Discussion

Max Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis: II

Author(s): Talcott Parsons

Source: The Review of Politics , Apr., 1942, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1942), pp. 155-172

Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1404548

REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1404548?seq=1&cid=pdf- reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms

University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics and Cambridge University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of Politics

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Max Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis

By Talcott Parsons

II.

The Political Situation of Western Society

(a) Democracy and the Party System

Max Weber died in 1920, when Communism was in its beginnings and Fascism had not appeared on the scene at all. There can be no question of his having predicted anything like the exact nature of these

movements. But he did develop a line of thought which, in connection with his broader analysis of authority, has an important bearing on the

understanding of the process by which they came into prominence, and

some of the possible consequence of their dominance.

There is an inherent connection between a rational-legal system of

authority and democracy. In the first place this is because the former both depends on conditions and in turn favors their intensification, which are incompatible with a stably traditionalized system, which usually, in a complex society, involves a system of established formal distinctions of social rank and status. The inherent tendency of bureau-

cracy on the other hand is a levelling tendency,' to treat persons indis-

criminately according to objective criteria, and to select for office accord-

ing to individual qualities, not established status. Much the same features have been true of the modern market economy.

With the progressive development of these tendencies the majority

of the population tend for many purposes to constitute a relatively undifferentiated mass, without fixed status or loyalties. Though a certain

role must be assigned to specifically anti-authoritarian ideologies in the

"revolutionary era" Weber lays stress on the fact that all systems of authority are dependent on legitimation, on some form of recognition

1 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 129. 155

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

156 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

by the great majority of those subject to them. Bureaucratic adminis- tration as such does not secure this for basic policy, and the form which

the search for legitimation has taken in the modern Western state has

involved the development of the party system.2 In its earlier stages of development the most influential elements in parties in Europe have

tended to be various sorts of "magnates" (Honoratioren), persons of established prestige whose lead the masses of humbler people could be expected to follow. Thus in England in the Tory party it was more than any other the mass of the landed gentry. But with the develop- ment of the process of levelling, these elements have tended to lose their power and be replaced by another type, the personal party leader.

Weber sees this first developing in England in the Liberal Party, with Gladstone as the first figure occupying this status in unequivocal form.

While in England such leaders have been public figures who directly strove to secure the highest office, in the United States part of the function came to be in the hands of another type, the party "boss" who typically has worked behind the scenes and avoided high office.

The basis of party power, along with patronage, lies in command over votes in the electorate, and the political struggle becomes one over

votes, thus involving an appeal to the sentiments of the masses. This, then is the fundamental combination, the dependence, of any group wishing to secure power, on an individual party leader with a mass popular appeal, and the basing of his power on an ability to command support by a direct appeal to the masses, apart from the influence of the

traditionally or otherwise established prestige or interest groups. Of course in the traditional party system a party leader has been one among several competitors, and the legitimation of access to power has

lain in the winning of majorities. Occasionally, however, in the past it has shifted over to a dictatorial pattern, as in the case of the two Napoleons in France. But even there certain elements of the previous pattern have remained present, the leader who has gained power is not,

to be sure, legitimized by having "won" an election in the usual sense, but he claims mass popular support, evidenced by the plebiscite. How- ever "unfair" the conditions under which this is achieved, Weber lays

2 See especially Politik als Beruf, in Gesammelle Politische Schriffen. Also Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Part I, Ch. III, Sec. 18ff.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

MAX WEBER 157

stress on the importance of the plebiscite as a symbol of popular support.

Even where there is a free competition of rival party leaders it is not uncommon for tendencies to develop which shift the basis of appeal

from that which is ordinarily thought of as democratic, in a charismatic

direction. Perhaps the best criterion of the distinction is that on an

ordinary democratic basis what the electors are expressing is their "preference," either or any of the competitors can legitimately hold power if he is preferred, and the others must accept defeat in good grace. There is no one objectively right cause which it is a duty of the electorate as a whole to support. But in a charismatic pattern this is precisely the case-for those who fall within the range of his claims,

it is delinquency in duty not to heed the call of the leader. Any competitor is by definition intolerable-there must be a decision as to which is the legitimate leader. The leader is not legitimized by incorporating the preferences of the electorate, but by their "recogni-

tion" of the rightness of his position. When, as has happened in the United States, one party claims that it alone is "fit" to govern the country, and that the policies of its rival are "Unamerican" it is closely

approaching the charismatic pattern.

This may be said to be the setting and the essential process, in certain respects, by which the Fascist dictatorships have developed. The

dictators were originally party leaders taking part in the competitive struggle for power with other parties. But their resort to other than

"orthodox" methods of rallying support before attaining power is already a symptom of their changed character. Thus the Nazis in their

party rallies would never permit discussion and would forcibly eject all hecklers, implying that only their position was legitimate. This is certainly "undemocratic," but in the other crucial aspect, the appeal for

mass support, they have remained close to democratic patterns. Hitler's

use of the plebiscite to legitimize so many of his decisive steps of policy fits admirably into Weber's analysis.3

3 When it is said that a man in some sense predicted a political development, there is usually danger of people assuming that he therefore favored it. Exactly what Weber's personal attitude toward National Socialism would have been, had he lived to see it, cannot of course be determined, but it seems pretty certain it would have been overwhelmingly negative. He was certainly, in his personal values, deeply attached to the rational-legal pattern, and could not have approved the Nazi attack upon it. He

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

158 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

(b) The Probable Consequences of the Permanent Consolidation of National Socialist Power.

What then, in terms of Weber's analysis, are the probable con- sequences of permanent consolidation of the political power of such a movement over a wide area of Western civilization? This may be said to depend primarily on two sets of considerations. In the first place there is the question of the specific content of the ideal patterns in terms of which the movement has put forth whatever claim to legitimacy

it has, in the second, those factors general to the process of routiniza-

tion of a charismatic movement in application to the circumstances of

this particular case.

The first set of questions Weber does not go into in his political writings or in his analysis of the institutionalization of authority. How-

was also deeply contemptuous of demagogic tactics in politics, as comes out at numerous points in his political writings.

He was, however, as will appear below, in a certain sense very much of a realist in politics, and hence held that these elements must be taken account of. In the discussion over the Weimar constitution he urged that the President of the Reich be given a strong "plebiscitary" basis for his position, that is that he be elected by universal popular vote, definitely not, like the French president, by the legislature. But his other most important single proposal was that the Parliament be given a central position in the government, above all one of high responsibility. He felt that one of the most serious defects in the monarchical constitution of Germany was that the Parliament was deprived of responsibility. Hence he could not have approved Hitler's centering of all power in the party, and reduction of the Reichstag to the position of a mere sounding board for his speeches.

In another specifically political connection Weber would almost certainly have fundamentally disapproved National Socialism. He had a deep antipathy to a wildly "adventurous" foreign policy. He very sharply criticized the annexationist elements in Germany in his time, and thought of Germany as one of the great units in a European power system, not as having hegemony over Europe. He argued that the destruction of Germany as such a unit could not in the long run succeed, but by the same token, in the present situation he would probably have argued that the destruction of the other great powers, namely France, Russia and England by Germany could not conduce to German welfare.

These are two specifically political contexts in which it is relevant to cite Weber's position. His ethical attitude to such things as Nazi Anti-Semitism and political re- pression generally, or his attitude toward the long-run consequences of predominance of the Nazi movement for social institutions and structure, lie upon a different plane. Something will be said about the latter in what follows. On Weber's personal attitudes see Marianne Weber, Max Weber, Ein Lebensbild and Eric Voegelin, "Max Weber," K1lner Vierteliahrshefte fiir Soziologie, Vol. 9, No. 1-2.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

MAX WEBER 159

ever, from his analysis of the role of ideals in his sociology of religion,4

and from certain other sources a rough appraisal on this level is possible.

For Weber "ideas" do not directly determine action in the sense of becoming the immediate "motives" of action. Their function is rather to "define the situation," that is to orient the actor to his situation

in such a way as to tell him what courses of action are "meaningful" in the realization of his "interests," material or immaterial. It is, says Weber, "interests, not ideas, which are the motive forces of action." 5

But interests alone, religious or economic, in hedonic satisfaction or in

power, do not suffice to tell people what to do. For this a system of ideas is, implicitly or explicitly, essential.

Now in certain essential respects the still rather vague and im- perfectly crystallized system of ideas of the National Socialist move- ment, stands in drastic conflict with those which have held the dominant

position in the Western world and become institutionalized as part of its social structure. Thus for instance, "race" membership in the "mystical body" of the German people, in all cases supersedes any considerations of individual quality or competence.6 This constitutes a fundamental break with the ethical significance of universalistic stan-

dards, in a variety of fields of application, such as rational knowledge,

the personal rights and liberties of a human individual as such, technical

competence and the like. In place of these, in its racial and party particularism, and in its emphasis on unlimited loyalty to the Fiihrer, it puts patterns that are much more appropriate to a traditionalistic organization of authority than a rational-legal one.

There are deeper functional reasons for this-it is not merely a matter of the arbitrary inventions of Hitler and the other party leaders.

Precisely the "rational" patterns of modern Western society which are

most important to its system of rational-legal authority have, in many

respects, been an important source of strain in its development. For these patterns have been able to develop as far as they have only by

4 See his Religionssoziologie. Also the present writer's "Role of Ideas in Social Action," American Sociological Review, April 1939.

5 Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

6 See Eric Voegelin, Rasse und Slaat.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

160 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

virtue of undermining many of the values which have played an im- portant part in our past history, especially in the informal, tradition-

alized social structures. Thus loyalties to neighborhood locality, ex- tended family tradition, social class tradition, and to a large extent traditional religion have been undermined. There has been a process of "emancipation" from these ties and the associated sentiments which

is one of the most important sources of wide-spread insecurity.

This process has, however, by no means led to the complete destruc-

tion of the traditionalistic elements in our society. What is has done is to leave a very considerable residue so that the actual situation is one of considerable tension, partly between different groups in the popu-

lation, partly within the personalities of the same individuals who participate in both elements at the same time without fully integrating

them. Thus we still have a great deal of adherence to traditional re- ligion, to peculiarities of local tradition, to "prejudices" about social class and ethnic origin.

When such elements in a culture are associated in a situation of

unresolved tension, it is natural that many of the elements which feel

the tension, consciously or not, most acutely, should react in terms of

a distorted appraisal of the other side of the tension. Thus among insecure and "touchy" people in the emancipated areas of our society there has been a prevalent "debunking" attitude which has tended to undermine traditional values and attitudes, especially those which are relatively "nonlogical," considerably farther than the intrinsic facts or

the basic rationalized patterns justify. This has taken the form both of denying the positive social functions we know to be associated with

those structures and attitudes, and of imputing to their holders negative

qualities such as stupidity which they do not, at least in the same measure, deserve. Thus, to many "emancipated" persons, anyone who adheres to one of the traditional Christian denominations is "childishly

stupid and ignorant."

Conversely, insecure people associated with the traditionalist ele- ments of our social structure tend to react in a "fundamentalist" pat- tern, to attribute to these values an absoluteness and literalness which

is untenable, to treat every slight departure from the formalistic letter

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

MAX WEBER 161

of tradition as an indication of the most fundamental immorality etc. The term "fundamentalism" is taken from the field of religion, but the same kind of pattern of reaction is observable in many fields, that

of morality, of devotion to the Constitution, of patriotism and many others.

Among the forms which such "distorted" reaction patterns take, is that of ideas. Either type of distortion is, in such a situation, with different groups, a favorable source of symbols and of ideological defini-

tions of the situation for charismatic movements, since both groups inevitably feel important dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the existing established order.' In this connection it is noteworthy that the

political movements of the "left" have, with varying emphasis, been bound up with the elements of "emancipation" in our society. Some of the extremer versions have incorporated important elements of eman-

cipated distortion which could easily provoke or strengthen the funda-

mentalist type of reaction among their opponents. For understandable reasons these movements of the left for long tended to monopolize the popular appeal since they have been in principle "democratic" while

their opponents have relied upon and been identified with the more traditional status groups, and mass support has been derived more through the prestige of these groups than directly. With, however, the weakening of these groups and the progressively increasing levelling,

the way has been opened to a demagogic appeal to fundamentalist sentiments. This, undoubtedly, is a most prominent aspect of National Socialism, as is shown by the fact that most of its negative symbols are chosen to represent the phenomena and groups of emancipation, the

capitalist, the internationalist, the Jew (not the "orthodox," but the metropolitan emancipated Jew), the political radical. Along with this go the imputation to their opponents of immorality (night club life), corrruption, irreligion, and "subversive" cultural tendencies, the Nazi Kulturbolschewismus.

7 It is interesting to note that Weber, in his sociology of religion, strongly empha- sized that no institutionally established order was ever fully integrated, and hence free from strain. Hence there is always, to a greater or less degree, an opportunity for a charismatic leader to take a stand which, in opposing some elements of the estab- lished order, will have an appeal to some elements of the population who feel a strain in relation to these points. Quantitatively, however, modern Western society contains much more of these strains than many others. See "Religionssoziologie," Wirlschaft und Cesellschaft, Part II, Chapter, IV.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

162 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

In so far as this diagnosis is correct one would expect the Nazi movement (and more generally Fascism) to develop a system of ideas which overwhelmingly favored a traditionalistic type of institutionali-

zation, and which undermined the ideological foundation of the rational-

legal system of authority in favor of a traditional. In this connection it may be noted that this is an excellent example of a basic conflict about which Weber had much to say, that between "Formal" and "Substantive" rationality.8 By formal rationality Weber meant the adherence to certain formal criteria in action and decision relatively regardless of the consequences in other respects. Thus in the economic field there are the rules of capital accounting, the tendency to reduce

all elements of the situation to calculability in money terms as far as possible. A tendency to order in this sense often, and Weber held, necessarily, comes into conflict with the requirements of a substantive

ethical code, no matter what its content. Similarly in law and bureau- cratic administration there is the formalism of adherence to generalized

rules relatively regardless of the ethical quality of the particular result

in any given case. In this sense the modern institutional order is dependent for its functioning on a realatively high level of formal rationality in various fields, but for this to be possible, those acting under it must somehow be affectively capable of "taking" a considerable

amount of violation of their sentiments of "substantive" rationality and justice. The Nazi movement precisely mobilizes a great deal of this outraged sentiment in opposition. What to the supporters of the system are its "abuses" become to the opponents its essence.

Thus on one set of grounds there is a strong presumption that long-

term predominance of National Socialism would strongly favor a traditionalistic rather than a rational-legal outcome of the process of routinization. This is greatly strengthened by the fact that, by its revolutionary activity, the movement everywhere goes far directly to

destroy the institutions which are most essential to rational-legal author-

ity. Thus, for instance, the inviolability of the regular system of courts

from interference is fundamental to a system of the "rule of law." In Nazi territory the secret police is above the courts and need give them

8 See, for instance, Wirtschaft und Cesellschaft, Part I, Chapter II, Sec. 9. The same theme is deveoped in the Rechissoziologie, Sec. 5.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

MAX WEBER 163

no acounting for its actions. Beyond that, every person with authority

in the party hierarchy is in an important sense above the law. Any of the regular state system of law-enforcement agencies which tried to

touch him, unless he were delivered to them by his party superiors, would do so at their peril. But what of the specific process of routiniza-

tion of the movement as Weber analyzed it in his treatment of the structure of systems of authority?

The evidence concerning the pattern of succession is indecisive. The

type most favorable to traditionalization, heredity, is, at least for the

first succession excluded. Hitler seems to favor personal designation which could, conceivably, develop into a pattern of office, but need not. The other most important problems concern the status of members

of the administrative staff, provision with means of administration and

remuneration. The party organization seems to have been a mixture of

a purely charismatic and a bureaucratic type,9 but with the charismatic

elements of great prominence, particularly at the most important points,

toward the top. There has been some "division of labor" according to different functional fields, but the primary principle seems to be a

hierarchy of leaders and sub-leaders, in the most important part, organ-

ized in terms of territorial jurisdiction (the Gauleiter) though again subdivided according to organizations such as the Labor Front, the Hitler Youth etc. The most important norm is that of loyalty to the immediate superior on whom one is personally dependent, and who is in turn responsible to his superior. As is typical, a higher functionary,

when he is present, supersedes a lower even in the latter's own juris- diction.

At present the most prominent feature of the party hierarchy is its

high degree of centralization, the extreme dependence of the whole mechanism on the will of the supreme leader. But there is also evidence

that a struggle for power has been going on within the party almost from the very beginning, as evidenced most dramatically by the blood

purge of June 1934. There are also persistent stories of bitter personal

rivalries, such as that between Goering and Goebbels. There seems, therefore, to be a high probability that important elements of the upper

circles would be in a position to establish a high degree of independence

9 See Hans Gerth, "The Nazi Party: It's Leadership and Composition," American Journal of Sociology, Jan. 1940.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

164 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

of the Fiihrer, to appropriate rights to status in the organization, to the

patronage under them, etc. This is particularly likely to occur after the passing of the original leader unless he should be succeeded by an unusually strong personality. Above all it should be remembered that the party has broken the state's monopoly of the use of physical force

-various organizations within the party structure exercise force in their own right, notably the Gestapo and the S. S. It is quite possible that those who control these organizations can establish a high degree of independence of the central party leadership. Hence the following seems likely: The system has gone far to break down the restrictions on arbitrary power which were constitutionally established in the old regime. In its place immediately has come a charismatic absolutism of the dictator. But in the longer run the break-up of the hierarchy into a variety of different elements which jealously guard their own

rights, territorially or functionally segregated from the whole, is prob-

able. This might well lead to a situation akin to feudalism except that the relation to land would presumably be different. There is good ground for believing that a great political empire built up by this movement would, in the second and third generations, prove as unstable

as other imposing structures built up by charismatic and patrimonial conquerors in the past, such as Kublai Khan or Charlemagne. But such instability would not necessarily mean that its long-run social consequences would be anything but profound.

In its economic provision for its functional goals and for the re- muneration of the administrative staff the Nazi movement has to a

large extent conformed with charismatic patterns. On the assump- tion of power it has, of course, taken over the taxation system of the state and used it to its own ends, principally to promote armaments. But before and since the party organization as such has lived principally

by Weber's two classic forms of charismatic provision, gifts and booty.

Gifts range all the way from the small weekly dues of party members to the subsidies of industrial magnates. Booty has consisted, internally,

in the processes of acknowledged or concealed confiscation at the ex- pense of all kinds of established interests. This has included the "Aryanizing" of Jewish business, and various forms of "protection" accorded to non-Nazi elements, etc., whereby enormous resources have

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

MAX WEBER 165

been appropriated by the party and elements of it. In addition many funds, such as those of Trade Unions have been formally confiscated. Externally, since the War, and before that in Austria and Czecho- slovakia, there has been a systematic process of expropriation going on,

only part of the proceeds of which have gone to the German "state." We can be sure that already the distinction between "party" resources and those private to people with power in the party has not been very

scrupulously observed. Functionaries in the party have feathered their

own nests very thoroughly, no doubt, and above all, have systematically

and, from a rational-legal point of view, shamelessly used the power of their party positions to do so.

But, as Weber insisted, this mode of provision is inherently tempor-

ary. If the party escapes collapse it will have to evolve gradually to a routine basis. The party has, in a sense, been living off capital- in time it will have to establish settled sources of steady income. It is conceivable that this might happen with a return to the rational- legal form-taxation according to universalistic norms by the state for the support of state functions, with the only difference that Nazis would be the office-holders paid out of taxation-and the meeting of strictly "party" needs by genuinely voluntary contributions-as in the United States (to a considerable extent). But this is very unlikely. What is much more likely is that these various sources of income, especially those associated with "protection" should develop into a kind of benefices which would be treated as the private property of the

various party functionaries, from which without distinction as to source

of income, they would both meet the costs of their political functions

and secure their personal remuneration. Such an outcome is the more

likely the more the members of the administrative staff are in a position

to assert their independence of centralized control. In addition to the above evidence it is relevant that the Nazi mentality is very definitely

one which sees no sense in segregating political authority from other aspects of the same concrete social relationships. One of the most conspicuous consequences of the movement has been the "politicizing" of a whole range of relationships which otherwise could be treated as non-political, that is in which the potential problems of political in- fluence and power could be treated as neutralized. Thus to do business

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

166 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

under Nazi auspices one must be properly "in" with the party authori- ties who might be in a position to intervene.

When considerations of the ideological content of National Socia- lism are combined with those of the dynamics of routinization of the charismatic movement the evidence seems to be overwhelming. The consequence of its political predominance for a considerable period would with a very high degree of probability be the transformation of

the area concerned into a system of institutional patterns of a strongly

traditionalistic character. Other elements of the social system which in

the Western world have been relatively independent of the political organization as such, such as the dominant forms of private property and economic enterprise, market relationships, education and cultural activities, could hardly avoid being drawn into the same basic course of change. That the most distinctive cultural features of our civiliza- tion could not long survive such a change, would scarcely seem to need to be pointed out.

(c) The Outcome of War and the Development of Institutions.

The above analysis has been mainly confined to the political aspect of social structure. If space permitted it could readily be supplemented

by considerations touching other aspects of our modern Western in- stitutional system, which point in the same general direction. But Weber's "sociology of authority" alone can, when applied to the present

situation, make a most important contribution to the understanding of the deeper nature of the crisis in which we have become involved. Build-

ing on that understanding, it can go farther to contribute, with a high

degree of probability, to an understanding of the probable consequences,

on a very broad scale, of either of the two main possible decisive out- comes of the present armed struggle. It is interesting to point out the

analogy of the present situation to another to which Weber, in a discussion with Eduard Meyer, devoted considerable attention, that of classical Greece at the time when the outcome of the Persian Wars

hung in the balance.1'

Weber argues that on their outcome, especially as determined by the

10 Talcott Parsons, Structure of Social Action, Chapter XVI, pp. 611 ff. A. von Schelting, Max Webers Wissenshaftslehre, pp. 280 ff.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

MAX WEBER 167

battles of Marathon and Salamis, hung, in all probability, the entire fate of Western civilization. This is because a decisive Persian victory, with long-term political control of the Greek peninsula, would have checked and probably destroyed the process of rationalization and secularization which made the distinctive Greek contributions to our

cultural heritage (not only directly but through Rome) possible, Greek

philosophy and science, humanistic Greek literature and art. Without these influences the distinctive cultural development of the Western world, which distinguishes it from the Orient and the Near East, could

not have taken place.

But why would the outcome of a mere war11 have checked it- is not Greece forever Greece? Because Persian political control would probably have resulted in a rigid traditionalistic stereotyping, strongly

aided by the predominance in social prestige and power of a ritualistic priestly class. It is well known that Greece was deeply divided at the time. Important elements, such as the oracle of Delphi, tended to favor the Persian cause and counselled non-resistance. Perhaps these were the "fascists" of the time. The effect of Persian political occupa- tion would have been to alter the internal balance of power in Greece. The free autonomous city states, which were the carriers of the seculari-

zing civic cults, and the associated cultural developments, would have been destroyed. Further, in the interests of their own power, the Persians would undoubtedly have favored the religious elements which

stood outside this structure, the priesthoods of the oracles, and perhaps

certain otherworldly religious tendencies. This is, indeed, precisely what they did in the nearest comparable case, their conquest of Judea,

and this policy contributed greatly to the ritualistic stereotyping of Judaism, hence of all subsequent Jewish culture. There must have been

many good people in Greece even as early as the sixth century who shook their heads at the excesses of the turbulent demos and longed

for a "strong authoritarian regime" to paraphrase Marshal Petain. And who promised more in this respect than the Persians?

Today religion as such is not so prominently involved. But it is safe to say that the reaction of the oracle of Delphi was a "fundamenta-

11 We are told in some quarters that "war never settles anything."

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

168 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

list" reaction in the sense of the above discussion. And most of the

basic analysis which Weber applied to the Persian wars seems applicable

today. It is altogether possible that we now stand at another equally critical point of decision for the course of history as a whole. There are those who feel that the rationalized liberal culture of the Western

world has played itself out, that it has no further creative potentialities.

Who in sober realism would, however, dare to presume such a judg- ment? But whatever its potentialities are, in following the further un-

folding of its main historic course, it seems as certain as conclusions of such scope can be, that their realization depends on the prevention of domination over the principal Western cultural area by such a move- ment as National Socialism.

(d) Moral Responsibility in Politics.

In closing, a few brief remarks may be made about Weber's approach

to the problems of political action. Weber himself would not have con-

sidered the question of the ultimate values to be embodied in a policy to lie within the province of science. There are, however, two sets of considerations which fall legitimately within the field of social science as such.

The first touches the question of the possibility of the accomplish-

ment of decisive results by political action. Today a very considerable influence is exerted over men's minds by "deterministic" theories of history according to which there is an inevitable process of unfolding of the historic pattern, and what men may or may not "do about it" by their decision and character and effort, cannot in the nature of the

case be important.12 Weber's position, as he developed it both in his empirical studies and in his methodological work, is sharply opposed to this view. No one was more empirically realistic than he, no one better realized the limitations placed upon action by the conditions of the situation which are beyond the actor's control. But at the same time, to him, human choice and decision were fundamental factors in

the determination of events. Above all, in many situations, there is

12 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, and P. A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, may be cited as prominent recent examples of this attitude.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

MAX WEBER 169

a relatively delicate balance between the forces working in radically opposed directions, so that the difference made by a war, a political movement, or even the influence of a single man may be of very far-

reaching consequences in determining which of the different potenti- alities of the situation is realized. It is not that such a factor "creates"

the result. It is rather that, in addition to the other forces working in that direction, it is sufficient to throw the total balance in favor of

the one possible outcome rather than the other.

Weber's general view of the social process then, was such as to fit in with a high sense of responsibility. Very great consequences for what are, in terms of the values a man happens to adhere to, good

or evil, may well hang on his particular action. He repudiates both what may be called the optimistic and the pessimistic versions of "determinism." For these, in the former case there is no need to

worry or take responsibility, in the latter there is no sense in it, since

the worst is bound to happen no matter what one does. It is relevant to this problem that, to Weber, social systems were notably unstable and inherently involved in tension and conflict. His "activism" was by no means based on an optimistic bias which saw the desired out- come as easy and simple.

On the background of this general position, Weber developed a theory of two possible, radically opposed types of attitude toward action, that is toward the problems of moral responsibility. These he called Gesinnungsethik, the "ethic of absolute value" and Verantwor- tungsethik, the "ethic of responsibility." 13 By the former he meant the

type of attitude according to which a given value-such as religious salvation-is pursued without relation either to the cost in blocking the

realization of other values, or to the consequences in injury to other persons or values. The individual's duty is to "do what is right" (however that be specifically defined.) If the conse- quences of this procedure are in any respect unfortunate or worse, he is not responsible-the responsibility can be turned over to God who created the world that way. To Weber, undoubtedly, action in terms

13 See Politik als Beruf and von Schelting, op. cit.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

170 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

of Gesinnungsethik, especially in charismatic movements, has been a force of the greatest importance in history.14

It was not, however, his personal choice, which fell rather to the other type. What is characteristic of this is the broadest possible ex- tension of the field of rational understanding of action, and the use of

this understanding in particular ways. Namely, in weighing the possible

ways of attaining a desirable goal, one must take specific account of the cost of its attainment, of the fact that other goals will have to be sacrificed in its favor-perhaps to such an extent as to counsel its abandonment altogether. Moreover, the consequences of a course of action are by no means confined to its direct bearing on the realization

of the immediate goal. It also has indirect consequences, in many directions perhaps, affecting many interests. To the actor in terms of

Verantwortungsethik it is an ethical obligation to be aware of these in-

direct consequences as far as possible, and to take responsibility for them. Since, to Weber, ethical conflict was from the point of view of

any system of substantive values whatever, inevitable, inherent in the

structure of the world of action, taking responsibility for consequences

meant the assumption of guilt for-_hings~.which were, in themselves, unethical.

One may say that Weber thoroughly respected the Gesinnungse- thiker if he was sincere and courageous enough to follow the implica-

14 It is plain that the very way Max Weber approaches these ethical problems is determined by a background of secularized Calvinism. The Thomistic theory of morality (Sum. Theod. I-II, 6-21), the Thomistic notion of prudence (I-II, 5 and II-II 47-52), finally the Thomistic conception of the natural law (I-II, 94) eliminate any radical (and essentially insoluble) antinomy between "Gesinnung" and "Verantwortung." The opposition between Gesinnungsethik and Verantwortungsethik would assume at most a psychological meaning. Max Weber's views on the irrational character of the acceptance of the supreme values has also a decidedly Calvinistic flavor. Thomists would say that the reason, even unaided by revelation, can know something about the supreme value. Of course, the ultimate end which is really (or existentially) that of man can be known only by revelation and faith. But even in regard to supernatural faith, it should not be spoken of as irrational adherence, since the credibility of the objects of faith can be rationally manifested. Supra-rationality, rather than irrationality, would be the proper expression.

For a thoroughly Thomistic discussion of the relationship between ethics and political activities see J. Maritain: End of Machiavellianism, THE REVIEw OF POLITICS, January, 1942; for a good exposition of Nature and Functions of Authority, the Aquinas Lecture, 1940, by Yves R. Simon, Milwaukee, 1940. A general criticism of Max Weber's fundamental concepts can be found in Gustav Gundlach, S.J., Zur Soziologie der katholischen Ideenwelt und des Jesuitenordens. (Herder, Freiburg, 1927).-Ed.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

MAX WEBER 171

tions of his position through to the bitter end, to the conclusion that it meant bitter renunciation of most of the accepted "good things of life" of ordinary society, as well as stringent control of many of the most "natural" of human impulses-it is really only possible of fulfillment through a heroic pattern of conduct. In Politik als Beruf he illustrated this by the example of absolute pacifism. Absolute Paci- fism, if taken seriously must be consistently applied,-in particular it was not tenable, as many "leftists" of his time were doing, to argue the inadmissibility of international war on grounds of the ethical prin-

ciple that the use of force was inherently evil, and not apply it to the

revolution internally. One either repudiates resistance to evil by force

in all fields, or the use of force becomes a "strategic" question, not one of fundamental ethical principle as such.

Though respecting the heroic type of Gesinnungsethik Weber felt that in most cases, particularly in his own time, it conduced to wishful

thinking and irresponsibility. Thus he says "In reality we find that the Gesinnungsethiker repeatedly becomes suddenly transformed into the

chiliastic prophet, of the type for instance, of those who, having preached

the doctrine of love against that of force, in the next moment rally their followers for a struggle by force, which they assure them, will be the last time force will ever have to be used, since it will lead to the

permanent elimination of force.-The Gesinnungsthiker cannnot bear the ethical irrationality of the world. He is a 'cosmic-ethical rational- ist'." 15 That is, the adherence to Gesinnungsethik readily degener- ates into utopianism, to wishful thinking which refuses to face the depth of tragedy and conflict which is inherent in the world. To Weber this utopianism was an object of deep personal antipathy. To him intellectual honesty demanded the facing of unpleasant reality. If one could do this and honestly accept the consequences of a system of absolute values, as in a genuine Christian pacifism, well and good. But if not, the only honest procedure was that of Verantwortungsethik,

which refused to judge any act, any means, any situation, as absolutely

good or bad, which was as clear-headed as possible as to the complex ramifications of action, and which, above all, was not afraid to assume

15 Politische Schriften, p. 443.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

172 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

responsibility with its inevitable accompaniment of guilt, responsibility

for being instrumental in bringing about things which, for their own

sake, must without hesitation be judged to be evil.

Along with this personal feeling for the extreme difficulty of com-

bining Gesinnungsethik with clear-headed honesty, there is another aspect of the matter in Weber's analysis. It was, to him, one of the prime characteristics of this position, that it absolved the individual from

responsibility for a whole range of the inevitable consequences of his own actions. But in absolving him from responsibility it at the same time deprived him of a powerful motive for acting rationally, for the

hard work of securing information and thinking the problems of conduct

through to the point where these consequences are known. There can be no doubt that, to Weber, not only was Gesinnungsethik "irrational"

in the sense that he held all orientation to ultimate values to lie beyond

the competence of rational analysis, but also that it was a force which inhibited what possibilities of rational orientation to problems of conduct

exist. The relative predominance of the two types of orientation would,

then, be an important factor in the ability of a social system to main-

tain rational patterns on the institutional level, and not to fall into traditionalism, either directly or through charismatic movements.

To a considerable extent the movements which, today, mobilize the

forces which threaten the basic modern Western institutional system,

are such as appeal to the Gesinnungsthik type of orientation, particu- lary in its weakened "chiliastic" form. This is true of National Social- ism in spite of its apparent extraordinary political "realism" since it purports, in its propaganda appeal, to end the sources of difficulty and

frustration for the German people "once and for all" and to usher in a completely utopian society of indefinite duration. Conversely there

can be little doubt that an ability to assume the burdens of responsible

action in Weber's particular sense constitutes one of the most important

conditions for the successful preservation of a rational-legal system of

authority and its related institutional forms in other aspects of the society, and for keeping open the potentialities of human development

which our Western "great society" holds.

This content downloaded from ������������132.174.253.149 on Wed, 31 Aug 2022 01:05:53 UTC������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms