits, and more money. The first sex-worker organization seems to have been COYOTE (Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics) established in San Francisco in 1973. In 1995, sex workers in the Sonagachi area of Calcutta organized the Durber Mahila Samanwaya Committee, claiming to represent 40,000 female, male, and transsexual sex-workers. Such organization is less possible where syndicated crime controls the sex industry.

Marriage Across Borders

The romantic notion that love knows no boundaries is statistically untrue; the vast majority of people marry not only within their own culture and race, but also within their own level of class and education. Nevertheless, cross-cultural marriage obviously has a long history. What globalization has done is increase the amount of intercultural connections and, thus, the

possibilities for people from different countries to meet, as tourism, international labor movements, war, and ecological disasters bring diverse people together. Also, the emergence of transnationalism as a way of life for a great many immigrants has changed the nature of cross-cultural marriage; assimilation within the country's dominant culture need no longer be necessary.

In some ways, the Western concept of marriage is an ethnocentric one. There are at least four different meanings of the term, probably more: First, marriage can be an institution based on state recognition of a legal bond and on the legitimacy of children; second, it can refer to people routinely living together to comprise a household; third, it can be ceremonial, with the bond being formed mainly to create an alliance between groups, as was traditional for the marriage of children who might never see each other again among the Nyar of India; finally, it may be a psychological and emotional bond between individuals, even without the recognition of the state, as would be the case with homosexual couples in many countries. Or it might be a combination of more than one of these forms. It should be evident, however, that the Western concept of marriage based on romantic love may or may not have anything to do with it. As a curmudgeonly professor of mine used to say: "Everybody believes in romantic love, but most cultures aren't dumb enough to base anything as important as marriage on such lunacy." Many cultures view marriage primarily as establishing or maintaining alliances between families or wider groups and/or as involving a primary responsibility for producing children for the lineage. In many cases, marriage can occur between people who have never met, as when the household or kin group arranges the marriage or in the case of mail-order brides. In the Philippines, as well as many other poor countries, marriages arranged via catalogue or on the Internet are seen as a means by which women, and by extension their families, can establish themselves in the United States or Europe. Mostly, these involve older men with much younger women. Often virtual sexual slavery, with the attendant violence, is the result, but many such marriages turn out to be egalitarian and happy.

Cross-cultural marriage is, by definition, between two people of different ethnic groups. Beyond this, little generalization is possible. The cultural distance between the two partners may be extreme, as, say, between an Amazonian Indian and a college-educated Canadian. Or the distance can be relatively close as between a Chicana and an Anglo man, both equally fluent in English. In researching cross-cultural marriage, it is easiest to emphasize *difference*, especially since anthropology defines itself as the study of difference, while ignoring what might be quite a number of similarities (Breger and Hill 1998). A Peruvian woman and a WASP man who meet while attending Harvard will both be from the upper classes, will be highly

cosmopolitan in outlook, may share the same interests in literature and movies, and may treasure cultural differences rather than see them as a burden. The exoticization of the other can lead to romantic fantasies. Women factory workers in the newly industrialized areas of China idealize Hong Kong businessmen as the perfect husbands; handsome and well-off, the men will take them away from the drudgery of their lives, while increasing their network capital, that is, expanding their networks across the channel (Ong 1999: 155–156).

On the other hand, migration to another country does not necessarily mean that a person wants to meet those of other cultures; it is usually not the first generation in the new country that marries out; with increased transnationalism even second and third generations may retain their cultural endogamy, as has been true, for example, for Miami Cubans. In cases where there is a relatively intact diaspora community, there will exist a tightly bounded conceptual image of the ideal woman, as well as sharply defined gender roles and concepts of male and female honor. These will act as strong constraints on outmarriage. Both women and men may travel back to the home country in search of spouses, or marriages in the new setting may be arranged by home-country kin.

Women's motives for marrying "out" were the focus of a study done in England of twenty cross-cultural marriages representing twelve different countries. Most of the subjects had known each other for an average of three years and had university educations, so the sample can hardly be judged typical, but some of the issues that emerged are most likely fairly universal to cross-cultural marriages. Prior to marriage, the foreign women felt marginalized, excluded, isolated, and unhappy. Many were alienated by parents who made little attempt to assimilate, but at the same time lacked any support from a cultural community. The women were often cosmopolitan in their values and outlook, which tended to cause dissention and to distance them from their families. Three of the women in the sample, all from the Mideast, felt that marrying was a way to escape the restrictive gender roles of their own cultures (Khatib-Chahidi, Hill, and Paton 1998).

American and British Wives, Indian Husbands

Another study focused on thirty North American and British women raised in upper-class nuclear families who married Indian men from extended patrilineal households; half of these were living in England or Canada and half in India. In all cases, the women resided with their husbands' families. Differences in values and expectations led to considerable stress. The Western women were brought up to be independent; they lived in fami-

lies where residence after marriage was separate, in-laws had no authority, and contact between generations more likely followed the maternal than paternal line. The patrilineal household of the husband, however, was run by his mother, and the wife was in a subordinate relationship to her. This wife/mother-in-law relationship was the primary one, not the relationship between wife and husband. One husband broke off the honeymoon to return to London because his mother had a minor throat problem; it never occurred to him that his wife expected priority.

Privacy, highly valued in the West, was viewed as secrecy among the Indian family; a closed door was interpreted as an act of hostility. The wives felt overwhelmed by the constant presence of family and found it was almost impossible to be alone for any length of time with their husbands who, in any case, could not understand that there might be a problem. Women found it extremely difficult, even within the family, to make friends on a one-to-one basis because of the constant presence of groups. Needed emotional support based on private confidences was impossible since the family itself was the main source of stress. Family harmony was held to outweigh any desire to assert individual wants or needs.

Children added to the stress. Whereas in the West, the mother-child bond was expected to be intense, in the Indian families, children were cared for by a number of women. Independence was not encouraged for children; teen-age girls would be reprimanded if they expressed any social or political ideas at odds with those of their Indian elders.

Many of the women remained unhappy, feeling that their integrity and sense of self were constantly eroded by the deferential role they were expected to play within the family (Joshi and Krishna 1998).

CONCLUSIONS

The globalization perspective has completely transformed the ways that anthropologists look at migration and brought this once-marginal subject area to the forefront of globalization research. The clear-cut dichotomies of the past, such as rural-urban trajectories and push-pull models of motivation, have given way to much more fluid, complex, and amorphous conceptualizations. In the next few chapters, we will examine in some detail three specific topics of anthropological interest: transnationalism, diaspora, and refugees.