Philosophy paper final draft

Discussion Notes

The Role of the Af nity Argument in the Phaedo1

MATTHEW ELTON

The af� nity argument (78b4-84b8) stands out in the Phaedo as the weakest of all SocratesÕ arguments for the immortality of the soul. Not only does Socrates recognise that it shows no more than that the Òsoul must be completely indis- soluble, or something close to itÓ (80b10) but, unlike his other arguments, it is thoroughly trounced by stinging and sarcastic replies from Simmias and Cebes. It is clear from the dialogue that Plato has grave doubts about the mode of argument employed in the af� nity passages. But if Plato knows the argument is so bad, then why is it here, nestling amongst, by the usual count, three more reasonable arguments for immortality?2 My answer is that it is here precisely in order to illustrate how not to argue the case for immortality, and, more generally, how not to argue the case for any thesis. The af� nity remarks, then, form part of an object lesson in how not to do good philosophy.

My strategy will be, � rst, to show that Plato (and his leading man) reject analogical forms of argument, and, secondly, to defend the stronger claim that the use of this argument forms part of an illustration of where the philos- ophy can go wrong.

I

I am more concerned with the overall role, rather than the � ner details of the af� nity remarks, so a quick and crude recap should serve my purposes here. Socrates claims that the soul is akin to unchanging, incomposite and invis- ible forms, the body is akin to mutable, composite and visible particulars. Forms are immortal, by analogy so too are souls. Or then again, the soul is akin to the divine, the body to the mortal. The divine are immortal, by anal- ogy so too are souls.

In fact, as already noted, the claim is that souls are immortal Òor some- thing close to itÓ (80b10). The quali� cation indicates an early awareness of

© Koninklijke Brill, Leiden, 1997 Phronesis XLII/3

Accepted February 1997 1 All quotations are from Plato: Phaedo translated with notes by D. Gallop. Oxford:

Clarendon, 1975. 2 Of course no-one would dispute that the remarks have plenty of other work to do

besides taking the main argument forward.

the limits of analogical argument. But Plato indicates the severity of the situ- ation by the responses he places in the mouths of Simmias and Cebes. In both cases, an explicit reference is made to the style of argument.

[One] could surely use the same argument about the attunement of a lyre and its strings, and say that the attunement is something unseen and incorporeal and very lovely and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are cor- poreal bodies and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Now, if someone smashed the lyre, or severed and snapped its strings, suppose it were maintained, by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished – because it would be inconceivable that when the strings had been snapped, the lyre and the strings themselves, which are of mortal nature, should still exist, and yet the attunement, which has af� nity and kinship to the divine and the immortal, should have perished. . . . (85e2)

The conclusion about the lyre is absurd. But until we reach the absurdity the analogies look to be quite as strong as SocratesÕ, and, as Simmias makes very clear, the same argumentative strategy is being used. The mode of argument, then, is cast under suspicion. (It is perhaps also worth noting that these remarks of Simmias come just after he has made some remarks about philo- sophical method.)

Cebes opens his reply in a similar manner:

WhatÕs being said [by Socrates in the af� nity argument] is very much as if some- one should offer this argument about a man – a weaver who has died in old age – to show that the man hasnÕt perished but exists somewhere intact, and should produce as evidence the fact that the cloak he had woven for himself, and worn, was intact and had not perished; and if anyone doubted him, he should ask which class of thing is longer-lived, a man, or a cloak in constant use or wear . . . [This weaver], though heÕd woven and worn out many such cloaks, perished after all of them, despite their number, but still, presumably, before the last one; and yet for all that a man is neither lesser nor weaker than a cloak. (87b5)

Cebes goes on to press an analogy between the body and the cloak, on the one hand, and the soul and the weaver, on the other. Once again, the analo- gies look just as convincing as SocratesÕ own, but here they are pressed into the service of a contrary conclusion. How is this possible? – because of the type of argument that is being employed. In fact, in both of these replies, Plato is illustrating the problems of analogical reasoning. SocratesÕ friends have grasped the way in which that style of reasoning works – as Socrates says Ò[Simmias] really seems to be coming to grips with the argument in no mean fashionÓ (86d9) – and are using their grasp to poke fun.

But there is further evidence that Socrates, despite having offered an argu- ment of this form, does not believe in the method. One of his criticisms of SimmiasÕ harmony theory is that it is incompatible with the pre-existence of the soul, a thesis established by the recollection argument. When pressed by Socrates to explain which argument he prefers, the analogical argument for the harmony theory or the earlier, Ònon-analogical Ó argument, for pre-

314 MATTHEW ELTON

existence, Simmias goes for the latter. And his choice is made on account of the type of argument used:

I acquired the [harmony conclusion] without any proof, but from a certain likeli- hood and plausibility about it, whence its appeal for most people; but IÕm aware that arguments basing proofs upon their likelihoods are impostors, and if one doesnÕt guard against them, they completely deceive one . . . the argument about recollection and learning has come from a hypothesis worthy of acceptance. . . . (92c11)

If Simmias is aware of this methodological principle which prejudices ana- logical arguments, Socrates and SimmiasÕ alike, we can hardly countenance that Socrates himself is not. Indeed, SimmiasÕ remark foreshadows SocratesÕ later discussion of right philosophical method, his Òsecond voyageÓ (99d-102a) . Here, in any case, we can take Socrates to endorse what Simmias has said, as he directly moves on to the next criticism of harmony, without pausing to comment or clarify SimmiasÕ moves.

Lastly, we can note that at no point does Socrates attempt to defend or shore up his own analogical argument. Rather, he attacks the conclusions of Simmias and CebesÕ replies, and goes on to defend the conclusion of his ana- logical argument by other, non-analogical means. On the evidence gathered so far, we can con� dently claim that Plato was very clear about the pitfalls of analogical reasons, and, although Socrates himself seems to have dropped his guard for a moment, he too is, at the very least, dimly aware of their limitations. 3

II

I now want to push for the stronger claim, viz. that Plato is providing an object lesson in how not to mount an argument. Consider � rstly the conver- sation just before Socrates launches into the af� nity remarks (77a7-78b4) . Cebes and Simmias appear to be rationally convinced by SocratesÕ case for immortality, but are still anxious. Socrates chides them:

I think you and Simmias would like to thrash out this argument still further; you seem afraid, like children, that as the soul goes out from the body, the wind may literally blow it apart and disperse it. . . . (77d5)4

Cebes: ÒTry to reassure us, Socrates, as if we were afraid; or rather, not as if we were afraid ourselves – but maybe thereÕs a child inside us, who has fears of that

3 Cf. Republic 434d-435b and 435d. Socrates explains that the analogy of justice in the state and in the individual should be treated as a heuristic, delivering merely provisional and fallible results.

4 The fear of a wind blown dispersal is an allusion to a materialist theory of the soul. The af� nity remarks help along PlatoÕs main argument by illustrating a non-materialist picture of the soul, but they do not provide a rational argument for that picture.

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sort. Try to persuade him, then, to stop being afraid of death, as if it were a bogey-man.Ó

ÒWell, you must sing spells to him every day,Ó said Socrates, Òtill youÕve charmed it out of him.Ó (77e3)

Socrates, then, is being exhorted to press on not with a decent philosophical argument, but rather with something that will soothe Cebes and SimmiasÕ anxiety. He is being exhorted to appeal to their emotions and not their rational faculties. And what does he deliver? – an argument that, to borrow from Simmias, has Òa certain likelihood and plausibility about it,Ó but which falls somewhat short of a proof.

Simmias and Cebes, forgetting what they had asked for, treat these remarks as kosher argument, and engage in a rational, and effective, critique. The result is that argument itself is given a bad name, for equally cogent argu- ments seemed to have established contradictory conclusions. This brings us to the remarks on misology (88c1-91c5) .5 Socrates explains that:

[It] would be a pitiful fate, if there were in fact some true and secure argument, and one that could be discerned, yet owing to association with arguments of the sort that now seem true and now false, a man blamed neither himself nor his own lack of skill, but � nally relieved his distress by shifting the blame from him- self to arguments. . . . (90c10)

Just as naive trust of people of poor character leads to misanthropy, tarring all people with the same brush, so too does naive trust of arguments of poor character lead to misology. Analogical arguments, Socrates is telling us here, are arguments of poor character. If one cannot distinguish between those sorts and the better sorts – such as the sort praised by Simmias as being derived from Ò[hypotheses] worthy of acceptance,Ó then it is no wonder trouble fol- lows. The pickle that all three friends � nd themselves in arose out of failure to distinguish between arguments of a decent sort and rogues. Socrates has to take some of the blame for this – he should not have given in to the requests to address the fears of Òthe child insideÓ – and in the misology remarks he is doing his best to undo the damage. Indeed the situation affords him an ideal opportunity to draw out a very important moral.

And so I suggest that Plato included the af� nity argument not in order to support directly the case for immortality, but, rather, to illustrate the pitfalls of analogical reasoning. Once this has been done, and once SimmiasÕ impor- tant rival hypothesis has been rejected, Plato returns to what is, in his eyes, kosher argument in support of the main claim of the dialogue.

University of Stirling

5 Here, we might note, there is a wholly legitimate use of analogy. Socrates helps make clear what misology is by an analogy with misanthropy, but the pitfalls of misol- ogy are independently explained.

316 MATTHEW ELTON