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MSU Graduate Theses

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Midnight in America: Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse and the 21st Midnight in America: Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse and the 21st

Century Threat to the United States Century Threat to the United States

Angela Weaver Missouri State University, [email protected]

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i

MIDNIGHT IN AMERICA: NUCLEAR ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND

THE 21st CENTURY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

A Masters Thesis

Presented to

The Graduate College of

Missouri State University

TEMPLATE

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies

By

Angela E. Weaver

May 2017

ii

Copyright 2013 by Angela Elaine Weaver

iii

MIDNIGHT IN AMERICA: ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND THE 21st

CENTURY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

Defense and Strategic Studies

Missouri State University, May 2017

Master of Science

Angela E. Weaver

ABSTRACT

The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects produced by the detonation of a nuclear weapon

at high altitude are capable of causing widespread destruction in the U.S. homeland with

few to no immediate casualties. The threat of nuclear EMP attack against the United

States was recognized as probable during the Cold War but as time passed, the threat lost

consciousness among U.S. policy makers as other issues and threats rose to the forefront.

Simultaneously, the United States military and civilian society grew increasingly reliant

upon emerging electronic systems and capabilities while adversary nations and rogue

states rapidly pursued nuclear weapons capabilities. Today, the United States, as one of

the most highly developed nations on the globe, is reliant upon electronic systems for

almost every aspect of life, from communications to economics and security. As such, the

United States is highly vulnerable to attacks that affect these cornerstones of U.S. society

and global presence. The threat of a nuclear EMP attack against the United States today

and in the future is not only an effective option for both states and non-state actors, it is

an attractive one. Adversaries could derive great value from an attack that cripples the

U.S. ability to function at even the most basic levels. The threat of EMP attack is more

prescient in today’s modern warfare environment than ever before. As such, the United

States’ approach to nuclear deterrence and escalation control must evolve to fully

encompass the threat of nuclear EMP by both state and non-state actors.

KEYWORDS: nuclear weapon, electromagnetic pulse, deterrence, defense policy,

terrorism, United States, national security, threat

This abstract is approved as to form and content

_______________________________

Professor David Trachtenberg

Chairperson, Advisory Committee

Missouri State University

iv

MIDNIGHT IN AMERICA: ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE AND THE 21st

CENTURY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

By

Angela E. Weaver

A Masters Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College

Of Missouri State University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Master of Science, Defense and Strategic Studies

May 2017

Approved:

_______________________________________

Professor David Trachtenberg

_______________________________________

Dr. Keith B. Payne

_______________________________________

Dr. Lisa Bronson

_______________________________________

Julie Masterson, PhD: Dean, Graduate College

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the following people for their support during the course of my

graduate studies:

My wonderful family, for their constant support and encouragement in every area of life.

My better half, for his support and enduring belief in my ability to be the best version of

myself.

My dear friends, for their understanding and flexibility throughout the last two years.

And finally my professors and colleagues, for their willingness to debate me, listen to my

theories and challenge me at every step.

I dedicate this thesis to the generations of civil servants who have come before me that

worked tirelessly in pursuit of a greater security and prosperity for the United States and

its citizens.

“The optimist thinks this is the best of all possible worlds. The pessimist fears it is true.”

J. Robert Oppenheimer

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1

Definitions............................................................................................................................6

Nuclear Employment ...............................................................................................6

Electromagnetic Pulse ..............................................................................................6

Asymmetric Warfare ................................................................................................7

Rogue State ..............................................................................................................8

Research Methodology ........................................................................................................9

Chapter 1: The Future Security Environment to 2040 .......................................................15

2017-2025 ..............................................................................................................15

2025-2033 ..............................................................................................................18

2033-2040 ..............................................................................................................20

Chapter 2: U.S. Expectations for Nuclear Deterrence and Employment within Modern

Warfare ..............................................................................................................................24

Chapter 3: Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse – A Historical Overview ................................31

Modern Day EMP Vulnerabilities .........................................................................40

Electrical Power .....................................................................................................40

Telecommunications ..............................................................................................43

Banking and Finance..............................................................................................45

Fuel and Energy Infrastructure ..............................................................................45

Transportation ........................................................................................................46

Government, Military and Space Assets ................................................................49

Chapter 4: 2003 Northeast Blackout – A Case Study ........................................................52

Chapter 5: The Utility of Nuclear EMP .............................................................................58

Rogue States...........................................................................................................58

Terrorist Organization ............................................................................................61

Russia and China....................................................................................................64

Chapter 6: Nuclear EMP and Deterrence ...........................................................................67

Conclusion .........................................................................................................................77

References ..........................................................................................................................84

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Level of EMP Threat According to Actor. ..........................................................66

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. EMP Range of the Starfish Prime Nuclear Test .................................................32

Figure 2. Area Effected by EMP Determined by Height of Burst .....................................33

Figure 3. U.S. Electric Grid Interconnections....................................................................40

1

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War marked, for many, an end to the prominence of nuclear

weapons. While Russia and the United States kept large numbers in their arsenals, the

focus on nuclear weapons shifted from buildup to reduction and the role of nuclear

weapons in U.S. national security strategy was greatly reduced. The United States largely

breathed a sigh of relief and shifted focus to domestic issues, other regions of the globe

such as Asia and, following September 11, 2001, long-term regional conflicts.

Simultaneously, proliferation quietly continued in states across the globe. China built up

its nuclear capabilities, Iran and North Korea further pursued nuclear weapons programs

of their own, India and Pakistan competed in the nuclear realm and Russia continued to

modernize and implement nuclear deterrence strategies for a multi-polar world. Terrorist

organizations like al Qaeda stated their intentions to gain access to weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) grew in strength,

number and territory, also stating intentions to use WMD if successfully acquired. As the

multi-polarity and variety of threats grew, nuclear weapons largely became, from a U.S.

point of view, a weapon of a bygone era with limited scope and purpose. For other states

and non-state actors, however, nuclear weapons remained the pinnacle of military

achievement, a guarantor of safety and security in a world dominated by conventionally

superior powers like the United States.

As the global security environment grew increasingly complicated, the technology

environment blossomed. Electronic systems, internet connectivity, global positioning

systems (GPS), energy and communications technology improved by leaps and bounds.

The United States became increasingly reliant upon electronic systems for everything

2

from personal communication to banking to commercial travel to healthcare. Throughout

the 1970’s, the U.S. military executed the second offset strategy, investing in the

technological advancements that would provide the military with capabilities like

extended-range precision guided munitions, stealth aircraft and advanced C4ISR1, all of

which enabled the strategies of the United States throughout the Cold War and post-Cold

War eras. Today, 99 percent of the electricity U.S. military bases use comes from the

civilian electrical grid2. Advanced U.S. military systems depend on electronic systems’

interaction with satellites to target, communicate and travel. These capabilities make the

United States a leader in both commercial and military technology, however they also

create a significant vulnerability. If the United States experienced widespread electronic

disruption or failure, the effects would be felt in every aspect of civilian and military life.

A catastrophic failure of electronic systems would impact the ability of emergency

services to respond to crisis, running water and access to food over the long term would

be threatened, communication made extremely difficult, if not impossible in the

immediate aftermath, and the ability of the U.S. military to respond in any meaningful

way, both at home and abroad, severely hampered. While this seems in many ways like

science fiction, the capability exists to cripple the United States’ ability to function at

even the most basic level – and it has existed since the first nuclear weapon was

detonated, more than 70 years ago.

The use of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) as a weapon is a long-held concept of warfare,

especially among U.S. adversaries who have held the capability for decades. During the

Cold War, the main concern about EMP emanated from the Soviet strategy to cripple or

extinguish the ability of the United States to retaliate before a second strike on the U.S.

3

homeland could be initiated, in the form of a high-altitude nuclear detonation over the

United States resulting in widespread EMP. However, this notion was largely rejected as

a strategy because many theorists of nuclear deterrence believed that the risk was not

worth the reward for the Soviet Union. If EMP worked as demonstrated in the nuclear

tests of the 1960’s, it was a suicide mission. Based on the deterrence strategy of the time,

the United States would undoubtedly respond in kind, all but guaranteeing an

overwhelming nuclear attack on Soviet territory. The stakes during the Cold War were far

too high and both sides relied so heavily on the theory of mutually assured destruction

that the idea of using a nuclear weapon for gaining the upper hand, however briefly, in

what would ultimately be a nation-ending war was not plausible, nor attractive. Today,

however, the world is very different. Nuclear weapons are possessed by nine states

instead of two, all with varying interests and strategic goals and quite different views on

the implementation of nuclear weapons as a tool of war in the 21st century. Additionally,

rogue states and non-state actors are potentially capable of launching their own nuclear

attacks if not now, then in the foreseeable future.

The risk and reward calculus has changed dramatically for U.S. adversaries who

seek to achieve strategic effects against the United States, in turn altering the deterrence

and escalation calculus. An adversary may choose to employ nuclear EMP in theater,

rather than over the U.S. homeland, rendering U.S. forces abroad incapable of responding

to regional or allied crises. The risk of a nuclear EMP attack against the United States

remains unlikely in comparison to smaller scale terror attacks or other security events but

the consequences of such an attack, if not prevented or deterred, would be catastrophic.

Yet, while any employment of a nuclear weapon would be viewed by the United States as

4

extremely escalatory and would provoke a serious U.S. response, it is unclear that that

response would be nuclear. The United States possesses the ability to hold at risk high

value targets with capabilities other than nuclear weapons, options such as cyber, which

very well may be considered proportional as a response. High-altitude nuclear

detonations cause widespread electrical and infrastructure damage, but they rarely result

in immediate human casualties. Nuclear EMP can also be difficult to attribute, much like

large-scale cyber-attacks. These factors may very well complicate the U.S. response

calculus.

This thesis examines the level of threat a nuclear EMP attack on the U.S.

homeland or in theater represents in the 21st century modern warfare environment and

analyzes the effect a threat of nuclear EMP has on deterrence and escalation. The first

chapter provides an eagle eye view of the international security environment through the

year 2040 to give context to the issue and remove nuclear EMP from its traditional Cold

War boundaries. The second chapter identifies how the United States understands the

conduct of modern warfare and establishes current U.S. deterrence and employment

policy regarding nuclear weapons. The second chapter will also explore how key U.S.

adversaries Russia and China are approaching modern warfare and nuclear deterrence in

the 21st century and introduce how nuclear EMP complicates that environment. The third

chapter quickly summarizes the history of nuclear EMP, describes the effects of an EMP

attack versus the effects of a “traditional” employment of a nuclear weapon and

introduces the historical views of the Soviet Union on EMP attacks during the Cold War.

The fourth chapter is a case study of the 2003 Northeast blackout, analyzing the effects of

the blackout on the civilian infrastructure and ability of the city to respond and recover.

5

The level of effect from the blackout is then compared to the estimated effect from

nuclear EMP employment and identifies the implications for U.S. national security

domestically and abroad. The fifth chapter explores the utility of nuclear EMP for both

state and non-state actors and identifies the motivating factors for employing nuclear

EMP. This chapter will also explore the strategy of employing nuclear EMP as part of a

larger asymmetric warfare strategy. Finally, the sixth chapter explores the relationship

between nuclear EMP and deterrence through analyzing how the employment of a

nuclear weapon to produce EMP effects may change how the United States thinks about

deterrence in the 21st century and identifying what policy options are available to the

United States in defining a deterrence strategy specifically designed to prevent a nuclear

EMP attack. Ultimately, the thesis will conclude with an identification of how likely it is

that nuclear EMP is to be used in the modern warfare environment, evaluate the level of

threat to the United States at home and abroad and identify recommendations for the

United States to best address the threat as it exists in the 21st century.

6

DEFINITIONS

Nuclear Employment

There is an ongoing debate over the term nuclear “use” and, depending on the

community, “use” can mean multiple things. For some, it means the detonation of a

nuclear weapon in the context of a conflict. For others, it means the use of nuclear

weapons as a political or deterrent tool. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger

famously remarked, “We use nuclear weapons every day to deter our potential foes and

provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection”3. The author of this thesis

tends to agree with Secretary Schlesinger, that nuclear weapons are indeed in use every

day as guarantors of security. As such, “nuclear use” will not appear as a package term in

this thesis so as to avoid confusion. Instead, “employment” will be used as a defining

term for the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the context of active conflict or attack

(testing excluded).

Electromagnetic Pulse

Electromagnetic pulse is a short burst of electromagnetic energy that, if strong enough,

can disrupt or destroy electrical components but is not of direct harm to human beings.

EMP can occur naturally, such as an effect of a strong geothermal storm or lightning

strikes. There are weapons that exist solely for creating EMP effect, though those are not

covered in this analysis. The EMP produced by a high-altitude nuclear detonation is

much stronger and more widespread than any other manmade EMP occurrence,

comparable only to a geothermal storm that directly affects Earth’s atmosphere. High-

altitude nuclear weapon detonations produce EMP in three waves as defined below4:

1) E1: An initial energy shockwave that is brief, about 1 microsecond. A

pulse of energy, similar to extremely strong static electricity, traveling at

7

90% the speed of light, capable of destroying computers and other

electronic devices in line of sight of the detonation.

2) E2: An intermediate pulse with a very similar effect as a lightning strike,

unlikely to do damage to electronics or electrical systems already

protected against surges from lightning strikes. However, most systems

will be initially damaged from E1 and would likely experience additional

damage if the protection systems went down in the initial E1 surge.

3) E3: A long-lasting magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) signal, a much slower

pulse that travels through the magnetic field of the Earth, disrupting or in

many cases, destroying power lines, electrical transformers and power

plants. MHD occurs in two phases: Blast (distortion of the Earth’s

magnetic field lines by the expanding fireball) and Heave (heating and

ionization of a patch of atmosphere directly below the detonation that rises

and distorts the Earth’s magnetic field)5. E3 only occurs in high yield

detonations.

Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric warfare is typically defined as a conflict between actors that have

significantly disparate levels of capability and as such, the conduct of warfare is

unconventional. Asymmetric warfare can consist of guerilla tactics, information

campaigns, cyber-attacks, WMD attacks, escalation of regional conflicts, conducted

through engagement in proxy wars, or any combination of the aforementioned tactics. It

is common that asymmetric warfare includes multiple unconventional tactics as part of an

overall strategy. Attacks like 9/11 or the Sony hack by North Korea are often cited as

examples of asymmetric warfare. This kind of warfare is becoming increasingly common

in the 21st century as the relative military power of states becomes more and more

disparate but access to lethal or disruptive technologies becomes easier. As is discussed

further in this thesis, asymmetric warfare will become the norm for threat and conflict in

the 21st century security environment. State actors will increasingly engage in asymmetric

behavior as technologies proliferate and the security environment becomes more

8

crowded. Employment of devastating cyber-attacks, nuclear weapons or other WMD to

create strategic effects in this environment are referred to as strategic asymmetric

capabilities.

Rogue State

Rogue states are often ruled by autocratic regimes and generally hostile towards the

United States. They often seek WMD capabilities, suppress or violate human rights and

disrupt regional security. They can be sponsors or partners in terrorism as well. For the

sake of this paper, when rogue states are mentioned or analyzed it is typically in reference

to Iran or North Korea. Though these two countries are very different, they are the two

most often labeled “rogue states”. Iran’s suppression of human rights, record of financing

or otherwise state-sponsoring terrorist organizations and secret but diligent pursuit of

nuclear weapons makes it an ideal, if nuanced, example of a rogue state. North Korea is

more obviously a rogue state based on its isolation from the global order, violations of

human rights and explicit and determined focus on developing a nuclear weapons

program. These two rogue states will be focused upon heavily in this thesis as actors

capable of and willing to employ nuclear EMP, especially in theater.

9

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research for this thesis took several routes: technology, history and policy oriented.

In order to best understand the motivations behind a state or non-state actor’s decision to

employ a nuclear weapon to achieve EMP effects, the author first needed to gain an

understanding and appreciation for the effects of EMP and how they are produced. This

consisted of reading through scientific journals and congressional testimony about

electrical pulses (natural and man-made), solar storms and nuclear physics. Next, the

author studied the 2003 Northeast blackout, not only to gain an understanding for the

case study but to better understand the vulnerabilities inherent to electrical systems and

the civilian infrastructure as a whole. Finally, in terms of technical research, the author

had to understand what was needed to successfully employ a nuclear weapon capable of

producing EMP effects. For example, it was essential to understand that high-altitude

nuclear detonations, meaning at least 30km or more above the Earth’s surface, are the

most effective for producing EMP effects over a wide area. The technologies required to

achieve a high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon are more intricate than a crude

nuclear device and a missile.

For the greatest probability of success, the actor would likely acquire ballistic

missile capabilities (short- or long-range and in some cases, intercontinental), a

miniaturized nuclear weapon capable of being fitted to the ballistic missile and a physics

package capable of withstanding the force of missile launch. However, the capabilities

required for employment of nuclear EMP are not as complex as those needed for ground

burst nuclear attack. For example, re-entry technology is not necessarily required. The

complexity of the challenge was incredibly important to take into account when

10

contemplating the decision calculus of actors possibly looking to employ this capability

against the United States or its forward-deployed forces in theater.

There is no credible basis to an analysis about a future threat without first understanding

the historical basis from which the threat emerged. The methodology on historical

context involved in-depth research about nuclear testing, specifically focusing on the

Starfish Prime test, the first U.S. nuclear weapons test that exhibited EMP effects as far

as 1,000 miles away. It was in this test that nuclear EMP began to emerge as a possible

weapon in and of itself. The author also looked into Soviet nuclear weapons testing that

exhibited EMP effects as well.

As time progressed, Congress and policy makers became increasingly concerned

about the threat, causing Congress to establish the Commission to Assess the Threat to

the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack in 2001. The reports from this

commission serve as the basis for the historical context of U.S. policy on the issue and as

the cornerstone for establishing credibility about the level of threat facing the United

States today and in the future. They also provide valuable information about the state of

U.S. infrastructure and its ability to withstand (or not) the effects of nuclear EMP. The

commission’s report on U.S. critical infrastructure also serves the purpose of framing the

arguments for adversarial use against the United States as it identifies key vulnerabilities

and the effects of those vulnerabilities being realized through a devastating natural

disaster, cyber or nuclear EMP attack. The Commission reports were especially eye-

opening in terms of nuclear EMP as part of a larger asymmetric strategy. This becomes

important in the analysis of deterrence and escalation decision making later on in the

discussion.

11

Finally, the author needed to understand the policies enacted by the United States as well

as potential adversaries on the subject of nuclear EMP, namely in the form of nuclear

declaratory policies or national statements on the matter, many of which have been

analyzed by U.S. experts. Russia and China are relatively clear about their broader

nuclear policies though there is by nature some ambiguity involved in those as well. The

challenge here was to try to identify the policies or doctrines, if such terms are even

applicable, to rogue states or non-state actors. Terrorist organizations are by nature more

declaratory than perhaps their capabilities can support but the history of their actions and

stated goals give hints as to how they may choose to employ nuclear EMP – or perhaps

why they would not. Rogue states are somewhat more formal in their statements but even

in those instances, the sincerity of their claims can often be disputed. The secretive nature

of rogue states and the actions they take make predictions of their future actions much

more difficult to ascertain, though their intended goals are in some ways easier to identify

than that of state actors. It was key to the analysis to make these distinctions as they

become important when exploring the possible approaches to deterrence.

This paper will explore all sides to the question of the level of threat represented by

nuclear EMP. The community debating this question has often been split into two camps:

the side that believes that this threat is unrealistic or so unlikely that is hardly worth

preparing to defend against, much less produce deterrence strategies designed specifically

for the threat, and the side that believes the threat is quite real and without preparing for it

or strategizing to prevent it, the United States is turning a blind eye to an existential

threat. This paper aims to remain somewhere in the middle while exploring the virtues

and misgivings of each side but will, in the end, come to a conclusion about the level of

12

threat nuclear EMP presents to the United States and its citizens. In order to do so, the

author makes several assumptions upfront about the security environment, the role of the

United States in the world and the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy.

It is the assumption of the author that the security environment the United States will face

through 2040 will be one of increasing complexity and instability. This theme will be

further explored within the following sections but it is fundamental to understanding the

approach to analysis found herein. If the world were in fact to become more peaceful,

perhaps through the eradication of terrorism or a more balanced global order, the need for

this analysis may not exist at all. However, it is in the belief of the author that the security

environment is more likely to deteriorate in coming decades than stabilize that the

motivation for exploring this subject in-depth is rooted.

Similarly, it is the assumption of the author that the United States will not shrink

from the world stage but will continue to be a conventionally superior global actor with

global interests. Globalization as a trend is assumed to continue due to communication

and technological innovation and as a leading contributor to technological change, the

United States is unlikely to become isolated, much less remain so. As such, U.S. interests

and allied relationships will remain, meaning the United States will continue to be an

actor both respected and feared. Threats from outside U.S. borders, it is assumed, will not

dissipate but remain or grow.

Finally, the author assumes that nuclear weapons will continue to be a cornerstone

of U.S. defense policy and strategy. No assumptions are made about the numbers of

nuclear weapons the United States may retain or if the numbers will grow, only that the

United States will not reduce to zero. The makeup of the nuclear arsenal – whether it

13

remains a triad or not – is also irrelevant to evaluating this threat. Though the force

structure may matter to some aspects of formulating deterrence policy, it has little effect

on the analysis of whether an actor will choose to use nuclear EMP against the United

States or not. Retaliation with nuclear weapons is retaliation regardless of whether the

weapon is launched from air, land or sea.

Throughout the research for this paper the author experienced several challenges.

The arguments surrounding this threat are somewhat passionate and can feel very much

like a conversation about science fiction at times. They also tend to be rather extreme in

some cases – borderline fear mongering on one side and tacit dismissal on the other.

While this is telling in terms of how split the community is on this issue, it also presented

a challenge to finding sources that looked at the issue in a balanced and sober manner.

The Congressional commission reports are the best sources in terms of a practical yet

serious examination of the threat but they are, at this date, somewhat aged6. Old sources

are a common problem when it comes to questions of nuclear weapons, though sources

on deterrence and its practice are much more recent and modern.

With that in mind, the author looked to three main pools of sources: official

government sources which assessed the threat and the technical and physical effects on

the United States, the debates of the community on the validity of the threat one way or

the other and both classic and modern approaches to nuclear deterrence, many of which

do not make mention of nuclear EMP but are the best representation of current deterrence

thinking and strategy. Through the combined analysis of these three pools of sources, the

author was able to come to conclusions about both the level of threat and how it affects

traditional approaches to nuclear deterrence and escalation.

14

15

CHAPTER 1: THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO 2040

The security environment is the driving force behind any threat to the United

States and will shape U.S. force structure, posture and policy. The security environment

through 2040 will exhibit several trends key to understanding the environment in which

the threat of EMP may emanate: technological innovation, proliferation of WMD and

shifts in regional power dynamics. Combined, these factors will challenging the primacy

of the United States as a military actor on the global stage. As economic growth

strengthens East Asia over time, the West may struggle to remain influential. This

chapter will explore these trends in greater detail over the course of three periods of time7

and identify the context for the threat of nuclear EMP and the actors who will likely

acquire the capability to employ nuclear weapons with an intent of EMP effects.

2017-2025

The next eight years are likely to feature many of the same threats facing the

United States today, though some will evolve. The threat of high end peer-to-peer

competition or conflict with states such as Russia and China is likely to rise as both states

continue to invest heavily in both traditional and hybrid warfare capabilities8.

Investments in cyber and C4ISR capabilities and increasing numbers of unmanned and

undersea platforms would complicate and already complex operating environment. The

military modernization of Russian forces will likely enable continued open challenges to

U.S. and NATO security, much like the activities undertaken in Crimea, Ukraine in 2013.

Chinese economic growth will enable their ability to bolster military modernization9 and

provide a platform for continued buildup in the South China Sea, contributing to rising

16

regional tensions. The United States will likely continue to monitor the competitive

balance of power in the Middle East, shaped by the conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan.

Unconventional warfare tactics and capabilities will begin to emerge more

frequently10 as rogue states and non-state actors continue to acquire, expand and improve

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, coordinated and sophisticated

intelligence/espionage campaigns, mine and swarming capabilities and autonomous and

deep learning machines. The importance of nuclear weapons in the defense strategies of

the United States, Russia, China, and NATO is likely to rise as developing nuclear

weapons programs in North Korea (and, potentially Iran) accelerate11 and regional

tensions grow. Health programs designed to defend against chemical and biological

attacks will likely seek increased funding as a result of the increased threat of WMD

employment by non-state actors, much like has been witnessed in Syria. Global

insurgency by non-state and/or state-sponsored terror organizations, such as Al-Qaeda

and ISIL, is likely to influence targeted countries to increasingly adopt defensive stances

and focus on security operations at home, including tightening immigration controls.

Simultaneously, terror attacks, both lone-wolf and organized, are likely to grow in

frequency and intensity12 as counter-terror operations and strategies are implemented and

terror organizations are challenged in key regions.

As technological advances continue over the next eight years, unmanned and

autonomous, deep learning machines will likely see widespread adoption in both defense

and commercial markets. As unmanned technology becomes increasingly salient across

societies and militaries, “physical conflict could occur between unmanned systems. The

opportunities for bloodless attacks could lower the threshold for conflict”13. China’s

17

technological adoption may rival that of the United States and could very well match the

U.S. ability to project power regionally and globally. Russia’s military modernization,

scheduled to be complete by the mid-2020’s14, includes fleets of modernized fixed-wing

aircraft (about 700 aircraft in total), new Borei-class ballistic missile submarines, and

improvements in ballistic missile technology; all of which could pose regional and global

threats to the United States and its allies.

Geopolitical movements, such as populism and isolationism, are likely to spread

due to diverging security priorities, economic disparities and demographic diversity,

especially across Western and Eastern Europe, prompting even more draconian

immigration regulations and impacting economic and allied relationships. While this

trend may slow or reverse within 4-8 years, the effects are likely to last for much longer.

International institutions such as NATO and the EU will adapt to the change more slowly

and it may take years for a stable rhythm to develop again. Policies emerging from these

movements may prove so extreme that domestic movements against isolationism pick up

momentum, the backlash against them may be more immediate and the West may see a

rapid return to more liberal policies and a re-engagement with globalization, aiding in the

share of emerging technologies and security cooperation.

In order to meet the complex and overlapping challenges of this time period, the

United States and its partners will likely look to develop forces that can rapidly and

adaptively face a broad range of threats, across varying regions and within multiple

domains. In the current zeitgeist, the United States may more critically assess the costs

and benefits of direct intervention in foreign conflicts, thought it will likely still have to

deploy forces to address a major crisis at some point while simultaneously managing

18

ongoing lower-level conflicts. The ability of the United States to credibly deter and if

called upon, decisively defeat enemies and defend interests will very likely be tested over

the next eight years.

2025-2033

By 2030, the world could look significantly different than it does today. There are

several trends occurring now that will hit their peak in the 2025-2033 timeframe15,

including economic growth in Asia, shift in power among traditional hegemons and

changes in the nature of power and governance. While these trends are subject to some

wax and wane, it is likely that the main threats facing the United States will emanate

from the culmination of these major shifts in the security environment and that some risk

factors seen in the previous timeframe will come to fruition in this period.

The projected growth of Asian economies is projected to overtake that of North

America and Europe by 2030 in terms of GDP, population size, military spending and

technical investment16. In doing so, the shift in the balance of power is likely to

dramatically shift towards countries like China and India, whose existing relationships

with countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Turkey will in turn raise their global

presence. While the economies of the United States, Europe and Russia will not collapse

in any dramatic fashion, their relative declines will be further exacerbated by strong

growth in other regions. Influence, as a result, may wane. As these countries grow in

economic strength, so will their ability to pursue technological advancements and 21st

century manufacturing.

19

Climate change consequences are projected to significantly worsen in terms of

increased occurrences of extreme weather events, more extreme droughts in dry areas and

significant and frequent flooding in wet areas. The Middle East, Northern Africa,

Western Central Asia, Southern Europe, Southern Africa and the Southwest United States

will be the most impacted by drought while coastal urban cities will face challenges with

extreme weather resulting in coastal flooding and threats from storm wave damage. There

is a possibility that extreme coastal weather will begin to drive coastal urban cities to

expand inland, stressing agricultural areas needed to support urban populations and

causing tensions among neighboring nations searching for area to expand. Resource

demands will likely become a centerpiece of international tensions, creating opportunity

for increased risk of state-to-state conflicts17.

Technological breakthroughs will become more frequent and significant and

public access to disruptive and potentially lethal technologies (precision-strike, cyber,

chemical/biological terror, artificial intelligence) will become easier. As processing

power and data storage becomes faster, easier and less expensive, governments and

societies will be faced with the challenge of preventing the commoditization of classified

military technology to non-state actors and individuals. These developments will likely

change the face of terrorism, the beginnings of which were seen in the previous era (use

of social media for propaganda and recruiting, drone warfare, etc.)18.

As the international system becomes more fragmented by shifts in power and

traditional means of cooperation are challenged, competition and conflict become more

likely. It is unlikely, however, that devastating great power conflict (on the level of WWI

or WWII) would take place, as the costs would be too high and the technology of the day

20

would increase the speed, discernment and precision of kinetic and non-kinetic effects

necessary for state actors to achieve objectives, thereby reducing the magnitude of

conflict as they affect civilian societies. However, the risk of conducting high-level

conflicts with significant weaponry may rise. The proliferation of WMD is likely

throughout this period and regional instability will only fuel desire for states to produce

their own deterrent. As the risk for these types of conflict rises, so too does the risk of

nuclear, chemical or biological employment in asymmetric ways.

The role of the United States in this period is an uncertainty. If the U.S. economy

remains relatively strong, the U.S. presence on the world stage will not decline

significantly, barring any extreme policies that call for U.S. isolationism on a grand scale.

U.S. innovation both commercially and militarily will likely continue but will face

competition abroad. If the U.S. maintains its allied relationships, security cooperation

with the West is likely to continue. The U.S. role in Asia will continue to be challenged

and very well may be curtailed by a risen China. U.S. military forces will remain pre-

eminent in their training and ability to conduct warfare but will face challenges in terms

of threats by proliferating technologies. U.S. force structure will likely need to be as, if

not more, flexible as in the previous period and much more technologically capable.

Nuclear weapons will likely remain a cornerstone of U.S. security and the improvement

of missile defense capabilities is likely, as naval and air capabilities will provide the

lion’s share of the projection of U.S. power.

2033-2040

21

The world in this time period is unlikely to be more stable or peaceful and will

almost certainly be characterized by instability19. The United States will likely remain the

pre-eminent military power but will struggle to remain a leader politically and

economically. While the continued rise of Asian countries, like China, is not a guarantee,

intense competition between major powers, especially over resources, is highly likely.

The convergence of globalization, population and emergence of new ideologies and

proliferation of WMD is likely to create an environment in which conflict and

confrontation, especially at lower levels, is a common occurrence.

Perhaps the biggest threat facing this period is the proliferation of WMD. Not

only will proliferation generate instability and shift the global balance of military power,

terror groups are more likely to acquire and use nuclear, chemical and biological

materials in significant payloads20. Increasing cyber capabilities “directed at critical

infrastructures, including space assets”21, complicate this threat picture. As these

technologies and materials spread, the United States and partner nations will have a

harder time developing successful deterrence policies and strategies. Terror groups are

unlikely to hesitate to use devastating WMD capabilities if acquired. As states and non-

state actors continue to clash in this period, it is highly likely that those conflicts will

exhibit combined capabilities, including WMD, conventional, irregular and high-end

asymmetric capabilities.

The United States will face extended years of instability in an environment in

which the traditional balance of power is almost guaranteed to shift dramatically. As

such, the United States must be able to respond with both agility and flexibility while

maintaining strong commitments to U.S. interests, allies and friends. The United States

22

must also be prepared to protect and defend innovation in both the military and

commercial realms in an attempt to remain the pre-eminent military power. U.S. force

structure will likely look drastically different by 2040 than it does today. Naval

capabilities, unmanned and autonomous technologies, superior air dominance, superior

cyber and space capabilities will own the military battlespace.

State-sponsored terrorism is likely to continue or even rise as regional conflicts

become more concentrated and frequent. In this event, the likelihood of a non-state actor

or terrorist organization acquiring WMD, as well as the expertise and technological

knowledge to employ it, may rise dramatically. While the employment of nuclear

weapons on a large scale remains unlikely, the employment of one or two in isolated

fashion is well within the realm of possibility. Analysts believe that conflicts in this era

are likely to include multiple forms of warfare with an increased risk of nuclear

employment22. The risk for nuclear employment to create EMP effects is higher in this

era as “countries with nuclear weapons could be tempted to explode a nuclear device to

wipe out their opponent’s ability to maintain connectivity…In this instance, nuclear first

use would not be used to harm humans as much as to deny opponents use of electronic

systems. Space, ocean and near coastal bottlenecks could be areas of nuclear use with

little human collateral damage”23.

The United States will be forced to confront an emerging threat environment

“characterized by a wide-spectrum of actors that include near-peers, established nuclear

powers, rogue nations, sub-national groups and terrorist organizations that now have

access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or may have such access over the next 15

23

years” and will have the capability to “place the risk of EMP attack and adverse

consequences on the U.S. to a level that is not acceptable”24.

24

CHAPTER 2: U.S. EXPECTATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND

EMPLOYMENT WITHIN MODERN WARFARE

The role of nuclear weapons has changed decade to decade and over time their

role has been reduced dramatically. From the height of the Cold War, when nuclear

weapons represented the bulk of U.S. security, to today where nuclear weapons have a

reduced role as a matter of policy. In 2009, at the beginning of the Obama administration,

the President gave a speech in Prague outlining his administration’s views of nuclear

weapons policy and efforts to begin to bring about a world without nuclear weapons. This

was the beginning of what many saw as a utopian approach to nuclear weapons, in spite

of the challenge of proliferation and modernizing nuclear weapons doctrines.

In the Prague speech, the President vowed to press the Senate to ratify the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security

policy and strengthen nonproliferation regimes designed to curb the spread of nuclear

weapons technology and information, the most important of which being the

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)25. While nuclear weapons would remain the cornerstone

of U.S. security and power projection, their prominence would dwindle.

It was in the same speech that President Obama identified nuclear terrorism as a

real threat, stating “terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one…We must ensure

that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme

threat to global security. One terrorist with a nuclear weapon could unleash massive

destruction”26. It is not clear if the threat of nuclear EMP was a consideration of the

Obama administration in classifying the threat of terrorist employment of a nuclear

weapon the most immediate and extreme threat to security. Nonetheless, terrorist

25

employment of a nuclear weapon was at the forefront of both the administration and

security experts’ minds. However, nuclear weapons have not traditionally been used as a

deterrent for terrorist attacks in the past, mainly due to the high number of civilian

casualties that would ultimately result from the employment of a nuclear weapon against

the territory inhabited by a terrorist organization. As such, the decision to broadly reduce

the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy is not entirely surprising.

For the remaining seven years of the Obama administration, the policy of a

reduced role for nuclear weapons continued. The President successfully negotiated the

New START treaty in 2010, enforcing new limits on nuclear warheads and missiles,

launchers and bombers. While there is nuance in those limits, the reductions were

significant and reflected an enduring desire to continue the traditions of arms control

following the end of the Cold War. The key provision in New START centered on the

freedom of both Russia and the United States to organize their nuclear force structures

however they wished, as long as they adhered to the limits imposed by the treaty. In

doing so, each state was free to create a force structure that best represented their

strategic goals. Today, the United States maintains a triad, emphasizing a capability to

support forward presence in allied nations and in maritime environments but has

struggled in recent years to provide sufficient funding for much-need modernization on

aspects of each leg of the triad. As budget pressures continue, the Trump Administration

will face challenges to funding expensive, existing programs like the Ohio-class

replacement submarines (recently named the Columbia-class) and the B-21 Long-Range

Strategic Bomber, while simultaneously awarding funding for new programs like the

Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program (the Minuteman replacement) and the Long-

26

Range Standoff Missile (LRSO). Key leaders in the Pentagon27 and Congress28 have

expressed commitment to funding these programs, as they are crucial to the credibility of

the U.S. nuclear deterrent, however with constrained defense budgets the fight over

funding and affordability will be fierce and is, as of yet, unsettled.

While the United States struggles to allocate the necessary funds for its nuclear

modernization, Russia’s significant and expensive nuclear modernization program,

expected to last through at least 2024, is well underway. The Russian Federation has

focused on phasing out Soviet-era systems and replacing them with more modern,

effective capabilities. The ICBM force structure will be completely modernized with

maximized warhead loads by 2021, the old Delta-class SSBNs will be replaced with eight

planned Borei-class SSBNs, and the nuclear-capable bomber fleet will feature a new sub-

sonic, low-observable long-range bomber by the mid-2020’s29. The modernization of the

Russian nuclear arsenal points to the commitment they have in maintaining a nuclear

deterrent far into the future.

The Russians are fairly forthcoming about nuclear weapons strategy in their

military doctrine. While the United States generally separates nuclear policy from

broader military strategies in official documents, the Russians include their nuclear

doctrine as a vital component of the larger military strategy. In 2014, the Russian policy

regarding nuclear weapons read as follows:

“The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in

response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction

against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian

Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the

state is in jeopardy”30.

27

This policy does not rule out first-use31 of nuclear weapons but frames the policy

within fairly tight parameters. Though the Obama administration explored transitioning to

a no-first-use policy in the last year of the administration, they ultimately decided against

doing so. Many experts in the field argued against it, citing concerns over possibly

undermining the deterrence strategy. Russian nuclear doctrine is much more belligerent

and prominent within the broader military strategy than that of the United States.

The Russian Federation has demonstrated a willingness to engage in asymmetric

warfare and is believed to include nuclear weapons within their asymmetric warfare

strategies. Even as the Russians scaled down their nuclear arsenal following the end of the

Cold War, they deliberately maintained the ability to employ nuclear EMP. Dr. Lowell

Wood, in his testimony before Congress on Russian nuclear strategy and EMP stated,

“EMP strike component exists today in the Russian strategic order-of-battle, moreover

likely at its maximum Cold War strength. I very confidently predict that it will be one of

the last features of Soviet strategic nuclear weaponry to be retired from the Russian

strategic force structure”32. It is highly unlikely that any Russian employment of nuclear

EMP would happen independent from other asymmetric warfare tactics such as “cyber-

attacks, sabotage, and kinetic attacks against the national electric grid and other critical

infrastructures – a decisive new way of warfare described by Russian experts as a

‘Revolution in Military Affairs’”33. Further analysis of the history of Russian EMP and its

potential asymmetric employment is explored further in following chapters.

While the United States has dealt with a nuclear Russia for decades, it must also

take into account younger nuclear powers (China, Iran, and North Korea) that pose

deterrence challenges to the United States and its allies. China’s nuclear program has

28

been active since its first test in October 1964 and has consistently operated under a no-

first-use policy, asserting that the Chinese nuclear arsenal is a minimum deterrent against

nuclear attacks34. The U.S. State Department believes that China’s missile arsenal

includes short-range ballistic missiles, ICBMs, SLBMs and possibly cruise missiles, all

capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads – and all capable of delivering nuclear

weapons to high-altitude to produce EMP effects.

Information about China’s nuclear arsenal is limited but its policies on no-first-

use and nuclear restraint are well documented. Chinese defense white papers consistently

reiterate China’s “unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will it use or

threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-

free zones” and there is “no sign that China is going to change a policy it has wisely

adopted and persistently upheld for half a century”35. However, some experts believe that

China views the employment of nuclear weapons to produce EMP effects an

unconventional attack, rather than a strategic one, and therefore believes the United

States may not view such employment as crossing the nuclear threshold36. Like Russia,

China has also invested in asymmetric capabilities, such as cyber, and may view nuclear

EMP as a broader asymmetric warfare tool. Considering the regional tensions between

China and the United States, especially regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, it is

far more likely that China would choose to employ nuclear EMP regionally in an attempt

to halt U.S. intervention, rather than over the U.S. homeland.

As rogue states, North Korea and Iran pose special challenges to the United States

in the modern warfare environment. Both have active nuclear weapons programs and

advancing missile capabilities that are more than capable of producing EMP effects

29

regionally and may be capable of reaching the skies above the United States to produce

intended EMP effects. Both are also conventionally inferior to the United States and gain

little by engaging in a conventional conflict in which they are sure to be decisively

defeated. Asymmetric use of a nuclear weapon may not only provide states like Iran and

North Korea the upper hand, it may postpone or prevent a devastating U.S defeat

altogether.

North Korea has often stated its adversarial position towards the U.S. and though

Iran has cooperated with the United States on some nuclear weapons issues, the

relationship between the two remains tense and unstable. The nuclear agreement between

the United States and Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), went into

effect in January 2016, lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. It requires that Iran

comply with all United Nations security resolutions regarding the Iranian missile

program. UN security resolution 2231 endorsed the JCPOA and “called upon” Iran to not

undertake any further action on the missile program (ballistic or cruise), including

launches, as well as endorsed previous security resolutions aimed at curbing Iranian

testing of missile technology37. However, Iran has tested missile technology as recently

as January 29, 2017, demonstrating an enduring desire to possess sophisticated missile

capabilities, the vast majority of which would be capable of delivering a nuclear payload

at high-altitude to produce EMP effects.

North Korea poses a slightly different challenge. It is extremely difficult to

ascertain exact numbers or facts about the status of North Korea’s nuclear program.

However, it is believed to be somewhat sophisticated, possibly including at least one

thermonuclear device. North Korea has conducted five tests of nuclear weapons in total

30

and a far larger number of missile tests, though they have enjoyed mixed success.

Regardless, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are only growing and they have been clear

about their intentions to target South Korea and the West Coast of the United States.

Even if targeting of the West Coast is not yet technically feasible, employment of a

nuclear weapon in theater would be devastating to U.S. forces and allies in the region and

would likely alter the regional balance of security permanently. To date, the United States

and South Korea have maintained deterrence in the region through security

demonstrations and exercises, however a nuclear EMP attack in theater may render these

types of operations incredibly difficult, if not impossible.

The nuclear security environment of today, from a U.S. perspective, largely

focuses on the threat from employment of nuclear weapons against the U.S. homeland,

U.S. forces in theater and U.S. allies and friends. However, it makes little-to-no mention

of asymmetric uses of nuclear weapons like that of nuclear EMP. Perhaps, this is due to

the fact that nuclear EMP fell out of public consciousness following the end of the Cold

War, or that more prescient threats became more urgent within the current security

environment, or perhaps that with an increasingly sophisticated technological

environment, the U.S. believes that an actor would not need to resort to the employment

of a nuclear weapon to produce effects similar to EMP. Whatever the answer, it is clear

that U.S. deterrence strategy is not focused on the threat of nuclear EMP by state

adversaries, rogue states or terrorist organizations but on more traditional nuclear

deterrence challenges.

31

CHAPTER 3: NUCLEAR EMP – A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Nuclear electromagnetic pulse was, in many ways, an unexpected discovery. In

the early years of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were racing to

produce large arsenals of nuclear weapons and testing of those weapons was happening

frequently. In 1961 and 1962, both countries began to test nuclear weapons at high-

altitude, during which they observed the first effects from the electromagnetic pulse

produced by the detonation of the weapon. Only a total of 20 high-altitude nuclear

weapons tests were conducted between the Soviet Union and the United States, during

which EMP effects were observed but not deliberately sought out38. The Soviet Union

conducted seven such nuclear weapons tests above their own territory of Kazakhstan

between 1961 and 1962, all of which demonstrated EMP effects such as observable

damage to transformers and collapsed critical electric infrastructure. The weapons tested

were mainly “low-yield warheads, at least one probably an Enhanced Radiation Warhead

that emitted large quantities of gamma rays that generate the E1 EMP electromagnetic

shockwave”39.

The most prominent of the U.S. high-altitude tests was in July 1962, named

“Starfish Prime”. The nuclear weapon was 1.45 megatons40 and was detonated at a height

of 400 kilometers above Johnston Atoll in the Northern Pacific Ocean. In Hawaii, almost

1,400 kilometers away, the “effects were bizarre and almost entirely unanticipated. One

effect was an electromagnetic pulse, but nobody knew it was going to be anywhere nearly

as large it proved to be. They had all this data and they didn’t understand very much of

it, including the EMPs that had been observed and the effects produced…all kinds of

electrical disturbances were seen over 1000 kilometers away in Oahu”41. The EMP

32

produced by the detonation “interrupted radio broadcasts, caused streetlights to

malfunction and burglar alarms to sound and resulted in electronic failures across the

islands”42. The night sky above Hawaii lit up with thermonuclear glow and about one

third of the satellites in low-earth orbit were damaged or destroyed43. Figure 1

demonstrates the path of the EMP the further it travels from the site of detonation and

shows how altitude has a direct correlation with effect. Had Starfish Prime been

detonated at a lower altitude, the EMP effects would have covered a much smaller area

and likely would not have affected electrical systems in Hawaii at all.

Figure 1. EMP Range of the Starfish Prime Nuclear Test44

As these effects were observed in subsequent tests by both the United States and

the Soviet Union, the scientific nuances of producing the desired effects became clearer.

A high-yield nuclear weapon detonated between 40 and 500 kilometers above the earth’s

surface (exo-atmospheric) is by far the most effective. Ground-burst nuclear weapons

produce EMP at thousands of volts per meter but only over short distances. The other

effects of ground-burst nuclear detonations typically outweigh any EMP effects. High-

altitude nuclear detonations, however, produce extremely strong EMP over very wide

distances with no physical threat to humans from the fireball, fallout or blast effect. The

radiation produced from the burst will not interact with other atoms until they reach the

33

top level of the atmosphere, causing them to excite and travel along the earth’s magnetic

field at an extremely accelerated rate over a vast area. Electromagnetic waves create

extremely high electric field strengths, producing thousands of volts in a split second

pulse, overwhelming electrical systems, especially unprotected equipment. The greater

the altitude, the more widespread the area effected and the greater the likelihood that low-

earth orbit satellites experience interference or are damaged45.

Figure 2. Area Effected by EMP Determined by Height of Burst46

Two types of basic damage occur in electrical systems due to electromagnetic

pulse: physical damage, such as short-out and burning, requiring replacement or repair

and operational upset requiring reboot or full reset of the system47. This type of damage

was observed in civilian infrastructure, such as traffic lights and electricity to homes, and

communications infrastructure, such as radio broadcasts and telephone lines during both

the Johnston Atoll tests and the Soviet tests above Kazakhstan. Once affected, electrical

systems could take days to repair or months to replace. The Soviet Union, after

witnessing these types of effects in Kazakhstan, began to develop strategies that included

34

the employment of nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland, with the goal of

“paralyz[ing] our military systems, as well as civilian critical infrastructure. The Russians

were also hoping it would interfere with emergency action messages to all forces,

including ballistic nuke submarines”48.

The United States developed Cold War national capabilities, such as the Ground-

Wave Emergency Network (GWEN)49, to protect communication networks from EMP

effects and worked to harden the nuclear weapons infrastructure in the event that the

Soviet Union would attempt to damage or destroy the United States’ ability to

communicate or respond to Soviet aggression. During the Cold War, it was assumed that

if nuclear EMP were to be employed, it would be done in an effort to cripple the ability

of the other to respond before a devastating second strike. However, because there were

so few high-altitude nuclear weapons tests and the numbers of nuclear weapons on each

side so high, there was no guarantee that an EMP attack could cripple the whole of one

side’s nuclear arsenal, and therefore not guarantee the prevention of a retaliatory strike. It

was also clear that any employment of a nuclear weapon would result in nuclear

retaliation, not just a ground- or air-burst. The deterrence that governed the battlespace of

the Cold War was fairly straight forward and understood by both sides. The guarantee of

mutual destruction combined with even a small doubt in the capability was strong enough

to prevent an EMP attack by either side.

However, even in the Post-Cold War environment, concerns over EMP remained

fresh in the minds of Russian strategic leadership. The Norwegian rocket launch incident

in 1995 was interpreted by the Russians as a U.S. SLBM launch designed to “take out the

general staff and paralyze the forces to enable a surprise attack. They would expect a

35

single missile from a close location. This was a week after they lost the battle of Grozny.

They thought, if the roles were reversed and the U.S. military had suffered a defeat in the

Cold War, [the Russians] would complete the process and at some point deliver a coup de

grace against the United States…they were waiting to see if the U.S. would launch a

surprise nuclear attack to finish off Russia and finalize its Cold War victory”50. While the

United States largely moved on from the Cold War and has, by all measures, thought of

nuclear EMP as a threat of that era ever since, the Russians have not. Scientists of the

Russian Federation have identified nuclear weapons as unique in their ability to create

widespread EMP. Efforts to create conventional weapons that have the same effects have

been challenging: “It is practically impossible for non-nuclear means to concentrate

energy that is in any way comparable with that of a nuclear burst”51. As Russian

asymmetric strategies of war developed and modernized to include cyber-attacks,

information campaigns and sabotage campaigns (small arms, bombs), the strategy for

employment of nuclear EMP evolved simultaneously. In 2004, Russian Major General

Vladimir Belous wrote the following in a public article:

“Space-based and ground facilities of the information-reconnaissance system,

without which the missile defense system will prove to be ‘blind, are

especially vulnerable in this sense [EMP]… ‘blinding’ of enemy territory by

disabling his electronic and power network is also possible. American

specialists determined that in case a large nuclear charger were detonated at an

altitude of hundreds of kilometers above the geographic center of the United

States, the State of Nebraska, a powerful electromagnetic pulse will disable

electronic and power systems on the territory of the entire country for a

certain time”52.

The same year, Russian Captain, First Rank, H. Rezyapov wrote an article entitled

“Asymmetric Threats to the National Security of the United States” in which he

postulated, “Such a blast would simultaneously take out of action almost all of the

36

satellites orbiting above the United States… and affect up to 90 percent of the territory of

the United States by the action of its EMP”53. Russia has not ceased to incorporate

nuclear EMP into its strategy and finds great value in the capability outside of the Cold

War era.

The Post-Cold War world not only saw disparities in the way Russia and the

United States viewed nuclear weapons and their employment, it experienced significant

growth in the number of states which possess nuclear weapons. U.S. allies like the U.K.

and France, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea all became states capable of

devastating destruction through the use of nuclear weapons, and each state’s strategy for

those weapons differs depending on the security situation in which they operate. For the

purposes of this analysis, China, Iran and North Korea are the focus, though any of the

remaining states could employ nuclear weapons for EMP effect and greatly influence

their own strategic situations.

The U.S. Department of Defense reports that China has included nuclear EMP as

part of its larger asymmetric strategy since 1999, though has spent more time pursuing

conventional directed energy and electronic warfare weapons as well as exploring space

and counter-space capabilities, which it views as inevitable factors of future asymmetric

warfare54. Technical papers on EMP appear regularly in Chinese technical journals, such

as one published in a Chinese military digest in 2002, which stated “EMP warheads will

make it much easier to cross the nuclear threshold”55. The Taiwanese government, as a

possible target of nuclear EMP, has been writing about Chinese EMP capabilities since at

least 1992. One such report in October 2003, reported that “China is engaged in

quantitative production and deployment of EMP micro nuclear warheads”56. According

37

to a Wall Street Journal article in the same year, “China recently published an article on

EMP in a Chinese-language technical journal. To make sure the U.S. got the message, the

article appeared in English’”57. Though China retains its commitment to a no-first-use

policy, it is clear that as the Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons employment has

shifted over time, especially in terms of the employment of a nuclear weapon for EMP

effects. In the eyes of Chinese defense strategists, nuclear EMP “will make it much easier

to cross the nuclear threshold”58.

Though Iran has not directly stated an intention to acquire EMP capabilities, it is

widely believed to be actively pursuing the capabilities needed as part of its nuclear and

missile programs. The JCPOA succeeded in slowing the Iranian nuclear program,

delaying it about a decade. However, the agreement has done little to slow the progress of

Iran’s missile program. Some experts believe that “the military utility of Iran’s ballistic

missiles is limited because of their poor accuracy”59 however, the capabilities required to

successfully employ nuclear EMP do not require accuracy, “it just has to go up. It's well

within the capability of even an earlier Scud missile, of which thousands have been

produced – it just has to have nuclear weapon on top”60. This does not require re-entry

capabilities or sophisticated targeting systems. Iran’s missile testing so far has

demonstrated their ability to launch “their versions of Scuds off of the Caspian Sea - not

from land, but from the sea - and launched them over land. And we’ve also seen them

launch missiles that have gone up and apparently exploded near their highest altitude –

when you put those two ideas together – that is an EMP attack”61. As a rogue state, Iran is

notoriously vague and secretive about its capabilities and intentions. It is difficult to

determine whether nuclear EMP is truly within the offensive strategies of Iran however,

38

if desired, it would not be a technical stretch to accomplish. Finally, Iran’s history of

state-sponsored terrorism is especially troubling in terms of nuclear EMP and will be

explored and analyzed in further chapters in the context of the modern threat to the

United States.

North Korea, as previously analyzed, has tested nuclear weapons for over a

decade and is well aware of the ability to produce EMP effects, especially against U.S.

and allied forces in theater. South Korea has long been concerned about the threat of

nuclear EMP from North Korea and has published many articles in academic and security

journals concerning the threat to low-earth-orbit satellites above the region as well as the

risk of ensuing panic among U.S. forces in the region62 if or when damage is done to

forward-deployed U.S. capabilities. Though there is little data, much like Iran, to

concretely determine that nuclear EMP is among the capabilities North Korea is

attempting to acquire, recent rocket and missile tests into the Sea of Japan63 show that

North Korea may indeed be capable of inflicting nuclear harm or nuclear EMP in theater

on U.S. military assets in Japan or South Korea.

Nuclear weapons have changed little since the Cold War but the nature and

strategy of their employment, especially in terms of nuclear EMP has evolved. While

asymmetric warfare is not a new concept, the frequency with which it is undertaken and

the use of the capabilities it involves are purely modern. For many of the states discussed,

the employment of nuclear EMP is not thought of or strategized as a singular event, but

as part of a larger whole. To best understand why this is so and why states and non-state

actors may find nuclear EMP appealing, one must first understand the effects nuclear

39

EMP would have on the United States, its infrastructure, military capabilities and

citizens.

Modern Day EMP Vulnerabilities

Older technology, such as the previously mentioned vacuum tubes of the 1960’s,

is “one million times less vulnerable”64 than today’s technology and effects were still

observed more than 1,400 kilometers away from the Starfish Prime detonation. To best

understand the utility of nuclear EMP, one must first understand the vulnerabilities

inherent in today’s electronically-dependent world. The United States has long been

known as an innovative nation, one which has experienced leaps and bounds of

technological advancement. Today, the United States is more technologically advanced

than ever before and electronics, telecommunication systems and electrical systems form

the cornerstones of a thriving U.S. society (transportation, banking, water and agricultural

production and dissemination, communications, etc). However, these critical

infrastructures within the United States are very poorly protected, not just from events

like nuclear EMP but also from natural disasters or terrorist attacks. These vulnerabilities

are well-known among adversaries and both invite and reward attacks like cyber,

sabotage and nuclear EMP; an adversarial “cheap shot”, if you will.

In 2001, the Commission to Assess the Electromagnetic Pulse Threat was

established to study the vulnerabilities of critical U.S. infrastructure systems to nuclear

EMP attack. The commission evaluated all aspects of U.S. infrastructure as they are

dependent upon one another to function in a meaningful way. What the commission

found was that this dependency created significant challenges for recovery after a nuclear

EMP attack. In 2008, the Commission again assessed the critical infrastructure of the

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United States and found it to be extremely vulnerable to the effects of nuclear EMP, in

such a way that any devastating attack is considered an existential threat to the United

States. Below are the elements of U.S. critical infrastructure and how each may be

affected by nuclear EMP.

Electrical Power

The U.S. electric grid is composed of networks of local electricity supplies, with

large-capacity electric transmission hubs few and far between. In such a setup, even small

upsets in the system can cause functional collapses and large disturbances like “EMP-

level effects could degrade or collapse 70 percent of the country’s electrical service in

one instant”65. The system is designed to withstand disturbances like lightning strikes, but

in limited areas, not overwhelming, instantaneous high-voltage pulses across vast swaths

of the country, which is why the infrastructure relies on a strategy of “islanding”.

Figure 3. U.S. Electrical Grid Interconnections66

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When a portion of the system is damaged or interrupted, the other islands continue to

operate based on geographic locations of the larger transmission hubs. However, in the

event of an EMP attack, numerous (if not all) islands would be degraded or destroyed

simultaneously. Though peripheral islands, if functioning, are capable of restarting those

in the immediate vicinity, the process would require restarts in rounds from the outside of

the damaged area, in. This process would take weeks, if not months, during which the

affected population would remain without power. The Commission report argued that

with the current setup, the only effective way to restart the system would be through

“black start generation”67: the process of using hydroelectric, geothermal and

independent diesel generators to restart the grid. These energy producers are not as

common in the U.S. system and the process would still take significant time. Another

complicating element is the overarching need for restart processes to take place. The

ability to repair and restart electrical power systems requires communication systems,

operational finance systems and transportation systems which need reliable, continuous

fuel supply. Fuel supply, communications, transportation and finance infrastructures will

all be affected in the event of a strong EMP attack. Restoring those systems is not only

essential to the ability to restore power but essential to the quick recovery of civilian

order.

Electricity is produced and distributed in various ways in the United States, some

more resilient to nuclear EMP than others. Coal-fired generation plants are generally the

most durable and normally have on-site fuel storage, so in the event of an emergency,

they can produce energy, if only for a short amount of time. Natural gas-fired turbines are

more modern and therefore more vulnerable. Nuclear plants, which represent 20% of the

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country’s electrical generation, have their own safe shut down systems that go into effect

in the event of system upsets – their ability to shut down safely is key during EMP but

they will be unavailable as generation sources for months following an EMP attack68.

Hydroelectric power is durable against EMP and produces significant generation but does

so unevenly in terms of its geographic availability. Hydroelectric power would be key in

recovering service for areas along the coast or dams of large rivers. Hydroelectric power

is likely the most helpful in a black start generation process because their geographic

locations allow restart to happen from the periphery of the grid.

Electrical power is the number one concern for loss during an EMP attack, as

numerous critical aspects of civilian life and the functioning of government at all levels

depend upon an operational power grid. A single EMP attack “may be strong enough to

seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid in the geographic

area of EMP exposure effective instantaneously…Should significant parts of the electric

power infrastructure be lost for any substantial period of time, the Commission believes

that the consequences are likely to be catastrophic, and many people may ultimately die

for lack of the basic elements necessary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban

communities. In fact, the Commission is deeply concerned that such impacts are likely in

the event of an EMP attack unless practical steps are taken to provide protection for

critical elements of the electric system and for rapid restoration of electric power,

particularly to essential services”69. The good news is that protecting, or hardening, key

generation capabilities in strategic geographic locations within the system would be

enough to create a network capable of quick restart in the event of a devastating attack.

Hardening and protection of key capabilities also contributes to deterrence of an attack in

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the first place. If it becomes clear that the United States has taken significant steps to

protect critical infrastructure from damage or disruption, the risk v. reward calculus shifts

and an actor may not believe that an EMP attack would have the desired effects but still

prompt a U.S. response.

Telecommunications

The immediate aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 best illustrate, on

a smaller scale, what may happen in the aftermath of an EMP attack in terms of the

disruption or loss of telecommunications networks. Personal telecommunications, the

vast majority over cell phone networks, were disrupted up and down the east coast simply

due to call volume which overwhelmed the system and caused cascading failures. Radio

communications between first responders were patchy and communication at ground zero

was confusing and incomplete. Perhaps the most alarming failure in communications

networks was at the federal level. According to the staff report of the September 11th

Commission, the Defense Department’s National Military Command Center initiated a

conference call about the ongoing situation but had trouble including the FAA, who had

information about the hijackings: “Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA in

this teleconference, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone

numbers. NORAD asked three times before 10:03 to confirm the presence of FAA on the

conference, to provide an update on the hijackings. The FAA did not join the call until

10:17”70. By the time a complete picture of the hijackings was garnered through

information sharing of the FAA and DoD, the Pentagon had been attacked as well.

Though communications infrastructure was not directly targeted on September 11th, the

event highlighted difficulties and vulnerabilities within the telecommunications system as

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well as its connection to other aspects of the national security architecture. The

interruption in communications affected key financial markets and posed liquidity risks

for U.S. finances. Business continuity and financial stability are essential in the recovery

effort and are closely tied to U.S. national security. In the event of an EMP attack

targeted to destroy these systems, the results could be much more devastating and long-

lasting. Unprotected communication within the affected area would be impossible and

operational areas would be severely degraded due to overwhelming call volume.

Concerning federal communications, the Commission reports of 2004 and 2008

recommended that the federal government ensure the Government Emergency

Telecommunications System is operational and protected, as the four types of

communications within it are unique in their ability to withstanding EMP71. Wireline

communications are durable but may be degraded within the affected area; wireless

communications are likely to be destroyed and inoperable (unless they are powered down

at the time of attack); the radio communication sub-system is not widespread but where it

is connected to antennas, power lines and telephone lines it is highly vulnerable. Radio

communications not connected to those assets at the time of attack will likely be

operational; and low-earth orbit communications satellites may be degraded or inoperable

from radiation damage depending on the altitude and magnitude of the detonation72.

In April 2015, as part of the government’s effort to “safeguard the command’s

sensitive sensors and servers from a potential EMP attack”73, NORAD decided to move

critical assets, like servers, sensors and communications equipment, back into the bunker

at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, the Cold War cavern built in the 1960’s to safeguard

sensitive military communications and technology from a Soviet EMP attack. Raytheon

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was awarded a $700 million, 10-year contract to provide sustainment and maintenance

services to “help the military perform accurate, timely and unambiguous warning and

attack assessment of air, missile and space threats”74. The facility was closed down about

a decade ago after the military deemed the threat low enough to move the operations to

Peterson Air Force Base nearby. It is possible that this is a first step in protecting

sensitive communications as tensions with the Russians are once again on the rise.

Banking and Finance

The American economy, one of the largest and strongest in the world, depends

upon electrical systems to run effectively and globally. The financial services industry is

comprised of a network of systems that process instruments of monetary value (deposits,

loans, funds transfers, savings, etc.) through banks and depository institutions, including

the Federal Reserve, investment companies, and industry utilities such as the NYSE.

Without functioning electricity and computer systems, the industry would be crippled.

These are the means and resources that provide the U.S. population with the ability to

buy food, fuel and essential goods and services. Without it, the chances for chaos to erupt

in a short amount of time are very high. Of all the institutions affected by EMP, banking

and finance come second only to the electrical grid. There is a direct link between the

economic security of the nation and national security. The EMP Commission reports

identified the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Reserve Board and the

Department of the Treasury as the agencies responsible for ensuring there are mitigation

tactics and recovery strategies in place for events like EMP75. Even if recovery takes

weeks, this is one sector which must recover fully.

Fuel and Energy Infrastructure

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The transport and dissemination of fuel and energy depends upon electronic

control systems, real-time data flows, communications and process control systems.

Operation of oil refineries and other fuel production technology requires an operational

electric system. In the aftermath of an EMP attack, lack of access to fuel further

exacerbates the challenge of restarting the electric grid and providing transportation to the

civilian population, who may be attempting to leave affected areas. Access to fuel also

impacts the ability of the government to respond to crises stemming from EMP attacks,

such as food and water shortages and medical emergencies.

Transportation

Transportation in the United States occurs in several forms: rail, road, water and

air. A nuclear EMP attack would affect all four of these, but in different ways.

Transportation services in the United States are increasingly reliant on information

technology and public information networks and disruption even at the local or regional

level can have national effects. The significant degradation of the transportation

infrastructure is likely in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack76. This would include

wide-area gridlock (traffic light malfunctions, temporary or unrecoverable engine

shutdown), the cessation of rail transportation (lost communication with rail traffic

control), air traffic grounded (lost air traffic control) and port closures (commercial

power and cargo hauling capabilities inoperable).

There are mixed reports about the risk to airliners in flight during an EMP attack.

While it the effects of EMP on airliners has not been widely tested, it is believed that

more modern airline designs, such as the Boeing 777, may experience failure in flight in

the aftermath of EMP because of increased reliance on computerized technology in the

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newer models77. If this were to in fact occur, immediate deaths from EMP would climb

dramatically due to the number of airlines in flight over the United States at any given

time. In the aftermath of an EMP attack, the U.S. government and the FAA must find a

way for planes in flight to land safely, without an operable air traffic control. DHS and

the FAA will need to coordinate extended no-fly periods and perform assessments on the

air traffic control systems to determine how quickly it can be recovered78. While the

airline industry is not critical to the survival of the United States, the impact on civilian

life and economic health of the nation would be extreme and long-lasting.

Railroad transportation is designed to operate under high stress but they often

require ample warning time, in the case of severe weather, for example. There will be

little to no warning for an EMP attack, giving railroad operators no time to prepare for

delays, prioritize shipments and enhance safety. Long delays and disruption on railroads

would likely cause further disruption in the distribution of food, water and fuel during a

crucial time when the civilian population will be in need.

Similar to airliners, the effect of EMP on vehicles is debated. Newer model cars

with onboard computers are likely to be more affected than older models and cars

powered off at the time of the electromagnetic pulse are likely to be completely operable,

regardless of the technology inside. However, the impact of EMP on vehicles does not

just affect the mobility of civilians, it affects the transportation of vital resources like

food, water and emergency personnel. Without viable transportation, the ability of

distributors to get food out to grocery stores from regional warehouses would be severely

impacted. Grocery stores typically stock enough fresh food for three to five days while

warehouses stock about a month’s worth79. Panicked populations are likely to buy out

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grocery stores in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack, adding to concerns about

food distribution and civil order. The Stafford Act80, an act passed to authorize the

President to ensure that emergency mass feeding and distribution is able to occur

efficiently, could be amended to provide for plans to protect, ration and deliver food from

both government and private sector stockpiles and provide plans for distribution in the

event of a national emergency. The Department of Homeland Security would act as the

lead agency responsible for coordination and dissemination of food assistance in

partnership with the Departments of Agriculture and Defense. Similarly, the distribution

of water would be challenging. Though water facilities are designed to be protected from

threats by terrorists and natural disasters, EMP is not currently listed as a threat

consideration for water treatment or distribution facilities. Lack of access to food and

water combined with limited access to transportation could result in civil disorder, such

as widespread looting and crime.

Though employment of nuclear EMP does not typically result in immediate

civilian casualties, weeks or months without proper access to food, water or electricity

could very well result in widespread civilian harm or death. Emergency services would

be in high-demand from the beginning of the crisis and throughout the recovery.

However, the technology relied upon by emergency personnel, such as mobile radio

communications equipment, commercial telephone networks and civil power networks, is

likely to be degraded or destroyed by EMP which would severely impact response time,

logistics and critical health operations. Increased demand for emergency services will

overwhelm any operational systems, introducing further complications.

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Government, Military and Space Assets

Maintaining continuity of government in the immediate aftermath of a crisis such

as EMP is priority number one. Secure communications between the President and senior

officials must remain intact in order to provide stability to the public and command

responsive actions if any are to be ordered. National capabilities were designed and

fielded during the Cold War but may need to be updated to reflect the complexity and

sophistication of today’s government and military structure. Current policy requires

protection from EMP effects on U.S. strategic forces and command and control81.

Certifying and maintaining the credibility of U.S. strategic forces is challenging and, as

observed by the Commission in 2004, EMP protections on such systems have

experienced “relaxed discipline”82; the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces in particular

may have become an “acceptable risk” post-Cold War83. However, for U.S. strategic

forces to contribute to deterrence of an EMP attack, the ability of forces to withstand

EMP effects and reliably respond or retaliate must be certified regularly and with public

acknowledgment.

U.S. general purpose forces are consistently technologically superior to those of

the vast majority of the world. Advanced warfighting and joint combat operations depend

upon technologically advanced computing, information flow and superior

communications, all of which are powered by advanced electronics and space-borne

assets. This highly superior technology is extremely vulnerable to the effects of EMP,

making them an attractive target for asymmetric deployment of nuclear weapons against

U.S. forces and infrastructure terrestrially and in space. Low-earth orbit satellites that

enable up- and down-link capabilities, GPS and PNT, remote sensing, weather

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forecasting, imaging, and other mission critical capabilities are politically, militarily and

economically valuable. They are also among the most vulnerable when it comes to

damage and destruction from EMP effects. The Commission to Assess National Security

Space Management and Organization cited low-earth orbiting satellites as particularly

vulnerable to “severe lifetime degradation or outright failure from collateral radiation

effects resulting from EMP attacks on ground targets”84. Without operable space assets,

the ability of the United States to operate in cross-domain operations, joint operations or

communicate in any meaningful way would be degraded to a significant degree, if not

made nearly impossible. Essentially, large swaths of the U.S. military would be operating

deaf and blind. While it is not practical to fund EMP protections on every military

capability, space assets such as satellite navigation systems, satellite and airborne

intelligence and targeting systems, and missile defense systems must be protected from

every level of EMP effect to ensure the continued operational capability of strategic

assets of the U.S. military at home and in theater. To implement EMP protections as

acquisition and design requirements for critical military assets, like space capabilities and

critical platforms, it will “require the personal involvement and cooperation of the

Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Service Chiefs, and the

appropriate congressional oversight committees”85.

In 2008, the EMP Commission released a second study on the critical

infrastructures of the United States, in which the Commission expressed serious doubts

that the U.S. federal government has “sufficiently robust capabilities for reliably

assessing and managing EMP threats. The country is rapidly losing the technical

competence needed”86 within the national labs, industry and government communities.

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Inaction may increase the EMP threat to the United States due to widespread and openly

available analysis showing that the United States is highly vulnerable to large-scale

attacks on electrical critical infrastructure. Without visible, publicly reported investments

that show a directed effort to protect infrastructure against EMP-style effects, adversarial

actors may be incentivized to take advantage of this critical U.S. vulnerability.

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CHAPTER 4: THE 2003 NORTHEAST BLACKOUT – A CASE STUDY

On August 14, 2003, in what utility officials called “a blink-of-the-eye second”87,

eight states in the Northeast and Midwestern United States, as well as Southeastern parts

of Canada, experienced electrical blackout after a power line sagging due to heat and

increased energy demand brushed against overgrown vegetation. The failure in the line

caused others in the same network to fail, which ultimately resulted in a “massive

outflow”88 of power as other lines and ground systems tried to cope with the extra energy.

Eventually, the overtaxed systems shut down and cascading failures began to result in

massive power failures across the larger grid. The effects of the blackout were

widespread and significant; in the course of an afternoon, more than 50 million people

were without power. Airports in the region experienced significant delays due to air

traffic control disruption, commuters on subway trains at the time of the blackout had to

be evacuated as trains were left stranded, and traffic lights remained out or blinking for

hours causing widespread gridlock. Telecommunications companies reported disruption

in service due to call volume compounded by failures at several cellular transmitters

reliant on electricity providers within the affected area. ATM’s and bank teller machines

were inoperable, leaving citizens without cash on hand unable to purchase flashlights,

batteries or other emergency supplies and incidents of looting were reported in downtown

New York City. Perhaps the most dangerous effect of the blackout was the loss of air

conditioning in the height of summer. Citizens vulnerable to the heat began to overflow

emergency rooms which were relying on emergency generators for power. Some reported

vehicle-related injuries due to traffic accidents and pedestrians being hit by cars. The

ability of emergency personnel to navigate dark and gridlocked streets to reach those in

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need was severely hampered. The stock exchange had closed for the day and was not

itself disrupted, though the economic impact of the blackout was later calculated to be

near $6 billion89.

Almost ten years later, in 2012, a report published in the journal Epidemiology

cited nearly 100 deaths that the blackout directly caused or contributed to. The study

found that 12 individuals perished due to accidents (vehicle or otherwise), 38 by

cardiovascular conditions (heart attacks, some triggered by panic), three from respiratory

problems (exacerbated asthma) and 37 from various other health conditions. The New

York City health department blamed six deaths on carbon monoxide poisoning due to the

blackout90. The study concluded that “power outages can immediately and severely harm

human health” 91, whether as a direct impact or a contributing factor.

The cause of the 2003 Northeast blackout, as determined by a comprehensive

report by the Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability

Corporation (NERC), was identified as long-term inadequacies within the system and

institutional failures and weaknesses resulting in widespread cascading failure. The report

separated the causes into four categories: failure to assess and understand the

inadequacies in the system, inadequate situational awareness, failure to keep vegetation

growth under control, and failure of organizations to provide real-time diagnostic

support.92 In simple terms, the 2003 blackout was a result of a single failure compounded

by human error and widespread system weaknesses.

Prior to the blackout, NERC set standards for the electrical grid system but they

were largely “administrative and technical rather than results-oriented” and represented

“minimum requirements that may be made more stringent if appropriate by regional or

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sub-regional bodies, but the regions have varied in their willingness to implement

exacting reliability standards”93. Without requirements codified by the Federal

Government, the industry created standards and best practices for itself that in many

cases were not adequately followed or inadequately communicated to operators

responsible for maintaining service, even under abnormal operating conditions.

Following the release of the report, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005,

which expanded the role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), giving

the agency authority to approve and enforce energy industry standards and requirements.

These standards which were once voluntary, are now mandatory and legally enforceable.

Human error and lack of training also contributed to the blackout. At the station in

Ohio where the originating line came in contact with overgrown vegetation, an alarm

system designed to alert operators of problems had gone offline more than an hour before

the failure and no one in the control room had noticed. The failure of the alarm system

prevented operators from re-distributing power to less overloaded transmission lines.

Additionally, at the regional power facility in Indiana, a grid-monitoring computer

crashed. A technician was able to fix it but left for lunch and forgot to turn the computer

back on. Consequently, the regional power station was unable to collect data on issues

within the regional grid and their effect on other stations, and as such, could not monitor

or take action to prevent the cascading failures94. Once cascading failures begin, there is

little human intervention can do to stop them. The key in preventing or responding to

wide-scale energy failures is maintaining well-trained, prepared staff operators and

technicians who have practiced what to do in the event blackout conditions arise. The

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report found that “significant additional training is needed to qualify an individual to

perform system operation and management functions”95.

The 2003 blackout lasted for just over two days, though some areas were able to

restore power in several hours. The blackout was widespread and disruptive, but not

long-lasting and did not severely impact communications capabilities or any capabilities

not directly attached to the grid. Independent electronics and vehicles were unharmed.

General civility among the population remained intact and widespread panic was

avoided. Blackouts like this are a good indicator of how systems typically recover from

widespread events and what is needed in terms of technology standards and human

intervention and training, but are not always a good measure of the enormity of an attack

like nuclear EMP.

First, the recovery period for an EMP crisis would be much longer and more

demanding. Unlike blackouts, the infrastructure in an EMP attack would not just be

damaged or offline but in some cases destroyed and not just state-by-state or regionally

but likely across multiple regions or, if the nuclear weapon is large enough, across the

majority of the country. Recovery time from an EMP attack would be exponentially

longer and the process more difficult. Replacing the power transmission infrastructure is

much more complicated than simply purchasing equipment or capabilities which were

destroyed. In many cases, equipment used in this grid is “specially produced and has to

be ordered from overseas… and generally takes two years to be manufactured and

delivered”96. Though transmission units outside of the affected area could begin to restart

others as they became repaired, this process would take weeks and gaps would occur

where stations were waiting on destroyed units to be replaced. Without protecting this

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critical infrastructure from EMP effects, the recovery time will be weeks at a very

minimum.

Second, the stability of communities and civilian populations is at far higher risk

of collapsing the longer a crisis extends. In longer-lasting recovery periods, communities

experience wide-spread looting, opportunism and vigilante civil defense. After disasters,

people expect help, and they expect it from federal, state and local governments working

in concert. Emotional reactions are compounded by the paralysis of government and

emergency services. In the 2003 blackout, civil order remained intact largely because

communications infrastructure was unaffected and civilians were largely successful in

contacting loved ones and getting information from federal and state officials. In an EMP

attack, the ability to do so in a widespread manner is highly unlikely. The first

requirement, and most stabilizing influence, in response to a disaster like EMP is the

dissemination of information to the public. The second is bringing back the ability of the

public to communicate with friends and loved ones they will be concerned about.

Third, and finally, the 2003 blackout affected the ability of state and local

emergency services to respond in a limited manner but did not affect the ability of the

United States military or government to function. Because the stock market was

unaffected, the financial viability of the country remained intact. Government agencies

were able to communicate and U.S. national security assets were not degraded or

prevented from performing critical missions. All of these critical capabilities are at risk in

the event of nuclear EMP. Blackouts rarely test the ability of the Federal Government to

protect national security interests and assets, beyond maintaining civil order, however it

is in the government’s interest to consider the effects of extended blackout in concert

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with communication infrastructure loss in national security terms. If the U.S. government

and military capabilities are unable to communicate with one another, instability among

government will be coupled with instability among the civilian population. Without

visible leadership, the credibility of the United States at home and as an international

actor will suffer immensely.

The 2003 blackout serves as a useful example of the kinds of effects the United

States may experience in the immediate aftermath of an EMP attack. No case study is

perfect, as this type of attack has never been perpetrated against a modern civilian

population. However, by piecing together examples of widespread outage or damage

caused by blackouts, severe weather events and terrorist attacks, important lessons can be

learned about what to expect, what may be needed to respond or recover and what can be

realistically and economically prevented. This kind of analysis also highlights the

vulnerabilities inherent within U.S. systems and policies of response, both of which are

well known to U.S. adversaries who wish harm against the United States – whether that

occurs in the form of nuclear EMP, cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks or other actions.

Up to this point, this analysis has focused on the effects of nuclear EMP, the

capabilities of U.S. adversaries to deliver it and the consequences for the United States

should one succeed. The following chapter will take this context and analyze how and

why identified adversaries may employ nuclear EMP, how this threat impacts deterrence

and what strategies the United States may be able to use to deter the employment of

nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland and U.S. forces abroad.

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CHAPTER 5: THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR EMP

The employment of a nuclear weapon with the intention of creating widespread

EMP effects is a viable option of attack for both state and non-state actors. The capability

to employ a nuclear weapon in this manner is available to existing nuclear weapon states

like Russia and China, rogue states like North Korea and Iran, as well as to terrorist

organizations who are able to acquire the capability either through purchase or, less

likely, through independent development. The fact remains, however, that employment of

a nuclear weapon is a serious action and the effort required to gain the ability to do so is

immense. For an actor to expel that amount of effort and to take on extreme political and

security risks, the utility of employment must be quite high. This chapter will explore the

motivations behind the employment of EMP and why it remains a viable option or goal

for adversaries of the United States in the 21st century environment.

Rogue States

The employment of WMD is attractive to rogue states like Iran and North Korea

because it provides them an asymmetric response to U.S. technological and conventional

superiority and complicates U.S. response options. Rogue states are most likely to

employ nuclear EMP as a battlefield component of an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy:

employ a nuclear weapon at high-altitude, in theater, to severely hamper the ability of

U.S. and allied forces to communicate, maneuver, recover or respond; or employ a

nuclear weapon at high-altitude above a U.S. ally or partner, creating a regional crisis and

forcing the United States to act or remain out of the conflict; or employ a small nuclear

weapon at high-altitude above the United States, demonstrating nuclear weapons

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capability, lowering U.S. resolve to respond or intervene in regional conflicts, and

impacting the ability of the United States to operate, in a limited manner.

The employment of WMD, or threat of employment, can be useful in influencing

the decisions or actions of U.S. allies. It is possible that rogue states would threaten the

employment of WMD against U.S. allies, friends or coalition members to frighten them

out of cooperation with the United States, either in the form of U.S. basing abroad or

political, military and economic support. The strategic goals of rogue states, such as

regime survival and regional hegemony, are most threatened by the presence and actions

of the United States military in the region.

However, experts today are in disagreement about where North Korea would most

likely employ nuclear EMP. While a “Taepo Dong-2 missile launched from North Korea

probably could deliver a warhead 300 miles above America, enough to degrade electronic

systems throughout the country,”97 this may guarantee an overwhelming response from

the United States that would devastate the North Korean regime. As a strategic option for

ending a regional conflict, this action by North Korea is highly unlikely and irrational98.

There is little utility in perpetrating an attack against the U.S. homeland that would likely

result in the end of the North Korean regime, by the hands of the United States or its

allies. Far more likely, is the employment of a North Korean nuclear weapon in the

atmosphere above the Korean peninsula in an attempt to cripple U.S. and South Korean

military capabilities present in theater, possibly as a first step in a larger campaign. North

Korean technical capabilities are less likely to be affected by EMP (either through

protection or limited sophistication) and would remain operable enough to execute

military missions on the peninsula as U.S. and South Korean forces attempted to recover.

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However, if the North Korean regime were to perceive that it would not survive a

conflict, regardless of U.S. and allied response, it may very well decide to employ nuclear

EMP against the U.S. homeland as a final act in an attempt to bring the United States to

its knees.

Iran’s decision calculus for nuclear EMP is likely very similar. Iran’s desire to be

the reigning regional power in the Middle East is the driving force behind its missile and

nuclear programs. Without either, Iran’s ability to project power and influence the

regional security environment would be severely limited. Protecting the ability to

influence the security dynamics of the region and act as the pivotal regional power is

essential to maintaining control and to the survival of the Iranian regime as it currently

stands. Employment of nuclear EMP in theater would cripple any regional forces or

assets and would enable the regime to act decisively without the threat of intervention, by

the U.S. or another regional adversary. Israel has recognized the utility of this strategy

and has taken measures to protect its assets and capabilities against nuclear EMP in order

to maintain the ability to respond.99 The United States would be forced to make difficult

decisions about potential responses and policy moving forward. Unlike the environment

on the Korean peninsula, the United States would be facing a much more complex and

volatile security situation with far more chances for miscalculation.

Iran certainly possesses the ability to employ nuclear EMP against the U.S.

homeland but, similar to North Korea, has little reason to do so outside of dire

circumstances. The risk of an overwhelming response by the United States is much lower

if Iran were to employ nuclear EMP in theater. An “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is

much more likely to succeed if U.S. civilians and the homeland are unharmed, leaving

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the United States’ interpretation of proportional response much narrower. However, if

Iran were to employ nuclear EMP against the United States homeland, an overwhelming

response, nuclear or conventional, is much more likely – even if the deployment of

conventional assets is more difficult; the risk-reward calculus is much more skewed. In

the case of both Iran and North Korea, the response of the international community to an

attack on the U.S. homeland, rather than the employment of nuclear EMP in a crisis or

battlefield scenario, would likely be swift and decisive. For two states who value survival

above all else, the risk of an attack of such magnitude against the United States at home is

far higher than the reward.

Terrorist Organizations

As demonstrated by the attacks of September 11th, “our enemies will seek to

attack in ways we are not prepared for, using methodologies that have not previously

been tried”100. Nuclear EMP represents a unique challenge and opportunity to terrorist

organizations. While it is difficult for terrorist organizations to acquire the technology

and materials needed to successfully execute a nuclear EMP attack, if executed

successfully, the event and its aftermath would be highly visible and widely covered.

Terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIL have publicly announced their desire for

WMD capabilities and include “using the technology of directed energy weapons or

EMP” as part of their information warfare campaigns101. The beauty of EMP for terrorist

organizations is its indiscriminate nature: the U.S. military is not the only entity severely

affected by EMP; the U.S. public relies on electronic systems that would also be severely

impacted, degraded or destroyed. While the non-discriminatory aspect of EMP may deter

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a state actor from using it against the U.S. homeland (making it more attractive as a

battlefield weapon), a terrorist may very well find great utility in it.

The national security community is divided on how sophisticated the technology

required to produce EMP effects must be and, as a result, which actors are capable of

employing nuclear EMP. One side believes the technical requirements of a nuclear

weapon capable of producing EMP are too sophisticated and as such, are a barrier to

terrorist acquisition and use; ultimately, they believe that a crude nuclear weapons

package will not produce the desired effects. The weapon must have a trigger

mechanism, electronics and complicated physics package as well as be compact enough

to fit onto a ballistic missile or other sophisticated missile system102. In their view, it is

highly unlikely that a terrorist organization could successfully steal these capabilities; yet

it is possible they could be purchased. Iran and North Korea are the most likely sellers of

ballistic missiles to terrorist organizations, however they are unlikely to do so after

spending significant money and time on their own programs while simultaneously

incurring political and security risks. The sale of nuclear material and technology is much

more difficult and monitored closely by the international community. Programs like

Cooperative Threat Reduction, international agencies like the International Atomic

Energy Agency and international communities, such as signatories to the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty, ensure, to the best of their ability, that nuclear material does not

enter the hands of terrorist organizations. However, if a terrorist organization were able to

successfully purchase or steal a complete nuclear weapons package, fitting it onto a

missile it was not designed for would be equally technically challenging. For an

organization to be successful in both areas, it would need significant time, money and

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likely capable members or partners. However, cooperation with a terrorist organization,

especially for Iran, is not outside the realm of possibility, as it would complicate

attribution and pose significant challenges for the United States when determining

proportionate response. North Korea is less likely to engage in such activity, as they do

not have a long history of state-sponsored terrorism on a large-scale and keep a close

hold on their technological achievements. However, the other side of the community

argues that the barrier to employment of nuclear EMP is not as high as described here and

that EMP effects can be achieved with low-yield nuclear weapons, launched from

relatively unsophisticated missiles at close-range. As mentioned previously, all a missile

needs to do is go up. If a terrorist organization could, for example, launch a 10kt weapon

(the size believed to be in the North Korean nuclear arsenal) with a short-range missile

off the coast of the United States from a cargo or transportation ship, it would likely

succeed in producing EMP effects up and down the coast of the United States103.

While the challenges facing a terrorist organization in acquiring nuclear

technology and missile capabilities are daunting, they are not impossible to overcome.

Once a terrorist organization has acquired the necessary materials and technology, it is

unlikely to hold onto it for long. Terrorist use of WMD has long been on the agenda and

once acquired, the organization is unlikely to wait to employ it, for fear of losing it to

adversaries who locate it and deny their ability to employ it. Depending on the

organization, it may be far more useful to employ a crude nuclear device in a more

traditional terror attack, such as a truck bomb, than go through the effort to employ a

successful EMP attack. How a terrorist organization chooses to employ WMD depends

completely on desired effect. If an organization is willing to take a longer view, it may

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very well decide upon nuclear EMP due to the existential nature of the threat against the

United States.

Russia and China

Unlike rogue states and terrorist organizations, nuclear EMP fits into a larger asymmetric

strategy for nuclear weapon states, in this case Russia and China. As has been previously

discussed, nuclear EMP does not represent a stand-alone strategy for either of these

actors but enables a larger asymmetric strategy to succeed. Nuclear weapons still act as a

counter to the conventional superiority of the United States and will continue to do so in

relations between Russia and China and the United States. However, the utility of nuclear

EMP is in its ambiguity as to whether it is considered employment of a nuclear weapon in

the traditional sense and therefore, whether employment of nuclear EMP is considered a

crossing of the nuclear threshold. The nuclear EMP policies of Russia and China suggest

that these two states believe the risk the United States would view nuclear EMP as a

crossing of the nuclear threshold and respond with nuclear weapons is low104. The

Russian belief in this theory is so strong that they have in the past made threats of nuclear

EMP based on it: “In 1999, for example, at a high level meeting in Vienna of a

Congressional delegation with senior members of the Russian government, Vladimir

Lukin, the chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, angry with American

policy in the Balkans, issued the following threat: ‘If we really wanted to hurt you with

no fear of retaliation, we would launch a Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM),

[and] we would detonate a nuclear weapon high above your country and shut down your

power grid’.”105

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Both Russia and China would benefit from a United States forced to retreat from the

global stage as it recovered from a devastatingly successful nuclear EMP attack. Russia

would emerge as the militarily superior power and China as the economic super power of

the world. Both would enjoy increased influence in their respective regions and face little

resistance to their expansionist strategies and territorial claims. Though NATO would

likely invoke Article 5 and attempt to respond to Russia, without the capabilities of the

United States, the alliance would struggle to match the military might of the Russian

Federation. The security environment in Europe would drastically change without the

deterrent effect of a NATO backed by U.S. nuclear capabilities. The Baltic States would

likely face a rapidly expansionist Russia and events like those witnessed in Crimea,

Ukraine in 2013 would be further enabled. China’s claims to islands in the South China

Sea would largely go unanswered and the security of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan

would lessen dramatically. In either case, it is likely that regional conflicts and crises

would break out with very limited U.S. aid or none at all. Though cooperation between

Russia and China in executing a nuclear EMP attack against the United States is highly

unlikely, one would certainly reap benefits from the action of the other. There is a high

likelihood that breakdowns in security in both regions would occur, regardless of who

perpetrated the attack. Russia and China recognize the opportunity nuclear EMP affords

them and has prepared their nuclear weapons and missile systems to be capable of

carrying it out. Through viewing nuclear EMP as an asymmetric capability, they increase

both the utility of it and the likelihood that it may be employed in today’s security

environment.

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Actor Threat Level Target Region Capability

Russia Moderate U.S. Homeland High-yield NW, Ballistic

Missile

China Moderate U.S. Homeland/In

Theater

High-yield NW, Ballistic

Missile

Iran Low In Theater Low-yield NW, Ballistic or

Cruise Missile

North Korea Low In Theater Low- or High-yield NW,

Ballistic or Cruise Missile

Terrorist

Organization

Low U.S. Homeland Low-yield NW, Crude

Ballistic or Cruise Missile

Table 1. Level of EMP Threat According to Actor

Nuclear EMP presents a unique opportunity to state and non-state actors alike.

While the threat of nuclear weapons employment against the U.S. homeland has been

reduced since the end of the Cold War, the utility of the employment of nuclear EMP has

risen dramatically. U.S. reliance on sophisticated electronics and technologically

advanced systems has created a vulnerability that now represents an existential threat to

the existence of the United States in its current form. No other threat facing the United

States in the 21st century security environment represents greater consequences,

regardless of its low likelihood. The following chapter analyzes how the threat of nuclear

EMP, as portrayed by the actors discussed here, impacts and challenges traditional

strategic deterrence and recommends the best deterrence strategies to reduce the risk of

employment or deter attack altogether.

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CHAPTER 6: NUCLEAR EMP AND DETERRENCE

Deterrence during the Cold War relied on the mutual understanding that nuclear

employment by one side would result in massive retaliation by the other. In the modern

warfare environment, massive retaliation has largely fallen by the wayside, replaced by

theories such as tailored deterrence, minimum deterrence and escalation control. The act

of deterring nuclear weapons employment includes more than the employment of nuclear

weapons in return but includes the ability to deny successful employment through

capabilities such as missile defense. As the deterrence picture became more complicated,

so did the threats. During the Cold War, nuclear EMP was a component of nuclear

employment, provoking the same result as detonating a nuclear weapon on enemy

territory. There was no daylight between the types of employment one could choose and

the response they received. The same is not true for today. Traditional approaches to

nuclear deterrence do not fully encompass or address the threat of nuclear

electromagnetic pulse. If the United States is to deter or deny the employment of nuclear

EMP against its homeland and forces and allies abroad, it must take current deterrence

policy and shape it to specifically address this threat, regardless of who poses it.

The 2004 EMP Commission began its analysis with upfront recommendations,

one of the first of which was to determine and develop a deterrence strategy designed to

counter the threat posed by nuclear EMP106, which would then be supplemented by

improvements in the protections of U.S. critical infrastructure systems and U.S. military

assets. As discussed in previous chapters, a tangible step the United States can take in

deterring an EMP attack is investing in physical protections of U.S. critical infrastructure,

including key transmission lines in the electrical grid, U.S. space assets (military and

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commercial), and strategic nuclear forces. As spending on nuclear weapons declined, so

did “budgets for programs to harden key satellite, communications and other critical

nuclear and non-nuclear supporting equipment and facilities to the effects of nuclear-

induced electromagnetic pulse…the failure to spend funds to maintain the hardness

against EMP…may be compounded by our increasing reliance on commercial off-the-

shelf technology. … If nuclear weapons and supporting systems, such as the systems that

warn of a missile attack, do not survive or do not operate as planned, they will not

support robust and flexible deterrence”107. The United States can also conduct training

exercises designed to train civilian and military personnel at all levels of critical

infrastructure how to recognize an EMP attack and what to do in the immediate

aftermath. Doing so in a deliberate and public manner will not only heighten U.S.

consciousness of the threat and prepare both civilian and military agencies for

emergencies, but lower the level of high-consequence risk to the United States and make

an EMP attack less attractive to adversaries. Reduced consequences have a direct

correlation in reducing risk and probability of attack. Additionally if the United States

can protect civilian and military assets in a meaningful way, the risk of delayed response

due to distraction by the level of devastation at home is far less and would contribute to a

credible threat of response. In fact, not investing in such protections, may incentivize an

adversary to choose nuclear EMP as a course of action due to their belief that the United

States would be blindsided and further incapacitated.

U.S. national security strategies over the years have contributed indirectly to the

deterrence of nuclear EMP and the defense of the nation and its allies through taking

actions to strengthen alliances to defeat terrorism and strengthen and enforce counter-

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proliferation and non-proliferation regimes, both independently and as part of global

partnerships108. These actions contribute significantly to the deterrence of terrorist

acquisition of a nuclear weapon or sophisticated missile technology, but do little to deter

the employment of nuclear EMP once already acquired. The same national security

strategies have called for increased ballistic missile defense and global precision strike

capabilities, both of which increase the ability of the United States to defend against

incoming missile threats to the homeland but do little to deter employment of nuclear

EMP. Currently, the only missile defense system capable of intercepting and destroying a

missile exo-atmospherically is the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)

system. THAAD has only successfully demonstrated the capability to destroy missiles

outside the Earth’s atmosphere twice109, one of which was a Medium-range ballistic

missile. While this is an achievement in missile defense technology, its contribution to

the deterrence of nuclear EMP is less significant. U.S. missile defense systems would

need to identify a missile as intended for nuclear EMP and intercept and destroy it prior

to its exit from Earth’s atmosphere, where it would be designed to detonate for maximum

EMP effect. To contribute in a significant way to deterrence or defense against nuclear

EMP, THAAD would be required to work far more often and at a much earlier stage than

it is currently designed. The capabilities of U.S. missile defenses simply “remain

uncertain at best”110 and do not address the technical challenges of defending against

high-altitude nuclear detonations.

Tangible protection measures, specialized training, international efforts to prevent

technology and material transfer, and kinetic defenses all contribute to the defense and

deterrence of nuclear EMP but do not lower risk to an acceptable level on their own.

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These measures must be supplemented by a strong deterrence strategy. Lawrence

Freedman, the prolific thinker on deterrence strategy, wrote in 2004 that deterrence “in

all cases is about setting boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with

the crossing of those boundaries…During the Cold War…the study of deterrence became

synonymous with the study of the strategic conduct of the Cold War. The confrontation

defined the concept rather than the concept the confrontation”111. In the case of nuclear

EMP, the current view of the United States is much the same; the confrontation defines

the concept of deterrence, rather than deterrence of the confrontation defining the

landscape in which it exists. To ignore the landscape out of which the threat emanates is

to ignore the reasons behind why actors would choose to employ nuclear EMP in the first

place. With these reasons understood, the United States must now create a strategy of

deterrence that defines the confrontation of nuclear EMP.

For a credible deterrence strategy to be formed around the issue of nuclear EMP,

the United States must first be willing to unambiguously designate the employment of a

nuclear weapon to achieve EMP effects as a crossing of the nuclear threshold. Doing so

upends the strategic calculus of adversaries like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea who

believe that the United States may not classify it as such and as a result, may exercise

restraint in response112. Strategic ambiguity does not serve the United States well when it

comes to the threat of nuclear EMP, mainly due to the fact that the very ability of the

United States to respond may be hampered by the effects of the attack itself. Strategic

nuclear forces will likely survive, and depending on the location of the detonation,

regional assets are likely to as well. Though the United States may choose not to respond

with a nuclear weapon detonation on the perpetrators territory, it must remain a clear and

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viable option. The nature of U.S. employment of a nuclear weapon in response - whether

it be a high-altitude detonation over the perpetrators territory, a low-yield, tactical ground

burst, or an air-burst targeting military assets – can remain ambiguous, but the United

States must be willing to maintain the long-held policy that an action crossing the nuclear

threshold will incur a proportionate and necessary response. As Freedman writes, “when

using deterrence to defend an interest, it is necessary not only to demonstrate how

deterrence will work if challenged but also the nature of the interest to be defended”113.

Nuclear EMP, as an existential threat, threatens the greatest security interest of the United

States: to maintain the security of the homeland, the safety of U.S. citizens and the role of

the United States in the world as a leading democratic power.

Establishing a declaratory policy that outlines the employment of nuclear EMP as

a violation of the nuclear threshold allows the United States to then tailor the strategy to

address the two aspects of the threat: deter employment of EMP in theater and deter

employment of EMP against the U.S. homeland. Unlike the strategic nuclear deterrence

strategies used today to deter nuclear employment in more traditional ways, deterrence

strategies for EMP need not be tailored by actor but by employment scenario. The results

for the actor who chooses to employ nuclear EMP should be largely the same, regardless

of who the actor may be. For North Korea and Iran, those results likely mean the end of

their regime – which speaks to their greatest strategic interest. For states like Russia and

China, those results mean devastating response on their homeland with the risk of

triggering a large-scale conflict that is outside of their interests and does not achieve the

strategic goal they hoped to through employment of nuclear EMP. Terrorist

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organizations, however, are a different animal altogether and must be considered

separately.

Additionally, any strategy designed to deter nuclear EMP must maintain the

freedom of the United States to respond across domains. Should an adversary employ

nuclear EMP with the intention of solely targeting U.S. space assets (though the physics

of a high-altitude nuclear detonation would likely result in effects terrestrially as well),

the United States should be clear in its declaratory policy that it maintains the freedom

and capability to respond to the perpetrator both in space and on earth. Due to the fact

that rules of engagement in space are not established and norms of weapons in space are

increasingly challenged, the risk of nuclear EMP employment specifically designed to

effect space assets is rising. In creating a strong policy on responses to nuclear EMP in

space, the United States may well lead the way in establishing deterrence norms about the

weaponization of the space domain, which in turn complicates the risk calculus for actors

looking to exploit vulnerabilities in space and enhances terrestrial deterrence strategies.

Though deterring nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland is priority number one,

the likelihood of nuclear EMP employment is far higher in theater because the utility in

an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is greater. Deterring an actor from employing a

nuclear weapon at high-altitude above a conflict zone not only requires the credible

capability of U.S. and allied forces to survive enough to respond quickly and in kind, but

requires a declaratory policy that is detailed and clear in its approach to response. The

United States must credibly convince the actor that crossing the nuclear threshold with

the employment of EMP would not only prompt devastating U.S. action against the

regime’s homeland in the form of targeted nuclear response against military assets, such

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as identified nuclear weapons facilities (ensuring the inability to launch additional

nuclear weapons), but overwhelming conventional response as well.

Deterrence of the employment of nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland looks

slightly different because the intended effects are different, are intended to occur on a

much larger scale and impact the U.S. civilian population in significant and potentially

long-lasting ways. The ability of the United States to credibly deny an adversary the

capabilities or chance to employ nuclear EMP against the United States is much more

important in this scenario than it is in theater. U.S. nonproliferation and counter-

proliferation efforts will go a long way in denying adversaries like Iran, North Korea and

terrorist organizations the ability to acquire sophisticated enough technology to launch a

nuclear EMP attack from their own territory. Denying their ability to launch an attack

from a mobile position, such as a freight cargo ship in the oceans off the coast of the

United States, is much more difficult and depends upon international cooperation in

intelligence and interdiction efforts. Improved homeland missile defenses with the

capability to monitor and destroy missile threats before they exit Earth’s atmosphere and

hardened, survivable space assets (both civilian and military) would also contribute to

credible denial efforts for actors like Russia and China who would not be affected by

efforts to control technology and materials.

The key in deterring nuclear EMP against the U.S. homeland is in convincing an

actor that their attempt at crippling the United States will either not be as effective as

intended or will not succeed at all. The greater the survivability of the United States, the

greater the chance of instant and overwhelming response, therefore making the risk

greater than the potential reward. If the United States can succeed in credibly defending

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the capabilities needed to respond to a nuclear EMP attack, such as strategic nuclear

weapon systems, communications, and command and control, then an aggressive

declaratory policy in which nuclear employment is not a last resort is much more

effective; this of course does not mean that an overwhelming conventional response

would not be seen as proportional. However, the United States should make clear that

self-deterrence will not be a consideration in response to nuclear EMP attacks against the

U.S. homeland, eliminating any doubt that the United States would be unwilling to

respond to a nuclear non-casualty event with nuclear weapons.

The act of deterring a terrorist organization from employing nuclear EMP is more

difficult, though not impossible. Declaratory policy and threats against the “homeland” of

a terrorist organization are less effective because terrorist organizations are often located

amongst innocent civilian populations and within the borders of sovereign nations, who

may or may not have been involved or complicit in an attack. In the case of terrorist

employment of EMP, self-deterrence is a serious consideration on the part of the United

States. That being said, terrorism and terrorist employment of WMD is not an abstract

concept to U.S. national security experts and planners. If those same experts can be

convinced of the reality of nuclear EMP as a threat to the U.S. homeland, that is likely a

community that can galvanize efforts to protect critical infrastructure against the threat.

As Freedman explains, “the argument that deterrence does not work with terrorism can be

challenged, not because for every terrorist challenge a sure-fire form of deterrence can be

devised, but because over time it becomes apparent that this is a threat for which the

community has made adequate provision to the point where, even if some attacks

succeed, little of political consequence will follow and those responsible can expect they

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will be hunted down and punished”114. In this same vein, if the United States can

convince state actors, like Iran, that their sponsorship or aid of a terrorist organization in

acquiring nuclear EMP capabilities will be treated with the same severity of response as

those who perpetrated the attack itself, the United States may be successful in deterring

terrorist acquisition of EMP capabilities in the first place. However, proportional

response means little to a terrorist organization who already has the capability and threats

of U.S. nuclear employment against them are neither very credible nor realistic. Instead,

strategies of containment and disruption are most likely to prevent a terrorist organization

from acquiring the necessary capability and strategies of prevention and denial are most

effective in convincing a terrorist organization that nuclear EMP will not succeed in

achieving their goals. Though terrorist employment of WMD in less sophisticated ways,

such as crude bombs in trucks or pressure cookers, would be devastating, it would be far

less consequential for the United States in the long-term than an effective nuclear EMP

attack.

Nuclear EMP poses a unique deterrence challenge for the United States, a country

which has typically relied upon traditional strategic deterrence strategies to deter high-

end nuclear employment and large-scale conventional conflict. Nuclear EMP in the 21st

century, while still employment of a nuclear weapon, exists in an inherently different

threat realm as an asymmetric tool. It is for this reason, and the potential crippling impact

on U.S. capabilities, that nuclear EMP represents such an attractive option to U.S.

adversaries. The United States must recognize this fact and shift its own thinking

regarding the utility of nuclear EMP for a range of adversaries. In doing so, the United

States will not only increase its own understanding of strategic deterrence in the 21st

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century but also begin to effectively deter threats and defend the U.S. homeland, U.S.

allies and friends from actions that threaten to alter the security landscape for years to

come.

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CONCLUSION

The United States has faced a myriad of threats since those first nuclear weapons

tests in 1962 exhibited electromagnetic pulse effects, from all-out nuclear war to

terrorism to regional conflict. It is highly unusual that a threat of an era long thought over

would return to be more salient than it was at its inception. However, as the United States

became increasingly reliant on technology and advances in communications, energy

technology, transportation, electronics and military capabilities proliferated, a

vulnerability – an invisible Achilles heel – presented itself. Adversaries of the United

States did not walk away from the Cold War era in the same way the United States did

and they learned different lessons from the capabilities and strategies of those decades.

The United States developed strategies dependent upon its ability to assert its military

dominance, enabled by capabilities like precision strike and advances in communications

and electronics. These capabilities and the technology that enables them, are the Achilles

heel adversaries seek to exploit.

While the United States attempted to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, they

became increasingly valuable to actors who could never compete with conventionally

superior adversaries. The United States, in many ways, became intellectually lazy in its

assessment of adversary motivations, capabilities and intentions. These trends have

contributed to the complex security environment of today, one in which the United States

finds itself existentially vulnerable to a threat it doesn’t believe is there in any meaningful

way. This is reflective of the kind of thinking that precipitated the attacks of September

11, 2001: a lack of creativity and out-of-the-box thinking that results in almost willful

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blindness to credible, potentially devastating threats that, once they occur, change the

fundamental fabric of the nation.

As discussed and analyzed in the pages here, the United States has the tools to

prevent or deter this threat, if it is willing to acknowledge it. The following are

recommendations for the United States government and its friends and allies to best deter

and prevent the unthinkable from becoming reality:

1. Immediately invest in the protection of critical infrastructure, especially those that

would take the longest to repair or replace (Large turbines, generators, high-

voltage transformers, key regional electrical grid stations, air traffic control, water

filtration and distribution centers, government communications, command and

control, critical components of the financial industry, and perhaps most

importantly, space assets – especially low-earth orbit satellites, both commercial

and military). Some individual U.S. states have begun to invest in their own

protections against EMP. Maine, Virginia and Arizona have all passed their own

laws about hardening against EMP. Florida has established a Cyber and EMP

Legislative working group115. The Federal Government can follow by expanding

the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructures Act of 2014 to include

threats from nuclear EMP and implementing the recommendations of the EMP

Commission reports as well as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

2. Publicly classify employment of a nuclear weapon to create EMP effects as an act

that crosses the nuclear threshold, no exceptions.

3. Develop a sophisticated and specific deterrence strategy for EMP attacks against

the U.S. homeland and EMP attacks in theater. Conduct studies to determine the

utility and impact of ambiguity on deterrence of nuclear EMP116.

4. Specifically identify nuclear EMP as a threat in publicly released policy and

strategy documents, such as the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense

Reviews, National Planning Scenarios, etc. Send a signal to adversaries that this

threat does not go unnoticed by the U.S. government. Lay the groundwork for

contributing to deterrence and denial.

5. Improve U.S. cross-domain capabilities. Actively participate in exercises

independently and with allies demonstrating cross-domain operational

capabilities.

6. Strengthen partnerships with U.S. allies and friends to improve intelligence and

interdiction of nuclear material and ballistic missile technology.

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7. Seek to improve U.S. missile defense capabilities to recognize and deny nuclear

EMP attacks.

8. Define the responsibilities of the Federal Government, state and local

governments and the private sector in recovering from an EMP attack against the

U.S. homeland. Equip and train individuals and agencies to respond specifically

to EMP effects. As of 2008, the EMP Commission was unable to convince the

Department of Homeland Security to include an EMP attack as one of the

National Planning Scenarios117; this should be priority number one in terms of

equipping federal agencies with responsibilities and action items in the event of a

nuclear EMP attack.

9. Continue to fund, for the next five to ten years, the Congressional EMP

Commission which was re-established in the 2016 National Defense

Authorization Act. Require reports on the study requirements as laid out in the

NDAA, including the vulnerability of U.S. military systems; the evolving current

and future threat; new technologies, procedures and contingency planning efforts

to protect against EMP; priorities for protection in each U.S. state; and the degree

of vulnerabilities in cascading failures118. Expand the study requirements to

include a study of the deterrence requirements and strategies that may be

employed against the threat of nuclear EMP for each actor capable of executing

the threat.

The United States remains the pre-eminent military power in the world and

continues to lead the way in technological advancements. As the security environment

becomes more complex, U.S. leadership will continue to play a role in creating a safer

world for many across the globe. To ignore capabilities and intentions that threaten that

role, not to mention the lives of its citizens and military personnel, is to ignore the

fundamental responsibilities and values the United States has for so long upheld. The

threat of nuclear EMP is real, present and clear. It is long past time the United States take

action to mitigate this threat and modernize its approach to deterrence in the 21st century.

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1 Keck, Zachary. “A Tale of Two Offset Strategies”, The Diplomat, November 18, 2014. 2 Huessey, Peter. "Electronic Doomsday for the U.S.?" January 13, 2016.

https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7214/electro-magnetic-pulse-emp. 3 Kirkpatrick, Melanie. "Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World." The Wall Street Journal, July 13,

2009. 4 Detwiler, Peter. "Failure to Protect U.S. Against Electromagnetic Pulse Threat Could Make 9/11 Look

Trivial Someday." Forbes, July 31, 2014.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2014/07/31/protecting-the-u-s-against-the-electromagnetic-

pulse-threat-a-continued-failure-of-leadership-could-make-911-look-trivial-someday/#179321387fcd 5 Wilson, Clay. “HEMP and HPM Devices: Threat Assessment.” CRS Report for Congress, July 21, 2008. 6 As is discussed in more detail further in the paper, the 2016 NDAA included a provision which required

the formulation of a new commission on the EMP threat. At the time this paper was written and completed,

the commission had not yet come to conclusions or published any results of their findings. This paper can –

and likely will – be updated upon completion of that commission for any changes to the level of threat as

examined. 7 Many thanks to my colleague, Rear Admiral Sam Paparo, for his insights, contributions and editing of this

section. 8 Global Trends 2030. Report. National Intelligence Council. 2010, viii. 9 Global Strategic Trends out to 2040. Report. Strategic Trends Programme, Ministry of Defence. 2013,

xxiii. 10 Ibid, 95. 11 Global Trends 2030, xi. 12 Ibid, iii. 13 Global Strategic Trends 2040, 94. 14 Mugg, James. “Russian Military Modernization: Everything Old is New Again”, Real Clear Defense,

January 17, 2017,

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/01/17/russian_military_modernisation_everything_old_is_n

ew_again_110645.html. 15 Global Trends 2030. 16 Global Trends 2030, iv. 17 Ibid, 5. 18 Ibid, iii. 19 Global Strategic Trends 2040, 135. 20 Global Trends 2030, 59. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid, 67. 23 Ibid. 24 Foster, Jr., John S. et al. Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Electromagnetic Pulse Commission, 2004, 47. 25 It is important to note that rogue states such as Iran and North Korea were parties to the NPT though

North Korea left the treaty in 2003 and Iran, though it remains a party, has been found in noncompliance of

its treaty obligations. 26 "Obama Prague Speech on Nuclear Weapons: Full Text." Huffington Post, May 6, 2009.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/05/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219.html 27 Reif, Kingston. “What Mattis and Perry Said about Nuclear Policy.” Arms Control Association, January

25, 2017. https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2017-01-25/What-Mattis-and-Perry-Said-

About-Nuclear-Policy 28 Woolf, Amy E. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments and Issues. Congressional

Research Service. February 10, 2017. 29 Kristensen, Hans M. Russian Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Status, Trends and Implications. Issue

Brief. Federation of American Scientists. September 29, 2014.

81

30 Oliker, Olga. Russia's Nuclear Doctrine. Issue brief. Center for Strategic and International Studies. May

2016. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-

public/publication/160504_Oliker_RussiasNuclearDoctrine_Web.pdf 31 In this instance, “first-use” is used instead of employment, because it is the name of the policy, widely

used throughout the nuclear weapons community. The term first-use will appear in discussions of the U.S.

policy as well, as the Obama administration debated adopting a no-first-use policy for U.S. nuclear

weapons. 32 Schneider, Mark. “The Emerging EMP Threat to the United States.” National Institute for Public Policy,

November 2007, 3. 33 Pry, Peter Vincent. Apocalypse Unknown: The Struggle to Protect America from an Electromagnetic

Pulse Catastrophe. Washington, DC: Task Force on National and Homeland Security, 2013. 34 “China”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 2015. www.nit.org/learn/countries/china/nuclear/. 35 Ibid. 36 Schneider, 2007. 37 “Iran”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 2015, www.nit.org/learn/countries/iran/missile/. 38 In 1958, a scientist named James Van Allen discovered radiation belts in the Earth’s magnetosphere. He

agreed to participate in a military study on how these radiation belts (later named Van Allen belts) were

affected by disruptions caused by the detonation of a nuclear weapon. There is no evidence, however, that

the United States was looking to determine how to use nuclear weapon effects as weapons themselves but

rather to understand the effects on U.S. space assets. 39 Quote by Peter Pry. “Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security and the Subcommittee

on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, First Session, May 13,

2015. 40 The nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima was, in comparison, about 13 kilotons. 41 Quote by Dr. William Graham. “Failure to Protect U.S. Against Electromagnetic Pulse Threat Could

Make 9/11 Look Trivial Someday”, Forbes, 31 July 2014.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2014/07/31/protecting-the-u-s-against-the-electromagnetic-

pulse-threat-a-continued-failure-of-leadership-could-make-911-look-trivial-someday/#179321387fcd. 42 “America’s Vulnerability to a Different Nuclear Threat: EMP”, Heritage Foundation, 2000. 43 “Starfish Prime”. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Organization. https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/9-july-1962starfish-prime-outer-space 44 Bump, Philip. “Republic Warnings about an EMP Attack Explained”, The Washington Post, January 15,

2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/15/no-you-dont-really-need-to-worry-

about-an-emp-attack/?utm_term=.6713151d243a. 45 Stein, Daniel L. “Electromagnetic Pulse: An Uncertain Certainty”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March

1993. 46 Wilson, 7. 47 “America’s Vulnerability”, Heritage. 48 Quote by Peter Pry. Forbes, July 2014. 49 GWEN was dismantled and replaced with Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable Terminal, or SCAMP,

a high-frequency technology resistant to EMP that is lightweight, transportable and interoperable with

today’s DoD satellite networks. The satellites are unaffected by the detonation of a nuclear weapon and its

associated radiation. 50 Ibid. 51 Schneider, 5. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Wilson, Congressional Research Service, 17-18. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid, 8. 59 Elleman, Michael. “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program”, The Iran Primer, U.S. Institute of Peace, August

2015. 60 Quote by William Graham. Forbes, July 2014. 61 Ibid.

82

62 Schneider, NIPP. 63 Pry, Peter. “Secure Freedom Radio Podcast with Frank Gaffney”, Center for Security Policy, March 10,

2017. 64 Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security and the Subcommittee on Oversight and

Government Reform, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, First Session, May 13, 2015. 65 Foster, EMP Commission, 2004. 66 Foster, Jr., John S. et al. Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Critical National Infrastructures, Electromagnetic Pulse

Commission, 2008. 67 Ibid. 68 Foster, EMP Commission, 2004, 21. 69 Quote by William Graham, Forbes, 2014. 70 “Improvising a Homeland Defense”, Staff Statement Number 17, National Commission on Terror Attacks

Upon the United States, 2004. 71 Foster, EMP Commission, 2004, 26. 72 Ibid, 26-28. 73 Nye, James. “Why is the US Military Moving Back into ‘Stargate’ base deep under the Rocky Mountains

a Decade After it was Abandoned?”, Daily Mail UK, April 8, 2015,

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3031041/Why-military-moving-Stargate-base-deep-Rocky-

Mountains-decade-abandoned.html. 74 Joint Hearing on National Security and Government Reform, May 2015. 75 Foster, EMP Commission, 2004, 31. 76 Ibid, 36. 77 Foster, EMP Commission, 2004, 124. 78 Foster, EMP Commission, 2004, 39. 79 Ibid, 40. 80 Ibid. 81 The requirement for EMP hardened systems exists as part of the acquisition process and as a result, many

equipment components meet requirements individually but integrated systems do not and are not tested to

certification (with the exception of strategic force components). The challenge of overall system protection

is often seen as a disincentive to applying the necessary rigor throughout the acquisition process in terms of

EMP protections. Cost concerns are often also cited as a reason why EMP requirements are not upheld

throughout the acquisition process. Typically, the expense of hardening entire systems against EMP

averages about 3-5% of the total cost of the system. 82 Ibid, 47. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid, 44. 85 Ibid, 48. 86 Foster, EMP Commission, 2008, viii. 87 Barron, James. “The Blackout of 2003: The Overview, Power Surge Blacks Out Northeast, Hitting Cities

in 8 States and Canada; Midday Shutdowns Disrupt Millions”, The New York Times, August 15, 2003. 88Ibid. 89 Minkel, JR. “The 2003 Northeast Blackout – Five Years Later”, Scientific American, August 13, 2008.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2003-blackout-five-years-later/ 90 “Spike in deaths blamed on 2003 New York blackout”, Health News Reuters, January 27, 2012. 91 Ibid. 92 Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and

Recommendations, Department of Energy, April 2004.

https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf 93 Ibid, 21. 94 Behr, Peter. “A decade after the Northeast blackout, reliability improves but human issues persist”, E&E

News, August 12, 2013. http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059985876 95 Final Report on 2003 Blackout, 20. 96 Carafano, James and Weitz, Richard. “EMP Attacks – What the U.S. Must Do Now”, Heritage

Foundation, November 17, 2010. http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/emp-attacks-what-the-us-must-

do-now#_ftnref24

83

97 “America’s Vulnerability”, Heritage. 98 Dr. Peter Pry, in an interview with Forbes magazine, recounted a meeting with Russian officials in 2004

in which the officials admitted that Russia had “developed this super EMP weapon, and during the post-

Cold War brain drain, some of our scientists went to North Korea’…They thought within a few years,

North Korea could develop a super EMP weapon. The South Korean military intelligence came up with

same conclusion – that Russian scientists were in North Korea developing their weapons.” (Forbes, July

2014). If this is true, North Korea’s intentions to employ nuclear EMP against the United States may be

much more mature than originally thought. However, it is still unlikely that deployment of a super EMP

weapon would be among the first options for North Korea if regime survival were at risk. 99 Huessey, “Electronic Doomsday”. 100 Riddle, Lt. Col. Thomas. “Nuclear HEMP: Implications for Homeland Security and Homeland

Defense”, US Army War College, May 2004, 14. 101 Schneider, 12. 102 “Gauging the Threat”, Stratfor. 103 Huessey, “Electronic Doomsday”. 104 Pry, Joint Hearing on National Security and Government Reform, May 2015. 105 Ibid. 106 Foster, EMP Commission, 2004. 107 Weinstein, John M. “Ten Reasons Why Nuclear Deterrence Could Fail: The Case for Reassessing US

Nuclear Policies and Plans”, Deterrence in the 21st Century, Frank Cass Publishing, Portland, OR, 2001,

34-35. 108 Miller, Major Colin. “Electromagnetic Pulse Threats in 2010”, United States Air Force Air War College,

November 2005. 109 “THAAD Flight and Intercepts Tests Since 2005”, MostlyMissileDefense.com, July 10, 2016.

https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2016/07/10/thaad-flight-tests-since-2005-july-10-2016/ 110 Pifer, Steven. “The Limits of U.S. Missile Defense”, Brookings Institution, March 30, 2015.

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-limits-of-u-s-missile-defense/ 111 Freedman, Lawrence. Deterrence, Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, 2004, 116. 112 Pry, Joint Hearing on National Security and Government Reform, May 2015. 113 Ibid, 118. 114 Ibid, 124. 115 Joint Hearing on National Security and Government Reform, May 2015. 116 It is the opinion of the author that ambiguity does little to serve deterrence of nuclear EMP; however, the

impact of EMP on deterrence needs to be further examined. 117 Wilson, Threat Assessment. 118 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, S. 1356, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted).

1

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