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CIt!tLF. 1C= MADE POLICY 57 .7')I r_

Bac re at the Border Why Enforcement without Legalization

Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration by Douglas S . Massey

Executive Summary

Despite increased enforcement at the U.S.-Mexican border beginning in the 1980s, the number of foreign-born work- ers entering the United States illegally each year has not diminished . Today an estimated 10 million or more people reside in the United States without legal documentation .

For the past two decades, the U.S . gov- ernment has pursued a contradictory poli- cy on North American integration . While the U.S. government has pursued more commercial integration through the North American Free Trade Agreement, it has sought to unilaterally curb the flow of labor across the U.S.-Mexican border. That policy has not only failed to reduce illegal immigration; it has actually made the problem worse

Increased border enforcement has only succeeded in pushing immigration flows into more remote regions . That has result- ed in a tripling of the death rate at the bor- der and, at the same time, a dramatic fall in the rate of apprehension. As a result, the cost to U.S. taxpayers of making one arrest

June 13, 2005

along the border increased from $300 in 1992 to $1,700 in 2002, an increase of 467 percent in just a decade .

Enforcement has driven up the cost of crossing the border illegally, but that has had the unintended consequence of encouraging illegal immigrants to stay longer in the United States to recoup the cost ofentry.The result is that illegal immigrants are less likely to return to their home country, causing an increase in the number of illegal immigrants remsmung in the United States Whatever one thinks about the goal of reducing migra- tion from Menace, US policies toward that end have clearly failed, and at great cost to U.S. taxpayers.

A border policy that relies solely on enforcement is bound to fail. Congress should build on President Bush's immigration initia- tive to enact a temporary visa program that would allow wodes from Canada, Mexico, and other countries to work in the United States without restriction for a certain limited time. Undocumented workers already in the United States who do not have a criminal record should be given temporary, legal status .

andcoautY lrBeyond Smoke and (Mirror pMelxic Immigration in an tE assof

INS! Economic Integration (New York. Russell Sage Foundation, 2002) .

No. 29

Despite increased enforcement at the U.S: Mexican bor- der beginning in the 1980s, the number

of foreign-born workers entering the United States

illegally each year has not diminished.

Introduction

One of the most important and challenging problems facing the 109th Congress will be immigration reform. Despite increased enforce- ment at the U.S .-Mexican border beginning in the 1980s, the number of foreign-born workers entering the United States illegally each year has not diminished . Today an estimated 10 million or more people reside in the United States with- out legal documentation, and that number con- tinues to grow by 400,000 or more each years

In his State of the Union message on February 2, 2005, President Bush challenged Congress to fix the problem :

America's immigration system is . . . outdated, unsuited to the needs of our economy and to the values of our country. We should not be content with laws that punish hardworking people who want only to provide for their families and deny businesses willing workers and invite chaos at our border. It is time for an immigration policy that permits temporary guest workers to fill jobs Americans will not take, that rejects amnesty, that tells us who is entering and leaving our coun- try, and that closes the border to drug dealers and terrorists .

The issue of immigration reform has been simmering throughout the Bush presidency . When the president first assumed office four years ago, it was already clear to most observers that U.S. immigration policy toward Mexico was not working. Despite a massive buildup of enforcement resources along the border, Mexican immigration continued apace throughout the 1990s, and the undocumented population grew at an unprecedented rate, enabling Hispanics to overtake African Americans as the nation's largest minority much sooner than Census Bureau demogra- phers had predicted? It was not surprising, therefore, that early in its first term the Bush administration began high-level talks on immigration reform with officials in the newly

2

elected government of Mexican president Vicente Fox .

By the summer of 2001, the discussions were inching toward a consensus that involved some kind of legalization program and a tem- porary work visa for Mexican citizens.' The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, how- ever, pushed immigration reform and Mexico to the back burner of administration concerns . The inability of president Fox to negotiate a labor accord with the United States under- mined his political position domestically, led to the early resignation of his foreign minister, and contributed to electoral losses for his party during the midterm elections of 2003 . Meanwhile, the problems associated with undocumented migration continued to fester

The Bush administration finally renamed to the issue of immigration reform in 2004 . In a January 7, 2004, speech at the White House, the president proposed creating a large tempo- rary worker program to legalize present undoc- umented migrants and accommodate new entrants in the future . He would grant renew- able three-year work visas to employers, which would enable them to hire workers from Mexico and other countries when suitable U.S . workers could not be found Undocumented migrants living in the United States would be required to pay a one-time registration fee to be eligible for the visa, but those who were still abroad could register free of charge . The three- year visa would be renewable, and, if in the course of working in the United States a work- er accumulated ties and characteristics that qualified him or her for permanent residence, he or she could apply for a green card confer- ring permanent resident status. Although the supply of residence visas would be increased to handle such applications, special credits and incentives would be implemented to encourage the return of temporary workers .'

The president's proposal did not contain specifics on the number of temporary worker visas or new green cards to be authorized, but his announcement set in motion a flurry of alternative proposals for reform, including bills introduced by Sens . McCain, Kennedy, Hagel, Daschle, Craig, and Cornyn, as well as Reps .

Pelosi, Cannon, Flake, Kolbe, and Gutierrez .° Paso, followed by Operation Gatekeeper in San Although none of those proposals made Diego. Those operations mobilized massive progress in 2004, after the elections President resources, in two border sectors to prevent Bush restated his commitment to achieving undocumented border crossings

e immigration reform in his second term .

Thereafter the United States pursued an To lay the groundwork for a reasoned con- increasingly contradictory set of policies, rowing

sideration of policy options, this study toward integration while insisting on separation, describes how the United States got into its moving headlong toward the consolidation of all current predicament with respect to Mexican North American markets save one: labor. In immigration. It then outlines the sorts of poll- order to maintain the pretense that such selective des that that must be implemented if we are to integration could be achieved and to demon- get out

strate that the border was "under control," the US. government devoted increasing financial and human resources to a show of force along the

Roots of the Current Problem Mexico-US. border, a repressive impulse that only increased in the wake of September 11 .

The year 1986 was pivotal for the political Unfortunately, those measures have not deterred economy of North America Two things hap- Mexicans from coming to die United States or pened in that year that signaled the end of one prevented them from settling her c .' era and the beginning of another. In Mexico, a new political elite succeeded in overcoming his- Moving toward Integration torical opposition within the ruling party to The adoption of economic reforms in secure the country's entry into the General Mexico in 1986 accelerated cross-border flows Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAFF) . of all sorts, and those flows increased dramati- Building on that initiative, President Carlos cally after NAFTA took effect in 1994 . Saunas approached the United States in 1988 to Consider, for example, trends in total trade make the economic reforms permanent by forg- between Mexico and the United States . From ing a continentwide alliance to create a free trade 1986 to 2003 total trade between the two zone stretching from Central America to the nations increased by a factor of eight, reaching Arctic, which ultimately resulted in the North $235 billion."Over the same period, the num- American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) .r

ber of Mexicans entering the United States on While trade liberalization took a step for- business visas more than tripled, from 128,000

ward in 1986, labor market mobility took a step to 438,000 annually, while the number of intra- backward. Even as U.S . officials worked with company transferees rose even more rapidly, Mexican authorities to integrate North from 4,300 to 16,000. From just 73 Mexican American markets for goods, capital, informa- "treaty investors" in 1986 the number grew lion, raw materials, and services, they simulta- exponentially to 4,700 persons in 2003 . (Treaty neously aced to prevent the integration of investors manage operations of an enterprise Mexican and American labor markets . Rather within the United States in which they are an than incorporating the movement of workers active investor.) " into the new free trade agreement, the US gov- This growth of trade and business migration ernment sought to unilaterally restrict the was accompanied by an expansion of other movement ofworkers .To underscore its resolve, cross-border movements. Over the same period, in 1986 Congress passed die Immigration the number of Mexican tourists entering the Reform and Control Act, which criminalized United States increased six-fold to 3 .6 million, the hiring of undocumented workers by U.S. while the number entering the United States as employers and increased funding for the U.S . students doubled to 22,500, and the number of Border PatroL Then, in 1993, Border Patrol educational and cultural exchange visitors more

officials launched Operation Blockade in El than doubled, from about 3,000 to 6,600. 12 The

3

Even as U.S. offi- cials worked with Mexican authori- ties to integrate North American markets, they simultaneously acted to prevent the integration of Mexican and American labor markets .

Between 1986 and 1996, Congress and

the president undertook a

remarkable series of actions to reassure citizens that they

were working hard to "regain control"

of the U.S: Mexican border.

total number of individual border crossings by car, bus, vain, and on foot also grew rapidly, ris- ing from 114 million in 1986 to more than 290 million in 2000. Owing to the events of September 11, 2001, and the US. economic recession, the number of border crossings fell between 2000 and 2002, but they were still 1 .7 times higher than their level in 1986?

Insisting on Separation As the foregoing figures indicate, evidence

for the ongoing integration of the North American economy is abundant, concrete, and compelling. As envisioned by the proponents of NAFTA, cross-border movements of people, goods, and services have grown rapidly along a variety of fronts . Although the United States has committed itself to integrating most markets in North America, however, it has paradoxically sought to prevent the integration of its labor markets. Indeed, since 1986 the United States has embarked on a determined effort to restrict Mexican immigration and tighten border enforcement, an effort that intensified around 1994, just as NAFTA took effect.

During the 1980s, border control was framed by U.S. politicians as an issue of"national secu- rity," and illegal migration was portrayed as an "alien invasion." As a result, between 1986 and 1996, the Congress and the president undertook a remarkable series of actions to reassure citizens that they were working hard to "regain control" of theUS.-Mexican borderM 'Me arrival of the new era was heralded by the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in October 1986.

As advocated by its proponents, IRCA sought to combat undocumented migration in four ways . To eliminate the attraction of U.S. jobs, it imposed sanctions on employers who hired undocumented workers . To deter undoc- umented migrants from entering the country, it allocated additional resources to the Border Patrol. To wipe the slate dean and begin afresh, it authorized an amnesty for undocumented migrants who could prove five years of contin- uous residence in the United States and a legal- ization program for migrant farm workers . Finally, IRCA gave the president new authori-

ty to declare an "immigration emergency" if large numbers of undocumented migrants had embarked or were soon expected to embark for the United States."

Despite expectations that IRCA would somehow, slow unsanctioned Mcdcan immigra- tion, both legal and illegal migration from Mexico still rose, and Congress returned to the drawing board in 1990 to pass another revision of U.S. immigration law. That legislation focused strongly on border control and autho- rized funds for the hiring of additional Border Patrol officers." Early in the Clinton adminis- nation (1993-94), the Immigration and Naturalization Service developed a new border strategy that took full advantage of this increased funding. Known as "prevention through deterrence," the strategy aimed to pre- vent Mexicans from crossing the border so that they would not have to be deported later . The strategy had its origins in September 1993, when the Border Patrol chief in El Paso launched "Operation Blockade"-an all-out effort to prevent illegal border crossing within that sector." Within a few months, immigrants had been induced to go around the imposing wall of enforcement, and traffic through El Paso itself was reduced to a trickle ."

Officials in Washington took note of the favorable outcome in El Paso and incorporated the operation into the Border Patrol's national strategic plan for 1994 . In October of that year, a second border mobilization was authorized for the busiest sector in San Diego . "Operation Gatekeeper" installed high-intensity flood- lights to illuminate the border day and night and built an eight-foot steel fence along 14 miles of border from the Pacific Ocean to the foothills of the Coastal Range . Border Patrol officers were stationed every few hundred yards behind this formidable steel wall, and a new array of sophisticated hardware was deployed in the no man's land it ficed'a

This buildup of enforcement resources was further accelerated by Congress when it passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 . Once again, the leg- islation focused heavily on deterrence, authoriz- ing funds for the construction of two additional

layers of fencing in San Diego and enacting that posed no conceivable strategic threat to the tougher penalties for smugglers, undocumented country and was, in fact, an ally and a large toad- migrants, and visitors who entered the country ing partner. Despite the fact that politicians sold legally but then overstayed their visas. It also NAFTA as a ova, for Mexico "to export goods included funding for the purchase of new mill- and not people," everything that occurs in the tary technology and provided funds for hiring course of integrating the North American market 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year through rakes the cross-border movement of people- 2001 to bring the total strength of the Border including workers-more rather than less likely Patrol up to 10,000 officers .

20

in the short and medium run . The expanding In 1986 the budget of the Immigration and binational netunrk of transportation and com-

Naturalization Service stood at just $474 mil- munication that evolves to facilitate trade also lion, and that of the Border Patrol was $151 makes the movement of people easier and cheap- million. IRCA began a modest acceleration of er. The interpersonal connections formed funding for border enforcement, but it was the between Mexicans and Americans in the course innovation of border blockades in 1993 that of daily business transactions create a social infra- really opened the spigot of money. By 2002 the structure offiiendship and kinship that encourage Border Patrol's budget had reached $1 .6 billion migration and facilitate further movement. and that of the INS stood at $6 .2 billion, 10

Moreover, it is not as if there were no move- and 13 nines their 1986 values, respectively . meets of migrants across the border when With this additional revenue, more Border NAFTA took effea . Large-scale migration Patrol officers were hired. Between 1986 and from Mexico has been a fact of life in North 2002 the number of Border Patrol officers America since 1942, when the United States tripled, and the number of hours they spent initiated the bracero guest worker program that patrolling the border ("linewatch hours") grew lasted 22 years .$° That program ultimately spon- by a factor of about eight 23

Bored the short-term entry of nearly five million workers, and when it was shut down in 1964,

The Consequences of

movement continued through other channels .

Contradiction

Thousands of former guest workers simply adjusted status to acquire permanent resident

As the foregoing data clearly show, the 1990s visas, and a growing number migrated without were a period of growing self-contradiction in documents . From 1942 to the present, the circu- U. S. policy toward Mexico. On the one hand, lation of labor between Me,dco and the United under NAFTA the United States committed States has been widespread and continuous . By itself to lowering barriers to the cross-border the end of the 20th century, two-thirds of all movement of goods, capital, raw materials, Mexicans knew someone who had been to the information, and services. As a result, the vol- United States and almost 60 percent were none ofbinationaltrade increased dramatically as socially connected to someone living in the did cross-border movements of people. On the United States n other hand, the United States attempted to This huge stock of social capital connecting harden the border against the movement of people in Mexico to destinations in the United labor by criminalizing the hiring of undocu- States, combined with the acceleration of eco- menred workers and fortifying the frontier with nomic integration along multiple fronts, pre- massive increases in money, personnel, and sents a huge obstacle for U.S. efforts to seal the equipment. By 2002 the Border Patrol was the border selectively with respect to the move- largest am s-bearing branch of the U.S govem- ment of workers.That the policywould fail was ment next to the military itself 'a almost preordained and should not be surpris-

Few in Washington stopped to consider the ing to anyone who understands the nature of fundamental contradiction involved in militariz- markets and their integration over time and ing a long border with a friendly, peaceful nation across international borders . What many do

5

Few in Washington stopped to consider the fundamental contradiction involved in milita- rizing a long border with a friendly, peaceful nation that posed no conceiv- able strategic threat to the country:

The fundamental weakness of

blockading particu- lar sectors of the

Mexican border is that there are always other, less-defended sectors within which

to cross.

not realize, however, is that U .S . policies have not simply failed: they have backfired-bring- ing about outcomes precisely opposite those they originally sought to achieve . Not only have U.S. policies failed to deter Mexicans from migrating to the United States, they have promoted a more rapid growth of the nation's undocumented population.

Failed Deterrence The fundamental weakness of blockading

particular sectors of the Mexican border is that there are always other less-defended sectors within which to cross. The mobilization of enforcement resources in El Paso and San Diego simply diverted the flows into Arizona, causing U.S. authorities to launch newblockades there, which channeled movement into New Mexico and the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, bringing about a mobilization of enforcement resources in those sectors?" Because the border is 2,000 miles long, systematically blockading this length in the manner of San Diego or El Paso would be prohibitively expensive .

Ultimately, the net effect of the border block- ades has been to push undocumented Mexican migrants into crossing at more remote and less accessible locations in mountains, deserts, and untamed sections of the Rio Grande River . The tragic result for undocumented migrants has been a tripling of their death rare during entry.r' But if migrants are more likely to die while crossing remote sectors of the border, they are also less likely to be caught, and a less-known consequence of US . border policy has been that it has decreased the odds that undocumented Mexican migrants are apprehended while attempting to enter the United States .28

Since 1982 the Mexican Migration Project (now based at Princeton University) has under- taken representative surveys of Mexican com- munities and their U.S. destination areas to cre- ate a database of detailed information on the characteristics and behavior of documented and undocumented migrants. At present, the MMP database contains surveys of 93 binational com- munities, yielding detailed information on 16,840 households." Each head of household with migratory experience in the United States

6

is interviewed to obtain a complete history of border crossings, where the crossings occurred, and the number of attempted entries and appre- hensions that took place.

Figure 1 draws on these data to show trends in the locations of border crossings and the probability of apprehension among undocu- mented Mexican migrations from 1980 to 2002, the latest year for which reliable esti- mates are available . 46 From 1980 through 1987, the proportion of migrants crossing in either Tijuana-San Diego or Juarez-El Paso increased By 1988 around 70 percent of all border crossings occurred within these two "traditional" sectors . The increased enforce- ment at the border begun by IRCA in 1986 was naturally aimed at those high-volume points of entry, a tendency that was amplified in 1993-94 with the launching of various blockades. As a result, beginning in 1988 the proportion of migrants trussing at nontradi- tional sectors along the border rose steadily from 29 percent to reach 64 percent in 2002 . Undocumented migrants simply went around the hardened sectors of the border.

Through the 1970s and early 1980s, the probability of apprehension along the border was relatively steady, averaging about 33 per- cent31 Thereafter, the probability of apprehen- sion fell into the 20 to 30 percent range, and following the implementation of Blockade and Gatekeeper in 1993 and 1994, the likelihood of arrest plummeted. By 2002 the probability of apprehension had reached an all-time low of just 5 percent . Rather than increasing the odds of apprehension, U .S. border policies have reduced them to record lows .

Given this fact, it is not surprising that U.S. border policies have had little detectable effect in deterring undocumented migrants from leaving for the United States in the first place . According to MMP data on the probability that Mexican men and women took a first trip to the United States from 1980 onward, there is little evidence in either series that the border buildup has dissuaded undocumented Mexicans from heading northward . There is considerable tem- poral variation in the Trend for males, whose probabilities of making a fast attempt to enter

Figure 1 Trends in Use of Nontraditional Crossing Points and Probability of Apprehension, 1980-2002

Probability of Apprehension

- - Proportion of Nontraditional Crossings

70% 1

60/a IRCA Enacted y 50% -

40% -

-~

t0%-

Operation Blockade Launched in El Paso

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992

Douglas S Mersey, Jmge Dmand and Nolan J . Merlons, BejardSmoke and Minors Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 2012), pp. 307 and 128 ; and con,putatious by the author using Mexican Migration Ponied data

I

1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

the United States illegally fluctuate between 1 .5 ing than ever before. The combination of huge and 2.5 percent, with variations being closely budget increases with rising migration rates sug- bed to economic conditions on both sides of the gests a marked deterioration in the efficiency of border." Although the likelihood of female U.S border enforcement operations . American migration is much lower, the trend is virtually taxpayers are spending vastly more to achieve lit-

de in the way of deterrence and much less in the way of arrests along the border .

One measure of the efficiency of enforcement is the cost of arresting one undocumented migrant, estimated by dividing the Border Patrol's annual budget by the number of apprehensions achieved along the Mexico-US. border. Before 1986 the cost of one apprehension was roughly constant at around $100 per arrest. Beginning with the passage of IRCA in 1986, however, the cost of enforcement began to rise, tri ' o around $300 per arrest in 1989 before stabilizing for a time . Beginning with the launching ofoper- ations Blockade and Gatekeeper in 1993 and 1994, however, the cost of making one arrest immediately jumped to more than $400 and then gradually trended upward to reach $600 in 1999. The events of September 11, 2001, brought another huge infusion of resources to the Border Patrol that was in no way connected to the threat of either terrorism or undocumented migration

fat The available data thus indicate that the

inflow ofundocumented migrants from Mexico continues apace, albeit with variations linked to economic cycles, but that once they are at the border the odds of being apprehended are much lower. As a result, more undocumented migrants am gaining entry to the United States than ever before. Over the same time period, legal immi- gration from Mexico has also grown, despite measures enacted by Congress to make it more

cult to qualify, for documents and to reduce the rights and privileges of legal immigrants once they are here .

Wasted Money Thus, although the size of the Border Patrol's

budget increased by a factor of 10 between 1986 and 2002, and the number of Border Patrol agents has tripled, more Mexican migrants- both documented and undocumented--are arriv-

7

0%

Rather than increasing the odds of apprehension, U.S. border policies have reduced them to record lows .

Whereas the cost of

making one arrest

along the border

stood at just $300 in

1992,10 years later

it reached $1,700,

an increase of 467

percent in just a

decade.

emanating from south of the border, and the mar- ginal cost of apprehension skyrocketed . Whereas the cost of making one unrest along the border stood at just $300 in 1992, 10 years later it reached $1,700, an increase of 467 percent in just a decade . 3

If this increase in the cost of enforcement, high as it was, had slowed the flow of undocu- mented migrants, one might consider it money well spent. But as we have already seen, in 2002 the probability of apprehension was lower than at any point in the modem history of Mexico- U.S. migration, and the number of Mexicans entering the United States was greater than ever. Whatever one thinks about the goal of reducing migration from Mexico, US . policies toward that end have clearly failed, and at great cost to U.S. taxpayers . The allocation of funds to border enforcement since 1986 has resulted in the waste of billions of dollars .

Dam presented so far have shown that despite massive increases in the personnel and budget devoted to border enforcement and congressional actions undertaken to discourage legal immigration, the number of legal and ille- gal entries from Mexco has continued to grow, implying the waste of billions of dollars (not to mention hundreds of lives each year) in the futile effort to prevent the movement of labor within a rapidly integrating North American economy. As grim as this assessment may be, it gets worse . Not only have U.S . policies failed to reduce the inflow of people from Mexico, they have perversely reduced the outflow to produce an unprecedented increase in the undocument- ed population of the United States' America's unilateral effort to prevent a decades-old flow from continuing has paradoxically transformed a circular flow of Mexican workers into a set- tled population of families and dependents .

More Settlement The unilateral militarization of the U.S .-

Mexican border has been successful in achiev- ing one outcome : it has dramatically increased the costs and risks of border crossing . By chan- neling undocumented flows into remote and more hazardous regions of the border, the bor- der blockades have tripled the risk of death

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during crossing. The increased mortal danger was offset, however, by a declining likelihood of apprehension, so that few migrants were deterred from making the attempt.

Rather than choosing not to enter the United States illegally, undocumented migrants quite rationally invested more money to minimize the risks and maximize the odds of a successful bor- der crossing. As U.S. authorities deployed a more formidable array of personnel and materiel at key points along the border, smugglers on the Mexican side upgraded the package of services they offered . Instead of simply accompanying small parties of undocumented migrants on foot across well-trod pathways from Tijuana to San Diego and delivering them to an anonymous urban setting, smugglers now had to transport people to remote sectors of the border, guide them across, and have them met on the other side by personnel who would arrange transport to destinations throughout the United States

The net effect of U.S. policies, in other words, was to increase the quality but also the price of border-smuggling services .' After the various blockades were launched, undocu- mented migrants faced rising out-of-pocket costs to ensure a successful border crossing. The extent of this increase is indicated by esti- mates of the average amount of money that undocumented migrants paid someone to smuggle them into the United States by year."

From 1980 to 1992 the cost of hiring a coyote, or pollera (as smugglers are colloquially labeled) was relatively flat, averaging around $400 per crossing. With the launching of the new strat- egy of prevention through deterrence in 1993, however, the cost of purchasing a smuggler's services rose to around $1,200 in 1999, before leveling off.

Compared to 1990 and before, in other words, by the year 2000 it cost undocumented migrants three times as much to gain entry to the United States . If the first order of business on any trip to the United States is to recover that cost, then holding constant the rate of remuneration and hours worked per week, the stay would have to be three times as long . Although beefing up the Border Patrol may not have reduced the inflow, therefore, it did

Figure 2 Probability of Returning to Mexico within 12 Months of Entry, 1980-2001

Source: Computations by author fmm Mexican Migration Project data tmnp .oprprinceton .edu/.

substantially increase the length of trips to entering the United States each year after 1986 reduce the outflow. Another way of viewing the remained constant or was increasing, as the cvi- increase in trip lengths is in terms of a decline dence suggests, and probability of return in the probability of return migration : fewer migration was simultaneously falling, then only migrants return within one year of their origi- one outcome is possible : a sharp increase in the nal entry. This fact is illustrated in Figure 2, size of the undocumented population living in which uses MMP data to compute the raw the United States at any point in time . In probability of returning to Mexico within 12 demographic terms, if the number of entries to months of entry. a population persists or grows while the num-

As can be seen, before IRCA the annual her of exits falls, the size of that population can likelihood of return migration fluctuated only grow. between 40 percent and 50 percent with no The growth in the size of the Mexican pop- clear trend. After 1986, however, there was a ulation of the United States as recorded by the steady, sustained decline in the likelihood of U .S. Bureau of the Census is shown in Figure return migration, which bottoms out at 24 per- 3. From 1980 through the mid 1990s, the cent in 1996 and begins to oscillate. Roughly Mexican population of the United States grew speaking, the average probability of return at a steady if rapid rate, roughly tripling in the migration went from around 45 percent before 15 years from 1980 to 1995 . After 1990 the IRCA to around 25 percent today. If 1,000 trend accelerated, with the population growing migrants were to enter the United States each from 7 million in 1997 to around 10 million in year at the former rate, 950 (or 95 percent) 2002, an increase of 43 percent in just five would be back in Mexico within five years and years . After results from the 2000 U .S. census the average length of trip would be 1 .7 years . were published, it was evident that Hispanics At the latter rate, of 1,000 migrants who had overtaken blacks to become the nations entered the United States within a given year, largest minority far earlier than most demogra- only 763 (or 76 percent) would have returned phers had predicted . Ironically, the U.S. gov- to Mexico within five years, and the average ernment's concerted effort to stop Mexican trip duration would have grown to 3 .5 years . migration at the border has been a major con-

If the number of undocumented Mexicans tributor to that developent .

9

The average proba- bility of return migration went from around 45 percent before IRCA to around 25 percent today.

President Bush's policy proposals are

a step in the right direction, but a tentative step .

Figure 3 Number of Mexicans in the United States, 1980-2002

IRCA Enacted -*

0 - I

Operation Blockade Launched in El Paso

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

Source : U.5 . Census Bureau, Foreign Born Population Database .

How to Curb Illegal Immigration

President Bush's policy proposals are a step in the right direction, but a tentative step . Moreover, the proposals are vague about the numbers of immigrants eligible for the various programs of legalization and temporary labor . But there is a set of policies that could reduce the disincentives that prevent Mexicans from returning to their home country, minimize the costs of migration to US citizens, maximize the potential of migrant remittances to promote economic growth in Mexicq and reduce the cost in lives and money of U.S. border enforcement s'

Specifically, in order to bring current flows of Mexican labor into the open, Congress should create a new category oftemporaryvisa that per- mits the bearer to enter, live, and work in the country without resaiction for two years, with an option for renewal once in the lifetime of the migrant, but only after he or she has returned home. The visas would be issued to persons and not tied to specific jobs . Such a program would guarantee the rights of temporary migrants, pro- tect the interests of American workers, and sat- isfy the demands of employers by moving toward a relatively, free and open North American labor market.

These new visas should be generously avail- able to residents of Canada and Mexico . If

1 0

300,000 two-year visas were issued annually, there would be 600,000 temporary migrants working in the United States at any time, a small share of the U.S. workforce but a large fraction of undocumented migrants . Moreover, the U.S . government should charge a $400 fee to migrants for each visa issued, to be paid up- front in cash or in low-interest installments from the migrants U.S. earnings . This money could be used far the benefit of the migrants them- selves, in ways described below. The data pre- sented above indicate that migrants are perfect- ly willing to pay this amount to gain entry to the United States, but until now the money has gone into the pockets of border smugglers rather than toward more beneficial purposes. A $400 fee paid by 300,000 temporary migrants per year would yield annual revenues of $120 million .

As an additional source of revenue, the gov- ernment could earmark federal taxes (Social Security, Medicare, and income taxes) withheld from the paychecks of temporary migrants for immigration-related initiatives. If 600,000 tem- porary migrants were to earn annual incomes of just $15,000 and have taxes withheld at a rare of 25 percent, the annual revenues would be $225 million per year. Additional resources could be freed by reducing the personnel and resources devoted to border enforcement . There is no evi- dence whatsoever that the costly expansion of Border Patrol personnel has raised the odds of

12 .000

10.000

9 8.000 w 0 6.000

4 .000

2,000

apprehension or prevented the entry ofundocu- gram is in order . Undocumented migrants oriented migrants, but the human costs in terms who have stayed out of trouble and lack a of injury and death have been great . The Border criminal record would be allowed to come Patrol would be equally effective, more efficient forward and register for temporary legal stat- and violate fewer human rights with a smaller us and then allocated points for number of number of officers assigned to the border. If years spent in the United States, taxes paid, workers could enter the United States through public services rendered, U .S. children born, an orderly and legal process at the traditional and so on . Those accumulating a certain urban entry points, Border Patrol personnel threshold of points at the time of legalization could train a higher share of their remaining or at some point in the future would be resources on apprehending criminals, potential admitted into permanent resident status . terrorists, and others who would try to sneak

Among the undocumented population are across the border rather than enter legally .

some 2 to 3 million children of undocumented It is also imperative to increase the number of migrants who entered as minors and are guilty

permanent resident visas available to Mexicans of nothing more than obeying their parents to100,000peryearThecurrent quota of20,000 and remaining loyal to their families .The over- visas for a nation to which we are so closely whelming majority of these people have grown bound by history, geography, and treaty is up in the United States, attended U .S. schools, absurdly low, yielding excessively long waiting and stayed out of trouble . Such people deserve times for many legally qualified immigrants and an immediate amnesty so that they can pursue virtually guaranteeing undocumented move- their lives in the United States as Americans . ment. At the same time, however, the U .S. gov- Undocumented status constitutes an imperme- emment should eliminate the preference catego- able barrier to mobility, blocking access to good ry that confers rights of entry on brothers and jobs and higher education for people who have sisters of U.S. citizens, an unnecessary provision grown up American and broken no law . The that is more responsible than any other feature longer the children of unauthorized migrants of U.S. immigration law for reinforcing the languish without documents, the more prob- process of chain migration that propels so much lems we create for ourselves down the road . of the immigration from Mexico .

The foregoing suggestions go beyond what Any legislation to reform immigration will President Bush has proposed but are not so dis-

be incomplete if it does not address the esti- tantfrom reforms broached by senators and rep- mated 10 million or more people already liv- restoratives in the wake of the president's ing in the United States who do not have announcement. If enacted, these policy reforms legal documents . Adults who made a willful will not eliminate undocumented migration decision to violate U.S. immigration laws and from Mexico, of course, nor solve all ofthe prob- enter the United States do not deserve a lems associated with it "They will, however, blanket amnesty, but neither do they deserve reverse the deleterious consequences of our cur- summary deportation . Violations of U.S . rent policies by eliminating the black market in immigration law are civil infractions, not immigrant labor, minimizing the long-term set- criminal acts, and most violators are guilty dement of Mexican immigrants, encouraging only of seeking to improve the welfare of the repatriation of capital and people to Mexico, themselves and their families by taking jobs promoting economic growth within migrant- that few Americans want . Since arriving in sending communities, and overcoming the pre- the United States, many have become parents vailing weaknesses in Mexican capital, credit, of U.S. citizens and their continued illegality and insurance markets. acts as a hindrance to their children's

In the short run, the disruptions that follow prospects in the country of their birth. For from the consolidation of the North American undocumented migrants who entered as market will continue to produce migrants to adults, some kind of earned legalization pro- the United States, but long-term economic

Adults who made a willful decision to violate U,S. immigration laws and enter the United States do not deserve a blanket amnesty, but neither do they deserve summary deportation .

The record of the past two decades

demonstrates that merely enforcing

current U.S . immigration law is

bound to fail .

growth and development within Mexico will gradually eliminate most of the incentives for international migration . We should seek not to stamp out the inevitable migratory flows but to help Mexico get over what Philip Martin at the University of California at Davis calls the "migration hump" as quickly and painlessly as possible. This will move North America toward a more balanced economy in which fewer Mexicans will experience the need to migrate northward."

Conclusion

If the United States had set out to design a dysfunctional immigration policy, it could hardly have done a better job than what it did between 1986 and the present. U.S. citizens have seen billions of their tax dollars wasted on fruitless efforts at border enforcement as the efficiency of Border Patrol operations reached all-time lows. Despite its extravagance, the expensive post-IRCA enforcement regime had no detectable effect either in deterring undoc- umented migrants from coming to the United States or raising their probability of apprehen- sion at the border. Indeed, the probability of apprehension has never been lower .

The record of the past two decades demon- strates that merely enforcing current U .S . immigration law is bound to fail. Current law itself is fundamentally at odds with the reality of the North American economy and labor market. As long as that remains me, enforce- ment alone will fail to stem the flow and growth of illegal immigration to the United States . U.S. policies have been effective, however,

in causing hundreds of migrant deaths each year and dramatically increasing the out-of- pocket monetary costs of border crossing . These "successes," however, have not had the desired effect. They have only increased the length of trips to the United States and low- ered the probability of return migration, there- by transforming a circular movement of work- ers into a settled population of families. Fueled by plummeting rates of return, migration

12

among undocumented migrants, and the rapid growth of legal immigration sponsored by newly naturalized citizens, the Mexican popu- lation in the United States grew at unprece- dented rates during the past decade.

Thus, repressive U.S. immigration and bor- der policies toward Mexico have backfired, producing more rather than less Mexican pop- ulation growth in the United States . This para- doxical outcome stems from the unwillingness of the United States to accept the reality of North American integration. In NAFTA the nation committed itself to a joint framework for the continentwide integration of markets for goods, capital, information, commodities, and services; but since then it has refused to recognize the inevitable fact that labor markets will also merge in an integrated economy. In practical if not logical terms, it is impossible to create a single North American market charac- terized by the free movement of all factors of production except one .

Rather than bringing labor migration into the open and managing the inevitable flows in ways that might maximize the benefits and minimize the costs, the United States has employed increasingly repressive means and growing amounts of money to drive the flows underground to maintain the illusion of a "con- trolled" border-one that is miraculously porous with respect to all movements except those of labor. Maintaining this pretense, how- ever, has become increasingly costly. The time is thus ripe for the United States to abandon its illusions and to accept the reality, indeed the necessity, of North American integration .

Notes 1 . Jeffrey S. Passel, "Fsrimates of the Size and Characteristics ofthe Undocumented Population," Pew Hispanic Center, Match 21, 2005, p . 2.

2. The White House, "The State of the Union Address," February 2, 2005, wwwwhitehouse.gov /news/releas es/2005/02/20050202-11 .heral .

3 . Douglas S . Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke And Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era ofEconomic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), p . 133.

4 . Jorge Durand and Douglas S . Massey, "Borderline Sanity," American Prospect 12, no . 17 (September 23, 2001): 28-31 .

5. The White House, "President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program," release January7,2004, www.whitehouse .gov/news/releases/2004/01 / 20040107-3htmL

6. Geoff Earle, "Hagel Joins Daschle on Bill: Republican Dimes Snub to Bush on Immigration Policy," The Hill, January 14, 2004, wwwhdlnew, tom/news/011404/IwgeLasp c' ItnmigtantAdwates React to Kolbe-Flake-McCairs Immigration Reform Measure,' National Immigration Forum, July 25, 2003, wa'wirmnigationforum.org/Desktop Default aspx?rabid-238

7. William A.Orme,UnderstandingNAFTA:Mexico, Free Trade, and the New North America (Austin : University of Texas Press, 1996) .

8. Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 73-104 .

9. Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey, 'The Costs of Contradiction : U .S. Immigration Policy 1986-2000," iatino Studies, July 2003, pp.233-52 .

10. U.S. Department of Commerce, "U.S . International Trade in Goods and Services : Annual Revision for 2003," Exhibit 13, p. 20, www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-R e ease/ 2003 pr/futal-revisions.

11. For 1986 figures, see Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 81-83. For 2003 figures, see Department of Homeland Security, 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statima, Office of Immigration Statistics, September 2004, Table 23, pp . 89-100 .

12. Ibid .

13. Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 81-82 .

14. Timothy J. Dunn, Tb1 MdtarttNion ofthe Meow U.S Bonier 1978-1992. Low harp ty Confba Doctrine Comes Manic (Austin : UniwhityofTeex Pres55 1996)

15. Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 89-90 .

16. Ibid ., pp. 91-92 .

17.) osephNevins, Openmon Gatekeeper The Rise of the "Illegal Alien" an Making ofthe U.S. Mexico Boundary (New York Routledge, 2002) .

18. Frank R Bean, R G . Chanove, R G . Cushing, et a1, Illegal Mexican Migration and the United States Border The Effects of Operation-Hold-the-Lne on El Paso/Juarez (Austin, TX: Population Research Center, University of Texas-Austin, 1994) .

19. Nevins, pp. 61-94 .

1 3

20. Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp . 95-96 .

21. Ibid ., pp . 96-98 .

22. Peter Andreas, "The Escalation of U .S . Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era," Political Science Quanerty 113(1998): 591-601 .

23. Peter Brownfeld,"NAFTA Gets Mixed Reviews after 10 Years," Fox News Channel, December 18, 2003, www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,10605 6 ,00.hrml

24. Kitty Calavica, Inside the State : The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the INS. (New York Routledge, 1992) .

25. Douglas S . Massey and Julie A . Phillips, "Engines of Immigration : Stocks of Human and Social Capital in Mexico," Social Science Quarterly 81(1999) :33-48.

26. Peter Andrea, Bonier Games: Policing the US Mexco Divide (hhaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp . 85-114 .

27. Karl Eschbach, Jacqueline Hagan, et al ., "Death at the Border," International Migration Review 33 (1999) : 430-54 ; see also Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp . 113-14 .

28. Douglas S. Massey and Audny Singer, "New Estimates of Undocumented Mexican Migration and the Probability of Apprehension," Demography 32 (1995) :203-13,

29. Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey, "Appendix: The Mexican Migration Project," in Jorge Durand and Douglas S . Massey, eds ., Crossing the Border: Research from the Mexican Migration Project (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), pp, 321-36 .

30. See Massey, Durand, and Malone, p. 107; and Mexican Migration Project, mmp.opr.prince t on.edu/.

31. Thomas J. Espenshade, "Undocumented Migration to die United States: Evidence from a Repeated Trials Model," in Frank D . Bean, Barry Edmonton, and Jeffrey S . Passel, eds ., (htdwimencd Mtgu wdeMnddSmhrIRCAanddhErpeSnrej4 1980s (Washington : Urban Institute, 1990), pp . 159-81;and1bomasJ. Espenshade,"DoestheThreat of Apprehension Deter Undocumented U.S . Immigation?' Population and Detdoprnent Review 20 (19941871-92

32. Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp. 110-12 .

33. Ibid ., pp .116-18 .

34. Ibid ., pp. 128-36 .

35. Audrey Singer and Douglas S . Massey, "The Social Process of Undocumented Border Crossing," IntenwtianalMigradon Reoiew 32 (1998) :561-92 .

36 See the Mexican Migration Project database, hap//mmp.opcptinceton .edu/ .

37. See Douglas S. Massey, "Much of Folly U .S . Immigration Policy under NAFTA," American

14

Prospect 37 (1998): 22-33; Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massy, "Borderline Sanity," pp. 28-31 ; and Massey, Durand, and Malone, pp . 142-64 .

38. Philip Martin, "Economic integration and Migation: The Mexico-US Case," World Institute for Development Economic Research, Discussion Paper no. 2003/35, pp . 9-13, www.wider .unu.edu/ publications/dps/dps2003/ dp2003-35 .pdf.

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Board of Advisers

Jagdish Bhagwati Columbia University

Donald J . Boudreaux George Mason University

James K. Glassman American Enterprise Institute

Douglas A . Irwin Dartmouth College

Lawrence Kudlow Kudlow & Co.

Jose Pinera International Center for Pension Reform

Russell Roberts George Mason University

Raze,, Sally London School of Economics

George P Shsihz Hoover Institution

Clayton Yeutter Former U.S . Trade Representative

CENTER FOR TRADE POLICY STUDIES

The mission of the Cato Institutes Center for Trade Policy Studies is to increase publicunderstanding of the benefits of free trade and the costs of protectionism . The center publishes briefing papers, policy analyses, and books and hosts frequent policy forums and conferences on the full range of trade policy issues .

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The center is part of the Cam Institute, an independent policy research organization in Washington, D.C. The Cato Institute pursues a broad-based research program rooted in the traditional American principles of individual liberty and limited government .

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