Philosophy

TREATISE ON LAW

OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW 1

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 1]

Whether Law Is Something Pertaining to Reason?

I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced 2 to act or is

restrained from acting: for lex (law) is derived from ligare (to bind), because it binds one

to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle

of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 3); since it

belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of

action…

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 2]

Whether the Law Is Always Something Directed to the Common Good?

I answer that …the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the

practical reason 3 , is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness,

4 as

1

For the footnotes portion of this text I am indebted to Peter Kreeft’s excellent

commentary in his Summa of the Summa (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990). 2 That is, led or commanded. Law binds us morally, though not physically: we can use

our free will to obey or disobey. Someone living according to reason (which directs us to

our goal of leading a good and happy life) will freely choose to obey. 3 The practical reason in St. Thomas operates in this way: The intellect apprehends

something as good and thereby presents it to the will, which then wishes or wills that

good as an end or goal. Once intending the good as its end, the agent (the one who wills)

must decide upon the means to the end. If the means are not immediately obvious, the

agent deliberates in order to seek out acceptable ways to the end. Reason then issues a

judgment as to which means are preferable, followed by an act of will (called choice),

and then the execution of that choice through deliberate action. For a fuller discussion of

practical reason in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, see the Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/prac-med/#SH4a. 4 Man’s ultimate good is happiness, which, for St. Thomas, requires that we live in

accordance with our God-given nature. As we will see in our discussion of natural law,

God built certain natural inclinations into human nature, the most important of which are

our reasoning abilities which allow us to discover our moral obligation to pursue those

goods to which we are naturally inclined and to avoid anything which runs contrary to

those inclinations (what St. Thomas refers to as “evil”). Man’s highest good (summum

bonum in Latin), however, is not a natural but a supernatural good: the beatific vision,

seeing God’s essence in a direct flash of insight, which is open only to those whom God

saves.

stated above (Q. 2, A. 7; Q. 3, A. 1). Consequently the law must needs regard principally

the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as

imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, 5 the law must

needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher 6 ,

in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for

he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce

and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic…"

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 3]

Whether the Reason of Any Man Is Competent to Make Laws?

I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the

common good. Now to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole

people, or to someone who is the viceregent 7 of the whole people. And therefore the

making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care

of the whole people…

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 4]

Whether Promulgation 8 Is Essential to a Law?

I answer that, As stated above (A. 1), a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and

measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled

and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is

proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such

application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore

promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.

Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is

nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has

care of the community, and promulgated.

QUESTION 91

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 1]

5 Just as the soul is an individual substance but also the form of the body, so too is the

human being a whole in himself and also a part of the greater whole of the community. 6 St. Thomas here refers to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle.

7 A vice-regent is a representative who rules for the good of the people.

8 To promulgate is to make known.

Whether There Is an Eternal Law?

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law is nothing else but a

dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community.

Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in

the First Part (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2), that the whole community of the universe is governed by

Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of

the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things

is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind

of law must be called eternal.

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 2]

Whether There Is in Us a Natural Law?

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by

nature those things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although they have no

written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of,

what is good and what is evil."

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be

in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as

in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it

partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence

are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (A. 1); it is evident that all

things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted

on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now

among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most

excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both

for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a

natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the

rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. 4:6):

"Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are,

adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says:

"The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of

natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function

of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore

evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the

eternal law. 9

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 3]

9 Therefore the voice of conscience (i.e., man’s reason judging good and evil) is an echo

or reflection of the voice of God, and is thus sacred and inviolable.

Whether There Is a Human Law?

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason.

Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the

speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above

(ibid.). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally

known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the

knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason,

so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable

principles, 10

that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination

of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called

human laws… 11

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 4]

Whether There Was Any Need for a Divine Law? 12

I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of

human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because…man is

ordained to an end of eternal happiness…

Secondly…on account of the uncertainty of human judgment…

Thirdly, because…man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are

hidden…

Fourthly, because…human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds…

QUESTION 92

OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW�(In Two articles)

We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of

inquiry:

(1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?

10

St. Thomas here refers to self-evident theoretical axioms such as the law of non-

contradiction (a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same respect) as

well as self-evident practical axioms, both general (do good and shun evil) and specific

(be just). These are what St. Thomas calls “the precepts of the natural law,” which are

naturally known to us just as the first theoretical principles are. 11

“Human law” is also known as “positive law” (law laid down or posited by man). 12

Divine law is that part of eternal law which God promulgated by special revelation

(i.e., Sacred Scripture).

(2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the

Jurist states? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 92, Art. 1]

Whether an Effect of Law Is to Make Men Good?

Objection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good

through virtue 13

, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject

good." But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without

us," as we stated above (Q. 55, A. 4) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law

does not make men good.

Obj. 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man

obeys a law is due to his being good. Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the

law. Therefore the law does not make men good.

Obj. 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). But

some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding

themselves. Therefore it is not the business of the law to make men good.

Obj. 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a

tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own profit.

Therefore law does not make men good.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention of every lawgiver

is to make good citizens."

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Q. 63, A. 2), viz. acquired and

infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in

different ways; for it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and

preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given for the purpose of

directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men

good. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that

"lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works."

Reply Obj. 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law,

but sometimes it is through fear of punishment…

Reply Obj. 3: The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole;

hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with

the whole." Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good,

unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well

13

A virtue is a good habit, a moral excellence.

consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the common good of the

state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to

govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so far

virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers...

Reply Obj. 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law,

absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law…

________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 92, Art. 2]

Whether the Acts of Law Are Suitably Assigned?

Obj. 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as stated above (A. 1).

But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good: because

"although a good deed may be done through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not

done well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore punishment is not

a proper effect of law.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits something, as: 'A

brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids something, as: "No man may ask a

consecrated virgin in marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put

to death."

Reply Obj. 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through

fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with delight and of one's

own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.

________________________

QUESTION 93

OF THE ETERNAL LAW

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 2]

Whether the Eternal Law Is Known to All?

Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all.� Because, as the

Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of �God no man knoweth, but the Spirit

of God." But the eternal law is a �type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is

unknown to all save� God alone.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law is

imprinted on us."

I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect,

wherein some likeness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its

substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in

itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows

it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and

participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De

Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the

common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge

of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the

eternal law.

Reply Obj. 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but

they are made known to us in their effects, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things

of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 3]

Whether Every Law Is Derived from the Eternal Law?

Obj. 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated

above (A. 2, Obj. 2), "the eternal law is that, according to which it is right that all things

should be most orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to Isa. 10:1: "Woe to them

that make wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.

On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers

decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above (A.

1). Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law.

I answer that…Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief

Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the

eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal

law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the

eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is

nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law."

Reply Obj. 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and

it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates

from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence.

Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though

being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is

from the Lord God, according to Rom. 13:1.

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 6]

Whether All Human Affairs Are Subject to the Eternal Law?

I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as

explained above (A. 5): first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge;

secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an

inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the

eternal law, as stated above (A. 5). But since the rational nature, together with that which

it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is

rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each

rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (A. 2), it also

has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are

naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).

Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked;

because in them the natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and,

moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But

in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural

knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again, besides

the natural inclination to good, there is the added motive of grace 14

and virtue…

QUESTION 94

**********

OF THE NATURAL LAW�

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2]

Whether the Natural Law Contains Several Precepts, or Only One?

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), the precepts of the natural law are to the

practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason;

because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two

ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident

in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject: although, to one who

knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-

evident. For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature,

self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet to one who knows

not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says

(De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such

are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its

part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another." But some

14

Grace refers to that which God bestows freely, as distinct from natural necessity.

propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms

of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-

evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the

unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For

that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is being, the notion of which is

included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable

principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which

is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this principle all others are based,

as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as being 15

is the first thing that falls under the

apprehension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the

practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the

aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the

notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first

precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." 16

All

other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason

naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as

something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it

is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended

by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as

evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is

the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an

inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all

substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being,

according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of

preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.

Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially,

according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this

inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to

all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring

and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his

15

By “being,” St. Thomas means that which is, whether actual (fully real, perfect,

complete) or potential (not yet fully actualized) either in the mind (a “being of reason”)

or in objective reality (“a being in nature”); also (ens) an entity or substance; (esse) the

act of existing; (essentia) essence or what a thing is. 16

It is important to recognize that for St. Thomas, all ethics is fundamentally about

goods, as opposed to modern ethics, which tends to be concerned most especially with

rights, duties, obligations, laws, or “values.” What exactly does St. Thomas mean by

“good”? He means that it is 1) metaphysical, 2) objective (unlike “values,” which are

relative or subjective), 3) universal (unlike “rights” and “duties”), 4) intellectually

grasped (“naturally apprehended by reason as being good”), and 5) correlative or

mutually related with natural inclination, in accord with human nature.

reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the

truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this

inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending

those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 3]

Whether All Acts of Virtue Are Prescribed by the Natural Law?

Obj. 2: Every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are

prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas

this applies to certain special sins.

I answer that,…If…we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous

acts belong to the natural law. For it has been stated (A. 2) that to the natural law belongs

everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined

naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to

give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every

man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue.

Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since

each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously…

Reply Obj. 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man—and in

this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as Damascene states

(De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other

animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary

to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received

the special name of the unnatural crime.

QUESTION 95

OF HUMAN LAW�

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 1]

Whether It Was Useful for Laws to Be Framed by Men?

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human

audacity might be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of

wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing

harm." But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that

human laws should be made.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 94, A. 3), man has a natural aptitude for

virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of

training. 17

Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance,

in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and

his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has

given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice

for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in

withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and

especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs

to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as

to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition,

or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by

admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily

amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear,

in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and

that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly

what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training,

which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order

that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the

Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in

virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because

man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which

other animals are unable to do.

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 2]

Whether Every Human Law Is Derived from the Natural Law?

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no

law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in

human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason.

But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated

above (Q. 91, A. 2, ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature

of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law

of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways:

first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain

generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions

are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the

arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine

the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived

from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one must

not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to

17

For St. Thomas, human beings have a natural aptitude for knowledge and virtue, but

we must freely choose to work to acquire both.

no man": while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of

nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that

way, is a determination of the law of nature.

Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things

which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating

therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things

which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.