lmy: 3 pages mgt class

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mgmtfinalproject.zip

LE_1984.docx

Questions:

1. Find all the labor management practices mentioned in the report, and discuss how they complement each other (i.e., how one's shortcoming is covered by another, or how use of two practices results in greater total benefit than simple aggregation of them, that is, 1+1>2). You can just pick 2 or 3 of them for illustrative purposes. No need to discuss every policy/practice.

2. Why couldn't other companies in the same industry copy these practices? You may suggest that practices are complementary to each other so an imitator may need to copy all, not just one or two, practices. But then the question remains: why can't say just copy all practices? What might be some factors that impede imitation?

The report -------------------------------------------------------------

EUCLID, OHIO TWO years ago, when the Lincoln

Electric Company's sales were sagging because of the recession, 50 factory workers volunteered to help out.

After a quick sales training course, they took to the road, their only compensation 18 1/2 cents a mile for expenses, with no money for lodging or meals. Their objective: to help sell the company's Model SP200, a small welder introduced a couple years earlier for use in small machine shops and auto body shops.

The tactic worked. People who had been plant workers all their lives walked into body shops all over the country and said: ''Hi. I'm a factory worker from Lincoln Electric. I've got a welder I'd like to sell you.'' The pitch brought in $10 million in new sales and the small arc welder is now one of Lincoln's best-selling items.

An unusual scenario, perhaps, in American industry where, often as not, a company and its workers are at odds. But from its earliest years, 90- year-old Lincoln has charted a unique course in worker-management relations - featuring high wages, guaranteed employment, few supervisors, a lucrative bonus incentive system and piecework compensation.

The company, the world's largest maker of arc welding equipment, has 2,650 employees in the United States, the bulk of them blue-collar workers. There are no unions. An old production man, like Henry Ford, or a traditional time and motion man, like Frederick Winslow Taylor, probably would feel at home at Lincoln, for the place, in its way, has old-fashioned charm.

The Euclid plant is not air-conditioned, and while the company's products are technologically advanced, much of its equipment and its production line layouts have changed little since World War II.

The largely windowless plant is a bit dark in places. Workers seem to move about quickly, and work stations, while clean, are often jumbled, for the company - predating the Japanese system - eschews warehousing. Wherever possible it has materials delivered directly to production areas.

There are no frills in the executive offices, either - no executive automobiles, club memberships or management retreats. The company's 75- year-old chairman and chief executive, William Irrgang, who started as a production worker in 1929, eats with the rest of the work force in the company cafeteria. The furniture in his office dates to the 1950's.

But its humble aspect belies Lincoln's success. Lincoln has, in large part, driven competitors like Westinghouse and General Electric from the arc welding business. So secure is the company in its niche that, for all practical purposes, Lincoln is the arc welding business.

Its place in its industry, some experts believe, insulates Lincoln from many of the competitive risks facing players in other markets and would make its labor-management practices difficult to transfer to other industries.

But Robert Zager, a vice president of Work in America Inc., a private research institute in Scarsdale, N.Y., believes that many of Lincoln's practices are transferable to other companies. He calls the system ''a work of genius.''

The company's executives describe Lincoln a bit more modestly, saying it always follows an old dictum of the late James F. Lincoln: simplicity. It's a tradition that started with his brother, John, back in 1895.

SON of a Congregational preacher with strict views on individualism and morality, John C. Lincoln started the company with $150 in borrowed capital. In 1907 he asked his brother to be sales director at $50 a month. James Lincoln was a husky, energetic man who worked until the day before he died in 1965 at age 82. He had been a fullback on the Ohio State University football team, and in his senior year, when he was captain, the team's goal line was never crossed. When he became Lincoln's general manager in 1914, he said he wanted his employees to show the same exuberance for work that he had seen athletes show for sport. So he decided to give workers responsibility and to stress competition.

He asked workers to elect representatives from each department to advise him and other executives. This became the company's advisory board, which has met twice a month ever since with Lincoln's top officers, and its suggestions have helped shape the company's success.

While few analysts follow the arc welding industry, and the company itself declines to talk about its market share, ''it's substantial,'' according to Richard S. Sabo, manager of publicity and education.

Arc welders use electrical current to heat metals to a molten state and fuse them together. The company prices its equipment according to costs, and says that its reasonable prices and its reputation for quality are responsible for the dearth of competition from other American producers and the absence of foreign competition in arc welding in this country.

But the company has not been tempted to diversify. It makes only arc welding equipment, both manual and automatic, and industrial engines, as it has for decades. It has two factories, one at corporate headquarters here in this Cleveland suburb and the other nearby, and it maintains sales and distribution offices in Canada, France and Australia.

In 1981, a typical year, Lincoln had net income of $39.8 million, or $28.95 a share, on sales of $527 million.

In recessionary 1982, the company slipped to net income of $21.4 million, or $15.82 a share, on sales of $377.7 million.

Workers have shared in the company's fortunes. Under an employee stock purchase plan, about 75 percent of the workers own about 40 percent of the stock, which must be sold back to the company when an employee quits or retires. Most of the rest of the stock is owned by members of the Lincoln family. Only one, James F. Lincoln Jr., is now active in the company, as a director and assistant to the vice president for sales. The company is publicly held, with its stock traded over-the-counter.

Despite such a record, company executives have kept a low public profile. ''We do a lot of things differently from other companies and the differences are what give us our competitive edge,'' said Mr. Sabo.

Among the innovative management practices that set Lincoln apart are these:

* Guaranteed employment for all full-time workers with more than two years' service, and no mandatory retirement. No worker has been laid off in more than 40 years, except for some temporary workers at the end of World War II.

* High wages, which include a substantial annual bonus based on the company's profits. While the average Lincoln worker earned about $44,000 in the industry's last good year, 1981, half of that was bonus. In 1983, a troubled year in which employees worked 30 hours a week under the company's traditional work-sharing plan that means no one had to be laid off, average pay was about $20,000 - half in bonus.

Lincoln has never had a strike and has not missed a bonus since the system was instituted in 1934 to spur production and to enable it to pay more to its workers, hard-pressed by the Depression. Individual bonuses are set by a complicated formula that judges workers on four points: ideas and cooperation, output, ability to work without supervision and work quality.

* Piecework. More than half of Lincoln's production workers are paid according to what they produce, rather than an hourly or weekly wage. If a worker is sick, he does not get paid. Workers with serious illnesses must use state workers' compensation, personal insurance through a plan administered by the company's employee association, or income protection insurance. Labor unions have long objected to piecework, but here, the company and most workers believe, it has meant improved productivity and higher pay.

* Promotion almost exclusively from within, except for some engineering and sales positions, and according to merit, not seniority. Almost all hiring is at the entry level.

* Relatively few supervisors. The company's supervisor-to-worker ratio is 1 to 100, far lower than in much of industry.

* No break periods. Smokers receive a 10-minute period in the first shift and another in the second to smoke, a policy suggested by employees during the 1940's. This is the only time anyone may smoke - production workers or executives.

* Mandatory overtime and job assignments. Workers must work overtime if ordered during peak production periods, and must agree to job transfers to meet production schedules or to maintain the company's guaranteed employment program.

Another area in which the company's labor practices differ is hiring. Lincoln carefully screens all job applicants to determine how they might fit in with its philosophies. It has never used employment tests, believing they can't predict an employee's performance on the job.

Instead, applicants are judged in interviews by the company's personnel department and, if thought to possess qualities that mark them as good Lincoln workers, are interviewed by a committee of Lincoln vice presidents and plant superintendents whose approval must be unanimous.

''It's pretty much a gut reaction type of thing,'' Mr. Sabo said in his small, stark office.

The company does not advertise job openings, depending on word of mouth and its reputation to lure applicants. But when Lincoln is hiring, it often gets 100 applicants a day, Mr. Sabo said.

Its allure is not hard to understand. The typical Lincoln production worker, in a good year, earns wages roughly equivalent to wages for similar work elsewhere in the Cleveland area. But the bonuses the company pays make its compensation substantially higher.

Some workers and former employees complain that the company's piecework system and a policy of mandatory overtime during peak production periods can be burdensome and that, as a result, unfriendly, sometimes fierce competitions between workers can result. But most employees seem to enjoy working here. Turnover is usually less than 3 percent a year, including retirements. More than 400 workers have been here over a quarter of a century, some more than 50 years. Only four workers quit in 1983.

''I can't complain about anything,'' said Paul Bolton, an assembler for six years. He said he was happy at the plant, although the work was often demanding.

Two other workers, Steve Boka and Frank Klima, have worked here for 28 years apiece, and said Lincoln is an exceptional workplace.

''I couldn't think of working some other place,'' Mr. Boka said.

''This is the best there is,'' Mr. Klima said. ''The pay is good. Management is nice to you.''

Both said they preferred working in a nonunion plant, and that they were pleased with the piecework system.

Trade union advocates are convinced that many of Lincoln's practices, such as piecework and mandatory overtime, would be abused at most companies, smacking of the harsh management practices that existed before the rise of industrial unionism. But no union has attempted to organize the company. Lincoln pays health insurance and other benefits, but stresses to workers that this comes out of money that otherwise would go to bonuses. Vacations are taken when Lincoln shuts down for two weeks in August and two weeks at Christmas. Those entitled to just two weeks' vacation do inventory over the holidays.

WHILE some scattered companies elsewhere are trying out some of the worker management features in evidence at Lincoln, no other sizable company appears to have used so many of them - nor for so long.

Norman Berg, a professor of business administration at the Harvard Business School who has studied Lincoln for years, says he has ''increasing high regard for what the company is doing.'' Unlike some efforts at humanistic management, he suggests, Lincoln's management system is not a fad. ''If more companies operated like Lincoln Electric,'' he says, the country ''would be a lot better off.''

Robert H. Guest, professor emeritus of organizational behavior at Dartmouth College, said that because of the company's peculiar and selective hiring practices, the philosophy could not be transferred to most other large industrial concerns.

Echoing Mr. Zager of Work in America, Professor Berg said that, while certain practices, like piecework, likely could be installed only with great difficulty at unionized companies, ''maybe a dozen'' of Lincoln's practices, like guaranteed employment and a policy against management perquisites, could be utilized at other companies, union and nonunion.

He is also impressed that the company has no debt, using its earnings to finance any plant improvements or expansions in its product line. As a result, he says, it ''doesn't have to kowtow to the banks.''

While the company insists on individual initiative - and pays according to individual effort - it works diligently to foster the notion of teamwork. Long before the Japanese became known for emphasizing such concepts, Lincoln stressed that its workers throughout their lives were part of what it called ''the Lincoln family.''

If a worker is overly competitive, or, in Mr. Sabo's words, ''playing dirty'' with fellow employees, the worker is rated poorly in terms of cooperation and team play on his semiannual rating reports. Thus, that worker's bonus will be smaller.

''This is not an easy style to manage,'' Mr. Sabo says. ''It takes a lot of time and a willingness to work with people.''

class6.pptx

MGMT450: Strategic Management

Di Tong

Fall 2018

Class 6

What makes people behave in a desirable way?

Last time…

Don’t always need to draft a contract – people behave desirably given “shadow of future” – relational contracts

E.g., being nice to my boss so that I may get more favorable treatment in next job assignment

Again, relational contracts are narrowly defined – simply being nice or having a good relationship needs not imply relational contracts

Today

Formal incentive schemes – actual contracts involved

What people work hard?

What happens when you have the wrong incentives (or lack of incentives)?

The Chinese agriculture experiment

People’s Commune: Social organization that manages, among other things, agricultural production at village level

Free food, clothing, education/day-care, etc. – sounds good!

Public land and production tools (owned by the collective)

Farmers work and turn in everything produced to the collective

The collective distributes the goods in a need-based fashion

Incentive problem: you get the same amount whether you work more or less

The Chinese agriculture experiment

Xiaogang, Anhui (小岗村)

A very poor village in a very poor province

Over half of the village population died in famine during the 50s

In 1978, 18 villagers met secretly and decided to break the law (death penalty if caught)

They divided the land into slots to be worked by families

Family turns in part of goods produced, but keeps surplus

The Chinese agriculture experiment

No death penalty (luckily) – but was actually endorsed by the central gov’t

Marked the beginning of Chinese economic reform

Grain harvest more than previous 5 yrs combined

Per capita income from 22RMB to 400RMB

The Chinese agriculture experiment

There were push-backs – “this is no communism!”

Deng: “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white…as long as it catches mice” - if the incentive system worked, then who cares if it is “communist” or “capitalist”

Policy expanded in 1981 under “household responsibility system” (家庭联产承包责任制) to many, and later on all, rural areas

The Chinese agriculture experiment

Same capital, workers, land, industry structure, technology – drastically different productivity

Incentives matter – a lot

A less dramatic and more recent example:

Tree planters randomly assigned to piece-rate rather than fixed-wage scheme planted 21% more trees in British Columbia

The Chinese agriculture experiment

You probably don’t need more convincing that incentives are important

But in reality, most people don’t do exactly what they are incentivized to do

Why?

The difficulty with providing incentives

Simple answer: information asymmetry

The difficulty with providing incentives

To help explain, let’s consider a basic principal-agent model

Principal hires agent to perform certain tasks

Most often, agent and principal has diverging interests so that agent needs to be incentivized to behave desirably

This is not easy due to information asymmetry

The difficulty with providing incentives

Three types of information asymmetry

Moral hazard

Adverse selection

Signaling

The difficulty with providing incentives

Type 1: moral hazard

No information asymmetry before signing contract

Post-signing, two types of moral hazard could emerge

Principal may not be able to observe what the agent is doing (hidden action)

Agent is able to know more about some very important information after signing the contract and taking the action (ex post hidden information)

The difficulty with providing incentives

Some examples:

You hire a doctor to diagnose your illness, but cannot verify/observe how much effort the doctor is put into diagnosing (is she really trying hard to find the real problem?) – hidden action

Shop owner hires a shop assistant, whose effort in attracting customers is hard to observe (unless the owner monitors the assistant all day long, but that defeats the point of hiring) – hidden action

Board of directors appoints a CEO to lead the firm. CEO implements a strategy the effect of which is best known to the CEO while the board may know less, let alone regular shareholders who are technically owners of the firm (how many read 10ks? Tons of research show management frames 10k within legal limits) – ex post hidden information

The difficulty with providing incentives

Type 2: adverse selection

Information already asymmetric before signing contract

Agents differ in “quality” or ability, which the principal cannot ascertain

Sometimes called ex ante hidden information

A pure case of adverse selection assumes full observability of effort post signing contract (matters in modeling but not very important for our purposes)

The difficulty with providing incentives

When buying cows during non-milking phase, you don’t know if the cow is good or not

Some cows have better milking potential, others not so much

Sellers know quality

Buyers don’t know well

The difficulty with providing incentives

Type 3: signaling

Similar to adverse selection in that there is ex ante information asymmetry

However, either principal or agent could send a signal to (imperfectly) reveal private information

Signal must be costly to send, else no use (anyone could send a signal)

Often partial or imperfect information (otherwise signal = information)

The difficulty with providing incentives

Example:

Why going to school if it doesn’t teach you anything?

Turns out a second function of education is signaling

Education is costly (in terms of effort/intellect) to obtain and thus a relatively useful signal

If anyone could obtain education without cost (free diploma to anyone) then education is not a signal

Partially revealed information – education doesn’t say everything about an individual

The difficulty with providing incentives

An additional condition: people are risk averse

$100 or 50% to get $200 and 50% to get 0? What about $100 vs. <50%-220, 50%-0>?

Agent performance often has a random-component (salesperson’s performance depends on the economy which is out of his control), which compounds the complication due to information asymmetry

The difficulty with providing incentives

Information asymmetry gives rise to several common problems:

Multitasking

Team incentives

The “Ratchet Effect”

Risk sharing

Multitasking problem

Worker often need to perform multiple-tasks and/or achieve multiple outcomes

Managers may only observe some outcomes but not all; alternatively, some outcomes maybe hard to measure

Teacher performance = exam grade is observable and measurable, but what about good manners, self-esteem, great personalities etc.?

Multitasking problem

Incentivizing observable outcomes may drive out effort in unobserved outcomes

Teachers spend more time “teaching-to-test” than shaping students into good citizens etc. if paid based on exam grades

Incentivizing all outcomes? Both principal and agent tend to focus on observable/measurable ones

Team incentives

Output based on team effort

Often hard to precisely observe individual effort/performance in team

Incentive for individual members to shirk, leading to loss of overall welfare

Team incentives

Example:

A worker has a brilliant idea, which, if executed by her 5-person team, will generate $3000 value for the firm. She’s willing to reveal the idea only if she gets $1000 for reward (e.g., she may have to exert extra effort to show the idea works, such as by working extra hours to make a prototype; extra effort is worth $1000)

If incentive is at team-level, the generated value will be spilt 5 ways so each member gets at most $600, so she won’t pursue the idea

Welfare loss: team members, herself, and firm are all worse off than an alternative scenario: she pursues the idea, get $1000, firm keeps $1000, the rest $1000 to be split so each member gets $200

The “Ratchet Effect”

Agent unwilling to reveal their “quality” or other private information if principal will change work conditions on the basis of revealed information

E.g., spend all research money or else next year they’ll give less

E.g., shirk a bit to make manager think it takes awhile to complete the task, so manager will not assign more tasks to make you busy

Risk sharing

Principal pay less to “insure” against risk for risk-averse agents

Inefficiency may result

Risk sharing

Example: suppose an agent works either normally or very hard, with effort level at N and H, respectively (H>N and thus most costly to the agent). When under H, generates $200 more profit than under N.

Either a fixed $100 salary or $210 if sales goal met, $10 if not

Even if agent works very hard, there is a lot of randomness in sales (store location, weather, holidays etc.) so there is a 50-50 chance the goal is met or not met – risk averse individual prefer $100 fixed wage

because fixed wage, no incentive to work hard

For a risk neutral agent, second pay-scheme is preferred because of the $110 expected pay, and will work hard to generate $200 more profit, so that agent ends up getting $10 more, the firm gets $90 more, than fixed wage situation

If more people have high risk aversion, need steep performance-pay ($2100 than $210) again leading to inefficiency

Solutions?

How to combat these incentive problems?

Not all can be solved, and most can only be solved imperfectly, but some solutions are better than none

Performance-based pay

Relative performance

Subjective evaluation

Promotion tournament

Efficiency wage

Team design

Task design

Committing to the contract

Performance-based pay

Moral hazard + adverse selection maybe overcome using performance-based pay

Pay = base_salary + stock_option, etc.

Principal needs not know level of effort or quality/ability (in fact given stock_option makes agent a principal as well)

Adoption of performance-based pay may drive out overly risk-averse individuals allowing more targeted incentivizing

Not always easy to measure performance (CEO maximize short-term stock price; stock price affected by random factors)

Performance-based pay

A good performance measure:

Less/un-affected by random factors

If performance-pay is based on coin-flips it won’t work

Captures all/most of the desirable outcomes without creating disturbances across activities

CEO be incentivized based on both short-term stock price + long-term potential (conducting risky R&Ds, developing a good culture)?

Does not generate counter-productive behaviors

Basically, very hard to find

Relative performance measure

Incentive based on relative performance:

Salesperson gets paid by how much better he did than company average, industry average, etc.

Cancels off some random factors (bad managers, industry downturn etc.)

May create sabotage or non-collaborative behaviors among agents

Subjective evaluation

You are rated by peers, supervisors, subordinates

Can capture more qualitative aspects that often get “crowded out” in a multitasking sense

Helpful employees are not rewarded for helping others, because “helpfulness” is much harder to measure and quantify than sales volume

But very subjective – leading to influence behaviors (good relation = good rating)

Rating compression – people tend to give out average ratings, thus not providing much useful information

Promotion tournament

Agent incentivized by the prospects of being promoted, rather than bonus or salary

Basically a type of relative performance measure – promotion means you are better than your colleagues

Not just a nicer title, bigger salary check, but also the “right” to compete in the next round

Good scientist = good CTO?

Same other issues as relative performance

Efficiency wage

Pay enough so that agent incentivized to work hard to not get fired

Better explained by a simple, toy model to get more insights

Efficiency wage

Working hard creates emotional strain, physical tiredness etc. and is undesirable to agent; that is, it is “costly” to work hard. Suppose that equals C

Agent wage is W. If not working hard, there is a P chance to get caught (e.g., for principal good at detecting shirking p=0.9, else 0.1). If fired, agent gets V (a lower salary at a lesser company)

Simple cost-benefit analysis

Work hard agent gets W-C, not work hard and not caught, agent gets W, else V

Chance to get W is (1-P), chance to get V is p, so the total “value” of not working hard is (1-P)*W+P*V

So, will work hard (incentivized) if W-C > (1-P)*W+P*V

Re-arrange the terms to get: will work hard if P*(W-V)>C

Efficiency wage

P*(W-V)>C – what does that mean? If income loss (due to getting caught) is higher than cost to work hard, agent will work hard

What implications do we have? Several:

For those who enjoy working (thus cost of working hard C is very low), they will work hard even if cost of shirking (i.e., P*(W-V)) is not very high

Principal can incentivize workers to work hard by:

Increasing W, so p(W-V) will be larger than C; high enough W that keeps worker from shirking is called efficiency wage

Increasing P, principal’s ability to detect shirking, so that P(W-V) will be larger than C

Or hoping that V is small enough: when there are few comparable opportunities (e.g., due to skill mis-match so small V), threat of firing is valid and will incentivize workers

Team design

Smaller teams and repeated interactions (keep same team members together)

Shirking reduces

Repeated interactions make relational contracts easier to establish (recall our results for one-shot vs. repeated interactions last time) – more “shadow of future”, so people may behave well

E.g., team members may willingly transfer reward money to the idea generator, knowing that next time if they come up with good ideas they will be treated the same – making themselves, the idea generator, and the firm all better off

Having same team members make individual ability hard to ascertain (for both outsiders but also team members)

Task design

Division of labor not only increases productivity, but also makes multitasking less of a problem (less likely to reward for A but get B – there is no B)

Not all tasks are dividable, or can be costly to do so

A teacher teaching to the test, another to teach good manners?

Too much specialization – boredom, narrow skill sets, etc.

Committing to the contract

Following the contract regardless of whether agent reveals information (thus countering ratchet effect)

However, 1. not everything is specified in contract – agent may fear principal change work conditions not specified in contract; and

2. when contract ends and a new one to be drafted, revealed information maybe used against agent

Lincoln Electric

Quick intro to international expansion

LE video

Case questions

Enter international markets

Why do firms expand internationally?

a. Extend product life cycle – developed -> developing markets

b.Better access to resources – raw materials, cheap labor

c. Integrate global operations – similar lifestyle, needs

d.Technology facilitates

e.Larger market – larger market (cost structure – scale economies)

f. Locational advantage

Enter international markets

Where to?

a. Factors of production

i.Labor, land, natural resource, capital, infrastructure

ii.Often differ across countries for historical, geographical reasons

Singapore

1.Lacking natural resources (except its location)

2.Highly educated population, good work ethic -> Finance, IT, tranportation

Germany

1.Lacking indigo dye (Britain has a lot from colonies)

2.Find synthetic indigo -> good chemical industry

Enter international markets

Where to?

b.Demand

i.Demand level: population size, wealth etc.

ii.Demand lag: Older tech. in US may still be demanded in developing countries

c. Related/supporting industries

i.Shoemaking in Italy – leather processing industry

ii.Video game industry in Japan – animation and electronic industries

d.Competitors present? Strong?

e. Institutional environment: Three pillars

i.Legal/political institution: your wind farm is ours

ii.Social norm (as an institution): How things are typically done there

iii.Cognitive institution: Taken for granted thinking processes you don’t even aware or question

Enter international markets

Types of entry mode

Exporting

Licensing

Strategic alliances

M&A

Greenfield venture

Pros and Cons?

International expansion

1. Exporting

Involves low expense to establish operations in host country

Often involves contractual agreements

Involves high transportation costs

May have some tariffs imposed

Offers low control over marketing and distribution

International expansion

2. Licensing

Involves low cost to expand internationally

Allows licensee to absorb risks

Has low control over manufacturing and marketing

Offers lower potential returns (shared with licensee)

Involves risk of licensee imitating technology and product for own use

May have inflexible ownership arrangement

International expansion

3. Strategic Alliances

Involve shared risks and resources

Facilitate development of core competencies

Involve fewer resources and costs required for entry

May involve possible incompatibility, conflict, or lack of trust with partner

Are difficult to manage

International expansion

4. Acquisitions

Allow for quick access to market

Involve possible integration difficulties

Are costly

Have complex negotiations and transaction requirements

International expansion

5. New Wholly-Owned Subsidiary

Greenfield venture: Establish entirely new subsidiary

Is costly

Involves complex processes

Allows for maximum control

Has the highest potential returns

Carries high risk

Lincoln Electric

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCGiB9heV6k

Q1

Before considering the Indian market, LE has entered several other countries, with varying performances at each

Why the same company performs differently as it enters different countries? What factors do you think predict the varied performances?

What are the pros and cons of entering the Indian market? If LE were to enter, which mode (e.g., JV, greenfield) would you recommend?

Q2 “When in Rome, do what Romans do?”

Core practices

Piecework

Discretionary bonus

Merit rating

Employee advisory board

Institutions have varying degrees of openness to how much these practices can be transplanted

Would they work if not fully transplanted?

Author of the case co-wrote a research paper based on LE welding businesses in several countries (Poland, Mexico, Venezuela, etc.) from 1996-2006

Excluded the JV with the Taiwanese company as LE has no say in operations

Excluded an operation in Ireland as it is not in welding industry

Excluded operation in Columbia as it started at the end of observation period (around 2006)

Transfer of these practices seem to positively affect ROA (return on assets)

But in fact transfer is endogenous (not a true effect) – quality of labor market institutions affect both practice-transfer and ROA, creating a “pseudo” relationship between transfer and ROA

However, transfer of any two combinations of the two practices seem to significantly predict ROA, regardless of labor market institutions

Controlled for how regulated labor market institutions are in different countries

In fact, LE performs better in countries with higher hourly labor cost (after GDP per capital is controlled so this is not a mere byproduct of those countries are simply wealthier)

Next time

Learning curve and efficient scale