COURSE MATERIAL REVIEW

96 J o s E p H s . N Y E , J R . / Hard and Soft Power in American Foreign Policy

Notes 1. A. J. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe,

1848-1918 ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), x:xix. 2. Whether this would change with the proliferation

of nuclear weapons to more states is hotly debated among theorists. Deterrence should work with most states, but the prospects of accident and loss of ~ontrol would increase. For my views, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986).

3. Robert Cooper, The Postmodern State and the World Order (London: Demos, 2000), 22.

4. John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsoles- cence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

5. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), chapter 6.

6. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 16, 160.

7. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972), book I, chapter 1.

8. And in turn, as industrialization progressed and railroads were built, Germany feared the rise of Russia.

9. Henry Kissinger portrays four international systems existing side by side: the West ( and Western Hemisphere), marked by democratic peace; Asia, where strategic con- flict is possible; the Middle East, marked by religious conflict; and Africa, where civil wars threaten weak post- colonial states. "America at the Apex:' The National Inter- est, summer 2001, 14. 10. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2000), chapter 1. 11. James Carville quoted in Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 302. 12. For a more detailed discussion, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), chapter 2. This builds on what Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz called the "sec- ond face of power" in "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework:' American Political Science Review, September 1963, 632-42. 13. Vedrine, France in an Age of Globalization, 3. 14. The distinction between hard and soft power is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Both are aspects of the ability to achieve one's purposes by affecting the behavior of oth- ers. Command power-the ability to change what others do-can rest ori coercion or inducement. Co-optive power-the ability to shape what others want-can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences

because they seem to be too unrealistic. The forms of behavior between command and co-optive power range along a continuum: command power, coercion, induce- ment, agenda setting, attraction, co-optive power. Soft power resources tend to be associated with co-optive power behavior, whereas hard power resources are usu- ally associated with command behavior. But the relation- ship is imperfect. For example, countries may be attracted to others with command power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later become regarded as legitimate. But the general association is strong enough to allow the useful shorthand reference to hard and soft power. 15. Josef Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mr. Big?" The National Interest, summer 2001, 43. 16. See Cooper, Postmodern State; Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. 17. Nixon quoted in James Chace and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, "Towards a New Concert of Nations: An American Perspective:' World Policy Journal, fall 1999, 9. 18. Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 97. 19. Margaret Thatcher, "Why America Must Remain Number One:' National Review, July 31, 1995, 25. 20. Josef Joffe, "Envy:' The New Republic, January 17, 2000,6. 21. Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and American Power:' The National Interest, spring 2000, 55-56. 22. Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power:' International Security, spring 1985. 23. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 144-45; Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkely: University of California Press, 1973 ), 305. 24. Joshua S. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 281. 25. See Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 235. 26. Over the years, a number of scholars have tried to predict the rise and fall of nations by developing a general historical theory of hegemonic transition. Some have tried to generalize from the experience of Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, and Britain. Others have focused more closely on Britain's decline in the twentieth century as a predictor for the fate for the United States. None of these approaches has been successful. Most of the theories have predicted that America would decline long before now. Vague definitions and arbitrary schematizations alert us to the inadequacies of such grand theories. Most try to squeeze history into procrustean theoretical beds by focusing on particular power resources while ignoring

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER / TragedyofGreatPowerPolitics 97

, , others that_ ar~ equally important. Hegemony can be used as_ a descr~ptlve term (though it is sometimes fraught with emotional overtones), but grand hegemonic theo- ries are weak in predicting future events. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations: Essays (New York: Cambri~g~, University Press, 1984), 38, 41; George Modelski, The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the

: ··, Nat~on-State:' Comparative Studies in Society and History, .· April 1978; George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics

(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987). For a , detaile~ ~iscussion, see Ny~, Bound to Lead, chapter 2.

27. William Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World:' International Security 24, 1 (summer 1999): 5-41.

28. Steph~n Walt, "Keeping the World 'Off-Balance': Self-Restramt and US Foreign Policy;' Kennedy School Researc~ :-Yorking Paper Series 00-013, October 2000. 29. William Safire, "Putin's China Card:' New York Times June18,2001,A29. ' 30. Patrick Tyler, "Bush and Putin Look Each Other in the Eye;' New York Times, June 17, 2001,AlO. 31. Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint" 47· also Ikenbe~ry, "Getting Hegemony Right;' The Na~ional Interest, sprmg 2001, 17-24. 32. Josef Joffe, "How America Does It," Foreign Affairs, September-October 1997.

Tragedy of Great Power Politics JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER

Mearsheimer is a structural or neorealist, but one who places emphasis on offensive or power-m · · · · contrast :o the defensive (~r "stat~s q~o") realism he finds in Kenneth Waltz and other struct':~7~::irs;:. Me_ar~heimer argues offensive realism ts both a descriptive theory about how states behave as well as a pre- scriptive one that states ought to follow as the best way to survive in a dangerous world. He discusses such concepts as anarchy, self-help, and relative gains.

Jhi_s _[article] offers a realist theory of international ·politics that challenges the prevailing optimism ,about relations among the great powers. That enter- ,prise involves three particular tasks. \ , I begin by laying out the key components of the tjleory, which I call "offensive realism:' I make a num- .ber of arguments about how great powers behave toward each other, emphasizing that they look for opportuniti~s to ?ain power at each others expense. Moreover, I 1dent1fy the conditions that make conflict '· ore or less likely. For example, I argue that multi- o.lar systems are more war-prone than are bipolar Y§t~ms, and that multipolar systems that contain

ecially powerful states-potential hegemons-are ,most dangerous systems of all. But I do not just ert ~ese various claims; I also attempt to provide

mpellmg explanations for the behaviors and the ·.· tcomes that lie at the heart of the theory. In other

words, ~ lay out the causal logic, or reasoning, which underpms each of my claims.

The theory focuses on the great powers because !h~se state~ have the largest impact on what happens m mternatlonal politics. The fortunes of all states- great powers and smaller powers alike-are deter- mined primarily by the decisions and actions of t?os_e with the greatest capability. For example, poli- !1cs m almost every region of the world were deeply mfluenced by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States between 1945 and 1990. The two world wars that preceded the Cold War had a similar effect on regional politics around the world. Each of these conflicts was a great-power rivalry, and each cast a long shadow over every part of the globe.

. Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military

'otn Trauedv o• G t p, p, z · · b . . • i,. . " .,, ~ rea ower o 1ttcs y John J. Mearshe1mer. Copynght © 2001 b J h J M h · u d b · · PW. W. Norton and Company, Inc. Y O n . ears e1mer. se yperm1ssmn

98 J O H N J • M EA R S H E I M E R / Tragedy of Great Power Politics

assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conven- tional war against the most powerful state in the world. The candidate need not have the capability to defeat the leading state, but it must have some reason- able prospect of turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ultimately wins the war. In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable conventional forces. In the unlikely event that one state gained nuclear su- periority over all of its rivals, it would be so powerful that it would be the only great power in the system. The balance of conventional forces would be largely irrelevant if a nuclear hegemon were to emerge ....

Theories encounter anomalies because they simplify reality by emphasizing certain factors while ignoring others. Offensive realism assumes that the international system strongly shapes the behavior of states. Structural factors such as anarchy and the dis- tribution of power, I argue, are what matter most for explaining international politics. The theory pays little attention to individuals or domestic political consid- erations such as ideology. It tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls. For example, it does not matter for the theory whether Germany in 1905 was led by Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, or Adolf Hitler, or whether Germany was democratic or autocratic. What matters for the theory is how much relative power Germany possessed at the time. These omitted factors, however, occasionally dominate a state's decision- making process; under these circumstances, offensive realism is not going to perform as well. In short, there is a price to pay for simplifying reality.

Furthermore, offensive realism does not answer every question that arises in world politics, because there will be cases in which the theory is consistent with several possible outcomes. When this occurs, other theories have to be brought in to provide more precise explanations. Social scientists say that a theory is "indeterminate" in such cases, a situation that is not unusual with broad-gauged theories like

offensive realism .... It should be apparent from this discussion that

offensive realism is mainly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. But it is also a prescriptive theory. States should behave ac- cording to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world.

One might ask, if the theory describes how great powers act, why is it necessary to stipulate how they should act? The imposing constraints of the sys- tem should leave great powers with little choice but to act as the theory predicts. Although there is much truth in this description of great powers as prisoners trapped in an iron cage, the fact remains that they sometimes-although not often-act in contradic- tion to the theory .... As we shall see, such foolish behavior invariably has negative consequences. In short, if they want to survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists.

The Pursuit of Power Enough said about theory. More needs to be said about the substance of my arguments, which means zeroing in on the core con<;ept of "power:' For all realists, calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them. Power is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international relations ....

Realism In contrast to liberals, realists are pessimists when it comes to international politics. Realists agree that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competition and war. Creating a peaceful world is surely an attractive idea, but it is not a practical one. "Realism;' as Carr notes, "tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accept- ing, and adapting oneself to these forces and these

tendencies." 1 This gloomy view of international relations is

based on three core beliefs, First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, be- cause these states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars. Sec- ond, realists believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. The structure of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend not to draw sharp distinctions between "good"

J O H N J • M EA R s H E I M E R / Tragedy of Great Power Politics 99

and "bad" states, because all great powers act accord- ing. ~o the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government . It . there~ore difficult to discriminate among states: sa~: for differences in relative power. In essence great powers ?re like b_illiard balls that vary only in ~ize.

Third, . realists hold that calculations about power dommate states' thinking, and that states com- pete f~r power a~ong themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war, which is consid- ered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl v~n Claus~witz, the nineteenth-century military strategist'. war 1s a continuation of politics by other means. ~~nally, a ze~o-sum quality characterizes that c?~petit10n, sometimes making it intense and unfor- g_1vmg. States may cooperate with each other on occa- sion, but at root they have conflicting interests ....

Defensive realism, which is frequently referred to as "structural realism;' came on the scene in the late 1970s with the appearence of Waltz's Theory of International Politics. Unlike Morgenthau, Waltz does n?t assume that great powers are inherently aggressive because they are infused with a will to power; instead he starts by assuming that states ~erely aim to survive. Above all else, they seek secu- nty. Nevertheless, he maintains that the structure of

. the international system forces great powers to pay , careful attention to the balance of power. In partic-

ular, anarchy forces security-seeking states to com" pete with each other for power, because power is the best means to survival. Whereas human nature is the

. deep cause of security competition in Morgenthau's theory, anarchy plays that role in Waltz's theory. , . ~altz does not emphasize, however, that the in-

.• ternat10nal system provides great powers with good reasons to act offensively to gain power. Instead, he

. appears to make the opposite case: that anarchy ' . e~courages states to behave defensively and to main- . tam rather than upset the balance of power. "The

firs~ concern of states;' he writes, is "to maintain th .. . h . eir po~1tion mt e system." There·seems to be, as mternational relations theorist Randall Schweller .notes, a "status qu? bias" in Waltz's theory.2

> , . Waltz recogmzes that states have incentives to ;· gam power at their rivals' expense and that it makes ~r~ood _str~tegic sense to act on that motive when the r tune IS ng~t. But he does not develop that line of t ·. a:gument m any detail. On the contrary, he empha- ::." sizes that when great powers behave aggressively , , the pot t' I · · ' '( en Ia VICtims usually balance against the

aggress~r and thwart its efforts to gain power. For Waltz, m short, balancing checkmates offense Furthermore, he stresses that great powers must b~ ~areful. not to ac~~ire too much power, because . e~cess1ve strength is likely to cause other states to JOm forces against them, thereby leaving them worse off than t~ey wo~l_d have been had they refrained from seek1,ng add1t10nal increments of power.

. Walt~ s views on the causes of war further reflect his theory s status quo bias. There are no profound or deep causes of war in his theory. In particular, he does not s~ggest that there might be important benefits to be gamed from war. In fact, he says little about the causes of war, other than to argue that wars are largely the result of uncertainty and miscalculation. In other words, if states knew better, they would not start wars.

Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera _buttress the defensive realists' case by focusing attention on a structural concept known as the offense-defense b?lan_ce. ~hey maintain that military powe: at ~ny pomt m time can be . categorized as favormg either offense or defense. If defense has a clear ~dvantage over offense, and conquest is there- fore difficult, great powers will have little incentive to use force to gain power and will concentrate instead on protecting what they have. When defense has the a~vantage, protecting what you have should be a rel- atively easy task. Alternatively, if offense is easier states will be sore!~ tempted to try conquering each other, ~nd the:e will be a lot of war in the system. Defensive realists argue, however, that the . offense- defense balance is usually heavily tilted toward defense, th_us making conquest extremely difficult. In sum, efficient balancing coupled with the natural advantages of defense over offense should discourage ?reat powers from pursuing aggressive strategies and mStead make them "defensive positionalists:'

My theory of offensive realism is also a structural the~ry of international politics. As with defensive realism, my theory sees great powers as concerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is no agency to protect them from each oth:r; they quickly r~alize that power is the key to their s~rv1val. _Offensive realism parts company with defensive realism over the question of how much po-;er states want. For defensive realists, the inter- ~at1onal structure provide,s states with little incen- ~1ve to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of

i

)

100 JOHN J · M EA R s H E I M E R / Tragedy of Great Power Politics

. power rather than increasing it, is Power Preservmg ' 1

. th . . 1 of states Offensive rea ists, on e

the mam goa · ly her hand believe that status quo powers are r~re

ot . , ld l't'cs because the internat10nal £ und m wor po i i , 1 k 0 t powerful incentives for states to oo system crea es f

ities to gain power at the expense o f~r ?port~o take advantage of those situatio~s ri~:~ t~: benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ulti- :ate goal is to be the hegemon in the system ....

Competition for Power

Great powers, I argue, are alwayhs ~ea~ch~ng !~;:ri~og:: . . t ain power over t eir nva s,

tmu::ye:s ~i!ir final goal. This perspectivhe does notl Pt for t e unusua allow for status quo powers, exce

state that achieves ~reponderance. I~:::ta:~\::~: tern is populated with great pow~rs . nts sionist intentions at their core. This [_a~ticle] prese a theory that explains this competition f~r power.

. 11 I attempt to show that there is a com- s~;~!c1:J~ behind my claim that great powers seek p . . e the1'r share of world power .... to maxim1z

Why States Pursue Power

My explanation for why great powers vie ~i~h ~ac~ other for power and strive for hegemony ~s e~ive from five assumptions about the internationa ds~s-

None of these assumptions alone man a es ~:; states behave competitively. Taken togethher,

d ict a world in which states ave ~::~~:~a~~::ea:~n to think and sometimes behave

. 1 the system encourages aggressively. In particu ar, . . h ir states to look for opportunities to maximize t e power vis-a-vis other states.···

Bedrock Assumptions The first assumption is that the intern~ti_onal sy~tem . h' whi"ch does not mean that it is chaotic or is anarc ic, h 1 · on . b di'sorder It is easy to draw t at cone us1 '

riven Y · · db secu-. 1· m depicts a world characterize y smce rea is . lf h the rity competition and war. By itse .' owev~r,with

The second assumption is that great powe_rs inherently possess some offensive ?1ilitar\capabild ity which gives them the wherewithal to urt _a~l

o'ssibly destroy:each other. States are potentia y p h other although some states have dangerous to eac , h £

ore military might than others and are ~ ere ore m d us A state's military power is usually more angero · · d" - . dentified with the particular weaponry at its ~ i h even if there were no weapons, t e posal, althoug ld till use their feet . dividuals in those states cou s :id hands to attack the population of anot~er ~tat~ After all, for every neck, there are two an s

choke it. ver be The third assumption is that states can n~

certain about other states' intentions .. Specifical~y, ate can be sure that another state will not use its

:~:~sive military capability to attac~ the firs~::~!f; This is not to say that states neces~arily have . t ntions Indeed, all of the states m the system ma~ : :eliabl; benign, but it is impossible_to be s~: ~o that judgement because intentions are impossi

d. . with 100 percent certainty. There are many ivme . d tate can be ossible causes of aggression, an . no s of

~ure that another state is not motivated by o1;1ekl them. Furthermore, intentions ca~ change J:icaj so a state's intentions can be bemgn on~ f hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is un-

"d ble which means that states can never be sure avoi a , · · t f ons to that other states do not have offens_i~e. m en i. .

Ion with their offensive capabilities. . . go a Th~ fourth assumption is that survival is the

. 1 of great powers. Specifically, states primary goa . · d th

k to maintain their territorial mtegrity an . ; see of their domestic political order. Surviv~ autonomy a state is dominates other motives because, on~~

d 't i's unlikely to be in a position to pur-conquere , i 1· t the h . s Soviet leader Josef Sta m pu sue ot er aim · . "W n and

oint well during a war scare m ~927: . e ca . ~ust build socialism in the [Soviet ~n:,on]. But m order to do so we first of all have to exist. 3 State~ ca~ and do pursue other goa~s, o_f course, but security is their most important obiective.

The fifth assumption is that great ~owers ar; tional actors. They are aware of their externa

::vironment and they think strategical~y about h~; . . it In particular, they consider the pr

realist notion of anarchy h~s ~othmg_ to d hat conflict; it is an ordering prmciple, which ;rs~ the s stem comprises independent states t_ at a:e

y t 1 authority above them. Sovereignty, m no cen ra h · no

to survi:/:th~r states and how their own behavior ;:;:~;s to affect the behavior of those othe~ st~tes, and hJw the behavior of those othe~ states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover,

. h ds i"nheres in states because t ere is ot er wor , · al tern higher ruling body in the internation ,~ys ' . There is no "government over governments. .

JOHN J. ME AR s HEIMER / Tragedy of Great Power Politics 101

states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions.

As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule should behave aggressively toward each other. There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive, which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, when the· five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior re- sult: fear, self-help, and power maximization.

State Behavior

Great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might

· be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the perspective of any one great power, all other great powers are potential enemies. This point is ill}lstrated by the reaction of .the United Kingdom and France to German reunifi- .cation at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three states had been close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united Germany.

The basis of this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other

might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other

.. states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the ,.'.'.911" problem-the absence of a central authority to .which a threatened state can turn for help-and Jtates have even greater incentive to fear each other. \Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the 'possible self-interest of third parties, for punishing }m aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to ,geter potential aggressors, states have ample reason

ot to trust other states and to be prepared for war ith them.

The possible consequences of falling victim to ggression further amplify the importance of fear as

.,,motivating force in world politics. Great powers ,9 not compete with each other as if international

politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic inter- course; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible conse- quences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great.

States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for their own secu- rity. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary marriages of conven- ience: today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon there- after flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.

Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its po- tential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. Weaker states will be reluctant to pick fights with more powerful states because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the ,bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger. Neither Canada nor

102 J o H N J • M EAR s H EI M ER / "Tragedy of Great Power Politics

directi~n and scope of change in the balance of power. Remember, few in the West anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union before it happened. In fact, during the first half of the Cold War, many in the West feared that the Soviet economy would eventu- ally generate greater wealth than the American econ- omy, which would cause a marked power shift against the United States and its allies. What the future holds for China and Russia and what the balance of power will look like in 2020 is difficult to foresee.

Mexico, for example, would countenance attacking the United States, which is far more powerful than its neighbors. The ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system. As Immanuel Kant said, "It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible:'4 Survival would then be almost

guaranteed. Consequently, states pay close attention to how

power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort. to maximize their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the balance of-power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. States employ a variety of means-economic, diplomatic, and military-to shift the balance of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. Because one state's gain in power is another state's loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. The trick, of course, is to be the winner in this competition and to dominate the other states in the system. Thus, the claim that states maximize relative power is tantamount to arguing that states are disposed to think offensively toward other states, even though their ultimate motive is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggres-

sive intentions. Even when a great power achieves a distinct

military advantage over its rivals, it continues look- ing for chances to gain more power. The pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved. The idea that a great power might feel secure without dominating the system, provided it has an "appro- priate amount" of power, is not persuasive, for two reasons. First, it is difficult to assess how much rela- tive power one state must have over its rivals before it is secure. Is twice as much power an appropriate threshold? Or is three times as much power the magic number? The root of the problem is that power calculations alone do not determine which side wins a war. Clever strategies,for example, some- times allow less powerful states to defeat more

powerful foes. Second, determining how much power is enough

becomes even more complicated when great powers contemplate how power will be distributed among them ten or twenty years down the road. The capabilities of individual states vary over time, some- times markedly, and it is often difficult to predict the

J

Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminat- ing any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system be- cause it thought it already had sufficient power to survive. But even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usu- ally the-case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are almost always better off with more rather than less power. In short, states do not become status quo powers until they completely dominate the system.

All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest them- selves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition,

· where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break

out in this world. The "security dilemma;'which is one of the most

well-known concepts in the international relations literature, reflects the basic logic of offensive realism. The essence of the dilemma is that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the , security of other states. Thus, it is difficult for a state to increase its own chances of survival without threat- ening the survival of other states. John Herz first

JOHN J. MEARS HEIMER / Tragedy of Great PowerPolitics 1.03

intr?duced the security dilemma in a 1950 article in th: Journal W?rld Politics. After discussing the anar- ~h1c nature_of mternat1onal politics, he writes, "Striv- m~ to attam s_ecurity from . . . attack, [states] are driven to a~qmre more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others Th' .

d , IS, In

turn, ren ers the others more insecure and compels the~ to prepare_ for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure m such a world of comp t' . . . e mg umts, powe~ competit10n ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on "s Th . 1· . f , . e1mp1Ca- t1on o Herz s analysis is clear the best c . . · way 1or a state to survive m_ anarchy is to take advantage of other states and gam power at their expense Th b d £. , eeste- ense is a good offense. Since this message is widely

understood, ceaseless security competition en Un~ortl1;nately, little can be done to ameliorate t;eu::~ curity dilemma as long as states operate in anarchy:

. It should be apparent from this discussion th.at t saymg that s~ates are power maximizers is tanta- ' mount to saymg that they c~re about relative power,

~ot absolute power. There is an important distinc- t10n here, beca~se states concerned about relative power behave differently than do states interested in itbsolute power. States that maximize relative po .. d . . wer \\re c~ncerne . f ~Imarily with the distribution of ,material capab1hties. In particular, they try to gain as 1:arge a power advantage as possible over potential ri- yals, because power is the best means to survival in ,,a:.dangerous world. Thu~, states motivated by rela- .n!~ power concerns are likely to forgo large gains .

mo 'f h m , . wn power, I sue gains give rival states even eater pow:r, for smaller national gains that never- e~es~ provide them with a power advantage over eir rivals. States that maximize absolute power on . other hand, care only about the size of their ~wn

,.ns, not those of other states. They are not moti- ted.by ~alance-of-power logic but instead are con- JJed with amassing power without regard to how ,;Sh power other states control. They would jum !~~ :port~nity for large gains, even if a rivii

. . ore m the deal. Power, according to this ·,; Is not a means to an end (survival), but an end . elf.... .

. . is obviously little room for status quo powers ,Ot~d where states are inclined to look for op- ·::1t1es to gain more power. Nevertheless, great

~owers cannot always act on their offensive inten- t10ns, because behavior is influenced not only b what stat:s want, but also by their capacity to realiz: these. desires. Every state might want to be king of . the hill, but not every state has the wherewithal to compete for that lofty position, much less achieve it Much depends on how military might is distributed among the great powers. A great power that has a marked power advantage over its rivals is likely to ?ehave more aggressively, because it has the capabil- ity as well as the incentive to do so.

By co~trast, great powers facing powerful op- po~ents will be less inclined to consider offensive ac~10.n and more concerned with defending the existmg balance of power from threats by their more powerful opponents. Let th.ere be an opportunity for those weaker states to revise the balance in their own fav~r, however, and they will take advantage of it ~talm put t~e point well at the end of World War II; Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army

can reach. It cannot be otherwise."6 States might 1 have the capability to gain advantage over a r~::i power but nevertheless decide that the perceived costs of offense are too high and do not justify the expected benefits.

In short, great powers are not mindless aggres- sors ~o bent ?n gaining power that they charge head- long mto losmg wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories. On t~e contrary, before great powers take offensive ac- t10ns, they think carefully about the balance of power and about how other states will react to the' mo~es. They weigh the costs and risks of offen;: ag~mst the l~ely benefits. If the benefits do not out- we1g~ _the nsks, they sit tight and wait for a more prop1t10us ~omen_t. Nor do states start arms races that are unlikely to improve their overall position States some~imes limit defense spending either ·b;~ cause sp~ndmg more would bring no strategic ad- vantage or because spending more would weaken the economy and undermine the state's power in the long run. :o ~ar~phrase Clint Eastwood, a state has t? know its hm1tations to survive in the interna- tional system. . Nev:rtheless, great powers miscalculate from

time to _t1;111e because they invariably make impor- tant dec1S1ons on the basis of imperfect information State~ har~y ever have complete information abou~ a~y situation they confront. There are two dimen- ~1ons ~o this problem. Potential adversaries have mcentives to misrepresent their own strength or

104 ) 0 H N J. MEARS HEIMER / Tragedy of Great Power Politics

weakness, and to conceal their true aims. For exan:- le a weaker state trying to deter a stronger state is

iik;ly to exaggerate its own power to discourage the potential aggressor from at~acl<~ng: On the other hand, a state bent on aggression is lil~ely _to er:i~ha- size its peaceful goals while exaggeratmg its miht~ry weakness, so that the potential victim does not bmld up its own arms and thus leaves itself vulnerable to attack. Probably no national leader was bett~r at practicing this kind of decep~ion than Adolf Hitler.

But even if disinformation was not a problem, great powers are often unsure about ho'; the_ir own military forces, as well as the advers~ry s, will _per- form on the battlefield. For example, it is sometimes difficult to determine in advance how ne': weapons and untested combat units will perform m the face of enemy fire. Peacetime maneuvers and wa~ g~mes are helpful but imperfect indi~ato~s of wha~ is hkely to happen in actual combat. Fightmg :vars is a com- plicated business in which it is often difficult to pre- dict outcomes ....

Great powers are also sometimes unsur~ about the resolve of opposing states as well as alhes. For example, Germany believed that. if it went to war against France and Russia in the summer of 1914, the United Kingdom would probably sta~ out of the fl ht. Saddam Hussein expected the Umted States to st~nd aside when he invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Both aggressors guessed wrong, but each had good reason to think that its initial judgment was_ correct. I the 1930s Adolf Hitler believed that his great- p:wer rivals, would be easy to_ exploi~ and isolate because each had little interest m fightmg Germany and instead was determined to get someone else to assume that burden. He guessed right. In sh~rt, g:eat powers constantly find themselves c?nfrontmg sit~- ations in which they have to make importan_t _deci- sions with incomplete information. Not surl?nsmgly, they sometimes make faulty judgments and end up doing themselves serious harm. .

Some defensive realists go so far as to suggest that the constraints of the international system are so powerful that offense rarely succeeds, an~ that ag- gressive great powers invariably end up bemg pun- ished. As noted, they emphasize that 1) threatened states balance against aggressors and ultimately crush them, and 2) there is an offense-defense balance that is usually heavily tilted toward the defense, thus niaking conquest especially difficult. Great po_w~rs, therefore, should be content with the existmg

balance of power and not try to change it b~ f?~ce. After all, it makes little sense for a state to imtiate a war that it is likely to lose; that would ~e self- defeating behavior. It is better to concentrate mstead on preserving the balance of power. Moreover, because aggressors seldom succeed, states should understand that security is abundant, and thus there is no good strategic reason for wanting more power in the first place. In a world where co~qu~st sel~om pays, states should have relatively bemgn mtenti~ns toward each other. If they do not, these d~fensive realists argue, the reason is probably poisonous domestic politics, not smart calculation~ about how to guarantee one's security in an anar~hic world.

There is no question that systemic factors con- strain aggression, especially balancing by threate~ed states. But defensive realists exaggerate those r~strai~ - ing forces. Indeed, the historical record provides lit- tle support for their claim that offense rarely succeeds. One study estimates that there were 63 wars between 1815 and 1980, and the initiator won 39 times, which translates into about a 60 percent success rate. Turning to specific cases, Ott~ . von Bismarck unified Germany by winnin? ~ilitary victories against Denmark in 1864, Austria m 1866, and France in 1870, and the United States as we know it today was created in good part by ~onque~t in the nineteenth century. Conquest certamly paid big dividends in these cases. Nazi Germany won wars against Poland in 1939 and France in 1940, but lost to the Soviet Union between 1941 a_nd 1~45. Conquest ultimately did not pay for the Third Reich, but if Hitler had restrained himself ~fter t?e fall of France and had not invaded the Soviet Umon, con- quest probably would have paid handsomely for the Nazis. In short, the historical record s?ows that offense sometimes succeeds and sometime~ d_oes not. The trick for a sophisticated power maximizer is to figure out when to raise and when to fold.

Hegemony's Limits Great powers, as I have emphasized, strive to gain power over their rivals and hopefully becom~ _heg~- mons. Once a state achieves that exalted position'. it becomes a status quo power. More needs to be said, however, about the meaning of hegemony. .

A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a

J O H N J • M EA R S H E I M E R / Tragedy of Great Power Politics 105

serious fight against it. In essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system. A state that is sub- stantially more powerful than the other great pow- ers in the system is not a hegemon, because it faces, by definition, other great powers. The United King- dom in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, is sometimes called a hegemon. But it was not a hege- mon, because there were four other great powers in Europe at the time-Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia-and the United Kingdom did not dominate them in any meaningful way. In fact, during that period, the United Kingdom considered France to be a serious threat to the balance of power. Europe in the nineteenth century was multipolar, not unipolar.

Hegemony means domination of the system, which is usually interpreted to mean the entire world.It is possible, however, to apply the concept of a system more narrowly and use it to describe par- . ticular regions, such as Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. Thus, one can distinguish between global hegemons, which dominate the world, and regional hegemons, which dominate dis-

. tinct geographical areas. The United States has been a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred years. No other state in

, the Americas has sufficient military might to chal- .. lenge it, which is why the United States is widely rec- ... ·ognized as the only great power in its region. , My argument .•. is that except for the unlikely ': event wherein one state achieves clear-cut nuclear _ superiority, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. The principal impedi-

. · ment to world domination is the difficulty of pro- 'jecting power across the world's oceans onto the 'territory of a rival great power. The United States, ,for example, is the most powerful state on the planet :today. But it does not dominate Europe and North- east Asia the way it does the Western Hemisphere, and it has no intention of trying to conquer and sontrol those distant regions, mainly because of the stopping power of water. Indeed, there is reason to Jhink that the American military commitment to J:~~rope and Northeast Asia might wither away over the next decade. In short, there has never been a 'gjpbal hegemon, and there is not likely to be one #iiytime soon. ,-· · The best outcome a great power can hope for

.,to be a regional hegemon and possibly control other region that is nearby and accessible over

• nd .... States that achieve regional hegemony seek

to prevent great powers in other regions from dupli- cating their feat. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peers. Thus the United States, for example, played a key role in preventing imperial Japan, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union from gaining regional supremacy. Re- gional hegemons attempt to check aspiring hege- mons in other regions because they fear that a rival great power that dominates its own region will be an especially powerful foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the fearful great power's backyard. Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions, be- cause their proximity will force them to concentrate their attention on each other rather than on the dis- tant hegemon.

Furthermore, if a potential hegemon el)1erges among them, the other great powers in that region might be able to contain it by themselves, allowing the distant hegemon to remain safely on the side- lines. Of course, if the local great powers were unable to do the job, the distant hegemon would take the appropriate measures to deal with the threatening state. The United States, as noted, has assumed that burden on four separate occasions in the twentieth century, which is why it is commonly referred to as an "offshore balancer."

In sum, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world. That state would be a status quo power, and it would go to considerable lengths to preserve the ex- isting distribution of power. The United States is in that enviable position today; it dominates the Western Hemisphere and there is no hegemon in any other area of the world. But ff a regional hege- mon is confronted with a peer competitor, it would no longer be a sta\us quo power. Indeed, it would go to considerable lengths to weaken and maybe even destroy its distant rival. Of course, both regional hegemons would be motivated by that logic, which would make for a fierce security competition between them.

Cooperation Among States

One might conclude from the preceding discussion that my theory does not allow for any cooperation among the great powers. But this conclusion would be wrong. States can cooperate, although coopera- tion is sometimes difficult to achieve and always

106 J O H N. J • M EA R S H E I M E R / Tragedy of Great Power Politics

difficult to sustain. Two factors inhibit cooperation: considerations about relative gains and concern about cheating. Ultimately, great powers live in a fun- damentally competitive world where they view each other as real, or at least potential, enemies, and they therefore look to gain power at each other's expense.

Any two states contemplating cooperation must consider how profits or gains will be distributed between them. They can think about the division in terms of either absolute or relative gains (recall the distinction made earlier between pursuing either absolute power or relative power; the concept here is the same). With absolute gains, each side is con- cerned with maximizing its own profits and cares little about how much the other side gains or loses in the deal. Each side cares about the other only to the extent that the other side's behavior affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits. With rel- ative gains, on the other hand, each side considers not only its own individual gain, but also how well it fares compared to the other side.

Because great powers care deeply about the bal- ance of power, their thinking focuses on relative gains when they consider cooperating with other states. For sure, each state tries to maximize its ab- solute gains; still, it is more important for a state to make sure that it does no worse, and perhaps better, than the other state in any agreement. Cooperation is more difficult to achieve, however when states are attuned to relative gains rather than absolute gains. This is because states concerned about absolute gains have to make sure that if the pie is expanding, they are getting at least some portion of the increase, whereas states that worry about relative gains must pay careful attention to how the pie is divided, which complicates cooperative efforts.

Concerns about cheating also hinder coopera- tion. Great powers are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a significant advantage. This concern is especially acute in the military realm .... Such a development could create a window of opportunity for the state that cheats to inflict a decisive defeat on its victim.

These barriers to cooperation notwithstanding, great powers do cooperate in a realist world. Balance- of-power logic often causes great powers to form al- liances and cooperate against common enemies .... Rivals as well as allies cooperate. After all, deals can be struck that roughly reflect the distribution of

power and satisfy concerns about cheating. The var- ious arms control agreements signed by the super- powers during the Cold War illustrate this point.

The bottom line, however, is that cooperation takes place in a world that is competitive at its core- one where states have powerful incentives to take ad- vantage of other states. This point is graphically highlighted by the state of European politics in the forty years before World War I. The great powers cooperated frequently during this period but that did not stop them from going to war on August 1, 1914. The United States and the Soviet Union also cooper- ated considerably during World War II, but that cooperation did not prevent the outbreak of the Cold War shortly after Germany and Japan were defeated. Perhaps most amazingly, there was significant economic and military cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the two years before the Wehrmacht attacked the Red Army. No amount _of cooperation can eliminate the dominating logic of security competition. Genuine peace, or a world in which states do not compete for power, is not likely as long as the state system remains anarchic.

In sum, my argument is that the structure of the international system, not the particular charac- teristics of individual great powers, causes them to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony. I do not adopt Morgenthau's claim that states invariably behave aggressively because they have a will to power hardwired into them. Instead, I assume that the principal motive behind great-power behavior is survival. In anarchy, however, the desire to survive encourages states to behave aggressively. Nor does my theory classify states as more or less aggressive on the basis of their economic or political systems. Offensive realism makes only a handful of assump- tions about great powers, and these assumptions apply equally to all great powers. Except for differ- ences in how much power each state controls, the theory treats all states alike ....

Notes 1. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 2nd ed. (London:

Macmillan, 1962), p. 10. 2. Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo

Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996, special issue): 90-121. '

3. Quoted in Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union En- tered World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 271.

Suggestions for Further Reading 107

4. Quo:ed in Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute oflnternational Affairs, 1946), p. 40. . 5. J~hn H. ~erz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Secu-

rity Dilemma, World Politic;s 2, No. 2 (January 1950): 157.

6'. Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace· Th~ Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Prmceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 36,

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

REALISM: Suggested Readings Below are lists of works on realism categorized b h . h [' - extensive literature. As with any such taxonom th t :me, ! ese ists only scratch the surface of a very rich, less, we offer this as an initial cut that we hop y, ·11 ~ca 1%o?es ovrlap as do the_ works within them. Neverthe- The categories we have selected in order of th:1::. e/ 1 e p to t ose approaching IR seen through this image. realism ( or neorealism)· (3) balance o·"p i ingh e owdare (1) classical realism; (2) realism and structural

. , 1 . ower, anarc y, an security· (4) · d · ership, hegemony, and hegemonic stability-(6) p ' d , war, its causes an remedies; (5) lead- eration under anarchy· (9\ empires· (10:1 i'nteowet~ w~lr, an,. pe,ace; (7) deterrence; (8) anarchy and coop- . . , 1 , 1 rna iona po itica economy· (11) l / h · international relations theory; (12) other, earlier work in th fl Id· d ( ' . o?~ eye es, istory, and modifications. e ie ' an 13) realist critiques, challenges, and

• On Classical Realism Bell, Dt:~::;:;:~;:~t~~~tt and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme. New York: Oxford

Carr, Ed~ard H. The Twenty Year's Crisfs. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Cl~usew1tz, ~arl von. On War. (Various editions.)

Clmto~t~:v~!i::s:;;a~~:s;~~ii;~n and Contemporary International Relations. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana

Doyle, Michael. The Ways of War and R N Yi k N Fra~kel, Benjamin. Roo~s of Realism. Lo:J~·n: ~:ut~;d~e, %t~;,

19 9 7

, [Part One addresses Realism.]

Guhck, Edward. Europe~ Clas~ical Bala~ce of Power. New York: 1 w. w. Norton, 1995_

Hasla~~~:~~~;i :fe ~::;s::/::::::!~t;alist Thought in International Relations Since Machiavelli. New

Herz, John. "Political Realism Revisited:' International Studies Q z · · Morgenthau (June 1981): 182-97. uartery 25, 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J.

H_ob_bes, Thomas. L~viathan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Kissmger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

---H!g:;:~ ~~:,et~511,etternich, Castlereagh and the Probler:is of Peace, 1812-22. Boston, MA:

Lebow,T~~t~!:et}l~sic~~ Re~issm." In I~ternational Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, eds. . , Ja ur 1, an teve Smith. New York: Oxfor&Universit Press 2007

Liska, George. The Ways of Power. Cambridge, England: Basil Blackwell 1990 y ' ·

Lowell,L~~::::~~nst:~; ~:~:::i;s~;!:~rota~nternational Relations: A iastin~ Possession. Baton Rouge, LA:

Lukes'. Stev~n. !'ower: A Rad~cal View. London: Macmillan, 1974. Machia;:~1;~;~i~~~- The Prince, The Discourses, The Art of War and History of Florence. Various translations

Morgenthau, Hans, and Kenneth Thom R r · A · 6_th ed. New York: Knopf, 1985. pson. o itics mong Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Brief

Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. New York: The Modern Library, 1951 , Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State and Wt N Yi k· C 1 · .' · · WU' M' h

1 . · ar. ew or · o umbia Umvers1ty Press 1959

I iams, IC ae . Realism Reconsidered New York Oxfiord U . . p ' . · . mvers1ty ress, 2007.