Discussion

Article

Middle Eastern Terrorist Stereotypes and Anti-Terror Policy Support: The Effect of Perceived Minority Threat

Kelly Welch1

Abstract Tests of the minority threat theoretical perspective have established that the common association made between crime and Black and Hispanic males is mani- fested, to some degree, in harsh approaches to crime control. Particularly since 9/11, a close association is also being made by the public between terrorism and those perceived to be of Arab or Muslim descent—a phenomenon coinciding with the implementation of intense social controls aimed at preventing terror attacks and punishing suspected terrorists. Using a national sample, this research is the first to explore the micro-level minority threat hypothesis in relation to those who are perceived to be Middle Easterners. Results of multivariate analyses indicate that those who typify terrorists as Middle Eastern are more likely to support punitive anti-terror techniques and that this relationship is more influential among those for whom the danger of terrorism is less salient. These findings not only suggest that the effects of minority threat extend beyond the racial and ethnic groups previously found to be stereotyped as law violators to others whose minority status is not as distinctly delineated, but that they also operate beyond the criminal justice insti- tutions research has demonstrated are influenced by them. Policy implications are discussed.

Keywords minority group threat, criminological theories, stereotypes, terrorist profiling, terrorism, terrorist era policing, race and policing

1 Department of Sociology and Criminology, Villanova University, Villanova, PA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Kelly Welch, Ph.D., Department of Sociology and Criminology, Villanova University, 800 Lancaster Avenue,

274 Saint Augustine Center, Villanova, PA 19085, USA.

Email: [email protected]

Race and Justice 2016, Vol. 6(2) 117-145 ª The Author(s) 2015

Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/2153368715590478 raj.sagepub.com

Introduction

Pervasive portrayals of Middle Easterners as terrorists have some important simila-

rities with entrenched criminal stereotypes frequently applied to Black and Hispanic

males (Cole, 2003a; Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund

[LCCREF], 2003; Simon, 2007). Specifically, they have all been the subject of threat-

related stereotypes. It seems that in contemporary American society, Middle East-

erners, and ‘‘those who look Arab or Muslim’’ (Grewal, 2003, p. 541), have become

‘‘the new racial other’’ (Grewal, 2003, p. 546), resulting in many who ‘‘equate Arab or

Muslim male with ‘terrorist’’’ (Cole, 2003b, p. 49). Moreover, because the terrorist

stereotype is not just limited to race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion (Chen, 2010),

the profile of a terrorist has been applied to individuals who are neither Middle

Eastern, Arab, nor Muslim (Kaplan, 2006; LCCREF, 2003).

These stereotypes are not inconsequential. Public attitudes affect public policy

(Green, 2006). Just as racial and ethnic criminal stereotypes have been shown to

contribute to increased punitiveness toward crime (Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004;

Welch, Payne, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2011) and to the disproportionate number of Black

and Hispanic convicts who are under some form of correctional control, it is plausible

that stereotypes related to those perceived to be Arab, Muslim, or Middle Eastern are

partially responsible for some degree of punitiveness toward terrorism and for the

diminished civil liberties and harsh treatment of suspected terrorists.

This research is the first to apply a micro-level minority threat theoretical explanation

for increased social control in the context of terrorist criminality and those who are

perceived to be of Middle Eastern descent. Traditionally applied to Blacks and

Hispanics in relation to criminal punitiveness, this study uses multivariate analyses of

national survey data to examine whether individuals who typify terrorists as Middle

Easterners are more likely to endorse punitive policies aimed at reducing terror and

punishing suspected terrorists.

Terrorism and Intensified Social Control

Formal Social Controls

Since the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has become

increasingly punitive toward terrorism. However, the enactment of intense security

measures intended to thwart terrorism is not new. Various terrorist acts in the decades

preceding the 9/11 attacks (including various plane hijackings, the Iran hostage crisis,

the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the 1993 bombing of the

World Trade Center, and the bombing of the USS Cole) resulted in several notable

anti-terror measures. Among them were the ‘‘Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigration Responsibility Act’’ and the ‘‘Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act,’’ both of which were implemented in 1996 to limit opportunities for

domestic acts of terror. These policies granted extraordinary authority to the Immi-

gration and Naturalization Service (INS), now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services, in order to locate and deport immigrants that were determined to present a

118 Race and Justice 6(2)

potential threat to U.S. security (Welch, 2003). It is noteworthy that many anti-terror

policies were designed to target immigrants from Middle Eastern or predominantly

Arab countries because of the ethnic and national affiliations of many notorious

terrorists, despite the fact that most terrorists and acts of terrorism do not originate

from these regions (LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2010; Shaheen, 2000). 1

Pursuant to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, the U.S. response to terrorism

reached unprecedented levels of punitiveness. In the days and weeks following these

attacks, there were reports of airline passengers—particularly those of Middle Eastern

descent—experiencing humiliation and abuse during the course of intrusive security

screening procedures (Cole, 2003a; LCCREF, 2003). Further, many passengers who

were successfully screened by transportation security were subsequently ordered off

flights by crews responding to passenger complaints and to their own concerns about

the apparent Arab or Muslim appearance of those passengers—often with the support

of those same security officials who had already passed them through security

(LCCREF, 2003; Verhovek, 2001). These and similar incidents lead to the recognition

that ‘‘flying while Arab’’ was a convenient, albeit highly questionable, proxy for

potential terrorists and one that could be especially precarious for travelers who

appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent (Davila, 2001; Fiala, 2003; Harris, 2001).

The well-known USA Patriot Act was quickly made into law by both houses of

Congress and the president by October 26, 2001, and is one of several sweeping

policies that expanded the government’s ability to track and manage potential ter-

rorists. So urgently did government leaders want to respond to the 9/11 attacks that it

is widely acknowledged that most members of Congress who voted in favor of it did

not even read the legislation before it was passed (Simon, 2007). Specifically, the

Patriot Act increased surveillance capabilities of law enforcement agencies and lifted

various due process restrictions on the accumulation of foreign intelligence, both

inside and outside U.S. borders. One result of the Patriot Act was that law enforcement

and government officials could access personal documents, such as telephone records,

e-mail correspondence, medical records, and financial reports of citizens and non-

citizens without obtaining warrants. Some have argued that this initiative has violated

civil liberties (ACLU, 2015), while others have maintained that the law, itself, does

not (Kerr, 2003; Ryan, 2005; Whitehead & Aden, 2002).

Another outcome of the Patriot Act and its ‘‘unprecedented assertion of executive

authority’’ (Simon, 2007, p. 266) is that thousands of Middle Easterners, South Asians,

and those from predominantly Muslim countries living in the United States and abroad

were detained in both state and military jails in response to voluntary registrations with

INS, without allowing their families to be notified of their whereabouts (Chen, 2004;

Cole, 2003a; U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). A sizable number of individuals were

interrogated about potential terrorist associations, tried for months, and were not

granted access to lawyers or to the evidence that contributed to their secret detentions

(Chen, 2004; Cole, 2003a; U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). The conditions under

which suspects were held and interrogated became a subject of strong international

controversy (Onwudiwe, 2005; Simon, 2007), as there was substantial evidence of

verbal abuse, psychological and physical torture, and sexual humiliation of detainees,

Welch 119

particularly those at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay (Salaita, 2006; U.S. Depart-

ment of Justice, 2003). Other harsh provisions allowed for the deportation of foreign

detainees without an opportunity for appeal (Cole, 2003a). Further, because the ethnic

and nationality-based proxies employed to represent potential terror supporters were

so inexact, most of the individuals detained or deported had either not been convicted

of wrongdoing or been proven innocent altogether (Cole, 2003a).

Further evidence of increased social control in relation to terrorism includes the

creation of several new institutions that focus on preventing terrorism, including

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, with its color-coding system, and the

Transportation and Security Administration (TSA), which uses a range of techno-

logies, including explosive-detecting technology and full-body scanners (TSA, 2015).

The establishment of new government offices has led to extensive hiring. Even U.S.

governmental institutions that existed prior to 9/11, such as the Central Intelligence

Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Federal Aviation Administration, have

hired more employees to facilitate greater emphasis on discovering and thwarting

terrorist plots (McRoberts, 2001). Of course, the United States is not the only country

that expanded its anti-terror laws to address terrorism. 2

Public Punitiveness and Support for Formal Social Control

Anti-terror punitiveness has gone beyond the actual implementation of policies. Since 9/

11, the public has demonstrated considerable support for harsh national policies aimed at

preventing terrorism and punishing suspected terrorists (Council on American–Islamic

Relations Research Center [CAIRRC], 2006; Panagopoulos, 2006; Sullivan & Hendriks,

2009). When the Patriot Act was first proposed, the public overwhelming endorsed its

passage (Dietz, 2002; Locy, 2004), despite the considerable criticism it has since

encountered. In the year after the attacks, over half of Americans felt that immigration

laws should be tightened, 42% felt the government should have more power to monitor Muslims more closely than other groups, and one third of Americans supported placing

Arabs and Arab Americans in the United States under special surveillance (Panago-

poulos, 2006). Additionally, polls showed that 44% of the public supported restricting civil liberties of U.S. Muslims and those with Middle Eastern heritage to promote security

(Nisbet & Shanahan, 2004). Further, 17% of the public believes it is acceptable to incarcerate Muslims ‘‘just in case they are planning terrorist acts’’ (CAIRRC, 2006, p. 5).

Although public support for racial and ethnic profiling at airports has been long-

standing (Gabbidon, Penn, Jordan, & Higgins, 2009), it also increased after 9/11. A

U.S. poll taken before the attacks showed that only 20% of the public approved of airport profiling (Gallup Poll, 1999), but after 9/11, support increased to between 25% and 60% in public surveys (Cole, 2003a; Gabbidon, Higgins, & Nelson, 2012; Johnson et al., 2011; Verhovek, 2001). Airline passengers’ concerns about appearances or

behaviors of other passengers (such as those wearing long beards or headscarves) also

led to numerous unsubstantiated requests that the individuals in question be removed

from flights—some of which were met with success (Associated Press, 2009;

LCCREF, 2003). Additionally, although there is controversy about the appropriate

120 Race and Justice 6(2)

degree of screening that should be undergone by passengers at airports, there has been

long-standing public support for screening young Middle Eastern men more carefully

than others (Forst, 2009; Ghareeb, 1983), with 53% of Americans favoring the requirement that Arabs and Arab Americans undergo more intensive security checks

(Saad, 2006) and 60% of Americans believing that racial profiling at airports has been occurring (Gabbidon et al., 2009).

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the incidence of hate crimes and ‘‘backlash

violence’’ against individuals perceived to be of Middle Eastern descent, which often

includes Arabs, South Asians, North Africans, Persians, Sikhs, and Muslims from

various countries, sharply rose (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

[AAADC], 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Kaplan, 2006; Panagopoulos, 2006,

p. 609). Law enforcement agencies and the CAIRRC (2006) received many more

reports of beatings and death threats directed toward ‘‘persons appearing Arab or

Muslim’’ than the previous year, and the federal government received 17 times as

many reports of harassment and physical attacks in the year following 9/11 than the

year before (Human Rights Watch, 2002). There was also an increase in reports of

threats and hate speech against perceived Middle Easterners since 9/11 (AAADC,

2008; Cole, 2003a), which has frequently resulted in feelings of humiliation and fear

(Merskin, 2004; Peek, 2003). In addition, there were a number of ‘‘racial-’’type

hoaxes related to perceived Middle Easterners that involved false allegations of

terrorist activity (Altheide, 2006).

Although the number of hate crimes committed against those perceived to be of

Middle Eastern origin rose dramatically, the incidence is somewhat limited relative to

other forms of public punitiveness toward these individuals. Widespread reports of

public religious bias (Armour, 2005), anti-Arab discrimination (Cole, 2003a;

Macfarquhar, 2006), and prejudice against perceived Middle Easterners and Muslims

(CAIRRC, 2006; Gabbidon et al., 2012) have been made since 9/11. Workplace

discrimination against Muslims, South Asians, and Arab Americans became more

prevalent and is actually the second most common context (after government) for a

discriminatory incident (Armour, 2005). Children who are perceived to be Middle

Eastern have even reported prejudice and humiliation by other students in schools,

which has contributed to greater academic discrimination (Merskin, 2004). Defense

lawyers have expressed concern that jurors view their clients who ‘‘look Middle

Eastern’’ more negatively than others, thus influencing case outcomes (Marvasti &

McKinney, 2004, p. 154). One British study found significant increases in negative

experiences related to ethnicity and religion among Muslims as well as both subtle and

overt racism and religious discrimination (Sheridan, 2006).

Although the government and public interests in being protected from terrorist

victimization are legitimate (Logan, 2007), many have expressed concern that anti-

terror efforts have disproportionately and negatively affected racial, ethnic, and

religious minorities (Cole, 2003a; Harcourt, 2007). Specifically, Arabs, Muslims, and

certain Middle Easterners are experiencing the greatest burden of harsh anti-terror

policies, terror-related public fear, prejudice, and discrimination (Braman, 2004;

Macfarquhar, 2007).

Welch 121

Middle Eastern Terrorist Stereotypes

As with the racial and ethnic stereotyping of criminals as Black and Hispanic, ‘‘a face

has also been put on terror, and it is Arab’’ (Merskin, 2004, p. 157). Ethnic and

religious stereotypes linking terrorism to certain Middle Easterners are ubiquitous

(Blasing, 1996; Jenkins, 2003; Said, 1997) and may be at least partially responsible for

fueling some degree of punitiveness toward terrorism. Those of Middle Eastern

descent, including many Arabs, Muslims, and others, are often believed to be full of

‘‘hatred’’ (CAIRRC, 2006, p. 2), ‘‘violent’’ (Marvasti & McKinney, 2004, p. 53) and

‘‘disproportionately prone to violence’’ (Deane & Fears 2006, p. 1). They are char-

acterized as ‘‘dangerous’’ (Kamalipour, 2000, p. 89), ‘‘machine-gun-toting’’ (Blasing,

1996, p. 107) ‘‘terrorists’’ (CAIRRC, 2006, p. 2; Marvasti & McKinney, 2004, p. 53;

Said, 1997), and ‘‘savage fanatics’’ (Jenkins, 2003, p. 150), who are intent on

‘‘destruction’’ (Kamalipour, 2000, p. 89). It is notable that while these stereotypes

were certainly exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks, they flourished long before then

(Ahmad & Szpara, 2003; Akram, 2002; Blasing, 1996; Said, 1997).

Considering the prevalence of media depictions of terrorists as apparently Middle

Eastern (AAADC, 2008; Archbold, Dahle, Fangman, Wentz, & Wood, 2013; Said,

1997; Suleiman, 1988, 1999), it is not surprising that ‘‘the vast majority of Amer-

icans—and many Europeans—do have a stereotype in mind when [they] think of

terrorists, and that stereotype is of someone of Arab descent’’ (Ervin, 2006, p. 1;

Shaheen, 2003) or a Muslim (Said, 1997). However, the truth is that this stereotype

is far from accurate: While it is clear that most Middle Easterners, Arabs, and

Muslims are not terrorists (Forst, 2009; LCCREF, 2003), it is also true that the

greatest source of terrorist threat does not originate in the Middle East or from

Muslims (Nance, 2008; U.S. Department of State, 2014). Media portrayals and the

fact that all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were Arab may contribute to the popular

perception that the most frequent and dire acts of terror are committed by Middle

Easterners (Archbold et al., 2013; Jenkins, 2003) and Muslims (Mass, 2009), even

though more terrorist acts are committed by Latin Americans, Africans, citizens of

former Soviet territories, and Communists (LaFree et al., 2010; Mass, 2009; U.S.

Department of State, 2014). Although race, ethnicity, and religion are often used as

proxies for terrorist involvement, most suspected of it have been found innocent

(Hashad, 2004).

Minority Threat Theoretical Perspective

Just as racial and ethnic stereotypes have been shown to contribute to increased

punitiveness toward crime, it is plausible that minority stereotypes related to those

perceived to be Middle Eastern are partially responsible for some degree of puni-

tiveness toward terrorism. The minority threat theoretical perspective was initially

rooted in the belief that racial prejudice that results in discrimination and increased

social control is a group-based, and not individual level, occurrence (Blumer, 1958).

From this idea, the power threat hypothesis was developed, which suggests that as the

122 Race and Justice 6(2)

proportion of racial or ethnic minorities increases in relation to Whites, intensified

measures of social control—particularly in the form of criminal justice responses—

will proliferate as a result of perceived economic and political competition presented

by the growing minority group (Blalock, 1967). This theory was further advanced by

the inclusion of perceptions of Black crime as an additional influence on social control

that is galvanized by a larger minority in what has been called social threat (Liska,

1992) and racial threat (Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001) because of the strong

associations made between Blacks and crime, and, more recently, the effects of

Hispanic threat on criminal controls (Eitle & Taylor, 2008). Although these studies

have focused nearly entirely on responses to traditional criminal threat, it is not

unreasonable to suppose that punitive support for anti-terror policies is similarly

linked to the threat of terrorism often associated with individuals perceived to be of

Middle Eastern descent (LCCREF, 2003; Simon, 2007). However, no minority threat

research has yet examined this possibility.

One way to test for the presence of minority group threat is by assessing the effects

of the racial or ethnic composition of place, which is the typical macro-level proxy for

threat that has been associated with a variety of punitive criminal justice outcomes,

including rates of arrest (Mosher, 2001), resources allocated to and the size of law

enforcement (Kent & Jacobs, 2005) and corrections (Jacobs & Helms, 1996), rates of

incarceration (Carmichael, 2005), and executions (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld,

2003). Because it is likely that ‘‘perception is, indeed, at the heart of the matter’’

(Blasing, 1996, p. 108), a limited amount of minority threat research has also gauged

the effects of micro-processes that mediate the relationship between minority com-

position and the implementation of powerful social controls. Among these studies are

those that assess individual attitudes surrounding minority compositional measures.

Findings from this research indicate that demographic composition influences not

only negative views of Blacks (Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989; Taylor, 1998) and the

perception of higher neighborhood crime (Quillian & Pager, 2001) but also fear of

crime perpetrated by Blacks (Quillian & Pager, 2001) and by Hispanics (Eitle &

Taylor, 2008), public support for the death penalty (Baumer et al., 2003), and overall

punitiveness by Whites (King & Wheelock, 2007).

Other micro-level studies have used perceptual measures of threat, rather than

aggregated compositional data, to assess effects on preferences for social control,

because they may be a more direct and valid representation of threat than actual

minority composition. Perceptions about minority population size should be more

meaningful than the true percentages or characteristics of minority groups, since the

public may not accurately gauge the actual size of minority groups (Welch, 2007). It

does appear that perceptions about the relative size of Black populations are just as

influential as actual percentages on perceived risk of crime (Chiricos et al. 2001). Other

studies using perceptual measures of threat find that the proportion of crime perceived

to be committed by Blacks (Chiricos et al., 2004) and by Hispanics (Welch et al., 2011)

is consequential for the degree to which the public supports punitive crime policies.

Moreover, when the public believes that Blacks as a group are more prone to violence,

they are likelier to favor various crime reduction expenditures (Barkan & Cohn, 2005).

Welch 123

Racial stereotypes of drug criminals have also influenced the manner with which

individual sentencing decisions are made (Steen, Engen, & Gainey, 2005).

Nonlinear and Contextual Effects of Threat

It is also possible that minority threat has nonlinear or contextual effects on punitive

social control as first suggested by Blalock (1967, p. 31) who noted that ‘‘different kinds

of persons will not be similarly motivated by the minority percentage variable.’’ Since

then, research has corroborated that the relationship between minority threat and

punitive social control is not always linear and not equally consequential in all social

contexts (Conklin, 1971; Tolbert & Grummel, 2003). Assessments of perceptual

minority threat show that individual punitiveness is influenced by regional variation on

the Black (Chiricos et al., 2004) and Hispanic (Welch et al., 2011) typification of crime

and the Black composition of place (Taylor, 1998), such that the influence of minority

threat on harshness is greater in nonsouthern states and the Midwest. Racial prejudice

also moderates the effects of perceived threat on general punitiveness as does high- and

low-crime salience (Chiricos et al., 2004) and political conservatism (Baumer et al.,

2003). One’s occupational prestige also affects the relationship between racial threat

and negative attitudes about minorities by Whites (Taylor, 1998).

It appears that racial and ethnic threat are more influential, particularly at the

individual level, in circumstances in which crime is less salient, punishment less

severe, and attitudes toward various policies less harsh, and therefore where one might

expect less public punitiveness toward criminals (Barkan & Cohn, 2005; Chiricos

et al., 2004; Taylor, 1998). It is possible that greater effects of minority threat are

likelier when the effects of other factors on social control are less powerful (Oliver &

Mendelberg, 2000). This type of ‘‘ceiling effect,’’ or ‘‘threshold effect,’’ connects the

actions of individuals to population processes and suggests that minority threat has

less opportunity to influence policies and policy support among the public in contexts

in which other factors are already more compelling. Further there is substantial

opportunity for threat to influence policy and policy support when punitiveness is not

already so high (Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000). 3

Overall, studies indicate consistent support for the minority threat theoretical

explanation for increased social control in relation to Black and Hispanic crime in

both compositional and perceptual tests as well as in linear and circumstance-specific

analyses. Yet there is no research testing the applicability of the minority threat

theoretical perspective in relation to perceived Middle Easterners and public support

for punitive ‘‘war on terror’’ policies.

The Present Study

It is plausible that terror-related Middle Eastern threat contributes to public punitiveness

much in the same way that crime-related racial and ethnic threat have fostered public

support for various harsh criminal justice policies. It has been argued that the common

association made by much of the public between individuals perceived to be of Middle

124 Race and Justice 6(2)

Eastern descent and certain salient terrorist attacks has facilitated the government pas-

sage of sweeping laws limiting immigration, restricting civil liberties, diminishing due

process rights, and punishing terrorist suspects (Cole, 2003a; LCCREF, 2003; Simon,

2007). Due to the strong potential for public attitudes to affect the implementation of

public policy (Green, 2006), as well as some substantial negative consequences of

intense war on terror policies, an exploration of the possibility that the Middle Eastern

stereotyping of terrorists is related to anti-terror punitiveness is important.

This research is the first to apply the minority threat theoretical perspective to

perceived Middle Easterners. Specifically, it uses a micro-level measure of the Middle

Eastern typification of terrorists (individual responses to questions gauging these

stereotypes) to test for an impact on preferences for stringent anti-terror prevention

and punishment policies (individual responses about favored legal actions). These

analyses assess the extent to which the association of terrorism with those believed to

be Middle Eastern enhances support among the public for intensified anti-terror

efforts, as has been previously assessed with relation to racial and ethnic stereo-

types and crime punitiveness. Thus, this study will examine the following primary

hypothesis: (1) those who stereotype terrorists as Middle Easterners are more likely to

support harsh terror prevention and punishment tactics.

Moreover, as suggested by the findings of research gauging individual manifes-

tations of stereotype-induced punitiveness, this study will explore whether the primary

relationship articulated in Hypothesis 1 is affected by nonlinear (or interaction/

moderating) and contextual (or conditional) influences that differentially affect sub-

groups of respondents according to certain characteristics (Iversen, 1991; Jaccard &

Turrisi 2003). These differential effects will be assessed according to the ceiling effect

hypothesis, which suggests that there will be less room for terrorist stereotypes to have

an effect on people’s policy preferences when there are already other, stronger

influences on those anti-terror policy preferences. Thus, stereotypes would be

expected to affect individuals differently according to those other influences. Prior

research and initial analyses indicate that those who are expected to already be quite

punitive include those for whom terrorism is a salient problem, political conservatives,

those who are prejudiced against Middle Easterners, and Whites. Therefore, this study

assesses the following hypotheses testing for the presence of these ceiling effects: (2)

effects of the Middle Eastern typification of terrorists on support for punitive anti-

terror policies are stronger or significant only among individuals for whom support

for these policies is expected to otherwise be lower, including individuals (2a) for

whom terrorism is less salient, (2b) who are not ideologically conservative, (2c) who

are less prejudiced against Middle Easterners, and (2d) who are not White.

Methodology

Data Collection and Sample

Data for this research were obtained for this specific study by surveying a U.S.

national sample of adults from November 2006 through January 2007 at the Research

Welch 125

Network based in Tallahassee. A two-stage semi-stratified Mitofsky-Waksberg tele-

phone sampling technique was used, ensuring that phone numbers randomly gener-

ated by computer were stratified to most accurately reflect the geographic distribution

of the population and enhance representativeness of the sample, as described by the

American Association of Public Opinion Research standards. 4

The final sample of 425

adults has the following characteristics, which are compared (in parentheses) with

contemporaneous U.S. demographics: 53% (51%) female, 81% (83%) White, 8% (12.1%) Black, 8% (14.5%), Hispanic, and 5.9% of Middle Eastern descent,5 and the average respondent was 49 (37) years old.

6 The generalizability of this study’s

findings is addressed in the Discussion section.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is represented by eight questions gauging support

for policies aimed at preventing and punishing terrorism, such as the use of torture,

withholding due process rights from detainees, and wiretapping phones domestically,

as detailed in Table 1. Using an 11-point scale, respondents indicated support for each

measure, with an overall mean level of 4.93. A factor score was then created using the

maximum-likelihood approach with varimax rotation to ensure proper weighting in

the Anti-Terror Punitiveness index, which has an a reliability coefficient of .91.7

Independent Variable

The primary independent variable, Middle Eastern Typification of Terrorists, is rep-

resented by responses to a single question gauging the extent to which respondents

stereotype terrorists as people of Middle Eastern descent and is modeled after per-

ceptual indicators of threat in prior research. Respondents were asked, ‘‘When you

think about people who actually commit acts of terrorism, approximately what per-

centage would you say are Middle Eastern?’’ 8

Considering the great variability of

geographic and ethnic backgrounds represented among terrorists globally, the mean of

54.6% is a likely overestimation of the involvement of Middle Easterners in terror- ism.

9 Table 2 describes this study’s variables.

Control Variables

The remaining independent variables were selected as controls because of their known

influence on support for punitive crime policies rather than terror policies, since there

is only very limited previous multivariate research that has examined predictors of

punitiveness toward terrorism. Among the demographic characteristics controlled is

gender, which is coded with a binary variable for female (¼ 1), and is predicted to be negatively associated with punitiveness (Welch, 2011). Age is a continuous measure

that tends to be associated with less punitiveness (Rossi & Berk, 1997). Education

represents respondents’ level of academic achievement, ranging from some high

school (¼ 1) to postgraduate work or degree (¼ 6), and has also been negatively

126 Race and Justice 6(2)

related to punitiveness (Costelloe, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2009). Race is controlled by a

measure of whether one is White (¼ 1) and ethnicity is controlled by a measure of whether one is Hispanic (¼ 1), because Whites and Hispanics are generally more punitive than others (Chiricos et al., 2004). In addition, a variable representing

whether respondents were of Middle Eastern descent (¼ 1) is included, because those with this background might be less inclined to adopt a stereotype of terrorists based on

that trait. Residents in the U.S. South have had a consistent tradition of punitiveness

(Borg, 1997), so the effects of being Southern (¼ 1) are controlled.10

Table 1. Punitive Support for Specific Anti-Terror Policy Proposals.

Anti-Terror Punitiveness (0–10 scale, 10 ¼ most punitive) Mean SD Factor Loading r MEtyp

Holding prisoners indefinitely without being charged for an offense

4.38 3.93 .742 .081

Detaining terrorist suspects without notifying their families or embassies

4.73 3.87 .782 .039

Using stressful interrogation techniques to get confessions 5.11 3.73 .777 .105* Holding trials that do not involve Bill of Rights protections 4.71 3.89 .789 .107* Executing more terrorists 6.31 3.82 .600 .129* Wiretapping phones in the United States 5.07 3.88 .782 .110* Intercepting emails and other personal electronic information 5.31 3.85 .780 .157* Conducting searches and seizures of individuals and their

belongings without proper warrants 3.81 3.82 .769 .057

Note. Factor loadings based on individual contributions to 8-item Anti-Terror Punitiveness Index. MEtyp ¼ Middle Eastern Typification of Terrorism. *Significant at .05 level. **Significant at .01 level.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Analyses.

Variables Mean SD Range r Punitiveness

Dependent variable Anti-Terror Punitiveness .00 1.00 �1.72–1.79 n/a

Independent variables M.E. Typification of Terrorists 54.62 31.19 1–100 .125* Female .53 .50 0–1 .049 Age 49.19 16.05 19–90 .125* Education 4.02 1.50 1–6 �.110* White .81 .40 0–1 .104* Hispanic .08 .28 0–1 �.075 Middle Eastern .05 .24 0–1 �.124* Southern .36 .48 0–1 .137** Conservative .34 .48 0–1 .267** Terror Salience .00 1.00 �2.24–1.17 .477** Middle Eastern Prejudice .00 1.00 �1.30–3.43 .290**

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Welch 127

Among the dispositional or attitudinal influences controlled is conservative

political ideology, which is represented by a dichotomous variable indicating whether

respondents consider themselves politically liberal or moderate (¼ 0) or Conservative (¼ 1). Since terror salience may also increase support for anti-terror policies (Davis & Silver, 2004; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005), concern about terrorism is

gauged by an 11-point scale of how concerned respondents reported being about

terrorism, and fear of terrorism (also using an 11-point scale) is represented by how

fearful respondents were that they or someone they cared about would become a

victim of terrorism (Leone & Anrig, 2007). Because preliminary analyses of variance

inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerance levels indicated the presence of multicollinearity

between these two salience measures, principle component varimax rotated factor

analysis created a single Terror Salience factor score, with an a of .81, indicating a high degree of reliability of each item representing the larger construct. Prejudice,

which increases support for harsh crime policies (Borg, 1997), is represented by an

index of two items based on the degree to which respondents felt it would be okay if a

Middle Eastern family with an income similar to theirs were to live nearby and if a

person of Middle Eastern descent were to marry into their families. The factor score of

Middle Eastern Prejudice has an a of .72.

Analytic Strategy

Table 2 provides means, standard deviations, and value ranges for the variables in

the analyses, as well as bivariate correlations of each independent measure with

the Anti-Terror Punitiveness index. As presented, the bivariate correlation of

Middle Eastern Typification of Terrorists with Anti-Terror Punitiveness is .125

and is significant at the .05 level. The highest correlations are with Terror Sal-

ience (.477, p < .01), Middle Eastern Prejudice (.290, p < .01), and Conservative

(.267, p < .01).

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to examine the effects of Middle

Eastern Typification of Terrorists and the control variables on Anti-Terror Punitive-

ness in the test of the first hypothesis. No tolerance values were smaller than .809, and

no VIFs were larger than 1.2, thus eliminating the possibility of multicollinearity

(Freund & Littell, 2000). Tests for linearity show that this regression assumption is not

violated, and a Modified-Glesjer test indicates there is no problem of hetero-

skedasticity. Due to the directional nature of the hypotheses, one-tailed t-values are

used to determine statistical significance (Henkel, 1976; Mohr, 1990).

Next, to test the second hypothesis, a series of multivariate OLS regression models

are estimated to assess moderating effects of the relationships between Middle Eastern

Typification of Terrorists and the variables that have the highest b values in the initial

regression model and that have had significant moderating or conditional effects on

punitiveness in prior research (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). Interaction terms were cre-

ated by separately multiplying Terror Salience, Conservative, Middle Eastern Pre-

judice, and White by Middle Eastern Typification of terrorism. 11

Anti-Terror

Punitiveness is then regressed on each product term in separate analyses, along

128 Race and Justice 6(2)

with all control variables, to determine if the terms are statistically significant. There

were no apparent violations of regression assumptions in these models. 12

Finally, to evaluate the specific effects of the statistically significant interactions on

all variables, models with interactive effects on Anti-Terror Punitiveness are

disaggregated according to the median value of the moderating variable to assess

possible conditional effects (Iversen, 1991). To test for significant context-specific

differences of the primary relationship analyzed, z-tests are conducted using unstan-

dardized coefficients and standard errors. 13

Results

The test of Hypothesis 1 is estimated in Model 1 in Table 3, where unstandardized

coefficients, standardized bs, and standard errors are reported. As predicted, Middle

Eastern Typification of Terrorists is significantly and positively related to Anti-Terror

Punitiveness (b ¼ .003, p < .05), indicating that those who stereotype terrorists as Middle Easterners are more likely to support harsh terror prevention and punishment

tactics. Also significantly more supportive of these punitive national security poli-

cies—and in accordance with expectations—are Whites, individuals not of Middle

Eastern origin, Southerners, ideological conservatives, those for whom terrorism is

more salient, and individuals who are prejudiced against Middle Easterners. b values

suggest that the variables influencing anti-terror punitiveness most strongly are Terror

Salience, Conservative, Middle Eastern Prejudice, White, and Middle Eastern

Typification of Terrorists. The R 2

(.324) demonstrates that this model explains nearly

one third of the variance in support for severe anti-terror policies, which is relatively

high for research assessing punitive attitudes.

The next stage of analysis involves examining possible moderating influences on

the relationship between Middle Eastern Typification of Terrorists and Anti-Terror

Punitiveness. Model 2 presents the regression estimate testing Hypothesis 2a, which

assesses moderating effects of Terror Salience. The coefficient for the product term is

significant and negative (b ¼�.004, p < .001), which indicates that among those for whom terrorism is less salient, the Middle Eastern typification of terrorists is more

likely to increase anti-terror punitiveness, and among those for whom terrorism is

more salient, the Middle Eastern typification of terrorists is less apt to increase the

endorsement of harsh anti-terror tactics. 14

As in Model 1, b values indicate that only

Terror Salience, Conservative, Middle Eastern Prejudice, and White have a stronger

influence on Anti-Terror Punitiveness. The only variable no longer retaining sig-

nificance from the first model is Middle Eastern. The R 2

of .341 indicates that this

model explains over 34% of the variance in Anti-Terror Punitiveness. Model 3 specifies the equation gauging moderating effects of ideological con-

servatism on the relationship between terrorist typification and punitiveness in the test

of Hypothesis 2b. The coefficient for the product term is not statistically significant,

indicating that the effects of the Middle Eastern Typification of Terrorists on Anti-

Terror Punitiveness are not conditioned by Conservative. Similar results are found

in Models 4 and 5 that test Hypotheses 2c and 2d, which examine possible interactions

Welch 129

T a b

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130

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131

of prejudice and race with the Middle Eastern typification of terrorists. These product

term coefficients are nonsignificant and imply the absence of differences according to

levels of Middle Eastern Prejudice or being White rather than a racial minority. It is

therefore not surprising that R 2

values for each of these estimates (.324) remain the

same value as that for the initial model.

To further examine the effects of the significant interaction of Terror Salience and

Middle Eastern Typification of Terrorists on Anti-Terror Punitiveness in the test of

Hypothesis 2a, the data were split at the 50th percentile of Terror Salience (median ¼ .0438), then Anti-Terror Punitiveness was regressed on Middle Eastern Typification of

Terrorists, results for which are provided in Table 4. Among those expressing high

terror salience, it appears that the Middle Eastern typification of terrorists no longer

affects one’s willingness to endorse harsh terrorism prevention and punishment

policies. Not only is this coefficient (b ¼ .000) no longer significant, but its b (.006) drops substantially from those produced in the nonconditional estimates.

15 Only

Middle Eastern Prejudice, Conservative, and White continue to significantly increase

Anti-Terror Punitiveness in this model.

By contrast, among those falling into the low terror salience context, the coef-

ficient for Middle Eastern Typification of Terrorists is statistically significant and

positive (b ¼ .007, p < .001), suggesting that the Middle Eastern typification of terrorists increases support for anti-terror policies only among those who are not

already fearful of and concerned about terrorism. In fact, the bs in this model

Table 4. Regression of Anti-Terror Punitiveness on the Middle Eastern Typification of Terror- ists Contextualized by Terror Salience.

Anti-Terror Punitiveness

High Terror Salience Low Terror Salience

Independent Variables b SE b b SE b

Middle Eastern Typificationa .000 .002 �.006 .007*** .002 .218 Female �.034 .128 �.018 �.051 .127 �.027 Age .001 .004 .012 �.001 .004 �.024 Education �.046 .041 �.077 �.056 .043 �.086 White .367* .165 .169 �.103 .202 �.036 Hispanic .237 .236 .072 �.397 .259 �.110 Middle Eastern �.450 .284 �.112 �.118 .449 �.017 Southern .160 .131 .085 .250* .132 .123 Conservative .350*** .130 .185 .634*** .135 .312 Middle Eastern Prejudice .169*** .064 .185 .137* .066 .138 Intercept .054 .330 �.568* .322 N 200 199 R2 .147 .218 F statistic 3.269*** 5.252***

a p Value for Anti-Terror Punitiveness slope is .007.

*p < .05. ***p < .001.

132 Race and Justice 6(2)

demonstrate that only Conservative has a stronger influence on levels of Anti-

Terror Punitiveness than Middle Eastern Typification of Terrorists (b ¼ .218). Interestingly, this context is also the first instance in which Hispanic ethnicity is

associated with punitiveness; Hispanic respondents were less supportive of anti-

terror policies than those who are not ethnically Hispanic. No other independent

measures are significant in this model. Tests for slope differences across low and

high Terror Salience contexts confirm that the coefficients for Middle Eastern

Typification of Terrorists are significantly different from one another (z ¼ 2.475, p ¼ .007), indicating that the Middle Eastern typification of terrorists only increases support for terror-fighting policies among those who are less fearful of and con-

cerned about terrorism.

Discussion

This research is the first to apply—and support—a micro-level minority group threat

theoretical explanation for social control to perceived Middle Easterners in relation to

terrorism. In particular, it uses an indicator of the association between those believed

to be of Middle Eastern descent and terrorism to represent minority threat in multi-

variate analyses, examining whether individuals who typify terrorists as Middle

Easterners are more likely to endorse punitive policies aimed at reducing terror and

punishing suspected terrorists than those who do not hold such stereotypes. The results

of OLS regression estimates indicate support for the primary hypothesis: the Middle

Eastern typification of terrorism increases anti-terror punitiveness. This relationship

remained statistically significant while controlling for the effects of various traits,

including gender, age, education, race, ethnicity, Middle Eastern descent, and regional

residence as well as attitudinal characteristics, such as conservatism, terror salience,

and, importantly, prejudice against Middle Easterners. This finding corroborates those

of previous studies assessing racial and ethnic stereotypes of traditional crime on

punitiveness. Accordingly, it appears that not only are perceptions of Middle East-

erners influential much in the same way that perceptions of Black and Hispanic

individuals affect public attitudes, but that punitive support for harsh anti-terror

policies is at least partially fueled by similar forces that incite support for harsh

anti-crime policies.

It is important to note that the minority threat perspective is supported here in large

part because this research was able to control for important terror-specific and Middle

Eastern–specific influences. It is apparent that there is a residual effect of the Middle

Eastern stereotyping of terrorists on anti-terror policy support even after controlling

for the effect of terror salience, which was measured irrespective of Middle Eastern

qualities. And, there remained an effect of Middle Eastern stereotypes of terrorists on

anti-terror policy support even after controlling for Middle Eastern descent and pre-

judice, which were measured irrespective of terrorism. Therefore, it is clear that the

Middle Eastern typification of terrorism represents something beyond bias or pre-

judice and beyond fear or anxiety about terrorism, and the stereotype itself appears to

have an influence on policy preferences.

Welch 133

In testing this study’s secondary hypothesis related to a ceiling effect, the potential

nonlinear and conditional influences of terror salience, political conservatism, racial

prejudice, and race on the primary relationship were examined. Regression estimates

show a statistically significant outcome for Hypothesis 2a, confirming a ceiling effect

with regard to terror salience: Support for terror prevention and punishment policies is

increased by Middle Eastern stereotypes of terrorists only among individuals who are

less fearful of and less concerned about terrorism, paralleling the outcomes of pre-

vious studies that have analyzed moderating and context-specific influences of

minority threat. This demonstrates that minority threat is more influential, particularly

at the individual level, in circumstances in which crime and terrorism are less salient

and general social control support is lower, and therefore where one would expect less

punitiveness. When terrorism is perceived to be a more salient problem, support for

harsh policies may already be so intense that there is less opportunity for other

influences, including Middle Eastern stereotypes of terrorists, to have significant

effects. Therefore, a multipronged policy response addressing stereotypes as well as

saliency of terrorism may be effective in reducing negative public responses.

In addition, although Hypotheses 2b–2d predicting interactions between Middle

Eastern terrorist stereotypes and conservatism, prejudice, and race were not supported

in these analyses, results confirm that the effect of the Middle Eastern typification of

terrorism on anti-terror punitiveness remains present, regardless of individual political

ideology, prejudice, or race. This lack of consistent nonlinear and conditional effect,

although contrary to this study’s secondary hypotheses, is not entirely surprising,

given similar patterns of findings in prior minority threat research. However, it

certainly warrants further future exploration.

The results of this study are important for a number of reasons. Notably, this

research is the first to demonstrate that the minority threat explanation for punitive-

ness is applicable to Middle Easterners, despite the lack of a cohesive racial or ethnic

dimension uniting this category. The common association of perceived Arabs,

Muslims, Middle Easterners, and others with terrorism has the capacity to promote

public support for certain policy initiatives above and beyond the effects of prejudice

and terror salience.

Moreover, this study shows that minority threat represents a substantial influence

on punitive attitudes toward terrorism, whereas most previous crime-related threat

research has examined effects only in a traditional criminal justice context. It appears

that minority threat is associated with both the severe treatment of criminals as well as

harsh tactics aimed to prevent terrorism. It is significant that this research demon-

strates not only that threat operates beyond the minority groups previously found to be

stereotyped as law violators, but that it also operates beyond the institutions already

shown to be affected by it.

It is also important that this research used a perceptual measure of Middle Eastern

threat, rather than an objective compositional measure. First, the public very often

associates individuals of many different racial and ethnic backgrounds, from a wide

variety of regions and countries, and of different religious affiliations with terrorism

and Middle Easterners. In this regard, this study does not fit perfectly within the

134 Race and Justice 6(2)

preexisting minority threat theoretical framework that links one specific group (i.e.,

Blacks or Hispanics) to threat. However, Middle Eastern threat encompasses a much

broader and more loosely defined group of presumably threatening individuals that

relies more on the perceptions of others according to appearance—as evidenced by the

fact that Hispanics and Sikhs, for example, have been categorized as potential terrorist

threats (Kaplan, 2006)—than actual characteristics. By using a generic question that

references ‘‘Middle Eastern’’ individuals, this study was able to tap into respondents’

stereotypes without encountering the problems that the fluidity of those stereotypes

would present.

Another reason that the use of a perceptual measure of Middle Eastern threat is

preferable to a compositional one is that this type of variable is arguably more directly

related to the minority threat concept. Tests using compositional measures presume a

mediating influence of individual perceptions about minorities as competitively or

criminally threatening; but testing minority threat with a perceptual measure that

combines a stereotype of a minority with a stereotype of violence results in a more

direct assessment that is likely more valid.

A final benefit of operationalizing Middle Eastern threat with a perceptual measure

rather than a compositional one is that it is a more practical method of operationalizing

this type of threat, since there is no publicly available data collected on populations of

Middle Eastern descent living in the United States. No reliable data are collected on

populations by religion, so it is not possible to create an objective Muslim composition

variable.

Study Limitations and Directions for Future Research

One limitation of this study is that the sample does not precisely represent the national

population, thus limiting the generalizability of its findings. This is an inherent

weakness of telephone survey research and is attributable to who is most likely to

answer the telephone and agree to participate in the survey. Further, the use of cross-

sectional data precludes firm conclusions about whether Middle Eastern terrorist

typifications are causally related to anti-terror punitiveness, a limitation that might be

avoided through the use of longitudinal approaches.

Because there is so little multivariate research assessing punitive attitudes toward

terrorism, it is not possible to know how the regression models would be most

accurately specified. The measures controlled were included either because of a

theoretical rationale or because of their relevance in research on punitiveness toward

traditional types of crime. While this study includes those factors found to most

consistently predict crime-related punitiveness, it was not able to control for every

possible influence on it, such as income, religion, or prior victimization. And, it was

not able to control for political or economic competition, which were relevant

influences in the original ‘‘power threat’’ hypothesis. In addition, national measures of

Middle Easterner composition are not available, which could have allowed for an

examination of the mediating role of perceptual Middle Eastern threat between

regional composition and support for anti-terror initiatives. Despite these limitations,

Welch 135

explained variance for the models specified are relatively high for telephone survey

research on public punitiveness.

The use of the term Middle Eastern in this study is inexact, since terrorist ste-

reotypes attributed to Middle Easterners are often directed at those who are not of

Middle Eastern origin—partially because Americans generally do not know where the

Middle East is located or which countries comprise it (Kamalipour, 2000). This

study’s primary independent variable (correctly or incorrectly) likely captures per-

ceptions about a number of categories of people often stereotyped as Middle East-

erners and/or terrorists, such as Arabs, Muslims, South Asians, Sikhs, and North

Africans (AAADC, 2008; Chen, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Kaplan, 2006).

However, because this measure is a stereotype, the accuracy of perceptions is less

relevant.

An interesting question to consider exploring in future research relates to alter-

native interpretations of the findings of this research. For example, respondents who

identify other groups as sponsoring terrorism (such as Ukrainian rebels, White

racists, or political extremists) may also be more supportive of harsh approaches to

curbing terrorism. Thus, it is possible that putting a face—any face—on terror is

what results in greater punitiveness, rather than a specifically Middle Eastern face.

The inconsistent relevance of a ceiling effect on the primary relationship examined

here also warrants further study. While it is important to have learned that terror

salience has a nonlinear and context-specific influence in accord with a ceiling

effect, it may also be useful to more fully understand the reasons, especially in light

of the lack of this effect for conservatism, prejudice against Middle Easterners, and

race. Another alternative explanation, proposed by Unnever and Cullen (2009, 2010)

in relation to traditional crime, is that a racial-type animus directed toward mar-

ginalized ‘‘others’’ manifests in a lack of empathetic identification that facilitates the

widespread support of punitive policies, and we may benefit from future research

that elaborates on this possibility.

Conclusion

This study supports the minority threat theoretical explanation for increased social

control by finding that Middle Eastern stereotypes of terrorists contribute to public

support for a range of harsh ‘‘war on terror’’ policies much in the same way that prior

minority threat research has found that stereotypes of criminals contribute to public

support for ‘‘war on crime’’ measures. This is true regardless of the effects of a

number of influences found to increase punitiveness in prior research and which

would be expected to increase punitiveness toward terrorism. In addition, this rela-

tionship is particularly strong among individuals for whom terrorism is a less salient

problem, although the influence of stereotypes on public harshness does not otherwise

appear to be nonlinear or dependent on contextual differences. Accordingly, minority

threat by perceived Middle Easterners appears to be a compelling explanation for

some portion of strong public support for many of the harsh anti-terror policies passed

following 9/11.

136 Race and Justice 6(2)

Research has already shown that threatening stereotypes of Blacks and Hispanics

as criminals has increased support for harsh anti-crime policies that have dis-

proportionately targeted and punished minorities. It now seems as though threatening

stereotypes of Middle Easterners as terrorists is similarly increasing support for harsh

anti-terror policies that have not only disproportionately targeted minorities (Braman,

2004; Gabbidon et al., 2009, 2012; Huq & Muller, 2008) but also diminished the

freedoms and liberties of all Americans and noncitizens living in the United States

(Harcourt, 2007; Merskin, 2004; Simon, 2007). The implementation of a range of

government policies to address terrorism has resulted in what some believe is an

unparalleled reduction in both civil liberties and due process protections as well as a

number of new measures to punish suspected terrorists more severely than ever

before. The public’s endorsement of these war on terror laws may have helped

facilitate the continuance of many of these policies that have resulted in what some

consider social injustice and a general erosion of human rights (Harcourt, 2007;

Merskin, 2004). It has been argued that ‘‘our country is in the grips of a threat greater

than terrorism,’’ and that is a loss of democracy (BBC News, 2002; Mujahid, 2003,

p. 9). While much of the response to the 9/11 terror attacks is understandable, it is

concerning if certain particularly harsh policies were supported because of the

influence of inaccurate stereotypes related to Arabs, Muslims, and others perceived to

be Middle Eastern. Therefore, it would be valuable and important to examine the role

of national security measures that do not have a clear influence on terrorism,

especially because of their troubling disparate consequences for certain minorities.

Acknowledgment

The author gratefully offers sincerest thanks to Marc Gertz for assistance with data collection.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,

and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of

this article.

Notes

1. For example, although initially presumed to be committed by Middle Easterners, the 1995

bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was committed by a White

American citizen. There have been fewer instances of Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim ter-

rorism than terrorism committed by others (Mass, 2009).

2. In response to 9/11, the United Kingdom swiftly adopted the ‘‘Anti-Terrorism, Crime and

Security Act’’ (since replaced by the ‘‘Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005’’), which

impedes various individual freedoms and civil liberties guaranteed by national mandates

of liberty (Logan, 2007). As with the United States, the United Kingdom has attempted

to protect its citizens from attacks while also trying to protect its citizens’ rights but has

Welch 137

ultimately limited individual freedoms—particularly those related to freedom of expres-

sion—in the interest of national security (Logan, 2007). The Canadian government also

supports limits on civil liberties following the American terror attacks of 2001 (Crépau

& Jimenez, 2004), and among Australia’s anti-terror policies passed in response to the

attacks is one endorsing certain racial profiling tactics that target any potential illegal activ-

ity of Middle Easterners, Arabs, and Muslims (Chong, 2006).

3. Subsequent to this research corroborating the presence of a ceiling effect, other similar

‘‘models of social interaction’’ (Bruch & Mare, 2006, p. 668) have been applied to instances

of crime and violence (LaFree, 1999), rates of teen sexuality and pregnancy (Crane, 1991),

and punishment certainty (Yu & Liska, 1993).

4. The overall response rate for this research was 46.8%, the cooperation rate was 48%, and

the contact rate was 83.1%. Participation rates are based on definitions provided by the

American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). Research by Pew has found

that telephone response rates have been declining over time and that, using rigorous survey

methods such as those in this study, a 50% response rate using AAPOR definitions is

typical (Keeter, Kennedy, Dimock, Best, & Craighill, 2006).

5. While the U.S. Census Bureau does collect information on ‘‘Arab’’ ethnicity, this group

is categorized as ‘‘White.’’ It does not collect data according to the broader category of

‘‘Middle Eastern’’ origin.

6. Although this distribution is not precisely representative of population means, it is not

atypical for telephone survey research to underrepresent male, Black, Hispanic, and

younger individuals.

7. The varimax rotation method was used in this instance to maximize the variance of the

squared loadings for each factor and offers clearer separation of the factors. A single factor

was identified after five rotation iterations. The maximum-likelihood procedure was chosen

for this set of measures because it provides a method identifying population parameters

with a maximum likelihood of generating the observed sample distribution and because

it provides a sample significance test in samples over approximately 50 (Kim & Mueller,

1978) or 100 (Long, 1983). The w2 of 258.202 indicates statistical significance (at the .001 level) of this index for the sample and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling ade-

quacy (.887) indicates there is a very high degree of common variance among the items in

the index.

8. The use of the term Middle Eastern in this study is inexact, since terrorist stereotypes attrib-

uted to Middle Easterners are often directed at those who are not of Middle Eastern origin—

partially because Americans generally do not know where the Middle East is located or which

countries comprise it (Kamalipour, 2000). To simplify the question representing this study’s

primary independent variable and because the term Middle Eastern, correctly or incorrectly,

captures a number of categories of people often stereotyped as Middle Easterners and/or ter-

rorists, such as Arabs, Muslims, South Asians, Sikhs, and North Africans (AAADC, 2008;

Chen, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Kaplan, 2006), survey respondents were asked

about ‘‘Middle Easterners’’’ involvement in terrorism and this study uses the variable

‘‘Middle Eastern typification of terrorism.’’ The limitations of using only a regional attribute

of a concept that also often pertains to ethnicity, religion, and other regions are addressed in

the discussion section.

138 Race and Justice 6(2)

9. As described earlier, more terrorist acts are committed by Latin Americans, Africans,

citizens of former Soviet territories, and communists, therefore it is not possible that

Middle Easterners commit more than 50% of terrorist acts, as estimated by this study’s

respondents. And, it is likely that—based on what is known regarding the terrorist acts

of non-Middle Easterners—the true figure is less than that (LaFree et al., 2010).

10. Southern includes residents of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,

Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,

Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

11. Interaction terms were mean centered to enhance interpretation of findings (see Jaccard &

Turrisi, 2003).

12. For each, tolerance values only for the interaction terms or their component parts are lower

than .799 and only the variance inflation factors associated with them are larger than 1.3, as

expected in tests of moderation (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). The estimation of various subset

specifications for the models with multicollinearity for the product terms indicates that the

results regarding the effects of the independent variables are stable and not sensitive to

simultaneous inclusion (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003).

13. z ¼ b1�b2ð Þ SE2

1 þSE2

2ð Þ 1=2

14. An examination of scatter plots for each of the hypothesized moderated relationships

corroborates the table findings.

15. While the strength of specific b values cannot be compared across models (only within models), its relative size change is considerable.

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Author Biography

Kelly Welch, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology and

Criminology at Villanova University. Her scholarly interests include racial and ethnic

justice, stereotyping, and the sociology of punishment with regard to criminal justice

and school discipline. Her recent research, which has appeared in Criminology, Social

Problems, Crime & Delinquency, and Social Science Research, specifically examines

the way stereotypes and racial and ethnic composition influence punitive attitudes and

institutional policies.

Welch 145