Advanced information systems case analysis
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n the information era, the best of times are the worst of times. Computer
hardware keeps getting faster, cheaper,
and more portable; new technologies
such as mashups, blogs, wikis, and busi-
ness analytic systems have captured the
imagination; and corporate IT spending
has bounced back from the plunge it
took in 2001. In 1987, U.S. corporations’
investment in IT per employee averaged
$1,500. By 2004, the latest year for
which government data are available,
that amount had more than tripled to
$5,100 per employee. In fact, American
companies spend as much on IT each
year as they do on offices, warehouses,
and factories put together.
However, as IT’s drumbeats become
louder, they threaten to overwhelm gen-
eral managers. One of the biggest prob-
lems companies face is coping with the
abundance of technologies in the mar-
ketplace. It’s hard for executives to fig-
ure out what all those systems, applica-
tions, and acronyms do, let alone decide
which ones they should purchase and
I
There are three
categories of IT, each
of which provides
different organizational
capabilities – and
demands very different
kinds of management
interventions.
Mastering the Three Worlds of Information Technology
by Andrew McAfee
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how to successfully adopt them. Most
managers feel ill equipped to navigate
the constantly changing technology
landscape and thus involve themselves
less and less with IT.
Adding to executives’ diffidence, cor-
porate IT projects have often delivered
underwhelming results or been outright
failures. Catastrophes – such as the one
at American pharmaceutical distribu-
tor FoxMeyer Drug, which went into
Chapter 11 and was sold in 1997 when
a $100 million IT project failed – may
be less frequent today than in the past,
but frustration, delay, and disappoint-
ment are all too common. In 2005, when
IT consultancy CSC and the Financial
Executives Research Foundation con-
ducted a survey of 782 American exec-
utives responsible for IT, 50% of the
respondents admitted that “aligning
business and IT strategy” was a major
problem. The researchers found that 51%
of large-scale IT efforts finished later
than expected and ran over budget.
Only 10% of companies believed they
were getting high returns from IT in-
vestments; 47% felt that returns were
low, negative, or unknown.
Not surprisingly, any fresh IT pro-
posal sparks fiery debates in board-
rooms. Some boards say “Why should
we bother? IT isn’t strategic, so it doesn’t
matter in a competitive sense. We should
be minimizing our technology expendi-
tures.” Others argue “Whether IT mat-
ters or not, we shouldn’t be doing it our-
selves. Companies are becoming virtual,
and software is becoming rentable, so
why do IT the old-fashioned way?” Thus,
executives try to delegate, outsource,
rent, rationalize, minimize, and gener-
ally remove IT from their already long
list of concerns.
But managers who distance them-
selves from IT abdicate a critical respon-
sibility. Having studied IT for the past
12 years, I believe that executives have
three roles to play in managing IT: They
must help select technologies, nurture
their adoption, and ensure their ex-
ploitation. However, managers needn’t
do all those things each time they buy
a new technology. Different types of
IT result in different kinds of organiza-
tional change when they are imple-
mented, so executives must tailor their
roles to the technologies they’re using.
What’s critical, though, is that execu-
tives stop looking at IT projects as tech-
nology installations and start looking
at them as periods of organizational
change that they have a responsibility
to manage.
Building an Effective IT Model Everyone who has studied companies’
frustrations with IT argues that technol-
ogy projects are increasingly becoming
managerial challenges rather than tech-
nical ones. What’s more, a well-run IT
department isn’t enough; line manag-
ers have important responsibilities in im-
plementing these projects. An insightful
CIO once told me,“I can make a project
fail, but I can’t make it succeed. For that,
I need my [non-IT] business colleagues.”
Managers I’ve worked with admit pri-
vately that success with IT requires their
commitment, but they’re not clear
where, when, and how they should get
involved.
That’s partly because executives usu-
ally operate without a comprehensive
model of what IT does for companies,
how it can affect organizations, and
what managers must do to ensure that
IT initiatives succeed. As HBS professor
Clayton M. Christensen and Boston Uni-
versity professor Paul R. Carlile point
out in their working paper “The Cycles
of Theory Building in Management Re-
search” (Harvard Business School, Feb-
ruary 2005), a good model or theory
does two things: It groups important
phenomena into categories, and, within
categories, it makes statements of cause
and effect. Yet even state-of-the-art mod-
els of IT’s impact consist only of state-
ments about individual technologies,
such as “CRM lets you get closer to cus-
tomers” and “SCM enables you to re-
duce inventory.” Such declarations don’t
help executives; they’re more akin to
sales pitches than statements of fact.
These assertions are also silent about
why technologies will deliver to compa-
nies the benefits they have promised.
Why will customers start confessing
their deepest desires to your customer
relationship management system? Why
will suppliers start delivering just in
time when you set up a supply chain
management system? Existing models
don’t help executives choose among
technologies, either. Every business
wants both to be closer to customers
and to keep inventory levels low – but is
it better to first invest in CRM or SCM
improvements?
One way to build a comprehensive
model is to place IT in a historical con-
text. Economists and business historians
agree that IT is the latest in a series of
general-purpose technologies (GPTs),
innovations so important that they
cause jumps in an economy’s normal
march of progress. Electric power, the
transistor, and the laser are examples
of GPTs that came about in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. Compa-
nies can incorporate some general pur-
pose technologies, like transistors, into
products, and others, like electricity, into
processes, but all of them share specific
characteristics. The performance of such
technologies improves dramatically
over time. As people become more fa-
miliar with GPTs and let go of their old
ways of thinking, they find a great many
uses for these innovations. Crucially,
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T O O L K I T • M a s t e r i n g t h e T h r e e W o r l d s o f I n f o r m a t i o n Te c h n o l o g y
Andrew McAfee ([email protected]) is an
associate professor at Harvard Business
School in Boston. Visit his blog at blog.hbs
.edu/faculty/amcafee.
Executives need to stop looking at IT projects as
technology installations and start looking at them
as periods of organizational change that they have
a responsibility to manage.
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general purpose technologies deliver
greater benefits as people invent or de-
velop complements that multiply the
power, impact, and uses of GPTs. For
instance, in 1970, fiber-optic cables
enabled companies to employ lasers,
which had already been in use for a de-
cade, for data transmission.
The complements of process GPTs are
organizational innovations, or changes
in the way companies get work done.
Research suggests that four organi-
zational complements – better-skilled
workers, higher levels of teamwork, re-
designed processes, and new decision
rights – allow process GPTs to deliver
improved performance. For instance, in
the early twentieth century, factories in
America replaced central motors driven
by waterwheels or steam engines with
newly invented electric motors. These
large motors were connected to a drive-
shaft, which was connected by belts to
the factory’s machines. At first, electric
motors were bolted onto the old drive-
shafts. As time went on, businesses built
smaller electric motors and connected
one to each machine. The new motors
gave companies the freedom to redesign
work flows. They were able to build
long, low factories instead of high, nar-
row ones, for example, and to arrange
machines in rows that later became as-
sembly lines. However, businesses had
to hire workers who were both more
skilled and better able to independently
make decisions at each station. Once all
the organizational complements to elec-
tric motors were in place, they maxi-
mized the technology’s impact and
boosted productivity in the U.S. manu-
facturing sector.
These insights are also true of IT, but
with one distinction: Information tech-
nologies, my research shows, don’t enjoy
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the same relationships with the four
organizational complements that other
process GPTs have. Some information
technologies can deliver results without
the complements being in place; others
allow the complements to emerge over
time; and still others impose the com-
plements they need as soon as compa-
nies deploy the technologies.
Based on those variations, we can
classify IT into three categories. (See
the exhibit “The Three Varieties of
Work-Changing IT.”) Each offers com-
panies distinctive capabilities, delivers
unique benefits, and triggers organiza-
tional changes of different types and
magnitudes. This classification can help
leaders understand which technologies
they must invest in as well as what they
should do to maximize returns. It can
also indicate which IT initiatives are
going to be relatively easy to imple-
ment and on which projects executives
should focus. In that light, IT manage-
ment starts to look less like a black art
and more like the work of the executive.
The Three Categories of IT Executives often talk about the revolu-
tion that computers have brought about
in companies, but, as the IT model I’ve
described illustrates, that’s an oversim-
plification. IT sets off several kinds of
revolutions in organizations because
technologies fall into three distinct
categories.
Function IT (FIT) includes technolo- gies that make the execution of stand-
alone tasks more efficient. Word proces-
sors and spreadsheets are the most
common examples of this IT category.
Design engineers, accountants, doctors,
graphic artists, and a host of other spe-
cialists and knowledge workers use FIT
all the time. People can get the most
value from these technologies when
their complements are in place but can
also use FIT without all of the comple-
ments. For instance, an R&D engineer
can use a computer-aided design (CAD)
program to improve the way he does
his work without making any changes
in how the rest of the department func-
tions. Furthermore, FITs don’t bring
their complements with them. CAD
software, for example, doesn’t specify
the processes that make the most of its
power. Companies must identify the
complements FIT needs and either de-
velop them or allow users to create them.
FIT is powerful. Five years ago, Ducati
announced that it would enter the
MotoGP racing circuit in 2003. Its de-
signers kicked off a project to build a
suitable motorcycle in November 2001.
They started by using simulation soft-
ware to build and test virtual engines.
The simulations made the team realize
that a two-cylinder engine wouldn’t be
powerful enough to win races, so it de-
cided to build Ducati’s first four-cylinder
engine. The team finished designing
the engine in August 2002; a motorcy-
cle powered by the engine was zoom-
ing around test tracks two months later;
and the project was largely complete by
January 2003. The Italian company par-
ticipated in the MotoGP circuit in 2003
and outperformed most of its rivals:
Ducati placed second in the manufac-
turers’ standings, a ranking of compa-
nies that race motorcycles on the cir-
cuit, and its riders finished fourth and
sixth in the individual standings.
Ducati’s experience with FIT vividly
demonstrates the capabilities of this IT
category:
• Enhancing experimentation capacity.
Ducati’s engineers built thousands of
engines and motorcycles and compared
their performance without touching a
sheet of steel.
• Increasing precision. The company’s
designers came to trust the software
so much that if test results disagreed
with a simulation, they told me, the
first reaction was to mistrust the test
results.
Network IT (NIT) provides a means by which people can communicate with
one another. Network technologies in-
clude e-mail, instant messaging, blogs,
and groupware like Lotus Notes. NIT al-
lows people to interact, but it doesn’t
define how they should interact. It gives
people freedom to experiment instead
of telling them what they must do. Un-
like FIT, network IT brings comple-
ments with it but allows users to imple-
ment and modify them over time.
In 2005, investment bank Dresdner
Kleinwort Wasserstein introduced three
network technologies: messaging soft-
ware, employee blogs, and a company
wiki, a Web site that employees could
contribute to or edit without needing
permission or HTML skills. DKW’s peo-
ple generate data, get opinions, and find
answers by using the messaging soft-
ware to contact the firm’s traders and
analysts across the world. Many man-
agers write blogs or post comments on
others’ blogs. Some DKW directors see
the wiki as a way to deal with e-mail
overload and encourage their teams to
post agendas, to-do lists, and work in
progress on the wiki rather than circu-
lating them via e-mail.
As the DKW example illustrates,
NIT’s principal capabilities include the
following:
• Facilitating collaboration. Network
technologies allow employees to work
together but don’t define who should
work with whom or what projects em-
ployees should work on. At DKW, ad hoc
teams have formed because employees
read one another’s blogs. These teams
have used the wiki to accomplish tasks,
and they have disbanded without orders
from senior executives.
• Allowing expressions of judgment.
NITs are egalitarian technologies that
let people express opinions. DKW em-
ployees use blogs to voice their views
about everything from open-source soft-
ware to interest rate movements.
• Fostering emergence. “Emergence” is
the appearance of high-level patterns or
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Classifying IT into three types can help leaders
understand which technologies they must invest in
as well as what they should do to maximize returns.
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information because of low-level inter-
actions. These patterns are useful be-
cause they allow managers to compare
how work is done with how it’s sup-
posed to be done. Emergence is also
valuable for users. For instance, employ-
ees can easily search and navigate DKW’s
blogs and wiki for trends and data even
though nobody is in charge of making
them easy to use.
Enterprise IT (EIT) is the type of IT application that companies adopt to re-
structure interactions among groups of
employees or with business partners.
Applications that define entire business
processes, such as CRM and SCM – as
well as technologies, such as electronic
data interchange, that automate com-
munications between companies – fall
into this category. Unlike network tech-
nologies, which percolate from the bot-
tom, enterprise technologies are very
much top-down; they are purchased
and imposed on organizations by senior
management. Companies can’t adopt
EIT without introducing new inter-
dependencies, processes, and decision
rights. Moreover, companies can’t slowly
create the complements to EIT; changes
become necessary as soon as the new
systems go live.
In 2002, American retail drugstore
chain CVS became concerned about
the long wait times at its pharmacies
and reexamined two steps in its pre-
scription fulfillment process that it had
automated. Initially, its pharmacies
had performed the first step, a safety
check for drug interactions, one hour
before the customer’s desired pickup
time. After that, it checked whether the
insurer would pay for the medicine.
Despite automating the process, CVS
often was unable to resolve all of the
outstanding safety and insurance issues
by the promised pickup times, which ir-
ritated customers. CVS then decided to
reverse the order in which the steps
were executed. The change met with
resistance from many CVS pharma-
cists, who felt that since the drug safety
check was the more important of the
two, it should be the first step in the
process. The team that was rolling out
the project reasoned with the skeptics
but eventually realized that it would not
win them all over. So it instructed the
pharmacies to perform the insurance
review first, when customers dropped
off prescriptions, rather than immedi-
ately before pickup time. That allowed
technicians to work with customers
to correct small glitches, such as date
of birth errors in health insurance rec-
ords, that would prevent drug reim-
bursements and to warn people if they
were likely to run into bigger issues,
such as the nonpayment of insurance
premiums. The new sequence also let
CVS’s pharmacists incorporate the
safety check into their quality control
procedures instead of treating it as a
separate step. Redesigning the fulfill-
ment process cut wait times at CVS by
as much as 80%, which improved cus-
tomer satisfaction.
As CVS’s experience shows, EIT’s pri-
mary capabilities include the following:
• Redesigning business processes. Be-
cause CVS employees couldn’t fill pre-
scriptions until they had completed the
two checks in the new sequence, the re-
vamped fulfillment process wasn’t just
a good idea in theory – CVS employees
had to execute the process in that partic-
ular sequence. EIT gives managers con-
fidence that employees will execute pro-
cesses correctly.
• Standardizing work flows. Once com-
panies identify a complementary busi-
ness process, they can implement it
widely and reliably along with the EIT.
CVS rolled out its new process in 4,000
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The Three Varieties of Work-Changing IT
IT Category Definition Characteristics Examples
Function IT IT that assists with • Can be adopted without complements Simulators, spreadsheets,
the execution of • Impact increases when complements computer-aided design,
discrete tasks are in place and statistical software
Network IT IT that facilitates • Doesn’t impose complements but lets them E-mail, instant messaging,
interactions without emerge over time wikis, blogs, and mashups
specifying their • Doesn’t specify tasks or sequences
parameters • Accepts data in many formats
• Use is optional
Enterprise IT IT that specifies • Imposes complements throughout the Software for enterprise resource
business processes organization planning, customer resource
• Defines tasks and sequences management, and supply
• Mandates data formats chain management
• Use is mandatory
outlets across the United States in less
than a year.
• Monitoring activities and events effi-
ciently. EITs can allow managers to get
an accurate and up-to-date picture of
what’s happening throughout the en-
terprise, often in something close to real
time. CVS’s software lets executives
know how many prescriptions are filled
every day in each location, how long it
takes to fill each prescription, and what
kinds of fulfillment problems employ-
ees had to tackle.
Managing the Three Types of IT Across the three IT categories, execu-
tives have three tasks. First, they must
help select IT applications that will de-
liver the organizational capabilities they
desire. Second, they must lead adoption
efforts that result in the creation of
complements for those technologies.
And third, they must shape the exploi-
tation of IT by ensuring that technolo-
gies, capabilities, and complements stay
aligned.
IT selection. Companies often select IT applications after one of their execu-
tives hears about a new technology and
wonders why his or her organization
hasn’t invested in it yet. This approach
is pervasive. How often do you hear,
“Shouldn’t we take a look at Technol-
ogy X?” or “Why can’t Technology Y do
that for us?” Companies will even in-
vest in a technology because everyone
else in the industry has purchased it or
because it comes with glowing recom-
mendations from consultants, analysts,
and journalists.
Trouble is, there’s an endless supply of
new applications, partly because of in-
novation and partly because of clever
rebranding. Companies can’t possibly
evaluate all the new applications that
cross their paths. Another, more funda-
mental, problem is that this method of
choosing applications reflects an outside-
in approach: Executives describe a tech-
nology that’s available in the outside
world and propose that it should be
brought into the company. No one stops
to think about whether the organiza-
tion actually needs the capabilities that
the technology offers. Between 1999
and 2001, American companies spent
$130 billion on IT they never used, ac-
cording to one estimate. An outside-in
mentality was surely behind much of
that waste.
A more sensible question for execu-
tives to ask is “What do we need IT to do
for us?” For instance, they might con-
sider, Do our company’s engineers need
to increase their experimentation capac-
ity? Do our sales and marketing depart-
ments need to collaborate more often?
Do we need to standardize fulfillment
processes throughout the world? Man-
agers should also set IT priorities. They
must decide, Is it more important to
have a single source of employee data or
to get weekly reports from the sales
force about client contacts? Would the
R&D department be better off if it
could conduct more simulations or if
it had an online space for brainstorm-
ing? Would it be more valuable to en-
hance the enterprise system by adding
a layer of analysis software or by extend-
ing it to suppliers through a private data
exchange? These are tough choices, but
they are appropriate ones for top man-
agement teams to talk through. (See the
sidebar “The IT Dialogue.”)
An inside-out approach puts the spot-
light squarely on the business before
evaluating the technology landscape; it
focuses on the capabilities that IT can
provide rather than on the technologies
themselves. A discussion among execu-
tives about capabilities will highlight
what the business most wants to be good
at – and it will show whether there’s
agreement about what the business
needs to be good at. Once the company’s
business needs are clear, the technolo-
gies it requires will come into focus. Typ-
ically, FIT delivers productivity and op-
timization, NIT increases collaboration,
and EIT helps standardize and monitor
work. Thus, when executives decide what
capabilities they need, they will know
what kind of IT to buy and the nature of
the initiatives they must manage.
In our 2004 case study “Enterprise IT
at Cisco,” two HBS colleagues, F. Warren
McFarlan and Alison Berkley Wagon-
feld, and I described how Cisco used the
inside-out approach to refocus the IT
selection process. Cisco realized that
there were drawbacks in its IT decision-
making process as it was trying to re-
cover in late 2001 from a fall in reve-
nues. CIO Brad Boston found that Cisco
had nine order status tools. Each of
them used data from different sources,
which used different definitions for key
terms. As a result, the systems couldn’t
give the company a clear picture of its
orders. There were similar problems in
the sales organization. Boston and his
colleagues realized that Cisco needed to
improve its standardization and moni-
toring capabilities, so they selected an
upgraded ERP system and a customer
database. They also decided to imple-
ment the new technologies across the
company even though it was costly and
time-consuming to do so. The ERP proj-
ect required three years to implement
and cost the company approximately
$200 million. Since Cisco couldn’t gain
the capabilities it wanted without those
technologies, however, it chose to invest
in them.
IT adoption. After IT selection, exec- utives’ attention turns to adoption: the
hard work of putting the technologies
they’ve invested in to productive use.
At this stage, managers’ main respon-
sibility is to help create the comple-
ments that will maximize IT’s value.
FIT doesn’t bring its complements with
it, so managers must find ways of iden-
tifying them. That’s what BMW’s chief
designer, Chris Bangle, did in the late
1990s when he wanted designers to use
computer-aided styling (CAS) software
in addition to paper, clay, and wood. As
Bangle explained to HBS professor Ste-
fan Thomke during an interview, the
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Once the company’s business needs are clear, the
technologies it requires will come into focus.
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designers were reluctant to use the soft-
ware, even though Bangle had hired
CAS specialists to work alongside them.
One day, Bangle declared that within
three months, the CAS team would have
to pay for itself – or he would sell the
team’s computers. He didn’t twist the
designers’ arms; he pressured the CAS
specialists and modelers. They helped
the designers adopt the software and
create new design processes. Bangle
knew he couldn’t force the technology’s
adoption or merely hope that comple-
ments would emerge. He had to allow
his team to discover new ways of work-
ing – although he could prod it a little.
There’s an interesting dichotomy in
executives’ roles when it comes to NIT
adoption. Because the use of such tech-
nologies is voluntary rather than manda-
tory, they make users feel more, rather
than less, in control of their work. As
a result, their adoption isn’t difficult.
However, managers still have to inter-
vene with new technologies, such as
groupware, wikis, and blogs, by demon-
strating how they can be used and by
setting norms for participation. Once
network technologies are properly es-
tablished, their use takes off, and the
challenge for managers is to refrain
from intervening too often or with too
heavy a hand.
In stark contrast to FIT and NIT, en-
terprise IT is hard for companies to
adopt. The benefits look great to people
at the top, but employees usually dis-
like EIT technologies. Unlike network
technologies, they don’t just enable
new ways of working; they dictate them.
Enterprise systems define new cross-
function business processes, impose the
processes on employees without allow-
ing employees to modify them, and
bring higher levels of oversight. Most
employees don’t like having new pro-
cesses dictated to them by a piece of
software and will use a variety of tech-
niques to prevent the adoption of en-
terprise technologies. Executives must
intervene forcefully throughout EIT
adoption efforts because new processes,
changed decision rights, and greater
interdependence come hand in hand
with these technologies.
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The IT Dialogue
Business and IT leaders should meet periodically to discuss the state of
the company’s IT-based capabilities. During these meetings, the CIO’s role
isn’t to unveil new technologies but to collaborate with executives on capa-
bility development. The discussions should cover organizational footprints:
the geographic, functional, and divisional range over which the company
will deploy new technologies. The expense, difficulty, and time involved in
deploying IT – especially enterprise IT – increases as the footprint grows.
The conversation can be broken down according to IT category and should
address some specific questions.
Functional IT • Will any of the new software on the market enable our engineers,
scientists, analysts, and other workers to do their jobs more efficiently?
• Are our function technologies outdated? If so, why? What has changed?
Network IT • How do our people collaborate? Do we know what technologies they’re
using?
• Do we have ways of letting qualitative information flow horizontally and
vertically within the company as well as back and forth with customers
and suppliers?
• If we wanted to get broad feedback on an important topic, how would
we do it?
• How do we know what our people are working on and what they think
the hot topics are?
Enterprise IT • In what ways are our current processes not supporting the needs of the
business? Which ones need to be redesigned? Which ones should be
extended to our customers and suppliers?
• Are there best practices that should be embedded in our enterprise IT
endeavors so that they can be deployed more widely? How much more
widely? Do they need to be adjusted at all for new environments?
• Are there important business activities, events, or trends that we should
monitor? If we aren’t monitoring them, why not? Are the data unavailable
or stored across so many systems that the information is difficult to
assemble?
• What’s the most recent period that we could easily analyze? One hour
ago? Yesterday? Last month? Last quarter?
It’s important for executives to know how long a proposed IT effort
will take and what it will cost, but the ROI figure is nearly worthless. I’ve
seen many business cases prepared to justify IT investments. Virtually
all of them predicted increased revenues, higher profits, and lower costs.
And all of them ascribed the benefits entirely to the technology, making it
sound like a can’t-lose proposition. In reality, IT is never a sure bet because
of the complex interplay between technologies, capabilities, and comple-
ments. Smart companies spend little time predicting the financial benefits
that will accrue from IT efforts. They keep track of spending and milestones
and constantly check to see if they are on track to gain the IT-based capabil-
ities they desire.
In fact, the biggest mistake business
leaders make is to underestimate re-
sistance when they impose changes in
the ways people work. In 2002, a
Boston-based hospital set up an IT sys-
tem that replaced handwritten prescrip-
tions with online orders. The system in-
stantly checked doctors’ prescriptions
for harmful doses or drug interactions
and transmitted the orders to the hospi-
tal pharmacy. Even though studies had
demonstrated that the system would re-
duce medication errors, physicians bit-
terly resisted. They complained that the
computer-based process was slower and
less convenient than paper-based order-
ing and that the built-in error checking
didn’t work. They protested so strongly
that the hospital was able to roll out
the system in only a few departments.
Today, most of the doctors continue to
write prescriptions on paper and fax
them to the hospital’s pharmacy. The
system’s champions were caught com-
pletely off guard by the doctors’ reac-
tion to the monitoring and standardi-
zation capabilities that the hospital
sought.
EIT adoptions can give rise to several
kinds of problems. For example, EIT
projects often become delayed as em-
ployees and managers negotiate the use
of complements, such as new processes,
that the technology has imposed. Com-
panies often settle for solutions that are
more modest than originally planned
and gain only some of the capabilities
they had initially sought. Firms may
even abandon EIT adoptions altogether.
Even worse, some businesses don’t aban-
don an EIT project when they should,
which wreaks havoc on performance.
For instance, in the late 1990s, both Her-
shey and Nike implemented technolo-
gies that were a poor fit with their busi-
ness needs and processes. As a result,
the finances and share prices of both
companies suffered.
All the successful EIT adoptions I’ve
studied have used the same process for
avoiding failure, and all the unsuccessful
EIT adoptions I’ve studied have not used
it: They have decided at the outset how
key issues about configuration and
other aspects of the adoption will be
raised and how they will be settled. The
most important participants in this task
are not IT specialists or consultants but
business leaders from the areas affected
by the new technology. The more areas
there are, and the more their work is
being changed, the more the adoption
effort needs a seasoned leader. A mid-
level project manager doesn’t have the
formal or informal authority required
to make and implement these tough de-
cisions. At CVS, for example, the leader
of the EIT project was responsible for
both IT and store operations, so he had
the authority to deploy the new pro-
cess despite opposition from the chain’s
pharmacists. Similarly, despite Cisco’s
decentralized culture, the company set
up a business process operating com-
mittee (BPOC) that consisted of six se-
nior executives and the CIO. The BPOC
met throughout the EIT adoption effort
to make policy and process decisions
and to signal that Cisco wouldn’t back
away from establishing the comple-
ments that the technology needed even
though there was resistance within the
organization.
Leaders who successfully implement
EIT try to build consensus in the organi-
zation, but they’re also willing to push
ahead without having everyone on
board every step of the way. Their deci-
sive style runs counter to the usual ad-
vice about how executives should get
users to accept and own new technolo-
gies. For example, in 1999, when a mu-
tual fund company set up a CRM sys-
tem, it asked its salespeople to enter the
information about their meetings with
brokerages and institutional investors
into the system. The sales reps saw this,
correctly, as an attempt to capture
knowledge that existed only in their
heads. They refused to use the system,
which delivered little value to anyone
for years. The situation changed with
the arrival in 2001 of a new sales presi-
dent, who demanded that reps enter in-
formation into the CRM system, threat-
ened to withhold commission payments
from those who didn’t, and instructed
her direct reports to cross-check the
sales reps’ entries against expense re-
ports. The president’s policy was met
with stiff opposition, but the reps
quickly realized that they had to accede
to the demands of the new boss if they
wanted to continue working for the
company.
IT exploitation. A business leader’s third IT-related responsibility is to ex-
tract the maximum benefit from tech-
nologies once they are in place.
Companies can best exploit FIT by
fine-tuning organizational complements.
When HBS professors Marco Iansiti and
Alan MacCormack studied the 1995
America’s Cup sailing competition, they
found that all of the teams used simu-
lation software to help them design
their boat keels. Most teams worked
with universities and aerospace compa-
nies to build sophisticated simulations
and used either mainframes or super-
computers to do the work. They were all
beaten by Team New Zealand, which
used less powerful workstations but
brought the computers down to the
docks where its boats were built. The
New Zealand team also encouraged
experimentation and teamwork and
pushed keel modification decisions
down the organization. Because the
other teams didn’t do all of those things,
they couldn’t harness the full power of
the FIT.
Employees exploit older NITs such as
e-mail and instant messaging on their
own, but business leaders have a role to
play in exploiting newer technologies
like blogs and wikis. They can help sus-
tain and increase the use of comple-
ments to make the technology continu-
ally more effective, primarily by guiding
users. Darren Leonard, a managing di-
rector in the global equity derivatives
business at Dresdner Kleinwort, recalls
148 harvard business review | hbr.org
T O O L K I T • M a s t e r i n g t h e T h r e e W o r l d s o f I n f o r m a t i o n Te c h n o l o g y
The biggest mistake
business leaders make
is to underestimate
resistance when they
impose changes in the
ways people work.
Y E
L M
A G
C Y
A N
B L
A C
K
how he got his colleagues to use the
company’s wiki: “First, if a wiki has no
structure, it’s perceived not as an oppor-
tunity but as anarchy, and our people
have no time for anarchy. I went back
to my initial pages and rewrote them to
be a lot more directive. For example, I
made a page with the agenda for an up-
coming meeting and asked people to
add to it. Second, wikis have to be
clearly better than other ways of collab-
orating. There have to be uses [for them]
that demonstrate their power. One of
these uses came prior to a special senior
management meeting where we could
bring questions from our groups and get
them answered. I put up a page…asking
my [team members] what questions
they wanted me to ask on their behalf.
People used the page to post questions,
edit them, and discuss which ones were
the most important and why. That really
accelerated wiki use. Finally, old habits
are hard to break. The tendency is for
people to keep using e-mail because
that’s what they know….I have to [tell
them], ‘I’m not reading e-mails on this
topic. Use the wiki’ or ‘Everyone’s assign-
ments are on this page – use the same
page to report on progress.’”
Interestingly, EIT’s exploitation is
often easier than its adoption. Since
the work of imposing new processes is
done by this stage, the manager’s task
is to leverage already standardized data
and work flows. Few employees and
managers have problems with that;
they’re eager to get the most out of a
system that was so much trouble to set
up. Exploiting EIT sometimes requires
adding a new FIT on top of it. In the
mid-1990s, food services giant Sysco im-
plemented an ERP system and data
warehouse across its 80 regional busi-
nesses. Sysco’s executives realized that
because all of the companies were now
recording orders in the same way, it
was possible to analyze the standard-
ized data to answer two questions:
Which customers were most likely to
defect? and What other products could
it be selling to existing customers? Sysco
invested in business intelligence soft-
ware, which sits on top of the ERP sys-
tem, extracts data from it, and facilitates
its analysis. As a result, salespeople and
managers gained something akin to a
crystal ball that could provide two criti-
cal answers they needed.
Other companies have exploited en-
terprise systems by extending them to
customers, suppliers, and joint-venture
partners. That expands businesses’ mon-
itoring capabilities and provides levels
of control that they could otherwise
have achieved only by employing more
people. For instance, the $107 million
Argentine grain producer Los Grobo
uses an EIT system to track all the work
done on its farms. Los Grobo rents most
of the fields, and contractors plant,
spray, harvest, and oversee them. The
contractors enter their activities into
Los Grobo’s system through a Web inter-
face, which allows managers and spe-
cialists at the company’s Buenos Aires
headquarters to make informed deci-
sions about land management and yield
improvement. This platform has helped
Los Grobo grow its sales at a rate of 40%
per year since 2000 – without buying
november 2006
M a s t e r i n g t h e T h r e e W o r l d s o f I n f o r m a t i o n Te c h n o l o g y • T O O L K I T
more land or hiring as many employees
as it used to.
• • •
For a resource to have an impact on a
company’s competitive position, it must
be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable. Oil wells and diamond
mines meet the test; pencils and paper
don’t. What about IT? At first glance, it
would seem that all three IT categories
fail to meet these criteria. Vendors offer
a wide range of FIT, NIT, and EIT, so
these technologies are not rare and
seem to be highly imitable. However,
people often forget that while the soft-
ware itself might not be any of those
things, a successfully implemented sys-
tem isn’t easy to replicate. Because of
the managerial challenges inherent in
its implementation, IT meets all four cri-
teria when a company succeeds in ap-
plying a technology and, consequently,
gains valuable capabilities.
Reprint R0611J
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