IR research

The Tragedy of Great

Power Politics

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Introduction

M any i n the West seem to believe that "perpetual peace" among

the great powers is finally at hand. The end of the Cold War, so

the argument goes, marked a sea change in how great powers

interact with one another. We have entered a world in which there is little

chance that the major powers will engage each other i n security competi­

tion. much less war, which has become an obsolescent enterprise. In the

words of one famous author, the end of the Cold War has brought us to

the "the end of history."'

This perspective suggests that great powers no longer view each other as

potential military rivals, but instead as members of a family of nations.

members of what is sometimes called the "'international community. " The

prospects for cooperation are abundant in this promising new world, a

world which is likely to bring increased prosperity and peace to all the great

powers. Even a few adherents of realism, a school of thought that has his­

torically held pessimistic views about the prospects for peace among the

great powers. appear to have bought into the reigning optimism, as reflect­

ed i n an article from the mid-l 990s titled "Realists as Optimists. "2

Alas, the claim that security competition and war between the great

powers have been purged from the international system is wrong. Indeed,

there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting peace among the

T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

great powers was stillborn. Consider, for example, that even though the

Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States still maintains about one

hundred thousand troops i n Europe and roughly the same number i n

Northeast A s i a . It d o e s so because it recognizes t h a t dangerous rivalries

would probably emerge among the major powers i n these regions if U . S .

troops were withdrawn. Moreover, almost every European state, includ­

ing the United Kingdom and France, still harbors deep-seated, albeit

muted, fears that a Germany unchecked by American power might

behave aggressively; fear of Japan i n Northeast Asia is probably even more

profound, and it is certainly more frequently expressed. Finally, the possi­

bility of a clash between China and the United States over Taiwan is hard­

ly remote. This is not to say that such a war is likely, but the possibility

reminds us that the threat of great-power war has not disappeared.

The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and

dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the

intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each

other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal

of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gain­

ing power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely

strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a wel­

come outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon-that is, the only

great power in the system.

There are no status quo powers i n the international system, save for

the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position

over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current dis­

tribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to

change it i n their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions,

and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be

done at a reasonable price . 3 At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift

the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more

favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away,

unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is

likely to achieve global hegemony, however, the world is condemned to

perpetual great-power competition.

lntrocluction

This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined

to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their

favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary capa­

bility. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does

a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also

tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great

power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors

another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction

of change is in its own favor.

Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure

of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure

nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the

international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the

absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them

from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive mili­

tary capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other

states' intentions. Given this fear-which can never be wholly eliminat­

ed-states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their

rivals. the better their chances of survival. lndeed, the best guarantee of

survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten

such a mighty power.

This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is gen­

uinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other-that

are merely concerned with their own survival-nevertheless have little

choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the

system. This dilemma is captured in brutally frank comments that

Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck made during the early 1 860s,

when it appeared that Poland, which was not a n independent state at the

time, might regain its sovereignty. " R estoring the Kingdom of Poland in

any shape or form is tantamount to creating a n ally for any enemy that

chooses to attack us, " he believed, and therefore he advocated that Prussia

should "smash those Poles till, losing all hope, they lie down and die; I

have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survive we have

no choice but to wipe them out. "4

4 T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

Although i t i s depressing t o realize that great powers might think and

act this way, it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it

to be. For example, one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United

States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic

growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Hong Kong.

Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the

global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead it will be con­

tent with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the

United States should engage China in order to promote the latter's inte­

gration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage

China's transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United

States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace

around the globe.

Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail. II China

becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its

economic might into military might and make a run at dominating

Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the

global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its

behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non­

democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee

its own survival. Of course, neither its neighbors nor the United States

would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power.

Instead, they would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a

balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security competition

between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power

war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are des ­

tined to be adversaries as China's power grows.

O F F E N S I V E R E A L I S M

T his book offers a realist theory o f international politics that challenges the prevailing optimism about relations among the great powers. That enterprise involves three particular tasks.

Introduction

I begin by laying out the key components of the theory, which I call

"offensive realis m . " I make a number of arguments about how great pow­

ers behave toward each other, emphasizing that they look for opportunities

to gain power at each others' expense. Moreover, I identify the conditions

that make conflict more or less likely. For example, I argue that multipolar

systems are more war-prone than are bipolar systems, and that multipolar

systems that contain especially powerful states-potential hegemons-are

the most dangerous systems of all. But I do not just assert these various

claims; I also attempt to provide compelling explanations for the behaviors

and the outcomes that lie at the heart of the theory. In other words, I lay

out the causal logic. or reasoning, which underpins each of my claims.

The theory focuses on the great powers because these states have the

largest impact on what happens in international politics . 5 The fortunes of

all states-great powers and smaller powers alike-are determined prima­

rily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability. For

example, politics in almost every region of the world were deeply influ­

enced by the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States

between 1945 and 1990. The two world wars that preceded the Cold War

had a similar effect on regional politics around the world. Each of these

conflicts was a great-power rivalry, and each cast a long shadow over

every part of the globe.

Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their relative mili­

tary capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient

military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war

against the most powerful state in the world.6 The candidate need not

have the capability to defeat the leading state, b u t it must have some rea­

sonable prospect of turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves

the dominant state seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ulti­

mately wins the war. In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear

deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it. a s well as formidable

conventional forces. In the u n likely event that one state gained nuclear

superiority over all of its rivals. it would be so powerful that it would be

the only great power in the system. The balance of conventional forces

would be largely irrelevant if a nuclear hegemon were to emerge.

6 T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E A T POW E R POL I T I C S

M y second task in this book i s to show that the theory tells us a lot

about the history of international politics. The ultimate test of any theory

is how well it explains events in the real world, so I go to considerable

lengths to test my arguments against the historical record. Specifically, the

focus is on great-power relations from the start of the French

Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1 7 92 until the end of the twenti­

eth century. 7 Much attention is paid to the E u ropean great powers because they dominated world politics for most of the past two h undred

years. Indeed, until Japan and the United States achieved great-power sta­

tus in 1895 and 1 8 98, respectively, E urope was home to all of the world's

great powers. Nevertheless, the book also includes substantial discussion

of the politics of Northeast Asia, especially regarding imperial Japan

between 1 8 9 5 and 1945 and China in the 1 9 90s. The United States also

figures prominently i n m y efforts to test offensive realism against past

events.

S o m e of the important historical puzzles that I attempt to shed light o n

i n c l u d e the following:

1 ) What accounts for the three longest and bloodiest wars i n m o d ­

ern history-the French Revolutionary a n d N a p o l e o n i c Wars

( 1 792- 1 8 1 5) , World War I ( 1 9 1 4 -1 8 ) , and World War II ( 1 9 3 9 -45)­ conflicts that involved all of t h e maj o r powers i n the system?

2) What accounts for the long periods of relative peace i n E urope

between 1 8 1 6 and 1 8 52 , 1 8 7 1 a n d 1 9 1 3 , and especially 1 94 5 a n d

1 99 0 , d u ring t h e C o l d War?

3) Why did the Unite d Kingdom, which was by far the wealthiest

state in the world during the m i d - n inetee n t h ce n t u ry, n o t build a

powerful military and try to d o m inate E u rope? In other w o rds,

w h y did it behave differently from Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine

Germany, Nazi Germany, a n d the Soviet Union, all o f w h ich trans­

lated their economic might into military might and strove for

E u ropean he ge m o n y ?

4) W h y was Bismarckian Germ a n y ( 1862- 90 ) especia l ly aggressive

between 1862 and 1870, fighting two wars with other great powers

I n t r o d u c t i o n 7

a n d one war with a minor power, b u t hardly aggressive at all from

1 8 7 1 until 1 890, when it fought n o wars and generally sought to

maintain the E u ropean status quo?

5) W h y did the United Kingdom, France, a n d Russia form a balanc­

ing coalition against Wilhelmine Germany before World War I, but

fail to organize a n effective alliance to contain Nazi Germany?

6) Why did Japan a n d the states of Western E u rope join forces with

the United States against the Soviet Union in the early years o f

the Cold War, e v e n t h o u g h the U n i t e d States emerged f r o m World

War II with the most powerful economy in the world and a

n u clear monopoly?

7 } W h a t explains the commitment of American troops to Europe

a n d Northeast Asia during the twentieth century? For example,

why did the United States wait until April 1 9 1 7 to join World War I,

rather than enter the war when it broke out in August 1 9 1 4? For

that matter, why did the United States not send troops to Europe

before 1 9 1 4 to prevent the outbreak of war? Similiarly, why did

the United States not balance against Nazi Germany in the 1 9 3 0s

or send troops to Europe before September 1 9 3 9 to prevent the

outbreak of World War II?

8 ) Why did the United States and the Soviet Union continue build­

ing u p their nuclear arsenals after each had acquired a secure sec­

ond-strike capability against the other? A world in which both

sides have a n "assured destruction" capability is generally consid­

ered to be stable and its nuclear balance difficult to overturn, yet

both superpowers spent billions of dollars and rubles trying to

gain a first-strike advantage .

Third, I use t h e theory to make predictions a b o u t great-power politics

in the twenty-first century. This effort may strike some readers as foolhardy,

because the study of international relations, like the other social sciences,

rests on a shakier theoretical foundation than that of the natura l sciences.

Moreover, political phenomena are highly complex; hence, precise politi­

cal predictions are impossible without theoretical tools that are superior to

8 T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

those w e now possess. A s a result, all political forecasting i s bound to

include some error. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should

therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted con·

fidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes.

Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their

theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps

inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding

in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making

explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own

ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good

way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the bene·

fit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence

(because it is not yet available ) . In short, the world can be used as a labo·

ratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that

spirit, I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both

the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

The V i rt u e s and L i m i ts of T h e o r y

It should b e apparent t h a t t h i s book is self·consciously theoretical. B u t out·

side the walls of academia, especially in the policy world, theory has a bad

name. Social science theories are often portrayed as the idle speculations of

head·in·the·clouds academics that have little relevance to what goes on in

the ""real world . " For example, Paul Nitze, a prominent American foreign·

policy maker during the Cold War, wrote, "Most of what has been written

and taught under the heading of 'political science' by Americans since

World War II has been . . . of limited value, if not counterproductive, as a

guide to the actual conduct of policy."' In this view, theory should fall

almost exclusively within the purview of academics, whereas policymak·

ers should rely on common sense, intuition, and practical experience to

carry out their duties.

This view is wrongheaded. In fact, none of us could understand the

world we live in or make intelligent decisions without theories. Indeed,

all students and practitioners of international politics rely on theories to

I n troduction 9

comprehend their surroundings. Some are aware of i t and some are not,

some admit i t and some do not; but there is no escaping the fact that we

could not make sense of the complex world around u s without simplify­

ing theories. The Clinton administration's foreign policy rhetoric, for

example, was heavily informed by the three main liberal theories of

international relations: 1) the claim that prosperous and economically

i nterdependent states are u n likely to fight each other, 2 ) the claim that

democracies do not fight each other, and 3) the claim that international

institutions enable states to avoid war and concentrate instead on build­

ing cooperative relationships.

Consider how Clinton and company justified expanding the member­

ship of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the mid-i 990s.

President Clinton maintained that one of the chief goals of expansion was

"'locking in democracy's gains in Central Europe,"' because "democracies

resolve their differences peacefully." He also argued that the United States

should foster an "open trading system," because "our security is tied to the

stake other nations have in the prosperity of staying free and open and

working with others, not working against them. "9 Strobe Talbott, Clinton's Oxford classmate and deputy secretary of state, made the same claims for

NATO enlargement: "With the end of the cold war, it has become possible

to construct a Europe that is increasingly united by a shared commitment

to open societies and open markets."' Moving the borders of NATO east­

ward, he maintained, would help "to solidify the national consensus for

democratic and market reforms"' that already existed in states like Hungary

and Poland and thus enhance the prospects for peace in the region. 1 0

I n the same spirit, Secretary of S t a t e Madeleine Albright praised

NATO's founders by saying that "[t]heir basic achievement was t o begin

the construction of the . . network of rule-based institutions and

arrangements that keep the peace . " " B u t that achievement is not com­

plete,"' she warned, and "our challenge today i s to finish the post-war con­

struction project . [and] expand the area of the world i n which

American interests and values will thriv e . " 1 1

These examples demonstrate that general theories about how the

world works play a n important role i n how policymakers identify the ends

lO T H I T R A O I D Y O P O R I AT P OW I R POL I T I C S

they seek and the means they choose t o achieve them. Yet that i s not to

say we should embrace any theory that is widely held, no matter how

popular it may be, because there are bad as well as good theories. For

example, some theories deal with trivial issues. while others are opaque

and almost impossible to comprehend. Funhennore, some theories have

contradictions in their underlying logic, while others have little explana­

tory power because the world simply does not work the way they predict.

The trick is to distinguish between sound theories and defective ones. 1 2

My a i m is t o persuade readers that offensive realism is a rich theory which

sheds considerable light on the workings of the international system.

As with all theories, however. there are limits to offensive realism's

explanatory power. A few cases contradict the main claims of the theory,

cases that offensive realism should be able to explain but cannot. All theo­

ries face this problem, although the better the theory, the fewer the

anomalies.

An example of a case that contradicts offensive realism involves

Germany in 1 90 5 . At the time Germany was the most powerful state in

E u rope. Its main rivals on the continent were France and Russia, which

some fifteen years earlier had formed an alliance to contain the Germans.

The United Kingdom had a tiny army at the time because it was counting

on France and Russia to keep Germany at bay. When Japan unexpectedly

inflicted a devastating defeat on Russia between 1 904 and 1 90 5 , which

temporarily knocked Russia out of the E u ropean balance of power, France

was left standing virtually alone against mighty Germany. Here was an

excellent opportunity for Germany to crush France and take a gi ant step

toward achieving hegemony in E urope. It surely made more sense for

Germany to go to war in 1 90 5 than in 1 9 1 4 . But Germany did not even

seriously consider going to war in 1 90 5 , which contradicts what offensive

realism would predict.

Theories encounter anomalies because they simplify reality by empha·

sizing certain factors while ignoring others. Offensive realism assumes that

the international system strongly shapes the behavior of states. Structural

factors such as anarchy and the distribution of power, I argue, are what

matter most for explaining international politics. The theory pays little

Introduction 11

attention to individuals or domestic political considerations such a s ideol­

ogy. It tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls. For example, it

does not matter for the theory whether Germany in 1 90 5 was led by

Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, or Adolf Hitler, or whether Germany was dem­

ocratic or autocratic. What matters for the theory is how much relative

power Germany possessed at the time. These omitted factors, however,

occasionally dominate a state's decision -making process; under these cir­

cumstances, offensive realism is not going to perform as well. In short,

there is a price to pay for simplifying reality.

Fu rthermore, offensive realism does not answer every question that

arises in world politics, because there will be cases in which the theory is

consistent with several possible outcomes. When this occurs, other theo­

ries have to be brought i n to provide more precise explanations. Social sci­

entists say that a theory is .. indeterminate" in such cases, a situation that is

not unusual with broad-gauged theories like offensive realism.

An example of offensive realism's indeterminacy is that i t cannot

account for why the security competition between the superpowers dur­

ing the Cold Wa r was more intense between 1 94 5 and 1 9 63 than between

1 9 63 and 1 990." The theory also has little to say about whether NATO

should have adopted an offensive or a defensive military strategy to deter

the Warsaw Pact in central E u rope.14 To answer these questions i t is neces­

sary to employ more fine-grained theories, such as deterrence theory.

Nevenheless, those theories and the answers they spawn do not contra­

dict offensive realism; they supplement it. In short, offensive realism i s

like a powerful flashlight in a d a r k r o o m : e v e n t h o u g h it c a n n o t i l l u m i ­

nate e v e r y n o o k and cranny, most of the t i m e i t i s an excellent tool f o r

navigating through the darkness.

It should be apparent from this discussion that offensive realism is main­

ly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved i n the

past a nd how they are likely to behave in the future. B u t it is also a pre­

scriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive

realism, because it outlines the best way to s u rvive i n a dangerous world.

O n e might ask, i f the theory describes how great powers act, w hy i s i t

necessary to s t ipulate how they should act? The imposing constrai nts of

12 T H I T R A O I D Y O F G R E A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

the system should leave great powers with little choice but t o act a s the

theory predicts. Although there is much truth in this description of great

powers as prisoners trapped in an iron cage, the fact remains that they

sometimes-although not often-act in contradiction to the theory. These

are the anomalous cases discussed above. As we shall see, such foolish

behavior invariably has negative consequences. In short, if they want to

survive, great powers should always act like good offensive realists.

The P u r s u i t of Power

Enough said about theory. More needs to be said about the substance of

my arguments, which means zeroing in on the core concept of "power."

For all realists, calculations about power lie at the heart of how states

think about the world around them. Power is the currency of great-power

politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What money is to

economics, power is to international relations.

This book is organized around six questions dealing with power. First,

why do great powers want power? What is the underlying logic that

explains why states compete for it? Second. how much power do states

want? How inuch power is enough? These two questions are of para­

mount imponance because they deal with the most basic issues concern­

ing great-power behavior. My answer to these foundational questions, as

emphasized above, is that the structure of the international system

encourages states to pursue hegemony.

Third, what is power? How is that pivotal concept defined and meas­

ured? With good indicators of power. it is possible to determine the power

levels of individual states, which then allows us to describe the architec­

ture of the system. Specifically. we can identify which states qualify as

great powers. From there, it is easy to determine whether the system is

hegemonic (directed by a single great power), bipolar (controlled by two

great powers ) , or mu ltipolar (dominated by three or more great powers ) .

Furthermore, w e will know the relative strengths of t h e major powers.

We are especially interested in knowing whether power is distributed

more or less evenly among them, or if there are large power asymmetries.

Introduction 13

In particular, does the system contain a potential hegemon-a great

power that is considerably stronger than any of its rival great powers?

Defining power dearly also gives us a window into understanding state

behavior. I[ states compete for power, we learn more about the nature of

that competition if we understand more fully what power is, and there­

fore what states are competing for. In short, knowing more about the true

nature of power should help illuminate how great powers compete

among themselves.

Fourth, what strategies do states pursue to gain power, or to maintain i t

when another great power threatens to upset the balance of power?

B lackmail and war are the main strategies that states employ to acquire

power. and balancing and buck-passing are the principal strategies that

great powers use to maintain the distribution of power when facing a dan­

gerous rival. With balancing, the threatened state accepts the burden of

deterring its adversary and commits substantial resources to achieving that

goal. With buck-passing. the endangered great power tries to get another

state to shoulder the burden of deterring or defeating the threatening state.

The final two questions locus on the key strategies that states employ to

maximize their share of world power. The fifth is, what are the causes of

war? Specifically, what power-related factors make i t more or less likely

that security competition will intensify and tum into open conflict? Sixth,

when do threatened great powers balance against a dangerous adversary

and when do they attempt to pass the buck to another threatened state?

I will attempt to provide clear and convincing answers to these ques­

tions. It s hould be emphasized, however, that there is no consensus

among realists on the answers to any of them. Realism i s a rich tradition

with a long history, and disputes over fundamental issues have long been

commonplace among realists. In the pages that follow, I do not consider

alternative realist theories i n much detail. I will make clear how offensive

realism differs from its main realist rivals. and I will challenge these alter­

native perspectives o n panicular points. mainly to elucidate my own argu­

ments. But no attempt will be made to systematically examine any other

realist theory. Instead, the locus will b e on laying o u t my theory of offen ­

sive realism a n d using i t to explain t h e past a n d predict t h e future.

14 T H I T R A G I D Y OP G R I A T POW I R POLI T I C S

Of course. there a r e also many nonrealist theories of international poli­

tics. Three different liberal theories were mentioned earlier; there are

other nonrealist theories, such as social constructivism and bureaucratic

poJitics, to name just two. I will briefly analyze some of these theories

when I look at great-power politics after the Cold War ( C hapter 1 0),

mainly because they underpin many of the claims that international poli­

tics has undergone a fundamental change since 1 9 90. Because of space

limitations, however, I make no attempt at a comprehensive assessment

of these nonrealist theories. Again, the emphasis in this study will be o n

m a k i n g the c a s e f o r offensive realism.

Nevenheless, it makes good sense at this point to describe the theories

that dominate thinking about international relations in both the academic

and policy worlds, and to show how offensive realism compares with its

main realist and nonrealist competitors.

L I B E R A L I S M V S . R E A L I S M

L iberalism and realism are the two bodies o f theory which hold places of privilege on the theoretical menu of international relations. Most of the great intellectual battles among international relations scholars take place

either across the divide between realism and liberalism, or within those

paradigms.15 To illustrate this point, consider the three most influential

realist works of the twentieth century:

1) E. H. Carr's The 1Wenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939, which was pub­ lished in the United Kingdom shonly after World War II staned in

Europe ( 1939) and is still widely read today.

2 ) Hans Morgenthau's Politics among Nations. which was first pub­

lished in the United States in the early days of the Cold War

( 19 48) and dominated the field of international relations for at

leas t the n e x t two decades.

3) Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics, which has dominat­

ed the field since it first appeared during the latter pan o f the Cold

War(l979).16

lntrocluction 15

All three of these realist giants critique some aspect of liberalism in

their writings. For example, both C a rr and Waltz take issue with the

liberal claim that economic interdependence enhances the prospects for

peace.17 More generally, C a rr and Morgenthau frequently criticize liberals

for holding utopian views of politics which, if followed, would lead states

to disaster. At the same time, these realists also disagree about a number

of imponant issues. Waltz. for example, challenges Morgenthau's claim

that m ultipolar systems are more stable than bipolar systems .11

F u rthermore. whereas Morgenthau argues that states strive to gain power

because they have an innate desire for power, Waltz maintains that the

structure of the international system forces states to pursue power to

enhance their prospects for survival. These examples are just a small sam­

ple of the differences among realist thinkers."

Let u s now look more closely a t liberalism and realism, focusing first on

the core beliefs shared by the theories in each paradigm, a n d second on

the differences among specific liberal and realist theories.

L i be rali s m

T h e liberal tradition h a s i t s roots in t h e Enlightenment, that period i n

eighteenth-ce nt ury E u rope when intellectuals and political l e a d e r s had a

powerful sense that reason could be employed to make the world a better

place.20 Accordingly, liberals tend to be hopeful about the prospects of

making t he world safer a n d more peacefu l . Most liberals believe that i t i s

possible to substantially r e d u c e the scou rge of war a n d to increase i n t e r ­

n a t i o n a l prosperity. For this r e a s o n , liberal theories are sometimes labelled

"utopian" or .. idealis t . "

Liberalism's optimistic view of international politics is b a s e d o n three

core beliefs, which are common to almost all of the theories i n t h e para­

digm. First, liberals consider states to be the m a i n actors i n international

politics. S econd, they emphasize that the internal characteristics of states

v a ry considerably, a n d that these differences have profound effects o n

s t a t e be ha vior." F u n h e rmore. liberal theorists often believe t h a t some

internal a rrangements ( e . g .. democracy) are i nherently preferable t o oth­

ers (e.g., dictatorsh ip ) . For liberals. therefore. there are " g o o d " a n d "bad"

16 T H I T R A G E D Y OF G R I A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

states i n the international system. Good states pursue cooperative policies

and hardly ever start wars on their own, whereas bad states cause con­

flicts with other states and are prone to use force to get their way.22 Thus,

the key to peace is to populate the world with good states.

Third, liberals believe that calculations about power matter little for

explaining the behavior of good states. Other kinds of political and eco­

nomic calculations matter more, although the form of those calculations

varies from theory to theory, as will become apparent below. Bad states

might be motivated by the desire to gain power at the expense of other

states, but that is only because they are misguided. In an ideal world,

where there are only good states, power would be largely irrelevant.

Among the various theories found under the big tent of liberalism, the

three main ones mentioned earlier are panicularly influential. The first

argues that high levels of economic interdependence among states make

them unlikely to fight each other." The taproot of stability. according to

this theory. is the creation and maintenance of a liberal economic order

that allows for free economic exchange among states. Such an order makes

states more prosperous. thereby bolstering peace, because prosperous

states are more economically satisfied and satisfied states are more peace ­

ful. Many wars are waged to gain or preserve wealth, but states have much

less motive to initiate war if they are already wealthy. Funhermore.

wealthy states with interdependent economies stand to become less pros­

perous if they fight each other. since they are biting the hand that feeds

them. Once states establish extensive economic ties, in short, they avoid

war and can concentrate instead on accum ulating wealth.

The second. democratic peace theory. claims that democracies do not

go to war against other democracies.24 Thus, a world containing only

democratic states would be a world without war. The argument here i s

not t h a t democracies are less warlike than non-democracies, b u t rather

that democracies do not fight among themselves. There are a variety of

explanations for the democratic peace, b u t little agreement a s to which

one is correct. Liberal thinkers do agree, however. that democratic peace

theory offers a direct challenge to realism and provides a powerful recipe

for peace.

Introducti o n 1 7

Finally. s o m e liberals m a i n t a i n that international institutions enhance

the prospects for cooperation among states and thus significantly reduce

the likelihood of war.15 Institutions are not independent political entities

that sit above states and force them to behave i n acceptable ways. Instead.

institutions are sets of rules that stipulate the ways i n which states should

cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms

o f state behavior a n d proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior. These

rules are not imposed o n states by some leviathan, but are negotiated by

states, which agree to abide by the rules they created because i t i s i n their

interest to do s o. Liberals claim that these institutions or rules can funda­

mentally change state behavior. Institutions. so the argument goes. can

discourage states from calculating self-interest o n the basis of how their

every move affects their relative power position. and thus they push states

away from war and promote peace.

Real i s m

I n contrast to liberals, realists a r e pessimists w h e n i t comes to internation­

a l politics. Realists agree that creating a peaceful world would b e desirable,

but the y s e e n o easy way to escape the harsh world of securi ty competi­

tion and war. C reating a peaceful world i s surely a n attractive idea, b u t it

i s n o t a practical one. "Realism," as Carr notes, "tends to em phasize the

irresistible strength o f existing forces and the inevitable character of exist­

ing t e n d e n cies, a n d to insist that the highest wisdom lies i n accepting. and

adapting oneself t o these forces and these tendencies. "26

This gloomy view of international relations i s based o n three core

beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states a s t h e principal actors in

world politics. Realists focus mainly o n great pow ers, however. because

these states dominate a n d shape international politics a n d they a l s o cause

t h e deadliest wars. S econd, realists believe that t h e behavior o f great pow­

ers i s i n fluenced mainly by their external environment, n o t by thei r inter­

n a l characteristics. The structure o f t h e international system, which a l l

states m u s t de a l w i t h , largely s h a p e s their foreign policies. R e a l i s t s t e n d

n o t to draw s h a r p distinctions b e t w e e n •good" a n d "bad" s t a t e s , becau s e

18 T H I T R A O I D Y OP G R E A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

all great powers act according t o the same logic regardless o f their culture,

political system, or who runs the government. 27 It is therefore difficult to

discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In

essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size."

Third, realists hold that calculations about power dominate states'

thinking, and that states compete for power among themselves. That com­

petition sometimes necessitates going to war, which is considered an

acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the

nineteenth-century military strategist. war is a continuation of politics by

other means.29 Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition,

sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. States may cooperate with

each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests.

Although there are many realist theories dealing with different aspects

of power, two of them stand above the others: human nature realism,

which is laid out in Morgenthau's Politics among Nations. and defensive

realism. which is presented mainly in Waltz's Theory of International Politics.

What sets these works apan from those of other realists and makes them

both imponant and controversial is that they provide answers to the two

foundational questions described above. Specifically, they explain why

states pursue power-that is, they have a story to tell about the causes of

security competition-and each offers an argument about how much

power a state is likely to want.

Some other famous realist thinkers concentrate on making the case that

great powers care deeply about power, but they do not attempt to explain

why states compete for power or what level of power states deem satisfac­

tory. In essence, they provide a general defense of the realist approach, but

they do not offer their own theory of international politics. The works of

C a rr and American diplomat George Kennan fit this description. In his

seminal realist tract, The 1\venty Yea rs ' Crisis. Carr criticizes liberalism at

length and argues that states are motivated principally by power consider­

ations. Nevenheless. he says little about why states care about power o r

how much p o w e r t h e y want.'° B l u n t l y put, t h e r e is no theory in his book.

The same basic pattern obtains i n Kennan's well-known book American

Diplomacy, 1900-1950. " Morgenthau and Waltz, on the other hand, offer

l n t r o cl u c t l o n 1 9

their o wn theories of international relations, which is why they have

dominated the discourse about world politics for the past fifty years.

Human nature realism, which is sometimes called "classical realism, "

dominated t h e study o f international relations from t h e late 1 940s, when

Morgenthau's writings began attracting a large audience, until the early

1 970s. 32 I t is based on the simple assumption that states are led by h u m a n

b e i n g s who have a " w i l l to p o w e r " hardwired i n t o them at birth . n That i s ,

s t a t e s have a n insatiable appetite f o r power, or what Morgenthau c a l l s " a

limitless lust for power, " w h i c h means that they constantly look f o r

opportunities to take the offensive and dominate o t h e r s t a t e s . i 4 All states come with a n "animus dominandi, " so there is no basis for discriminating

among more aggressive and less aggressive states, and there certainly

should be no room in the theory for status q u o state s . 1 5 Human nature

realists recognize that international anarchy-the absence of a governing

a uthority over the great powers---ca u ses states to worry about the balance

o f power. But that structural constraint is treated a s a second-order cause

o f state behavior. The principal driving force in international politics is the

will to power inherent in every state in the system, and it pushes each of

them to strive for supremacy.

D e fensive realism, which is frequently referred to a s "stru ct u ral real­

ism." came o n the scene in the late 1 970s with the appearence of Waltz's

Theory of International Politics. i6 U n like Morgenthau, Waltz does not a s s u m e t h a t great p o w e r s are inherently aggressive b e c a u s e they are i n f u s e d w i t h

a will to p o w e r ; i n s t e a d he s t a n s by assuming that s t a t e s merely aim to

survive. Above all else. they seek security. Nevertheless, he maintains that

t h e structure o f the international system forces great powers to pay careful

attention t o the balance of power. In particular, a n a rchy forces security­

seeking states to compete with each other for power, because power is the

best means to s u rvival. Whereas human nature is the deep cause o f s e cu ­

r i t y competition i n Morgen t h a u 's t h e o ry, a n a rchy plays t h a t role i n Waltz's t h eory. "

Waltz does not e m phasize, however, t h a t the international system pro­

vides great powers with good reasons to act offensively to gain power.

Instead, h e appears to m a k e t h e opposite case: that anarchy encourages

20 T H E T R A G E D Y OF G R E A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

states t o behave defensively and t o maintain rather than upset the balance

of power. "The first concern of states, " he writes, is "to maintain their

position in the system. "'38 There seems to be, as international relations the­

orist Randall Schweller notes, a •status quo bias• in Waltz's theory."

Waltz recognizes that states have incentives to gain power at their

rivals' expense and that it makes good strategic sense to act on that motive

when the time is right. But he does not develop that line of argument i n

any detail. On the contrary, he emphasizes that w h e n g r e a t powers

behave aggressively, the potential victims usually balance against the

aggressor and thwan its effons to gain power.40 For Waltz, i n shon, bal­

ancing checkmates offense." Funhermore, he stresses that great powers

must be careful not to acquire too much power, because "excessive

strength" is likely to cause other states to join forces against them, thereby

leaving them worse off than they would have been had they refrained

from seeking additional increments of power.42

Waltz's views on the causes of war further reflect his theory's status

quo bias. There are no profound or deep causes of war in his theory. In

particular. he does not suggest that there might be imponant benefits to

be gained from war. In fact, he says little about the causes of war, other

than to argue that wars are largely the result of uncenainty and miscalcu­

lation. In other words, if states knew better, they would not stan wars.

Roben Jervis, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera buttress the defen­

sive realists' case by focusing attention on a structural concept known as

the offense-defense balance." They maintain that military power at a n y

p o i n t in t i m e c a n be categorized as favoring e i t h e r offense or defense. If

defense has a dear advantage over offense, and conquest is therefore diffi­

cult, great powers will have little incentive to use force to gain power and

will concentrate instead on protecting what they have. When defense has

the advantage, protecting what you have should be a relatively easy task.

Alternatively, if offense is easier, states will be sorely tempted to try con­

qu ering each other, and there will be a lot of war in the system. Defensive

realists argue. however, that the offense-defense balance is usually heavily

tilted toward defense, thus making conquest extremely difficult.44 I n sum,

efficient balancing coupled with the natural advantages of defense over

I ntroduction 2 1

offense should discourage great powers from pursuing aggressive strate­

gies a n d instead make them "defensive positionalists. "45

M y theory of offensive realism is also a structural theory of internation­

a l politics. As with defensive realism, my theory sees great powers a s con­

cerned mainly with figuring out how to survive in a world where there is

n o agency to protect them from each other; they q u ickly realize that

power is the key to their survival. Offensive realism parts company with

defensive realism over the question of how much power states want. For

defensive realists. the international structure provides states with little

incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them

to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than

i n creasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other

hand, believe that status q u o powers are rarely found in world politics,

because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to

look for opponunities to gain power at the expense o! rivals, a n d to take

advantage o! those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A

state's ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.46

I t should be apparent that both o!!ensive realism and h u m a n nature

realism portray great powers a s relentlessly seeking power. The key differ­

ence between the two perspectives is that offensive realists reject

Morgentha u's claim that states are naturally endowed with Type A per­

sonalities. O n the contrary, they believe that the international system

forces great powers to maximize their relative power beca use that is the

optimal way to maximize their security. In other words, s u rvival man­

dates aggressive behavior. Great powers behave aggressively not because

they want to o r because they possess some inner drive to dominate, but

beca u s e they have to seek more power i i they want to m a x i m ize their

odds o ! s u rvival. (Table I. I s um m a rizes h o w the m a i n r ealist theo r ies

a n s w e r the f ou ndational que st ions described abov e . )

N o ankle o r b o o k m a k e s the c a s e f o r offensive realism i n the sophisti­

cated ways t h a t Morgenthau does for human n a t u r e realism a n d Waltz

a n d others d o for defensive realism. For sure, some realists have argued

t h a t th e system gives great powers good reasons t o a ct aggressively.

Probably t h e best brief for offensive realism is a shon. obscure b o o k writ-

2 2 T H I T R A G E D Y O F G R I A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

T A. I L i 1 . 1

The Major Realist Theories

Human Nature

Realism

What causes states to Lust for power compete for power? inherent in states

How much power A l l they can get.

do states want? States maximize

relative power.

with hegemony as

their ultimate goal.

Defensive

Realism

Structure o f

the system

Not much more

than what they have.

States concentrate

on maintaining the

balance of power.

Offensive

Realism

Structure of

the system

A l l they can g e t .

States maximize

relative power,

with hegemony as

their ultimate goal.

ten during World War I by G. Lowes Dickinson, a B ritish academic who

was an early advocate of the League of Nations.47 In The European Anarchy,

he argues that the root cause of World War I ·was not Germany nor any

other power. The real culprit was the E u ropean anarchy,· which created

powerful incentives for states "to acquire supremacy over the others for

motives at once of security and domination. "48 Nevertheless, neither

Dickinson nor anyone else makes a comprehensive case for offensive real­

ism." My aim in writing this book is to fill that void.

P OW E R P OL I T I C S IN L l l E R A L A M E R I C A

Whatever merits realism may have a s a n explanation for real-world politics and as a guide for formulating foreign policy, it is not a pop­ ular school of thought in the West. Realism's central message-that it

makes good sense for states to sellishly pursue power-does not have

broad appeal. It is difficult to imagine a modem political leader openly ask­

ing the public to light and die to improve the balance of power. No

European or American leader did so during either world war or the Cold

I n troduction 23

War. Most people prefer to think of fights between their own state and

rival states as clashes between good and evil. where they are on the side of

the angels and their opponents are aligned with the devil. Thus, leaders

tend to portray war as a moral crusade or a n ideological contest, rather

than a s a struggle for power. Realism is a hard sell.

Americans appear to have a n especially intense antipathy toward bal­

ance-of-power thinking. The rhetoric of twentieth-century presidents, for

example, is filled with examples of realism bashing. Woodrow Wilson is

probably the most well-known example of this tendency, because of his elo­

quent campaign against balance-of-power politics during and immediately

after World War 1 . 50 Yet Wilson is hardly unique, and his successors have fre­

quently echoed his views. In the final year of World War II, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared, "In the future world the misuse of

power as implied in the term 'power politics' must not be the controlling

factor i n international relations. " 5 1 More recently, Bill Clinton offered a

strikingly similar view, proclaiming that "in a world where freedom, not

tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply

does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era. "' 52 He sounded the same

theme when defending NATO expansion in 1 997, arguing that the charge

that this policy might isolate Russia was based on the mistaken belief "that

the great power territorial politics of the 20th century will dominate the 2 1 st

century. • Instead, Clinton emphasized his belief that •enlightened self­

interest, a s well a s shared values, will compel countries to define their great­

ness in more constructive ways . . . and will compel u s to cooperate . " 5 3

W h y A m e r i c a n s D i s l i ke Real i s m

Americans t e n d to be hostile to realism because it clashes w i t h t h e i r basic

values. Realism stands opposed to Americans' views of both themselves

a n d the wider worl d . " In particular, realism is a t odds with the deep-seated sense o f optimism a n d moralism that pervades much of American society.

Liberalism. o n the other hand, fits neatly with those values. Not s urprising­

ly, foreign policy discourse i n the United States often sounds a s if it has

been lifted right o u t of a Liberalism I O I lecture.

24 T H I T R A G I D Y OF G R E A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

Americans are basically optimists.55 They regard progress i n politics,

whether at the national or the international level, as both desirable and

possible. As the French author Alexis de Tocqueville observed long ago,

Americans believe that •man is endowed with an indefinite faculty of

improvement. " 56 Realism, by contrast, offers a pessimistic perspective on

international politics. It depicts a world rife with security competition and

war, and holds out little promise of an "escape from the evil of power,

regardless of what one does . " 57 Such pessimism is at odds with the power­

ful American belief that with time and effort, reasonable individuals can

cooperate to solve important social problems.58 Liberalism offers a more

hopeful perspective on world politics, and Americans naturally find it

more attractive than the gloomy specter drawn by realism.

Americans are also prone to believe that morality should play an

important role in politics. As the prominent sociologist Seymour Martin

Lipset writes, "Americans are utopian moralists who press hard to institu­

tionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions

and practices. "'59 This perspective clashes with the realist belief that war is

an intrinsic element of life in the international system. Most Americans

tend to think of war as a hideous enterprise that should ultimately be

abolished from the face of the Earth. It might j ustifiably be used for lofty

liberal goals like fighting tyranny or spreading democracy, but it is morally

incorrect to fight wars merely to change or preserve the balance of power.

This makes the Clausewitzian conception of warfare anathema to most

Americans.60

The American proclivity for moralizing also conflicts with the fact that

realists tend not to distinguish between good and bad states, but instead dis­

criminate between states largely on the basis of their relative power capa­

bilities. A purely realist interpretation of the Cold War, for example, allows

for no meaningful difference in the motives behind American and Soviet

behavior during that conflict. According to realist theory, both sides were

driven by their concerns about the balance of power, and each did what it

could to maximize its relative power. Most Americans would recoil at this

interpretation of the Cold War, however, because they believe the United

States was motivated by good intentions while the Soviet Union was not.

l n t r o cl u c t i o n 2 5

Liberal theorists do distinguish between good and bad states, of course,

and they usually identify liberal democracies with market economies a s

the most worthy. Not surprisingly, Americans t e n d to l i k e t h i s perspective,

because i t identifies the United States as a benevolent force i n world pol­

itics a n d ponrays its real and potential rivals as misguided or malevolent

troublemakers. Predictably. this line of thinking fueled the euphoria that

attended the downfall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

When the •evil empire• collapsed, many Americans (and E u ropeans) con­

cluded that democracy would spread across the globe and that world peace

would soon break out. This optimism was based largely on the belief that

democratic America is a virtuous state. If other states emulated the United

States, therefore, the world would be populated by good states, and this

development could only mean the end of international conflict.

Rhetoric vs. Proctice

B ecause Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign poli­

cy i n the United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism.

Hence the pronouncements of the policy elites are heavily flavored with

optimism a n d moralism. American academics are especially good at pro­

moting liberal thinking in the marketplace of ideas. Behind dosed doors.

however, the elites who make national security policy speak mostly the

language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the

international system according to the dictates of realist logic . 6 1 In essence,

a discernible gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of

American foreign policy.

Prominent realists have often criticized U . S . diplomacy on the grounds

that i t is too idealistic and have complained that American leaders pay

insufficient attention to the balance of power. For example, Kennan wrote

i n 1 9 5 1 . •1 see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie

i n something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to interna­

tional problem s . This approach runs like a red skein through o u r foreign

policy o f the last fifty years . • ., According to this line of argument. there is

n o real gap between America's liberal rhetoric a n d its foreign policy

26 T H I T R A G I D Y or G R E A T P O W E R P O L I T I C S

behavior, because t h e United States practices what it preaches. B u t this

claim is wrong, as I will argue at length below. American foreign policy

has usually been guided by realist logic. although the public pronounce­

ments of its leaders might lead one to think otherwise.

It should be obvious to intelligent observers that the United States

speaks one way and acts another. In fact, policymakers in other states

have always remarked about this tendency in American foreign policy. As

long ago as 1 9 39, for example, Carr pointed out that states on the

European continent regard the English-speaking peoples as "'masters in

the a n of concealing their selfish national interests in the guise of the gen­

eral good , · adding that "this kind of hypocrisy is a special and characteris­

tic peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon mind. " 6 1

Still, the gap between rhetoric and reality usually goes unnoticed in the

United States itself. Two factors account for this phenomenon. First, realist

policies sometimes coincide with the dictates of liberalism, in which case

there is no conflict between the pursuit of power and the pursuit of prin­

ciple. Under these circumstances, realist policies can be j ustified with lib­

eral rhetoric without having to discuss the underlying power realities.

This coincidence makes for an easy sell. For example. the United States

fought against fascism in World War I I and communism in the Cold War

for largely realist reasons. B u t both of those fights were also consistent

with liberal principles, and thus policymakers had little trouble selling

them to the public as ideological conflicts.

Second, when power considerations force the United States to act in

ways that conflict with liberal principles, "spin doctors· appear and tell a

story that accords with liberal ideals." For example. in the late nineteenth

century. American elites generally considered Germany to be a progres­

sive constitutional state wonhy of emulation. But the American view of

Germany changed in the decade before World War I, as relations between

the two states deteriorated. B y the time the United States declared war on

Germany in April 1 9 1 7, Americans had come to see Germany as more

a utocratic and militaristic than its European rivals.

Similarly. during the late 1 9 30s, many Americans saw the Soviet Union

a s a n evil state. panly in response to Josef Stalin's murderous internal

I n tro d u c t i o n 2 7

policies and h i s infamous alliance with Nazi Germany i n A u g u s t 1 9 3 9 .

Nevertheless, w h e n t h e United States joined forces w i t h the Soviet Union

in late 1 94 1 to fight against the Third Reich, the U.S. government began a

massive public relations campaign to clean up the image of America's new

ally and make it compatible with liberal ideals. The Soviet Union was now

portrayed a s a proto-democracy, and Stalin became "Uncle Joe . "

H o w is it possible to g e t away with this contradktion between rhetoric

and policy? Most Americans readily accept these rationalizations because

liberalism is so deeply rooted in their culture. As a result, they find it easy

to believe that they are acting according to cherished principles, rather

than cold and calculated power considerations.65

T H E P L A N OF T H E B OO K

T he r e s t of the chapters in t h i s b o o k are concerned m a i n l y with answering the six big questions about power which I identified earlier. Chapter 2 , which is probably the most important chapter i n the book, lays

out m y theory of why states compete for power and why they pursue

hegemony.

In Chapters 3 and 4, 1 define power and explain how to measure it. I do

this in order to lay the groundwork for testing my theory. It is impossible

to determine whether states have behaved according to the dictates of

offensive realism without knowing what power is and what different

strategies states employ to maximize their share of world power. My start­

ing point is to distinguish between potential power and actual military

power, and then to argue that states care deeply about both kinds of

power. Chapter 3 focuses on potential power, which involves mainly the

size o f a state's population and its wealth. Chapter 4 deals with actual mil­

itary power. It is a n especially long chapter because I make arguments

about "the primacy of land power· and "the stopping power of water"

that are novel and likely to be controversial.

I n Chapter 5, I discuss the strategies that great powers employ to gain

a n d maintain power. This chapter includes a substantial discussion of the

28 T H E T R A G I D Y Of G R I A T P O W I R P O L I T I C S

utility o f war for acquiring power. I also focus o n balancing and buck­

passing, which are the main strategies that states employ when faced with

a rival that threatens to upset the balance of power.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I examine the historical record to see whether

there is evidence to suppon the theory. Specifically. I compare the con­

duct of the great powers from 1792 to 1 990 to see whether their behavior

fits the predictions of offensive realism.

In Chapter 8, I lay out a simple theory that explains when great powers

balance and when they choose to buck-pass. and then I examine that the­

ory against the historical record. Chapter 9 focuses on the causes of war.

Here. too, I lay out a simple theory and then test it against the empirical

record.

Chapter IO challenges the oft-made claim that international politics has been fundamentally transformed with the end of the Cold War. and that

great powers no longer compete with each other for power. I briefly assess

the theories underpinning that optimistic perspective, and then I look at

how the great powers have behaved in Europe and Northeast Asia

between 1 99 I and 2000. Finally, I make predictions about the likelihood of great-power conflict in these two important regions in the early twenty­

first century.