lmy: 3 pages mgt class
class6.pptx
MGMT450: Strategic Management
Di Tong
Fall 2018
Class 6
What makes people behave in a desirable way?
Last time…
Don’t always need to draft a contract – people behave desirably given “shadow of future” – relational contracts
E.g., being nice to my boss so that I may get more favorable treatment in next job assignment
Again, relational contracts are narrowly defined – simply being nice or having a good relationship needs not imply relational contracts
Today
Formal incentive schemes – actual contracts involved
What people work hard?
What happens when you have the wrong incentives (or lack of incentives)?
The Chinese agriculture experiment
People’s Commune: Social organization that manages, among other things, agricultural production at village level
Free food, clothing, education/day-care, etc. – sounds good!
Public land and production tools (owned by the collective)
Farmers work and turn in everything produced to the collective
The collective distributes the goods in a need-based fashion
Incentive problem: you get the same amount whether you work more or less
The Chinese agriculture experiment
Xiaogang, Anhui (小岗村)
A very poor village in a very poor province
Over half of the village population died in famine during the 50s
In 1978, 18 villagers met secretly and decided to break the law (death penalty if caught)
They divided the land into slots to be worked by families
Family turns in part of goods produced, but keeps surplus
The Chinese agriculture experiment
No death penalty (luckily) – but was actually endorsed by the central gov’t
Marked the beginning of Chinese economic reform
Grain harvest more than previous 5 yrs combined
Per capita income from 22RMB to 400RMB
The Chinese agriculture experiment
There were push-backs – “this is no communism!”
Deng: “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white…as long as it catches mice” - if the incentive system worked, then who cares if it is “communist” or “capitalist”
Policy expanded in 1981 under “household responsibility system” (家庭联产承包责任制) to many, and later on all, rural areas
The Chinese agriculture experiment
Same capital, workers, land, industry structure, technology – drastically different productivity
Incentives matter – a lot
A less dramatic and more recent example:
Tree planters randomly assigned to piece-rate rather than fixed-wage scheme planted 21% more trees in British Columbia
The Chinese agriculture experiment
You probably don’t need more convincing that incentives are important
But in reality, most people don’t do exactly what they are incentivized to do
Why?
The difficulty with providing incentives
Simple answer: information asymmetry
The difficulty with providing incentives
To help explain, let’s consider a basic principal-agent model
Principal hires agent to perform certain tasks
Most often, agent and principal has diverging interests so that agent needs to be incentivized to behave desirably
This is not easy due to information asymmetry
The difficulty with providing incentives
Three types of information asymmetry
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Signaling
The difficulty with providing incentives
Type 1: moral hazard
No information asymmetry before signing contract
Post-signing, two types of moral hazard could emerge
Principal may not be able to observe what the agent is doing (hidden action)
Agent is able to know more about some very important information after signing the contract and taking the action (ex post hidden information)
The difficulty with providing incentives
Some examples:
You hire a doctor to diagnose your illness, but cannot verify/observe how much effort the doctor is put into diagnosing (is she really trying hard to find the real problem?) – hidden action
Shop owner hires a shop assistant, whose effort in attracting customers is hard to observe (unless the owner monitors the assistant all day long, but that defeats the point of hiring) – hidden action
Board of directors appoints a CEO to lead the firm. CEO implements a strategy the effect of which is best known to the CEO while the board may know less, let alone regular shareholders who are technically owners of the firm (how many read 10ks? Tons of research show management frames 10k within legal limits) – ex post hidden information
The difficulty with providing incentives
Type 2: adverse selection
Information already asymmetric before signing contract
Agents differ in “quality” or ability, which the principal cannot ascertain
Sometimes called ex ante hidden information
A pure case of adverse selection assumes full observability of effort post signing contract (matters in modeling but not very important for our purposes)
The difficulty with providing incentives
When buying cows during non-milking phase, you don’t know if the cow is good or not
Some cows have better milking potential, others not so much
Sellers know quality
Buyers don’t know well
The difficulty with providing incentives
Type 3: signaling
Similar to adverse selection in that there is ex ante information asymmetry
However, either principal or agent could send a signal to (imperfectly) reveal private information
Signal must be costly to send, else no use (anyone could send a signal)
Often partial or imperfect information (otherwise signal = information)
The difficulty with providing incentives
Example:
Why going to school if it doesn’t teach you anything?
Turns out a second function of education is signaling
Education is costly (in terms of effort/intellect) to obtain and thus a relatively useful signal
If anyone could obtain education without cost (free diploma to anyone) then education is not a signal
Partially revealed information – education doesn’t say everything about an individual
The difficulty with providing incentives
An additional condition: people are risk averse
$100 or 50% to get $200 and 50% to get 0? What about $100 vs. <50%-220, 50%-0>?
Agent performance often has a random-component (salesperson’s performance depends on the economy which is out of his control), which compounds the complication due to information asymmetry
The difficulty with providing incentives
Information asymmetry gives rise to several common problems:
Multitasking
Team incentives
The “Ratchet Effect”
Risk sharing
Multitasking problem
Worker often need to perform multiple-tasks and/or achieve multiple outcomes
Managers may only observe some outcomes but not all; alternatively, some outcomes maybe hard to measure
Teacher performance = exam grade is observable and measurable, but what about good manners, self-esteem, great personalities etc.?
Multitasking problem
Incentivizing observable outcomes may drive out effort in unobserved outcomes
Teachers spend more time “teaching-to-test” than shaping students into good citizens etc. if paid based on exam grades
Incentivizing all outcomes? Both principal and agent tend to focus on observable/measurable ones
Team incentives
Output based on team effort
Often hard to precisely observe individual effort/performance in team
Incentive for individual members to shirk, leading to loss of overall welfare
Team incentives
Example:
A worker has a brilliant idea, which, if executed by her 5-person team, will generate $3000 value for the firm. She’s willing to reveal the idea only if she gets $1000 for reward (e.g., she may have to exert extra effort to show the idea works, such as by working extra hours to make a prototype; extra effort is worth $1000)
If incentive is at team-level, the generated value will be spilt 5 ways so each member gets at most $600, so she won’t pursue the idea
Welfare loss: team members, herself, and firm are all worse off than an alternative scenario: she pursues the idea, get $1000, firm keeps $1000, the rest $1000 to be split so each member gets $200
The “Ratchet Effect”
Agent unwilling to reveal their “quality” or other private information if principal will change work conditions on the basis of revealed information
E.g., spend all research money or else next year they’ll give less
E.g., shirk a bit to make manager think it takes awhile to complete the task, so manager will not assign more tasks to make you busy
Risk sharing
Principal pay less to “insure” against risk for risk-averse agents
Inefficiency may result
Risk sharing
Example: suppose an agent works either normally or very hard, with effort level at N and H, respectively (H>N and thus most costly to the agent). When under H, generates $200 more profit than under N.
Either a fixed $100 salary or $210 if sales goal met, $10 if not
Even if agent works very hard, there is a lot of randomness in sales (store location, weather, holidays etc.) so there is a 50-50 chance the goal is met or not met – risk averse individual prefer $100 fixed wage
because fixed wage, no incentive to work hard
For a risk neutral agent, second pay-scheme is preferred because of the $110 expected pay, and will work hard to generate $200 more profit, so that agent ends up getting $10 more, the firm gets $90 more, than fixed wage situation
If more people have high risk aversion, need steep performance-pay ($2100 than $210) again leading to inefficiency
Solutions?
How to combat these incentive problems?
Not all can be solved, and most can only be solved imperfectly, but some solutions are better than none
Performance-based pay
Relative performance
Subjective evaluation
Promotion tournament
Efficiency wage
Team design
Task design
Committing to the contract
Performance-based pay
Moral hazard + adverse selection maybe overcome using performance-based pay
Pay = base_salary + stock_option, etc.
Principal needs not know level of effort or quality/ability (in fact given stock_option makes agent a principal as well)
Adoption of performance-based pay may drive out overly risk-averse individuals allowing more targeted incentivizing
Not always easy to measure performance (CEO maximize short-term stock price; stock price affected by random factors)
Performance-based pay
A good performance measure:
Less/un-affected by random factors
If performance-pay is based on coin-flips it won’t work
Captures all/most of the desirable outcomes without creating disturbances across activities
CEO be incentivized based on both short-term stock price + long-term potential (conducting risky R&Ds, developing a good culture)?
Does not generate counter-productive behaviors
Basically, very hard to find
Relative performance measure
Incentive based on relative performance:
Salesperson gets paid by how much better he did than company average, industry average, etc.
Cancels off some random factors (bad managers, industry downturn etc.)
May create sabotage or non-collaborative behaviors among agents
Subjective evaluation
You are rated by peers, supervisors, subordinates
Can capture more qualitative aspects that often get “crowded out” in a multitasking sense
Helpful employees are not rewarded for helping others, because “helpfulness” is much harder to measure and quantify than sales volume
But very subjective – leading to influence behaviors (good relation = good rating)
Rating compression – people tend to give out average ratings, thus not providing much useful information
Promotion tournament
Agent incentivized by the prospects of being promoted, rather than bonus or salary
Basically a type of relative performance measure – promotion means you are better than your colleagues
Not just a nicer title, bigger salary check, but also the “right” to compete in the next round
Good scientist = good CTO?
Same other issues as relative performance
Efficiency wage
Pay enough so that agent incentivized to work hard to not get fired
Better explained by a simple, toy model to get more insights
Efficiency wage
Working hard creates emotional strain, physical tiredness etc. and is undesirable to agent; that is, it is “costly” to work hard. Suppose that equals C
Agent wage is W. If not working hard, there is a P chance to get caught (e.g., for principal good at detecting shirking p=0.9, else 0.1). If fired, agent gets V (a lower salary at a lesser company)
Simple cost-benefit analysis
Work hard agent gets W-C, not work hard and not caught, agent gets W, else V
Chance to get W is (1-P), chance to get V is p, so the total “value” of not working hard is (1-P)*W+P*V
So, will work hard (incentivized) if W-C > (1-P)*W+P*V
Re-arrange the terms to get: will work hard if P*(W-V)>C
Efficiency wage
P*(W-V)>C – what does that mean? If income loss (due to getting caught) is higher than cost to work hard, agent will work hard
What implications do we have? Several:
For those who enjoy working (thus cost of working hard C is very low), they will work hard even if cost of shirking (i.e., P*(W-V)) is not very high
Principal can incentivize workers to work hard by:
Increasing W, so p(W-V) will be larger than C; high enough W that keeps worker from shirking is called efficiency wage
Increasing P, principal’s ability to detect shirking, so that P(W-V) will be larger than C
Or hoping that V is small enough: when there are few comparable opportunities (e.g., due to skill mis-match so small V), threat of firing is valid and will incentivize workers
Team design
Smaller teams and repeated interactions (keep same team members together)
Shirking reduces
Repeated interactions make relational contracts easier to establish (recall our results for one-shot vs. repeated interactions last time) – more “shadow of future”, so people may behave well
E.g., team members may willingly transfer reward money to the idea generator, knowing that next time if they come up with good ideas they will be treated the same – making themselves, the idea generator, and the firm all better off
Having same team members make individual ability hard to ascertain (for both outsiders but also team members)
Task design
Division of labor not only increases productivity, but also makes multitasking less of a problem (less likely to reward for A but get B – there is no B)
Not all tasks are dividable, or can be costly to do so
A teacher teaching to the test, another to teach good manners?
Too much specialization – boredom, narrow skill sets, etc.
Committing to the contract
Following the contract regardless of whether agent reveals information (thus countering ratchet effect)
However, 1. not everything is specified in contract – agent may fear principal change work conditions not specified in contract; and
2. when contract ends and a new one to be drafted, revealed information maybe used against agent
Lincoln Electric
Quick intro to international expansion
LE video
Case questions
Enter international markets
Why do firms expand internationally?
a. Extend product life cycle – developed -> developing markets
b.Better access to resources – raw materials, cheap labor
c. Integrate global operations – similar lifestyle, needs
d.Technology facilitates
e.Larger market – larger market (cost structure – scale economies)
f. Locational advantage
Enter international markets
Where to?
a. Factors of production
i.Labor, land, natural resource, capital, infrastructure
ii.Often differ across countries for historical, geographical reasons
Singapore
1.Lacking natural resources (except its location)
2.Highly educated population, good work ethic -> Finance, IT, tranportation
Germany
1.Lacking indigo dye (Britain has a lot from colonies)
2.Find synthetic indigo -> good chemical industry
Enter international markets
Where to?
b.Demand
i.Demand level: population size, wealth etc.
ii.Demand lag: Older tech. in US may still be demanded in developing countries
c. Related/supporting industries
i.Shoemaking in Italy – leather processing industry
ii.Video game industry in Japan – animation and electronic industries
d.Competitors present? Strong?
e. Institutional environment: Three pillars
i.Legal/political institution: your wind farm is ours
ii.Social norm (as an institution): How things are typically done there
iii.Cognitive institution: Taken for granted thinking processes you don’t even aware or question
Enter international markets
Types of entry mode
Exporting
Licensing
Strategic alliances
M&A
Greenfield venture
Pros and Cons?
International expansion
1. Exporting
Involves low expense to establish operations in host country
Often involves contractual agreements
Involves high transportation costs
May have some tariffs imposed
Offers low control over marketing and distribution
International expansion
2. Licensing
Involves low cost to expand internationally
Allows licensee to absorb risks
Has low control over manufacturing and marketing
Offers lower potential returns (shared with licensee)
Involves risk of licensee imitating technology and product for own use
May have inflexible ownership arrangement
International expansion
3. Strategic Alliances
Involve shared risks and resources
Facilitate development of core competencies
Involve fewer resources and costs required for entry
May involve possible incompatibility, conflict, or lack of trust with partner
Are difficult to manage
International expansion
4. Acquisitions
Allow for quick access to market
Involve possible integration difficulties
Are costly
Have complex negotiations and transaction requirements
International expansion
5. New Wholly-Owned Subsidiary
Greenfield venture: Establish entirely new subsidiary
Is costly
Involves complex processes
Allows for maximum control
Has the highest potential returns
Carries high risk
Lincoln Electric
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCGiB9heV6k
Q1
Before considering the Indian market, LE has entered several other countries, with varying performances at each
Why the same company performs differently as it enters different countries? What factors do you think predict the varied performances?
What are the pros and cons of entering the Indian market? If LE were to enter, which mode (e.g., JV, greenfield) would you recommend?
Q2 “When in Rome, do what Romans do?”
Core practices
Piecework
Discretionary bonus
Merit rating
Employee advisory board
Institutions have varying degrees of openness to how much these practices can be transplanted
Would they work if not fully transplanted?
Author of the case co-wrote a research paper based on LE welding businesses in several countries (Poland, Mexico, Venezuela, etc.) from 1996-2006
Excluded the JV with the Taiwanese company as LE has no say in operations
Excluded an operation in Ireland as it is not in welding industry
Excluded operation in Columbia as it started at the end of observation period (around 2006)
Transfer of these practices seem to positively affect ROA (return on assets)
But in fact transfer is endogenous (not a true effect) – quality of labor market institutions affect both practice-transfer and ROA, creating a “pseudo” relationship between transfer and ROA
However, transfer of any two combinations of the two practices seem to significantly predict ROA, regardless of labor market institutions
Controlled for how regulated labor market institutions are in different countries
In fact, LE performs better in countries with higher hourly labor cost (after GDP per capital is controlled so this is not a mere byproduct of those countries are simply wealthier)
Next time
Learning curve and efficient scale