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Wearing "Our Sword": Post-September 11 Activism Among South Asian Muslim Women Student Organizations in New York Author(s): Etsuko Maruoka Source: Social Justice, Vol. 35, No. 2 (112), Asian American & Pacific Islander Population Struggles for Social Justice (2008), pp. 119-133 Published by: Social Justice/Global Options Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29768491 Accessed: 08-01-2018 19:42 UTC

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Wearing "Our Sword": Post-September 11 Activism Among South Asian Muslim Women Student Organizations in New York

At the time after September 11 happened, the campus was dominated by joking and all that stuff like, "Oh, you look like a terrorist, you dyke." It was like blame was imputed to us. So, it was very sad.... But for me, I think that the experience made me feel even stronger about our decision to wear the hijab outside.... If I had had to take my hijab off at that time, I would have become extremely weak and broken down.... You know, tak? ing off a hijab was like giving up our sword (Aisha, Pakistani-American college senior).1

H|he September 11 terrorist attacks and the consequent political ten sions profoundly affected the lives of many Muslim women residing in the

A United States. Those who wear the Islamic headscarf (or hijab) became an especially easy target for scapegoating, since this religious dress code had been seen as the most definable marker of the faith. Along with a dramatic increase in hate crimes targeting Muslim individuals and institutions, the local media and affiliated associations stressed a dramatic increase in human rights violations specifically targeting women. Such acts include the attempted forceful removal of their hijab and public taunting with ethnic aspersions.2 This swift rise of violence centering on this cultural practice has reasserted continuing racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism against ethnic minority women. Focusing on this striking challenge in

Muslim women's social lives, this article explores the forms of collective activism that these rigorously persecuted women develop against this social injustice. The examples presented here are based on the author's four-year ethnographic study of two student groups of South Asian Muslim women in two socio-geographically

Etsuko Maruoka

Etsuko M?ruoka is a Ph.D. candidate of the Department of Sociology at State University of New York at Stony Brook and an instructor of Sociology at Suffolk County Community College (e-mail: [email protected]). Her research and teaching interests are in the areas of gender, race, migration, Asian American studies, and the impact of the religious involvement of veiling on gender relations, assimilation, and family life among U.S.-born Muslim women. The author wishes to thank

Mr. Robert Donnelly for his comments and support, and Dr. Javier Auyero and Dr. Naomi Rosenthal for their incisive feedback.

Social Justice Vol. 35, No. 2 (2008) 119

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different campus communities in New York. By describing the process whereby members expand the meaning of their religious practice of veiling to a political one and use it as the major tool for their collective resistance, this article suggests how "being different" and "marginalized" becomes a significant, driving force for group mobility, solidarity, and strength in "identity movements" (Melucci, 1995, 1996; Alcoff, 2000,2005). According to Melucci, the women's movement is based on "the themes of identity and difference as an assertion of the priority of the right to be before the right to do and as a claim for a life-space in which to withdraw from the structures of social control" (1996: 136; emphasis added).

In the models of Goff man's study on stigma (1964) and the work of assimila? tion theorists, difference has typically been conceptualized as a point of weak? ness and frailty for ethnic minority groups (Gordon, 1964; Alba and Nee, 2005). Responding to this conformist view, Chin (2000) and Nagata's (2000) historical studies on Asian American women suggest that "difference" should be considered from the perspective of resiliency and strength, as well as the ability to cope with adversity. These findings concur with the recent increasing voice among scholars of Asian American feminism and "identity movements." As the above narrative, "taking off a hijab was like giving up our sword," metaphorically underlines, the women in this study are not simply resigned to the stigmatization of their religious practice; instead, they transform it into a symbol of might and dignity, as well as loyalty to other Muslim "sisters," asserting their right to be Muslim. Revealing such

women's perspectives toward their political action is especially important for the study of South Asian women and their identity movement by providing a window to see forthcoming issues, coping strategies, and boundary formation among future generations of South Asians.

(South) Asian American Women's Activism

Many scholars of women's movements have suggested that the strategies and views chosen by Asian women in their activism differ from those that white and Black women's groups embrace. In contrast to mainstream white women's leaders, who typically situate gender as the central agenda, many Asian women activists view gender as only one part of social relations (Shah, 1994; Purkayastha et al., 1997; Espiritu, 1997; Khandelwal, 2003). They are deeply committed to women's struggles for empowerment, as are white feminist groups. Yet, for them women's issues are inextricably linked to their community and to other societal obstacles that are mainly associated with their racial status. This suggests that sexism and racism are not parallel, but intersect and interact in their social experience.

Although the viewpoints of activist Asian women and Black women are simi? lar in terms of facing their gender and race issues, they are disparate in approach.

Whereas Black feminism primarily focuses on racial oppression and associated economic exploitation, recent Asian leaders stress women's issues in connection to cultural imperialism and discrimination, resulting in what they call "bicultural

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Po st-September 11 Activism Among South Asian Muslim Women 121

feminism" (Shah, 1994). The "the plea for bicultural feminism is," according to Shah, "a call for an agenda that subverts the black/white paradigms, articulates cultural discrimination and how it illuminates and connects to other processes of oppression, and politicizes the process of cultural reconciliation for feminism and liberation" (Ibid:. 155). It highlights the significance of understanding the struggles of women who physically and psychologically live in two (or sometimes more) different cultural worlds?one based on their ethnic traditions and the other on the

mainstream American system?due to their immigrant history, as well as racial and socioeconomic status (Tan, 1997).

For instance, George (2005) shows that Indian female nurses from Kerala, who emigrate before their husbands do, grapple with the reconstruction of gender and class relations in their marriage lives along with their professional achievement in the United States. Also, studies on the South Asian women's social movement

against marital violence describe the angst and trepidation women experience for taking their "private problem" outside their community, because by doing so they feel they are betraying members of their own ethnic group (Abraham, 1995; Chiang et al., 1997). With these unique circumstances in mind, Shah (1997) outlines the three agendas for Asian, and especially South Asian, women's activism: (1) to connect gender issues to immigration matters, cultural practice, and community representation; (2) to transcend the boundaries of more distinct identities, such as national origin and religion within its own community; and (3) to establish linkages between local and global feminism. The narratives of women presented in this article show some of the ways in which the younger generation of South Asian

Muslim women interpret, internalize, and embody "bicultural feminism" in their identity movement in the post-September 11 era.

Method

This study is part of a larger project on the identity reconstruction of second generation Muslim women. To examine the influence of local racial relations on coping strategies, I conducted my fieldwork with two groups of women associated with the Muslim Student Association (MSA) at two public universities in New York from December 2001 to 2005. One, which I call Eastern State University (EU), is located in an upper-middle-class suburban area, consisting predominantly of an established community of European-origin Christian families. The other, which I call Metro University (MU), is in a lower-middle-class metropolitan area and is mainly comprised of recent East and South Asian immigrant enclaves. Each group consists of about 50 religiously devout second-generation female college students. They are predominantly of South Asian origin, ranging from ages 18 to 23. Over 80% of them are Pakistani-origin, followed by Indian, Bangladeshi, and Afghan, along with a small number of Middle Easterners. Most of them are Shi'ite Muslim. In

each of the two areas, most of the group members are from middle-class immigrant families. However, EU does include some from extremely wealthy homes, while

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MU consists of some from working-class backgrounds. The overwhelming majority of both groups practice hijab daily. With few exceptions, members of both groups came from families in which veiling was not practiced by their mothers; most of them started the religious dress code after they joined these associations.3

The following sections illustrate the experiences of these women in the aftermath

of September 11, from their own perspectives. I then examine the coping strategies developed by each local group to realize their political and cultural resistance. After discussing their identity reconstruction, the article demonstrates how their sense of "difference" and "marginalization" promotes these particular political strategies, goals, and group boundary formation even more strongly within their identity of being an "American Muslim."

Views from under the Veil

After September 11, there were a lot of things that happened around us. The news said that some people tried to take off Muslim women's scarves and run them over with their cars. On campus, some guys tried to threaten us

in the same way. They chased after my friend and me, and tried to take off our scarves from their car. It happened more than once (Habiba, EU).

When my friend and I were walking on campus after September 11, some guys yelled at us, like "take off your scarf!" And a couple of them followed

right behind us. The other people looked at us and were all pretty much just giggling... (Sara, MU).

One of the brothers told me that he and his roommate overheard, while in

a laundry room in their dorm, that some guys were talking to each other like, "This Saturday night, Sunday night, or some other party night, we're gonna go out, rip those girls' scarves off, rip their clothes off, and rape them...." It was a scary time... We really got scared. So, we just stayed in our room and locked ourselves in (Zayda, EU).

These narratives describe what many women associated with the MSA expe? rienced after the destruction of the World Trade Center. As many as 35 of the 40 women I interviewed mentioned that they or their friends have on more than one occasion felt anxiety and fear about wearing the hijab in public after September 11. These stories outline the ways in which their religious dress code turned into a symbol of extreme stigma and a key in instigating widespread, racialized anti Islamic bombardment against Muslim women. Although some found significant support and even favor within their local areas, including being escorted by their

male counterparts and other non-Muslim volunteers, many were traumatized by their experience of physical and verbal violence, as well as psychological intimi? dation during this period.

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Post-September 11 Activism Among South Asian Muslim Women 123

Beyond the violent nature of these assaults, this backlash significantly shook the foundations and convictions of these women in their inherent American identity. Rohi at MU and Fahima at EU describe these experiences as follows:

A couple weeks after September 11,1 was driving my car in my neighbor? hood and stopped at a red light. The driver in the next lane glared at me, opened his car window, and suddenly yelled at me in a harsh voice, "What's wrong with you? Go back to your country!" ...I was really shocked and couldn't go out of my house for a while (Rohi, MU).

I hate it when people always say, "Go back to your country!" to me, es? pecially after September 11. What do they mean by that? I was born here. I don't have any place to go back to (Fahima, EU).

On both campuses, women I interviewed mentioned the phrase "Go back to your country!" as a common element of the verbal attacks they experienced. Many had been the recipients of insulting remarks before September 11, but the sudden increase in hostile reactions stigmatized them as "foreign enemies." According to

Amira from EU:

After September 11,1 tended to be a little bilious when I was walking outside, always thinking like, "Oh, somebody is looking at me and giving me a look again." It's funny because before September 11 people saw me and gave me a look, like "Oh, you are covered up. You have oppressed yourself, right?" or "Look at you! You look so pathetic. I'm sorry.... We feel so bad for you...." But after September 11, the attitude changed, all of a sudden, to antagonism. Now, people give me a look...like "We hate you!" And it hits my eyes.... It is sad...really sad.

Amira sensed that before September 11 some people viewed her as an op? pressed and therefore subservient woman. Thereafter, she believed, the veil made

her an object of hate. In the eyes of Amira (and many others), the altered public image toward her as a foreign enemy increased her social burdens and spurred her toward self-preservation. Individual experiences obviously vary, but women from both communities felt that wearing the hijab significantly increased their chances of becoming scapegoats and damaged their social lives and sense of self.

Action As a Living Billboard

My interviews with leaders of the two local groups suggested that the ongoing wave of social intimidation has led them to develop two major agendas: (1) to fight the anti-Islamic environment that violates the human rights of Muslim women, and (2) to promote solidarity in order to protect the members' individual and united interests. In their mission to accomplish these two political aims, leaders of both

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groups primarily saw the stigmatization of Muslim women as stemming from a basic ignorance and misunderstanding of Islam itself. Their representatives, Aisha and Faiza, stated in this regard:

One thing that has really been bothering me about our association is its increasingly insular nature after September 11. Some people have this idea that we are like a cult because of the media and just the way we look and pray.... And we are going to brainwash them. I think we really do need to reach out to non-Muslims a lot more now (Aisha, EU).

Some people yelled at us like, "Why are you wearing that? Take it off!" I usually find people who are more educated don't talk like that. I'm not trying to classify or anything, but in general it's usually people who have a fear because of some type of ignorance or lack of understanding of the religion itself that view us as different and weird and talk to us like that (Faiza, MU).

These narratives underline the two core strategies of these leaders. First, both groups chose to actively publicize "similarities" between them and mainstream lo? cal groups by increasing their public presence. Second, their social position would change only by altering negative images of women and the Muslim community. Thus, working with mdfor their "brothers" and other groups of Muslim sisters was a necessity. Frequent media presentations of violent scenes in the Middle East and South Asia, they believe, serve only to amplify negative images of them. Maryam, the sisters' secretary at EU, stated these views on their website in 2003:

It involves the attitude of simply allowing people to understand the true message of Islam by first getting them to respect us as good, moral citi? zens and helping to get rid of their internalized biases created from the media along with the ongoing actions against fringe Muslims around the world. We have to set examples through our actions and try not to seclude ourselves from non-Muslims. This is at the core of this attitude as well...

We can achieve this goal by highlighting "similarities" between them and us, so that they will be more likely to listen to us.

This statement illustrates that their strategies reflect a strong sense of mem? bership in the "imagined" global Muslim community, which transcends existing national, ethnic, and even gender lines under a united religious identity. According to Anderson (1983), an "imagined community" is one that is not (and cannot be) based on quotidian face-to-face interaction between its members, but is rather their

strong mental image of their communion. That image is especially encouraged by massive circulation of books and media in "print-capitalism." For Mohanty (1991), an "imagined community" is "a community that is bounded not only by color, race, gender, or class but crucially by a shared struggle against all pervasive

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Post-September 11 Activism Among South Asian Muslim Women 125

and systematic forms of domination" (see Espiritu, 1997: 119). Reflecting a strong sense of membership in this "imagined" Muslim community and viewing the social violence against them as a challenge to their religious faith, Maryam and other leaders of both groups turned to publicizing positive images of Islam.

Along with the brothers' group, the EU women's group organized frequent workshops and lectures that targeted non-Muslims and addressed how Islam and Christianity stemmed from the same religious roots. For that reason, Muslims venerate Jesus. Often discussed at these events were the egalitarian nature of Islam, arranged marriage, and the meaning of the dress code. Comparisons were drawn between Muslim practices and those of Christian women, who are also veiled. When possible, committee members tried to have Christian and Jewish student clubs cosponsor these events, along with other activist political groups on campus. That highlighted their ecumenicism and drew a more diverse audience. Similar to the approach at EU, the sisters' group at MU, where Asians and Hispanics comprise a large part of the student body, arranged events that emphasized the experiences of

Muslims as an ethnic and religious minority. By explaining the history of American Muslims and the challenges they faced after September 11 at their events, the group attempted to emphasize their similarity with other local groups.

The activism of Muslim women at the two campuses goes beyond "educating" the local mainstream. To demonstrate their likeness to other local students, these

members collectively participated in campus-related recreational events, such as daytrips to theme parks, festivals, and sports tournaments. In addition, the group leaders at EU arranged their monthly gatherings at a neighborhood fast-food res? taurant so that they could increase their visibility and show the social side of their organization more effectively. Malika, the sister's secretary at MU, describes this strategy:

We need to show that Muslim women also have fun and have social lives

in order to change their image toward us.... Like we have to show that Muslim women can go out and chill, go bowling, play basketball, go shopping, and stuff like that. We have to show what Muslim women are really like. Yes, we wear the headscarf, cover our body, and don't date or drink, but we still have fun like everybody else.

Similarly, Lulua from the public relations committee at EU also works to increase the members' public presence. At a sister's meeting, she states the im? portance of recruiting members for a theme park trip hosted by the university's student association:

I really want the sisters to go on the trip this time. I definitely think we should organize and participate in more of that kind of fun stuff. That way,

non-Muslims can see that we are not what they think we are.

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Surrounded by anti-Islamic sentiment and construing it as a challenge to the Muslim community, these women's groups developed a unique strategy of resis? tance. Instead of adopting rebellious forms of protest and confronting the local

mainstream, these groups publicize the positive aspects of Islam to improve their situation. To achieve these goals, they tactically use their bodies, taking advantage of the stigmatized symbol of veiling and its consequent visibility to increase their presence. The positive and more serious limelight they gain from others is somewhat like an animated social billboard. Although one might see this "soft" approach as owing to the spiritual nature of these religious women's organizations, it is also important to stress that these unique strategies significantly reflect on their dignity and inventiveness in the face of extreme hostility and the limited political options associated with their gender, race, and religious status.

Solidarity as Resistance

I believe that we must now learn more about ourselves. We should real?

ize that despite all the classification that goes on inside the MSA sisters, that we are all classified by everyone as Muslim. Every single one of us, no matter our spiritual degree, ethnic origin, or political affiliations, are all under this word "Muslim" and everything that is attached to it. It is obvious that we must unite to meet this challenge.

Aisha, the sisters' representative at EU, posted the above statement on her group's website in May 2003. In this statement, she argues for unity among mem? bers to fight anti-Islamic violence and feelings against women. Acknowledging the diverse backgrounds of the members, she proposed this idea by promoting their shared social classification as "Muslim." Although this monochromatic labeling by others results from the ignorance of inner-group differences, these women reversely internalize this imposition on their social identity as a driving force for developing their collectivism.

By disseminating the symbolic meanings of their veiling practice as a unify? ing thread, Aisha and other leaders at MU reaffirmed their inner-group union and increased their political appeals to outsiders. Such intra-group efforts were most graphically illustrated by the events that took place at two anti-war rallies. One was on campus in 2003 and the other took place in New York City in 2004, where all the participants from the MU group chose to wear a solid black hijab. By making their appearance even more uniform and vivid in the public's eyes at these occasions, the members reinforced a vision of the veil as a powerful symbol of collective morale, loyalty, political voice, and shared identity as a "Muslim" woman.

Acknowledging their presentation of solidarity as a form of resistance, both group leaders, together with other regional and national Islamic associations, strongly encouraged their members to continue wearing hijabs and to recruit fellow practitioners. For example, a special weekly meeting of the group at EU

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Post-September 11 Activism Among South Asian Muslim Women 127

discussed the theoretical meanings of veiling and its practical benefits for Muslim women by inviting a local group of older Muslim women who veil to their cam? pus. Beyond being posted on their website, information about these events was delivered to all members through an e-mail list service every week. Beginning in 2002, the group's website and bimonthly newsletters included autobiographical pieces on the first time someone had worn the hijab, as well as poems and essays that described what practitioners saw as the beauty of veiling. In 2003, this group established online sisters' discussion meetings every weekend for those who lived some distance away.

The group at MU pursued similar tactics. In 2003, the organization launched a book club to discuss the advantages of veiling. During the first half of 2005, group leaders invited their alumna and women from a local mosque to a weekly lecture series on Muslim women's lives. Yet, unlike the EU group, where most members are full-time students living in dorms on campus, the group at MU consists of com? muters. Thus, MU leaders were limited in their ability to organize their religious and social activities. To overcome this difficulty, the MU group fostered veiling by strengthening individual ties to the group. For instance, group leaders encouraged

members to use their prayer rooms on campus during breaks and at lunchtime to increase the opportunity of interacting with fellow sisters. The group created a library section in their prayer room that included books on Muslim women and veiling. A section of the library was available for storing members' textbooks so that they could study and pray together, as well as socialize during breaks. In addition, a message board at the entrance of the room allowed members to inform others

about upcoming events and relevant news items. This expanded use of the prayer room as a "hang out" spot enabled the MU women to promote veiling through the development of intimate ties and support systems among individual members.

Although each group adopted a unique approach, both believed that veiling was key to enhancing their solidarity and making their action more powerful in the eyes of the general population. Wearing the hijab veils their individuality by allowing others to perceive them under the monochromatic label of a "Muslim woman." This imposed identity transcended their internal ethnic, national-origin, and political differences and allowed these women to maximize their political voice in resisting the larger social forces of the period.

Being "Muslim" and "American"

The strategies of adopting a stigmatized symbol and fighting to be Muslim are also realized through the strong attachment of group members to both Islamic and American identities. Consistent with much of the literature on migration, many young Asian Americans see themselves as stuck between two cultural worlds. At

the point in which they are beginning to develop an independent identity, they perceive themselves as marginalized in the community of their immigrant par? ents, as well as in the larger society of their age peers (Tuan, 1999; Bacon, 1999;

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Kibria, 2006; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Min, 2002; Lee and Zhou, 2004). Yet, the literature also states that current Asian adolescents are better equipped than ever before to resolve the distinct demands of "two very different cultures" (Lu,

1997: 20; Leonard, 1997; Shandhu, 2004). For instance, Margaret Cho (1994: 79) describes herself and other U.S.-born Asians as follows: "We can create our own

identity. One that satisfies our parents that we take pride in our roots, cherish our rich ethnic heritage, and have the possibility of becoming doctors and lawyers. But also an identity that says it's OK to love America." Current coming-of-age Asian Americans do not necessarily see as disadvantageous their social labeling as neither a "real" Asian nor a "real" American. Instead, many use this ambiguity before different audiences by choosing or discounting one, or combining both to realize their social objectives. In the case of women in this study, this multicultural identity is equally presented in relation to non-Muslims:

Etsuko: How do you see yourself being Muslim and American?

Adiba: You know, "American Muslim" shouldn't be an oxymoron. It isn't.... His? tory tells us that categorizing people is not only inaccurate, but also judgmental.... I know some of my friends say things like, "Islam and American cannot be one." But lama. Muslim American and I feel blessed.

Ilham: After I started wearing the hijab after September 11, they [non-Muslim friends] wouldn't even talk to me and would just give me looks. But I was like.. .1 am who I am. And I was always different from them, but at the same time, I feel that I could still relate to them because I was born and raised in this country.

A large number of my respondents in both groups expressed a strong attach? ment to and appreciation of mainstream American and Muslim identities when it comes to their perception of their relations with non-Muslims. My interviews show that this multicultural identity in the context of the ongoing anti-Islamic sentiment

in the U.S. led many of them to think of themselves as bridging two separating cultural worlds. For instance, Afia at EU and Sabat and Rana at MU describe their ambitions as follows:

Etsuko: What is your plan after you finish your college education?

Afia: I'm taking a teacher's certificate program right now because I want to become a teacher in a public school. There are already many Muslim female teachers at Islamic schools, but there are very few in public schools. You know, if I become

a teacher, since I am wearing hijab, everyone, including non-Muslims can easily tell that I'm Muslim and can ask about Muslim women or anything about Islam

when they have a question and I can answer that.

Sabat: I've been studying to become a film director. I want to make a documentary film after graduating and want to show the real lives of Muslim women to others in this country.

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Post-September 11 Activism Among South Asian Muslim Women 129

Rana: I think I want to go to law school after graduating because I want to become a lawyer, especially for immigration and family law. I know that there were many Muslims who were deported to their countries after September 11. Also, there are a lot of Muslim immigrant women who suffer from domestic violence from their husbands. I really think that we need more lawyers from our community so that we can protect and help those people.

Embracing their social, cultural, and legal advantages as middle-class, college educated American citizens, many of these women see themselves as being privileged to contribute to improving the public image of Muslims and their own lives through their future professions. This tendency was stronger within the group at MU, where most of its members grew up in a lower- or middle-class multiethnic

or predominantly Muslim immigrant community. Of the 20 interviewees from each group, 14 from MU and eight from EU specifically said that they wished to become professionals (including a lawyer, teacher, journalist, and governmental or community organization employee) in the public-service sector to increase acceptance of Muslims and Islam.

Yet, even members of the EU group, who did not expressly associate their aims with aiding the Muslim community, took this mission to heart in other ways. For instance, Tahira described her workplace efforts as follows:

I work at my father's 7 to 11. So, I deal with people all day long. People are always amazed to see me working because they see a woman in hijab and they think I am oppressed and some think I'm uneducated, too. Some people come to me and literally talk to me in a way as if I don't understand anything they're saying. When I talk back to them in fluent English, they are taken back and change their attitude. Yes, I'm Pakistani and wear hijab, but I'm American also and I grew up here.... People judge us before they even get to know us, but at least I can do something about it by showing them that I am an educated American woman also.

Tahira's mission is to take advantage of her native-born language skills. The "billboard" effect she uses on excursions with her fellow group members is also effective in her high-traffic workplace area. Showing her "Americanness" to the general public, she feels that she contributes to altering prevalent images of Muslim women. Zayda, who is from EU, also describes herself as wearing hijab and being American for activist purposes:

I started to wear hijab just a few weeks before Bush attacked Afghanistan. At that time, many articles were about Muslim women in hijab and bad things about Islam. I was so frustrated by that. Then, I thought that if I wore hijab, I could show people that we were not oppressed. "Look at me! I can laugh, be happy, and I can do everything that you guys can do

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and more...." So, I thought that this was a contribution that I could make to my religion.... And I could really put my soul into it.

Following her group's technique, Zayda believes that wearing hijab contributes to altering the political climate in the United States. She sees herself as being in a key position to reduce the gap between two seemingly separate cultural worlds. By embracing the opportunity to veil herself, she turns herself into a symbol of her loyalty to Islam and fellow Muslim "sisters" in the world, and at the same time remains a "normal" American who "can laugh, be happy...do everything that you guys can do and more." These narratives underline these women's unique social position and sense of self as being "Muslim" and "American" in a hostile political environment. Their activism is therefore not limited to their local area, but extends

to the larger religious community in a global context.

Conclusion

This article demonstrates the political strategies of two groups of South Asian Muslim women. The study reveals the ways in which members embody the idea of bicultural feminism in their identity movement by using what has been a stigmatized image of veiling as a major tool for their activism. Taking advantage of the visibility of their dress code, they attempt to publicize positive images of Islam while increasing their solidarity. Their narratives suggest that these forms of activism are elaborate strategies that result from embracing their multicultural identity as U.S.-born Muslim women. They reflect a strong sense of mission to bring social justice to the lives of "unseen" or "imagined" Muslim sisters in the United States and other nations. Such resilience underpins the fact that difference and deviance can be translated into a symbol of strength, as well as a driving force for Asian women to cope with social adversity stemming from cultural sexism and imperialism.

The implications of this study are that the future orientation of political boundar? ies and activism associated with South Asian women, especially Muslims, will be along the lines of their religious identity, in contrast to previous generations. Many studies of the Asian-American movement in the late 20th century have noted that rising anti-Asian violence has often spurred panethnic solidarity among diverse Asian groups (Espiritu, 1993; Chang, 2001; Lien, 2001; Wei, 1993, 2004). Also, many South Asian feminist leaders have sought to reduce ethnic and religious disparities among members by emphasizing their shared social experiences and histories of immigration and colonization (Aguilar-San Juan, 1994; Shah, 1994; Leonard, 2003; Takhar, 2003). Contrary to these trends, in the aftermath of Sep? tember 11 the Muslim women studied here believe their social experiences, issues, and consequent political strategies have significantly departed from those of other groups of South Asians. Instead, the emergent generation of South Asian Muslim women may expand their membership to other Muslim women's groups nationally

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Post-September 11 Activism Among South Asian Muslim Women 131

and internationally, as increasing media attention is devoted to the political tension between the United States and Middle Eastern (as well as other Islamic) nations in the post-September 11 global age.

NOTES

1. All of the names of individuals have been changed to protect their anonymity. 2. For examples, see U.S. Department of Justice (2002). For a list of hate crimes by state, see

Tolerance.Org (2002). Also, see Burson (2001), Saada (2003), Ahmad (2006), and Melwani (2005). 3. The data for this study are derived from my participant observation in over 100 activities of

these groups on and off campus, from 40 in-depth interviews with their group leaders and affiliates, and from analysis of websites and newsletters. As a group member, I participated in their religious meetings, including prayers and Quran reading circles, as well as in nonreligious events such as general body meetings and anti-war protests. I also attended leisure activities such as weekend trips, parties, and inner-peer-group gatherings. The interviewees were selected using snowball sampling. Each of the interviews was conducted individually on campus or at their residence and lasted from one to three hours. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed.

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