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The Legal and Regulatory Environment of BUSINESS
Nineteenth Edition
Marisa Anne PAGNATTARO Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor of Legal Studies,
University of Georgia
Daniel R. CAHOY Professor of Business Law and Dean’s Faculty Fellow,
Pennsylvania State University
Julie Manning MAGID Professor of Business Law and Kelley Venture Fellow, Indiana University
Peter J. SHEDD University Professor Emeritus of Legal Studies, University of Georgia
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THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS, NINETEENTH EDITION
Published by McGraw Hill LLC, 1325 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10121. Copyright © 2022 by McGrawHill LLC. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Previous editions © 2019, 2016, and 2013. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written consent of McGraw Hill LLC, including, but not limited to, in any network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance learning.
Some ancillaries, including electronic and print components, may not be available to customers outside the United States.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
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ISBN 978-1-260-73428-7 (bound edition) MHID 1-260-73428-5 (bound edition) ISBN 978-1-264-12581-4 (loose-leaf edition) MHID 1-264-12581-X (loose-leaf edition)
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All credits appearing on page or at the end of the book are considered to be an extension of the copyright page.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Pagnattaro, Marisa Anne, 1961- author. | Cahoy, Daniel R., author. | Magid, Julie Manning, author. | Reed, O. Lee (Omer Lee), author. | Shedd, Peter J., author. Title: The legal and regulatory environment of business / Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Josiah Meigs, Distinguished Teaching Professor of Legal Studies, University of Georgia; Daniel R. Cahoy, Professor of Business Law and Dean’s Faculty Fellow, Pennsylvania State University; Julie Manning Magid, Professor of Business Law, Indiana University; O. Lee Reed, Emeritus Professor of Legal Studies, University of Georgia; Peter J. Shedd, University Professor Emeritus of Legal Studies, University of Georgia. Description: Nineteenth edition. | New York, NY : McGraw Hill LLC, [2021] | Includes index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020027610 (print) | LCCN 2020027611 (ebook) | ISBN 9781260734287 (hardcover) | ISBN 1260734285 (bound edition) | ISBN 9781264125814 (loose-leaf edition) | ISBN 126412581X (loose-leaf edition) | ISBN 9781264125838 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Trade regulation--United States. | Commercial law--United States. | Industrial laws and legislation--United States. | LCGFT: Textbooks. Classification: LCC KF1600 .C6 2021 (print) | LCC KF1600 (ebook) | DDC 346.7307--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020027610 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020027611
The Internet addresses listed in the text were accurate at the time of publication. The inclusion of a website does not indicate an endorsement by the authors or McGraw Hill LLC, and McGraw Hill LLC does not guarantee the accuracy of the information presented at these sites.
mheducation.com/highered
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Marisa Anne PAGNATTARO Marisa Anne Pagnattaro is a Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor of Legal Studies in the Terry College of Business at the University of Georgia. She received her Ph.D. in English at the University of Georgia, her J.D. from New York Law School, and her B.A. from Colgate University. Prior to joining the Georgia fac- ulty, Dr. Pagnattaro was a litigation attorney with Kilpatrick & Cody (now known as Kilpatrick Townsend) in Atlanta. Dr. Pagnattaro is the recipient of numerous teach- ing awards, and she also won the Academy of Legal Studies in Business Charles M. Hewett Master Teacher Competition. She is the author of many scholarly articles on national and international employment law issues, as well as labor issues related to international trade and the protection of trade secrets in China. She is an active member of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business and is a former Editor in Chief of the American Business Law Journal.
Daniel R. CAHOY Dan Cahoy is a Professor of Business Law, Dean’s Faculty Fellow and Research Director of the Center for the Business of Sustainability in the Smeal College of Business at The Pennsylvania State University. He is a registered patent attorney, with a J.D. from the University of New Hampshire School of Law and a B.A. from the University of Iowa. Prior to joining Penn State, Professor Cahoy was a litigator at an intellectual property firm in New York City, where he specialized in pharma- ceutical and biotechnology cases. He is the author of numerous scholarly articles on technology law, regulatory policy, and sustainability, and he received a Fulbright Scholarship in 2009 to serve as the Visiting Chair in International Humanitarian Law at the University of Ottawa. Professor Cahoy is a former Editor in Chief of the American Business Law Journal and IDEA: The Journal of Law and Technology. He has also held various leadership positions in academic organizations including serv- ing as the President of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business.
about the authors
Simone Beasley
Pennsylvania State University
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Julie Manning MAGID Julie Manning Magid is a Professor of Business Law and Kelley Venture Fellow in the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University. She also is the Director of the Randall L. Tobias Center for Leadership Excellence at Indiana University. She received her J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School and her A.B. from Georgetown University. Prior to joining the Kelley School faculty, Professor Magid was a litigation attorney specializing in employment and business litigation. Profes- sor Magid is recognized for her teaching in the undergraduate, graduate, specialized graduate, and online teaching environments, with numerous teaching awards, includ- ing the Kelley School of Business MBA Teaching Excellence Award and the Schuy- ler F. Otteson Undergraduate Teaching Excellence Award. Her teaching received international recognition from the Academy of Legal Studies in Business as the over- all winner of the Charles M. Hewitt Master Teacher Award. Professor Magid is the author of numerous scholarly articles and book chapters focused on public policy related to health care, diversity and inclusion, innovation, and privacy. She is a Life Sciences Research Fellow with the Center for the Business of Life Science and for- mer Editor in Chief of the American Business Law Journal.
Peter J. SHEDD Peter Shedd is the University Professor Emeritus of Legal Studies in the Terry Col- lege of Business at the University of Georgia where he received his B.B.A. and J.D. degrees. He also has been a Visiting Professor in the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan and the Warrington College of Business at the Univer- sity of Florida. Professor Shedd has extensive experience as a teacher, researcher, administrator, and author of business-related texts. His teaching of undergraduate and MBA courses has earned Professor Shedd numerous teaching awards including being named a Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor. Professor Shedd is a member of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business and its Southeastern Regional. He served as national president during 1999–2000. Professor Shedd is a member of the State Bar of Georgia and is an experienced arbitrator and mediator. In 2020, Professor Shedd was honored by the University of Georgia Alumni Association with their Faculty Service Award.
Indiana University
Peter Shedd
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T his nineteenth edition continues the long, rich tradition of our commitment to presenting timely examples and cases that underscore the relevance of the law for business. We are passionate about helping students understand the
importance of the legal and regulatory environment of business. Our goal is to make this text accessible, and we hope that they will embrace the study of the law with enthusiasm. In this preface, we strive to highlight themes, additions, and pedagogical devices—including important electronic features—that are key to this edition.
The Nineteenth Edition: Themes and New Additions With each new edition, we endeavor to maintain the reputation of this text as being the most up-to-date on the latest important developments in the law for business. As we prepare each new edition, we consider the events that affect the business environment and discuss how to incorporate them into the text. The nineteenth edition includes a new focus on sustainability and innovation, including the ethical issues. Because we were in the midst of revising the text during COVID-19, issues related to the pan- demic are also incorporated throughout this edition. We also continue to highlight ongoing legal fallout from the 2008 financial crisis. In this edition, we spotlight the U.S. Supreme Court case Iancu v. Brunetti, which addresses issues at the intersection of business and the law related to the protection (trademarks) and the First Amend- ment. We also added a number of recent federal cases and Supreme Court decisions.
Each chapter includes a range of relevant examples and case opinions, with key points noted for each case. Sidebars within each chapter provide students and instructors with opportunities to learn about topics that illustrate the principles dis- cussed within the text. Margin comments also reinforce key themes and points of emphasis. We hope that that this layering of the law with examples reinforces each student’s understanding of the law for business.
We believe that this text is well suited for both legal environment and business law classes. The fundamental message we wish our readers to grasp is that the law is at the core of private enterprise. The law determines ownership and protects busi- ness and individual ownership interests, which is why property law is at the heart of this text. Law defines property, enforces property rights, resolves disputes about where the boundaries of property lie, and recognizes that compensation is appropri- ate when one person infringes across the boundary of what is owned by another. Nations enforcing property rights under the rule of law establish conditions for cre- ating prosperous, diversified economies, which are crucial for businesses to thrive.
All of the current examples and sidebars are designed to teach business students the relevance of the law for business and to prepare them to make informed decisions about how the law can be used strategically to protect their rights and business interests.
Organization of the Nineteenth Edition This edition consists of 22 chapters, divided into four parts. Part One introduces students to the legal foundations for business. The first chapter in this section under- scores the importance of the legal environment of business to appreciate the role of law as the foundation for business in the private market system. This section also includes a chapter on ethics, as well as three chapters pertaining to dispute
preface
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resolution: courts, litigation, and alternative dispute resolution. Lastly, this first part includes a chapter on the U.S. Constitution (including the Commerce Clause) and its fundamental role in the legal system for business.
Part Two consists of basic legal principles, incorporating eight chapters: property, contract formation, contractual performance, torts, intellectual property, international law, criminal law, and business organizations. These chapters are designed to help stu- dents learn basic legal principles, as well as how to identify them in business contexts.
Part Three details the regulatory landscape for business. Five chapters cover essential regulatory aspects of business: the regulatory process, antitrust, financial and securities regulation, privacy and consumer protection, and environmental regulation.
The final section, Part Four, contains three chapters pertaining to the employer– employee relationship: discrimination, employment laws (including agency), and the labor–management relationship.
Taken together, these chapters should provide students with a comprehensive, yet accessible, sense of the laws and regulations crucial for companies doing busi- ness in the United States.
WHAT’S NEW PART ONE
Chapter 1 Law as Foundation for Business
• Edited the Introduction to incorporate new themes for the text, including sus- tainability, integrity, and corporate social responsibility.
• Updated Sidebar 1.1, adding information about Wells Fargo to underscore the kind of liability that can result from a lack of integrity.
• Added new Sidebar 1.2 about the importance of lawyers in the boardroom. • Updated Sidebar 1.3 with information from the AmCham China 2019 Climate Survey. • Updated Sidebar 1.4 with a new example involving a $1 billion scandal at Gold-
man Sachs. • Replaced Sidebar 1.5 with a new topic about the enforceability of corporate
social responsibility.
Chapter 2 Ethics in Decision Making
• Added discussion in introduction about the Business Roundtable Statement calling for fair and ethical treatment of suppliers.
• Added new Learning Objective 2-1 about ethical challenges facing business in the 21st century.
• Added new subsection “Modern Ethical Challenges in Innovation and Technol- ogy” addressing artificial intelligence.
• Added information about FTC fine for violations of user privacy against Facebook. • Added 2018 National Business Ethics Survey results. • Added new Sidebar 2.3 “Facebook Tackles Fake News.” • Updated Hertz standards of business conduct. • Updated Sidebar 2.7 with Boeing Code of Conduct.
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Chapter 3 Courts
• Updated the federal caseload statistics in Sidebar 3.1. • Updated Sidebar 3.3 with new examples. • Sidebar 3.4 updated with the 2018 term stats. • Updated the statistics in Sidebar 3.5 and added information about 5-4 Supreme
Court decisions. • Revised Sidebar 3.6, adding information about the role of the chief justice. • Updated Sidebar 3.7 with information about the process of selection of a
Supreme Court justice. • Updated Sidebar 3.8 with new information about how business fares in the Rob-
erts Court. • Updated Sidebar 3.9. • Updated Sidebar 3.11 with new information about the Supreme Court justices. • Added new Case 3.1 Iancu v. Brunetti and commentary in the text, replacing
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. The corresponding Case Briefing in Appendix I has been updated as well.
Chapter 4 Litigation
• Added a new Case 4.1 Juliana v. United States regarding standing to sue related to climate change.
• Updated Sidebar 4.3 adding information about Paul Ceglia. • Added a new example to Sidebar 4.4 about allegations regarding Apple and throttling. • Updated Sidebar 4.5 with new cases including major securities-related class
action cases, Facebook litigation, and a class action related to a data breach. • Revised Sidebar 4.7 with a new example related to discovery abuse. • Updated Sidebar 4.8 adding commentary about big data being used to predict lawsuits. • New Sidebar 4.10 with examples of frivolous lawsuits. • Added new examples to Sidebar 4.11 about social media and jurors. • Updated Sidebar 4.15 with new information about cameras in the courtroom,
including Congressional testimony by Justices Kagen and Alito.
Chapter 5 Alternative Dispute Resolution
• Updated conflict example to reflect modern global office culture. • Updated marginalia concerning number of tort cases settled out of court. • Replaced Sidebar 5.4 referencing trends in arbitration including #MeToo and
Uber agreement examples. • Replaced Sidebar 5.11 with a summary of four recent Supreme Court rulings
developing arbitration law.
Chapter 6 The Constitution
• Added a new Sidebar 6.3 with the case involving the sale of wine and spirits in Tennessee as an example of litigation related to the Commerce Clause.
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• Updated Sidebar 6.4 with information about the kinds of acts that can jeopar- dize tax-exempt status.
• Updated Sidebar 6.7 with an example from the 2020 Superbowl and a FCC fine involving Jimmy Kimmel.
• Updated Sidebar 6.9 with a new case involving the First Amendment and a rap artist. • Updated Sidebar 6.10 with new 2020 label on cigarette packaging and issues
related to vaping. • Updated Sidebar 6.12 regarding the Second Amendment. • Updated information about the Oberfeld case. • Clarified information about the levels of scrutiny.
PART TWO
Chapter 7 Property
• Updated Sidebar 7.4 to address recent Supreme Court case on intangible property.
• Updated Sidebar 7.5 to address current drone use and include current references. • Added new Case 7.1 Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Prod. Co. and commentary
in the text, replacing Coastal Oil v. Garza. • Added Sidebar 7.9 on property rights impact of light, odor and noise. • Added Sidebar 7.10 discussing how property restrictions contribute to sustainability.
Chapter 8 Contract Formation
• Added Sidebar 8.7, Overcharging into Invalidity to address contractual issues related to price gouging.
• Updated Sidebar 8.8 to reflect new legislation regarding non-compete covenants. • Added Sidebar 8.9 to address truth in sustainability advertising and greenwashing.
Chapter 9 Contract Performance and Breach
• Replaced Sidebar 9.1 to more broadly address the judge’s role in interpreting contracts and highlight recent case.
• Added section on Force Majeure clauses as excuses for non-performance. • Added Sidebar 9.4 to address when a global pandemic will be considered a
Force Majeure.
Chapter 10 Torts
• Added a definition for business invitee. • Revised Trespass section to distinguish trespass from business invitee. • Added new marginalia about defamation on web pages that allow comments. • Added new marginalia describing 2019 defamation claim filed against Amazon’s
Jeff Bezos. • New Sidebar 10.2 addressing Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
and Trump Administration Executive Order.
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• Included discussion about manipulation of audio or visual files as potential mis- appropriation concern.
• Revised Sidebar 10.6 updating medical malpractice claims. • Condensed Case 10.4 for readability. • Replaced Sidebar 10.11 describing the increase in billion dollar jury verdicts.
Chapter 11 Intellectual Property
• Revised Sidebar 11.1 to include discussion of 2018 Nobel Prize winner Paul Romer’s work.
• Added Sidebar 11.3 on the role of trade secrets in international trade relations, particularly with China.
• Updated text on trade secrets to include current UTSA adoptions. • Added Sidebar 11.6 to address whether artificial intelligence (AI) can be an
inventor on a patent. • Added Sidebar 11.8 to discuss sharing intellectual property related to the
COVID-19 pandemic as an emergency response. • Revised Sidebar 11.10 to address Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti cases and
cross reference Case 3.1. • Added Sidebar 11.13 to discuss Public Domain Day and the expiration of copy-
right on a new set of works. • Added new Case 11.4 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin and commentary in the text,
replacing Campbell v. Acuff Rose. • Added Sidebar 11.14 concerning two recent Supreme Court cases that address
state copyright ownership and infringement.
Chapter 12 International Law
• Updated Figure 12.1, Top Ten Trading Partners, with 2019 year-end data. • Updated Sidebar 12.1 with current information from Transparency Interna-
tional, including new commentary about corruption and inequality. • Updated Sidebar 12.3 with new FCPA prosecutions. • Updated marginalia with new information about export controls. • Added a new example of a $1 billion fraud scheme involving fraudulently
obtained funds and money laundering. • Updated the text and Table 12.2 to reflect the withdrawal of the United King-
dom from the EU (Brexit). • Updated Sidebar 12.4 to focus on export violations. • Updated Sidebar 12.5 with new information about pirate attacks. • Updated all information about NAFTA, now known as USMCA. • Updated Sidebar 12.9 about the top international franchises. • Updated Sidebar 12.10 regarding Chiquita’s liability for alleged acts in Colombia. • Updated Sidebar 12.12 regarding Chevron and Texaco’s liability for alleged acts
in Ecuador.
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Chapter 13 Criminal Law
• Made general chapter updates, including the chapter introduction. Updates include the Wells Fargo $3 billion criminal fine and marginalia regarding incar- ceration in the United States.
• Revised Sidebar 13.1 to add potential fraud related to COVID-19. • Updated information about the grand jury process. • Updated Sidebar 13.2 with additional information regarding the death of Bernard
Ebbers who was incarcerated for fraud at WorldCom. • Added new material to Sidebar 13.5 about checking identification and the case
Kansas v. Glover. • Updated Sidebar 13.6 with additional information about Bernie Madoff. • Updated Sidebar 13.7 and added more examples of fraud schemes. • Case 13.1 added a note about Carpenter v. U.S. involving searches and cell phones. • Case 13.2 added updated information about Jeffrey Skilling. • Updated Sidebar 13.8 with new information about preventing identity theft. • Updated Sidebar 13.9 with new information about the Department of Justice
priorities related to false claims act cases • Updated Sidebar 13.12 with new information about the post-prison life of Don
Blankenship. • Replaced Sidebar 13.13 with a new example involving the prosecution of execu-
tives at the New England Compounding Center.
Chapter 14 Business Organizations
• Revised Taxation overview to include information about the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
• Added Sidebar 14.2 to provide detail of changes that Tax Cuts and Jobs Act made to corporate tax rates.
• Revised Trends in Managing the Organization to describe increasing emphasis on sustainability.
• Added new Case 14.2 Marchand v. Barnhill and commentary in text, replacing FCC v. AT&T.
• Revised Trends in Managing the Organization to discuss how businesses are dealing with remote workspaces.
PART THREE
Chapter 15 Regulatory Process
• Updated Sidebar 15.2 examining the unique structure of the Consumer Finan- cial Protection Bureau to include 2018 D.C. Circuit Court opinion.
• Added marginalia concerning FTC request for information from big tech companies.
• Replaced Case 15.1 with Free Lucia v. SEC highlighting the authority of admin- istrative law judges in federal agencies.
• Added Key Points for Case 15.1.
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Chapter 16 Antitrust Regulation
• Added new Case 16.1 Prosterman v. American Airlines and commentary in text, replacing U.S. v. Apple.
• Added Sidebar 16.2, addressing debate regarding whether Big Tech firms are monopolists.
• Added new Case 16.3, Apple v. Pepper, and commentary in text, replacing Kolon Industries v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours.
• Updated Figure 16.3 on criminal antitrust fines (2008-2019).
Chapter 17 Financial and Securities Regulation
• Updated marginalia with quote concerning capital formation trends. • Replaced Case 17.1 with Lorenzo v. SEC in which the Supreme Court addressed
Rule 10b-5 liability. • Added Key Points for Lorenzo v. SEC. • Added reference to Case 17.1 in discussion of PSLRA. • Updated number of filings of securities claims against foreign companies with
2019 data. • Update Table 17.2 with data from 2010-2019. • Added new marginalia providing link to the 2019 PCAOB five-year strategic plan. • Updated Dodd-Frank whistleblower discussion with Supreme Court’s 2018 deci-
sion in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers. • Added findings from 2019 SEC crowdfunding study under the JOBS Act. • Added Figure 17.1 demonstrating the geographical distribution of crowdfunding
offerings.
Chapter 18 Privacy and Consumer Protection
• Added new Case 18.1 Carpenter v. United States and commentary in text, replacing In re Zynga.
• Added Sidebar 18.2 discussing the possible exchange of privacy rights for increased protection and security during a crisis.
• Updated Sidebar 18.3 discussing the development and impact of the GDPR. • Added discussion of 2018 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer
Protection Act that revised system for credit freezes and fraud alerts.
Chapter 19 Environmental Regulation and Resource Sustainability
• Updated Learning Objective 19-4 to reflect 21st century sustainability issues. • Updated NEPA discussion to include 2020 proposed rule limiting its impact. • Updated data regarding international air quality rankings. • Changed the title of Table 19.1 to better reflect its contents. • Replaced marginalia with Supreme Court’s 2020 Clean Water Act decision in
County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund. • Updated Superfund cleanup discussion with Supreme Court’s 2019 case Atlan-
tic Richfield v. Christian.
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• Changed the final section title to Sustainability Approaches to better reflect updated contents.
• Reorganized discussion of the Kyoto Protocol as a precursor to the Paris Agree- ment and updated the Paris Agreement discussion.
• Added discussion about government and business leaders around the world engaging in new actions to preserve the environment and promote jobs, such as education and ecotourism.
PART FOUR
Chapter 20 Employment Discrimination
• Updated marginalia and added additional information to the text, including the McDonald’s sexual harassment class action.
• Updated Figure 20.1 EEOC data. • Updated Sidebar 20.3 with new material about concerns related to COVID-19. • Updated Sidebar 20.4 with additional examples about religious accommodation
claims related to Muslims. • Updated Sidebar 20.5 with additional information about the many forms of sex-
ual harassment for women in the workplace. • Updated Sidebar 20.6 with information about #MeToo and the unintended con-
sequences and backlash in the workplace. • Updated Sidebar 20.7 information about pregnancy discrimination claims and
added more information about the Young v. UPS case. • Updated Sidebar 20.9 with information about cases brought in the U.S. Supreme
Court involving LGBT discrimination. • Updated Sidebar 20.10 with a case involving age discrimination at PwC. • Updated Sidebar 20.11 with additional examples.
Chapter 21 Employment Laws
• Updated minimum wage information and added statistics on COVID-19 unemployment.
• Updated Sidebar 21.1 with the FLSA overtime rules and new examples. • Updated Sidebar 21.2 with information about the department of Labor’s new
primary beneficiaries test for internships. • Updated Sidebar 21.4 FMLA statistics information. • Added an example to Sidebar 21.9 about OSHA’s severe violator program. • Updated Sidebar 21.10 with information about Families First Coronavirus
Response legislation.
Chapter 22 Labor–Management Relationship
• Updated Table 22.1 with statistics on union membership. • Updated Sidebar 22.1 with information on union membership. • Replaced Sidebar 22.2 with details of three Trump Administration Executive
Orders.
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• Replaced Sidebar 22.5 with information about Kickstarter, the first technology company to unionize.
• Update statistics regarding state right-to-work laws.
Authorship Team One of the strengths of this text is its continuity of authorship and the coordina- tion among the authorship team. Marisa Pagnattaro, who joined the team on the fourteenth edition, continues to lead the authorship team. Dan Cahoy (who began on the sixteenth edition) and Julie Manning Magid (who joined on the seventeenth edition) have played a significant role in shaping this edition. Peter Shedd, who has long been a steward of the text, joined the book as a co-author on the eighth edition in 1990. Although he is no longer part of the authorship team, we want to recognize Lee Reed who joined the team in 1977 on the fourth edition.
Acknowledgments We want to thank a number of people who contributed to the nineteenth edition. We greatly appreciate the efforts of our team at McGraw-Hill, especially Tim Vertovec and Kathleen Klehr. We greatly appreciate their support of the authorship team and the continued development of new electronic features of the text. We are also grateful to all of the regional sales team representatives for their enthusiastic marketing support.
The following colleagues gave of their time and provided insight during the review process. For their expert comments and suggestions, we are most grateful.
Perry Binder Georgia State University
Aaron Butler Warner Pacific College
Elizabeth Cameron Alma College
Amy Chataginer Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College
Marsha Cooper California State University, Long Beach
Joe Easton Pueblo Community College
Mark Edison North Central College
Howard Ellis Millersville University of Pennsylvania Jackson
Ken Ginsberg Hodges University
Earl Clayton Hipp Jr. Wake Forest University
Johndavid Kerr Harris-Stowe State University
Michael Koval Salisbury University
Sharlene McEvoy Fairfield University
Michael Monhollon Hardin-Simmons University
Nancy Oretskin New Mexico State University
David Orozco Florida State University
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Susan O’Sullivan-Gavin Rider University
Victor Parker University of North Georgia
Matthew Phillips Wake Forest University
Debra Strauss Fairfield University
Byron Stuckey Dallas Baptist University
Lee Usnick University of Houston, Downtown
Mary-Kathryn Zachary University of West Georgia
Benjamin Akins Georgia Gwinnett College School of Business
Dr. Christy Ann Powers St. Petersburg College
Gene Blackmun III Rio Hondo College
John Washington Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University
Lora J. Koretz Arizona State University
Roberto Sandoval University of Texas El Paso
Vlad A. Bursuc Georgia Gwinnett College
Finally, we thank all of the professors and students who have used or are using our text. Your feedback continues to be important. Please feel free to share your thoughts with us. Your feedback also may be sent to The McGraw-Hill Companies.
Marisa Anne PAGNATTARO Daniel R. CAHOY
Julie Manning MAGID
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This nineteenth edition continues the reputation of our prior editions for having many valuable teaching elements. The following list highlights the various pedagogical tools in this edition:
guided tour
Remote Proctoring & Browser-Locking Capabilities New remote proctoring and browser-locking capabilities, hosted by Proctorio within Connect, provide control of the assessment environment by enabling security options and
verifying the identity of the student.
Seamlessly integrated within Connect, these services allow instructors to control students’ assess- ment experience by restricting browser activity, recording students’ activity, and verifying students are doing their own work.
Instant and detailed reporting gives instructors an at-a-glance view of potential academic integrity concerns, thereby avoiding personal bias and supporting evidence-based claims.
SmartBook® SmartBook® makes study time as productive and efficient as possible. SmartBook identifies and closes knowledge gaps through a continu- ally adapting reading experience that highlights portions of the content based on comprehension. Students have a visual representation of the areas in which they have demon- strated understanding, as well as areas in which they need to focus. The result? More confidence, better grades, and greater success.
Interactive Applications Interactive Applications like “drag and drop” and “comprehension case” help students apply important con- cepts they learned in each chapter. These engaging materials are assign- able and auto-gradable, so students receive feedback on their work immediately.
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Business Law Case Repository The Case Repository is a collection of cases from previous editions and the current edition, accessible and assignable in Connect. Cases can be selected based on Topic, Type, or State.
Case Brief Case Briefs, found in the Instructor Resources, contain a brief of each edited case found in the text. For ease of use, the briefs are numbered by chapter in the order they appear in the text. Case Briefs offer additional information like the Facts, the Issue, the Decision, and the Reasoning, for each case.
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Procedural History This case was brought as a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, claiming (among other things) that Spokeo willfully failed to comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The District Court ini- tially denied Spokeo’s motion to dismiss the complain for lack of jurisdiction. Upon reconsideration of the motion, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice holding that Robins had not properly pleaded “injury in fact.”
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Robins adequately alleged an injury in fact.
The case was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue Appealed The key issue on appeal was: 1. Whether Robins had standing to maintain an action
in federal court against Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Who Wins and Why? 1. In that the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit
failed to consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact requirement and, as such, its standing analysis was incomplete, Spokeo prevailed.
2. The Supreme Court, vacated the Ninth Circuit decision and remanded the case back to the district court.
What Does This Mean? Overall, this case was a narrow victory for Spokeo, but the case is not over. By remanding the case back to the lower court, it allows Robins another chance to allege injury in fact. If he can success- fully demonstrate the kind of injury necessary to support his claim, he could prevail in the long run. Many watch- ing the case hoped for a clear ruling from the Supreme Court that would define the parameters for lawsuits based on violation of statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Source: Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. __ (2016)
in its decision; also to ask a higher court to review (decide) the case. dissent To disagree with both the result and the legal reasoning of the majority opinion. opinion The court’s decision in a case. petitioner The losing party in the court of appeals who asks (i.e., “petitions”) the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower court made a mistake. respondent The prevailing party in the court of appeals who is responding to the petitioner. reversed What an appeals court says when it dis- agrees with the court beneath it. If it agrees with the lower court, it says “affirmed.”
CASE BRIEF Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. __ (2016). How do I read this citation?
∙ “Spokeo, Inc.” refers to the petitioner. ∙ “v” means versus or against. ∙ “Robins” refers to the respondent. ∙ 578 is the volume number of the official U.S. Supreme
Court Reporter, and __ refers to the page number where the case begins (once it is assigned a page num- ber). The date, 2016, is the year the case was decided.
Facts Thomas Robins discovered that his Spokeo- generated profile contained inaccurate information. Spokeo Inc. describes itself as a “people search engine,” which organizes public information from white pages, public records, and social networks. Robins contended that the information indicated that he was wealthy, married with children, and worked in a professional or technical field. He contended that the inaccuracies could make it seem that he is overqualified for employment positions he was seeking, or could suggest that he might want a salary higher that the position, or that he might be unwilling to relocate.
Quizzes Quizzes are available for each chapter and test students’ overall comprehen- sion of the concepts presented in the chapter.
Test Bank Instructors can test students’ mastery of concepts as the instructors create exams with the use of this Test Bank. Organized by chapter, the Test Bank contains multiple-choice, true/false, and essay questions. Many of the questions have been modified to correspond with the text’s revision. Answers immediately follow each question, along with corresponding Learning Objectives.
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
2-1 To consider ethical challenges facing business in the 21st century.
2-2 To compare the connection between law and ethical principles.
2-3 To analyze why ethical consequentialism and not ethical formalism has been the chief source of values for business ethics.
2-4 To generate an individual framework for ethical values in business.
2-5 To evaluate the obstacles and rewards of ethical business practice in our property-based legal system.
The Role of Ethics in Decision Making2 Michael Hitoshi/Getty Images
Do understand that an amendment must be ratified by 38 states through leg- islative action or by a con- stitutional convention. The United States has never held a convention for the purposes of amending the Constitution.
Marginalia In the margins, each chapter includes notes, points of emphasis, definitions, quotes, and recom- mendations about what to do and what to avoid.
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Does the emphasis on profit in a property-based private market mean that only profit must be considered in business decision making? For an example of a nation where not only profit is important in business, see Sidebar 2.8.
The Effect of the Group The social critic Ambrose Bierce once remarked that the corporation is “an ingenious device for obtaining individual profit without individual responsibility.” He was referring to the fact that individuals in large groups such as the corporation feel less responsibility for what happens in the group than they do for what happens in their individual lives. They may also act differently, and to some extent less ethically, in a group.
Ambrose Gwinnett Bierce (1842 – 1914)
That individuals will do unethical things as part of a group which they would never do alone is widely recognized, and the same pattern can be observed in cor- porate behavior. Within corporations, it becomes easy for a researcher not to pass on lately discovered concerns about the possible (yet not certain) side effects of a new skin lotion that upper management is so enthusiastic about. In corporate life, it is not difficult to overlook the unethical behavior of a superior when many fellow employees are also overlooking it. And of course, “I did it because everyone else did it” is a common rationalization in groups of all kinds. “Just following orders” is a similar rationalization.
That individuals in groups may feel a diminished sense of responsibility for deci- sions made and actions taken invites ethical compromise. Coupled with an over- emphasis on profit, the group effect increases the difficulty of achieving an ethical business corporation.
The Control of Resources by Nonowners In the modern corporation, the owners (or shareholders) are often not in possession and control of corporate resources. Top management of many corporations effectively possess and control vast resources that they do not own. This produces the problems of corporate gov- ernance mentioned in Chapter 1. Managerial agents like the president and vice
Don’t forget that a nation is just a large group. This means that “culture matters” in the implementation (or not) of moral values.
“Study after study con- firms it: the vast majority of people act based on the circumstances in their environment and the standards set by their leaders and peers, even if it means com- promising their personal moral ideals. ‘Good’ peo- ple do bad things if they are put in an environ- ment that doesn’t value values, if pressured to believe that they don’t have any choice but to get the job done— whatever it takes.”
–Ethics Resource Center (2008)
The Swedes have a strong property-based private mar- ket, but the business emphasis in Sweden is not solely on profit making. Instead, the Swedes have a strong ethic of lagom, which means “not too much, not too little, but just enough.”
As a result, the pay of corporate chief executive officers (CEOs) is only a small fraction of what it is in the United States, and the average take-home pay of employ- ees (excluding CEOs) varies from highest to lowest by a ratio of only 3 to 1. Sweden provides universal health care, public nursing homes, and subsidized child care
and parental leave-taking during a child’s first year. When Swedish companies go overseas, they treat employees there with much of the same ethic as in Sweden.
Lagom means that there are few wealthy Swedes, and Sweden’s social welfare system of “just enough” depends on a tax rate of approximately twice that in the United States. Note also that Sweden is a small, homog- enous country whose citizens share a common ethical culture that is often not found in larger nations. Source: Susan Wennemyer, “Sweden: The Kindness Economy,” Business Ethics, Fall 2003.
sidebar 2.8
The Swedish Example of Lagom
Learning Objectives Learning Objectives are included at the beginning of each chapter. These objectives will act as a helpful road map of each chapter, narrow- ing the focus of each topic for both instructor and students. You will also find these Learning Objectives tagged for every test bank question to ensure that key points from each chapter are covered in every quiz and exam.
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Sidebars Examples or further descriptions are separated from the text into boxes labeled Sidebars. As in the courtroom setting, when a judge calls for a conversation with the lawyers away from the jury, these boxes are sidebars to the overall discussion. Through these side- bars, the text is explained in more detail or is brought to life with a business-related example.
Concept Summary At appropriate points in each chap- ter, a summary of the preceding material appears. Through these summaries, complex and lengthy presentations are easily reviewable by the reader.
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sidebar 2.5
American Marketing Association Statement of Ethics PREAMBLE The American Marketing Association commits itself to pro- moting the highest standard of professional ethical norms and values for its members (practitioners, academics and students). Norms are established standards of conduct that are expected and maintained by society and/or profes- sional organizations. Values represent the collective con- ception of what communities find desirable, important and morally proper. Values also serve as the criteria for evaluat- ing our own personal actions and the actions of others. . . .
ETHICAL VALUES Honesty—to be forthright in dealings with customers and stakeholders. To this end, we will: • Strive to be truthful in all situations and at all times. • Offer products of value that do what we claim in our
communications. • Stand behind our products if they fail to deliver their
claimed benefits. • Honor our explicit and implicit commitments and
promises. Responsibility—to accept the consequences of our marketing decisions and strategies. To this end, we will: • Strive to serve the needs of customers. • Avoid using coercion with all stakeholders. • Acknowledge the social obligations to stakeholders that
come with increased marketing and economic power. • Recognize our special commitments to vulnerable
market segments such as children, seniors, the eco- nomically impoverished, market illiterates and others who may be substantially disadvantaged.
• Consider environmental stewardship in our decision-making.
Fairness—to balance justly the needs of the buyer with the interests of the seller. To this end, we will: • Represent products in a clear way in selling, advertis-
ing and other forms of communication; this includes the avoidance of false, misleading and deceptive promotion.
• Reject manipulations and sales tactics that harm cus- tomer trust.
• Refuse to engage in price fixing, predatory pricing, price gouging or “bait-and-switch” tactics.
• Avoid knowing participation in conflicts of interest.
• Seek to protect the private information of customers, employees and partners.
Respect—to acknowledge the basic human dignity of all stakeholders. To this end, we will: • Value individual differences and avoid stereotyping
customers or depicting demographic groups (e.g., gender, race, sexual orientation) in a negative or dehumanizing way.
• Listen to the needs of customers and make all rea- sonable efforts to monitor and improve their satisfac- tion on an ongoing basis.
• Make every effort to understand and respectfully treat buyers, suppliers, intermediaries and distribu- tors from all cultures.
• Acknowledge the contributions of others, such as consultants, employees and coworkers, to marketing endeavors.
• Treat everyone, including our competitors, as we would wish to be treated.
Transparency—to create a spirit of openness in marketing operations. To this end, we will: • Strive to communicate clearly with all constituencies. • Accept constructive criticism from customers and
other stakeholders. • Explain and take appropriate action regarding signifi-
cant product or service risks, component substitutions or other foreseeable eventualities that could affect cus- tomers or their perception of the purchase decision.
• Disclose list prices and terms of financing as well as available price deals and adjustments.
Citizenship—to fulfill the economic, legal, philanthropic and societal responsibilities that serve stakeholders. To this end, we will: • Strive to protect the ecological environment in the
execution of marketing campaigns. • Give back to the community through volunteerism
and charitable donations. • Contribute to the overall betterment of marketing
and its reputation. • Urge supply chain members to ensure that trade is
fair for all participants, including producers in devel- oping countries.
Source: AMA Statement of Ethics, published at https://www.ama.org/. Repro- duced with the permission of the American Marketing Association.
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When you are convinced that a law itself is morally wrong, you may be justified in disobeying it. Even then, to be ethical, you should be willing to make public your disobedience and to accept the consequences for it. Both Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. deliberately disobeyed laws they thought were morally wrong, and they changed society by doing so. Ulti- mately, they changed both laws and ethics. But they made their disobedience to these laws public, and they willingly accepted punishment for violating them. Dr. King famously wrote about his decision to disobey a law that he evaluated as unjust as he accepted the consequences of that decision in “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”
Leading an ethical business life may be difficult at times. You will make mis- takes. You will be tempted. It is unlikely that you will be perfect. But if you want to be ethical and will work hard toward achieving your goal, you will be rewarded. As with achieving other challenging business objectives, there will be satisfaction in ethical business decision making.
• Have I thought about whether the action I may take is right or wrong?
• Will I be proud to tell of my action to my family? To my employer? To the news media?
• Am I willing for everyone to act as I am thinking of acting?
• Will my decision cause harm to others or to the environment?
• Will my actions violate the law?
concept summary
Self-Examination for Self-Regulation
In business as well as in personal life, the key to ethical decision making is wanting to be ethical and having the will to be ethical. If you do not want to be ethical, no code of conduct can make you ethical. Potential harm you may cause to individuals and to society will best be deterred by the threat of legal punishment and the sanctions of professional and corporate codes. You may never get caught, lose your job, or go to jail. But, as Mortimer Adler observed, you will lack “much that is needed for the good life.”
Achieving an Ethical Business Corporation The dominant form of organization in modern business is the corporation. Currently, the top 100 manufacturing corporations produce more than two-thirds of the nation’s entire manufacturing output. In 1840, the largest manufacturing firm in the United States, the Springfield Armory, employed only 250 workers. Today, many corporations have tens of thousands of employees. Some have hundreds of thousands. In substantial part, the development of the corporate form of business organization made possible this growth in business size.
Ethical problems, however, arise in corporate life that are not present in one’s individual experience. In a study of Harvard MBAs during their first five years
The primary reason that corporations dominate the business landscape is that their ownership is divisible into small shares that make them easily sellable.
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Cases Except for the first two chapters, chapters include edited portions of actual court decisions. These cases illustrate the parties’ argu- ments and the judge’s decision of the issues. We have deleted most of the procedural aspects, citations, and footnotes. An alternative to these edited cases appears in some sidebars; there a case may be explained in our own language.
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case 4.1
JULIANA v. UNITED STATES ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. 2020)
The panel reversed the district court’s interlocutory orders in this action which was brought by 21 individual plaintiffs (all young citizens) and environmental organizations against the federal government alleging climate-change related inju- ries caused by the federal government continuing to “permit, authorize, and subsidize” fossil fuel.
COWEN, Circuit Judge In the mid-1960s, a popular song warned that we were “on the eve of destruction.” (Barry McGuire, “Eve of Destruction,” on Eve of Destruction, Dunhill Records, 1965.) The plaintiffs in this case have presented compelling evidence that climate change has brought that eve nearer. A substantial evidentiary record documents that the federal government has long pro- moted fossil fuel use despite knowledge that it can cause cata- strophic climate change, and that failure to change existing policy may hasten an environmental apocalypse.
The plaintiffs claim that the government has violated their constitutional rights, including a claimed right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to a “cli- mate system capable of sustaining human life.” The central issue before us is whether, even assuming such a broad constitutional claim exists, an Article III court can provide plaintiffs with the redress they seek—an order requiring the government to develop a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emis- sions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2.” Reluctantly, we conclude that such relief is beyond our constitutional power. Rather, the plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be presented to the political branches of government.
The district court denied the government’s motion to dis- miss, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, raised justiciable questions, and stated a claim for infringement of a Fifth Amendment due process right to a “climate system capa- ble of sustaining human life.” The court defined that right as one to be free from catastrophic climate change that “will cause human deaths, shorten lifespans, result in widespread damage to property, threaten food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem.” The court also concluded that the plaintiffs
had stated a viable “danger-creation due process claim” arising from the government’s failure to regulate third-party emissions. Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs had stated a public trust claim grounded in the Fifth and Ninth Amendments. . . .
The government . . . argues that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue their constitutional claims To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have (1) a concrete and particularized injury that (2) is caused by the challenged conduct and (3) is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision. . . .
[After expressing skepticism that the first redressability prong is satisfied, the court stated] even assuming that it is, the plaintiffs do not surmount the remaining hurdle--establishing that the specific relief they seek is within the power of an Arti- cle III court. There is much to recommend the adoption of a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change, both as a policy matter and in general and a matter of national survival in particular. But it is beyond the power of an Article III court to order, design, supervise, or implement the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan. . . .
The plaintiffs have made a compelling case that action is needed; it will be increasingly difficult in light of that record for the political branches to deny that cli- mate change is occurring, that the government had a role in causing it, and that our elected officials have a moral responsibility to seek solutions. We do not dispute that the broad judicial relief that plaintiffs seek could well goad the political branches to action. . . . We reluctantly con- clude, however, that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large, thee latter of which can change the composition of the political branches through the ballot box. That the other branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how well- intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes. . . .
*Note: On March 3, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing, asking the Ninth Circuit to hear the matter en banc.
KEY POINTS • To maintain a lawsuit, a plaintiff must have standing or a legally cognizable claim and the
court must have the authority to hear the matter. • The Ninth Circuit found that the court lacked Article III standing. • Accordingly, the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of
Article III standing. Case Icon: McGraw-Hill Education.
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case 4.1
JULIANA v. UNITED STATES ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. 2020)
The panel reversed the district court’s interlocutory orders in this action which was brought by 21 individual plaintiffs (all young citizens) and environmental organizations against the federal government alleging climate-change related inju- ries caused by the federal government continuing to “permit, authorize, and subsidize” fossil fuel.
COWEN, Circuit Judge In the mid-1960s, a popular song warned that we were “on the eve of destruction.” (Barry McGuire, “Eve of Destruction,” on Eve of Destruction, Dunhill Records, 1965.) The plaintiffs in this case have presented compelling evidence that climate change has brought that eve nearer. A substantial evidentiary record documents that the federal government has long pro- moted fossil fuel use despite knowledge that it can cause cata- strophic climate change, and that failure to change existing policy may hasten an environmental apocalypse.
The plaintiffs claim that the government has violated their constitutional rights, including a claimed right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to a “cli- mate system capable of sustaining human life.” The central issue before us is whether, even assuming such a broad constitutional claim exists, an Article III court can provide plaintiffs with the redress they seek—an order requiring the government to develop a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emis- sions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2.” Reluctantly, we conclude that such relief is beyond our constitutional power. Rather, the plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be presented to the political branches of government.
The district court denied the government’s motion to dis- miss, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, raised justiciable questions, and stated a claim for infringement of a Fifth Amendment due process right to a “climate system capa- ble of sustaining human life.” The court defined that right as one to be free from catastrophic climate change that “will cause human deaths, shorten lifespans, result in widespread damage to property, threaten food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem.” The court also concluded that the plaintiffs
had stated a viable “danger-creation due process claim” arising from the government’s failure to regulate third-party emissions. Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs had stated a public trust claim grounded in the Fifth and Ninth Amendments. . . .
The government . . . argues that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue their constitutional claims To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have (1) a concrete and particularized injury that (2) is caused by the challenged conduct and (3) is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision. . . .
[After expressing skepticism that the first redressability prong is satisfied, the court stated] even assuming that it is, the plaintiffs do not surmount the remaining hurdle--establishing that the specific relief they seek is within the power of an Arti- cle III court. There is much to recommend the adoption of a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change, both as a policy matter and in general and a matter of national survival in particular. But it is beyond the power of an Article III court to order, design, supervise, or implement the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan. . . .
The plaintiffs have made a compelling case that action is needed; it will be increasingly difficult in light of that record for the political branches to deny that cli- mate change is occurring, that the government had a role in causing it, and that our elected officials have a moral responsibility to seek solutions. We do not dispute that the broad judicial relief that plaintiffs seek could well goad the political branches to action. . . . We reluctantly con- clude, however, that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large, thee latter of which can change the composition of the political branches through the ballot box. That the other branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how well- intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes. . . .
*Note: On March 3, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing, asking the Ninth Circuit to hear the matter en banc.
KEY POINTS • To maintain a lawsuit, a plaintiff must have standing or a legally cognizable claim and the
court must have the authority to hear the matter. • The Ninth Circuit found that the court lacked Article III standing. • Accordingly, the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of
Article III standing. Case Icon: McGraw-Hill Education.
Key Points At the end of each edited case, key points can be found. These key points help students gasp the essential elements and rel- evance of each case.
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Review Questions and Problems Following the text of each chap- ter is a series of questions and problems. These are tied to the sections of each chapter and serve as an overview of the material covered.
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Review Questions and Problems Litigation—An Overview
1. Parties A building contractor is sued by homeowners alleging that their homes were poorly constructed resulting in several defects. The contractor adds to the lawsuit a build- ing supplier that it claims provided faulty support beams. How can the contractor add the building supplier as a party to the lawsuit? What is this procedure called and how does it work?
2. Standing to Sue A group of environmentalists filed a lawsuit challenging commercial fishing in Gla- cier Bay National Park and sued the secretary of the interior and the National Park Service in order to prevent more commercial fishing. (a) What must the environmentalists show in order to satisfy the requirement of
standing to sue in this case? (b) At what point should the issue of standing be decided by the court during the
course of litigation? 3. Personal Jurisdiction
Smith, a resident of Michigan, was in Florida for a business meeting where he was served with a divorce petition filed by his wife, who had moved to Florida recently. Smith objected to the Florida court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. What is the basis of Smith’s objection? Should he prevail? Why or why not?
4. Class-Action Suits How have the federal courts discouraged class-action lawsuits? What are the key requirements for federal courts to permit class-action suits?
Pretrial Procedures
5. Pleadings Describe the purpose of a complaint and an answer in civil litigation. What is the function of the pleading stage in a lawsuit?
6. Steps in Discovery (a) Why do surprises rarely occur at trial? (b) What are some of the key devices a litigant can use in discovery?
7. Scope of Discovery How do abusive discovery practices raise the cost of litigation?
8. Motions Under what circumstances may a court grant a motion for summary judgment?
9. Frivolous Cases Federal Rule 11 sanctions are available against both lawyers and their clients to curb frivolous litigation. Under what circumstances may sanctions be imposed?
The Trial
10. Jury Selection In light of recent court decisions restricting the use of peremptory challenges, should they be eliminated from litigation altogether? Would the elimination of peremptory challenges improve the efficiency of the trial process?
11. Other Steps during a Trial What is the purpose of jury instructions?
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12. Burden of Proof There are three distinct levels of proof required by law depending upon the kind of case involved. Describe them and when they are used.
13. Deciding the Case Under what circumstances should a judge enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict?
Posttrial Issues
14. Appeals What normally is contained in an appellate brief? An oral argument?
15. Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees How does the court enforce judgments?
16. Res Judicata Why is the notion of res judicata critical in civil litigation?
1. You are the manager of a used car firm known as Reliant Motor Company. Your lawyer has called to tell you that John Doe, a customer you have been dealing with for several months, has filed a lawsuit against the firm. The customer claims the vehicle he purchased is a lemon and no longer even operates. You knew the vehicle was not in the best of condi- tion at the time of sale, but you believe the buyer caused most of the problems by taking the vehicle “off road” several times. You are not looking forward to discovery or trial in this case. You have several questions. • How does discovery work? • Can you be required to testify twice in a deposition and at trial? • Should you shred all documents you have about this case? You know that some of the
documents will not put the firm in the best light. You wonder what will happen at trial. Will it be like what you have seen on TV or in the movies? 2. You are the owner of a small firm that manufactures lawn mowers. While using one of your products, a person suffers severe injury and now is suing, claiming that your product was negligently designed because it did not adequately protect the user. You have no experience with the legal system. You learn that lawyers charge as much as $250 per hour and must be paid whether they win or lose their cases. You are surprised at what must happen before a trial can occur to determine who is at fault. First, your lawyer may move to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds. If that fails, both sides will take costly deposi- tions of likely witnesses. You will have to turn over reams of internal documents related to the design of your mower. Each side also will have to pay several hundred dollars per hour for experts as the lawyers prepare the case. These experts will have to be paid again when they testify at trial. As the time for the trial approaches, each side will spend money trying to discern the most sympathetic type of jury. Years after the lawsuit was first filed, the par- ties will be sitting in the courtroom waiting for jury selection to begin. More money will have been spent defending this case than the plaintiff was seeking when the lawsuit was first filed. Many questions come to mind:
• Should you have settled the case at the beginning? • Has your attorney been getting rich at your expense? • Is discovery more of a burden than a help?
business discussions Expanded Business Discussions The last item in each chapter is a scenario designed to stimulate conversation among students, allowing them to review and apply the material within the chapter.
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Key Terms A list of critical words or phrases is found at the end of each chapter. These terms are boldfaced in the text, and definitions are repeated in the glossary.
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RES JUDICATA Once a decision of the court has become final, it is said to be res judicata (the thing has been decided), meaning that a final decision is conclusive on all issues between the parties, whether raised in the litigation or not. Res judicata means either that the case has been finally decided on appeal or that the time for appeal has expired and a cause of action finally determined by a competent court cannot be litigated by the parties in a new proceeding by the same court or in any other court. Res judicata prevents successive suits involving the same factual setting between the same parties and brings disputes to a conclusion. A matter once litigated and legally determined is conclusive between the parties in all subsequent proceedings.
Ideally, companies will avoid litigation. See Sidebar 4.18 for practical tips to prevent lawsuits.
• Make sure supervisors and managers have access to legal counsel and use it before small issues explode into major disputes.
• Encourage teambuilding and development of coop- erative relationships in the workplace.
• Develop internal mechanisms for resolving disputes. • Perform regular audits to ensure compliance with
legal rules and best practices. • Require legal analysis of major decisions under
consideration.
sidebar 4.18
How Do You Prevent a Lawsuit in Your Firm?
Key Terms Affidavits 100 Answer 96 Appellant 110 Appellee 110 Beyond a reasonable doubt 107 Brief 111 Burden of proof 107 Class-action suit 92 Clear and convincing proof 108 Complaint 95 Counterclaim 88 Counterdefendant 89 Counterplaintiff 89 Default 96 Defendant 88 Depositions 98
Directed verdict 106 Discovery 97 Execution 113 Extradition 92 Garnishment 113 Interrogatories 97 Judgment 109 Judgment notwithstanding the
verdict 109 Judgment on the pleadings 100 Jury instructions 107 Long-arm statutes 91 Motion 100 Oral argument 111 Peremptory challenges 103 Personal jurisdiction 91
Petitioner 110 Plaintiff 88 Pleadings 95 Preponderance of evidence 108 Request for an admission 98 Request for production of
documents 97 Res judicata 114 Respondent 110 Standing to sue 89 Statute of limitations 100 Summary judgment 100 Summons 91 Third-party defendants 89 Verdict 109 Voir dire 102
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Instructor’s Resources Manual This manual consists of the teaching outline. The teaching outline section makes up the bulk of this Instructor’s Manual, which is organized by text chapter. This section corresponds with the headings in the text and typically includes suggestions on points of emphasis, answers to the case questions that appear within each chapter of the text, cases for discussion, and additional matters for discussion. Each chapter of this manual also includes a list of references that might be useful secondary sources of information and suggested answers to all case questions and responses to the end-of-chapter review questions.
Test Bank Instructors can test students’ mastery of concepts as the instructors create exams with the use of this Test Bank. Organized by chapter, the Test Bank contains multiple-choice, true/ false, and essay questions. Many of the questions have been modified to correspond with the text’s revision. Answers immediately follow each question, along with corresponding Learning Objectives.
PowerPoint Presentation The PowerPoint Presentation provides detailed lecture outlines for discussing key points and figures from the book.
Business Law Newsletter McGraw-Hill Education’s monthly Business Law newsletter, Proceedings, is designed specifically with the Business Law educator in mind. Proceedings incorporates “hot topics” in business law, video suggestions, an ethical dilemma, teaching tips, and a “chapter key” cross-referencing newsletter topics with the various McGraw-Hill Education business law textbooks. Proceedings is delivered via e-mail to business law instructors each month.
Assurance of Learning Ready Many educational institutions today are focused on the notion of assurance of learning, an important element of some accreditation standards. The Legal and Regulatory Environment of Business, 19e, is designed specifically to support your assurance of learning initiatives with a simple, yet powerful solution. Each test bank question for The Legal and Regulatory Environment of Business, 19e, maps to a specific chapter learning outcome/objective listed in the text. You can use our test bank software to easily query for learning outcomes/objectives that directly relate to the learning objectives for your course.
support materials
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AACSB Statement The McGraw-Hill Companies is a proud corporate member of AACSB International. Understanding the importance and value of AACSB accreditation, The Legal and Regulatory Environment of Business, 18e, recognizes the curricula guidelines detailed in the AACSB standards for business accreditation by connecting selected questions in the text and the test bank to the six general knowledge and skill guidelines in the AACSB standards. The statements contained in The Legal and Regulatory Environment of Business, 19e, are provided only as a guide for the users of this textbook. The AACSB leaves content coverage and assessment within the purview of individual schools, the mission of the school, and the faculty. While The Legal and Regulatory Environment of Business, 19e, and the teaching package make no claim of any specific AACSB qualification or evaluation, we have within The Legal and Regulatory Environment of Business, 19e, labeled selected questions according to the six general knowledge and skills areas.
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PartONE Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business 1 Law as a Foundation for Business 4 2 The Role of Ethics in Decision Making 26 3 Understanding the Court System 60 4 Litigation 86 5 Alternative Dispute Resolution 118 6 The Constitution 150
PartTWO Basic Legal Principles 7 The Property System 186 8 Contract Formation 224 9 Contractual Performance and Breach 258 10 Torts Affecting Business 282 11 Intellectual Property 312 12 Global Expansion and International Law 352 13 Criminal Law and Business 380 14 Business Organizations 414
PartTHREE The Regulatory Landscape for Business 15 The Regulatory Process 450 16 Regulating Competition—Antitrust Laws 476 17 Financial and Securities Regulations 510 18 Privacy and Consumer Protection 550 19 Environmental Regulation and Resource Sustainability 582
PartFOUR The Employer—Employee Relationship 20 Employment Discrimination Laws 616 21 Employer Responsibilities and Employee Rights -Employment Laws 654 22 Labor—Management Relationship 684
Appendix I: Case Briefing and Legal Study Tips 709 Appendix II: Sample Complaint 711 Appendix III: The Constitution of the United States of America 714 Appendix IV: Selected Sections of Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code 723 Appendix V: Selected Sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 729 Appendix VI: Selected Sections of Securities Act of 1933 733 Appendix VI: Selected Sections of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 735 Glossary 737 Index 757
brief table of contents
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PartONE Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
1. Law as a Foundation for Business 4 INTRODUCTION 5
WHY LAW AND REGULATIONS ARE FUNDAMENTAL FOUNDATIONS FOR BUSINESS 6
sidebar 1.1 Sustainability and Integrity: Cautionary Tales of Legal Liability 6
Law, the Rule of Law, and Property 7 LAW 7
THE RULE OF LAW 7
PROPERTY 8 sidebar 1.2 Lawyers in the Boardroom 9
PROPERTY IN ITS BROADEST SENSE 9 sidebar 1.3 China: The Rule of Law and Property Rights are Key 11
JURISPRUDENCE 11
Classifications of Law 12 COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 12
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 13
CIVIL LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW 13 sidebar 1.4 Goldman Sachs: “Rouge” Bankers and a $1 Billion Legal Charge 14
SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURAL LAW 14
Sources of Law 14 FEDERAL LAW 15
STATE LAW 15
JUDICIAL DECISIONS OR CASE LAW 15 Advantages 16
Disadvantages 16
SOURCES OF LAW HIERARCHY IN REVIEW 17
LEGAL SANCTIONS 17
SANCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT 18
SANCTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 18
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SANCTIONS FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT 19
SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 19
Property and Corporate Governance 20 THE SPECIFIC SENSE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 20
THE GENERAL SENSE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 21 sidebar 1.5 Corporate Social Responsibility: Good Faith 22
2. The Role of Ethics in Decision Making 26 Contemporary Business Ethics 28 MODERN ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 29
ETHICS AND SOCIETY 30 Changing Normative Values 30
Economic Interdependence 30
News Media and the Internet 31
ETHICS AND GOVERNMENT 31 sidebar 2.1 Wells Fargo Sham Accounts 31
The Nature of Ethics 32 ETHICS AND MORALITY 32
ETHICS AND LAW 33 sidebar 2.2 Price Gouging after Hurricane Katrina 34
Two Systems of Ethics 35 FORMALISM 35
Kant and Formalism 35
The Social Contract 36
CONSEQUENTIALISM 37 sidebar 2.3 Facebook Tackles Fake News 38
The Protestant Ethic 38
COMPARING THE TWO ETHICAL SYSTEMS 39 sidebar 2.4 Tobacco Facts 40
Sources of Values for Business Ethics 40 LEGAL REGULATION 41
Liberty and Rights 41
Good Faith 41
Due Care 42
Confidentiality 42
Conflicts of Interest 43
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PROFESSIONAL CODES OF ETHICS 43 sidebar 2.5 American Marketing Association Statement of Ethics 44 sidebar 2.6 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code of Professional Conduct 45
ORGANIZATIONAL CODES OF ETHICS 46 Different Approaches to Ethical Codes 46
sidebar 2.7 Boeing Code of Conduct 47
INDIVIDUAL VALUES 48
Achieving an Ethical Business Corporation 50 THE OBSTACLES 50
The Emphasis on Profit 50
sidebar 2.8 The Swedish Example of Lagom 51 The Effect of the Group 51
The Control of Resources by Nonowners 51
THE STEPS 52 Involvement of Top Management 52
sidebar 2.9 Failure and Collapse 52 Openness in Communication 53
Consideration of All Stakeholders 54
THE REWARDS 54 sidebar 2.10 Removing Conflict Minerals from the Supply Chain 55
CAN A BUSINESS HAVE A CONSCIENCE? 55 sidebar 2.11 Same-Sex Marriage Debate and “Kiss-Ins” 56
3. Understanding the Court System 60 sidebar 3.1 The “Daunting Workload” of Federal Trial Judges 62
Personnel 62 JUDGES AND JUSTICES 62
JURORS 63 sidebar 3.2 Trial Consultants and Technical Support: Other Key Parties in Litigation 64
LAWYERS 65
Organization of the Court System 66 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 66
STATE COURTS 66 Trial Courts 66
Appellate Courts 67
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FEDERAL COURTS 67 sidebar 3.3 Small-Claims Courts 68
District Courts 69
Appellate Courts 69
sidebar 3.4 Circuit Scorecard 71
DECISIONS BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 71 sidebar 3.5 Very Slim Odds 72 sidebar 3.6 The Role of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice 73
The Power of Judicial Review 73 sidebar 3.7 Choosing a Supreme Court Justice 74 sidebar 3.8 Business and the Roberts Court 75
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 75
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 76 sidebar 3.9 Typical Alignment of Justices 77
A SAMPLE U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE 77 sidebar 3.10 Labeling Judges as Liberal or Conservative 77
case 3.1 IANCU v. BRUNETTI 78
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 79 sidebar 3.11 U.S. Supreme Court Justices 80 sidebar 3.12 The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 82
4. Litigation 86 Litigation—An Overview 88
sidebar 4.1 Inadequate Risk Management Leads to High Legal Costs 88
PARTIES 88
STANDING TO SUE 89
case 4.1 JULIANA v. UNITED STATES 90
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 91 sidebar 4.2 Personal Jurisdiction: Minimum Contacts 91 sidebar 4.3 Where Does Mark Zuckerberg Reside? 92
CLASS-ACTION SUITS 92 sidebar 4.4 Consumer-Related Liability Watch: Allegations Against Apple and the Fallout from Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal 93 sidebar 4.5 Record Number of Securities Class-Action Lawsuit Settlements 94
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Pretrial Procedures 95 sidebar 4.6 Understanding the Sample Complaint 95
PLEADINGS 95
STEPS IN DISCOVERY 96 Purpose 97
Methods 97
sidebar 4.7 Discovery Abuse: Alleged Failure to Produce Documents 97
SCOPE OF DISCOVERY 98 sidebar 4.8 Data Analytics and Litigation 98 sidebar 4.9 Litigation Holds and E-Discovery 99
MOTIONS 99
FRIVOLOUS CASES 100 sidebar 4.10 Wacky Warning Label Contest 101
The Trial 102 JURY SELECTION 102
sidebar 4.11 The Intersection of the Internet and Juries 103 sidebar 4.12 The Jury and Constitutional Limits on Peremptory Challenges 104 sidebar 4.13 Religion and Peremptory Challenges 104
OTHER STEPS DURING A TRIAL 104
case 4.2 WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES 105
BURDEN OF PROOF 107 Criminal Cases 107
Civil Cases 108
sidebar 4.14 Cameras in the Courtroom 109
DECIDING THE CASE 109
Posttrial Issues 110 APPEALS 110
sidebar 4.15 Qualcomm and Posttrial Sanctions 111 Appellate Procedures 111
Deference to Trial Courts 112
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND DECREES 112 sidebar 4.16 Appealing an Evidentiary Ruling 113 sidebar 4.17 Discovery of Misconduct Causes Lockheed to Lose Its $37 Million Verdict 113
RES JUDICATA 114 sidebar 4.18 How Do You Prevent a Lawsuit in Your Firm? 114
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5. Alternative Dispute Resolution 118 Conflicts and Negotiation 120 CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES 120
STYLES AND METHODS OF NEGOTIATION 121 sidebar 5.1 Negotiation Styles 121 sidebar 5.2 A Business Dispute 122
POSITIONAL NEGOTIATION 122
PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION 123 Communication 123
Relationship 123
Interests 124
Options 124
Legitimacy 124
Alternatives 124
Commitment 124
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Systems 125 RANGE OF OPTIONS 125
SETTLEMENTS 125
FOCUS GROUPS 126
Arbitration 127 sidebar 5.3 Examples of Contracts with Arbitration Clauses 128 sidebar 5.4 Trends in Arbitration 128
SUBMISSIONS 129 sidebar 5.5 Sample Arbitration Clause 129
ARBITRATORS 129 Expertise 129
sidebar 5.6 To Arbitrate or Litigate 130 Number Chosen 130
Authority over Certain Matters 130
case 5.1 RENT-A-CENTER, WEST, INC., v. ANTONIO JACKSON 131
AWARDS 132
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 133 Impact on Policy 133
Impact on State Laws 133
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STATUTORILY MANDATED ARBITRATION 133
case 5.2 14 PENN PLAZA LLC. v. PYETT 134 sidebar 5.7 Enforcing Arbitration in Cases of Identity Theft? 135 sidebar 5.8 Strict Enforcement of a Class-Action Waiver in an Arbitration Agreement 136
Types of Cases 136
Procedures 136
VOLUNTARY/CONTRACT-BASED ARBITRATION 137
JUDICIAL REVIEW 137 Review of Voluntary/Contract-Based Arbitration Awards 137
sidebar 5.9 Single Claims v. Class Actions 138 sidebar 5.10 Judicial Review of Arbitrator’s Award 139
Review under the Federal Arbitration Act 140
sidebar 5.11 Supreme Court Continues to Develop Arbitration Law 141
Mediation 142 sidebar 5.12 Bill’s and M&N Revisited 143
PROCEDURES 143 sidebar 5.13 Steps in the Mediation Process 143
ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES 144
LACK OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT 145
COMBINATION OF ADR SYSTEMS 145
6. The Constitution 150 Basic Concepts 153 SEPARATION OF POWERS 153
SUPREMACY CLAUSE 153 Preemption 154
sidebar 6.1 Examples of State Laws Preempted by Federal Law 154
Federal Government’s Authority to Regulate Business— The Commerce Clause 155 REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE 155
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 155
IMPACT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE 156
LIMITATION ON FEDERAL AUTHORITY 156
Source: Carol M. Highsmith Archive, Library of Congress [LC-DIG-highsm-12945]
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CONTRACT CLAUSE 156
State and Local Government’s Authority to Regulate Business—Police Powers 157 LIMITATION OF POLICE POWERS 157
Exclusively Federal 157
Exclusively State 157
sidebar 6.2 Federalism and State Rights under the Commerce Clause 158
Dual Regulation 159
sidebar 6.3 State Protectionism Struck Down 160
Amendments and Basic Protections 160 FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 161
Freedom of Religion 161
sidebar 6.4 How Does the IRS Define “Churches”? 161 sidebar 6.5 Business and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 162
Freedom of Speech 162
sidebar 6.6 Art and Obscenity 163 sidebar 6.7 The FCC Is Not Amused: Controversies over the Super Bowl & More 164 sidebar 6.8 Picketing as Free Speech 164
case 6.1 SNYDER v. PHELPS 165
case 6.2 BROWN v. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION 167 sidebar 6.9 When Does a Communication Become a Threat Unprotected by the First Amendment? 169 sidebar 6.10 The Controversy over Cigarette Warning Labels 170
Freedom of the Press 170
sidebar 6.11 WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden, and Freedom of the Press 171
Second Amendment: The Right to Possess Guns 171
sidebar 6.12 The Second Amendment After the Heller Case 172 The Fifth Amendment: Takings Clause 172
Eminent Domain and the Common Good 172
Public Use 173
case 6.3 KELO v. CITY OF NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT 173 Just Compensation 176
The Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection and Due Process of Law 176
DUE PROCESS OF LAW 176 Incorporation Doctrine 177
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EQUAL PROTECTION 177 Minimum Rationality 178
Strict Scrutiny 178
Quasi-Strict Scrutiny 178
sidebar 6.13 Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution 179 sidebar 6.14 Analysis of Equal Protection 180
PartTWO Basic Legal Principles 7. The Property System 186
Introduction to the Property-Based Legal System 188 sidebar 7.1 Property as the Foundation of the Private Market 189
Rationale for the Property System 189 THE PROBLEM OF LIMITED RESOURCES 190
sidebar 7.2 The Three Faces of Property 190
PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY 191 sidebar 7.3 The Mystery of Capital 192
Defining Property in the Legal System 193 TWO BASIC DIVISIONS OF PROPERTY 193
PROPERTY BOUNDARIES IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD 194 sidebar 7.4 Additional Complexity in Defining Intangible Property 194
Defining Land 195
Air Rights 195
sidebar 7.5 Trespassing Drones? 195 Subsurface Rights 196
case 7.1 BRIGGS v. SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY PRODUCTION CO. 196
Fixtures on Land 198
Interests in Property with Respect to Others and Time 198 TYPES OF OWNERSHIP 198
Fee Simple 198
Life Estate 198
Leasehold Estate 198
Concurrent Ownership 199
Specialty Applications of Property 199 EASEMENTS 199
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BAILMENTS 200
case 7.2 DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS v. GRAY 201 sidebar 7.6 Is Your Financial Data “Property” That Is Bailed? 204
Acquiring Resources in a Property System 204 ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH EXCHANGE 204
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH POSSESSION 205 sidebar 7.7 Barry Bonds’ Home-Run Ball 205
Lost Items 206
Adverse Possession 206
sidebar 7.8 Curing Blight through Adverse Possession? 206
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH CONFUSION 207
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH ACCESSION 207
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH GIFT 208
TITLE AND PROPERTY REGISTRATION 208
Property and Security Interests 209 SECURITY INTERESTS IN LAND 209
Recording Statutes 210
Foreclosure, Deficiency, and Redemption 210
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 211 Perfection 211
ARTISAN’S LIENS AND MECHANIC’S LIENS 212
Limitations on Property and the Common Good 212 PROPERTY, THE USE OF RESOURCES, AND THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS 212
NUISANCE AND ZONING 213 sidebar 7.9 Light, Odor, Noise, and the Property Fence 214
case 7.3 COOK v. SULLIVAN 215
PROPERTY LIMITATIONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 217 Duration Limitations on Property 217
Taxation 217
PROPERTY: A CONCLUSION AND COMMENT 218 sidebar 7.10 Property Restrictions for a More Sustainable Future 218
8. Contract Formation 224 Basic Concepts 226 CONTRACT LAW IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 226
SOURCES OF CONTRACT LAW 227
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Contractual Classifications and Terminology 227 BILATERAL AND UNILATERAL CONTRACTS 228
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS 229
case 8.1 LEYDEN v. AMERICAN ACCREDITATION HEALTHCARE COMMISSION 230 sidebar 8.1 Idea Submission 231 sidebar 8.2 Implied Warranties 232
IMPLIED-IN-LAW OR QUASI-CONTRACTS 232
CONTRACTUAL ENFORCEMENT TERMINOLOGY 233
CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE TERMINOLOGY 233
Contract Formation 234 OFFER TO CONTRACT 235
sidebar 8.3 Are You Serious? 235 Definite Terms 235
sidebar 8.4 Is an Online “Policy” a Definite Offer? 236 Termination of Offer 236
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER 237 Mirror Image Rule 237
UCC Battle of the Forms 237
Silence Not Acceptance 237
case 8.2 GOTTLIEB & CO., INC. v. ALPS SOUTH CORPORATION 238 Mailbox Rule 239
sidebar 8.5 Is the Mailbox Rule Still Relevant? 240
CONSIDERATION 240 Agreement Not to Sue 241
case 8.3 VASSILKOVSKA v. WOODFIELD NISSAN, INC. 241 Preexisting Obligation 243
sidebar 8.6 Consideration Not Necessary 243 Past Consideration 243
Promise to Make a Gift 243
Option Contract 244
Promissory Estoppel 244
CAPACITY OF PARTIES TO CONTRACT 244 Minors 244
Intoxicated and Mentally Incompetent Persons 245
LAWFUL PURPOSE 245 sidebar 8.7 Overcharging Into Invalidity 245
Contracts That Restrain Trade 246
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When a “Meeting of the Minds” Is Lacking 246 FRAUD OR INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATION 246
sidebar 8.8 Restraining Competition in Sandwiches? 247 sidebar 8.9 How Green is My Ad? 248
MISTAKE 248
DURESS OR UNDUE INFLUENCE 249
Contract Form 249 ORAL CONTRACTS 249
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 250 sidebar 8.10 Examples of Contracts Required to Be Evidenced by a Signed Writing 250
Sale of an Interest in Land 250
Collateral Promise to Pay Another’s Debt 250
Cannot Be Performed within One Year 251
Sale of Goods of $500 or More 251
sidebar 8.11 Are Electronic Contracts Considered Writings? 252 Others Contracts 252
EXCEPTIONS TO THE WRITING REQUIREMENT 252 Part Performance 252
Rules Involving Goods 253
sidebar 8.12 Exceptions to Statute-of-Frauds Requirement That Sale-of-Goods Contracts Be in Writing 253
Judicial Admissions 253
9. Contractual Performance and Breach 258 Interpretation of Contracts 260 RULES OF INTERPRETATION 260
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 260 sidebar 9.1 Judging What the Contract Says 261
Performance 261 CONDITIONS OF PERFORMANCE 263
case 9.1 ST. LOUIS PRODUCE MARKET v. HUGHES 263
PAYMENT, DELIVERY, SERVICES TENDERED IN GOODS CONTRACTS 265
sidebar 9.2 Terms of Delivery in the UCC 265 DISCHARGE OF DUTIES THROUGH PERFORMANCE 266
sidebar 9.3 Levels of Performance 266 DIVISIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE 267
Excuses for Nonperformance 267
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FORCE MAJEURE 267 sidebar 9.4 Is a Global Pandemic Considered a Force Majeure? 268
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE AND FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE 268
case 9.2 EAST CAPITOL VIEW COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. ROBINSON 269
COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY 270
WAIVER OR RELEASE 270
Breach of Contract 271 DAMAGES 271
sidebar 9.5 Opening the Door to Related Liability 273
EQUITABLE REMEDIES 273
case 9.3 OLIVER v. BALL 273
EFFICIENT BREACH 275 sidebar 9.6 Walking Away from a Mortgage 275
Third Parties’ Rights 275 BENEFICIARIES 276
ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION IN CONTRACTS 276 Notice of Assignment 277
Contracts That Cannot Be Assigned or Delegated 277
NOVATIONS 278
Practical Perspective on Contracts 278 sidebar 9.7 Suggestions for Businessperson/Lawyer Relationship on the Drafting of Contracts 279
10. Torts Affecting Business 282 Intentional Torts 284
sidebar 10.1 Types of Intentional Torts 284
ASSAULT AND BATTERY 284
case 10.1 HARPER v. WINSTON COUNTY 285
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS 286
INVASION OF PRIVACY 287
case 10.2 EHLING v. MONMOUTH-OCEAN HOSPITAL SERVICE CORP. 287
FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 289
TRESPASS 289
CONVERSION 290
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DEFAMATION 290 Defamation and the First Amendment 291
sidebar 10.2 Section 230 and President Trump’s Executive Order 291
FRAUD 292 sidebar 10.3 Tort or Crime? or Both? 293
INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS 293 Injurious Falsehood 293
sidebar 10.4 One Set of Facts but Several Tort Claims? 294 Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 294
Negligence 294 sidebar 10.5 Elements of Negligence 295
DUTY OF CARE 295
case 10.3 IANNELLI v. BURGER KING CORP. 296 sidebar 10.6 Medical Malpractice Claims 297
UNREASONABLE BEHAVIOR—BREACH OF DUTY 298 Examples of Negligence 298
Willful and Wanton Negligence 298
sidebar 10.7 Strip Search Hoax Costs McDonald’s $6.1 Million 299
CAUSATION IN FACT 299
PROXIMATE CAUSATION 300
DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE 300 Contributory Negligence 300
sidebar 10.8 Explosion on the Long Island Railroad 301
Assumption of Risk 301
Strict Liability in Tort 302 STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 302
sidebar 10.9 Tort Reform 303
case 10.4 BRANHAM v. FORD MOTOR CO. 304
ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITY 305
OTHER STRICT LIABILITY TORTS 305 sidebar 10.10 The Great Molasses Flood 306
Damages 306 sidebar 10.11 The Rise of Billion Dollar Jury Verdicts 306
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 307
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 307 sidebar 10.12 Punitive Damage Guidelines 308
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11. Intellectual Property 312 sidebar 11.1 The Importance of Intellectual Property (IP) 314
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 315
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION 315 sidebar 11.2 The Open-Source Alternative 316
CAPTURING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 316
Trade Secrets 317 sidebar 11.3 Trade Secrets and International Relations 318
ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF A TRADE SECRET 318
case 11.1 AL MINOR & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. MARTIN 319
DEMONSTRATING MISAPPROPRIATION 321 Employee Mobility and Trade Secrets 321
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT OF TRADE SECRETS 321
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF TRADE SECRETS 322 sidebar 11.4 Soda Secrets 322 sidebar 11.5 Federal Government Intellectual Property Enforcement 323
Patent Law 323 OBTAINING A PATENT 324
Patent Type 324
sidebar 11.6 Can AI Be an Inventor? 325
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 325
case 11.2 ALICE CORPORATION PTY. LTD. v. CLC BANK INTERNATIONAL 326
NOVELTY, NONOBVIOUSNESS, AND UTILITY 327 sidebar 11.7 Is Software Patentable? Maybe. 328
PATENT ENFORCEMENT 329
PATENT TROLLS AND THE LITIGATION THREAT 330 sidebar 11.8 Invention Sharing During a Public Emergency 331
Trademark Law 331 TYPES OF TRADEMARKS 332
sidebar 11.9 Brands vs. Trademarks 332 Trade Dress 333
TRADEMARK REGISTRATION 333 sidebar 11.10 Can you Register an Offensive Mark? 334
Source: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Reproduction number LC-USZ62-127779 (b&w film copy neg.)
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TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT 335
case 11.3 KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC. v. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC. 336 sidebar 11.11 Counterfeiting Has a Global Economic Impact 338
Trademarks and the Internet 338
TRADEMARK DILUTION 339
Copyright Law 339 COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 340
sidebar 11.12 When Is a Uniform Expressive? 341 sidebar 11.13 Public Domain Day Finally Arrives 341
COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 342 sidebar 11.14 State Governments and Copyright: the Supreme Court Giveth and Taketh Away 342
case 11.4 SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN 343
COPYRIGHT FAIR USE 345
COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 345 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 345
sidebar 11.15 Knowledge of Users’ Infringing Activity 346
International Intellectual Property Rights 346 A Conclusion about Intellectual Property 347
12. Global Expansion and International Law 352 Risks Involved in International Trade 355
sidebar 12.1 Pharmaceutical Products to Toys: Issues Related to Sourcing 355
PRESSURES FOR BRIBES 355 sidebar 12.2 Turning Back the Tide of Corruption 356
MONEY LAUNDERING 357 sidebar 12.3 FCPA Prosecutions: U.S. Government Success Stories 358
EXPROPRIATION AND NATIONALIZATION 359
EXPORT CONTROLS 359 sidebar 12.4 U.S. Export Enforcement and Economic Espionage: Sample of Major Cases 360 sidebar 12.5 Twenty-First-Century Pirates 361
International Law and Organizations 362 sidebar 12.6 What Are Corporate Codes of Conduct? 362
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SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 362 Public International Law 363
Private International Law 364
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 364 United Nations 364
World Trade Organization 365
The European Union 366
MAJOR AGREEMENTS AFFECTING TRADE 367 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 367
North American Free Trade Agreement 368
Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 368
sidebar 12.7 Key Achievements of the U.S-Mexico-Canada Agreement 369
Other Important Trade Agreements 369
sidebar 12.8 Philip Morris: Restrictions Affecting Their Global Business 370
Methods of Transacting International Business 370 FOREIGN SALES 370
LICENSES OR FRANCHISES 371 sidebar 12.9 Successful International Franchising Ventures 371
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 372 sidebar 12.10 Chiquita Brands International: Ongoing Actions Related to Alleged Payments to Death Squads for “Protection” 372
Resolving International Disputes 373 ALIEN TORT STATUTE 373
case 12.1 KIOBEL v. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM, CO. 374
SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 375
SUING FOREIGN FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES 375 sidebar 12.11 The Reach of U.S. Law: Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd. 545 U.S. 119 (2005) 376
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 376 sidebar 12.12 Chevron and Texaco in Ecuador: $18 Billion Judgment 376
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 377
The World Intellectual Property Organization: Arbitration and Mediation Center 377
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13. Criminal Law and Business 380 Terms and Procedures 383 CLASSIFICATIONS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 383
sidebar 13.1 U.S. Department of Justice: Fraud Prosecutions 383
BASIC CONCEPTS 384
THE GRAND JURY 384 sidebar 13.2 One of the Worst Accounting Scandals of All Time: $11 Billion Accounting Fraud at WorldCom 385
Constitutional Issues 386 THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE 386
sidebar 13.3 The Fourth Amendment: Exigent Circumstances and Identification Checks 387
case 13.1 RILEY v. CALIFORNIA 388 sidebar 13.4 Know Your Miranda Rights 389
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 389
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 390 sidebar 13.5 Fifth Amendment Rights: Mere Silence Does Not Invoke Miranda 390
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS IN A CRIMINAL CASE 391
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 392
Specific Crimes 392 FRAUD 392
sidebar 13.6 Madoff’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Ponzi Scheme 393 Mail and Wire Fraud 394
sidebar 13.7 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Report: Common Fraud Schemes 394
case 13.2 SKILLING v. UNITED STATES 395 Securities Fraud 397
sidebar 13.8 Preventing Identity Theft 397 Health Care Fraud 398
Counterfeiting 398
sidebar 13.9 False Claims Act and Whistleblower Lawsuits 398 Bankruptcy Fraud 399
CONSPIRACY 399 sidebar 13.10 Anatomy of a Prosecution: The Demise of Enron 400
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OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 400 sidebar 13.11 Think Before You Act: Examples of Obstruction of Justice 401
FALSE STATEMENT TO A BANK 402
FALSE STATEMENT TO A FEDERAL AGENCY 402 sidebar 13.12 Massey Energy Co. Explosion: Multiple Charges 403
LARCENY 403
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO) 404
sidebar 13.13 Major RICO Prosecutions 405
CYBER CRIME 406
ENDANGERING WORKERS 406 sidebar 13.14 HACKED! The Increasing Problem of Cyber Crime 407
AIDING AND ABETTING 408
BRIBERY AND KICKBACKS 408 sidebar 13.15 Bribery Prosecutions 409
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 409
TRENDS 410
14. Business Organizations 414 FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 416
sidebar 14.1 Possible Forms of Business Organizations 416
Factors to Consider when Selecting a Business’s Organizational Form 416 CREATION 417
CONTINUITY 417
MANAGERIAL CONTROL 417
LIABILITY 417
TAXATION 418 sidebar 14.2 U.S. Corporate Taxes are No Longer the Highest in the World 418
Selecting the Best Organizational Form 419 SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS 420
Creation 420
Continuity 420
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Managerial Control 420
Liability 420
Taxation 420
PARTNERSHIPS 420 Creation 421
sidebar 14.3 Formation and Naming of a Partnership 421 Continuity 421
sidebar 14.4 Anticipating a Partnership’s Dissolution—Buy and Sell Agreements 422
Managerial Control 422
Liability 422
Taxation 422
CORPORATIONS 423 Creation 424
sidebar 14.5 Steps in Creation of a Corporation 424 Continuity 424
Managerial Control 425
sidebar 14.6 Why Are So Many Companies Incorporated in Delaware? 425
Liability 426
case 14.1 ALLI v. U.S. 427 Taxation 429
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 430 Creation 431
Continuity 431
Managerial Control 431
Liability 431
sidebar 14.7 Actions by Limited Partner 432
S CORPORATIONS 432
LIMITED LIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS 433 Creation 433
Continuity 433
Managerial Control 433
sidebar 14.8 Fiduciary Duties in LLCs 434 Liability 434
Taxation 434
NON-PROFITS 434
MAKING THE DECISION 435
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Operating the Organization through Agents 435 TERMINOLOGY 436
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY FROM AN AGENT’S ACTS 436 Actual Authority 437
Implied Authority 437
Apparent Authority 437
Ratification 438
TORT LIABILITY FROM AN AGENT’S ACTS 438
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 439
Trends in Managing the Organization 439 case 14.2 MARCHAND v. BARNHILL. 440
PartTHREE The Regulatory Landscape for Business 15. The Regulatory Process 450
Regulatory Process—Administrative Agencies 452 REASONS FOR AGENCIES 452
sidebar 15.1 Major Federal Agencies 453 Providing Specificity 453 Providing Expertise 454 Providing Protection 454 Providing Regulation 454 Providing Services 454
FUNCTIONS OF AGENCIES 455 Rule Making 455 Adjudicating 456 Advising 456 Investigating 456
sidebar 15.2 Is the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Constitutional? 457
ORGANIZATION OF AGENCIES 457 In General 457 Quasi-Judicial Staff 459
case 15.1 FREE LUCIA v. SEC 459 sidebar 15.3 Procedures Followed in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings 461
INFLUENCING AGENCY DECISIONS 461
Judicial Review of Agency Decisions 462
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STANDING TO SUE 462 Reviewability 462 Aggrieved Party 462
REVIEW OF RULE MAKING 462 sidebar 15.4 Standing to Sue or Who May Challenge an Administrative Policy 463
Is Delegation Valid? 463 Authority Exceeded? 464
sidebar 15.5 Standard of Review of Agency Actions 464 case 15.2 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION 465
REVIEW OF ADJUDICATIONS: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 467 Exhaustion of Remedies 468
Primary Jurisdiction 468
sidebar 15.6 Exceptions to Requirement of Exhaustion 468
REVIEW OF FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS 469
Criticism of Administrative Agencies 470 sidebar 15.7 Criticisms of Administrative Process 470
THE COSTS TO BUSINESS 471
THE COSTS TO SOCIETY 471
CONCLUSION 472 sidebar 15.8 Trends in Regulations: Growth of Government in the 20th Century 473
16. Regulating Competition—Antitrust Laws 476 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 478
The Sherman Act, Section 1—Agreements in Restraint of Trade 479 ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST LAW 481
Rule of Reason 481
Per Se Illegality 481
HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING 482
case 16.1 PROSTERMAN v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. 482
VERTICAL PRICE FIXING 485
INDIRECT PRICE FIXING 486
TERRITORIAL AGREEMENTS 486
CONCERTED ACTIVITIES 487
case 16.2 AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 487
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sidebar 16.1 Basic Provisions of National Cooperative Research and Production Act 489
The Sherman Act, Section 2—Monopolization 490 sidebar 16.2 Are Big Tech Companies Monopolists? 490
case 16.3 APPLE, INC. V. PEPPER. 491 sidebar 16.3 Proving That an Illegal Monopoly Exists is Not Easy 493
Sherman Act Sanctions and Exceptions 494 SANCTIONS 494
EXEMPTIONS 496 sidebar 16.4 Antitrust vs. Securities Regulation 497
The Clayton Act 498 PRICE DISCRIMINATION 498
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS 499 sidebar 16.5 Tying Contracts, Patents, and Standard of Review 500
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 502 sidebar 16.6 Preserving Competition in Pens, Post-Its, and Paper Clips 503
The Federal Trade Commission Act—Unfair Competition 503
sidebar 16.7 Read it!—The FTC and DOJ Guidelines 504
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 505
17. Financial and Securities Regulations 510 WHAT IS A SECURITY? 513
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 514
The Securities Act of 1933: Going Public 514 PARTIES REGULATED 515
DOCUMENTS INVOLVED 515 Registration Statement 515
Prospectus 516
LIABILITY 517 Section 11: Registration Statement 517
Section 12: Prospectus and Other Communications 518
Section 17: Fraudulent Transactions 518
DEFENSES 518 Materiality 518
Statute of Limitations 519
Due Diligence 519
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Being Public 520 sidebar 17.1 Language of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC’s Rule 10b-5 521
SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5 521 Liability 521
Damages 521
case 17.1 FRANCIS V. LORENZO V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. 522 sidebar 17.2 Proof of Loss Due to Fraud 523
Materiality 524
sidebar 17.3 Right to Contribution from Others 524 sidebar 17.4 Statute of Limitations for Fraud Claims 525
International Application 525
case 17.2 MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. 526
INSIDER TRANSACTIONS 528
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION 529
case 17.3 UNITED STATES v. O’HAGAN 530
ADDITIONAL CIVIL LIABILITY 532
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 532
Other Considerations 534 PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 534
case 17.4 HALLIBURTON CO. v. ERICA P. JOHN FUND, INC. 535
STATE BLUE SKY LAWS 538 Registration Requirements 538
Exemptions 538
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 539 REVITALIZATION OF SEC 540
ACCOUNTING REFORMS 540
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 540
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND CONTROLS 541
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 542 sidebar 17.5 Extending Whistleblower Protection 542
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 543
sidebar 17.6 CFPB Files Brief Addressing Spokeo v. Robins Petition 545
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 545
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18. Privacy and Consumer Protection 550 The Federal Trade Commission 552 THE FTC AND TRADE PRACTICE REGULATION 552
FTC PENALTIES AND REMEDIES 554 Civil Fines 554
Other Remedies 554
sidebar 18.1 When Clean Diesel Isn’t so Clean 555
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: THE FTC TODAY 555
Privacy 556 LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENT INTRUSIONS 556
case 18.1 CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 557
TRADITIONAL BUSINESS PRIVACY 559
ELECTRONIC AND ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION 560
STATE AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION 561 sidebar 18.2 Exchanging Privacy for Protection During A Crisis 562 sidebar 18.3 The Long Reach of the GDPR 563
False Advertising 563 case 18.2 LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. STATIC CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC. 565
Federal Credit Regulations 567 THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT 567
ECOA Prohibitions 567
Responsibilities of the Credit Extender 567
ECOA Remedies and Penalties 568
sidebar 18.4 Who Regulates FinTech? 568
THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 569 Consumer Rights under FCRA 569
Investigative Consumer Reports 569
Observing Reasonable Procedures 570
FCRA Penalties and Remedies 570
case 18.3 SAFECO INSURANCE CO. v. BURR 570 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act Amendments 571
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 571
THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT 572 Truth-in-Lending Coverage 572
Finance Charge and Annual Percentage Rate 572
Financing Statement 572
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Penalties and Remedies under Truth-in-Lending 573
sidebar 18.4 Truth-in-Lending and the Subprime Mortgage Mess 573
Truth-in-Lending Trends 574
Debt Collection and Consumer Protection 574 THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 574
FDCPA Remedies and Enforcement 574
State Laws Regulating Debt Collection 575
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT 575
BANKRUPTCY 576 Bankruptcy Proceedings 576
Trustee in Bankruptcy 576
Creditor Priority 576
Discharge 577
ADDITIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION 577
19. Environmental Regulation and Resource Sustainability 582
sidebar 19.1 Categories of Environmental and Pollution-Control Laws 584
Government’s Regulation of Itself 585 THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 585
NEPA Basics 585
EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 586
case 19.1 SIERRA FOREST LEGACY v. SHERMAN 586 NEPA Trends 588
Government’s Regulation of Business 588 THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 589
sidebar 19.2 Responsibilities of the EPA 589
AIR POLLUTION 589 Clean Air Act and Amendments 589
Clean Air Act Enforcement 590
Air Pollution Sources 590
CLEAN AIR ACT TODAY 591 Emissions Reduction Banking 591
Prevention of Significant Deterioration 592
The Permitting Process 592
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Indoor Pollution 592
Conclusion 592
case 19.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. EME HOMER CITY GENERATION L.P. 593
WATER POLLUTION 594 Goals and Enforcement 595
sidebar 19.3 The Dakota Access Pipeline Controversy 596
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 596 Application of the ESA 597
PESTICIDE CONTROL 597 The Federal Pesticide Acts 598
Enforcement 598
SOLID WASTE 599 The Solid Waste Disposal Act 599
TOXIC AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 600 The Problem 600
Toxic Substances Control Act 600
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 601
The Superfund 602
case 19.3 BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. v. UNITED STATES 603
Radiation 606
Suits by Private Individuals 606 CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT 606
TORT THEORIES 607 Nuisance 607
Other Tort Doctrines 607
Sustainability Approaches 608 AREAS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 609
Loss of Natural Ecosystems 609 Ozone 609 Greenhouse Effect 610
sidebar 19.4 Mass Extinction and Its Consequences 610
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 610 sidebar 19.5 Hersey Commits to Environmental Sustainability 611
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 611
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PartFOUR The Employer–Employee Relationship 20. Employment Discrimination Laws 616
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 618 GENERAL PROVISIONS 618
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 619 The 1991 Amendments 619
Winning a Title VII Civil Action 620
case 20.1 THOMPSON v. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS, LP 621
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE OR COLOR 623 sidebar 20.1 Hithon v. Tyson Foods, Inc.: The Use of the Word “Boy” 624
case 20.2 RICCI v. DESTEFANO 625 sidebar 20.2 Abercrombie & Fitch’s $40 Million Diversity Lesson 627
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN 627 sidebar 20.3 National Origin: Problematic Discrimination and Slurs 628
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION 628 sidebar 20.4 Workplace Discrimination against Muslims 629
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX 629 sidebar 20.5 Women in Business: A Tough Go for Many 630
Sexual Harassment 631
sidebar 20.6 Sexual Harassment in the Workplace 632 Pregnancy Discrimination Act 633
sidebar 20.7 Pregnancy Discrimination: Claims on the Rise 634 Equal Pay Act 634
sidebar 20.8 Did the Supreme Court Get It Wrong? Legislative Action Post-Ledbetter 635
Sexual Orientation Discrimination 636
sidebar 20.9 Sexual Orientation Discrimination 636
Employment Practices That May Be Challenged 637 QUESTIONNAIRES, INTERVIEWS, TESTING, AND EDUCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS 637
HEIGHT AND WEIGHT REQUIREMENTS 638
APPEARANCE REQUIREMENTS 638
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 638 Private Employer Affirmative Action 639
SENIORITY SYSTEMS 640
Other Statutes and Discrimination in Employment 640
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CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 641 Unlimited Damages 641
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF AGE 641 Types of Age Discrimination 642
sidebar 20.10 Did You Read the Law? A Law Firm Runs Afoul of the ADEA 642
Employer Defenses in ADEA Cases 643
Remedies under the ADEA 643
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITIES 643 Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA 644
sidebar 20.11 Chipotle Mexican Grill: Must Accommodate Disabled Patrons 645
Remedies under the ADA 646
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 646 sidebar 20.12 Protecting against Inadvertent Acquisition of Medical Information in Violation of GINA 647
DISCRIMINATION IN GETTING AND KEEPING HEALTH INSURANCE 647
OTHER FEDERAL LEGISLATION 647
STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 648
TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND LITIGATION 648 Surge in Private Lawsuits 648
sidebar 20.13 Is It Important to Investors if the CEO Is a Man or a Woman? 643
Arbitration in Employment Discrimination Disputes 649
Insuring against Employment Discrimination Claims 650
21. Employer Responsibilities and Employee Rights— Employment Laws 654
sidebar 21.1 Fair Labor Standards Act: To Pay or Not to Pay Overtime? 656
Employment Laws 656 MINIMUM WAGES AND MAXIMUM HOURS 656
case 21.1 SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. 658 sidebar 21.2 Internship Programs under the FLSA 659 sidebar 21.3 Break Time for Nursing Moms 660
case 21.2 KASTEN V. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS CORP. 660
THE WARN ACT 662
THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 663
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sidebar 21.4 FMLA: Facts and Statistics 664 sidebar 21.5 EEOC: Best Practices Recommendations on Work/ Family Balance 664 sidebar 21.6 States Are Immune from FMLA Self-Care Claims 665
FMLA and Military Families 666
UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT 666
sidebar 21.7 Rand Study: Invisible Wounds of War 667
case 21.3 STAUB v. PROCTOR HOSPITAL 667
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 669 sidebar 21.8 New OSHA Crowd Management Safety Guidelines 670 sidebar 21.9 OSHA’s Severe Violator Enforcement Program 670
PENSION PLANS 671
HEALTH CARE 671 sidebar 21.10 Families First Coronavirus Response Act 672
LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 672 sidebar 21.11 IRS Whistleblowers Rewards Program 673 sidebar 21.12 Privacy, Technology and Social Media 674
WORKERS’ PRIVACY 674 sidebar 21.13 Is There Any Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Workplace? 675
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACTS 675 History 675
The System 676
Tests for Determining Compensation 677
Exclusive Remedy Rule 677
The Future of State Workers’ Compensation 678
EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION 678 sidebar 21.14 Arizona Law on Hiring Foreign Workers Is Upheld 679
Employee Lawsuits 679 sidebar 21.15 What Can Employers Do to Avoid Employment Litigation? 680
22. Labor—Management Relationship 684 Labor Laws 686
sidebar 22.1 2019 Statistics on Union Membership 687
LAWS BEFORE 1935 687 The Clayton Act 687
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The Railway Labor Act 688
The Norris-LaGuardia Act 689
The Wagner Act 689 sidebar 22.2 Three Executive Orders Impacting Unions 690
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 690 NLRB Organization 690
Jurisdiction 691
case 22.1 HISPANICS UNITED OF BUFFALO, INC. AND CARLOS ORTIZ 691
Quasi-Judicial Authority 692
sidebar 22.3 Are College Football Players Employees? 693
CERTIFICATION OF UNIONS 693 Certification Elections 693
sidebar 22.4 Limitation of NLRB’s Remedies 694 Certification through Cards 694
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY MANAGEMENT 694 sidebar 22.5 An Historic Vote to Unionize at Kickstarter 695
Interfering with Unionization 695
Dominating a Labor Organization 696
Discriminating Based on Union Affiliation 696
Discriminating as a Result of NLRB Proceedings 697
Refusing to Bargain in Good Faith 696
sidebar 22.6 This Was No Joke: The Writers Guild of America Strike 698 sidebar 22.7 Fired! Venting about the Boss on Facebook 699
The Taft-Hartley Act 699 EIGHTY-DAY COOLING-OFF PERIOD 700
FREE SPEECH 700 sidebar 22.8 Tweeting His Way to Termination 701
UNION SHOP—MEMBERSHIPS AND FEES 701 sidebar 22.9 Restricting Workplace Speech: Setting the Parameters 702
SUITS AGAINST UNIONS 702 sidebar 22.10 Making a Point: Union Protests with Giant Inflatable Rats 703
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY UNIONS 703 Restraining or Coercing an Employee into Joining a Union 704
Causing an Employer to Discriminate against a Nonunion Member 704
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Striking or Picketing for Illegal Purposes or Engaging in Secondary Boycotts 704
AMENDMENTS 705 Agreeing to Engage in a Secondary Boycott 705
Picketing When Not Certified 705
Appendix I: Case Briefing and Legal Study Tips 709
Appendix II: Sample Complaint 711
Appendix III: The Constitution of the United States of America 714
Appendix IV: Selected Sections of Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code 723
Appendix V: Selected Sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 729
Appendix VI: Selected Sections of Securities Act of 1933 733
Appendix VII: Selected Sections of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 735
Glossary 737
Index 757
1
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I n the 21st century, business managers who under- stand how to handle legal challenges will be in a position to use law to their strategic advantage.
As President John Adams said, the United States is a nation “of law.” Certainly, law is all around us. The news media are full of stories about law, and many of our most popular television programs concern lawyers, courts, and law enforcement. Law surrounds how we buy and sell goods, when we can drive a car and vote, and who we can see for many licensed ser- vices. Law taxes and punishes us as well as grants rights and privileges. Marriage and divorce apply rules of law, and even birth and death have legal sig- nificance. The conduct of modern business is hardly possible without the support of law, and everything you own is yours because of law. Part One of this book helps you understand the legal foundations for business.
Chapter 1 emphasizes the importance of under- standing the fundamental role of law for business. The chapter explains that there are understand- able organizing principles to the legal system, and it asserts that these principles—law, the rule of law, and property—provide a necessary foundation for successful modern business. Chapter 1 also covers the concepts of jurisprudence, explains the sources of law, sets out various classifications of law, iden- tifies legal sanctions, and introduces the concept of corporate governance. A good part of what you do in this course is to learn a legal vocabulary. Even more
important, you must then learn to apply it. Chapter 1 gets this important process under way.
Chapter 2 emphasizes that the social basis of legal rules in a democracy are the traditional values, morals, and ethics of society. In a democracy, law is a very significant expression of society’s moral beliefs and concerns. Law often prohibits behavior that we consider morally wrong and permits or tol- erates customary behaviors. Chapter 2 looks at two ethical systems: formalism and consequentialism. It then examines various sources of values for business ethics, including legal regulation, professional and organizational codes of ethics, and individual values. It also suggests an approach to individual ethics in business organizations.
The next three chapters address dispute reso- lution, by explaining the U.S. court system, as well as the process of litigation and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Learning about the court system and ways to resolve disputes will help you understand how business can use the law strategi- cally. Also, as you read law-related news, these basic concepts are fundamental to grasp how and why a company resolves disputes.
Chapter 3 explains the court system, identifying key players: judges, jurors, and lawyers. Each plays a distinct and important role. This chapter also sets forth the organization of the state and federal court systems, including the appellate courts. This chapter also includes a guided reading of the text’s first court
Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
Part ONE
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opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court case Iancu v. Bru- netti, which addresses issues related to the Lanham Act, specifically whether the prohibition on the reg- istration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks infringes on the First Amendment.
Chapter 4 focuses on how civil cases move through the court system in a process known as litigation. This chapter describes how the filing of a complaint commences cases and then explains all of the other pleadings that can be filed, as well as all of the pretrial discovery procedures and motions. The chapter concludes with information about the stages of a trial and any posttrial appeals.
There are many drawbacks to litigation, and Chapter 5 illustrates alternative ways to resolve dis- putes. This chapter explains different negotiating techniques to settle disputes. It also demonstrates the key differences between mediation and arbitra- tion. Although both use a neutral third party to assist in resolving the dispute, they have significantly dif- ferent features, which are important to know before agreeing to resolve a dispute.
Chapter 6, the final chapter in Part One, dis- cusses the U.S. Constitution and constitutional guarantees relevant to business, including First Amendment protections, due process, and equal pro- tection. This chapter also explains the significance of the Commerce Clause. Decisions involving the Com- merce Clause have played a major role in defining how business works in the United States. This clause has a rich history of empowering the federal govern- ment’s authority to regulate business.
Taken together, these chapters introduce readers to the legal foundations for business. The following section makes suggestions about the best way to read and study The Legal and Regulatory Environment of Business.
How to Study This Textbook To read this textbook, we highly recommend a cer- tain method called Survey, Question, Read, Recite, Review (SQ3R). SQ3R is much more effective than simply starting at the beginning of a chapter and reading straight through to the end. But it should not take much longer than reading straight through.
If you are allowing two hours for the reading of a chapter, first take no more than five or six minutes and “survey” the chapter. Flip through the chapter and look at all of the main headings and subhead- ings of the sections, perhaps also looking at the first sentences of several paragraphs in each section. In surveying you are not trying to learn or even under- stand the material but rather to get an idea of what the chapter is about.
After surveying the material, develop a “ques- tion” for each section as you read. If the section heading says “Why Nations Are Economically Weak or Strong,” turn the heading into a question, like “Why are some nations economically weak and oth- ers economically strong?” Then “read” the section with the purpose of answering your question. When you finish reading, “recite” aloud or silently to your- self the answer to the question.
The last “R” refers to “review.” Spend the last 10 minutes of your study time reviewing the chapter. A good way to do this is to go back to your ques- tions and answer them again. If you will study by this method, we guarantee more effective results than if you simply read the chapter straight through. We have included a longer explanation of SQ3R as Appendix 1 in the back of the book, along with an explanation of the case briefing system, which you may need beginning with Chapter 3. •
2
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
1-1 To understand that laws and regulations are fundamental foundations for business.
1-2 To explain that “property” in the law refers not to something that is owned but to the right of ownership itself, which gives incentive for wealth creation.
1-3 To analyze why stare decisis is different in common law nations than in civil law nations.
1-4 To classify what legal sources lawyers turn to in answering legal questions from their clients and the hierarchy of those sources.
Law as a Foundation for Business1 Pixtal/AGE Fotostock
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Introduction
B usiness school students may wonder why they
need to study the law. The answer is quite
straightforward. Law is an essential foundation
for business. Learning about the law is key to understand-
ing how law can be used for strategic advantage and to
develop sustainable business practices. Law is pivotal to
successful innovation. Consider, for example, the impor-
tance of substantive legal topics such as torts, contracts,
intellectual property, and labor and employment for
business. A culture of legal compliance is necessary for
business practices to be sustainable. As you learn about
the law, also consider the ethical implications of deci-
sions and how integrity is critical to long-term viability.
This text and its accompanying electronic fea-
tures are designed to create a learning environment in
which you will gain:
• The legal vocabulary to communicate with law-
yers and business colleagues about areas of the
law in a sophisticated manner.
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• The ability to identify legal issues potentially relevant to a particular business situation. • The judgment to make sound business decisions to prevent legal disputes. • The knowledge to determine legal issues that require advice from counsel. • The foundation to act as a sophisticated consumer of legal services.
As you read this book, consider the impact of the law on business. This chapter provides a basic overview of the law, helping you understand the common classifica- tions and sources of law. Many examples are provided throughout the chapters to underscore the relevance of the law for business.
WHY LAW AND REGULATIONS ARE FUNDAMENTAL FOUNDATIONS FOR BUSINESS In the 21st century, it is crucial for companies doing business in the United States to be aware of the legal and regulatory landscape. Lawyers are increasingly taking on key leadership roles within corporations as their expertise is key to sustainable busi- ness practices. As vividly evidenced by the experience of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Deutsche Bank in Sidebar 1.1, companies must take steps to ensure that they are in
LO 1-1
When the former chief executive of Wells Fargo John G. Stumpf was fined $17.5 million in 2020 for his role in the company’s fake accounts scandal, it became clear that the tone from the top not only matters—it can give rise to individual liability. More individual fines are expected to follow sending a strong signal that corporate cultures that foster fraud will lead to personal liability.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. has come a long way from the significant legal liability it experienced a few years ago. If there was ever a question about the toll that wrongdoing can take on a company, it was addressed by Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. In his 2013, 30-page letter to shareholders, Dimon addressed the ramifications of the bank’s legal cases with multiple government agencies, stating that the previous year was “the most painful, difficult, and nerve wracking experience that I have ever dealt with professionally.” At that time, the company had already spent more than $20 billion to set- tle a range of cases.
JPMorgan undertook to add more than 13,000 employees to handle regulatory compliance and risk control, including approximately 8,000 employees whose primary responsibility is to combat money laundering. The company expected to spend $2 billion to com- ply with new rules and regulations. In the same letter to
shareholders, Dimon acknowledged that the company was too self-assured when it saw regulators investigating its competitors and that the company needs to be “bet- ter listeners and do a better job at examining critiques of others so [it] can learn from other people’s mistakes, too.”
Also facing massive liability, Deutsche Bank agreed to a $7.2 billion settlement in 2016 with the U.S. Depart- ment of Justice in connection with its sale of toxic mort- gage securities. The settlement included a $3.1 billion civil penalty and $4.1 billion in consumer relief, primarily in the form of loan forgiveness. In early 2017, Deutsche Bank agreed to a $95 million settlement to resolve a lawsuit brought by the U.S. government that accused Deutsche Bank of tax fraud involving shell companies.
These examples underscore the importance of integ- rity for sustainability, including the key role boards of directors play to assure stakeholders that the company is engaged in business practices with an eye to long-term value creation.
Sources: Stacy Cowley and Emily Flitter, “Wells Fargo’s Ex-Chief Fined $17.5 Million Over Fake Accounts, New York Times, January 23, 2020; John H. Stout, “Sustainability Meets Integrity,” ABA Journal, December 20, 2016; “Deutsche Bank Agrees to Pay $95 Million to End Tax Fraud Case,” Reuters, January 5, 2017; “Deutsche Bank Agrees to a $7.2 Billion Settlement with the U.S.,” Reuters, December 23, 2016; David Henry, “JPMorgan’s Dimon Calls Settling Legal Issues ‘Nerve Wracking,’” Reuters, April 9, 2014.
sidebar 1.1
Sustainability and Integrity: Cautionary Tales of Legal Liability
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full compliance with the law to avoid a range of civil and criminal liability. By study- ing the legal and regulatory environment of business, you will gain an understanding of basic legal vocabulary and gain the ability to identify problematic situations that could result in liability. Moreover, whether you are involved in contract negotiations, the development of intellectual property, or dealing with employees, learning the fundamentals of the law will not only help you make informed decisions but also to know when to call an attorney for advice.
Law, the Rule of Law, and Property
Three concepts establish a necessary framework for the most effectively functioning market in the modern nation: law, the rule of law, and property. Note how they con- nect to each other.
LAW In the last 10,000 years, human society has moved from roving bands of hunter- gatherers to large modern nations with populations in the hundreds of millions. The social forces that hold together societies range from custom and religion to law and economic ties. In the modern nation, however, the most significant of the social forces is law because law can glue together diverse peoples of different backgrounds into very large, organized groups. Law is known by everyone as being intended to tell members of society what they can or cannot do. Strangers to a society may not under- stand or appreciate complex and subtle customs of behavior, but they can observe the formal laws governing what kinds of activities are permitted and prohibited in society. Lawyers, judges, and other trained interpreters of the rules can help them in this process.
A simple definition of law follows:
• Law is made up of rules. • These rules are laid down by the state and backed up by enforcement.
Law is a formal social force, meaning that laws come from the state and are usually written down and accessible so those who need to understand and obey them can. To maintain order in society, adequate enforcement institutions such as courts and the police are a necessary part of the legal system. As countries such as China are finding out, written laws mean little unless they can be promptly and fairly enforced. Without adequate enforcement, resources can be taken from those who have them, and agreements can be disregarded. The certainty and trust necessary to make complex, long-term business arrangements are absent. People must spend much of their time guarding their resources rather than developing them.
THE RULE OF LAW In a modern nation, law is important to implement either the commands of a dicta- tor or the will of the people in a democracy. However, only in democracies is there true concern for the rule of law, which goes beyond merely thinking of law as govern- mental commands backed up by force. Under the rule of law, laws that are made are generally and equally applicable. They apply to all or most members of society and they apply to various groups in the same way.
The first known written set of laws was the Code of Hammurabi, named after the Babylonian king of the 18th century BC.
“Privatization without necessary institutional infrastructure [such as law] in the transition countries led to asset stripping rather than wealth creation.”
–Joseph E. Stiglitz, economist
“Without the rule of law, major economic institutions such as corporations, banks, and labor unions would not function, and the government’s many involvements in the economy—regulatory mechanisms, tax sys- tems, customs structure, monetary policy, and the like—would be unfair, inefficient, and opaque.”
–Thomas Carothers, Director, Democracy
and Rule of Law Proj- ect, Carnegie Endow- ment for International
Peace
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According to the World Justice Project, an organization seeking to advance the rule of law around the world, four universal principles define the rule of law:
1. The government and its officials and agents, as well as individuals and private entities, are accountable under the law.
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property and certain core human rights.
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is acces- sible, fair, and efficient.
4. Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representa- tives and neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.
In today’s international business environment, more and more voices are calling for the rule of law. The secretary-general of the United Nations says that “without confidence based on the rule of law; without trust and transparency—there could be no well-functioning markets.” The managing director of the International Monetary Fund asserts that “high quality” economic growth depends “in particular on the rule of law,” which is a “lodestar for all countries.” Observes the managing director of JPMorgan Chase: “An environment in which courts cannot be relied upon to adhere to the rule of law is an environment in which businesses will be reluctant to invest and in which development will be stunted.” He calls the rule of law “a cornerstone of free trade.”
Unfortunately, the rule of law is an ideal rather than a complete fact in even the most democratic nation. Special interest groups attempt to persuade lawmakers to ben- efit these groups at the expense of others. And it is not always clear what it means to apply laws generally and equally. Still, in a democracy, well-educated voters who under- stand the importance of the rule of law can hold to account lawmakers who excessively favor special interests. Judges also play a vital role in maintaining the rule of law.
Because of their key role in understanding the rule of law and promoting corporate governance, lawyers are increasingly being asked to join corporate boards. In 2000, only 24 percent of U.S. companies had lawyer-directors on their boards, but by 2009, 43 percent did. A recent study demonstrated that having lawyer-directors resulted in an average 9.5 percent increase in firm value. Without question, lawyers on boards can help companies navigate a myriad of issues and help manage risk.1 (See Sidebar 1.2.)
Almost all wealthy countries embrace the rule of law; for example, most European countries. Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, called the Maastricht Treaty, says the EU is “founded” on “the rule of law.” There are no countries with strong, diverse economies that do not have the rule of law. As former President Eisenhower warned, “The clearest way to show what the rule of law means to us in everyday life is to recall what has happened when there is no rule of law.”
PROPERTY The third concept necessary for a successful private market in the modern nation is property. In a dictionary, property has two common meanings: (1) something that is owned and (2) ownership. We will be using the word in its second definition as
1See Lubormi Litov, Simone Sepe and Charles Whitehead, “Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer Directors in Public Corpo- rations,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2218855 (January 14, 2014).
LO 1-2
Property is a legal right that allows you to exclude others from your resources.
“While economic growth can occur in the short run with autocratic regimes, long-run eco- nomic growth entails the development of the rule of law.”
–Douglas C. North, acceptance speech
for the Nobel Prize in Economics, 1993
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“ownership.” In law, the word “property” (or “ownership”) means the right to turn to public authorities like the police or the courts to help you keep others from inter- fering with what you own. Property is a legal fence that keeps others out without your permission. It allows you to exclude others from something without your permission.
Three types of ownership fences are
• Public property, which applies to public resources owned by the government (or “state”) like roads, public buildings, public lands, and monuments.
• Private property, which applies to resources that you own as an individual. • Common property, which applies to resources like land that more than one indi-
vidual owns jointly.
So important is the right of private property that in this book we often just refer to private property as “property.” We will specifically say “public property” or “com- mon property” if we mean those applications of exclusionary right.
It is through the law of property that individuals and business organizations can possess, use, and transfer their private resources. The enforcement of the prop- erty right under the rule of law gives people incentive to develop the resources they own and a property-based legal system that enables such control by allowing people to exclude others from interfering with what their efforts produce. The exclusion- ary right of property provides a basis for the private market and modern business. Scholars have traced the economic flourishing of Western civilization during the last several hundred years to the increasing recognition of the right of property in the nations of the West.
PROPERTY IN ITS BROADEST SENSE Property can be thought of as the central concept underlying Western legal systems. (See Figure 1.1.) Most of the topics discussed in this book relate to the exclusionary right of property. Contract law enables an owner to exchange resources (Chapters 8 and 9), especially at a future date. Tort law compensates owners whose resources are wrong- fully harmed by the actions of others (Chapter 10). Criminal law punishes those who harm an owner’s resources in particular ways, for example, by theft (Chapter 13). The law of corporate governance and business organizations identifies how individu- als can own and use private resources in groups (Chapter 14).
Do remember that the property right gives a major incentive to develop resources.
Property is the central concept of Western legal systems.
Here are a few examples of high-profile executives who bring their legal acumen with them into the boardroom:
- Belinda H. Johnson, Director of Paypal since 2017; appointed as the Chief Operating Officer of Airbnb, Inc. in 2018, where she previously served as Chief Business Affairs and Legal Officer and also General Council.
- Erika Rottenberg, General Council for the Chan- Zuckerburg Initiative, previously general council of
LinkedIn, who serves as on the board of diectors for Wix. com and Twilio.
- Michelle Wilson, serves as a director for Stripe, Zendesk, Okta, and Pinterest; she is the former general counsel of Amazon.
Sources: LinkedIn bios (February 16, 2020); Olga V. Mack and Katia Bloom, “From the Courtroom to the Boardroom: Lawyers Belong on Boards, not in Punchlines,” Above the Law, April 10, 2017.
sidebar 1.2
Lawyers in the Boardroom
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Figure 1.1 The wheel of property.
CON STITUTION
AL LAW
Establishes the fram ework of the
state whose purpose is to protect
property in its broadest sense.
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Protects and com pensates owners
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PROPERTY The legal right to
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LAW
Regulatory law both protects ownership and sets limits on private resource use (Chapter 15). Antitrust law forbids owners from monopolizing classes of resources and sets rules for how businesses can compete to acquire ownership in new resources (Chapter 16). Securities laws regulate the transfer of ownership in certain profit- making opportunities (Chapter 17). Environmental law controls how owners can use their resources when creating pollution (Chapter 19). Even labor laws and antidiscrimi- nation laws involve property in the sense they protect the employees’ right to exclude employers from interfering with certain self-ownership interests of the employees (Chapters 20, 21, and 22). Finally, a theme of the entire book, corporate governance, specifically concerns the law protecting the owners of a business organization from the managers who run it for them. Generally speaking, corporate governance also refers to any law regulating and limiting private owners’ productive resources and their use.
In its broadest sense, property includes an ownership of individual constitutional and human rights in ourselves that excludes the state from interfering with these rights. Today, we usually call our relationship to these rights “liberty,” but liberty and property in this sense have almost identical meanings. John Locke, the 17th century English philosopher who greatly influenced the framers of the Constitution, asserted that private property begins with the right we have in ourselves and in our efforts and actions. He said that an individual is the “proprietor [owner] of his own person, and
To say that you have a “right” means that legally you can keep others from interfering with that right. To be able to exclude others is the essence of property.
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the actions or labour of it” and that this is “the great foundation of property.” Later, James Madison wrote that property “in its larger and juster meaning . . . embraces everything to which a man may attach value and have a right . . . . [A] man has prop- erty in his opinions and free communication of them. . . . In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.” For Madison and other constitutional framers, property protected not only physical resources like land but also human rights like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom from unreasonable intrusion by the government. The individual’s very relationship to society was defined by the word property. Scholars have pointed out that the modern understanding of human rights began with the concept of property.
According to Tim Stratford, Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, “Substantial improve- ments in market access, intellectual property rights protection, regulatory transparency and evenhanded enforcement are all cited by members as critical to their continued success. Additionally, members are asking the US government to advocate even more strongly for a level playing field, pursue investment reciprocity, and engage in results-oriented discussions between the two sides.” Although there are concerns about trade conflicts, most American companies in China continue to see revenues growing and the market in China remains a “high priority.”
Background: When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, concerns persisted about its pro- tection of real and intellectual property. Foreign firms faced an uncertain landscape of property rights, including the enforcement of the laws. In late 2016, China released
new guidelines about the protection of property to “raise people’s sense of wealth security, boost social confi- dence, foster positive expectations and raise the impetus for entrepreneurship and innovation.”
The new guidelines pertain to real property and intel- lectual property. Importantly, the guidelines are designed to shore up legal enforcement mechanisms. Although China implemented intellectual property protection laws when it joined the WTO to comply with TRIPS, enforce- ment has been a continuing issue. This can be at odds with innovation. One study found that “intellectual prop- erty protection leads Chinese firms to innovate more, with patenting rates going up by as much as 7.2% in high intellectual property protection regions.” Sources: Growth Continues Amid Heightened Uncertainty, AmChamChina, February 26, 2019; Sara Hsu, “China is Finally Improving Property Rights Pro- tections,” Forbes, Nov. 30, 2016.
sidebar 1.3
China: The Rule of Law and Property Rights are Key
JURISPRUDENCE Over the centuries, several ideas have developed that help explain the origin of law and its justification. We call these ideas (or philosophies) of law jurisprudence. Briefly, the main types or “schools” of jurisprudence include the following:
• Natural law. Going back to Aristotle and other ancient philosophers, natural law theory asserts that law contains universal moral principles. These principles are observable in nature, and we can determine them through human reason. John Locke, the British philosopher whose writing influenced the framers of the U.S. Constitution, thought that “property” was part of natural law. Merely human laws that contradict the principles of natural law are improper. Compare natural law to “formalism,” discussed in Chapter 2.
• Positive law. Positive law jurisprudence believes that law is simply the commands of the state backed up by force and punishments. It is contrary to the philosophy
Jurisprudence is the philosophy of law.
“True law is right rea- son in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting. . . .”
–Cicero, Roman historian
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of natural law. Eighteenth century philosopher Jeremy Bentham ridiculed the idea of natural law as “nonsense upon stilts.” Compare positive law to “conse- quentialism,” discussed in Chapter 2.
• Historical school. The historical school of jurisprudence emphasizes that con- temporary law should focus on legal principles that have withstood the test of time in a nation. The historical school believes that law reflects the cultural traditions of a people and recognizes that different nations may have different traditions and, consequently, different laws. Friedrich Savigny, a prominent German legal philosopher, helped develop this jurisprudence.
• Sociological jurisprudence. Sociological jurisprudence supports the idea that law can and should change to meet new developments in society. From this point of view, the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which asserts the right to “bear arms,” or weapons, should not be interpreted today to allow citizens to own and carry lightweight fully automatic rifles that can fire hundreds of rounds per minute. When the Second Amendment was written, a highly trained person carrying a 25-pound rifle could fire only about two rounds per minute.
• Legal realism. Legal realism tries to go beyond just the words of law to examine what police, administrators, prosecutors, and judges are actually doing as they enforce, interpret, and apply laws. When Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. said that “law is what officials do about it,” he reflected the jurisprudence of legal realism. For instance, the posted speed limit around the Atlanta perimeter highway, Interstate 285, is 55 mph. However, almost no one drives within the posted speed limit and traffic police rarely ticket drivers until they go faster than 75 mph. In terms of legal realism, what is the actual speed limit on Atlanta’s perimeter highway?
Several of these types of jurisprudence overlap. For instance, sociological jurispru- dence and legal realism are types of legal positivism. Jurisprudence may also certainly influence the actual rules of law, but jurisprudence is a philosophy about law rather than the law itself. However, complicating matters is that the word jurisprudence also refers to the general body of law interpretations by judges as different from legisla- tion passed by legislators.
Classifications of Law
Even when you understand jurisprudence and grasp the significance of our property- based legal system to the private marketplace, you still have much left to know about the legal and regulatory environment of business. In large part, learning about law demands an extensive vocabulary of legal terms and concepts. It will be useful in organizing this vocabulary to examine several major classifications of law.
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW The world has two major legal systems: common law and civil law. The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Jamaica, India, Nigeria, New Zealand, and a few other countries—all colonized by England—follow the common law. The common law legal system emphasizes the role of judges in determining the meaning of laws and how they apply. It arose beginning in the 11th and 12th centuries as the English monarch appointed royal judges to ride circuits around the English countryside and to resolve disputes in the name of the king (or queen). As there was little formal law to apply to many disputes, the decisions handed down by the judges literally made the law.
The definition of law at the beginning of this chapter is taken from positive law jurisprudence.
LO 1-3
Common law emphasizes the role of judges in determining the meaning of laws.
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By the time the English legislature (Parliament) emerged, a huge body of writ- ten judicial decisions was “common” to all of England. The role of judges in making and interpreting law was in place. English colonists then brought the common law to what became the United States and various other countries. The common law continues its development even today, and so significant is the role of judges in the United States that they determine the meaning of the Constitution and can declare void the legislation of Congress and the acts of the president.
The world’s nations not colonized by England generally observe civil law legal systems. The civil law relies more on legislation than judicial decisions to deter- mine what the law is. Like common law courts, courts in civil law nations decide the facts in a disputed case (e.g., who did what, who committed a crime or breached a contract), but civil law courts do not make law nor do their judges think themselves obligated to follow prior judicial decisions, called precedents, as they do in common law nations, although they do refer to “settled” cases. Essentially, judges play a much more important role in determining law and its meaning in common law nations than in civil law nations. Only Louisiana, among the U.S. states, follows a partial civil law system. This is due to Louisiana’s historical ties with France, a civil law nation.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW Another way of classifying the law is to divide it into matters of public law and mat- ters of private law. Public law includes those matters that involve the regulation of society as opposed to individuals interacting. In each of these matters, a government official represents society, or “the people,” and the official is responsible for seeking justice to achieve the ends of society. The main types of public law include:
• Constitutional law, which involves the interpretation and application of either the federal or state constitutions.
• Administrative law, which covers the legal principles that apply to government agencies, bureaus, boards, or commissions.
• Criminal law, which specifies various offenses against the proper order of the state.
Private law covers those legal problems and issues that concern your private resource relationships with other people. Private law traditionally includes:
• Property law, which involves the recognition of exclusive right in both tangible (physically touchable) and intangible resources. Special areas of property law concern land, goods, copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets.
• Contract law, which covers the rules of how owners transfer resources by exchanging them. Contracts often involve enforceable promises to exchange resources in the future.
• Tort law, which establishes rules for compensation when an owner’s legal boundaries are wrongfully crossed by another. Tort law often but not always requires actual injury to the owner’s resources.
CIVIL LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW Another means of classifying the law is to divide it into civil law and criminal law. For administrative purposes, courts usually separate criminal actions from all other lawsuits. Civil cases may include suits for breach of contract or tort cases, such as suits for personal injuries. Typically, they involve a request for damages or other appropriate relief that does not involve punishment of the wrongdoer. Criminal cases
Civil law relies more on legislation than judicial decisions for law.
Public law includes constitutional law, administrative law, and criminal law.
Special areas of prop- erty concern land, goods, copyrights, pat- ents, and trademarks.
Don’t confuse our reference to civil (or noncriminal) lawsuits with a civil law legal system, which is one emphasizing the importance of the legislature in determining the meaning of laws.
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involve a representative of government attempting to prove the wrong committed against society and seeking to have the wrongdoer punished by the court system. See Sidebar 1.4 for an example criminal liability arising from the financial transactions.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND PROCEDURAL LAW Another important classification or distinction in law is between substance and pro- cedure. Substantive law defines the legal relationship of people with other people or between them and the state. Thus, the rules of law governing the creation or enforcement of a contractual promise are substantive in nature. Procedural law deals with the method and means by which substantive law is made and adminis- tered. The time allowed for one party to sue another and the rules of law governing the process of the lawsuit are examples of procedural laws. Thus, substantive rules of law define rights and duties, while procedural rules of law provide the machinery for enforcing those rights and duties.
Judicial procedures involve the conduct of lawsuits and appeals and the enforce- ment of judgments. The rules for conducting civil trials are different from those for criminal trials. For example, each party may call the other party to the witness stand for cross-examination in a civil trial, but the defendant may not be required to testify in a criminal case. Procedural problems sometimes arise concerning papers filed in lawsuits, the admission of evidence, and various other techniques involved in trying the case. They are the rules of the game. In Chapter 4, you will study these proce- dural aspects of law in greater depth.
Sources of Law
In the following sections, consider that you have a dry cleaning business and have gone to a lawyer to ask what the law says about your emitting certain chemical clean- ing pollutants into the air. What sources of law will the lawyer have to be familiar
That a plaintiff must prove the defendant failed to use reasonable care in order to establish the tort of negligence is an example of substan- tive law.
LO 1-4
Here are the key facts: • 1MBD (Malaysia Development Fund) was owned and
controlled by the Malaysian government to attract foreign investment and development.
• Goldman made $6.5 billion in loans was arranged for 1MDB, which was involved in bond deals and earned approximately $600 million.
• Criminal allegations included misappropriation of funds/embezzlement (including to purchase, New York Condos, hotels, yachts, and a jet), conspiracy, and bribery.
• 2018: A Goldman Sachs partner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder money and conspiracy to
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and for- feited $43.7 million
• 2020: Goldman Sachs set aside $1.09 billion to set- tle allegations with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
• Goldman Sachs is involved in ongoing talks with the DOJ regarding U.S. bribery laws.
• The Malaysian government is seeking massive fines from Goldman.
Sources: Kori Hale, “Goldman Sachs Takes a $1 Billion Hit Due to Ex-Hip Hop Banker, Forbes, January 21, 2020; and Callum Burroughs and Yusuf Khan, “The Bizarre Story of 1MDB, the Goldman Sachs-backed Malaysian fund that turned into one of the Biggest Scandals in Financial History,” Business Insider, August, 9, 2019.
sidebar 1.4
Goldman Sachs: “Rouge” Bankers and a $1 Billion Legal Charge
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with in order to answer your questions? The following sources form a hierarchy of law, which means that if a lower source of law conflicts with a higher source of law, it is legally void; that is, the higher source trumps, or prevails over, the lower.
FEDERAL LAW Federal law is a very important source of law. It includes the U.S. Constitution, which is the supreme law of the nation. Any law, federal or state, that conflicts with the Constitution is said to be void and has no legal effect. In consulting sources of law, your attorney will look closely indeed to determine how the Constitution affects any other rules of law that adversely affect you. Chapter 6 examines more closely how the U.S. Constitution in particular applies to business practice.
Next in the hierarchy of federal law comes the legislation passed by Congress, also called acts or statutes (collections of legislation, often on the same subject, are codes). The Clean Air Act discussed in Chapter 19 is an example of such legisla- tion that will be very important in answering the legal questions you have. Federal legislation that is constitutional prevails over all other sources of law. Finally, in federal law, your attorney will also have to look at administrative law—specifically, administrative law that regulates business. Administrative law or regulation is made by agencies of the federal government like the Environmental Protection Agency. To answer your legal questions, the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulation will be the most important regulatory law of the 15 independent regulatory agencies of the federal government. Chapter 15 will tell you more about administrative regula- tion in general.
STATE LAW All federal law prevails over all state law in the hierarchy of our sources of law. But state law will still be very important in answering your legal questions about dry cleaning and putting certain pollutants into the air. At the state level, the hierarchy of law sources begins with the state constitution, followed by the statutes or acts adopted by the state legislature, like its commercial code. You will study the Uniform Commercial Code or UCC in Chapter 8. Then there is also the regulatory law of the state administrative agencies. Even lower in the hierarchy of law at the state level is the law in the counties and cities called ordinances. Counties and cities also sometimes have administrative agencies that help plan local development, such as zoning boards that specify where businesses and housing can be located.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS OR CASE LAW Finally, your attorney must consult the decisions of judges as a source of law. Even after considering constitutional language, reading legislation, and referring to admin- istrative regulation, your attorney must still know the judicial decisions, called case law, that apply to your legal problem. These decisions interpret the relevant constitu- tional, legislative, and regulatory laws. As previously discussed, judges also make and interpret the common law.
When judges, especially judges who decide appeals from trial courts, make deci- sions on legal issues, they write their decisions, or opinions, setting out reasons. These case opinions are collected and published in book volumes known as “report- ers,” and these opinions now become precedents for future cases involving similar facts and legal issues. To locate prior precedents, it is helpful to know the citation
“The American Constitu- tion is the most wonder- ful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.”
–William Gladstone, four-time prime minis- ter of Great Britain in
the 1800s
Do remember that there are court systems in all 50 states plus a federal system. According to the U.S. Department of State, more than 31,000 judges nationwide make numerous decisions every year, including approximately 1,700 federal judges.
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for the case where a precedent is found. For example, a case opinion cited as 675 F.3d 23 (2014) can be located on page 23 of volume 675 of the Federal Reporter, third edition, a case decided in 2014. Knowing a case citation, you can easily locate the case in a library or through computer databases.
The extensive reliance of our legal system on judicial case law has both advan- tages and disadvantages. It is useful to summarize these.
Advantages Stare decisis is the doctrine of prior precedents. The Latin meaning of these words is “let the prior decision stand.” Under stare decisis, judges in current cases follow whenever possible the interpretation of law determined by judges in prior cases. This doctrine arose from the desire for certainty and predictability in the law. One important advantage of stare decisis was people became secure in their right of property. They then became willing to invest resources in fixed locations for factories and other immovable valuables because they were certain the state would not seize these resources for its own use. Case law helps specify in great detail the boundaries of our property-based legal system, and it protects what is “proper” to people from the interference of others.
Disadvantages Several disadvantages of case law are also important to know. Keep in mind, however, that we do not believe these disadvantages destroy the ben- efits of certainty, predictability, and stability provided by case law and stare decisis. Disadvantages of case law include:
• Volume of cases. Even with computers, searching through hundreds of thousands of cases and then identifying and reading the significant ones is often a very great task. At the very least, it is both time consuming for the attorney and expensive for the client.
• Conflicting precedents. Sometimes in searching prior cases, attorneys find cases in which judicial decisions conflict with each other. Conflicting precedents do not create confidence in the certainty of law.
• Dicta. Increasing the difficulty of determining how to follow prior precedent is the distinction between the holding in a prior case and mere dicta. The hold- ings in prior cases are precisely what was necessary to the decision reached. Dicta are whatever else the court said. Judges in future cases are not so likely to follow the dicta in prior cases as they are the holdings.
• Rejection of precedent. Because of stare decisis, courts usually hesitate to reject the precedents of prior cases, but sometimes they do. They may think that prior cases were wrongly decided, or they may think that times have changed. In con- stitutional law, the idea that courts should understand the meaning of the Consti- tution relative to the times in which they interpret it is known as constitutional relativity. Originalism is the opposite of constitutional relativity. It stands for the idea that courts should interpret the Constitution only according to the intentions of those who wrote it.
• Conflicts of law. A buyer in Georgia orders equipment by telephone from a sell- er’s representative in Illinois. The buyer directs the seller to ship the equipment to New York. When the equipment breaks down while being used in Pennsylvania, the buyer sues the seller in Ohio where the seller is incorporated. What state’s law applies? Courts resolve such problems by applying conflicts of law rules, but even these rules may vary from state to state. A better solution is for the buyer and seller to specify in the contract which state’s law will apply in case of a dispute. In a tort case, the usual conflicts of law rule applies the law of the state where the
“Stare decisis is the viaduct over which the law travels in transport- ing the precious cargo of justice.”
–Bosely v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161 (1958)
A baseball fan is hurt by a foul ball and sues the baseball team’s owner. The court writes, “Whether a fan is injured by a foul ball or an accidentally thrown bat, the result is the same. The fan cannot recover damages against the team because the fan assumes the risk.” The comment about “thrown bat” is dicta because the case involved only a foul ball. Bats are heavier and more dangerous than balls, and a judge in a future case may not feel obligated to follow the dicta in this case concerning bats.
Do make sure to include a provision for the payment of attorney’s fees in any contract loaning money or extending credit to someone.
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injury occurred, no matter where the injury occurred. If a contract specifies no particular state’s law for the parties to a dispute to follow, a court interpreting the contract will usually apply the law of the state where the contract was made.
Regarding case law, you should note that courts are the institution in our legal system that interpret the meaning of the law, whether that law is the U.S. Constitu- tion, legislation, administrative law, or the common law. Because there are an infi- nite number of possible cases, each a little bit different on its facts, the power of courts to interpret meaning is very important. Consider the Second Amendment to the Constitution. It says that “the right to bear arms shall not be infringed.” What do these words mean? Do they apply constitutionally only to protect seven-foot muskets weighing 20 pounds that a well-trained person could only fire twice per minute? Do they apply constitutionally to protect possession of semiautomatic pistols that an eight-year-old child can fire 20 times per minute? Do they apply to protect ownership of machine guns that can be fired hundreds of times per minute? Now are you begin- ning to understand the powerful role that courts play in interpreting the meaning not only of the Constitution but of all laws in our legal system?
SOURCES OF LAW HIERARCHY IN REVIEW So your lawyer has to know many sources of law and how they interact in order to answer your question about the pollutants from your cleaning business. It is mis- taken to think that lawyers know all of the law that applies to every legal question that you may ask them. However, they should know how to go about answering your questions, including the fact that some questions may not have answers that can be known in advance and that require formal dispute resolution—that is, they require that a judge, or perhaps an arbitrator, decide them.
The hierarchy of the sources of law, however, is well understood. That hierarchy is as follows. Remember that each higher source of law voids, or prevails, over every lower source of law in the hierarchy, except that in many instances there will be no conflict between higher and lower sources of law and in other instances it may not be clear whether or not a higher source of law (such as a constitutional right of speech) conflicts with a lower source of law (such as a law regulating advertising expression).
Hierarchy of sources of law from highest to lowest:
• U.S. Constitution and Amendments. • Statutes (also called “acts” or “legislation”) of Congress. • Federal administration regulation. • State constitutions (apply only in individual states). • State statutes (apply only in individual states). • State administrative regulation (applies only in individual states). • Local ordinances (apply only in cities, towns, and other such areas). • Case law (court cases, as they interpret all of the other sources, may or may not
void sources lower than the source being interpreted).
LEGAL SANCTIONS The enforcement of the law is vital to the rule of law and a “proper” legal system. Law enforcement officials and the courts use several methods to encourage or to force compliance with the law. These methods, often called sanctions, may be used
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against a person who has failed to comply with the law. The sanctions are, in effect, a form of punishment for violating the law. Sanctions also have a preventive function. The threat of sanctions usually results in compliance with the requirements of law.
Because punishment is used to secure obedience to the law, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides in part: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” This provision recognizes that the law is enforced by taking a person’s life, freedom, or the resources that he or she owns. The taking of an owner’s resources may be (1) for the benefit of society generally, as when land is taken through eminent domain; (2) to punish someone, as with a traffic fine; or (3) for the benefit of another person, as an award of damages. The right of an individual to take another person’s resources (especially money) because that person has failed to meet the require- ments of the law (e.g., the breach of a contract) is known as a remedy. As you study the following sections, identify the remedies available to those seeking through the courts what belongs to another, and keep in mind how important adequately and fairly enforced sanctions are to a property-based legal system and how nations lack- ing adequate enforcement sanctions tend to be poor even when they claim to believe in private property.
SANCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT A crime is a public wrong against society. Criminal cases are brought by the govern- ment on behalf of the people. The people are represented by a state’s attorney or U.S. attorney or other public official. When a person is convicted of a crime, one of the following punishments may be imposed:
• Death. • Imprisonment. • Fine. • Removal from office. • Disqualification from holding any office and from voting.
Among the purposes of such punishments are to protect the public and to deter persons from wrongful conduct.
SANCTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT Legally enforceable agreements, called contracts (see Chapter 8), are vitally impor- tant to business because they allow buyers and sellers to exchange resources and shape their agreements any legal way they wish. When one party to a contract fails to do what he or she agreed to do, a breach of contract occurs. The usual remedy for a breach is a suit for dollar damages. These damages, called compensatory damages, are awarded to make the victim of the breach “whole” in the economic sense. Such damages compensate the party for all losses that are the direct and foreseeable result of the breach of contract. The objective is that the party be in as good a position as he or she would have been in had the contract been performed. Damages do not make most parties totally “whole,” however, because they do not as a general rule include attorney’s fees. Unless the contract or some special law provides to the con- trary, parties to the contract litigation pay their own attorneys.
In addition to compensatory damages, breach-of-contract cases may award consequential damages when the breaching party knew or had reason to know that
Do remember that the law divides crimes into misdemeanors and felonies.
Compensatory damages awarded for breach of contract attempt to make a plaintiff “whole,” as though in an economic sense the defendant had not breached the contract.
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special circumstances existed that would cause the other party to suffer additional losses if the contract were breached.
There are other remedies available for a breach of contract. If a breach by one party is serious enough, the other party may be permitted to rescind or cancel the contract. In some circumstances, the remedy of an injured party may be a decree of specific performance—an order by the court commanding the other party actually to perform a bargain as agreed. The single largest number of lawsuits today, espe- cially in the federal courts, involves one business suing another business for breach of contract.
SANCTIONS FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT A tort is a civil wrong other than a breach of contract. Torts involve improper cross- ing of property boundaries, usually causing injury to our person or other things we own. The boundaries may be physical as when someone trespasses across the bound- aries of another’s land. Boundaries may also be behavioral as when someone acts unreasonably and injures another.
The law divides torts into the following three categories:
• Intentional torts. These torts all require the plaintiff (the person who initiates a lawsuit) to prove the defendant intended to cross the boundaries protecting the plaintiff. Intentional torts include assault (intentionally placing someone in apprehension of his physical safety), battery (intentionally making offen- sive, unconsented to physical contact with someone), conversion (intentionally depriving someone of goods owned), and trespass (intentionally crossing some- one else’s land boundaries without permission).
• Negligence. This tort requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant injured what was proper to the plaintiff through unreasonable behavior.
• Strict liability. Strict liability torts usually require the plaintiff to prove only that the defendant has injured something proper to the plaintiff. Injury caused by an ultrahazardous activity like blasting is an example.
In law, the sanction (or remedy) for tortious conduct is money damages. The damages compensate injured plaintiffs for medical expenses, lost wages or earning power, pain and suffering, and damages to other owned goods and land. Punitive damages—also called exemplary damages—are also appropriate when the tort is intentional or the unreasonable conduct is extremely severe.
SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS Statutes at both the federal and state levels of government impose a variety of sanc- tions for violating the statutes or regulations of administrative agencies adopted to accomplish statutory purposes. These sanctions are often similar to those imposed for criminal conduct, breach of contract, or tortious conduct. Many statutes, for example, impose a fine for a violation and authorized damages to injured parties as well. Although common law did not make a defendant pay a plaintiff’s attorney fees, many statutes do require so in various circumstances.
You should keep in mind that the sanctions imposed for violating statutes or administrative agency regulations are an important part of enforcing the property- based legal system. These laws help define boundaries and protect us from the
Tort law helps protect property boundaries by providing compensa- tion when someone wrongfully crosses such boundaries.
Punitive damages are a civil punishment for intentional or extremely negligent wrongdoing. Their purpose is to deter others from such conduct in the future.
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1. Persons and businesses convicted of criminal con- duct may be fined, imprisoned, or both.
2. A party who breaches a contract may be required to pay as compensatory damages to the other party the sum of money required to make the victim whole. In addition, special circumstances may justify conse- quential damages.
3. A tort victim is entitled to collect as damages the amount of money necessary to compensate the
concept summary
injured party for the total harm caused by the inten- tional or negligent conduct of the wrongdoer.
4. Punitive damages may be awarded in the case of intentional torts.
5. Statutes and regulations issued by government agencies often authorize sanctions similar to those used in the criminal law, contracts, and torts. They usually go further by using a multiplier for damages and award attorney’s fees as well.
boundary infringements of others. Regulations often set boundaries of what it is proper for businesses to do in producing and selling goods and competing with other producers in the market. Many of the chapters in this book examine the boundaries set by various business regulations.
Property and Corporate Governance
Under the rule of law in a property-based legal system, all persons have an equal right to their resources. Property problems arise when one person harms another’s resources or takes them without permission or authorization. When a stranger takes your car without permission, we call this “theft,” and it is easy to appreciate how it violates your right of property under the rule of law. However, more complex prop- erty problems can arise.
Much, if not most, business in the United States is transacted through large corporate business organizations. A corporation is a business chartered by the state to do business as a legal person in a certain form of organization. Chapter 11 will explain the details of corporate legal ownership, but, briefly, a corporation is owned by shareholders who have stock in the business. They vote to elect the board of direc- tors who legally run the business but who often hire managers to be in charge of day-to-day business operations. In large corporations, few shareholders sit on the board of directors or are managers of these businesses, and thus ownership is usually separate from resource control.
THE SPECIFIC SENSE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Because of the separation of ownership and control, corporate governance is very important. Corporate governance refers to the legal rules that structure, empower, and regulate the agents (primarily the board of directors and managers) of corpora- tions and define their relationship to the owners (shareholders). Specifically, corpo- rate governance rules protect the property interest that the owners have in corporations.
Because of the complexity of modern corporations, there are sometimes break- downs in corporate governance. Managers like the president, vice presidents, or
Corporations are businesses chartered by the state to do business as legal persons.
Corporate governance defines the legal relationship between corporate agents like managers or boards of directors and the shareholder owners of the corporation.
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chief financial officer of a corporation can abuse their control of its resources to benefit themselves in ways that impair or even destroy the corporation’s value to the shareholders. For example, often these top managers have salaries, bonuses, or stock options that are tied to the corporation’s profitability or stock price. If they manipu- late the corporation’s profit by puffing up assets or concealing debts, they may be able to raise their incomes by millions of dollars even as they mislead the owners about the true value of the corporation and risk corporate collapse when the true situation is disclosed. Other examples of corporate misgovernance include manag- ers’ engaging in insider trading of stock, running up stock prices in order to exercise stock options, and taking advantage of business opportunities that rightfully belong to the corporation and its shareholders.
Corporate governance can fail even when corporate managers do nothing ille- gal. An economically painful recession began in 2008 in part because lenders at large banks allowed and encouraged risky loans that loan applicants could not repay unless the market value of their homes went up substantially. Millions of homeown- ers borrowed under these conditions. When the market value of housing did not increase and borrowers could not repay their loans, the entire banking system came close to collapse.
Businesses depend on credit, and when they could not borrow money from banks because of the near collapse, many businesses either failed or had to lay off employees. Much harm was done to investors and others because those in control of the banks took risks they should not have. Why did they take these risks? That the risky loans they generated led to large salary increases, personal bonuses, stock options, and resale commissions and profits on packaged loans was a significant reason. Bank executives and managers chose to ignore the risk that the housing market might stop its rapid increase in value. After all, the risk was being taken not with their personal money, but with the money of the bank’s shareholders and investors. As Nobel laureate Paul Krugman wrote, “[I]t was mainly about gambling with other people’s money. The financial industry took big, risky bets with borrowed funds—bets that paid high returns until they went bad—but was able to borrow cheaply because investors didn’t understand how fragile the industry was.”
THE GENERAL SENSE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE In a general sense, corporate governance also applies to the legal relationships that businesses have with each other, with their customers, and with society. The eco- nomic collapse of 2008 illustrates the need for corporate governance in this general sense. As previously explained, a major factor in the collapse was the risky home- owner lending practice of banks, added to by the risky practices of other financial institutions that repackaged, sold, and resold hundreds of billions of dollars of poor- quality housing loans that were inadequately secured. As long as housing prices were rising, many people made a great deal of money, but when the housing bubble burst and prices began to decline, economic collapse occurred, affecting not only the financial institutions but also the entire economy because credit was too expensive or unavailable. It has been suggested that lack of adequate corporate governance allowed the risky lending practices that ultimately led to the biggest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. A number of the chapters that follow discuss the general corporate governance that has followed this recession.
In a broad general sense, corporate gover- nance includes the legal property relations that large businesses have with each other, with their customers, and with society.
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Key Terms Act 15 Administrative law 13 Breach of contract 18 Citation 15 Civil law 13 Codes 15 Common law 12 Compensatory damages 18 Conflicts of law 16 Constitution 15 Constitutional law 13 Constitutional relativity 16 Contract law 13 Corporate governance 20 Corporation 20 Criminal law 13
Dicta 16 Exemplary damages 19 Holding 16 Intentional torts 19 Jurisprudence 11 Law 7 Legislation 15 Negligence 19 Opinion 15 Ordinances 15 Originalism 16 Ownership 9 Precedent 15 Private law 13 Procedural law 14 Property 8
Property law 13 Public law 13 Punitive damages 19 Remedy 18 Rule of law 7 Sanctions 17 Specific performance 19 Stare decisis 16 Statute 15 Strict liability 19 Substantive law 14 Tort 19 Tort law 13 Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) 15
As you study law, ethics, and consider corporate social responsibility (CSR), one concern comes to mind: Is there any enforcement mechanism? Or is CSR a good-faith movement? At this point, CSR is a form of what is known as “soft law,” rules that are not legally binding (as opposed to statutes and regulations).
There are, however, international trends to raise the commitment to CSR. Most notably, the United Nations endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011. This document details the global standard for “preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activ- ity.” The principles are formulated around three pillars:
1. the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business;
2. the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and 3. greater access by victims to effective remedy, both
judicial and non-judicial. Some companies also include corporate social respon-
sibility and/or statements about the sustainability of their business practices in their communications to stakeholders.
Source: Elizabeth George, “Can Corporate Social Responsibility be Enforced?” Forbes, October 11, 2019; UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
sidebar 1.5
Corporate Social Responsibility: Good Faith
Review Questions and Problems Introduction
1. Why Nations Are Economically Weak or Strong (a) Identify several reasons put forth to explain why nations are prosperous or poor. (b) What does this section say is the foundation of the private market and prosperity?
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Law, the Rule of Law, and Property 2. Law
(a) Define law. Compare and contrast law and custom. (b) What role do the courts and police play in the legal system?
3. The Rule of Law (a) Define the rule of law. How does the rule of law differ from law as the
commands of the state? (b) Explain why the rule of law is “an ideal rather than a complete fact.”
4. Property (a) What is property? How does property differ from “resources”? (b) Why is property important to society? To private enterprise?
5. Property in Its Broadest Sense (a) Explain why property can be thought of as the central concept underlying
Western legal systems. (b) What does James Madison mean when he says we have property in our
opinions “and free communication of them”? 6. Jurisprudence
(a) Define jurisprudence and name four schools of jurisprudence. (b) Describe the main difference between the jurisprudences of natural law and
sociological jurisprudence. Classifications of Law 7. Common Law and Civil Law
(a) What is “common law”? Why is the United States a “common law country”? (b) What is the primary distinction between common law and civil law legal
systems? 8. Public and Private Law
(a) What is public law? Give three examples of public law. (b) Explain private law. Give three examples.
9. Civil Law and Criminal Law (a) What is the difference between civil law and criminal law? (b) Explain the two ways that the words civil law are used in this chapter.
10. Substantive Law and Procedural Law (a) Define substantive law and procedural law. (b) Is contract law substantive law or procedural law? How about a rule specifying
that a defendant has 30 days to respond to a complaint? Sources of Law 11. Federal Law
(a) Explain what it means to say that constitutions are the “highest laws of the nation.”
(b) Explain the important distinctions between state and federal constitutions. 12. State Law
(a) Give two additional terms for legislation. (b) Why is uniformity of law important to business? How can legislators achieve
uniformity of the laws affecting business? What is the most significant uniform law affecting business?
(c) For what purposes do administrative agencies exist?
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13. Judicial Decisions or Case Law (a) Define stare decisis. What are its advantages? Disadvantages? (b) What is the distinction between a precedent and dicta in judicial decisions, and
how does this distinction relate to stare decisis? (c) Alex was on a coast-to-coast trip by automobile. While passing through Ohio,
Alex had a flat tire. It was fixed by Sam’s Turnpike Service Station, and later, while Alex was driving in Indiana, the tire came off and Alex was injured. Alex was hospitalized in Indiana, so he sued Sam in Indiana for the injuries. What rules of substantive law will the Indiana court use to determine if Sam is at fault? Explain.
14. Sources of Law Hierarchy in Review (a) Explain the relationship of case law to the other sources of law.
15. Legal Sanctions (a) Why are legal sanctions important in a property-based legal system? (b) What is the difference between a sanction and a remedy?
16. Sanctions for Criminal Conduct (a) What are the sanctions for criminal conduct? (b) Name three purposes of criminal sanctions.
17. Sanctions for Breach of Contract (a) What is the purpose of compensatory damages? (b) What is specific performance of a contract?
18. Sanctions for Tortious Conduct (a) What are the two premises of tort liability? (b) When are punitive damages appropriate in a tort case?
19. Sanctions for Violating Statutes and Regulations (a) What types of sanctions are used for the violation of statutes and regulations? (b) What is an injunction?
Property and Corporate Governance 20. The Specific Sense of Corporate Governance
(a) What is the “specific” sense of corporate governance? (b) Why might some managers try to artificially raise or “puff up” the market price
of their stocks? Describe several ways they could do this. 21. The General Sense of Corporate Governance
(a) What is the “general” sense of corporate governance? (b) Discuss how effective corporate governance contributes to the creation of
economic wealth.
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1. As the vice president of finance for a company producing and selling electronic switchboards, you are considering foreign investment to build a plant to assemble electronic components. A source in China advises you that a town near Shenzhen may be an excellent location for a new plant. Chinese workers are well educated and willing to work for reasonable wages. Projected construction costs are acceptable. Both rail lines and airports are nearby, and the current Chinese government seems politically stable. The town even has a technical college that will be an excellent source for skilled employees. The plant will ship most of the finished electronic components back to the United States.
• Do you know everything you need to make an investment decision? • If not, what else do you need to know about investment in foreign countries? • What does it mean to say that law is the foundation of the private enterprise
system? 2. Three years ago, the Darden Corporation bought a thousand acres of land that borders the Potowac River in Washam County. While waiting on development opportunities, Darden cut timber to help repay the mortgage loan it took out to buy the land. On March 2, the Washam County Commission proposed an ordinance to establish a 250-foot-wide greenway along the south side of the Potowac that will effectively ban both development and timbering on nearly 80 acres of Darden’s land. The same day, in an unrelated accident, a Darden truck ran over a hunter who was hunting without permission on the company’s land. Darden immediately contacted an attorney in Washam City.
• What is law? • What does it mean to say that Darden has “property” in the land? That the hunter
has “property” in himself? • What sources of law will the attorney have to understand in order to advise Darden
about the proposed greenway? The company’s potential responsibility to the hunter?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
2-1 To consider ethical challenges facing business in the 21st century.
2-2 To compare the connection between law and ethical principles.
2-3 To analyze why ethical consequentialism and not ethical formalism has been the chief source of values for business ethics.
2-4 To generate an individual framework for ethical values in business.
2-5 To evaluate the obstacles and rewards of ethical business practice in our property-based legal system.
The Role of Ethics in Decision Making2 Michael Hitoshi/Getty Images
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A re we at the beginning of a new era of busi-
ness purpose? On August 19, 2019, the
highly influential Business Roundtable,
comprised of 200 CEOs from the largest and most
powerful companies in the United States, issued a
statement that surprised and even shocked the busi-
ness community and beyond. In the statement, the
group challenged the widely accepted notion that
the purpose of businesses is to increase shareholder
wealth, an idea that the Business Roundtable pro-
moted for more than two decades.
The statement begins: “Americans deserve an
economy that allows each person to succeed through
hard work and creativity and to lead a life of meaning
and dignity. We believe the free-market system is the
best means of generating good jobs, a strong and sus-
tainable economy, innovation, a healthy environment,
and economic opportunity for all.” The statement
goes on to state that companies share a commit-
ment to all stakeholders and that each stakeholder is
essential. In particular, the members of the Business
Roundtable committed to:
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1. Delivering value to customers. 2. Investing in employees. 3. Dealing fairly and ethically with suppliers. 4. Supporting local communities. 5. Generating long-term value for shareholders.
It remains to be seen if “stakeholder capitalism,” as many refer to the idea of businesses addressing the needs of multiple stakeholders in decision making, gains traction over the theory of “shareholder primacy,” a focus championed by Milton Friedman, a Nobel economist, and embraced by U.S. businesses for decades. Friedman wrote in 1970 that, “There is one and only one social responsibility of business,” to “engage in activities designed to increase its profits.” But there is a growing sense that businesses can participate in creating better communities and that they have a unique role in solving complex problems in the 21st century.
Treating supply chain partners fairly and ethically, a commitment made in the Business Roundtable statement, is just one example of the importance of ethical decision making in the modern business environment. With technology develop- ments that challenge notions of privacy, sustainability efforts that challenge the use of limited resources, and innovations that challenge equal access to economic opportunities, the need for developing an ethical mindset is clear.
In our interconnected economy, an individual’s conduct affects many others, making a discussion of the ethical mindset especially significant in a book on the legal and regulatory environment of business. Ethical values underlie much law, including the law of how business operates and is regulated, making it important for business students to know about the nature of ethics, sources of ethics, and problems of achieving an ethical business organization. This chapter introduces the study of business ethics. It explores the relationship of morality and ethics and then of ethics and law. Two principal approaches to ethics are presented: formalism and consequentialism.
Next, the chapter looks at ethical values for business decision making. It exam- ines trends and looks at four sources of ethical values:
• Legal regulation. • Professional codes of ethics. • Codes of ethics from business organizations. • Individual values.
The chapter also considers the problems faced in achieving an ethical business organization. When in groups, people often decide and act differently from the way they act as individuals. This fact has special significance for ethics in business cor- porations. The chapter examines how the profit motive and business bureaucracy put pressure on ethical decision making and how ethical reform must begin with the top leadership of business organizations. The importance of open communication to the ethical life of a business organization is emphasized, and several strategies for implementing corporate ethics are presented.
Contemporary Business Ethics
In 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) imposed the largest privacy or data security penalty ever when it ordered Facebook to pay $5 billion and increase cor- porate accountability and transparency after finding that Facebook deceived users
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about the use of their personal information. More than 185 million people in the United States and Canada use Facebook on a daily basis. Facebook sells targeted advertising developed from users’ personal information, generating most of its $55.8 billion in revenue in 2018. The FTC found that Facebook’s disclosures about how it uses personal information were deceptive and that the company undermined users’ privacy preferences so it could share their information with third-party apps.
The FTC held Facebook executives responsible for the lack of accountability and transparency about user privacy. It ordered new structures to enforce privacy protec- tion from the corporate board-level to lower levels of the company. The restructuring limited CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s ability to have exclusive control over decisions about users’ privacy.
Press Release, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook, July 24, 2019
More than ever before, business ethics are of concern to the business commu- nity and to society. In the 1980s, few corporations hired people as ethics officers. Today more than 20 percent of big companies have ethics officers whose job is to develop ethics policies, listen to complaints of ethics violations, and investigate eth- ics abuses. The role has various titles. Salesforce hired an ethics officer in January 2019 who has the title of chief ethical and humane use officer. The research firm, Cognizant, identified “chief trust officer” as one of its “21 Jobs of the Future.” The increase in the number of organizations with a chief ethics and compliance officer is tied to increases in regulations following several high-profile business ethics fail- ings. Often, businesses navigate the ethics and compliance requirements through an executive who operates across business functions to hold the organization account- able for high ethical standards.
Importantly, there is evidence that creating ethics programs are working. The 2018 National Business Ethics Survey found a significant decline in misconduct and vio- lating standards when organizations have effective ethics and compliance programs. Only 33 percent of workers reported observing misconduct in large companies with effective ethics programs, as compared to 51 percent of workers observing misconduct in large companies overall. The Ethics & Compliance Initiative, which sponsors the survey, concluded that, “Companies that invest in ethics reap an enormous return.”
MODERN ETHICAL CHALLENGES IN INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY New ethical questions have emerged in the 21st century due to significant advances in technology and innovation in all aspects of our lives. Artificial intelligence, for example, poses risks from cybersecuity to bias in algorithms. How to minimize the threats posed by these important advances is the tremendous ethical challenge that we must face today. It is not enough to address these challenges for the present because it also requires considering sustainability; that is, how to address present challenges without compromising future generations’ opportunities.
A March 2019 New York Times article asked, “Is Ethical AI Even Possible?” It noted that employee protests were requiring businesses to address the ethical ques- tions raised by technologically advanced products. Employees at Google in 2018 staged a walkout to protest a contract with the Pentagon for use of its technology in weapons. Since 2001, Google’s Code of Conduct included the phrase, “Don’t be evil,” and these employees asserted that the Pentagon contract violated the code. In response, Google CEO Sundar Pichai released a Code of Ethics to guide similar issues and agreed not to
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“The extent to which employees feel pressure to compromise organizational standards is a leading indicator of a larger potential threat: the presence of actual wrongdoing. Nearly three-quarters (a median of 73 percent) of all public and private sector employees surveyed who felt pressure also said they witnessed misconduct where they worked. In the absence of pressure, by comparison, a median of only 17 percent said they observed misconduct in their place of business.” Source: 2016 Global Business Ethics Survey
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renew the Pentagon contract. Similar walkouts were staged by employees at Microsoft, Amazon, and Salesforce protesting contracts with police and customs agencies.
Susan Liautaud, founder of the Ethics Incubator, argues that now is the time to reexamine who is involved in ethical decision making. “Increasingly, the people and companies with the technological or scientific ability to create new products or inno- vations are de facto making policy decisions that affect human safety and society. But these decisions are often based on the creator’s intent for the product, and they don’t always take into account its potential risks and unforeseen uses. What if gene- editing is diverted for terrorist ends?”
Source: Susan Liautaud, “Ethical innovation means giving society a say,” Wired, June 13, 2017
Innovation has eliminated disease through new medical therapies and created opportunities to engage with businesses around the world through advanced commu- nication system. Ethical decision making is a necessary aspect of continued positive innovation.
ETHICS AND SOCIETY On April 29, 2014, Adam Silver, still new to the job as NBA Commissioner, banned Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling from association with the NBA for life and fined him $2.5 million following public release of a recording in which the longest-tenured NBA owner made repeated racist comments. Commissioner Silver announced the decisive punishment for violation of NBA rules that all owners agree to follow. Commissioner Silver stated in reference to the racist statements that were universally condemned by players and defended by none, “Sentiments of this kind are contrary to the principles of inclusion and respect that form the foundation of our diverse multicultural and multiethnic league.” During the 33 years that Donald Sterling owned an NBA team, society had changed. As society changes, shared val- ues emerge that strengthen ethical foundations.
Changing Normative Values Ours is a diverse society formed from many ethnic backgrounds, races, and religions. When a business decision maker, such as Donald Sterling, does not share common values with society, the entire business organization is affected, as the NBA was in this context. Diversity fosters concern over values, and as America becomes increasingly pluralistic, changes in traditional norms create challenges in establishing shared values. Rather than a threat to ethics, however, the inevitable changes in societal norms create the opportunity to focus on foundational principles that bind all members of the society.
Economic Interdependence Increasing economic interdependence promotes concerns about business ethics. Not even farm families are self-sustaining. Each of us depends on business and industry for our every necessity—food, clothing, shelter, and energy. The marketplace dominates all aspects of life, and how the marketplace is conducted concerns us. The decisions people in business make have a significant impact on us. When there is a labor-management dispute in the coal industry, our source of electricity is threatened. When manufacturers conspire to raise prices, the cost of our goods goes up. The sale of dangerous pesticides or impure drugs threat- ens our health. A management decision to close a plant may threaten our jobs.
The 2008 recession also illustrates economic interdependence. As credit from the banks dried up, the adverse economic effects spiraled throughout the economy.
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A serious ethical problem arises from economic interdependence and the modern corporation, which is the structure of most large businesses in this country. The problem is that the corporate leaders are not the real owners of corporations; the shareholders are. Although corporate executives and managers may own some stock, they seldom own significant percentages of very large companies. The ethical problem that can arise is that the executives and managers who control what the shareholders own are sometimes able to manipulate corporate actions for their own benefit, actions that have unacceptable risks to the owners and others. Executives, managers, and other employees are sometime able to take actions that if successful benefit themselves greatly, but if unsuccessful impact many others harmfully.
News Media and the Internet Extensive coverage of business decisions and their impact on society makes us more aware than ever of failures of business ethics. The news media and the Internet make it increasingly difficult to hide the question- able behavior of large organizations. From the coverage of stock market manipula- tions to safety violations, the news media and Internet heighten public attention and concern. The ethical issues that surround nearly every significant business decision are easier to see than they once were. As a result of greater visibility, more individu- als can comment on the fairness, justice, and values reflected by actions, or inac- tions, of business executives. Changes in the law and workplace can improve the ethical processes that affect us all in our economically interdependent world.
Refer now to Sidebar 2.1. This recent case highlights the widespread impact of high-pressure work environments and lack of organizational ethical standards.
ETHICS AND GOVERNMENT These changes in society have been accompanied by changes in the role of govern- ment. When business fails to make ethical decisions, when it fails to live up to soci- ety’s expectations for ethical behavior, government may step in. As noted in a prior
The watchdog group, Citizen Works, documented the dips in stock prices that businesses experience following a corporate scandal. Source: Citizen Works
sidebar 2.1
Wells Fargo Sham Accounts
A 2013 Los Angeles Times investigative story helped uncover a massive internal fraud at one of the United States’ oldest and most respected financial services insti- tutions, Wells Fargo. The fraud apparently originated from CEO John Stumpf’s mantra for employees that “Eight is Great.” This mantra meant that Wells Fargo’s employees should sell each customer eight bank products. However, Wells Fargo employees struggled to achieve the demand- ing quota and, to artificially meet the quota, began open- ing fake accounts without their customers’ knowledge. From 2011 to 2016, employees created 1.5 million unau- thorized deposit accounts and 500,000 credit card appli- cations. These products resulted in $2.6 million in fees for the bank.
On September 8, 2016, regulators ordered Wells Fargo to pay $185 million in fines. Wells Fargo also announced that it had fired more than 5,300 employees for creating sham accounts. However, there was a public outcry that no executives were terminated for failing to protect customers and to properly supervise and incentivize employees. On September 20, 2016, the Senate Banking Committee called for Stumpf’s testimony. Despite his apologizing for the bank’s actions and abolishing all sales goals in the retail banking business, Senator Elizabeth Warren, among others, called on Stumpf to resign. Under increasing pressure, Stumpf announced his resignation on October 12, 2016.
Source: Wasik, John, “The Wells Fargo Fake Account Scandal: A Timeline,” Forbes, November 4, 2016.
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section, and detailed throughout the chapters of this book, government regulates business when there are ethical failures such as those that preceded the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 when business scandals dominated headlines.
Business leaders have incentive to promote corporate integrity, and thereby to limit further governmental regulation. They recognize that by encouraging ethical conduct and self-regulation within business organizations, they will prevent out- side standards from being imposed on them through public law. As a consequence, both business and industry have, in recent decades, developed codes of ethics. Such efforts by professions and businesses to set standards of behavior are evidence of the increasing tendency toward self-regulation. Self-regulation can mean more than helping a business stay out of trouble. Companies that are perceived as ethical and acting in a responsible manner can attract loyal customers, employees, and investors.
Federal law also encourages self-regulation. Federal sentencing guidelines reduce criminal fines for legal violations in companies that have taken specific steps to self- police ethical/legal conduct. (See Chapter 13.) In an increasingly international busi- ness environment, it is worth noting that outside the United States, governments value compliance programs. For example, in Italy, businesses may defend against charges of corrupt practices with evidence of a compliance program. (See Chapter 12.)
The Nature of Ethics
In 1759, Adam Smith wrote, “However selfish man believes himself to be, there is no doubt that there are some elements in his nature which lead him to concern himself about the fortune of others, in such a way that their happiness is necessary for him, although he obtains nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.” With this statement, the author of The Wealth of Nations, perhaps the most famous book on economic theory ever written, recognized a moral element in human nature that goes beyond self-interest.*
What is it that makes us care about the fortunes of others? The next sections examine the nature of ethics. What is morality? What are ethics? How are morality and ethics similar? How do ethics relate to law? What are the major ethical systems? How do these systems apply to business decision making? When you have finished reading these sections, come back to these questions and see if you can answer them.
ETHICS AND MORALITY In 2011, Gil Meche, a 32-year-old right-handed pitcher for the Kansas City Royals, had a baseball contract that called for a $12 million salary. The previous season, he had hurt his arm, but, under the terms of his contract, all he had to do was show up for spring training to earn his salary, even if he could not pitch well or needed surgery. Instead of collecting his $12 million salary as he was legally entitled to do, he retired, which meant that he would not be paid at all. Gil said, “Honestly, I didn’t feel like I deserved the salary. Retiring is the right thing to do.” This statement shows the pitcher’s morality, which is the collection of values that guides human behavior.
In society at large, the sharing of moral values promotes social cooperation and is a significant means of social control. Shared moral values lead us to accept and trust others. Shared values allow us to recognize when there is proper behavior in
Morality is the collection of values that guides our behavior.
A study conducted by establishing an “ethics index” of companies with high rankings in corporate citizenship, governance, social responsibility, and sustainability practices showed an average five- year investment return of 102% compared to 26% for the S&P 500. Source: Corpedia
* Adam Smith (1723-1790)
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others and where limits to behavior rightfully belong. Shared moral values create social harmony.
The sharing of values in business life is as important as it is in other aspects of our lives. Today, many businesses try to foster shared moral values in employees. It is right to strive for quality in products and service. It is wrong to discriminate against or harass a person because of race, gender, or religion. One of the successes of many Japanese companies has been to instill shared moral values in their employees.
Internationally, businesses often face problems when they do business with nations with different moral values. What is wrong in the United States may be right somewhere else and vice versa. Is it right to bribe customs officials so that your com- pany’s goods can enter a country? Is it wrong for a woman to appear in public with- out her face covered? Is it right to eat meat and consume alcohol? Is it wrong to talk business on Sunday? On Saturday? On Friday evening? To succeed in international operations, businesses must be sensitive to differences in moral values.
If morals involve what is right and wrong, ethics is a systematic statement of right and wrong together with a philosophical system that both justifies and neces- sitates rules of conduct. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, private owner- ship of land and goods is highly valued. It is wrong to take something that does not belong to you—hence the rule “Thou shalt not steal.”
Ethics involves a rational method for examining our moral lives, not only for rec- ognizing what is right and wrong but also for understanding why we think something is right or wrong. “The unexamined life is not worth living,” said the Greek philoso- pher Socrates. In other words, ethical self-examination is necessary for a meaningful human life.
The end result of ethical examination is what philosophers call the good. The con- cept of the good is central to the study of morality. The good may be defined as those moral goals and objectives we choose to pursue. It serves to define who we are. Thus, leading a good life means more than having the good life. It means more than material possessions and luxury. It means pursuing intangibles, being concerned, as Adam Smith put it, about the fortunes of others. That many in contemporary society do not achieve the good is evident. Too often, we confuse a good time with a good life.
In summary, morality involves what we mean by our values of right and wrong. Ethics is a formal system for deciding what is right and wrong and for justifying deci- sions that involve competing or conflicting values. In everyday language, the terms morality and ethics are often used interchangeably.
ETHICS AND LAW Chief Justice Earl Warren once remarked: “In civilized life, law floats in a sea of eth- ics.” Ethics and law have similar or complementary purposes. Both consist of rules to guide conduct and foster social cooperation. Both deal with what is right and wrong. Society’s ethical values may become law through legislation or court deci- sions, and obedience to law is often viewed as being ethically correct. That society’s ethical values often become law is the subject of Sidebar 2.2.
Chief Justice Earl Warren (1891-1974)
However, there are also differences between ethics and law. Unlike ethical sys- tems, the legal system is an institution of the state. The state enforces legal rules through civil and criminal sanctions, like monetary damage awards, fines, and imprisonment. Many ethical values (e.g., regarding the treatment of animals) are
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“If you don’t have integrity, you have nothing. You can’t buy it. You can have all the money in the world, but if you are not a moral and ethical person, you really have nothing.”
–Henry Kravis, co-founder
KKR equity firm
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not enforced by the state, and many laws (e.g., regarding traffic violations) do not address ethical concerns.
An important difference between morality and law concerns motivation. Although values found in ethics may be imposed on an individual (by the family, the company, or the law), the motivation to observe moral rules comes from within. On the other hand, even though the values expressed through law also may be the personal moral values of an individual, the motivation to observe the law comes from outside the individual in the form of state sanctions. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained:
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the practical importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841–1935)
Ethical systems also involve a broader-based commitment to proper behavior than does the law. Law sets only the minimum standards acceptable to a society. As a former chief executive officer of Procter & Gamble points out: “Ethical behavior is based on more than meeting minimum legal requirements. It invariably involves a higher, moral standard.”
Ultimately, the commitment to ethical values is superior to mere observance of the law in ensuring responsible business behavior. Legal rules can never be specific enough to regulate all business actions that may have socially undesirable or even dangerous consequences. And lawmakers often do not have the information to know whether specific conduct threatens employees, consumers, or the public generally. They may also lack the consensus to act quickly, or to act at all, in the face of poten- tially harmful business actions. However, a commitment to acceptable business eth- ics will usually ensure responsible business behavior.
Ethical values are ulti- mately superior to law in ensuring responsible business behavior.
sidebar 2.2
Price Gouging after Hurricane Katrina
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina crippled many oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico and temporarily put out of commission sev- eral oil refineries along the coast. The devastation caused a shortage of gasoline.
Responding to reduced supply and constant or increased demand, the price of gasoline shot up, doubling or, in some instances, tripling in price. Economists urge that retail price increases help ensure that those drivers who need and want gasoline the most will be able to get it dur- ing times of shortage. Price increases reduce unimportant driving and promote conservation.
However, many people see soaring prices during times of emergency as unethical. Almost half the states have passed laws prohibiting too-rapid rises of retail prices during times of declared emergency. Throughout the South, there were numerous fines imposed for illegal “price gouging” after Katrina. And when following the hur- ricane the oil companies reported record profits, there was an outpouring of public criticism. Do you think it should be illegal to profit during times of public emergency?
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Two Systems of Ethics
Two principal systems of reasoning dominate ethical decision making in Western civilization. They are formalism and consequentialism. Although these two systems are not mutually exclusive in the outcomes of their ethical analyses, they begin from different assumptions. Most people adopt elements of both systems in making ethical choices. It is very important to appreciate how these systems have influenced your own values and ethical mindset even though, until now, you may have been unaware of it.
FORMALISM Formalism is an approach to ethics that affirms an absolute morality. A particular act is in itself right or wrong, always and in every situation. For example, lying is wrong. There are no justifications for it, and its wrongness does not depend on the situation in which the lie is told. Formalism is primarily a duty-based view of ethics. To be ethical, you have a duty, or moral obligation, not to lie. You have a duty to keep promises. You have a duty not to divulge confidences.
For the formalist (one who expresses the ethics of formalism), the ethical focus is on the worth of the individual. Individuals have rights, and these rights should not be infringed, even at the expense of society as a whole, because they have an intrinsic moral value to them. The Bill of Rights illustrates this view of the rights of individu- als. When the First Amendment states “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” it takes the formalist approach.
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Kant and Formalism For the formalist thinker Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), to be ethical requires that you act with a good intent. To have a good intent, you have to act in ways that are ethically consistent. This emphasis on consistency Kant called the categorical imperative. You have a moral duty to act in the way you believe everyone should act. You should never act in a certain way unless you are willing to have every- one else act in the same way. You cannot make an exception for your own action. You cannot say, “I can lie (cheat) (steal) (cause injury), but others should not do this to me (to my family) (to my friends).” Kant said that to make an exception for your own behavior is immoral and unethical. Note the similarities between Kant’s categorical imperative and the Golden Rule: “Do to others as you would have others do to you.”
Formalist thinking raises many questions for business ethics. Are you treating your employees with respect for their rights as individuals, or are you treating them only as units of production to make a profit? If you are willing to lie about your ability to meet a produc- tion schedule in order to get a new customer, are you willing to have the customer lie to you about his or her ability to pay? If you pass on information that was told to you in con- fidence, are you willing to have your confidences passed on? Can business function with widespread lying, cheating, and stealing and without respect for the rights of individuals?
In his novel The Turquoise Lament, John D. MacDonald puts words into the mouth of his Travis McGee character that illustrate well a formalist approach:
Integrity is not a conditional word. It doesn’t blow in the wind or change in the weather. It is your inner image of yourself, and if you look in there and see a man who won’t cheat, then you know he never will. Integrity is not a search for the rewards for integrity.
John D. MacDonald, The Turquoise Lament
Table 2.1 illustrates other examples of a formalist approach to ethics.
Do remember that formalism says certain behaviors are always wrong.
Categorical imperative (Kant) says that you have a moral duty to act in the way you believe everyone should act.
“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe—the starry heavens above me and the moral laws within me.”
–Immanuel Kant, philosopher
(1724-1804)
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The Social Contract The social contract theory of Harvard philosopher John Rawls furnishes an important recent example of how formalism has influenced thinking about business and personal ethics. This theory is based not on duty but on contract (agreement).
Social contract theory concerns itself with how to construct a just society given the many inequalities of wealth, knowledge, and social status. Rawls suggests a simple first step in determining the ethical values on which a just society can be built. We should assume that we do not know our age, gender, race, intelligence, strength, wealth, or social status. This step is vital because it keeps us from being self-interested in the ethical values we consider. For example, not knowing our sex or race, will we agree that it is ethical to discriminate in employment compensation based on sex or race? Not knowing our wealth, will we agree that owning property is a fair prerequisite to being able to vote? Not knowing our age or work status, will we agree that it is just for a company to have mandatory retirement of its officers at age 65? Freeing ourselves of self-knowledge, Rawls argues, improves our ability to evalu- ate the terms of a fair agreement (contract) under which we enter society or join an organization like a corporation.
Placing himself behind a veil of self-ignorance, Rawls proposes two ethical prin- ciples. First, everyone is entitled to certain equal basic rights, including liberty, free- dom of association, and personal security. Second, although there may be social and economic inequalities, these inequalities must be based on what a person does, not on who a person is, and everyone must have an equal opportunity for achievement. Since there are natural differences of intelligence and strength and persistent social differences of wealth, class, and status, defining “equal opportunity” is crucial to this second ethical principle. Rawls insists that individuals in a just society have the right to an equal place at the starting line. This is as true within a corporation as it is within a country.
Because of its emphasis on individual rights and self-worth, social contract the- ory has its origin in formalism. It provides a powerful process for ethical business decision making. Social contract theory is especially valuable in international busi- ness. In this arena, in the absence of much law, businesses from various cultures must agree as to the terms under which international business is to take place.
Rawls’s “veil of igno- rance” means, to think ethically, you must lose the assumption that what you personally need or want is neces- sarily morally correct.
Statement Source
“We hold these truths to be self-evident.” Declaration of Independence “Thou shalt not steal.” The Ten Commandments “A sale made because of deception is wrong. . . . The end doesn’t justify the means.”
Caterpillar Code of Ethics
“There are fundamental values that cross cultures, and companies must uphold them.”
Thomas Donaldson, business ethics scholar
“Openness in communications is deemed fundamental.”
Business Roundtable
The moral sense is “the sense of what is inherently right and wrong. . . .”
Barbara Tuchman, historian (1912-1989)
table 2.1 Examples of Ethical Formalism
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CONSEQUENTIALISM The second principal system of ethics is consequentialism. Consequentialism con- cerns itself with the moral consequences of actions rather than with the morality of the actions themselves. For the consequentialist, lying itself is not unethical. It is the consequences, or end results of lying, that must be evaluated for their ethical impli- cations. It is the loss of trust or harm done by lying that is unethical.
If formalism focuses on individual rights, consequentialism focuses on the com- mon good. The ethics of actions are measured by how they promote the common good. If actions increase the common good, they are ethical. If actions cause overall harm to society, they are unethical.
The dominant form of consequentialism is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism judges actions by usefulness, by whether they serve to increase the common good. For utilitarians, the end justifies the means. But to judge the utility of a particular action, it is neces- sary to consider alternative courses of action. Only after you consider all reasonable courses of action can you know whether a particular one has the greatest utility.
The International Franchising Association (IFA) adopted a new code of ethics. Officers of the association indicated that an important reason for adopting the new code was to head off government regulation of franchising through self-policing. The code states that when a franchiser is going to make a decision about adding a new franchise outlet into an area where a franchisee already owns an existing outlet, it should weigh “the positive or negative effect of the new outlet on the existing outlet.” Another factor to be considered is “the benefit or detriment to the franchise system as a whole in operating the new outlet.” The motivation of the IFA in adopting the new ethics code and the quoted language of the code suggest a consequentialist ethi- cal view. Table 2.2 gives other examples of consequentialism.
Although business ethics reflect elements of both formalism and consequential- ism, they focus more heavily on the latter. Business leaders feel a need to justify what they do in terms of whether or not it produces dividends for their shareholders. Their primary goal or end is to produce a profit. This orientation reflects consequentialism.
The many statements of business leaders that ethics are “good for business” illus- trate this point. These statements imply that certain values are important because
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Modern economic theory reflects utilitarianism.
Statement Source
“There is no doubt that ethics pays off at the bottom line.”
CEO, Procter & Gamble
“Loss of confidence in an organization is the single greatest cost of unethical behavior.”
CEO, KPMG
“The strongest argument for raising the ethics bar boils down to self-interest.”
CEO, KPMG
“Cost-benefit analysis (used by various governmental agencies and in business and finance).”
Economic theory, finance theory, and policy studies
“The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation.”
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), English social philosopher
table 2.2 Examples of Ethical Consequentialism
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their end result is useful in increasing productivity and profit rather than because the values are intrinsically good. The way business managers evaluate alternative courses of action through cost-benefit analysis is a form of consequentialism.
One approach to business ethics, called “values-based management,” also illus- trates consequentialism. The emphasis of this approach teaches ethical values to employees that enhance the profitability of the company. Examples include why it is wrong to use company computers for personal entertainment during work hours and why it is unethical to use company long-distance phone service to contact friends and relatives.
Sidebar 2.3 is one example of a business response to concerns that it profited from misinformation while undermining a common good.
The Protestant Ethic In part, the current focus on consequentialism in business ethics is due to the decline in business life of what has been described as the Protestant ethic. With the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century came a new emphasis on the importance of the individual. Instead of relying on the intercession of a church hierarchy to achieve grace, each person, Protestants asserted, had the means to address God personally. Thus religion provided the impetus to hard work and achievement. Human desire and indulgence, said Protestants, should be bent to God’s will through self-denial, rational planning, and productivity. The Protestant ethic was rooted in a formalist approach: honesty and keeping promises were intrinsically good.
The Protestant ethic was a boon to capitalism. The quest for economic inde- pendence fueled commercial growth, which fueled industrial growth, which created our modern consumer society. Along the way, however, the religious basis of the Protestant ethic was eroded by rising wealth and the encouragement of mass con- sumption. The part of the ethic that supported hard work, success, and rational planning continued, but without the original absolute moral values. The Protestant ethic became transformed into an organizational ethic that supports the modern
In the book Moral Intelligence: Enhancing Business Performance & Leadership Success (2004), Doug Lennick and Fred Kiel use research to show that the best performing companies are led by those who can effec- tively promote moral principles throughout their organizations.
sidebar 2.3
Facebook Tackles Fake News In the wake of a divisive 2016 presidential election, the social media giant, Facebook, received a great deal of criticism that it was a primary driver of “fake news”—false stories that injected confusion in the election process. Fake news and conspiracy theories spread through Face- book also were identified as a motivating factor in a man firing a rifle at a pizzeria in Washington, DC. Following the election, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg acknowledged that there was “much more work” to do to eliminate false news stories, many produced by individuals to drive some of the 1.8 billion users who log on to Facebook each month to their websites.
In December 2016, Facebook announced steps to identify misinformation. A reporting and flagging sys- tem relies on users to report a story as false, “along with
other signals.” Although Facebook users can share the false stories, the stories are labeled with a warning, and attempts to turn the misinformation into promoted ads are rejected.
In February 2020, with another divisive presidential election underway, Facebook announced that it would hire fact-checkers from Reuters, an international news organizations, to verify the information on its platform. However, Facebook does not fact-check political ads and has received criticism for refusing to ban inaccurate politi- cal ads.
Sources: “Facebook Details Its New Plan To Combat Fake News Stories,” National Public Radio, December 15, 2016; Allison Matyus, “Reuters to Fact-Check Facebook Posts But Not Political Ads,” Digital Trends, February 12, 2020.
The absolute moral values of the Protestant ethic declined. Hard work and planning become justified by the consequentialist results they produce.
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bureaucratic managerial system. The sociologist Robert Jackall identifies this system as having “administrative hierarchies, standardized work procedures, regularized timetables, uniform policies, and centralized control.” The goal of this system is to produce profit. Business actions are justified by their usefulness in accomplishing the goal. The religious formalism of the Protestant ethic has become a type of utili- tarian consequentialism.
COMPARING THE TWO ETHICAL SYSTEMS Formalists and consequentialists can arrive at the same conclusion for an ethical course of action, but they use a different evaluation process. Figure 2.1 illustrates how this might happen. Take as an example a company’s decision whether or not to secretly monitor its employees’ use of the e-mail system. The company suspects that some employees are using the system for personal business and to spread damaging rumors about the company and its executives. How would formalists and consequen- tialists approach this decision?
Formalists might say that secret monitoring treats employees only as a means to the end of increasing organizational efficiency and does not respect their self-worth as individuals. The monitoring also does not respect their dignity and their privacy. Formalists might conclude that secret monitoring is unethical. Explaining the prob- lem to the employees and asking for their consent to monitor would be a more ethi- cal action to take.
For a consequentialist, the act of secret monitoring itself is ethically neither right nor wrong. It is the end result that is ethically important. Secret monitoring and the punishment of wrongdoers are useful in improving productivity, which is an appropriate company goal and beneficial to society at large. To that extent, secret monitoring is ethically acceptable. But the punishment of wrongdoers will likely reveal to all employees that their e-mail has been secretly monitored. This breach of trust can lower employee morale and lessen employee loyalty to the com- pany. Overall productivity may fall. In the examination of alternative solutions to the problem, a more beneficial overall solution, and thus a more ethical one, might
In 2005, someone dis- covered that Sony BMG had secretly inserted a spyware program in several million CDs. The spyware installed itself when buyers ran the CDs on their computers. What are the ethics of this business decision?
Figure 2.1 A common result.Dilemma
Resolution
Formalism • Absolutism • Morality of actions • Test: Am I willing to permit others to act in this way?
Consequentialism • Relativism • Morality of actions • Test: Do the results promote the common good?
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sidebar 2.4
Tobacco Facts Consider the ethical significance of the following facts: • Tobacco products have been consumed in the
United States since at least the early 1600s. • Hundreds of thousands of people are involved in the
growing, manufacturing, distributing, and selling of tobacco products.
• In the first 20 years of tobacco litigation, juries did not award plaintiffs a single penny against tobacco companies.
• Scientists and doctors accept that tobacco consump- tion is an important contributing factor in cancer and heart disease. Excess consumption of fatty foods and lack of exercise are also contributing factors to these diseases.
• Some 435,000 people in the United States, or 1 percent of all cigarette smokers, die prematurely every year due to tobacco consumption.
• Health-related tobacco disease costs more than $75 billion annually in spending for medical care.
• The average age of beginning tobacco consumption is around 16.
• Almost no one begins tobacco consumption past age 21. Three thousand new teenagers begin tobacco consumption every day.
• Tobacco companies spend billions of dollars annu- ally in advertising and marketing tobacco sales. A main strategy of tobacco promotion is to associate glamour, excitement, sex, and desirable life images with tobacco consumption. Another strategy is to get young people to sample cigarettes and other tobacco products.
• The law requires that health warnings accompany the advertising and sale of tobacco products.
• The nicotine in tobacco is considered addictive. How- ever, millions have stopped tobacco consumption.
Primary sources: Federal Trade Commission Cigarette Report (2007); Centers for Disease Control; The New York Times.
be to explain the problem to the employees and ask for their consent to monitor all e-mail messages.
This example of the thinking processes of formalists and consequentialists does not exhaust all of the possible approaches that these groups might take to the e-mail problem. It does emphasize the fact that both formalist and consequentialist thinking can lead to the same business decision.
One of the most complex problems of contemporary business ethics concerns the promotion and sale of tobacco products. Cigarette smoking alone kills hun- dreds of thousands of people every year in the United States. Bring to bear your new knowledge about ethics by evaluating the tobacco facts presented in Sidebar 2.4. No one ever said that ethical evaluation would be easy.
Sources of Values for Business Ethics
There are at least four sources of values for business ethics. The sections that follow identify them as:
• Legal regulation. • Professional codes of ethics. • Organizational codes of ethics. • Individual values.
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LEGAL REGULATION Insider trading, bribery, fraudulent practices, and conflicts of interest are often cited as examples of ethical failures. But these practices are illegal as well. That the unethi- cal may be illegal and vice versa is often confusing to students.
The way to understand the ethical-legal relationship is to realize that in our society ethical values frequently become law and that legal regulation can reflect society’s ethical values. For example, society’s ethical commitment to equal opportunity became law in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimina- tion based on “race, sex, color, religion, and national origin.”
At the same time, the very existence of legal regulation can influence society’s view of what is ethical. In 1964, when the Civil Rights Act was passed, few people were concerned about sex discrimination in employment. Some, such as Justice Gorsuch in the Bostock v. Clayton County, GA decision, maintain that opponents of the bill inserted the prohibition against sex discrimination in hopes of preventing its passage. The Civil Rights Act passed, and over the years, as legal battles involving sex discrimi- nation in employment were fought, Americans’ moral sense of the importance of equal employment opportunity regardless of sex caught up with the law. Today a great major- ity of Americans believe women should not be discriminated against in employment simply because they are women and that such discrimination is wrong. In 2020 the court clarified that Title VII prohibited discrimination against LGBT in the Bostock decision. To a significant extent, the law itself contributed to the change in values.
Legal regulation is, then, a significant source of values for business ethics. In fact, many business and professional organizations look to the law when drawing up their codes of ethical conduct. At least five major ethical rules can be drawn from the law. These include:
• Respect for the liberty and rights of others. • The importance of acting in good faith. • The importance of exercising due care. • The importance of honoring confidentiality. • Avoidance of conflicts of interest.
The following sections elaborate these concepts. These values derived from legal regulation are appropriate for use in ethical business decision making even when decisions do not involve legal issues.
Liberty and Rights First, the law requires respect for the liberty and rights of oth- ers. We see this requirement in legislation protecting the right of privacy, promoting equal employment opportunity, and guaranteeing freedom of expression and due process of law. In one form or another, these legal rights often appear in ethical codes. Do you think that the concern for individual rights represents formalism or consequentialism?
Remember from Chapter 1 that respect for individual rights is historically connected to the legal concept of private property. To have exclusive legal rights over what you say (freedom of speech), for example, is quite similar to having exclusive rights to an area of land or a piece of machinery. The philosopher John Locke, who influenced the framers of the U.S. Constitution, even referred to “lives, liberties, and estates which I call by the general name property.”
Good Faith The law requires that good faith be demonstrated in various eco- nomic and other transactions. An example comes from the Uniform Commercial
Don’t forget that respect for law itself can help change moral values. Anti- discrimination laws have helped convince many people that discrimination based on race, gender, and religion is morally wrong.
“At this moment, America’s highest economic need is higher ethical standards—standards enforced by strict laws and upheld by respon- sible business leaders.”
–President George W. Bush
As legal principles, both liberty and property involve keeping others from interfering with what is yours.
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Code, adopted in 49 of the 50 states. It requires that all sales of goods must be car- ried out in good faith, which means “honesty in intent” and “honesty in fact.”
The reverse of good faith is bad faith, which can be understood as dishonesty in intent. In cases involving a bad faith withholding of amounts due under insurance policies, some courts and juries have severely punished defendant insurance compa- nies with large punitive damage awards. Acting with an honest intent is the key to understanding good faith. Is looking at the intent of parties to a business contract evidence of formalism or consequentialism?
Due Care Another ethical value reflecting legal rules requires the exercise of due care in our behavior. This value comes from the law of torts, which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said “abounds in moral phraseology.” Due care derives from soci- ety’s expectations about how fair and reasonable actions are. Due care promotes the common good. In negligence law, failure to exercise due (or reasonable) care is the principal element that triggers liability against the defendant. Courts have examined due care in negligence cases in terms of a balancing test. The likelihood that the defendant’s conduct will cause harmful consequences, taken with the seriousness of the harmful consequences, is balanced against the effort required to avoid the harm- ful consequences. The balancing test is central to the concept of due care.
Consider the following problem of due care. Bridgestone/Firestone became aware that certain of its tires were showing defects at much higher rates than what might be thought of as normal. Still, the tires operated perfectly on hundreds of thousands of vehicles. Was the company ethically required to warn the public about the tires? To recall the tires? A very small fraction of all tires showed defects. What level of defect is acceptable without warning those who use a product? Ford Explorer sport utility vehicles used the Firestone tire, and Ford decided to recall and replace the tires in Saudi Arabia. But Ford did not notify U.S. safety authorities or the public about what it was doing overseas, even though the same tires were on Ford Explorers in the United States. Was Ford acting ethically? What would you need to know in order to decide?
Another form of the requirement to exercise due care comes from the Federal Guidelines for Sentencing for Criminal Convictions, which focus specifically on corporate white-collar crime. In determining what punishment a company should receive for the illegal business acts of its employees, the guidelines look at whether the company has “an effective program to prevent and detect violations of the law.” An effective program is measured by whether “the organization exercised due dili- gence in seeking to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents.” Due diligence is another way of saying “due care.”
As with the determination of due care in negligence law, the determination of due diligence in sentencing guidelines requires use of a balancing test. Considering the significance of the balancing test to the exercise of due care (or due diligence), do you think that formalist or consequentialist values are reflected?
Confidentiality Honoring confidentiality is the fourth major ethical value emerging from the law and legal regulation. The legal requirement of honoring confi- dentiality appears in agency law generally and in the professional-client relationship in particular. For a CPA to share with unauthorized third parties what has been learned during a client’s audit is professional malpractice. Likewise, it is malpractice for an attorney, physician, real estate broker, or any professional agent to tell others what a client (principal) has related in confidence.
Constitutional law also involves many balancing tests. Do these tests illustrate formalism or consequentialism?
Chapter 13 further dis- cusses the Federal Sen- tencing Guidelines.
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In addition to not telling others of a confidence, an agent must in many instances not act on the confidence related by a principal. The securities laws make it a crime for agents like the officers and managers of a corporation to buy and sell corporate stock on information only they know. (See Chapter 17.) Many “insider trading” scan- dals have occurred because corporate agents illegally traded on confidential infor- mation they learned from their positions in the corporation.
The legal requirement of honoring confidences contains both formalist and con- sequentialist ethical values. Can you identify these values?
Conflicts of Interest Often embodied in business codes of ethics, avoiding con- flicts of interest is a final ethical value flowing from the law, especially from agency law. A conflict of interest occurs when one attempts to “serve two masters,” and no agent or employee of one principal can secretly work for another whose interest competes with that of the first principal. That is why a real estate agent may not represent both the seller and the buyer in a real estate transaction without permission from both parties.
Sometimes when corporations “go public” or otherwise sell new stock issues, they will give employees of their customers or suppliers the option of buying a num- ber of the new stock shares at a special fixed price. If the market value of the stock rises, exercise of the stock options can be quite valuable to these employees as they resell the stock at market price. Is it a conflict of interest for employees of other companies to accept these stock options? Does it impair their objective judgment about continuing to do business with the corporation that has given them such a gift? Compaq Computer Corporation, Cisco Systems, and AT&T specifically forbid employees from accepting stock options from their suppliers or customers.
Conflicts of interest also arise in public service. For instance, it is a conflict of interest for a judge or administrative regulator to make a decision involving a company in which he or she owns stock. Note that in this instance the conflict of interest does not involve “serv- ing two masters.” The conflict arises because of the ownership interests that will make it difficult for the judge or regulator to make an unbiased decision. In terms of formalism and consequentialism, how do you evaluate the prohibition against conflicts of interest?
Many people consider it a type of conflict of interest for accounting firms to both advise their clients on general financial matters and to audit them when audits may uncover financial wrongdoing.
concept summary
Ethical Values from Legal Regulation 1. Respect the liberty and rights of others. 2. Act in good faith. 3. Exercise due care. 4. Honor confidentiality. 5. Avoid conflicts of interest.
PROFESSIONAL CODE OF ETHICS Another important source of business ethics comes from the historic tradition of the professional codes of ethics. Professions such as law and medicine have long tradi- tions of codes of ethical conduct. Other professions—and, more recently, business and industry in general—have developed and adopted codes of ethical conduct. Here
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sidebar 2.5
American Marketing Association Statement of Ethics PREAMBLE The American Marketing Association commits itself to pro- moting the highest standard of professional ethical norms and values for its members (practitioners, academics and students). Norms are established standards of conduct that are expected and maintained by society and/or profes- sional organizations. Values represent the collective con- ception of what communities find desirable, important and morally proper. Values also serve as the criteria for evaluat- ing our own personal actions and the actions of others. . . .
ETHICAL VALUES Honesty—to be forthright in dealings with customers and stakeholders. To this end, we will:
• Strive to be truthful in all situations and at all times. • Offer products of value that do what we claim in our
communications. • Stand behind our products if they fail to deliver their
claimed benefits. • Honor our explicit and implicit commitments and
promises. Responsibility—to accept the consequences of our marketing decisions and strategies. To this end, we will: • Strive to serve the needs of customers. • Avoid using coercion with all stakeholders. • Acknowledge the social obligations to stakeholders that
come with increased marketing and economic power. • Recognize our special commitments to vulnerable
market segments such as children, seniors, the eco- nomically impoverished, market illiterates and others who may be substantially disadvantaged.
• Consider environmental stewardship in our decision-making.
Fairness—to balance justly the needs of the buyer with the interests of the seller. To this end, we will: • Represent products in a clear way in selling, advertis-
ing and other forms of communication; this includes the avoidance of false, misleading and deceptive promotion.
• Reject manipulations and sales tactics that harm cus- tomer trust.
• Refuse to engage in price fixing, predatory pricing, price gouging or “bait-and-switch” tactics.
• Avoid knowing participation in conflicts of interest.
• Seek to protect the private information of customers, employees and partners.
Respect—to acknowledge the basic human dignity of all stakeholders. To this end, we will: • Value individual differences and avoid stereotyping
customers or depicting demographic groups (e.g., gender, race, sexual orientation) in a negative or dehumanizing way.
• Listen to the needs of customers and make all rea- sonable efforts to monitor and improve their satisfac- tion on an ongoing basis.
• Make every effort to understand and respectfully treat buyers, suppliers, intermediaries and distribu- tors from all cultures.
• Acknowledge the contributions of others, such as consultants, employees and coworkers, to marketing endeavors.
• Treat everyone, including our competitors, as we would wish to be treated.
Transparency—to create a spirit of openness in marketing operations. To this end, we will: • Strive to communicate clearly with all constituencies. • Accept constructive criticism from customers and
other stakeholders. • Explain and take appropriate action regarding signifi-
cant product or service risks, component substitutions or other foreseeable eventualities that could affect cus- tomers or their perception of the purchase decision.
• Disclose list prices and terms of financing as well as available price deals and adjustments.
Citizenship—to fulfill the economic, legal, philanthropic and societal responsibilities that serve stakeholders. To this end, we will: • Strive to protect the ecological environment in the
execution of marketing campaigns. • Give back to the community through volunteerism
and charitable donations. • Contribute to the overall betterment of marketing
and its reputation. • Urge supply chain members to ensure that trade is
fair for all participants, including producers in devel- oping countries.
Source: AMA Statement of Ethics, published at https://www.ama.org/. Repro- duced with the permission of the American Marketing Association.
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we use portions of professional codes to demonstrate sources of ethical values that come from the development of group standards for ethical conduct.
We begin with selected excerpts from codes of conduct for two professions: mar- keting and accounting. These codes are the Statement of Ethics from the American Marketing Association, shown in Sidebar 2.5, and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code of Professional Conduct, which appears in Sidebar 2.6. Understand that what follows are only excerpts from these codes, which in full may run several pages.
So important are ethics to the conduct of accounting that when Arthur Ander- sen, once one of the world’s oldest and largest accounting firms, was implicated in a cover-up when the energy firm Enron collapsed, the entire accounting firm went out of business. Enron had contributed only a small percentage of the worldwide busi- ness of Arthur Andersen.
From these excerpts, the ethical values expressed in the codes of ethics for mar- keters and accountants may seem overly general in nature. But each code has pages of rules that apply to specific situations arising in the marketer-client and accountant- client relationship. As the state does not enforce these codes, it is not proper to call them law. Yet the professional organizations that have adopted these codes employ specific sanctions to back them up. Because the state will likely regulate these profes- sions if they do not do so themselves, it is appropriate to term their ethical codes self-regulation.
sidebar 2.6
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code of Professional Conduct The Principles call for an unswerving commitment to honor- able behavior, even at the sacrifice of personal advantage.
In carrying out their responsibilities as profession- als, members should exercise sensitive professional and moral judgments in all their activities.
As professionals, members perform an essential role in society. Consistent with that role, members . . . have responsibilities to all those who use their professional ser- vices. Members also have a continuing responsibility to cooperate with each other to improve the art of account- ing, maintain the public’s confidence, and carry out the profession’s special responsibilities for self-governance. The collective efforts of all members are required to main- tain and enhance the traditions of the profession.
Members should accept the obligation to act in a way that will serve the public interest, honor the public inter- est, and demonstrate commitment to professionalism.
A distinguishing mark of a profession is accep- tance of its responsibility to the public. The accounting profession’s public consists of clients, credit grantors,
governments, employers, investors, the business and financial community, and others who rely on the objectiv- ity and integrity of certified public accountants to main- tain the orderly functioning of commerce. This reliance imposes a public interest responsibility on members.
In discharging their professional responsibilities, members may encounter conflicting pressures from each of those groups. In resolving those conflicts, members should act with integrity, guided by the precept that when members fulfill their responsibility to the public, clients’ and employers’ interests are best served.
Those who rely on members expect them to dis- charge their responsibilities with integrity, objectivity, due professional care, and a genuine interest in serving the public. They are expected to provide quality services, enter into fee arrangements, and offer a range of ser- vices—all in a manner that demonstrates a level of profes- sionalism consistent with these Principles.
Source: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc. AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, 2016.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CODES OF ETHICS There are few industry-wide codes of ethics, so many businesses have adopted ethi- cal codes at the individual organization level. Nearly all large corporations now have their own codes of business ethics, often called codes of conduct. These codes are obviously an important source of business ethics.
The previously referenced Business Roundtable, a national group of senior busi- ness leaders, has identified a general list of topics that organizational codes of busi- ness ethics should cover. These include:
• Fundamental honesty and adherence to the law. • Product safety and quality. • Health and safety in the workplace. • Conflicts of interest. • Fairness in selling/marketing practices. • Financial reporting. • Supplier relationships. • Pricing, billing, and contracting. • Trading in securities/using inside information. • Payments to obtain business/Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. • Acquiring and using information about others. • Security. • Political activities. • Protection of the environment. • Intellectual property/proprietary information.
Different Approaches to Ethical Codes Individual companies take differ- ent approaches to ethical codes. The Hertz Corporation developed a Standards of Business Conduct document that outlines ethics and compliance obligations for all Hertz employees, officers, and directors. The document begins with a clear state- ment of ethics as the foundation of the company: “acting ethically is part of our DNA—it is who we are, and it is what our customers expect from us at every turn.” The Standards of Business Conduct is Hertz’s guide for ethical decision-making and corporate contacts when more guidance is needed.
Boeing Corporation has a short code of conduct (see Sidebar 2.7). Other companies spell out their expectations for employees’ behavior in con-
siderable detail. For instance, the Martin Marietta Corporation Code of Ethics and Standard of Conduct is 17 pages long and covers a wide variety of company activities and practices.
Many codes of business ethics contain both general statements of shared ethi- cal values and more specific applied examples of these values. General statements of shared values remind employees what their companies stand for and at the same time serve to encourage ethical behavior in situations not covered by specific ethical guides. The applied examples address specific types of business conduct like those listed above by the Business Roundtable.
A majority of organizational codes of business ethics provide sanctions for their violation, up to and including employee termination. As with professional codes of conduct, it is appropriate to call these organizational codes self-regulation. Whether
Some companies provide only general ethics guidelines to employees. Other companies pro- vide very specific and detailed ethics rules.
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companies pursue ethical self-regulation with enthusiasm and commitment or the codes are mere window dressing to satisfy the government and the general public is an important issue in determining the value of these codes.
Although many businesses have codes of ethics, effective implementation and enforce- ment of those codes is far more important than the creation of a code. For instance, in March 2019 aviation regulators grounded Boeing’s 737 MAX aircraft following two crashes within five months that killed 346 people. A design change to the aircraft that inspectors believe caused the plane to suddenly nosedive was not documented in safety manuals or crew training. Does safety of its passengers belong in the Code of Ethics?
The decision by General Motors not to recall the Chevrolet Cobalt after discovery of faulty ignition switches renewed debate about when executive compensation poli- cies should require forfeiture of past bonuses, or “claw back” of compensation. For more than 10 years, apparently, General Motors was aware of the problem with the ignition switch that is linked to 13 deaths. A 90-cent part would have fixed the defect. GM’s ability to recover bonuses, similar to the majority of compensation policies in corporate America, is limited to issues related to accounting violations. The disas- trous decision to not fix the Cobalt’s ignition switches raised the question whether past pay of executives should be recoverable when unethical conduct is discovered, utilizing personal bank accounts as a way to enforce ethical codes.
The Boeing Code of Conduct outlines expected behaviors for all Boeing employees. Boeing will conduct its business fairly, impartially, in an ethical and proper manner, in full compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, and consistent with Boeing’s enduring values. In conducting its business, integrity must underlie all company relation- ships, including those with customers, suppliers, commu- nities, and among employees. The highest standards of ethical business conduct are required of Boeing employ- ees in the performance of their company responsibilities. Employees will not engage in conduct or activity that may raise questions as to the company’s honesty, impartial- ity, reputation or otherwise cause embarrassment to the company. Employees will demonstrate their commitment to the enduring values, will treat each other with respect and will refrain from any type of harassment, including sexual harassment.
As an employee of The Boeing Company, I will ensure that:
• I will not engage in any activity that might create a conflict of interest for me or the company.
• I will not take advantage of my Boeing position to seek personal gain through the inappropriate use of
sidebar 2.7
Boeing Code of Conduct Boeing or non-public information or abuse my posi- tion. This includes not engaging in insider trading.
• I will follow all restrictions on use and disclosure of information. This includes following all requirements for protecting Boeing information and ensuring that non-Boeing proprietary information is used and dis- closed only as authorized by the owner of the infor- mation or as otherwise permitted by law.
• I will observe fair dealing in all of my transactions and interactions.
• I will protect all company, customer and supplier assets and use them only for appropriate company approved activities.
• Without exception, I will comply with all applicable laws, rules and regulations.
• I will promptly report any illegal or unethical conduct to management or other appropriate authorities (i.e., Ethics, Law, Security, EEO).
Every employee has the responsibility to ask questions, seek guidance and report suspected violations of this Code of Conduct. Retaliation against employees who come forward to raise genuine concerns will not be tolerated.
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INDIVIDUAL VALUES The ultimate source of ethics for business decision making comes from the individ- ual. Others can tell you what is right or wrong. They can sanction you for failing to live up to their expectations. But only you can develop an ethical mindset. Only you can intend your actions to be honest and fair or to serve the common good.
How to act ethically in every business situation is beyond the scope of this chap- ter, or that of any book, for that matter. Business life is just too complex. There is no way to create enough rules to cover all possible ethically significant situations, even if they could be identified in advance. However, there are five questions that you can ask yourself that will help you explore ethical implications before making personal or business decisions about what to do.
1. Have I thought about whether the action I may take is right or wrong? John Smale, former CEO of Procter & Gamble, has said that “there is an ethical dimension to most complex business problems.” If this is so, then you should consider whether any decision you propose to make to solve such a problem is ethical or not. The philosopher Hannah Arendt explained that evil often comes from a kind of thoughtlessness. Plato wrote that immoral behavior often flows from ignorance. A major goal of this chapter is to encourage you to think about the ethical implications of what you decide and what you do. It is the first step in leading a good life.
2. Will I be proud to tell of my action to my family? To my employer? To the news media? An excellent way to uncover whether there are ethical difficulties with a possible decision is to consider how proud you would be to share it with others. Before reaching an important business decision, consider how you would feel about tell- ing your decision to your family, your employer, and the public through the news media. The less proud you are to share your decision with others, the more likely your decision is to be unethical. As Stephen Butler, former CEO of KPMG, said, “An essential part of an ethics process is identifying issues that would mortify a chief executive if he were to read about them on the front page of the newspaper.”
3. Am I willing for everyone to act as I am thinking of acting? With this question you encompass a major principle of ethical formalism. If you consider suggesting to a co-worker that it would be advantageous for him or her to develop a sexual relationship with you, are you willing to have your superior suggest this relation- ship to you? Or to your friends or a member of your family? Trying to convince yourself that it is acceptable for you to do something but not acceptable for oth- ers in your situation to do it is virtually always immoral.
4. Will my decision cause harm to others or to the environment? Asking this question exposes a significant principle of ethical consequentialism: promotion of the common good. Promoting the common good within your business organization is important, but it is even more important to consider whether your decision is good for society.
You can approach this issue of the common good by asking whether your decision will cause harm. If the decision will cause no harm and will advance your business interests, it will also usually advance the good of society by increasing productivity, efficiency, or innovation.
Many business decisions, however, do cause harm to others or to the environ- ment. It is difficult to construct an interstate highway without workers being injured and trees being cut. The point of asking yourself the question about potential harm is
LO 2-4
Do remember that a “good life” means more than having material possessions and a good time. It means being concerned about others.
Numerous commenta- tors have asserted that “harm” to the interests of others is the major limitation on both liberty and the use of an own- er’s resources.
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so you can weigh the harm against the increase in the common good and so you can evaluate whether an alternative course of action might bring about the same increase in the common good with less harm.
Recall that ethical formalists maintain that harm to some individual rights is never justified by an increase in organizational or common good. But as ethical deci- sion making in business often involves a mixed approach, including both formalism and consequentialism, it is appropriate for you to evaluate potential business deci- sions by weighing harms against benefits to the common good.
5. Will my actions violate the law? Both formalists and consequentialists believe that you have an ethical duty to obey the law except in very limited instances. The law provides only minimum standards for behavior, but they are standards that should be observed. Thus, to be ethical, you should always consider whether any business decision you make will require illegal actions.
Sometimes it is not clear whether proposed actions will violate the law. Then you should consult with legal counsel. Many regulatory agencies will also give legal advice about whether actions you are considering are legal or not.
When you are convinced that a law itself is morally wrong, you may be justified in disobeying it. Even then, to be ethical, you should be willing to make public your disobedience and to accept the consequences for it. Both Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. deliberately disobeyed laws they thought were morally wrong, and they changed society by doing so. Ultimately, they changed both laws and ethics. But they made their disobedience to these laws public, and they willingly accepted punishment for violating them. Dr. King famously wrote about his decision to disobey a law that he evaluated as unjust as he accepted the consequences of that decision in “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”
Leading an ethical business life may be difficult at times. You will make mis- takes. You will be tempted. It is unlikely that you will be perfect. But if you want to be ethical and will work hard toward achieving your goal, you will be rewarded. As with achieving other challenging business objectives, there is satisfaction in ethical business decision making.
In business as well as in personal life, the key to ethical decision making is wanting to be ethical and having the will to be ethical. If you do not want to be ethical, no code of conduct can make you ethical. Potential harm you may cause to individuals and to society will best be deterred by the threat of legal punishment and the sanctions of pro- fessional and corporate codes. You may never get caught, lose your job, or go to jail. But, as Mortimer Adler observed, you will lack “much that is needed for the good life.”
To be ethical and violate a law, you should be willing to accept the consequences for it.
• Have I thought about whether the action I may take is right or wrong?
• Will I be proud to tell of my action to my family? To my employer? To the news media?
• Am I willing for everyone to act as I am thinking of acting? • Will my decision cause harm to others or to the
environment? • Will my actions violate the law?
concept summary
Self-Examination for Self-Regulation
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Achieving an Ethical Business Corporation
The dominant form of organization in modern business is the corporation. Currently, the top 100 manufacturing corporations produce more than two-thirds of the nation’s entire manufacturing output. In 1840, the largest manufacturing firm in the United States, the Springfield Armory, employed only 250 workers. Today, many corporations have tens of thousands of employees. Some have hundreds of thousands. In sub- stantial part, the development of the corporate form of business organization made possible this growth in business size.
Ethical problems, however, arise in corporate life that are not present in one’s individual experience. In a study of Harvard MBAs during their first five years fol- lowing graduation, 29 of 30 reported that business pressures had forced them to violate their own ethical standards. The next sections focus on the ethical problems of an individual in the corporation and suggest several ways of dealing with them.
THE OBSTACLES Some may contend that the corporation by its very nature, with its dependence on a competitive edge and on profit and its limited liability, is so constituted as to make ethical behavior unlikely. That is not true, but there are certain obstacles to ethical corporate behavior that deserve serious consideration.
The Emphasis on Profit Notwithstanding the statement from the Business Roundtable, detailed in the Introduction to this chapter, the primary goal of the mod- ern business corporation is to produce a profit. Management demands it, the board of directors demands it, and shareholders demand it. Making a profit motivates our entire economic system, and it promotes the common good by providing incentive for job creation and the efficient fulfillment of social needs for goods and services.
Unfortunately, emphasis on corporate profit alone sometimes conflicts with ethical responsibility. How a profit is made becomes less important than that it is made. Various business scandals illustrate this point.
In many corporations, the responsibility for profit making is decentralized. The home office expects a plant in another state to meet certain profit goals, but the home office does not know much about the particular operations of that plant. Meeting profit goals places enormous pressure on the local plant manager. The man- ager’s career advancement depends on the plant’s profitability, yet the home office does not appreciate the difficulties under which the plant is operating. In such a situ- ation, the overemphasis on profit can easily lead to the manager’s taking ethical and legal shortcuts to ensure profit.
An example of such shortcuts involved Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corpora- tion, one of the major national hospital chains. Following a government investiga- tion, many units of the company were accused of enhancing profits by improperly billing Medicare for laboratory tests and home health care services. It was also alleged that managers were “upcoding,” or exaggerating patient illness, in order to get greater reimbursements from the Medicare system. Several managers were crimi- nally indicted and convicted. The company’s CEO resigned. To settle charges, the company agreed to pay the federal government $745 million to resolve fraud allega- tions. As part of its response, the company also stationed ethics and compliance officers in nearly every hospital, in part to prevent managers from “looking good” by producing profits through improper billings.
The primary reason that corporations dominate the business landscape is that their ownership is divisible into small shares that make them easily sellable.
LO 2-5
“The cult of short-term stockholder value has been corrupting.”
–John S. Reed, former chair of the New York
Stock Exchange
“I do not believe maxi- mizing profits for the investors is the only acceptable justification for all corporate actions. The investors are not the only people who matter. Corporations can exist for purposes other than simply maximizing profits.”
–John Mackey, CEO, Whole Foods Market
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Does the emphasis on profit in a property-based private market mean that only profit must be considered in business decision making? For an example of a nation where not only profit is important in business, see Sidebar 2.8.
The Effect of the Group The social critic Ambrose Bierce once remarked that the corporation is “an ingenious device for obtaining individual profit without individual responsibility.” He was referring to the fact that individuals in large groups such as the corporation feel less responsibility for what happens in the group than they do for what happens in their individual lives. They may also act differently, and to some extent less ethically, in a group.
Ambrose Gwinnett Bierce (1842 – 1914)
That individuals will do unethical things as part of a group which they would never do alone is widely recognized, and the same pattern can be observed in cor- porate behavior. Within corporations, it becomes easy for a researcher not to pass on lately discovered concerns about the possible (yet not certain) side effects of a new skin lotion that upper management is so enthusiastic about. In corporate life, it is not difficult to overlook the unethical behavior of a superior when many fellow employees are also overlooking it. And of course, “I did it because everyone else did it” is a common rationalization in groups of all kinds. “Just following orders” is a similar rationalization.
That individuals in groups may feel a diminished sense of responsibility for deci- sions made and actions taken invites ethical compromise. Coupled with an over- emphasis on profit, the group effect increases the difficulty of achieving an ethical business corporation.
The Control of Resources by Nonowners In the modern corporation, the owners (or shareholders) are often not in possession and control of corporate resources. Top management of many corporations effectively possess and control vast resources that they do not own. This produces the problems of corporate gov- ernance mentioned in Chapter 1. Managerial agents like the president and vice
Don’t forget that a nation is just a large group. This means that “culture matters” in the implementation (or not) of moral values.
“Study after study con- firms it: the vast majority of people act based on the circumstances in their environment and the standards set by their leaders and peers, even if it means com- promising their personal moral ideals. ‘Good’ peo- ple do bad things if they are put in an environ- ment that doesn’t value values, if pressured to believe that they don’t have any choice but to get the job done— whatever it takes.”
–Ethics Resource Center (2008)
The Swedes have a strong property-based private mar- ket, but the business emphasis in Sweden is not solely on profit making. Instead, the Swedes have a strong ethic of lagom, which means “not too much, not too little, but just enough.”
As a result, the pay of corporate chief executive officers (CEOs) is only a small fraction of what it is in the United States, and the average take-home pay of employ- ees (excluding CEOs) varies from highest to lowest by a ratio of only 3 to 1. Sweden provides universal health care, public nursing homes, and subsidized child care
and parental leave-taking during a child’s first year. When Swedish companies go overseas, they treat employees there with much of the same ethic as in Sweden.
Lagom means that there are few wealthy Swedes, and Sweden’s social welfare system of “just enough” depends on a tax rate of approximately twice that in the United States. Note also that Sweden is a small, homog- enous country whose citizens share a common ethical culture that is often not found in larger nations. Source: Susan Wennemyer, “Sweden: The Kindness Economy,” Business Ethics, Fall 2003.
sidebar 2.8
The Swedish Example of Lagom
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presidents of a large corporation have ethical and legal duties to manage the corpo- rate resources for the benefit of their owners. But because they control corporate resources, it may be easy to manipulate the resources in their own interest and dif- ficult for others to find out that they have done so. In other words, managers may be in an ideal position to infringe on the property interest of the corporate owners.
Sometimes, managers embezzle corporate money or abuse expense accounts. At other times they misrepresent the financial condition of the corporation in order to exercise stock options, obtain undeserved bonuses, or prop up loans they have secured with company stock. Because the very nature of corporate structure gives managers the opportunity to abuse and misappropriate corporate resources owned ultimately by the shareholders, ethical business practice is made more important yet more difficult. Consider Sidebar 2.9.
THE STEPS Despite the obstacles that sometimes stand in the way of ethical corporate behavior, certain steps can be taken to promote business ethics in corporate life.
Involvement of Top Management To encourage corporate ethics, it is not enough merely to adopt a code of conduct. For the code to change behavior, corpo- rate employees must believe that the values expressed by the code represent the val- ues of the corporation’s top management. Top management must act as a role model for values it wishes corporate employees to share.
The sociologist Robert Jackall attributes the importance of a corporation’s top management in encouraging business ethics to the bureaucratic system for career advancement. Each employee owes loyalty to his or her immediate corporate supe- rior. As a practical matter, career advancement for the employee is generally tied
In the financial collapse and recession of 2008, many finan- cial institutions were paying executives enormous sums of money. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., an investment bank, paid its CEO, Richard Fuld, a reported $480 million in salary and bonuses between 2000 and 2008. During this period, Lehman Brothers had leveraged its assets more than 30 to 1, meaning that it had debts of over 30 times the value of its assets, and it bought and sold extremely high-risk, mort- gage-based securities. However, when the housing market declined and these securities turned out to have little value, Lehman Brothers fell, helping to start a series of worldwide financial collapses. Consider the ethical implications, both to shareholders and society, of business agents like Richard Fuld taking risks with money they do not own in return for the possibility of enormous personal returns.
Consider also that the executives of Lehman Broth- ers were telling investors, right up until the time of their collapse, that the company was in good financial shape. Are such statements unethical, illegal?
In 2002, Bernard J. Ebbers, the chief executive offi- cer of WorldCom, characterized investors’ concerns as mostly “unfounded nonsense” and said that “bankruptcy or a credit default is not a concern” and that “it has been 10 years since WorldCom has been so well positioned from an operating perspective.” Immediately following these statements, the company’s stock rose in market value. However, five months later WorldCom filed for bankruptcy. Mr. Ebbers was arrested and in 2005 a court sentenced him to 25 years in prison.
sidebar 2.9
Failure and Collapse
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to career advancement for the superior. In turn, that supervisor has a corporate superior to whom loyalty is owed, and so on up the corporate bureaucratic hierarchy.
Beyond a certain level in corporate bureaucracy, argues Jackall, social indicators about how well an employee “fits in” to the company management are as important as merit performance in securing further career advancement. For this reason, cor- porate employees tend to be very sensitive to the values of top corporate manage- ment and take these values as their own. Due to the interlocking system of loyalties that run between employment levels of the corporate hierarchy, top management’s values filter down quite effectively to lower-level employees.
The values adopted by lower-level employees, however, will be top management’s real values. So if the corporation has a code of conduct that expresses excellent ethical values, but top management shows that it expects profit at any cost, then the values adopted by lower-level employees will likely relate to profit at any cost rather than to values appearing in the code of conduct.
Top management must really believe in the ethical values expressed in codes of conduct for these values to take hold throughout the corporation. But if they do believe them and will communicate this belief through the corporation, there is an excellent chance that these values will be adopted within the corporate group. As Stephen Butler, former CEO of KPMG, says, “I really believe that corporate ethics are essential for a successful business today, and the CEOs of corporate America are the only ones who can institutionalize them.”
Unfortunately, some top management support for business ethics may be merely for show. One survey concluded that 59 percent of the largest British companies offered no training to lower management on the meaning and use of their corporate codes of conduct. These findings are similar to those conducted by the U.S.-based Ethics & Compliance Officers Association, where an even larger percentage of com- panies offered no guidance on the meaning and use of ethical codes.
Openness in Communication For ethical corporate values to make their most significant impact on decision making, corporate employees must be willing to talk with each other about ethical issues. “Openness in communication is deemed fundamental,” states the Business Roundtable. Openness promotes trust, and without trust even the best- drafted code of ethics will likely fall short of achieving an ethical business corporation.
Beyond helping establish trust, openness in communication is necessary for ethical corporate decision making because of the complexity of information required to evaluate the implications of many business decisions. Without open discussion of these implications among employees and between employees and their superiors, ethical decision making is severely hindered. Information crucial to making an ethi- cal decision may be lacking.
For example, consider the complexity of a firm’s decision to sell in other coun- tries a pesticide that is banned for sale in the United States. Evaluating the ethical implications of the sale (assuming there are no legal ones) will demand considerable information. To make a fully informed decision the firm must know:
• What the effects of the pesticide on humans and the environment are. • Why the pesticide was banned in the United States. • Why the pesticide is useful in other countries. • Whether in spite of its ban for use in the United States there may be good rea-
sons to use the pesticide in other countries. • Whether there are alternatives to its use in other countries.
The complexity of information required to evaluate the implications of many business deci- sions requires openness in communication.
“Ethics . . . is a respon- sibility given to every employee in the company, but it must be led by top leadership.”
–Ira A. Lipman, Chairman,
Guardsmark LLC
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The sharing of information about the implications of this pesticide sale will greatly assist the making of an ethical decision about its use. Openness in communica- tion among employees on these implications will be vital in reaching an ethically informed corporate decision about this complex matter.
How is openness in communication on ethical issues promoted within the corpo- ration? There is no single answer. For top management to provide a good role model of concern for speaking out on ethical issues is certainly a right beginning. Another possibility is for employees to meet periodically in small groups to consider either real or hypothetical ethical problems. In general, a shared corporate commitment to the ideal of ethical decision making is important to openness in communication.
Consideration of All Stakeholders Large corporations affect the interests of many different groups in society, which are called “stakeholders” because they have something at risk when the company acts and thus have a “stake” in it. Investor-owners, employees, the board of directors, and managers typically have a stake in the actions of large corporations, but so do customers, suppliers, financial creditors like banks, and the community in which a company is located. If a company pollutes as a by-product of production, society itself may have a stake in what actions a corporation takes.
The consequentialist ethics known as stakeholder theory maintains that ethical corporate behavior depends on managers who recognize and take into account the vari- ous stakeholders whose interests the corporation impacts. Stakeholder theory includes but goes beyond the responsibilities of corporate governance, which focuses on the legal responsibilities of managers to society and to the investor-owners of the corpora- tion. Stakeholder theory suggests that through its managers, an ethical corporation
• Considers the concerns of all proper stakeholders and weighs their interests when making decisions.
• Allows stakeholders to communicate with decision makers and informs them about risks to their interests that may arise from corporate action.
• Adopts communication methods that are appropriate to the sophistication lev- els of various stakeholders.
• Realizes the interdependence of all stakeholders and demonstrates fairness toward both voluntary stakeholders (e.g., employees) and involuntary stakehold- ers (e.g., the community).
• Works actively and cooperatively to reduce the risk of corporate harm to all stakeholders and to compensate them when harm occurs.
• Avoids risks to stakeholders which, if explained, would be clearly unacceptable. • Acknowledges the potential conflict between managerial self-interest and the
ethical responsibility of managers to other stakeholders, and promotes open procedures that allow managers to monitor their own ethical performance.
For an example of what can happen when a large business prioritizes its ethical val- ues, see Sidebar 2.10.
THE REWARDS Of the world’s 100 largest economies, 49 of them are countries and 51 are companies. General Motors has greater annual sales than the gross national products of Denmark, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, or Saudi Arabia. Walmart’s economy is larger than that of Poland, Ukraine, Portugal, Israel, or Greece. Because of the size and influence
Stakeholder theory holds that ethical corporate behavior requires that directors and managers take into account everyone whose interests the corporation impacts, called “stakeholders.”
Walmart also has more than 1 million employees.
Stakeholder theory is part of the ethics sometimes also called “corporate social responsibility.”
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of modern corporations, business ethics take on special significance. Although there are unique problems with promoting ethical corporate decision making, the rewards for making the attempt are important both to business and society.
The Spanish journal Boletín Círculo makes four observations about business ethics. A paraphrase of these observations provides a good way to highlight a chapter on ethics and self-regulation:
1. Profits and business ethics are not contradictory. Some of the most profitable businesses have also historically been the most ethical.
2. An ethical organizational life is a basic business asset that should be accepted and encouraged. The reverse is also true. Unethical behavior is a business liability.
3. Ethics are of continuing concern to the business community. They require ongoing reevaluation. Businesses must always be ethically sensitive to changes in society.
4. Business ethics reflect business leadership. Top firms can and should exercise leadership in business ethics.
Business plays a vital role in serving society, and we cannot isolate the impact of important business decisions from their social consequences. For businesses merely to observe the law is not sufficiently responsible. Legal regulation lacks flexibility and is inadequately informed to be the only social guide for business decision making. Ethics belong in business decision making. A business that does not act ethically sev- ers itself from society, from the good, and ultimately from its own source of support.
In reading the next chapters on the regulatory environment, consider how pas- sage of much of the regulation was preceded by breaches of business ethics. If ethical self-regulation does not guide business behavior, legal regulation often follows quickly.
CAN A BUSINESS HAVE A CONSCIENCE? This chapter has emphasized the importance of creating and sustaining shared values within a business so that integrity guides decision making throughout the
Legal regulation lacks flexibility and is inad- equately informed to be the only social guide for business decision making.
Intel, the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer, has become a corporate leader in developing a transparent and conflict-free mineral supply chain.
When the Enough Project identified for Intel that the gold, tin, tungsten, and tantalum crucial to building electronic components were also fueling one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II, Intel began a long process of cleaning its supply chain of these “conflict minerals.” These minerals and metals were extracted from militant-controlled mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo and used to fund a brutal civil war. Intel realized it inadvertently played a role in sustaining the violence of the Congolese conflict. But because it did not buy the raw materials from the mines, cleaning the supply
chain of conflict minerals meant changing the way it did busi- ness from sourcing the cheapest supply to creating value for conflict-free minerals.
Intel launched a plan to develop a consortium of inde- pendent, third-party, not-for-profits to audit mines in the Congo, working with the local governments. If the audited mine receives a positive rating, its mined ore is placed in labeled bags that are tracked to smelters in places such as Russia and China. Intel admits that the system is not perfect, but there is evidence that it is effectively redirect- ing mineral revenue from militants to miners. Source: Kaufman, Alexander, “How Intel Eliminated War from Its Supply Chain,” Huffington Post, January 12, 2016.
sidebar 2.10
Removing Conflict Minerals from the Supply Chain
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organization and each member of the organization is accountable for high ethical standards. Is it possible to take that to the next level? Can the business itself exercise religious values and morality? The courts are considering that question in light of a controversial provision of the Affordable Care Act.
The “personhood” rights of a corporation have long been recognized in the law. For example, the Supreme Court ruled in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Com- mittee case of 2010 that corporations had the right to express political views and that the law attempting to ban political contributions by corporations was, therefore, a violation of the U.S. Constitution. In addition to political speech, what else can busi- nesses express? Moral views?
The Affordable Care Act includes a provision that businesses’ health care insur- ance plans offered to employees must include coverage for a wide range of con- traceptives. Several corporations filed a lawsuit on the basis that the coverage of contraceptives violates the businesses’ religious conscience. If a corporation is a “person” with free expression rights, does it likewise have freedom of religion? One of the businesses answering that question in the affirmative is Hobby Lobby because its owners believe the business is an extension of their religious lives and that it would be a violation of conscience to pay for others’ contraception through its business.
This issue of business ethics has many implications. Certainly, laws that force individuals to violate a religious value are problematic. But what are the parameters of business and religious expression? Hobby Lobby, for example, does not sell shot glasses because the owners’ religious values include an aversion to alcohol. From another perspective, should employees risk termination for partaking in legal behavior that may violate their employer’s religious code, such as having a child out of wedlock or drinking alcohol? If the business has a conscience, does it have greater weight and validity than the individual consciences of its employees? See Sidebar 2.11 for another example of a business representing its business owners’ religious beliefs.
The president and CEO of restaurant chain Chick-fil-A Dan Cathy regretted speaking out on same-sex marriage following a media firestorm that erupted after he affirmed his personal support for traditional marriage in the summer of 2012. The chain was founded by Dan Cathy’s father and operates with Christian values, such as keeping its stores closed on Sun- days to give all employees a day to rest, spend time with fam- ily and friends, and attend worship services if they so choose.
When same-sex marriage initiatives were on four state ballots in 2012, Dan Cathy responded to a question and affirmed his opposition to same-sex marriage. Sup- porters of Mr. Cathy’s beliefs lined up for hours to eat at the stores, while opponents held highly publicized “kiss- ins” outside the stores. Throughout the United States, media covered the developments.
Two years later, Mr. Cathy stated that he had made a mistake in “making the company a symbol in the marriage debate” and “alienating market segments.” “Consum- ers want to do business with brands that they can inter- face with, that they can relate with and it’s probably very wise from our standpoint to make sure that we present our brand in a compelling way that the consumer can relate to.”
Although his personal views on same-sex marriage have not changed, Mr. Cathy states, “I know others feel very different from that and I respect their opinion and I hope that they would be respectful of mine.”
Source: Stafford, Leon, “Cathy gay marriage stance re-ignites Chick-fil-A debate,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 27, 2013.
sidebar 2.11
Same-Sex Marriage Debate and “Kiss-Ins”
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Key Terms Categorical imperative 35 Consequentialism 37 Duty 35 Ethics 33
Formalism 35 Good, the 33 Morality 32 Protestant ethic 38
Self-regulation 45 Social contract theory 36 Stakeholder theory 54 Utilitarianism 37
Review Questions and Problems Contemporary Business Ethics
1. Modern Ethical Challenges in Innovation and Technology What new challenges are brought through advances in technology?
2. Ethics and Society Describe the reasons for the rising concern over business ethics.
3. Ethics and Government How has government action in recent years encouraged increased business attention to ethical matters?
The Nature of Ethics 4. Ethics and Morality
Compare and contrast ethics and morality. What do philosophers call the end result of ethical examination?
5. Ethics and Law A marketing consultant to your firm comments that being ethical in business means nothing more than obeying the law. Discuss.
Two Systems of Ethics 6. Formalism
As amended in 1988, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits bribery as a practice for U.S. companies to use in obtaining business in other countries. In passing the act, Congress expressed the concern that bribery was inherently wrong. Which major system of ethical thought does this concern suggest? Explain.
7. Consequentialism A headline from The Wall Street Journal read “U.S. Companies Pay Increasing Attention to Destroying Files.” The article discussed how many companies are routinely shredding files in the ordinary course of business to prevent future plaintiffs from obtaining the files and finding incriminating evidence. Is this practice unethical? Evaluate.
8. Comparing the Two Ethical Systems (a) Is it ethical to advertise tobacco products in association with a desirable, exciting, or sophisticated
lifestyle? (b) Is it ethical to advertise these products in association with a cartoon character that is appealing to
young people?
Sources of Values for Business Ethics 9. Legal Regulation
Explain how, in our society, ethical values frequently become law and how legal regulation can promote change in ethical values. Describe several common ethical values that are found in law.
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10. Professional Codes of Ethics Discuss why lawyers are sometimes viewed as being unethical. Is the average lawyer more or less ethical than the average business manager?
11. Organizational Codes of Ethics A study of one major company’s code of ethics by the Business Roundtable found that the lower the level of employees on the corporate ladder, the greater their hostility and cynicism toward codes of business ethics. (a) Why might this be true? (b) What can top business management do to change this view?
12. Individual Values In addition to the five questions listed in the text, can you think of questions to ask yourself to help explore your ethical mindset before making a business (or personal) decision?
Achieving an Ethical Business Corporation
13. The Obstacles (a) A Newsweek article on business ethics concludes, “Even in today’s complex world, knowing what’s
right is comparatively easy. It’s doing what’s right that’s hard.” Explain why this statement may be true in modern corporate decision making.
(b) In 2010, average CEO pay was 319 times higher than the average employee’s pay, according to the Institute for Policy Studies. In 1980, CEO pay was only 42 times higher. Discuss possible reasons for this tremendous increase in CEO pay and analyze the ethical implications.
14. The Steps Another article from The Wall Street Journal carries the headline “Tipsters Telephoning Ethics Hot Lines Can End Up Sabotaging Their Own Jobs.” Discuss why whistle-blowing is unpopular within the corporation. Apply to your discussion what sociologist Robert Jackall said about a subordinate’s loyalty to supervisors within the corporation. Is whistle-blowing an appropriate subject for corporate ethics codes?
15. The Rewards Why are formal legal rules alone not an adequate ethical system for business?
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1. As the chief executive officer of a Silicon Valley software company, you become aware that your chief competitor is working on a new computer program that will revolutionize interactive voice-based applications. You know that if you can find out about several key functions relating to your competitor’s program, your own programmers can duplicate the function of the program without actually copying its code. • Is it ethical for you to hire away from your competitor a secretary who may have over-
heard something that will be useful to you? • Is it ethical for you to send an attractive employee to a bar where your competitor’s
programmers hang out in the hope of getting the information you want? • Is it ethical for you to have someone hunt up and read everything published by your
competitor’s programmers in case they may have let slip something that will help you? 2. The research director of PharmCo, a midsize pharmaceutical company, tells top management of an important new discovery. After years of effort, one of the company’s research teams has discovered a drug that will reverse pattern baldness, the leading cause of male hair loss. The potential for profit from such a drug is enormous, but the director cautions that two of the eight principal researchers on the team believe that the drug may also increase the possibility of potentially fatal cerebral aneurysms in a very tiny percentage of users.
• If follow-up animal studies of the new drug do not show significant side effects, would it be ethical for the company to tell the two researchers to keep quiet about their concerns?
• Is it ethical to put animals at risk in order to test the drug’s safety? Many poor men in the world will be unable to afford the new drug if PharmCo sets the price too high. • Is it morally right for PharmCo to maximize its profit even if it means that many men will
have to remain bald? • Does your answer change if the drug cures rheumatoid arthritis? AIDS?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
3-1 To recognize the role of key personnel associated with the courts.
3-2 To know the organization of the state and federal court systems.
3-3 To understand the power of judicial review and the philosophies of judi- cial restraint and judicial activism.
3-4 To appreciate and contrast the background and judicial alignment of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
3-5 To analyze a sample case from the U.S. Supreme Court, including the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
Understanding the Court System3 Hero Images/AGE Fotostock
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A viable court system is crucial to maintain-
ing the rule of law. This chapter describes
the court system and the court’s authority
to decide disputes between parties. First, it examines
the personnel who operate our courts, including the
role of judges, jurors, and lawyers in a case. It next
explores the organizational structure of both the
state and federal courts and the differences between
trial courts and appellate courts. Finally, the chapter
examines the U.S. Supreme Court and the concept
of judicial review and the role of courts in interpret-
ing the Constitution, state and federal legislation, and
the making of common law in the process of deciding
cases (stare decisis).
By the time you have completed this chapter,
you should have an understanding of the court sys-
tem and a greater sensitivity for how the courts apply
the law. You will understand the importance of every
citizen willingly serving on a jury and receiving the
cooperation of employers and the protection of the
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62 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
government for doing so. You will appreciate the difficult questions jurors must answer and the complex cases juries must decide. Finally, you will appreciate the difficulty that arises in resolving legal disputes. See Sidebar 3.1 to get a sense of the substantial amount of cases in the federal court system.
Managers often are involved in the litigation process as either parties or witnesses in a case.
“Litigation is costly and everyone benefits if disputes can be resolved efficiently with minimal expense and delay.”
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts The following is a summary of key findings provided
for the year ending March 31, 2019. • In the U.S. courts of appeals, filings decreased 3 percent. • The bankruptcy appellate panels reported that filings
fell 1 percent. • Filings in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit dropped 9 percent. • In the U.S. district courts, civil case filings increased
3 percent, and criminal defendant filings rose 11 percent.
• Cases dealing with personal injury and product liability went up 36 percent (up 212 cases).
• Civil rights filings grew 7 percent (up 2,502 cases) as cases involving claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Other) rose 28 percent (up 2,474 cases) and cases addressing housing and accom- modations climbed 20 percent (up 163 cases).
• Intellectual property right filings grew 20 percent (up 2,171 cases) as cases related to copyright jumped 57 percent (up 2,294), mainly as a result of copyright infringement claims raised by Strike 3 Holdings, LLC.
• The U.S. bankruptcy courts received 1 percent fewer petitions.
• The number of persons under supervision by the fed- eral probation system on March 31, 2019, was 3 per- cent lower than the total reported one year earlier. Although most cases are resolved before trial, each
federal judge typically as more than 500 cases on the docket, which Chief Justice Roberts characterized as a “daunting workload” that carries with it “severe time and resource constraints.” Recent revisions in the federal rules for civil litigation are helping judges to handle cases more efficiently, yet litigation continues to be very time consum- ing and costly. Source: Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, United States Courts; Adam Liptak, “Chief Justice Salutes Trial Judges for Tackling ‘Daunting Workload,’” The New York Times, Dec. 31, 2016.
sidebar 3.1
The “Daunting Workload” of Federal Trial Judges
Personnel
Before we look at the court system, you should have some background and under- standing of the individuals who operate our court system. Judges apply the law to the facts, jurors find or determine the facts from conflicting evidence, and the facts as found by the jury are given great deference. In the process of representing clients, law- yers present evidence to the jury and argue the law to the court. Collectively, these per- sons conduct the search for truth. The court system is the way we enforce our laws in a property-based legal system. Without the courts, our legal system could not operate.
JUDGES AND JUSTICES The individuals who operate our courts are called judges or magistrates. In some appellate courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, members of the court are called justices. In this discussion, we will refer to trial court persons as judges and review- ing court persons as justices.
LO 3-1
“Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.”
–John Adams (1735-1826)
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In all cases, the function of the trial judge is to determine the applicable rules of law to be used to decide the case. Such rules may be procedural or substantive. In cases tried without a jury, the judge is also responsible for finding the facts. In cases tried before a jury, the function of the jury is to decide questions of fact. The judge still is responsible for deciding questions of law.
Trial judges are the main link between the law and the citizens it serves. The trial judge renders decisions that deal directly with people in conflict. These judges have the primary duty to observe and to apply constitutional limitations and guarantees. They bear the burden of upholding the dignity of the courts and maintaining respect for the law.
Justices do more than simply decide an appeal—they often give reasons for their decisions. These reasoned decisions become precedent and a part of our body of law that may affect society as a whole, as well as the litigants. So in deciding cases, jus- tices must consider not only the result between the parties but also the total effect of the decision on the law. In this sense, their role is similar to that of legislators. When reviewing appeals, justices are essentially concerned with issues of law; issues of fact normally are resolved at the trial court level.
For these reasons, the personal characteristics required for a justice or appellate judge are somewhat different from those for a trial judge. The manner of performing duties and the methods used also vary between trial and reviewing courts. A trial judge who has observed the witnesses is able to use knowledge gained from partici- pation as an essential ingredient in his or her decisions. A justice must spend most of the time studying the briefs, the record of proceedings, and the law in reaching decisions.
The judiciary, because of the power of judicial review, has perhaps the most extensive power of any branch of government. This issue will be extensively exam- ined later in the chapter. Lower court judges’ decisions may be reviewed by a review- ing court, but they have personal immunity from legal actions against them based on their judicial acts.
JURORS It is important to understand the role of the jury as a fact-finding body. Because liti- gation may involve both questions of law and questions of fact, the deference given to the decisions of a jury is very important. Trial by jury is a cherished right guaran- teed by the Bill of Rights. The Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution guarantee the right of trial by jury in both criminal and civil cases. The petit jury is the trial jury that returns a verdict in both situations.
Although juries are used in only a very small percentage of all cases, they remain critical to the administration of justice. In civil cases the right to trial by a jury is preserved in suits at common law when the amount in controversy exceeds $20. State constitutions have similar provisions guaranteeing the right of trial by jury in state courts.
Historically, a jury consisted of 12 persons. Today, many states and some federal courts have rules of procedure that provide for smaller juries in both criminal and civil cases. Such provisions are acceptable because the federal law does not specify the number of jurors—only the types of cases that may be brought to trial before a jury at common law. Several studies have found no discernible difference between results reached by a six-person jury and those reached by a 12-person jury. As a result, many cases are tried before six-person juries today.
Most cases are resolved before trial and even fewer cases lead to an appeal.
Judges and justices often sacrifice consider- able financial opportu- nities by giving up the practice of law in the prime of their careers.
Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “A jury must begin with at least 6 and not more than 12 members.” Each juror must participate in the verdict unless excused. Local rules allow district courts to set the number of jurors consistent with this rule.
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64 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
In most states, a jury’s decision must be unanimous because many believe that the truth is more nearly to be found and justice rendered if the jury acts only on one common conscience. However, there is growing evidence that the requirement of una- nimity is taking its toll on the administration of justice in the United States. Holdout jurors contribute to mistrials, and many cases are routinely deadlocked by margins of 11–1 or 10–2. Many states have eliminated the requirement of unanimity in their courts in civil cases, and two states have done so in criminal cases. Several legal com- mentators have argued that unanimous jury verdicts are not constitutionally man- dated and should be eliminated to help restore public confidence in our jury system.
Thanks to a series of sensationalized trials, the jury system has been subject to much criticism. Many argue that jurors are not qualified to distinguish fact from fiction, that they vote their prejudices, and that their emotions are too easily swayed by skilled trial lawyers who may work with jury consultants and have other technical support to present a case to a jury (Sidebar 3.2). However, most members of the bench and bar feel the right to be tried by a jury of one’s peers in criminal cases is the most effective method of discovering the truth and giving the accused his or her “day in court.”
The quality of a jury depends upon the abil- ity to get competent and dedicated citizens to serve.
Both before and during a civil trial, trial consultants and technical support services are often a key aspect of liti- gation. The following list provides a sense of the ways in which they offer trial support: • Coaching attorneys. • Conducting community attitude surveys. • Providing focus groups. • Developing voir dire to elicit attitudes and
experiences. • Creating a theme for the case. • Preparing sophisticated demonstrative exhibits,
including timelines.
• Helping with media management for high-profile cases. Example: In a $2 billion lawsuit involving Oculus, a
virtual reality company owned by Facebook, chief execu- tive Mark Zuckerberg donned a suit when he testified in the trial. According to one trial consultant, shedding his famous hoodie and T-shirt combination “shows that he is respectful of the judge and the process.” Trial consultants are skilled at considering how a witness’s appearance may be perceived by a jury. Source: Catey Hill, “Why You should Pay Attention When Mark Zuckerberg Wears a Suit,” Market Watch, Jan. 20, 2017.
sidebar 3.2
Trial Consultants and Technical Support: Other Key Parties in Litigation
Jurors normally do not give reasons for their decisions, although some special verdicts may require juries to answer a series of questions. Actually, it would be almost impossible for the jury to agree on the reasons for its verdict. A jury may agree as to the result but disagree on some of the facts, and different jurors may have different ideas or understandings of the testimony.
Many individuals attempt to avoid jury duty. Some lose money because of time away from a job or profession. Others feel great stress in having to help make important decisions affecting the lives of many people. Because so many potential jurors seek relief from jury duty, many trials often end up with more jurors who are unemployed or retired than should be the case. Today, there is a strong trend toward requiring jury duty of all citizens, irrespective of any hardship that such service may entail. Courts often refuse to accept excuses because jury duty is a responsibility of all citizens in a free society.
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One of the most difficult issues facing the judicial system is the right to a trial by jury in very complex and complicated cases that frequently take a long time to try. For example, many antitrust cases involve economic issues that baffle economists, and such cases may last for several months or even years. The average juror may not comprehend the meaning of much of the evidence, let alone remember it when it is time to make a decision. As a practical matter, many persons cannot serve on a jury for several weeks or months. How does a free and democratic society deliver a trial by jury of one’s peers, if busy people are excused from jury service? For these and other reasons, some experts recommend that the right to a trial by jury be abolished in very complex and time-consuming cases.
Many of the largest jury verdicts involve medical malpractice, products liability, fraud, or breach of contract. Juries have been increasingly generous to plaintiffs who suffer death or serious physical injury. Many plaintiffs’ lawyers now contend that million dollar awards—once the standard for measuring a successful case—are no longer indicative of a major victory.
LAWYERS Our court system is an adversarial one. Although private parties may represent them- selves without a lawyer, as a practical matter, lawyers are required in most cases. Because knowledge of court procedures and substantive law is required as a bare minimum in most cases, lawyers serve as the representative advocates in our court system. They present the evidence, the points of law, and the arguments that are weighed by juries and judges in making their decisions.
A lawyer’s first duty is to the administration of justice. As an officer of the court, he or she should see that proceedings are conducted in a dignified and orderly manner and that issues are tried on their merits only. The practice of law should not be a game or a battle of wits, but a means to promote justice. The lawyer’s duties to each client require the highest degree of fidelity, loyalty, and integrity.
A lawyer serves in three capacities: counselor, advocate, and public servant. As a counselor, a lawyer by the very nature of the profession knows his or her client’s most important secrets and affairs. A lawyer is often actively involved in the personal decisions of clients, ranging from their business affairs and family matters such as divorce to their alleged violations of the criminal law. These relationships dictate that a lawyer meet the highest standards of professional and ethical conduct.
Obviously, if a lawyer is to give competent advice, he or she must know to the fullest extent possible all the facts involved in any legal problem presented by the client. To encourage full disclosure by a client, the rules of evidence provide that
“I do not assert that the jury trial is an infallible mode of ascertaining truth. Like everything human, it has its imper- fection. I only say, that it is the best protection for innocence and the surest mode of punish- ing guilt that has yet been discovered.”
–Jeremiah Black, defense attorney in
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1886)
Lawyers can be sanc- tioned for unethical conduct and some have gone to jail for illegal conduct.
The American Bar Asso- ciation reported more than 1.3 million licensed lawyers in the United States in 2018.
1. Trial judges determine the applicable law, and in cases without a jury, they also are responsible for finding the facts.
2. Appellate courts act as reviewing courts and gener- ally are concerned with issues of law.
3. The petit jury is the trial jury that returns a verdict. 4. The nation’s top 10 jury verdicts include three over
$500 million. 5. Lawyers serve three roles: counselor, advocate, and
public servant.
concept summary
Personnel
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66 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
confidential communications to a lawyer are privileged. The law does not permit a lawyer to reveal such facts and testify against a client, even if called to do so at a trial. This is the attorney-client privilege, and it may extend to communications made to the lawyer’s employees in certain cases. This is especially important today because law firms frequently use paralegals (legal assistants) to gather facts and assist attorneys.
Organization of the Court System
There are two major court systems in the United States: the federal courts and the 50 state courts. The federal court system and those in most states contain three levels— trial courts, courts of appeals, and supreme courts. Lawsuits begin at the trial court level, and the results may be reviewed at one or more of the other two appellate court levels. Critical to every lawsuit is the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION Jurisdiction refers to the power of a court, at the state or federal level, to hear a case. For any court to hear and decide a case at any level, it must have subject matter jurisdiction, which is the power over the issues involved in the case. Some state trial courts have what is called general jurisdiction, or the power to hear any type of case. Other state courts have only limited jurisdiction, or the power to hear only certain types of cases. Jurisdiction may be limited as to subject matter, amount in contro- versy, or area in which the parties live.
Courts, especially those of limited jurisdiction, may be named according to the subject matter with which they deal. Probate courts deal with wills and the estates of deceased persons, juvenile courts with juvenile crime and dependent children, criminal and police courts with violators of state laws and municipal ordinances, and traffic courts with traffic violations.
Even trial courts (courts of general jurisdiction) cannot attempt to resolve every dispute or controversy that may arise. Some issues are simply nonjusticiable. For example, courts would not attempt to referee a football or basketball game. They would not hear a case to decide how English or math should be taught in the public schools. Moreover, courts do not accept cases involving trivial matters.
STATE COURTS State court systems are created, and their operations are governed, from three sources. First, state constitutions provide the general framework for the court sys- tem. Second, the state legislature, pursuant to constitutional authority, enacts stat- utes that add body to the framework. This legislation provides for various courts; establishes their jurisdiction; and regulates the tenure, selection, and duties of judges. Other legislation may establish the general rules of procedure to be used by these courts. Each court sets forth its own rules of procedure within the statutory bounds. These rules are detailed and may specify, for example, the times when vari- ous documents must be filed with the court clerk.
Trial Courts Depending upon the particular state, a general trial court can take on any number of names: the superior court, the circuit court, or the district court. In the trial courts, parties file their lawsuits or complaints seeking to protect their property
LO 3-2
Courts of different scope and subject matter juris- diction help create order and efficiency.
Currently, 39 states elect judges at some level.
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rights or redress a wrongdoing. The complaint describes the parties (John Doe versus Sally Smith), the facts and law giving rise to a cause of action, the authority of the court to decide the case, and the relief requested from the court. (See Chapter 4 for a more complete explanation of the litigation process including a sample complaint.) The trial court is responsible for determining both the facts and the law in the case.
Appellate Courts The parties to litigation are entitled as a matter of right to a review of their case by a higher court, or an appeal, if the requirements of pro- cedural law are followed in seeking the review. In some states, there is only one appellate court, which is usually called the supreme court of the state. In more popu- lous states, there often are two levels of reviewing courts—an intermediate level and a court of final resort. In states with two levels of review, the intermediate courts are usually called the courts of appeal, and the highest court is again called the supreme court. In states with two levels of reviewing courts, most appeals are taken to the lower of the two courts, and the highest court of the state will review only very important cases. Intermediate courts of review typically consist of three to five judges. A state supreme court typically has seven to nine judges.
Reviewing courts are essentially concerned with questions of law. Although a party is entitled to one trial and one appeal, he or she may obtain a second review if the higher reviewing court, in the exercise of its discretion, agrees to such a review. The procedure for requesting a second review is called in some states a petition for leave to appeal and in others a petition for a writ of certiorari. The process for requesting a review is explained more fully later in this chapter. Deciding such requests is a major function of the high- est court in each state. As a practical matter, less than 5 percent of all such requests are granted. See Figure 3.1 for an overview of a typical state court system.
FEDERAL COURTS Article III of the Constitution (see Appendix) provides that judicial power be vested in the Supreme Court and such lower courts as Congress may create. Figure 3.2 shows you the hierarchy of the federal court system. The judicial power of the federal courts has been limited by Congress. Essentially, it extends to matters involving (1) questions of federal law (federal question cases), (2) the United States as a party, (3) controversies among the states, and (4) certain suits between citizens of different states (diversity of citizenship). Federal question cases and diversity of citizenship cases require further discussion as presented in the following paragraphs.
95% to 98% of all com- plaints are settled or fully resolved at the trial court level. Very few cases, by comparison, are appealed.
Direct Appeal in Limited Cases
Supreme Court 7 to 9 Justices
Intermediate Reviewing Courts
3 to 5 Justices
Trial Court General Jurisdiction LAW EQUITY
Certiorari or Leave to Appeal Certification
Figure 3.1 Typical state court system.
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68 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
Entrepreneurs are well advised to be aware of the small- claims court as an effective place to resolve matters that do not involve large amounts of money. The dollar limit jurisdiction of the courts varies by state from approxi- mately $2,500 to $25,000. Small-claims courts have low court costs and simplified procedures. The informal- ity of the proceedings speeds up the flow of cases. The services of a lawyer are not usually required, and some states do not allow lawyers to participate in these pro- ceedings. Typical cases: • clients who fail to pay;
• disputes with vendors; • landlord-tenant problems, including security deposits; • damage to clothing caused by cleaners or alterations; • relatively minor personal injuries (e.g., dog bites); • issues with contractors; • failure to repair a vehicle or appliance properly.
The following claims cannot be brought in small claims courts: divorce, guardianship, name change, bank- ruptcy, or actions for emergency relief (injunctions).
sidebar 3.3
Small-Claims Courts
Figure 3.2 The federal court system.
Supreme Court of the United States
(9 justices) Certiorari
Certiorari or Certification
Tax Court
Administrative Agencies
United States
District Courts
(with federal jurisdiction
only)
United States
Bankruptcy Courts
(District of Columbia,
Virgin Islands, Guam)
(94 districts in 50 states
and Puerto Rico)
Court of Appeals for
Federal Circuit*
State Courts** 50 states
*Same as other United States Courts of Appeal. **Certiorari.
United States
District Courts
(with federal and local
jurisdiction)
United States Courts
of Appeals (12 circuits)
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Federal question cases may be based on issues arising out of the U.S. Con- stitution or out of federal statutes. Any amount of money may be involved in such a case, and it need not be a suit for damages. For example, a suit to enjoin a violation of a constitutional right can be filed in a federal court as a federal question case. These civil actions may involve matters based on federal laws such as those deal- ing with patents, copyrights, trademarks, taxes, or employment discrimination. The rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution also may be the basis for a federal question case.
Diversity of citizenship requires that all plaintiffs be citizens of different states from all defendants. If a case involves a party on one side that is a citizen of the same state as a party on the other, there will then be no diversity of citizenship and thus no federal jurisdiction. Courts have held that it is the citizenship of the party in the case that determines whether diversity of citizenship exists. For example, diversity jurisdiction is based on the citizenship of all members of a partnership.
The fact that business corporations, which are considered persons before the law, are frequently incorporated in one state and have their principal place of busi- ness in another state also causes problems in determining when diversity of citizen- ship exists. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of the state of incorporation and also a citizen of the state in which it has its principal place of business. Thus, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois is a citizen of both Delaware and Illinois for purposes of diversity. If any party on the other side of a lawsuit with such a corporation is a citizen of either Illi- nois or Delaware, there is then no diversity and no federal jurisdiction.
In diversity of citizenship cases, the federal courts have a jurisdictional amount of more than $75,000. If a case involves multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims, each claim must satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Thus, in a class-action suit, the claim of each plaintiff must be greater than the $75,000 jurisdictional amount.
One of the reasons Congress provides for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is to guard against state court bias against the nonresident party in a lawsuit. Because the biggest increase in federal lawsuits in recent years has been over businesses suing one another in contract disputes, diversity jurisdiction preserves the sense of fair- ness in such situations when one of the parties is out of state.
District Courts The federal district courts are the trial courts of the federal judi- cial system. There is at least one such court in every state and the District of Colum- bia. These courts have subject matter jurisdiction over all the cases mentioned above. These courts have the authority to review lawsuits, receive evidence, evaluate testi- mony, impanel juries, and resolve disputes. Most significant federal litigation begins in this court. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the details concerning procedures to be followed in federal court litigation. These rules are strictly enforced by the courts and must be followed by the parties in every lawsuit.
Appellate Courts Under its constitutional authorization, Congress has created 12 U.S. Courts of Appeal plus a special Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as intermediate appellate courts in the federal system. This special reviewing court, located in Washington, DC, hears appeals from special courts such as the U.S. Claims Court and Contract Appeals as well as from administrative decisions such as those made by the Patent and Trademark Office. Other courts, such as the Court of Appeals for Armed Forces, have been created to handle special subject matter. Figure 3.3 illustrates the location of the Courts of Appeals.
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdic- tion over federal ques- tion cases and diversity of citizenship cases.
An adverse decision from a federal district court in Atlanta may be appealed to the Elev- enth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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DECISIONS BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT In addition to the court of appeals, the federal court system provides for a Supreme Court. Because the litigants are entitled to only one review, or appeal, a subsequent review by the U.S. Supreme Court must be obtained through a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Sidebar 3.4 provides an overview of the number of cases granted certiorari and their disposition.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is a request by the losing party in the court of appeals for permission to file an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court. In such situa- tions, the Supreme Court has discretion as to whether or not it will grant the petition and allow another review. This review is not a matter of right. Writs of certiorari are granted primarily in cases of substantial federal importance or where there is an obvious conflict between decisions of two or more U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal in
Four U.S. Supreme Court justices must vote yes to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari.
The following chart illustrates the number of cases granted certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court and their disposition for the 2015–2016 term:
CIRCUIT NUMBER OF
CASES % DECIDED % AFF’D % REV’D
CA1 2 3% 3 50% 50%
CA2 5 7% 5 40% 60%
CA3 3 4% 3 33% 67%
CA4 4 5% 4 50% 50%
CA5 4 5% 4 50% 50%
CA6 7 9% 7 57.1% 42.9%
CA7 1 1 1 — 100%
CA8 4 5% 4 24% 75%
CA9 14 19% 14 14.3% 85.7%
CA10 2 4% 2 50% 50%
CA11 7 9% 7 57.1% 42.9%
CA DC 3 4% 3 66.7% 33.3%
CA Fed 4 5% 4 50% 50%
State 11 15% 11 18% 82%
Dist. Ct 3 4% 3 33.3% 66.8%
Original 0 0% - - -
Source: SCOTUSblog Stat Pack, October Term 2018. https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_30_19.pdf
sidebar 3.4
Circuit Scorecard
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72 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
an important area of the law that needs clarification. Pursuant to the U.S. Constitu- tion (Art. III. Sec. 2), the Supreme Court also has original jurisdiction over a small range of cases, including those affecting ambassadors and in which the state is a party. The Supreme Court’s decision becomes the law of the land and reconciles the division of opinion between the lower courts.
When the U.S. Supreme Court reviews petitions for a writ of certiorari, the writ is granted if four of the nine justices vote to take the case. The Supreme Court spends a great deal of time and effort in deciding which cases it will hear. It is able to pick and choose those issues with which it will be involved and to control its caseload. The Supreme Court normally resolves cases involving major constitutional issues or interpretation of federal law. Sidebar 3.5 illustrates the very slim odds of the U.S. Supreme Court hearing a case and also the voting pattern from a recent term.
More than 7,000 certiorari petitions are filed in the U.S. Supreme Court each year by parties seeking review of adverse decisions by federal circuit courts of appeal or state supreme courts. The Supreme Court grants only a fraction of the petitions filed. During the 2018 term, the Court decided 74 cases.* In a decline from recent years, 27 of those decisions were unanimous (38%) and five more were 8–1 (7%). Evidencing less agreement on the Court, 21 decisions were 5–4 (29%). This voting pattern
is a significant departure from other terms in which a unanimous vote was more common. See, for example, the 2015 term (48%).
For ongoing updates, see the Stat Pack compiled by SCOTUS, the Supreme Court of the United States blog: www.scotusblog.com/. *Note that for purposes of the Circuit Court Scorecard, the statistics treat cer- tain consolidated cases separately, which is why the number of decisions is less than the number of cases.
sidebar 3.5
Very Slim Odds
The Supreme Court is far more likely to review and reverse a decision rendered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—treating it, as one commentator noted, like a wayward child. Many commentators attribute the difference to the judicial activism of the Ninth Circuit, which often is at odds with the philosophy of judicial restraint found in the Supreme Court in recent years. In contrast, decisions rendered by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals tend to be far more conservative or consistent with the philosophy of judicial restraint. A more thorough discussion of these two phi- losophies will follow later in this chapter.
The federal district courts and the courts of appeal cannot review, retry, or cor- rect judicial errors charged against a state court. Final judgments or decrees ren- dered by the highest court of a state are reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United States. State cases reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court must concern a federal question involving the validity of state action on the grounds that the statute under review is repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. If the case does not involve a federal question, the decision of the highest state court is not subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States. Sidebar 3.6 elaborates on the role of the Supreme Court.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court cancelled in- person arguments and, in an unprecedented move, agreed to hear cases remotely by telephone.
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As the highest court in the land, the U.S. Supreme Court plays a very important role in our constitutional system of government. The power of judicial review is an essential part of the checks and balances of government. The Supreme Court also is entrusted with the protection of civil rights and liberties, charged with the responsibility to strike down laws violating the U.S. Constitution. Lastly, the Supreme Court is responsible to ensure that “popular majorities do not pass laws that harm and/or take undue advantage of unpopu- lar minorities.” In other words, “it serves to ensure that the changing views of the majority do not undermine the
fundamental values common to all Americans, i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and due process of law.”
The Chief Justice is appointed for life by the president with the advice and counsel of the Senate. The primary functions are to preside over the Supreme Court in public sessions during oral arguments and in private sessions when discussing and decid- ing cases. The Chief Justice has the authority to assign the writ- ing of opinions where he or she is in the majority. If not, the most senior justice in the majority assigns the case.
Source: “About Supreme Court,” http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/ educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about.
sidebar 3.6
The Role of the Supreme Court and Chief Justice
1. The court system—both at the federal and state level—operates on three levels: the trial court, the court of appeals, and the supreme court.
2. Trial courts focus on the law and facts while review- ing courts focus only on the law.
3. The parties to litigation are entitled as a matter of right to one review of their case by a higher court.
4. Subject matter jurisdiction must exist for a court to hear a case.
5. Federal courts typically obtain jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship or federal questions.
6. The highest legal authority in the United States is the U.S. Supreme Court.
7. Parties seek permission to bring their case to the Supreme Court through a petition for a writ of certiorari.
concept summary
Organization of the Court System
The Power of Judicial Review
In the United States the most significant power of the courts, or “judiciary,” is judicial review, which is the power to review laws passed by the legislative body and to declare them to be unconstitutional and void. It also allows the courts to review actions taken by the executive branch and to declare them unconstitutional. Although the Constitution does not expressly provide that the judiciary shall be the overseer of the government, the net effect of this power is to make it so. Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), announced the power of judicial review using in part the following language and reasoning:
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may not alter the constitution by an ordinary act. . . .
LO 3-3
Judicial review is the ultimate power to invalidate actions by the president or the Congress.
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74 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case, conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case: this is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitu- tion is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordi- nary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
In practice, the U.S. Supreme Court rarely exercises its extraordinary powers and has developed carefully crafted rules as self-imposed limits on its authority as individual jurists.
As individual jurists exercise the power of judicial review, they do so with varying political attitudes and philosophies. Some judges believe that judicial power should be used very sparingly, although others are willing to use it more often. Those who believe that the power should not be used except in unusual cases are said to believe in judicial restraint. Those who think that the power should be used whenever the needs of society justify its use believe in judicial activism. All members of the judi- ciary believe in judicial restraint and all are activists to some extent. Often a jurist may be an activist in one area of the law and a firm believer in judicial restraint in another. Both judicial restraint and judicial activism describe attitudes or tendencies by matters of degree. Both terms are also used to describe general attitudes toward the exercise of the power of judicial review.
Traditionally, judicial restraint has been associated with conservative judges often appointed by Republican presidents. Judicial activism primarily is linked to liberal judges generally appointed by Democratic presidents. The tension between these philosophies can lead to divided confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate where less attention often is paid to a nominee’s qualifications than to his or her political views. It is important to remember, however, that conservative judges may take activist positions. Court decisions should be analyzed on their merits with an open mind. Sidebar 3.7 describes the process of becoming a Supreme Court justice. Sidebar 3.8 provides commentary about how business fares in the Roberts court.
LO 3-4
The terms judicial restraint and judicial activism are not exclu- sive to particular judges. Many judges may share aspects of both in their judicial philosophy.
In the federal system, the U.S. Constitution gives the president the power to appoint federal judges, including Supreme Court justices, subject to the advice and con- sent of the U.S. Senate. In practical terms, this means a majority of the U.S. Senate must vote to confirm the presi- dent’s nominee. Typically, after the president announces his nominee, interest groups on both sides search out information, including past decisions, about the candi- date. The nominee is questioned by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which also hears testimony from others about the nominee’s qualifications and judicial philosophy. If the Judiciary Committee approves the nominee, the nomina- tion is forwarded to the entire Senate for debate before a vote is taken.
The confirmation process can take months and is often subject to conflict between Republican and Demo- cratic senators and the White House. This was particularly evident in recent years.
sidebar 3.7
Choosing a Supreme Court Justice
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JUDICIAL RESTRAINT The philosophy of judicial restraint developed naturally from the recognition that, in exer- cising the power of judicial review, the courts are overseeing coequal branches of gov- ernment. When the power of judicial review is used to set aside decisions by the other branches of government, the courts are wielding great power. A commitment to the consti- tutional system dictates that this almost unlimited power be exercised with great restraint.
Those who believe in judicial restraint think that many constitutional issues are too important to be decided by courts unless absolutely necessary and are to be avoided if there is another legal basis for a decision. They believe the proper use of judicial power demands that courts refrain from determining the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless it is absolutely necessary to a decision of a case. This modest view of the role of the judiciary is based on the belief that litigation is not the appropriate technique for bringing about social, political, and economic change.
The philosophy of judicial restraint is sometimes referred to as strict construc- tionism, or judicial abstention. Strict constructionists believe that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of what the Founding Fathers intended. They place great weight on the debates of the Constitutional Convention and the language of the Constitution. Those who promote judicial abstention hold that courts should decide only those matters they must to resolve actual cases and controversies before them. Courts should abstain from deciding issues whenever possible, and doubts about the constitutionality of legislation should be resolved in favor of the statute. Cases should be decided on the facts if possible and on the narrowest possible grounds.
Those who believe in judicial restraint believe that social, political, and eco- nomic change in society should result from the political process rather than from court action.
Followers of judicial restraint favor a very limited role for the courts in our system of government.
How does business fare in the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts? Somewhat surprisingly, the 2018- 19 term was not as successful for business as previous terms, signaling a limit to how far the Court will do to support business. According to an analysis by the Con- stitutional Accountability Center, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was on the prevailing side in 12 of 21 cases (57 percent) this term, the lowest rate in a decade. The success rate was 90 percent in the 2017-18 term and 80 percent in the 2016-17 term.
The 2018-19 term provides an interesting update to the observations in Business and the Roberts Court (Oxford University Press, 2016, edited by Jonathan Adler), where nine scholars consider this question. Here are a few highlights from an interview with Jonathan Ader: • Tables in the book “show that when the Chamber of
Commerce and the Office of the Solicitor General are
aligned they have had an incredibly high success rate—over 80 percent—both in terms of cert grants and on the merits.”
• The Chamber of Commerce’s “win rate is up, but so is the overall strategic nature” of its involvement. It tends to advocate when a business-favored out- come is likely to prevail.
• The “Roberts court has been very aggressive in strik- ing down government limitations on speech across the board, both in cases related to business (includ- ing commercial speech cases) as well as those that have nothing at all to do with business (such as cases involving offensive protests or videos).”
Source: Andrew Chung, “Supreme Court’s Business-Friendly Reputation Takes a Hit,” Reuters, June 26, 2019; and Ronald Collins, “Ask the Author: Adler and Others on Business and the Roberts Court,” scotusblog.com, Nov. 28, 2016.
sidebar 3.8
Business and the Roberts Court
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76 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
Judges who identify with judicial restraint give great deference to the political process. They believe that the courts, especially the federal courts, ought to defer to the actions of the states and of the coordinate branches of government unless these actions are clearly unconstitutional. They allow the states and the federal legislative and executive branches wide latitude in finding solutions to the nation’s problems.
Judicial restraint jurists have a deep commitment to precedent. They overrule cases only when the prior decision is clearly wrong. They try to refrain from writing their personal convictions into the law. They do not view the role of the lawyer and the practice of law as that of social reform. To them, reform is the function of the political process.
Followers of judicial restraint often take a pragmatic approach to litigation. Whenever possible, decisions are based on the facts rather than a principle of law. Reviewing courts exercising judicial restraint tend to accept the trial court decisions unless they are clearly wrong on the facts or the law. If there is any reasonable basis for the lower court decision, it will not be reversed. Such courts often engage in a balancing approach to their decisions. They weigh competing interests. For example, justices who adhere to judicial restraint often weigh the rights of the person accused of crime with the interests of the victim and of society in determining the extent of the rights of the accused in criminal cases.
Throughout most of our history, judicial restraint has been the dominant philosophy.
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM Those who believe in the philosophy of judicial activism believe that courts have a major role to play in correcting wrongs in our society. To them, courts must pro- vide leadership in bringing about social, political, and economic change because the political system is often too slow or unable to bring about those changes necessary to improve society. Activists tend to be innovative and less dependent on precedent for their decisions. They are value oriented and policy directed. Activist jurists believe that constitutional issues must be decided within the context of contemporary soci- ety and that the meaning of the Constitution is relative to the times in which it is being interpreted. Activists believe that the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, sit as a continuing constitutional convention to meet the needs of today.
During the 1950s and 1960s, there was an activist majority on the Supreme Court. This activist majority brought about substantial changes in the law, especially in such areas as civil rights, reapportionment, and the criminal law. For example, the activist court of this period ordered desegregation of public schools and gave us the one-man, one-vote concept in the distributing of legislative bodies. Earl Warren, chief justice during that period, used to request that lawyers appearing before the Court address themselves to the effect of their clients’ positions on society. “Tell me why your position is ‘right’ and that of your opponent is ‘wrong’ from the standpoint of society” was a common request to lawyers arguing cases before him.
Activist courts tend to be more result conscious and to place less reliance on precedent. Activists also believe that justices must examine for themselves the great issues facing society and then decide these issues in light of contemporary standards. Otherwise, they believe we are governed by the dead or by people who are not aware of all of the complexities of today’s problems.
Sidebar 3.9 provides insight into the general alignment of the justices. It is important to understand, however, that this overall perspective does not translate
Followers of judicial activism favor a more expansive role for the courts in our system of government.
Although dissenting opinions are not usu- ally included in this textbook, they remain an important part of the judicial process and may become the law of the land in the future as the composition of the Supreme Court changes over time.
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into predictability. It is often fascinating to analyze each justice’s position as set forth in concurring and dissenting opinions.
Mirroring societal trends, the Supreme Court’s divided decisions are often peppered with angry words about each other. Justices use phrases like “scanty and equivocal evidence” and “analytical confusion” and words such as “unrealistic” and “indefensible” in response. The importance of the issues and the close division of the Court contributes to the tension found in many divided opinions. Sidebar 3.10 offers another perspective on the differences found on the Supreme Court.
A SAMPLE U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE We present the following case at the outset of this edition as an example of how the Supreme Court influences critically important areas of the law: the protection of intel- lectual property and the First Amendment. Case 3.1 Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U.S. __ (2019)
LEFT SWING RIGHT
Ginsburg Roberts Alito
Breyer Thomas
Sotomayor Gorsuch
Kagan Kavanaugh
sidebar 3.9
Typical Alignment of Justices
Some legal scholars do not think it is fair to label judges as liberal or conservative. Professor Lawrence Friedman notes, “[H]owever easy it may be for commentators and the general public to label Supreme Court justices with politically loaded terms like ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal,’ in reality this tendency may be less informative and merely simplistic.” Peter G. Verniero, a former justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, made the following argument against this traditional approach: “In particular, labeling judges as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ can result in false impressions of the judiciary. Those labels wrongly sug- gest that judges should resolve disputes on the basis of partisan ideology. . . . Jurists are not robots. When the law is unclear, judges must do their best to determine the
intent of the lawmakers. That process of judicial decision- making is not activism—it’s judging. In an earlier, less partisan era, terms like ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ might have communicated something useful about the philoso- phies of sitting or potential jurists. Indeed, there’s nothing inherently bad about being known by either label. Still, in today’s climate, use of those terms can have a polarizing effect and erode confidence in judges by casting them in a purely political way. That weakens the judiciary, to everyone’s detriment.”
Source: Lawrence Friedman, “The Limitations of Labeling: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the First Amendment,” 20 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 225 (1993) and Atlanta Constitution, April 22, 2008.
sidebar 3.10
Labeling Judges as Liberal or Conservative
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case 3.1
IANCU V. BRUNETTI 588 U.S. ___ (2019)
Respondent Erik Brunetti sought federal registration of the trademark FUCT. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied his application under a provision of the Lanham Act that prohibits registration of trademarks that consist of or com- prise immoral or scandalous matter. Brunetti brought a First Amendment challenge to the “immoral or scandalous” bar in the Federal Circuit.
The federal circuit invalidated the provision. The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gor- such, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justices Roberts and Breyer filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor filed an opin- ion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Breyer joined.
KAGAN, J.: Two Terms ago, in Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. __ (2017), this Court invalidated the Lanham Act’s bar on the registra- tion of “disparag[ing]” trademarks. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). Although split between two non-majority opinions, all Members of the Court agreed that the provision violated the First Amendment challenge to a neighboring provi- sion of the Act, prohibiting the registration of “immoral[] or scandalous” trademarks. We hold that this provision infringes the First Amendment for the same reason: It too disfavors certain ideas.
Respondent Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepre- neur who founded a clothing line that uses the trademark FUCT. According to Brunetti, the mark (which functions as the clothing’s brand name) is pronounced as four letters, one after the other: F-U-C-T. . . But you might read it dif- ferently and, if so, you would hardly be alone. . . To deter- mine whether a mark fits in the [prohibited] category, the PTO asks whether a “substantial composite of the general public” would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety”; “giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings”; “calling out for condemnation”; “disgrace- ful”; “offensive”; “disreputable”; or “vulgar.”
Both a PTO examining attorney and the PTO’s Trade- mark Trial and Appeal Board decided that Brunetti’s mark flunked the test. The attorney determined that FUCT was “a total vulgar” and “therefore[] unregisterable.” . . .
On review, the Board concluded: “Whether one con- siders [the mark] as a sexual term, or finds that [Brunetti] has used [the mark] in the context of extreme misogyny, nihilism or violence, we have no question but that [the term is] extremely offensive.”
This Court first considered a First Amendment chal- lenge to a trademark registration restriction in Tam, just two Terms ago. There, the Court declared unconstitutional the Lanham Act’s ban on registering marks that “dispar- age” any “person[], living or dead.” . . .
The Justices thus found common ground in a core postulate of free speech law: The government may not dis- criminate against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys. . . .
Viewpoint discrimination doomed the disparagement bar. If the “immoral or scandalous” bar similarly discrimi- nates on the basis of viewpoint, it must also collide with our First Amendment doctrine. The Government does not
argue otherwise. . . So the key question becomes: Is the “immoral or scan-
dalous” criterion in the Lanham Act viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint-based? It is viewpoint-based. . .
And once the “immoral or scandalous” bar is inter- preted fairly, it must be invalidated. . . Once we have found that a law “aim[s] at the suppression of” views, why would it matter that Congress could have captured some of the same speech through a viewpoint-neutral statute?
But in any event, the “immoral or scandalous” bar is substantially overbroad. There are a great many immoral and scandalous ideas in the world (even more than there are swearwords), and the Lanham Act covers them all. It there- fore violates the First Amendment. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered.
Source: Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States, Photographer: Steve Petteway
78
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KEY POINTS • Trademarks may be protected by federal law known as the Lanham Act. • View-point discrimination violates the First Amendment. • The Lanham Act’s bar against immoral and scandalous marks constitutes view-point dis-
crimination and, as such, violates the First Amendment.
Case Icon: McGraw-Hill Education.
[continued]
involves the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) not to extend trade- mark protection to the trademark for a streetwear brand, FUCT. The PTO denied regis- tration because it deemed the mark to be “immoral” or “scandalous” under a provision of the Lanham Act (the law that protects trademarks). In a 6-3 ruling, the Supreme Court held that this provision violated the First Amendment. As such, brand owners may register marks that are distinctive, even if they may be offensive.
As you read the excerpt from Iancu v. Brunetti, note the reference to the Matal v. Tam case. In Tam, the court considered the constitutionality of registering a “dispar- aging” mark, which was prohibited by the Lanham Act. In that case, Simon Shiao Tam, the founder of the dance-rock band “THE SLANTS,” sought to register the name of the band. Tam was aware that “slants” has been used a slur against Asians and, by using the term, he was endeavoring to reclaim it as an exercise in empower- ment. The PTO ruled against him, but the Supreme Court subsequently held unani- mously that the disparagement clause violated the First Amendment. As such, by denying registration, the PTO engaged in illegal viewpoint discrimination. The Court stated that the disparagement clause: “violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudent is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017).
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS In deciding cases and in examining the powers discussed in the prior sections, courts are often faced with several alternatives. They may decide the case by use of existing statutes and precedents and demonstrate a deep commitment to the common law system. They may also refuse to apply existing case law or declare a statute to be void as unconstitutional. If there is no statute or case law, the court may decide the case and create law in the process. However, case law as a basis for deciding controversies often provides only the point of departure from which the difficult labor of the court begins. The court must examine and compare cases cited as authority to it so it can determine not only which is correct, but also whether the principles should continue to be followed. In reaching its decision, the court must consider whether the ruling will provide justice in the particular case and whether it will establish sound prec- edent for future cases.
LO 3-5
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80 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
sidebar 3.11
U.S. Supreme Court Justices
John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States (born 1955). He received his B.A. from Harvard College and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. President George W. Bush nominated him as chief justice, and he took office in 2005. Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice (born 1948). He attended Conception Seminary and received an A.B., cum laude, from Holy Cross College, and a J.D. from Yale Law School. President George H. W. Bush nominated him as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, and he took office in 1991. Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice (born 1938). He received an A.B. from Stanford University, a B.A. from Magdalen College, Oxford, and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School, magna cum laude. President Clinton nominated him as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, and he took office in 1994. Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
Samuel Alito, Associate Justice (born 1950). He received his A.B. from Princeton University and his J.D. from Yale Law School. President George W. Bush nominated him as associate justice, and he took office in 2006. Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice (born 1954). She received her B.A. from Princeton University, summa cum laude, and a J.D. from Yale Law School. President Obama nominated her as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, and she took office in 2009. Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
Elena Kagan, Associate Justice (born 1960). She received her A.B. from Princeton University, summa cum laude, an M. Phil. from Oxford University, and her J.D. from Harvard Law School, graduating magna cum laude. President Obama nominated her as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, and she took office in 2010. Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
Neil Gorsuch, Associate Justice (born 1967). He received his B.A. from Columbia University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School and a D.Phil. from Oxford University. President Trump nominated him and he took office in 2017. Source: Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
Brett Kavanaugh, Associate Justice (born 1964). He received his B.A. from Yale University and his J.D. from Yale Law School. President Trump nominated him and he took office in 2018. Fred Schilling, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
At the time the text went to press, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s seat was unfilled.
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The foregoing alternatives raise several questions: Why do courts reach one con- clusion rather than another in any given case? What formula, if any, is used in decid- ing cases and in determining the direction of the law? What forces tend to influence judicial decisions when the public interest is involved?
There is no simple answer to these questions. Many people assume that logic is the basic tool of the judicial decision. But Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, “the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”1 Others argue that courts merely reflect the attitudes of the times and simply follow the more popular course in decisions where the public is involved.
Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1938).
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in a series of lectures on the judicial process,2 dis- cussed the sources of information judges utilize in deciding cases. He stated that if the answer were not clearly established by statute or by unquestioned precedent, the problem was twofold: “He [the judge] must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle, the ratio decidendi; he must then determine the path or direc- tion along which the principle is to work and develop, if it is not to wither or die.” The first part of the problem is separating legal principles from dicta so that the actual precedent is clear.
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1921.
In Cardozo’s judgment, the rule of analogy also was entitled to certain presump- tions and should be followed if possible. He believed that the judge who molds the law by the method of philosophy is satisfying humanity’s deep-seated desire for cer- tainty. History, in indicating the direction of precedent, often illuminates the path of logic and plays an important part in decisions in areas such as real property. Custom or trade practice has supplied much of the direction of the law in the area of business. All judicial decisions are at least in part directed by the judge’s viewpoint on the welfare of society. The end served by law must dictate the administration of justice, and ethical considerations, if ignored, will ultimately overturn a principle of law.
Noting the psychological aspects of judges’ decisions, Cardozo observed that it is the subconscious forces that keep judges consistent with one another. He recog- nized that all persons, including judges, have a philosophy that gives coherence and direction to their thought and actions whether they admit it or not.
All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging at them—inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired conviction; and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs, . . . which when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall. In this mental background every problem finds its setting. We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own. To that test they are all brought—a form of plead- ing or an act of parliament, the wrongs of paupers or the rights of princes, a village ordi- nance or a nation’s charter.
Sidebar 3.12 contains excerpts from Cardozo’s famous book, The Nature of the Judicial Process.
1Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1938). 2Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921). Excerpts are used by permission from the Yale University Press.
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82 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
Benjamin N. Cardozo
. . . My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic, and history, and custom, and util- ity, and the accepted standards of right conduct are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon the comparative impor- tance or value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted or impaired. One of the most fundamental social interests is that law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim for fitfulness. Therefore in the main there shall be adherence to precedent. There shall be symmetrical development, consistently with history or custom when history or custom has been the motive force, or the chief one, in giving shape to existing rules, and with logic or philosophy when the motive power has been theirs. But symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price. Uniformity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity of oppression. The social interest
served by symmetry or certainty must then be balanced against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare. . . .
If you ask how he is to know when one interest out- weighs another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here, indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator’s work and his. The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end be guided by like considerations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. How far he can go without traveling beyond the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out for him upon a chart. . . . Nonethe- less, within the confines of these open spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but made. The process, being legislative, demands the legislator’s wisdom. . . .
sidebar 3.12
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)
1. Judicial review allows the courts to review actions taken by legislative and executive branches of government.
2. The philosophy of judicial restraint is sometimes referred to as strict constructionism or a conservative approach.
3. Supporters of judicial activism believe the courts are the appropriate body to bring about social, political, and economic change.
4. The Supreme Court is deeply divided between these two competing views of judicial decision making.
concept summary
Judicial Review
Key Terms Appeal 67 Appellate court 66 Courts of appeal 67
Diversity of citizenship 69 Federal question
cases 69
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 69
Judicial activism 74
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Judicial restraint 74 Judicial review 73 Petit jury 63
Small-claims court 68 Subject matter jurisdiction 66 Supreme court 67
Trial court 66 Writ of certiorari 67
Review Questions and Problems Personnel
1. Judges and Justices What are the essential responsibilities of a trial judge?
2. Jurors Why have several states eliminated the requirement of unanimity in jury trials?
3. Lawyers Name the three critical roles a lawyer serves in society. Why have many lawyers and their business clients had such conflict in recent years?
Organization of the Court System 4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Mark, a citizen of Georgia, was crossing a street in Atlanta when he was struck by a car driven by David, a citizen of New York visiting Atlanta. The car was owned by David’s employer, a Delaware corporation that has its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Mark sues both David and the corporation in federal district court in Atlanta alleging damages in the amount of $500,000. Does the court have subject matter jurisdiction? Why or why not?
5. State Courts What role do reviewing or appellate courts play in the judicial process? How do they differ from trial courts?
6. Federal Courts XYZ makes and markets a product that it believes will help control weight by blocking the human body’s digestion of starch. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has classified the product as a drug and orders it removed from the market until it can evaluate its use through testing. XYZ disputes the FDA’s action and seeks to bring suit in the federal courts. Will the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the case? Why or why not?
7. Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court Susan files a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court following an adverse decision in the Illinois Supreme Court on a claim arising under a breach of contract. What chance does Susan have of the Supreme Court granting the petition? What special circumstances would she need to show?
The Power of Judicial Review 8. Judicial Restraint
Define the power of judicial review. How do advocates of judicial restraint exercise that power? 9. Judicial Activism
Define judicial activism. Compare and contrast judicial restraint and judicial activism. 10. A Sample U.S. Supreme Court Case
Why are concurring and dissenting opinions important? 11. The Nature of the Judicial Process
What are the forces that Justice Cardozo says shape the judicial process? How is the law made? In light of the liberal versus conservative divisions in the courts, are Cardozo’s observations still relevant?
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1. You have spent the past four weeks away from work serving as a juror in a case decid- ing whether a pharmaceutical company should be held liable for the heart attack of a woman who took its painkiller, Oxxy-1. The lengthy case has taken a toll on your professional career, and you have many unanswered questions as jury deliberations begin.
• Where does your duty lie in serving on a jury? • Are you protected against adverse employment action by your firm for missing
work to serve on a jury? • How do you reconcile the woman’s prior heart palpitations from years ago with her
recent attack? Was her heart already compromised before she began taking the painkiller Oxxy-1?
• Why didn’t the pharmaceutical company withdraw the painkiller from the market at the first sign of a problem?
2. You are the president of a large corporation that is in the business of manufactur- ing, among other things, chemical products used to eradicate termites. You have just reviewed a confidential report, prepared by one of your top scientists, questioning the effectiveness of the product and the claims your business has been making to home- owners, pesticide treatment firms, and the general public. You have heard rumors that a lawsuit will be filed shortly against your corporation claiming that this product is ineffective.
• Who should you turn to for advice? • Should you destroy the report? • In which court can a lawsuit be filed? • If you lose the lawsuit at trial, can you appeal?
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
4-1 To understand the litigation process and the parties to a case.
4-2 To discuss how issues such as standing, personal jurisdiction, and class actions can affect litigation.
4-3 To understand how pretrial procedures, including pleadings, discovery, and motions affect litigation.
4-4 To recognize the major steps in a civil trial.
4-5 To appreciate posttrial issues, such as appeals and enforcement.
Litigation4 rubberball/Getty Images
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T he court system and the litigation process
help the business community resolve actual
disputes under the rule of law. An impartial
enforcement and dispute resolution process is essen-
tial to any system that preserves private property inter-
ests. To conduct business and enforce rights, we need
a process to resolve disputes. Effective business leaders
should develop an appreciation and understanding of
the litigation process. Lawsuits and the threat of lawsuits
impact every business regardless of size. By the time you
have completed this chapter, you should have acquired
a knowledge base regarding litigation and greater sen-
sitivity to how a lawsuit is an immense drain of time,
money, and energy on everyone involved in the case.
In this chapter, you will study the parties to litiga-
tion and the barriers presented to the resolution of
a case in court. You will study a lawsuit itself—from
pretrial procedures to the trial. Finally, you will learn
about the process for resolving appeals and, ulti-
mately, the enforcement of a final judgment.
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A sample complaint is contained in Appendix II. The complaint sets out the parties, jurisdiction, venue, facts, and legal causes and remedies just like a real case. You should study it carefully before reading this chapter and refer back to it often to help you understand this chapter better. Another important consideration is the cost of litigation. See Sidebar 4.1 for an example of the high cost of litigation and the importance of having effective strategies to handle legal issues and disputes.
Litigation—An Overview
To fully understand the litigation process, you need to be familiar with the terminol- ogy used to describe the parties who are adversaries in lawsuits. The next section reviews a variety of relevant terms. Following that, the legal concepts of when a party has the right to file a lawsuit, when a court has power over the parties, and when one person might sue on behalf of a much larger number of other persons are discussed.
The first of these issues is generally described as standing to sue. If a plaintiff has standing to sue, the court next must determine if it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The third problem area relates to class-action suits, which involve one or more individuals suing on behalf of all who may have the same grounds for suit. These concepts are discussed in more detail throughout the chapter.
LO 4-1
The complaint formally starts the lawsuit. How- ever, parties often have already attempted to informally or formally resolve their dispute through negotiation and alternative dispute reso- lution, which you will learn about in Chapter 5.
Legal costs related to alleged wrongdoing can be very expensive. In 2016, Deutsche Bank posted an annual loss of $1.4 billion following a record penalty in the United States and a $630 million fine in connection with a Rus- sian money laundering plan. By 2014, Bank of America spent more than $50 billion to resolve legal issues con- nected to the 2008 financial crisis.
In addition to paying settlements and judgment, the cost of legal representation can be high. If you are a plain- tiff, your lawyer may be paid on a contingency basis—that is, if you prevail, your lawyer receives a percentage of the settlement or judgment. In most other circumstances, however, attorneys bill by the hour. The hourly rate for top
attorneys in the United States can run as much as $1,250 for highly specialized advice about legal issues related to mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy, China trade and investment, high-end litigation, and capital markets. Although most attorneys do not command these rates, the costs of litigating a dispute can add up very quickly and should be taken into consideration as part of your overall strategy for handling a dispute.
Sources: “Deutsche Bank Results Hit by Legal Costs,” BBC News, February 2, 2017; Christina Rexrode and Devlin Barrett, “Bank of America Swings to Loss on Legal Charge, Lower Mortgage Originations,” The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2014; Vanessa O’Connell, “Big Law’s $1,000-Plus an Hour Club,” The Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2011.
sidebar 4.1
Inadequate Risk Management Leads to High Legal Costs
PARTIES The party who files a civil action is called the plaintiff. The party sued is known as the defendant. The term defendant also is used to describe the person against whom a criminal charge is filed by the prosecuting state or federal government. When a defendant wants to sue the plaintiff, the defendant files a counterclaim. Most
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jurisdictions use the terms counterplaintiff and counterdefendant to describe the parties to the counterclaim. Thus, the defendant becomes a counterplaintiff and the plaintiff becomes a counterdefendant when a counterclaim is filed.
In most state jurisdictions and in federal courts, the law allows all persons to join in one lawsuit as plaintiffs if the causes of action arise out of the same transac- tion or series of transactions and involve common questions of law or fact.
In addition, if a defendant alleges that there cannot be a complete determination of a controversy without the presence of other parties, he or she may bring in new third parties as third-party defendants. This procedure usually is followed when there is someone who may have liability to a defendant if the defendant has liability to the plaintiff. For example, assume Brakes Plus supplies brake shoes to the Your Mechanic, Inc. If Your Mechanic replaced your brake shoes and you were subse- quently injured in a car accident when your brakes failed, you could file a lawsuit against Your Mechanic. Inasmuch as the accident could have been caused by faulty brake shoes, Your Mechanic could bring Brakes Plus into the the case as a third- party defendant.
STANDING TO SUE A court’s power to resolve a controversy is limited by the subject matter involved in the case. The plaintiff must show the court that it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Moreover, a plaintiff must establish that he or she is entitled to have the court decide the dispute, that is, he or she has standing to sue.
To establish the required standing, a plaintiff must allege two things. First, the plaintiff must allege that the litigation involves a case or controversy. Courts are not free to litigate matters that have no connection to the law. For example, one business cannot maintain a suit against another business just because the two are competi- tors. There must be some allegation of a wrong that would create a dispute between plaintiff and defendant.
Second, the plaintiff must allege a personal stake in the resolution of the con- troversy. This element of standing prevents any individual from asserting the rights of the general public or of a group of which he or she is not a member. For instance, only a shareholder of one of the two companies involved in a merger could sue to stop the combination of these companies, despite the fact that such a merger may have a substantial adverse impact on competition in general.
In essence, through the standing-to-sue requirements, courts are able to insist that there be an adversarial relationship between plaintiff and defendant. This adversarial relationship helps present the issues to be litigated in sharper focus. To establish standing, plaintiffs must assert their personal legal positions and not those of third parties. Without the requirements of standing, courts would be faced with abstract legal questions of potentially wide public significance, questions generally best left to legislative bodies or administrative agencies.
It is very important to note that standing to sue does not depend upon the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal. The presence of stand- ing is determined by the nature and source of the plaintiff’s allegations. Standing is determined at the outset of the litigation, not by the outcome. Case 4.1 illustrates the critical nature of standing in bringing a lawsuit. A plaintiff must have a legally cognizable claim to maintain a lawsuit. The case reinforces the rule that the courts are careful to avoid overstepping their constitutional role and will only rule on actual cases or controversies.
The sample complaint in the appendix keeps things very simple. How- ever, in many complex cases there may be several plaintiffs and defendants and multiple claims.
LO 4-2
In the sample complaint, the plaintiff satisfies standing by alleging facts demonstrating that the defendant has com- mitted two legal wrongs causing a serious prop- erty loss to the plaintiff.
In environmental harm cases, standing often is satisfied by show- ing the plaintiff uses the affected area and its aesthetic and rec- reational value has been lessened by the pollution.
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case 4.1
JULIANA v. UNITED STATES ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. 2020)
The panel reversed the district court’s interlocutory orders in this action which was brought by 21 individual plaintiffs (all young citizens) and environmental organizations against the federal government alleging climate-change related inju- ries caused by the federal government continuing to “permit, authorize, and subsidize” fossil fuel.
COWEN, Circuit Judge In the mid-1960s, a popular song warned that we were “on the eve of destruction.” (Barry McGuire, “Eve of Destruction,” on Eve of Destruction, Dunhill Records, 1965.) The plaintiffs in this case have presented compelling evidence that climate change has brought that eve nearer. A substantial evidentiary record documents that the federal government has long pro- moted fossil fuel use despite knowledge that it can cause cata- strophic climate change, and that failure to change existing policy may hasten an environmental apocalypse.
The plaintiffs claim that the government has violated their constitutional rights, including a claimed right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to a “cli- mate system capable of sustaining human life.” The central issue before us is whether, even assuming such a broad constitutional claim exists, an Article III court can provide plaintiffs with the redress they seek—an order requiring the government to develop a plan to “phase out fossil fuel emis- sions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2.” Reluctantly, we conclude that such relief is beyond our constitutional power. Rather, the plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be presented to the political branches of government.
The district court denied the government’s motion to dis- miss, concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, raised justiciable questions, and stated a claim for infringement of a Fifth Amendment due process right to a “climate system capa- ble of sustaining human life.” The court defined that right as one to be free from catastrophic climate change that “will cause human deaths, shorten lifespans, result in widespread damage to property, threaten food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem.” The court also concluded that the plaintiffs
had stated a viable “danger-creation due process claim” arising from the government’s failure to regulate third-party emissions. Finally, the court held that the plaintiffs had stated a public trust claim grounded in the Fifth and Ninth Amendments. . . .
The government . . . argues that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue their constitutional claims To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have (1) a concrete and particularized injury that (2) is caused by the challenged conduct and (3) is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision. . . .
[After expressing skepticism that the first redressability prong is satisfied, the court stated] even assuming that it is, the plaintiffs do not surmount the remaining hurdle--establishing that the specific relief they seek is within the power of an Arti- cle III court. There is much to recommend the adoption of a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel emissions and combat climate change, both as a policy matter and in general and a matter of national survival in particular. But it is beyond the power of an Article III court to order, design, supervise, or implement the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan. . . .
The plaintiffs have made a compelling case that action is needed; it will be increasingly difficult in light of that record for the political branches to deny that cli- mate change is occurring, that the government had a role in causing it, and that our elected officials have a moral responsibility to seek solutions. We do not dispute that the broad judicial relief that plaintiffs seek could well goad the political branches to action. . . . We reluctantly con- clude, however, that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the political branches or to the electorate at large, thee latter of which can change the composition of the political branches through the ballot box. That the other branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how well- intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes. . . .
*Note: On March 3, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing, asking the Ninth Circuit to hear the matter en banc.
KEY POINTS • To maintain a lawsuit, a plaintiff must have standing or a legally cognizable claim and the
court must have the authority to hear the matter. • The Ninth Circuit found that the court lacked Article III standing. • Accordingly, the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of
Article III standing. Case Icon: McGraw-Hill Education.
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PERSONAL JURISDICTION Power to hear a case means a court must have authority not only over the subject matter of the case but also over the parties to the case. This latter authority is called personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff is obtained when the plaintiff files the suit. Such action indicates voluntary submission to the court’s power.
Personal jurisdiction over the defendant usually is obtained by the service of a summons, or notice to appear in court, although in some cases it is obtained by the publication of notice and mailing a summons to the last known address. This delivery of notice is referred to as service of process. Service of a summons on the defendant usually is valid if it is served upon any member of the household above a specified age and if another copy addressed to the defendant is mailed to the home.
For many years, a summons could not be properly served beyond the borders of the state in which it was issued. However, states now have what are called long-arm statutes, which provide for the service of process beyond their boundaries. Such statutes are valid and constitutional if they provide a defendant with due process of law. Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amend- ment provides that states must also guarantee due process protection. Due process requires that if a defendant is not present within the state where the lawsuit is filed, he or she must have certain minimum contacts with the state so that maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
The typical long-arm statute allows a court to obtain jurisdiction over a defen- dant even though the process is served beyond its borders if the defendant:
1. Has committed a tort within the state. 2. Owns property within the state that is the subject matter of the lawsuit. 3. Has entered into a contract within the state or transacted the business that is the
subject matter of the lawsuit within the state.
Long-arm statutes do not authorize out-of-state service of process in all cases. Personal jurisdiction is obtained under long-arm statutes only when requiring an out-of-state defendant to appear and defend does not violate due process. Sidebar 4.2 details a classic case on personal jurisdiction and the importance of establishing
No case can proceed forward without the exis- tence of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
The World-Wide Volkswagen case is the leading case on the constitutional limits associated with personal jurisdic- tion on out-of-state defendants. In this case, the plaintiff filed a products liability lawsuit in Oklahoma to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident in that state. The defendants were the German manufac- turer of the automobile, the importer of the car, the whole- sale distributor, and the retail dealership. The wholesaler and retailer were located in New York State, and they challenged personal jurisdiction because they did not do business in Oklahoma and had no ties or contacts to the
state. The court held in favor of the defendants, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, because these defendants had not “pur- posefully availed” themselves of the privilege of conduct- ing business in Oklahoma. The plaintiff should have sued these defendants in New York State. The manufacturer and importer were proper defendants in Oklahoma since they envisioned that the cars they made and imported had contacts with all states, including Oklahoma.
Source: World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980).
sidebar 4.2
Personal Jurisdiction: Minimum Contacts
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minimum contacts. See Sidebar 4.3 for an example of establishing personal jurisdic- tion over an individual.
In criminal suits, the crime must have been committed within the state for the court to have jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained by arrest. In the event of arrest in a state other than that in which the crime was committed, the prisoner must be transported back to the state where the crime occurred. This is done by the governor of the state of arrest voluntarily turning the prisoner over to the governor of the requesting state. The process of requesting and transporting the prisoner from one state to another is called extradition.
Regardless of the type of case, a defendant may decide not to object to a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. In other words, a defendant may agree to submit to a court’s authority even though personal jurisdiction may not be obtained under the rules discussed in this section. A defendant may waive or forgo any objection to a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.
CLASS-ACTION SUITS A class-action suit is one in which one or more plaintiffs file suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons who may have a similar claim. For exam- ple, all sellers of real estate through brokers were certified as a class in an antitrust suit against the brokers. All persons suing a drug company, alleging injuries from a product, constituted a class for a tort action. Class-action suits may also be filed on behalf of all shareholders of a named corporation. The number of people constitut- ing a class is frequently quite large. Class-action suits are popular because they often involve matters in which no one member of the class would have a sufficient finan- cial interest to warrant litigation. However, the combined interest of all members of the class not only makes litigation feasible, it quite often makes it very profitable for
In the context of the Internet, courts have held that there are suf- ficient minimum contacts with the state when the website is targeted to the state or knowingly conducts business within the state.
Claiming that he is entitled to 84 percent of Facebook, Paul Ceglia sued Mark Zuckerberg in state court in Buffalo, New York. Zuckerberg’s lawyers removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds: Zuckerberg resides in Califor-
nia, Facebook Inc. is a Delaware corporation, and Ceglia resides in New York.
Arguing that Zuckerberg should be considered domiciled in New York because he represented in a 2004 lawsuit that he lived in New York, Ceglia moved the court to reconsider the move.
U.S. District Judge Richard Arcana sided with Zucker- berg, ruling that after moving to California in 2004, and as owner, founder, and CEO of a multi-billion-dollar company with over 1,600 employees within “walking distance” of
his current residence in California, Zuckerberg is domi- ciled in California. Judge Arcana flatly rejected Ceg- lia’s arguments, stating “It is simply incomprehensible to believe that Zuckerberg intends to abandon his life, friends, and daily management of his multi-billion-dollar company to return to New York and live near his parents.”
The case was ultimately dismissed as fraudulent. Ceglia was later arrested and charged with mail and wire fraud for fabricating evidence. After posting $250,000 bail in 2015, Ceglia allegedly fled to Ecuador. He has yet to stand trial.
Source: Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, Decision and Order (W.D. N.Y. March 28, 2011), available at http://nyctlitigation.foxrothschild.com/WDNY%20Facebook%20 Ruling.pdf; and “Paul Ceglia, the NY wood pellet salesman who claimed Zucke- berg gave him half of Facebook, was freed by Equador’s President but the US says he’s a fugitive,” Business Insider, June 24, 2019.
sidebar 4.3
Where Does Mark Zuckerberg Reside?
The Asahi Shimbun via Getty Images
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the lawyer who brings the suit. In addition, such litigation avoids a multiplicity of suits involving the same issue, especially when the issues are complex and the cost of preparation and defense is very substantial.
At the federal level, the Supreme Court discourages class-action suits. Federal cases require that members of the class be given notice of the lawsuit; actual notice and not merely notice by newspaper publication is usually required. This notice must be given to all members of the class whose names and addresses can be found through reasonable efforts. In addition, those plaintiffs seeking to bring the class- action suit must pay all court costs of the action, including the cost of compiling the names and addresses of those in the class. If the trial court denies the plaintiff a right to represent the class, that decision cannot be appealed until there is a final decision in the lawsuit itself. Denial of class-action status making it impractical to continue the litigation does not give grounds for an immediate appeal.
One legal commentator has described the class-action suit as the law’s version of a nuclear weapon—it is so destructive no side wants to set it off. A plaintiff’s threat to aggregate thousands of individual claims is so powerful that it can destroy a defen- dant’s business. However, if the class action fails, the plaintiff wins nothing and loses the investment in the litigation. Simple cost-benefit analysis leads the litigants to settle a class-action suit. If a class-action suit is in federal court because of diversity of citizen- ship, only one member of the class must meet the jurisdictional amount of $75,000.
See Sidebar 4.4 about Volkswagen’s massive liability following the emissions scandal and Apple’s potential liability for “secretly throttling” older iPhones.
Consumer suits can be an effective way to redress corporate misconduct and be very costly for corporations to defend against. There are a number of class action lawsuits against Apple in which consumers allege that Apple is engaged in “secretly throttling”
older iPhones. They claim that Apple has a planned obso- lescence scheme to shorten the life of certain products to maximize profits. In 2019, over 60 class action lawsuits were pending against Apple alleging that implementing an iOS feature can, under certain conditions, interfere with and slow down the phone’s performance capability.
Another high-profile example involves Volkswagen, whose image suffered a blow with consumers in connec- tion with what became known as its emissions scandal. In the fall of 2015, Volkswagen admitted that it installed secret software in its diesel cars to make the cars appear cleaner than they were during emissions tests. In fact, the cars at issue emitted as much as 40 times the legally allow- able amounts of pollution. Approximately 580,000 Volk- swagen cars in the United States and nearly 10.5 million worldwide were at issue. Multiple parties—including
vehicle owners, dealers, the U.S. Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and the state of California— brought actions against Volkswagen. In one of the largest corporate settlements on record, Volkswagen agreed to up to $10.033 billion on car buybacks and owner com- pensation and $4.7 billion on programs to offset the excess emissions and to fund clean-vehicle projects. Pursuant to another federal court settlement, Volkswa- gen was required to pay 650 U.S. dealers an average of $1.85 million in a $1.2 billion agreement. According to an attorney from the firm that represented the dealers, “the franchise dealer class-action settlement finalized . . . rep- resents an outstanding result for Volkswagen’s affected franchise dealers who, like consumers, were blindsided by the brazen fraud that VW perpetrated.”
Sources: Mikey Campbell, “Apple Hit With New iPhone Throttling Class Action in California,” AppleInsider, October 16, 2019; “VW Will Pay Dealers $1.2 Billion as U.S. Judge Approves Settlement,” Fortune, January 24, 2017; “U.S. Judge Approves $14.7 Billion Settlement in VW Diesel Scandal,” Fortune, October 26, 2016; Geoffrey Smith and Roger Parloff, “Hoaxwagen: How the Massive Diesel Fraud Incinerated VW’s Reputation—and Will Hobble the Com- pany for Years to Come,” Fortune, March 7, 2016.
sidebar 4.4
Consumer-Related Liability Watch: Allegations Against Apple and the Fallout from Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal
rvlsoft/123RF
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In the past, the federal courts routinely approved class-action settlements pro- vided there was some benefit to the class and a release of all class members’ claims. Typically, large attorneys’ fees were included in the settlements. However, in recent years, the federal courts have begun carefully examining class-action settlements and have developed a much higher standard for approving settlements. A tougher standard is especially important where settlements have been proposed because of the risk that the class representatives and their lawyers could sacrifice the interests of the class in order to financially benefit themselves. Class-action suits in federal courts may be settled on a classwide basis only if the settlement’s terms are fair and equitable and only if all the class certification requirements for trial have also been met. Sidebar 4.5 offers examples of high-profile securities-related class-action law- suits. Other class actions involving privacy and data protection were brought against Facebook, Yahoo, and Equifax.
Don’t assume that class-action suits can be easily settled.
During 2019, there were 101 monetary settlements of securities-related claims totaling $3.7 billion. Compare this to 80 securities class-action settlements approved in 2015, at that time the highest number since 2010, and total settlement dollars were more than $3 billion, an increase of 184 percent over 2014. Worth noting: 35 percent of accounting-related cases had a named auditor as a defendant, representing a 50 percent increase over the prior ten-year average. Also, consistent with previous years, the Second and Ninth Circuits had the largest number of settlements.
At the top of the list of 2018–2019 securities class action settlements: Petrobas $3,000,000,000 Cobalt International Energy $389,600,000
Alibaba Group Holding $250,000,000 And these standouts from years prior: Enron Corporation: $7,227,390,000; WorldCom Inc.: $6,133,000,000; Tyco International Ltd.: $3,200,000,000; AOL TimeWarner Inc.: $2,500,000,000; Bank of America Corp/Merger with Merrill Lynch: $2,425,000,000. Sources: “Two Settlements Included in ISS SCAS’ TOP 100 List,” ISSgover- nance.com, Feb. 18, 2020; “Number of Securities Class Action Settlements at Highest Level Since 2010,” The National Law Review, January 25, 2017; “Top Ten by Largest Settlement,” Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clear- inghouse, securities. stanford.edu/top-ten.html (2017).
sidebar 4.5
Record Number of Securities Class-Action Lawsuit Settlements
Some attorneys have found a way around the costs of litigation and continue to file class-action lawsuits. The practice of consumers’ and plaintiffs’ lawyers of com- bining a single grievance into a lawsuit on behalf of every possible litigant is quite common in state courts. Numerous state class-action statutes allow consumers and others to file suit in state courts on behalf of all citizens of that state. So although the Supreme Court has attempted to reduce class-action cases, it is apparent that public companies are still subject to this type of claim.
“Justice is the great interest of man on earth. It is the ligament which holds civilized beings and civilized nations together.”
–Daniel Webster
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Pretrial Procedures
How does a lawsuit begin, and how are issues presented to a court? How does a court decide whether it is the proper place for the lawsuit to be tried? To what extent do the parties in a civil lawsuit learn of the opposing party’s legal arguments and factual presentations? How can one party test the validity of the other party’s claims prior to trial? And what are the protections against one party harassing another by filing improper or unwarranted lawsuits? The following sections provide the answers to these questions. See Figure 4.1 for a graphic representation.
LO 4-3
PLEADINGS The legal documents that are filed with a court to begin the litigation process are called pleadings. Through the contents of the pleadings, the issues to be resolved are brought into sharper focus. Lawsuits begin by a plaintiff filing a pleading, called a complaint, with the court clerk. The complaint contains allegations by the plain- tiff and a statement or request of the relief sought. The clerk issues the summons, and a court official (usually a sheriff or marshal) delivers the summons and a copy of the complaint to the defendant.
The summons provides the date by which the defendant must respond to the complaint. This response usually takes the form of a written pleading, called an
Do review the sample complaint in Appendix II referenced in Sidebar 4.6.
1. The party who files a civil action is called the plaintiff and the party sued is known as the defendant.
2. To establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must establish that a case or controversy exists and that he or she has a personal stake in the resolution of the case.
3. Long-arm statutes are constrained or limited by the requirement the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state.
4. Many requirements must be met to bring a class- action suit, particularly in a federal court.
concept summary
Litigation—An Overview
The sample complaint sets out the parties (plaintiff and defendant) and also explains how the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case (discussed ear- lier in Chapter 3). The sample complaint also explains
how the parties can be served. In criminal cases, by con- trast, the government files the case as the prosecutor and the defendant is the party charged with a crime. See Appendix II.
sidebar 4.6
Understanding the Sample Complaint
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answer. The defendant’s answer will either admit or deny each allegation of the plaintiff’s complaint and may contain affirmative defenses that will defeat the plain- tiff’s claim. The answer may also contain causes of action the defendant has against the plaintiff. These statements are called counterclaims. If the defendant does not respond in any way, the court may enter an order of default and grant the plaintiff the relief sought by the complaint.
After receiving an answer that contains one or more counterclaims, the plain- tiff files a reply that specifically admits or denies each allegation of the defendant’s counterclaims. The factual issues of a lawsuit are thus formed by one party making an allegation and the other party either admitting it or denying it. In this way, plead- ings give notice of each party’s contentions and serve to set the boundary lines of the litigation.
STEPS IN DISCOVERY Lawsuits are often high drama in the movies and on television. Inevitably, in these dramatized courtroom scenes, some element of surprise is the turning point, thereby ensuring a favorable outcome for the popular client or lawyer. In reality, civil
The complaint and the answer provide the framework for the lawsuit.
Figure 4.1 Pretrial procedure.
Parties may file motions for summary judgment or judgment on pleadings
Plaintiff files complaint
Complaints and summons served on defendant
Defendant files motion or answer with possible counterclaim and defenses
Court rules on motions
Plaintiff files reply to answer
Attorneys conduct discovery procedures
Court conducts pretrial conference
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litigation seldom concludes with a surprise witness or new piece of evidence. The reason the surprises do not occur is the process of discovery.
Purpose Discovery procedures are designed to take the “sporting aspect” out of litigation and ensure that the results of lawsuits are based on the merits of the con- troversy and not on the ability, skill, or cunning of counsel. Historically, an attorney who had a weak case on the facts or law could win a lawsuit through a surprise wit- ness at the trial. Today, the law is such that verdicts should not be based on the skill of counsel but on the relative merits of the controversy.
Discovery practice is designed to ensure that each side is fully aware of all the facts involved in the case and of the intentions of the parties. Discovery aids trial preparation by permitting the parties to learn how a witness will answer questions prior to actual questioning at the trial. Discovery provides a “dress rehearsal” for the trial. Even more important, discovery narrows the issues disputed by the parties. In this way, discovery encourages the settlement of the lawsuit, thereby avoiding the actual trial.
Methods During the discovery phase of litigation, clients and lawyers need to work very closely together. Several methods of discovery can be utilized, or it might be decided that some methods will not produce new information and thus will be skipped. It is only through the aid of a client that a lawyer can gain the confidence that the discovery is complete and that the case is ready to go to trial.
Typically, the least expensive method of discovery is to present a series of writ- ten questions to the opposing parties. These questions, called interrogatories, must be answered by the party receiving them. It is fairly common for plaintiff and defen- dant to attach a series of interrogatories to their respective pleadings. A common interrogatory is “Please furnish the names and addresses of all persons known to you that witnessed the occurrence which is the subject matter of this lawsuit.”
After answers to the interrogatories are received, either party might ask the other to produce specific documents, called request for production of documents, that are important to the lawsuit’s outcome. For example, a buyer of merchandise who is suing the seller can request that this defendant produce the original sales contract that contains certain warranties covering the merchandise. Sidebar 4.7 addresses issues related to discovery abuse related to allegedly failing to produce documents.
Do take advantage of the discovery process to learn as much as you can about the strengths and weaknesses of the case.
The plaintiff’s lawyer often will want to have a trial without delay as opposed to the defendant’s lawyer who will have a greater incentive to extend the case through discov- ery and other pretrial procedures.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) ordered Morgan Stanley to pay $3.3 million to investors in a Puerto Rico bond case in which the firm allegedly did not turn over key documents in a hearing. Documents “related to the termination of a key employee” were not produced in connection with a FINRA arbitration matter. A three-person panel ordered Morgan Stanley to produce
the documents to opposing counsel and found that Mor- gan Stanley’s failure to do so violated its arbitration rules related to acting in good faith to produce documents dur- ing discovery. The award was one of the largest awards ever made by a FINRA panel for discovery abuse. Source: Mark Schoeff, Jr., “Finra arbitrators order Morgan Stanley to pay $3.3 million for concealing evidence,” InvestmentNews, July 18, 2019.
sidebar 4.7
Discovery Abuse: Alleged Failure to Produce Documents
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In a personal injury action, the defendant can require the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by the defendant’s expert physician. Although the plaintiff may object to the specific doctor, a general objection to the physical examination is not permissible.
The most expensive method of discovery is also the most revealing with regard to preparing for the trial. To conduct discovery to the greatest extent possible, the lawyers will want to take depositions of all potential witnesses. In a deposition, the lawyer orally asks questions of the possible witness and an oral response is given. All the spoken words are recorded by a court reporter, and a written transcript is prepared. In this way, a permanent record of the anticipated testimony is created. With depositions, lawyers seldom need to ask a question during a trial to which they do not already know the answer.
Finally, after some or all of these methods of discovery are used, either party may request the other to admit that certain issues presented in the pleadings are no longer in dispute. The request for an admission narrows some issues and makes settlement more likely.
SCOPE OF DISCOVERY The discovery procedures are intended to be used freely by the parties to litigation without the court’s direct supervision. At times, a question about the scope of what is discoverable arises, and the party objecting to discovery seeks the judge’s opinion. In this setting, a ruling must be given. Generally, judges provide a very broad or liberal interpretation of the degree of discoverable information. The usual rule is that as long as the information sought in discovery will lead to evidence admissible during the trial, the information is discoverable and an objection is overruled. If a party fails to produce rel- evant, requested evidence, the party seeking the information may file a motion to com- pel discovery, asking the court to order production of the material. See Sidebar 4.8 for a discussion about how data analytics can be sued to predict lawsuits and aid in discovery.
Depositions of all poten- tial witnesses can be very expensive and burdensome. Lawyers advise their witnesses to answer truthfully but not volunteer information in a deposition.
Data analytics is increasingly a tool essential to many aspects of litigation. In terms of risk management, one study used data analytics to predict the likelihood of firms being sued. They found that certain words in employee reviews present an increased or decreased risk of liti- gation. For example, employees who regularly refer to “teammates” in company reviews correlate with fewer lawsuits. Conversely, discussions that include the word “manager” are more likely to be sued--perhaps because a blameworthy manager increases the risk of litigation.
In the realm of discovery, how should lawyers handle massive amounts of documents in the electronic age? Data analytics can help sort through a wide range of digitalized documents, including e-mail, text messages, spreadsheets, and PDF files. According to one estimate,
the majority of Fortune 1000 companies spend an esti- mated $5 million to $10 million a year on e-discovery, and expenditures are expected to increase.
As data analytics tools become more user friendly, law firms of all sizes are integrating them into their prac- tice to streamline and be more efficient during discovery. According to a survey of in-house legal departments, 56 percent of legal departments reported using data analytics during discovery. The top three uses are culling (72 percent), early case assessment (72 percent) and rel- evance review (71 percent).
Sources: Chantalle R. Forgues and Daniel Lee, “INSIGHT: Will Your Clients Be Sued? Big Data Analytics Can Help Predict Lawsuits,” Bloomberg Law, Dec. 27, 2019; “Three Keys to Powerful Analytics in Ediscovery,” LEXIS Business of Law Blog, April 12, 2016; “The Rise of Analytics in E-Discovery,” FTI Consulting, 2015.
sidebar 4.8
Data Analytics and Litigation
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Discovery imposes a tremendous burden on the judicial system because judges must be diverted from other important matters, such as hearing criminal cases or conducting trials, to resolve heated discovery disputes. Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “a party, upon reasonable notice to the other par- ties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.”
Parties can become very aggressive during the discovery process, causing sig- nificant damage to the litigation process. The key for both sides is to act in a rea- sonable and prudent manner. The plaintiff should only ask for things needed to prepare for trial, and the defendant should be open and responsive to reasonable requests for discoverable information. In the end, the plaintiff and the defendant can do themselves great harm by acting otherwise. One of the faults with the liti- gation process is the tendency for both sides to stake out extreme positions and engage in a strategy of open warfare leading up to trial. Because many cases are settled without a trial, the best chance of that taking place quickly, and thereby avoiding greater lawyer expense, is for the parties to act in a moderate and reason- able manner during the discovery process. Moreover, as illustrated in Sidebar 4.9, if there is pending or imminent litigation, litigation holds should be issued to pre- serve data.
Don’t try to impede the discovery process. Such efforts often backfire, and you could be sanctioned.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended several years ago to address discovery of electronically stored information (ESI). An important aspect of the rules is that the information sought must be “relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case” [Rule 26(b)(1)]. Litigants must “take reasonable steps to preserve” potentially relevant ESI [Rule 37(e)]. To be safe, when there is pending or imminent litigation, your company should issue a “litigation hold” to preserve all relevant data from being destroyed, altered, or mutilated. The litigation hold applies to all documents, including electronic ones.
What are the best ways to identify and produce all electronic documents that may be used to support claims
and defenses? Here are best practices suggestions to streamline the process: • Select an individual to take the lead in preserving all
documents. • Identify all custodians of information (including former
employees) and both hard copies of documents and electronic material.
• Notify all custodians about the pending litigation. • Create a chart or content map of all categories of
documents and custodians. • Remind all custodians to suspend routine destruction
policies and to preserve all documents.
sidebar 4.9
Litigation Holds and E-Discovery
MOTIONS During the pretrial phase of litigation, either plaintiff or defendant or both may attempt to convince the court that there are no questions about the factual setting of the dispute. An argument is presented that there are only questions of law for the judge to resolve. For example, the parties may be in complete agreement that the plaintiff has not been paid by the defendant for the merchandise that was delivered by the plaintiff and received by the defendant. The dispute between these parties is
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simply whether, under the stated facts, the defendant must pay the plaintiff. This dispute presents only an issue of law, not of fact.
When a question of law is at issue, the parties can seek a pretrial determination of their rights by filing a motion with the court. These motions can be made at any point in the litigation process. First, the defendant may, instead of filing an answer, file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. By this pleading the defen- dant, in effect, says to the court, “Even if everything the plaintiff says in his com- plaint is true, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks.” For example, the defendant in the case involving the nonpayment for merchandise can argue the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant ordered the goods. By federal law, merchandise sent unso- licited does not have to be paid for even when it is kept. In essence, the defendant, in the motion to dismiss, argues that the plaintiff failed to plead an essential element of a valid claim.
In addition, a defendant may move to dismiss a suit for reasons that as a mat- ter of law prevent the plaintiff from winning his or her suit. Such matters as a lack of jurisdiction of the court to hear the suit, or expiration of the time limit during which the defendant is subject to suit, may be raised by such a motion. This argu- ment is usually referred to as the statute of limitations. Each state has prescribed a time limit after which a suit cannot be filed. For example, if the plaintiff fails to sue within the stated period, the defendant is not liable for the nonpayment of the merchandise.
The rules of procedure in the federal court system and in most of the state sys- tems provide for motions for a judgment on the pleadings, which asks the judge to decide the case based solely on the complaint and the answer. If, in the example involving the nonpayment for the merchandise, the complaint does contain all the elements needed to state a claim and if the defendant offers no explanation or excuse for nonpayment in the answer, the judge can enter a judgment that the defendant must pay the plaintiff a specified amount. Through this motion, a time-consuming but unnecessary trial can be avoided.
A motion for summary judgment seeks a similar conclusion to the litiga- tion prior to trial. However, the party filing this motion is asking the judge to base a decision not only on the pleadings but also on other evidence. Such evi- dence usually is presented in the form of sworn statements called affidavits. The judge also may conduct a hearing and allow the lawyers to argue the merits of the motion for summary judgment. If there are no material disputed issues of fact, the judge will decide the legal issues raised by the case and enter a judgment in favor of one party over the other. Even if the motion for summary judgment is not granted in full, its use often narrows the issues for trial. Figure 4.2 presents typical motions.
FRIVOLOUS CASES Either on a motion by a party or on their own initiative, judges may terminate the litigation process if there is a finding that the lawsuit is frivolous, that is, totally lack- ing in merit. (See Sidebar 4.10 for an examples of warning labels may be the result of litigation fears.) The difficulty is in the determination of what is frivolous. What ini- tially may appear to be a frivolous complaint may upon the presentation of evidence become a legitimate case.
During the past decade, courts within the federal judiciary and most state court systems have increased the frequency of assessing fines against lawyers who
Motion practice is a criti- cal part of the litigation process.
Many cases settle after a ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
A recent study by the Federal Judicial Center found that the overwhelming majority of federal judges do not believe that frivolous litigation is a major problem in the federal court system.
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The annual Wacky Warning Label contest offers a $1,000 prize for the most outlandish product warning label. The Top Five are: • Does not supply oxygen—on a common dust mask • For Accessory Use Only. Not to Be Used as a Battle
Device—on a Star Wars toy light saber • The Silence Feature is intended to temporarily
silence the horn while you identify and correct the problem . . . it will not extinguish a fire—warning on a ceiling-mounted smoke alarm
• This product moves when used—on a motorized go-cart
• Blades are sharp—on a common utility knife Although these examples are humorous, the vast majority of majority labels are useful preemptive measures to ensure that products are properly used by consumers.
Source: Consumer Watchdog Group Offers $1,000 Prize to the Person Who Can Find the Wackiest Warning Label,” Yahoo Finance, Feb 17, 2020.
sidebar 4.10
Wacky Warning Label Contest
Figure 4.2 Typical pretrial motions.
Motion to dismiss, including for
Statute of Limitations
Motion for judgment on the Pleadings
Motion for Summary Judgment
Motion to Compel Discovery
Motion in Limine (excluding evidence from trial)
Motion: Frivolous Litigation/Rule
11
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file frivolous cases. For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the imposition of fines for filing frivolous papers. These fines are justified because Rule 11 states:
The Signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Most states have a rule similar to Federal Rule 11. The courts have upheld fines against lawyers and clients who sign frivolous documents. These holdings make it essential that businesspeople have thorough discussions with their lawyers about liti- gation strategies.
Frivolous lawsuits are misunderstood by many individuals and corporations. Judges have the tools to address such matters if they operate their courts with care and efficiency.
1. Lawsuits typically are won and lost at the discovery stage of litigation.
2. Interrogatories are a series of written questions that must be answered by the opposing party.
3. Substantial penalties can be imposed by courts for abusing the discovery process.
4. Abusive discovery is one of the primary reasons for the high cost of litigation.
5. A motion for summary judgment seeks to resolve the case without a trial.
6. Frivolous cases are not a significant problem and can be redressed.
concept summary
Pretrial Procedures
The Trial
If efforts to resolve a case through pretrial motions or negotiations have been unsuc- cessful, the case will proceed to trial. A trial normally involves the presentation of evidence to a jury to determine the actual facts in dispute. After the evidence is presented, the judge explains the applicable law to the jury. The jury is asked to deliberate and render a verdict and the trial court must then decide whether to enter a judgment based on the jury’s verdict.
JURY SELECTION As the case is called, the first order of business is to select a jury. Prior to the calling of the case, the court clerk will have summoned prospective jurors. Their names are drawn at random from lists of eligible citizens, and the number of jurors required is selected or called into the jury box to conduct the voir dire examination. Voir dire literally means to speak the truth. This examination allows the court and often the attorneys for each party to examine each potential juror as to his or her qualifica- tions and ability to be fair and impartial. A party to a lawsuit is entitled to fair and impartial jurors in both civil and criminal cases. Prospective jurors are sworn to give truthful answers to the questions on voir dire.
Either party in the lawsuit may challenge or excuse a prospective juror for a specific reason or cause. For example, if a prospective juror is related to one of the
“I consider trial by jury as the only anchor yet devised by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”
–Thomas Jefferson
LO 4-4
Do remember that most civil cases are settled or resolved prior to trial.
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parties or to a witness or the juror admits bias favoring one side, that person may be excused as a juror because of the specific reason. In addition to the excuses for cause, the plaintiff and defendant are given a certain number of challenges, known as peremptory challenges, for which no cause or reason need be given to excuse a prospective juror. The number of peremptory challenges varies from court system to court system and on the type of case being tried. The number also may vary between the parties. For instance, in a criminal case, the defendant may have 12 peremptory challenges, and the government may have only six. The process of voir dire examina- tion continues until all the peremptory challenges are exhausted and a full jury panel is selected. See Sidebar 4.11 for example of problems involving juries and social media.
On the basis of a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), outlawing racial discrimination in jury selection, the jury has become increasingly more representative of the racial diversity in the United States. Batson represented a major development in Supreme Court jurisprudence allowing lawyer misconduct in a single case to establish discriminatory motive in making peremptory strikes. The Court banned gender discrimination in jury selection in the case of J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex Rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (see Sidebar 4.12).
The peremptory challenge, the method by which attorneys have traditionally been able to disqualify prospective jurors without having to state any reason, occupies an increasingly uneasy position in the law today as more questions are raised by each pass- ing decision. See Sidebar 4.13 for issues related to religion and peremptory challenges.
Given all of the criticism raised about juries today, particularly their abil- ity to decide celebrity criminal cases or complex civil cases, we are likely to see further court decisions clarifying the use of peremptory challenges. Several legal
Peremptory challenge means no cause or reason needs to be given to excuse a prospective juror. It can be traced at least as far back as 14th century England.
Google, Facebook, and Twitter are adding a new dimension to jury selection and dynamics. Here are a few examples: • Some lawyers might search
the Internet for personal
federal judges explicitly tell jurors that “You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through e-mail, BlackBerry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any blog or web- site, through any Internet chat room, or by way of any other social networking websites including Face- book, My Space, LinkedIn, and YouTube.” Reason- able? Did the court properly respond or overreact?
• At least one court was asked to overturn a multi-million dollar judgment after a juror tweeted during the trial about the defendant.
• There was also a report about a juror who held a Facebook poll to help her with deliberation of the case.
• Concerns about juror misuse of social media led to a California law allowing judges to fine jurors $1500 if found using social media during a trial.
sidebar 4.11
The Intersection of the Internet and Juries
(Left): Moritz Wolf/image- BROKER/Shutterstock (Right) Craig Ruttle/AP Photo
information about jurors. Social media sites may pro- vide lawyers with information not typically revealed in voir dire.
• Information on social networking sites such as Face- book can offer clues about a potential juror’s sympa- thy or the lack thereof to a client.
• Likewise, jurors should not send a “friend” request to a witness or other person involved in the trial.
• Jurors need to be advised that commenting about an ongoing trial is not allowed. The Judicial Con- ference of the United States is recommending that
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J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex Rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), was the Supreme Court’s initial expansion of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment in the jury selection context. In a paternity suit, the state used nine of its ten preemp- tory challenges to remove males from the jury. As a result, the trial court empanelled an all-female jury. After the jury found the defendant to be the father of the child in ques- tion and the court ordered him to pay child support, the defendant appealed on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender in
the jury selection process. The state maintained its rea- son for the gender-based peremptory challenges was stereotypes of the genders that indicated men were more sympathetic to the man in a paternity action. The Court held this reason was based on actions that the Fourteenth Amendment was aimed at eliminating. By relying on those stereotypes when it made the peremptory challenges, the state ratified and reinforced prejudicial views of the abili- ties of men and women. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s determination and remanded for a new trial with a new jury.
sidebar 4.12
The Jury and Constitutional Limits on Peremptory Challenges
commentators have suggested following the example of England and eliminating the use of peremptory challenges altogether. These commentators argue that there would be fewer problems and more just results if the first 12 prospective jurors who walked through the courtroom door were seated. By taking this action, the cost spent on hiring jury selection experts or litigating the use of peremptory challenges would be eliminated.
OTHER STEPS DURING A TRIAL After selecting jurors to hear the case, the attorneys make their opening statements. An opening statement is not evidence; it familiarizes the jury with the essential facts that each side expects to prove. So that the jury may understand the overall picture
The next big question in jury selection is whether peremptory strikes based on religion violate the Equal Protection Clause. Lower courts are divided on this issue. One distinguishing factor between religion as opposed to race and gender is that religion is not visible from a juror’s appearance. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Min. 1993), held that Batson protection does not extend to religious affilia- tion. It reasoned that such protection of religion was not
necessary because “the use of the peremptory strike to discriminate purposefully on the basis of religion does not appear to be common and flagrant . . . there is no indication that irrational religious bias so pervades the peremptory challenge as to determine the integrity of the jury system.” The Second Circuit, however, in United States v. Brown, 352 7.3d 654 (2nd Cir. 2003), held that a peremptory strike based on a person’s religious affiliation was a Batson violation.
sidebar 4.13
Religion and Peremptory Challenges
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case 4.2
WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES 564 U.S. __ (2011)
Respondents, current or former employees of petitioner Wal- Mart, sought judgment against the company for injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay, on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of some 1.5 million female employees, because of Wal-Mart’s alleged discrimina- tion against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They claim that local managers exercise their discretion over pay and promotions disproportionately in favor of men, which has an unlawful disparate impact on female employees; and that Wal-Mart’s refusal to cabin its managers’ authority amounts to disparate treatment. The District Court certified the class.
The Ninth Circuit substantially affirmed. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion on the “com-
mon question” issue under Rule 23(a)(2). She emphasized that the majority opinion “disqualifies the class at the starting gate” because it puts too much burden on the plaintiffs to show how their individual claims are sufficiently similar to form a class action. She was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
SCALIA, J.: We are presented with one of the most expan- sive class actions ever. . . . We consider whether the certi- fication of the plaintiff class was consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2). Petitioner Wal- Mart is the Nation’s largest private employer. . . . In all, Wal-Mart operates approximately 3,400 stores and employs more than one million people.
Pay and promotion decisions at Wal-Mart are gener- ally committed to local managers’ broad discretion, which is exercised “in a largely subjective manner.” . . . Local store managers may increase the wages of hourly employees (within limits) with only limited corporate oversight. As for salaried employees, such as store managers and their depu- ties, higher corporate authorities have discretion to set their pay within preestablished ranges.
Promotions work in a similar fashion. Wal-Mart per- mits store managers to apply their own subjective criteria when selecting candidates as “support managers,” which is the first step on the path to management. Admission to Wal-Mart’s management training program, however, does require that a candidate meet certain objective criteria, including an above-average performance rating, at least one year’s tenure in the applicant’s current position, and a willingness to relocate. But except for those requirements, regional and district managers have discretion to use their own judgment when selecting candidates for management
training. Promotion to higher office—e.g., assistant manager, co-manager, or store manager—is similarly at the discretion of the employee’s superiors after prescribed objective fac- tors are satisfied.
The named plaintiffs in this lawsuit, representing the 1.5 million members of the certified class, are three cur- rent or former Wal-Mart employees who allege that the company discriminated against them on the basis of their sex by denying them equal pay or promotions, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended. . . .
[The plaintiffs/respondents] do not allege that Wal-Mart has any express corporate policy against the advancement of women. Rather, they claim that their local managers’ discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an unlaw- ful disparate impact on female employees, see 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(k). And, respondents say, because Wal-Mart is aware of this effect, its refusal to cabin its managers’ author- ity amounts to disparate treatment, see §2000e–2(a). . . . Importantly for our purposes, respondents claim that the discrimination to which they have been subjected is com- mon to all Wal-Mart’s female employees. The basic theory of their case is that a strong and uniform “corporate cul- ture” permits bias against women to infect, perhaps sub- consciously, the discretionary decision making of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers—thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.
Class certification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking certifi- cation must demonstrate, first, that:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class . . .
The crux of this case is commonality—the rule requir- ing a plaintiff to show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” . . . Quite obviously, the mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims can
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention. . . .
In this case, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination . . . Here respon- dents wish to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial ques- tion why was I disfavored. . . .
The first manner of bridging the gap [use of a biased testing procedure] obviously has no application here; Wal-Mart has no testing procedure or other company- wide evaluation method that can be charged with bias. The whole point of permitting discretionary decision making is to avoid evaluating employees under a common standard.
The second manner of bridging the gap requires “sig- nificant proof” that Wal-Mart “operated under a general policy of discrimination.” That is entirely absent here. Wal- Mart’s announced policy forbids sex discrimination, see App. 1567a–1596a, and as the District Court recognized the company imposes penalties for denials of equal employ- ment opportunity . . . Respondents have not identified a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company . . . Respondents attempt to make that
showing by means of statistical and anecdotal evidence, but their evidence falls well short [The Court was not per- suaded by regression analyses submitted by a statistician and labor economist]. . . .
Even if they are taken at face value, these studies are insufficient to establish that respondents’ theory can be proved on a classwide basis. . . . There is another, more fundamental respect in which respondents’ statistical proof fails. Even if it established (as it does not) a pay or promo- tion pattern that differs from the nationwide figures or the regional figures in all of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores, that would still not demonstrate that commonality of issue exists. Some managers will claim that the availability of women, or qualified women, or interested women, in their stores’ area does not mirror the national or regional statistics. And almost all of them will claim to have been applying some sex-neutral, performance-based criteria—whose nature and effects will differ from store to store. . . .
In sum, we agree with Chief Judge Kozinski that the members of the class: “held a multitude of different jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed. . . . Some thrived while others did poorly. They have little in common but their sex and this lawsuit.” . . .
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.
[continued]
KEY POINTS • “Commonality,” which requires a plaintiff to show that there are “questions of law or fact
common to the class,” is an essential element to establish a class action. • Because the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate commonality, class certification was
denied. • Even though class certification was denied, women in the potential class can still bring
claims if they can demonstrate discrimination.
Case Icon: McGraw-Hill Education.
of the case and the relevancy of each bit of evidence as presented, the lawyers inform the jury of the facts they expect to prove and of the witnesses they expect to call to make such proof.
After the opening statements, the trial continues with the plaintiff introducing evidence to establish the truth of the allegations made in the complaint. Evidence is normally presented in open court by the examination of witnesses and production of documents and other exhibits. After the plaintiff has presented his or her evidence, the defendant may make a motion for a directed verdict. Under rule 50 of the Federal Rules, this motion is called a Judgment as a Matter of Law. The court can
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only direct a verdict for one party if the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the other party, establishes as a matter of law that the party making the motion is entitled to a verdict. Just as a plaintiff must allege certain facts or have the complaint dismissed by motion to dismiss, he or she must have some proof of each essential allegation or lose the case on a motion for a directed verdict.
After the parties have completed the presentation of all the evidence, the law- yers have an opportunity to summarize the evidence. Unlike the opening statements, which involved simply a preview of what was to come, the lawyers in closing argu- ment try to convince the jury (or judge if no jury is used) of what the case’s outcome should be.
Following the closing arguments, the judge acquaints the jury with the law appli- cable to the case. These are the jury instructions. As the function of the jury is to find the facts and the function of the court is to determine the applicable law, the purpose of jury instructions is to bring the facts and the law together in an orderly manner that will result in a decision. A typical jury instruction might be:
The plaintiff in his complaint has alleged that he was injured as the proximate cause of the negligence of the defendant. If you find from the evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence, which proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.
In this instruction, the court is in effect saying that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was at fault. Thus, the jury is instructed as to the result to be returned if the jurors have found certain facts to be true. At the conclusion of the jury instruc- tions, the judge informs the jurors to begin their deliberations and to return to the courtroom when they have reached a decision. See Figure 4.3 for a list of the steps in a trial.
BURDEN OF PROOF The term burden of proof has two meanings depending on the context in which it is used. It may describe the burden or responsibility that a person has to come forward with evidence on a particular issue. The party alleging the existence of certain facts usually has the burden of coming forward with evidence to establish those facts.
Burden of proof may also describe the responsibility a person has to be persua- sive as to a specific fact. This is known as the burden of persuasion. The party with this burden must convince the trier of fact on the issue involved. If a party with the burden of persuasion fails to meet this burden, that party loses the lawsuit. Thus, the burden of persuasion is a legal device used to help determine the rights of the litigating parties.
Criminal Cases The extent of proof required to satisfy the burden of persua- sion varies, depending upon the issue and the type of case. There are three distinct levels of proof recognized by the law. For criminal cases, the burden of proof is described as beyond a reasonable doubt. This means that the prosecution in a criminal case has the burden of convincing the trier of fact, usually a jury, that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged and that the jury has no reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. This burden of proof does not require evidence beyond any doubt, only beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one that a reason- able person viewing the evidence might reasonably entertain. This standard is not used in civil cases.
Defendants typically make a motion for a directed verdict after the plaintiff has presented his or her case.
Don’t underestimate the importance of jury instructions given at the close of the case.
The burden of proof used in a case often can determine the outcome for one side or the other.
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Civil Cases In civil cases, the party with the burden of proof is subject to one of two standards: the preponderance of evidence standard or the clear and con- vincing proof standard. The preponderance of evidence standard is used most fre- quently. It requires that a party convince the jury by a preponderance of evidence that the facts are as he or she contends. Preponderance of evidence is achieved when there is greater weight of evidence in support of the proposition than there is against it. The scales of justice, in other words, tilt more one way than the other. The clear and convincing proof standard is used in situations where the law requires more than
Preponderance of the evidence standard is typically used in contract and tort cases.
Figure 4.3 Trial steps.
Attorneys present closing arguments
Court instructs jury on the law
Jury deliberates and makes decision (verdict)
Judge enters judgment on verdict
Losing party files posttrial motion
Attorneys present opening statements
Defendant moves for directed verdict/ judgment as a matter of law
Voir dire—Parties and their attorneys select jury
Plaintiff presents evidence through witnesses
Defendant presents evidence through witnesses
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a simple preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The scales of justice must tilt heavily one way. Unless the evidence clearly establishes the proposition, the party with the burden of proof fails to sustain it and loses the lawsuit. Should jury deliberations be televised? See Sidebar 4.14.
A raging debate has developed in recent years over tele- vising jury deliberations. Some legal scholars believe that jurors are oblivious to the cameras and that the televised proceedings better inform the public in the modern age of mass communication. They argue that the American jury system is excellent and that we should not be ashamed to see how it works. Other scholars think that televising the jury deliberation process is a terrible idea because it will turn a civic duty into a public performance. They fear it could adversely impact the jury deliberations by turning them into a form of reality television.
In January 2017, a bill was introduced in Congress requiring the Supreme Court to televise open sessions
unless the majority of justices believe it would violate due process of one or more parties in case.
Supreme Court justices Samuel Alito and Elena Kagen testified before Congress in 2019 reiterating the court’s opposition to televising oral arguments. The jus- tices expressed concern about comments and questions being taken out of context.
What do you think? Would cameras in the courtroom change the tone and risk reducing the proceedings to soundbites? Source: Joan Biskupic, “Supreme Court Justices Still Skeptical of TV Cameras,” CNN, Mar. 7, 2019.
sidebar 4.14
Cameras in the Courtroom
DECIDING THE CASE The principal job of the jury is to determine what the facts are and to apply the law, as instructed by the judge, to these facts. The jury’s decision is called a verdict, and it is announced in the courtroom when the jury’s deliberations are completed. An example of a verdict might be “We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiff and award $1,000,000 to be paid by the defendant” or “We, the jury, find the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff and should pay nothing.” The judge must decide whether to accept the verdict. If the judge agrees with the verdict, a judgment is entered in favor of the party that won the jury’s verdict.
The party who is dissatisfied with the jury’s verdict may file a posttrial motion with the judge seeking either a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (state court) or motion for judgment as a matter of law (federal court). The judge may enter a judgment opposite to that of the jury’s verdict if the judge finds that the verdict is erroneous as a matter of law. The test used by the judge is the same one used to decide a motion for a directed verdict. To grant a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the judge must find that reasonable persons viewing the evidence would not reach the verdict the jury returned. Because jurors are presumed to be reasonable, this motion is not frequently granted.
The party who receives the adverse judgment may file a motion for a new trial. This motion may be granted if the judge is convinced that a legal mistake was made during the trial. Because a judge is not usually inclined to acknowledge that mistakes have been made, a motion for a new trial is usually denied. It is from the ruling on this motion that the losing party appeals.
Judges do not like to admit to making mis- takes during the trial.
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Posttrial Issues
Even after the trial, a number of issues may still exist. First among these is this one: How can a disappointed litigant obtain a review of the trial judge’s legal rulings? If the trial court’s judgment is final, what can the victorious party do to collect the dollar damages awarded? Finally, can the same subject matter be relitigated? These questions are the subject of the final three sections of this chapter.
When the result at the trial court level is appealed, the party appealing is usu- ally referred to as the appellant, and the successful party in the trial court is called the appellee. Most jurisdictions, in publishing decisions of reviewing courts, list the appellant first and the appellee second, even though the appellant may have been the defendant in the trial court. As a result, the names used in a case are somewhat misleading. When a petition for certiorari is filed to the Supreme Court, the party ini- tiating the petition is the petitioner and the other party is known as the respondent. For a complete list of parties involved in litigation see Table 4.1.
See Sidebar 4.15 for a case involve post-trial sanctions.
APPEALS Each state prescribes its own appellate procedure and determines the jurisdiction of its various reviewing courts. Although having knowledge of the procedure used in an appeal is essentially a responsibility for the lawyer, understanding certain aspects of this procedure may assist you in understanding our judicial system.
LO 4-5
Losing parties have the right to appeal the case to a higher court.
1. Peremptory challenges may not be based upon race or gender discrimination.
2. A directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law may be granted when the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that the moving party is entitled to a verdict.
3. Jury instructions are used to acquaint the jury with the law applicable to the case.
4. In most civil cases, the preponderance standard is used to evaluate the case.
5. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be entered if the verdict is erroneous as a matter of law.
concept summary
The Trial
Action Filed Party Filing the Action Party against Whom the Action Is Filed
Civil case Plaintiff Defendant Criminal case State or federal government as
represented by a prosecutor Defendant
Appeal Appellant Appellee Petition for a writ of certiorari
Petitioner Respondent
table 4.1 Litigating Parties
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Appellate Procedures Courts of appeal deal with the record of the proceed- ings in lower court. All the pleadings, testimony, and motions are reduced to a writ- ten record, which is filed with the court of review. The court of appeal studies the issues, testimony, and proceedings to determine whether prejudicial errors occurred or whether the lower court reached an erroneous result. In addition to the record from the trial, each party files a brief. The briefs contain a short description of the case; a factual summary; legal points and authorities; and arguments for reversing or affirming the lower court decision.
In addition to the brief, the reviewing court is often given the benefit of oral argument in deciding the case. The attorneys are given a specified amount of time to explain orally to the court their position in the case. This also gives the court of review an opportunity to question the attorneys about various aspects of the case.
After oral argument, an initial vote of the judges’ or justices’ impressions is usu- ally taken. The case is assigned to one judge or justice to prepare an opinion. Each judge or justice has a staff of clerks assisting in the preparation of opinions. After the opinion is prepared, it is circulated among the other members of the court. If a majority approve the opinion, it is adopted. Those who disagree may prepare a dis- senting opinion. If the review is conducted by an intermediate appellate court, the
Courts of appeal are looking to see if harmful errors were made by the trial court.
Oral argument is used less frequently today with courts often relying on written briefs.
The 2008 Qualcomm versus Broadcom case should send shock waves far outside of the state of California. Follow- ing the completion of a trial, the trial court referred six attorneys to the State Bar of California for investigation of possible ethical lapses. The lawyers for Qualcomm called a witness to testify. During cross-examination by Broad- com’s lawyers, the witness revealed receiving multiple e-mails that had not been produced during discovery. The case ended, and the jury found for Broadcom. However, the court retained jurisdiction to address the discovery misconduct. Several months after the adverse verdict, lawyers for Qualcomm advised the court that Qualcomm had located thousands of other unproduced e-mails that appeared to be inconsistent with certain arguments made on Qualcomm’s behalf during the case. The documents were located by searching the e-mail archives of less than two dozen key Qualcomm employees, searches that had not earlier been undertaken.
The court found that Qualcomm’s failure to conduct basic searches at any time prior to trial amounted to an intentional withholding of documents. The court rejected Qualcomm’s assertion that its legal counsel should have given more guidance on the scope of searches that should
have been performed. Qualcomm was responsible for its own failings and for the failings of its chosen counsel.
The case likely would not have been brought, or would have been quickly dismissed, if Qualcomm had produced the documents that made Broadcom’s defense effective. So the court imposed a discovery sanction of over $8.5 million—the full amount of Broadcom’s legal fees. The court rejected the possibility that Qualcomm had hoodwinked its lawyers. The lawyers should have seen through Qualcomm’s failures to conduct basic searches, whether that failure was intentional or negli- gent. The court noted that the lawyers ignored obvious signs that Qualcomm’s production was incomplete.
In April 2010, the court held that although there was “an incredible breakdown in communication,” there was insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the attor- neys to support any sanctions for misconduct. Despite this ultimate outcome, this series of events significantly affected the professional reputations of the attorneys involved. Sources: Jerold S. Solovy and Robert L. Byman, “Qualcomm Case Sends Tremors Nationwide,” The National Law Journal, January 31, 2008; Elizabeth S. Conan, “Qualcomm: Scandal and Professional Reputation,” ABA GPSolo Maga- zine, October/November 2010.
sidebar 4.15
Qualcomm and Posttrial Sanctions
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losing party may petition the highest court in the system for a writ of certiorari. See Figure 4.4 for an overview of appellate review and Sidebar 4.16 for what is necessary to appeal an evidentiary ruling.
Deference to Trial Courts Courts of appeal are essentially concerned with questions of law. However, a reviewing court may be asked to grant a new trial on the ground that the decision in the lower court is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence found in the record. In the federal courts and in many states, appellate courts are not allowed to disturb factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. This limitation recognizes the unique opportunity afforded the trial judge in evaluating the credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence. Determining the weight and credibility of the evidence is the special function of the trial court. An appellate court cannot substitute its interpretation of the evi- dence for that of the trial court simply because it construes the facts or resolves the ambiguities differently.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND DECREES After a judgment in a court has become final, either because of the decision on appeal or because the losing party has failed to appeal within the proper time, it may
Great deference is given to the trial court in reviewing appeals.
Figure 4.4 Appellate review.
Further review may be requested by petition to higher court
Higher court allows or denies further review
Final decision (successful party may require judicial assistance in enforcing the final decision)
Parties file briefs in reviewing court
Reviewing court announces decision
Party receiving adverse judgment files notice of appeal
Oral argument made in reviewing court
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become necessary for the successful party to obtain judicial assistance in enforcing the court decision. For example, the loser (judgment debtor) may not have volun- tarily paid the amount of the judgment to the winner (judgment creditor).
The primary enforcement mechanism is for the judgment creditor to request the court’s assistance to have the execution of the judgment or decree. An execution of a judgment occurs when a court official, such as a sheriff or marshal, seizes some property of the debtor, sells it at public auction, and applies the proceeds to the creditor’s claim.
Another form of execution is garnishment. This method of enforcement involves having a portion of the debtor’s wages paid to the court, which in turn pays the creditor.
Sidebar 4.17 details a situation in which a new trial was ordered following a find- ing that a party failed to produce key documents in the litigation.
An adverse judgment can lead to the partial loss of wages to satisfy the creditor.
Judges are required to make split-second rulings on the admissibility of evidence during trial. Lawyers, in order to preserve an argument for appeal, must show the following:
1. An objection is made, 2. In a timely manner,
3. Challenging the evidence on specific grounds, 4. The lower court’s ruling was wrong, and 5. The error harmed your client.
sidebar 4.16
Appealing an Evidentiary Ruling
Federal District Judge Charles A. Pannell Jr. vacated a $37.3 million trade secrets verdict and dismissed a motion for more than $16 million in attorneys’ fees in favor of Lock- heed Martin Corp. and ordered a new trial. Why? The court found that Lockheed failed to produce defendant’s com- petitor documents critical to the litigation. The documents at issue are internal corporate e-mails that may have con- tradicted the testimony of witnesses. Defendant L-3 Com- munications Integrated Systems argued that Lockheed intentionally withheld evidence critical to L-3’s defense, which “undoubtedly changed the outcome of the trial.”
On April 13, 2010, in response to a media inquiry about vacating of the multi-million dollar verdict, the court
took another noteworthy action by unsealing all briefs and exhibits related to Lockheed’s alleged withholding of documents. These documents originally had been filed under seal and held confidential. The court found that the content of these documents was not confidential and released them to the public.
The parties later settled. Sources: Fenwick & West LLP, “Substantial Consequences for Discovery Fail- ures in a Trade Secrets Case,” Lexicology, Aug. 7, 2010; R. Robin McDonald, “Lockheed Withheld Discovery Documents in Trade Secrets Case, Court Records Show,” Fulton County Daily Report, May 19, 2010; “Discovery Failure Sinks Lockheed’s $37 Million Win,” Fulton County Daily Report, April 6, 2010.
sidebar 4.17
Discovery of Misconduct Causes Lockheed to Lose Its $37 Million Verdict
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RES JUDICATA Once a decision of the court has become final, it is said to be res judicata (the thing has been decided), meaning that a final decision is conclusive on all issues between the parties, whether raised in the litigation or not. Res judicata means either that the case has been finally decided on appeal or that the time for appeal has expired and a cause of action finally determined by a competent court cannot be litigated by the parties in a new proceeding by the same court or in any other court. Res judicata prevents successive suits involving the same factual setting between the same parties and brings disputes to a conclusion. A matter once litigated and legally determined is conclusive between the parties in all subsequent proceedings.
Ideally, companies will avoid litigation. See Sidebar 4.18 for practical tips to prevent lawsuits.
• Make sure supervisors and managers have access to legal counsel and use it before small issues explode into major disputes.
• Encourage teambuilding and development of coop- erative relationships in the workplace.
• Develop internal mechanisms for resolving disputes. • Perform regular audits to ensure compliance with
legal rules and best practices. • Require legal analysis of major decisions under
consideration.
sidebar 4.18
How Do You Prevent a Lawsuit in Your Firm?
Key Terms Affidavits 100 Answer 96 Appellant 110 Appellee 110 Beyond a reasonable doubt 107 Brief 111 Burden of proof 107 Class-action suit 92 Clear and convincing proof 108 Complaint 95 Counterclaim 88 Counterdefendant 89 Counterplaintiff 89 Default 96 Defendant 88 Depositions 98
Directed verdict 106 Discovery 97 Execution 113 Extradition 92 Garnishment 113 Interrogatories 97 Judgment 109 Judgment notwithstanding the
verdict 109 Judgment on the pleadings 100 Jury instructions 107 Long-arm statutes 91 Motion 100 Oral argument 111 Peremptory challenges 103 Personal jurisdiction 91
Petitioner 110 Plaintiff 88 Pleadings 95 Preponderance of evidence 108 Request for an admission 98 Request for production of
documents 97 Res judicata 114 Respondent 110 Standing to sue 89 Statute of limitations 100 Summary judgment 100 Summons 91 Third-party defendants 89 Verdict 109 Voir dire 102
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Review Questions and Problems Litigation—An Overview
1. Parties A building contractor is sued by homeowners alleging that their homes were poorly constructed resulting in several defects. The contractor adds to the lawsuit a build- ing supplier that it claims provided faulty support beams. How can the contractor add the building supplier as a party to the lawsuit? What is this procedure called and how does it work?
2. Standing to Sue A group of environmentalists filed a lawsuit challenging commercial fishing in Gla- cier Bay National Park and sued the secretary of the interior and the National Park Service in order to prevent more commercial fishing. (a) What must the environmentalists show in order to satisfy the requirement of
standing to sue in this case? (b) At what point should the issue of standing be decided by the court during the
course of litigation? 3. Personal Jurisdiction
Smith, a resident of Michigan, was in Florida for a business meeting where he was served with a divorce petition filed by his wife, who had moved to Florida recently. Smith objected to the Florida court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. What is the basis of Smith’s objection? Should he prevail? Why or why not?
4. Class-Action Suits How have the federal courts discouraged class-action lawsuits? What are the key requirements for federal courts to permit class-action suits?
Pretrial Procedures
5. Pleadings Describe the purpose of a complaint and an answer in civil litigation. What is the function of the pleading stage in a lawsuit?
6. Steps in Discovery (a) Why do surprises rarely occur at trial? (b) What are some of the key devices a litigant can use in discovery?
7. Scope of Discovery How do abusive discovery practices raise the cost of litigation?
8. Motions Under what circumstances may a court grant a motion for summary judgment?
9. Frivolous Cases Federal Rule 11 sanctions are available against both lawyers and their clients to curb frivolous litigation. Under what circumstances may sanctions be imposed?
The Trial
10. Jury Selection In light of recent court decisions restricting the use of peremptory challenges, should they be eliminated from litigation altogether? Would the elimination of peremptory challenges improve the efficiency of the trial process?
11. Other Steps during a Trial What is the purpose of jury instructions?
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12. Burden of Proof There are three distinct levels of proof required by law depending upon the kind of case involved. Describe them and when they are used.
13. Deciding the Case Under what circumstances should a judge enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict?
Posttrial Issues
14. Appeals What normally is contained in an appellate brief? An oral argument?
15. Enforcement of Judgments and Decrees How does the court enforce judgments?
16. Res Judicata Why is the notion of res judicata critical in civil litigation?
1. You are the manager of a used car firm known as Reliant Motor Company. Your lawyer has called to tell you that John Doe, a customer you have been dealing with for several months, has filed a lawsuit against the firm. The customer claims the vehicle he purchased is a lemon and no longer even operates. You knew the vehicle was not in the best of condi- tion at the time of sale, but you believe the buyer caused most of the problems by taking the vehicle “off road” several times. You are not looking forward to discovery or trial in this case. You have several questions. • How does discovery work? • Can you be required to testify twice in a deposition and at trial? • Should you shred all documents you have about this case? You know that some of the
documents will not put the firm in the best light. You wonder what will happen at trial. Will it be like what you have seen on TV or in the movies? 2. You are the owner of a small firm that manufactures lawn mowers. While using one of your products, a person suffers severe injury and now is suing, claiming that your product was negligently designed because it did not adequately protect the user. You have no experience with the legal system. You learn that lawyers charge as much as $250 per hour and must be paid whether they win or lose their cases. You are surprised at what must happen before a trial can occur to determine who is at fault. First, your lawyer may move to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds. If that fails, both sides will take costly deposi- tions of likely witnesses. You will have to turn over reams of internal documents related to the design of your mower. Each side also will have to pay several hundred dollars per hour for experts as the lawyers prepare the case. These experts will have to be paid again when they testify at trial. As the time for the trial approaches, each side will spend money trying to discern the most sympathetic type of jury. Years after the lawsuit was first filed, the par- ties will be sitting in the courtroom waiting for jury selection to begin. More money will have been spent defending this case than the plaintiff was seeking when the lawsuit was first filed. Many questions come to mind:
• Should you have settled the case at the beginning? • Has your attorney been getting rich at your expense? • Is discovery more of a burden than a help?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
5-1 To understand why disputing parties seek alternatives to the litigation pro- cess as methods to resolve their differences.
5-2 To appreciate the importance of effective negotiation and to recognize the basic methods of negotiation.
5-3 To evaluate the various forms of ADR systems so that efficient choices can be made as to the means of resolving disputes.
5-4 To explain the differences between arbitration and mediation and to know when each is the most appropriate method of ADR.
5-5 To comprehend why courts have a very limited role in reviewing the actions of arbitrators and mediators.
Alternative Dispute Resolution5 Exactostock/SuperStock
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F rom the preceding chapter, you should appre-
ciate that the litigation process within the
court system imposes tremendous costs in
terms of time, money, emotional stress, and harmony
in relationships. This fact is a major reason you prob-
ably have very little personal experience with litiga-
tion. It also is the reason most businesses try to avoid
litigation and use it as a means of last resort to resolve
disputes.
One way to confirm how seldom we litigate is to
examine some data. Ask yourself, have I ever had a
conflict with someone? Maybe a better question is,
does a day go by without me experiencing one or
more conflicts? We constantly and consistently deal
with conflicts, and even disputes, without filing a law-
suit to resolve our problems.
However, sometimes lawsuits are necessary.
Even after beginning the litigation process, most
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120 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
parties reach some type of resolution before the case is presented to a jury for a verdict and judgment. The general rule, usually cited, is 95 percent or more of the lawsuits filed settle prior to the completion of the litigation process.
The litigation process provides individuals and businesses with a formal method to enforce agreements. It can be said that business cannot be conducted without the existence of the court system to protect property interests. A more accurate state- ment probably is we transact business, personally and professionally, in a way that hopefully avoids the need to use litigation as our dispute resolution system.
In this chapter, you will study a variety of alternatives to litigation. Prior to reviewing more formal alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems, we take a look at the distinction between conflicts and disputes and how negotiation is a skill we each use all the time.
Conflicts and Negotiation
In answer to one of the earlier questions, a day does not go by without encountering conflicts at home, on the road, and at work. Only a day of total isolation might be the exception. Even then the lonely person likely experiences internal conflicts over how best to utilize this time alone.
In the following sections, the distinction between a conflict and a dispute helps emphasize the importance of how people negotiate.
CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES Conflict exists whenever there are two or more points of view. Even in productive relationships, involving amicable co-workers or happily married couples, conflict is always present. Conflicts are not negative; indeed, conflict can stimulate significant thoughts and produce great discoveries. So, why do we shy away from conflict? Why do most of us perceive conflict as bad and try to avoid it?
The answer likely lies in the fact that conflict leads to disputes. A dispute arises when one party makes a claim that another party denies. For example, two co-workers in a global office environment may have a conflict because one works from an office in France and often sends multiple, seemingly urgent, messages before 5 AM for her U.S.-based co-worker when she is sleeping or just waking up. This conflict escalates when the U.S.-based person asks her colleague to not send messages that are not time sensitive until later in the day and the request is refused. These parties now are in dispute as to appropriate timing of their communications. In essence, the process of these co-workers claiming a right to determine communication timing likely causes the dispute to become more emotional and thus uncomfortable for both involved.
Does this example prove disputes are bad and conflicts should be left alone? Not necessarily. Suppose the U.S.-based person simply kept her concern about the early communications to herself. The worker in France may not know about the frus- tration and angst that exists inside the co-worker. On the other hand, the U.S.-based person may be expressing impatience through comments or responses without ever asking her colleague in France to make an adjustment. The person sending the mes- sages may feel this pressure and become upset by what is perceived as rudeness or a lack of respect. Leaving the conflict unresolved may cause larger problems among those co-workers later. Thus, it may be more beneficial to everyone involved to have the conflict become a dispute so the parties can more easily express their emotions. Such expressions may lead to an earlier resolution between these co-workers.
LO 5-1
Conflict is ubiquitous and can be productive.
Conflict + Claim that is rejected = Dispute
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STYLES AND METHODS OF NEGOTIATION All of us instinctively engage in some form of negotiation. Even as evidence of a con- flict is exhibited (through comments or sighs or groans), the parties are negotiating. Negotiation is the process used to persuade or coerce someone to do what you want them to do. All of us negotiate all the time with ourselves, our family members, our co-workers, and even with strangers.
The issue to focus on is not when do I negotiate but how do I negotiate. Think again about the co-workers and the early morning messages. The actual request (or claim) to adjust the timing is the beginning of a negotiation. How the other person responds to this request likely will set a tone for the negotiation process. An exami- nation of how this tone is set can be viewed through the illustration in Sidebar 5.1.
LO 5-2
“When do we negotiate? Always!”
–Dialogue from the movie The Devil’s
Advocate
sidebar 5.1
Negotiation Styles
H ig
h L
ow
Low High
Degree of Cooperation
D eg
re e
of A
ss er
ti ve
ne ss
Compete
Avoid
Collaborate
Accommodate
Compromise
Source: Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument.
Can you imagine the conversation between these two co-workers that illustrates each style listed? Avoiding could be seen through the person sending the messages ignoring the request to stop sending early morning messages or pretending not to have received the request. Accommodating occurs if the request to stop sending early morning messages is granted. Competing comes into play if the France-based person tells the co-worker who requested later messages to either wake up early or get used to the messages arriving before she is ready to start the day. Collaborat- ing might exist if the co-workers discuss why this pattern in communication timing exists. Is it right before lunch in France and the best time for communicating before afternoon meetings? Can the colleagues plan a regular time to touch base in the
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122 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
afternoon? Compromising is the hardest to demonstrate even though it is a com- mon response in a negotiation. Perhaps a compromise occurs in this example if the France-based co-worker agrees to limit messages to a certain number before 8 AM U.S. time.
Understanding the styles used in negotiations is not enough. Analyses of nego- tiation processes also need to focus on the methods used by the negotiators. The next two sections examine two of the most studied methods of negotiations. To help illustrate these methods, consider the factual situation in Sidebar 5.2.
Mickey Shears and Naomi Hamilton operate a business that manufactures large (55+ inches) 4K OLED televisions. The business name is M&N TVs Inc. The principal market for M&N televisions has been buyers for home use. M&N’s reputation is based on assembling a high-quality TV for a relatively low price. M&N’s biggest problem has been maintaining a large enough, qualified sales force while keeping the price for its TVs below the market average.
William Dalton operates a nationwide chain of dis- count department stores. This chain is known as Bill’s Discount Centers. One year ago, Bill’s Discount Centers agreed to buy from M&N a minimum of 250 TVs (with specifications stated in the contract) per month for six months. The agreed-upon price of each TV was $1,250.
The relationship between M&N and Bill’s worked very well. In the fifth month of this initial contract, Bill’s agreed to increase its minimum purchase per month to 750 TVs, and Bill’s committed to this monthly purchase for a 12-month period to begin after the sixth month of the original con- tract. The price per TV was to remain at $1,250.
M&N was delighted with the arrangement because it allowed M&N to concentrate on increasing its production capacity while reducing the costs of maintaining a large active sales force.
Unlike the success of its initial relationship with M&N, Bill’s began receiving complaints from its customers about the lack of quality of M&N’s TVs. These complaints were traced by Bill’s customer service representatives to the newer TVs that M&N was assembling under its expanded production program. Despite its knowledge of these quality-related problems, Bill’s never informed M&N of its findings.
The complaints continued to become more numer- ous. During the fifth month of the 12-month period, Bill’s purchased only 350 TVs from M&N. When M&N sent an invoice for the 750 TVs specified as the monthly minimum, Bill’s refused to pay for any TVs over the 350 actually pur- chased. In the second week of the sixth month, Bill’s sent M&N written notice that it was canceling the remainder of the sales contract due to declining quality of M&N’s TVs. M&N offered to reduce the price per TV to $1,050, but Bill’s refused to withdraw its termination letter.
M&N wants to sue Bill’s for $7,062,500. This figure is based on the shortfalls of 400 TVs in the fifth month times $1,250/TV plus 750 TVs times seven months times $1,250/TV. Prior to filing suit, M&N wants to explore the chances for a negotiated settlement in the hope of sal- vaging a constructive relationship with Bill’s.
sidebar 5.2
A Business Dispute
POSITIONAL NEGOTIATION Most people instinctively use a negotiation method called positional bargaining. Typically, these parties begin in a competitive style by stating their respective expec- tations. For example, in a sales transaction, the seller starts with as high an asking price as is considered reasonable. Likewise, the buyer begins with the lowest rea- sonable price. The gap between these two opening prices provides room for give and take. If the negotiation remains focused on the sales price, all the parties do is change their respective positions on the acceptable price. This process of exchange moves the parties toward the middle of the gap.
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In the factual situation in Sidebar 5.2, Bill’s is saying that it owes nothing to M&N. On the other side, M&N is demanding payment of more than $7 million. The difference between these two positions is so wide that it may be difficult to bring these parties into agreement.
Even if Bill’s was willing to buy some TVs at a revised price and even if M&N agreed to a reduced quantity or selling price, the issue of quality is not being addressed. Does Bill’s gain any market advantage in selling an inferior product, albeit at a lower price, to its customers? Clearly not.
If the positions on quantity and price are the only items open for negotiation, Bill’s and M&N are unlikely to reach a satisfactory compromise. Hence, the chances of a negotiated settlement through positional bargaining are minimal. This result occurs because positional bargaining does not focus on the underlying conflicts.
There is another method of negotiation that might help these parties. This alter- native is discussed in the next section.
PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION A better approach to negotiating among disputing parties has been described as principled, interest-based negotiations in the book Getting to Yes by Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton.1 These authors present seven elements that should become the focus of negotiators. The elements will vary in importance depending on the factual situation in dispute and on the parties’ individual perspectives. However, concentrating on these elements can help remove some of the barriers created by positional negotiation. A quick focus on these elements illustrates how M&N and Bill’s can be more productive in their negotiation efforts.
Communication First, as expressed in the factual situation above, Bill’s has not openly explained to M&N the nature of its dissatisfaction. Sharing customer com- plaints, either in general or with specificity, might help M&N locate a production operations problem. Likewise, M&N does not appear to be informing Bill’s of any dif- ficulties it faced as it expanded production capacities. Clear communication between these parties may assist them in becoming joint problem solvers. Without this exchange of information, these parties are likely to continue blaming each another. To change from a “game” of blaming, effective negotiators put significant energy into lis- tening to the other party. Communication involves a balance of talking and listening.
Relationship Second, these parties would likely benefit by discussing how each could benefit by continuing their relationship of customer and supplier. Can they solve the current problem and maintain, if not enhance, their future business oppor- tunities together? Maintaining, or even enhancing, the relationship may be possible if these parties focus on effective communications.
Interests Third, have M&N and Bill’s communicated their real interests to each other? Perhaps these interests are not mutually exclusive. For example, Bill’s might want to expand its offerings in TV technology to customers. M&N might want to dis- solve its sales force and concentrate on production of a variety of TVs. These inter- ests, once communicated, may help the parties realize that a continuing relationship is in their mutual best interests.
The Seven Elements of Interest-Based Negotiation:
Communication Relationship Interests Options Legitimacy Alternatives Commitment
1Penquin Books, 3d ed., 2011.
Positional bargaining.
Seller’s movement
Buyer’s movement
High Price
Low Price
“If negotiation is half talking and half listening, the more important half is listening.”
–Roger Fisher
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124 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
Options Fourth, M&N and Bill’s should brainstorm possible options or solutions to their dispute. This exploration process is best done with the parties agreeing that an option mentioned is not necessarily a proposal for compromise. One attractive option might be for Bill’s to agree to buy all the TVs M&N can produce and for Bill’s to market these TVs under its own name. Rather than severing their business relationship, M&N could become the exclusive supplier of store-brand TVs. The renaming of these products also can help overcome the “quality problems” custom- ers associate with M&N’s TVs.
Legitimacy Fifth, legitimacy involves the application of accepted standards to the topic negotiated—rather than having the parties state unsupported propositions. Bill’s probably will not be impressed by M&N stating it will improve the quality of its TVs. Instead, the parties should focus on how quality can be improved and how customers will accept the improvements. Production engineers may help address the former issue, while specific test marketing plans may assist in legitimizing the latter.
Alternatives Sixth, alternatives are outcomes that are possible without the agreement of the other party. In essence, alternatives are the thing that parties to a negotiation can do away from the bargaining table. If the parties understand their alternatives to negotiating a settlement and understand the unattractive nature of these alternatives, the desire to negotiate, instead of litigating, is enhanced. M&N, for example, may perceive that bankruptcy is a very likely result if this dispute is not resolved. Bill’s, on the other hand, may believe that another supplier is readily avail- able. The desirable result of any negotiation is to agree on an outcome that is better than both parties’ alternatives.
Commitment Seventh, any successful negotiation must conclude with the par- ties making realistic commitments that can be put into practice. Perhaps an initial commitment that assists the overall process of negotiation is to have the parties agree that they will continue to meet and focus on these seven elements. Hopefully, the conclusion of the negotiation will be an agreement between the parties that avoids the expense (dollars, time, and emotions) of litigation. If that commitment is not a settlement, then it might be an agreement to utilize one of the following ADR systems.
1. Conflicts are everywhere; each personal interaction can cause conflicts or be impacted by them.
2. Conflicts may be insignificant and easily avoided, or they may produce significant anxiety if ignored.
3. A dispute arises from a conflict when one party makes a claim that another denies or refuses to honor.
4. Conflicts and disputes can be managed and perhaps resolved through negotiations.
5. Styles of negotiation include avoiding, accommodat- ing, competing, compromising, and collaborating.
6. Two methods of negotiation include positional bar- gaining and principled (interest-based) bargaining.
concept summary
Conflicts, Disputes, and Negotiation
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Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Systems
Negotiations occur in everything we do. Thus, even as we present the following mate- rial on formal and informal alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems, remember the negotiation processes still govern the success or failure of such ADR systems.
It is important to remember several things at the outset of this discussion. First, litigation does not preclude the use of ADR techniques. Indeed, it is very common for disputes to be arbitrated, mediated, or settled through negotiations during the pretrial process discussed in the preceding chapter.
Second, disputing parties do not have to begin a lawsuit to use any form of ADR. In the rest of this chapter, you will study how ADR systems relate to formal litigation and how they are utilized independently from the litigation process.
Third, ADR systems used by disputing parties may be part of a contractual rela- tionship between these parties. For example, even before any problem arises, it is an effective dispute resolution tool to have the parties’ contract specify a preferred ADR system. Disputing parties also may agree to use an ADR technique after the dispute arises even if they did not foresee the possibility of needing to use a dispute resolution system at the time of their original agreement.
Fourth, effective use of ADR systems can save disputing parties many of the costs associated with litigation. Especially important is the preservation of an ongo- ing business relationship. The ability to keep doing business often is destroyed through litigation. ADR systems, when used appropriately, help ensure the produc- tive relationships needed for successful business transactions.
RANGE OF OPTIONS Figure 5.1 illustrates an array of ADR systems. These are arranged along a spectrum of high cost (in dollars, time, emotions, and relationships) to lowest cost. Although any given factual situation may cause the items on this spectrum to shift places, this figure presents a generally accepted view of dispute resolution systems.
The next two sections briefly address why settlement is attractive and how law- yers utilize focus groups. Arbitration and mediation are discussed in more detail since they are the most popular ADR systems used by businesses and people attempt- ing to resolve disputes.
SETTLEMENTS It is often the case that both parties to litigation are losers. The winning party in a lawsuit is a loser to the extent of the attorney’s fees—which are often substantial. The fact that the loser usually also has to pay court costs is an added incentive to settle- ment without litigation.
The Department of Jus- tice reports 98 percent of tort cases filed in the U.S. District Courts settled prior to either a bench or jury trial. https://www.bjs.gov/ index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=451
Figure 5.1 Scale of dispute resolution systems.Trial and
Appeal (most
expensive in time, cost, and
emotions)
ArbitrationFocus Groups
Mediation Negotiated Settlement
(least expensive in
time, cost, and emotions)
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126 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
There are also personal reasons to settle controversies. The desire to resolve dif- ferences is instinctive for many Americans. Most of us dislike trouble, and many fear going to court. The opinions of others are often a motivating force in encouraging amicable settlements.
Businesses tend to settle disputes with customers for two additional reasons. First, it is simply not good business from a goodwill and public relations standpoint to sue a customer. Second, juries are frequently sympathetic to individuals who have suits against large corporations or defendants who are covered by insurance. Juries may decide close questions of liability, as well as size of the verdict, against business organizations because of their presumed ability to pay. As a result, businesses settle many disputes even though they might possibly prevail in litigation.
Table 5.1 provides a summary of settled cases. The size of these settlements rep- resents evidence that the companies wanted to avoid litigation.
FOCUS GROUPS Recognizing that a jury’s function is to determine the facts, attorneys frequently use focus groups in significant cases. The attorneys assemble a group of citizens and present their evidence. This group then deliberates and makes findings. This dress rehearsal gives attorneys insight into possible jury reaction to the evidence and points up weaknesses in the case. Sometimes issues are tested without introducing evidence. Lawyers argue the case on the basis of assumed facts to the mock jury for a few hours, and this jury returns a verdict.
The verdicts often cause plaintiffs to take a more realistic view of the damages to which they think they are entitled. This “reality test” helps disputing parties to
Company Product or Action Settlement
British Petroleum (BP) Gulf Oil Spill (Deepwater Horizon explosion)
$20 billion distributed among thousands of claimants
Bank of America Securities fraud claims $9.5 billion Merck Vioxx linked to heart attacks and
strokes $4.85 billion to 47,000 possible claimants
GlaxoSmithKline Off-label promotion $3 billion Citicorp Conspiring with Enron executives
to misstate Enron’s financial condition
$1.66 billion to Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation
JPMorgan Chase Mortgage Lending
Practices $13 billion to the Justice Dept.
Pfizer Off-label promotion $2.3 billion Eli Lilly Failure to disclose information
about side effects of Zyprexa $1.2 billion to 31,000 possible claimants
Pfizer Claims Failure to disclose accurate information about Bextra
$669 million under False Act; $331 million for state Medicaid programs
Novartis Gender bias in pay $175 million to 5,600 current and former female sales representatives
table 5.1 Samples of Major Settlements
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engage in more meaningful negotiations. Through such negotiations, these parties often settle their dispute without having to go through the formal process of either a trial or an arbitration.
Arbitration
To avoid the various expenses of litigation, disputing parties sometimes agree to have a third party decide the merits of the dispute. This formal ADR system is called arbitration. The decision maker, who should be disinterested in any financial impact of the decision and neutral regarding the issues presented in the dispute, is known as an arbitrator. The distinctive characteristic of this form of ADR is the arbitra- tor’s decision on the merits. In essence, the arbitrator takes the place of the jury and judge in the litigation process.
Over the past 80 years, arbitration has played an increasingly important role in resolving business disputes. Historically, arbitration has been the most commonly used ADR system. The primary reason for the use of arbitration is the laudable goal of providing a relatively quick and inexpensive resolution of disputes. Arbitration not only helps the parties avoid the expense of litigation but also provides a means of avoiding the formalities of the courtroom. Formal pleadings, for example, and other procedural steps such as discovery and the rules of evidence are usually not used in an arbitration hearing.
Arbitration also serves to help ease congested court dockets. A primary func- tion of arbitration is to serve as a substitute for and not a prelude to litigation. It is a private proceeding with no public record available to the press and others. Thus, by keeping their dispute private, adversaries may be more likely to preserve their business relationship. Privacy also helps parties avoid bad publicity that may come from wrong-doing. See Sidebar 5.4 noting the potential problem with privacy; hiding a discriminatory workplace.
Arbitration also has the advantage of submitting many disputes to experts for solutions. For example, if the issue involves whether a building has been prop- erly constructed, the matter could be submitted to an architect for resolution. If it involves a technical accounting problem, it could be submitted to a certified pub- lic accountant. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has approved an arrangement whereby investors with complaints against securities dealers must sub- mit them for arbitration to arbitrators assigned by the various stock exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. These arbitrators are selected because they possess the special knowledge required to determine if a customer of a broker- age house has a legitimate complaint.
Arbitration is of special importance in labor relations, where it provides the grievance procedures under collective bargaining contracts. Arbitration is a means for industrial self-government, a system of private law for all problems that may arise in the workplace.
Sidebar 5.3 illustrates the growing importance and widespread use of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution system.
The parties authorize an arbitrator to make a decision that binds these par- ties and resolves their dispute. The act of referring a matter to arbitration is called submission. Submission to arbitration often occurs when the disputing parties agree to use this form of ADR. Such an agreement by the parties is a submission to voluntary arbitration. Generally, an agreement to submit an issue to arbitration is
LO 5-3
LO 5-4
Arbitrators are autho- rized to make decisions that are binding on the parties, thereby resolv- ing the dispute.
Benefits of Arbitration: • Costs • Swift resolution • Experienced
decision makers • Flexibility • Privacy Disadvantages of Arbitration: • Enforcing arbitration
agreements may be costly
• Limited discovery • Limited applicability
of rules of evidence • Compromise verdict
is common • Limited appeal
rights
Source: Arbitration: A Comparison of Pros
and Cons, Ellis & Winters (2015).
Submission is the process of beginning an arbitration proceeding.
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128 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
• Stockbroker and client • Commodities broker and customer • Brokerage firm and employee • Attorney* and client • Union-management collective bargaining agreements
• Owner–contractor and contractor–subcontractor • Insurance company and insured • Public carrier and shipper of goods
*Most bar associations require lawyers to arbitrate disputes with clients.
sidebar 5.3
Examples of Contracts with Arbitration Clauses
irrevocable, and a party that thinks the process is not going well cannot withdraw from the arbitration and resort to litigation. Another form of a submission occurs when a statute or court requires parties to arbitrate. This type of submission results in a mandatory arbitration.
After the submission, a hearing is conducted by the arbitrator or arbitrators. Both parties are allowed to present evidence and to argue their own points of view. Then a decision, known as an award, is handed down. In most states, the arbitra- tor’s award must be in writing. The award is valid as long as it settles the entire con- troversy and states which party is to pay the other a sum of money.
Sidebar 5.4 discusses trends in the use and popularity of arbitration.
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, businesses increasingly included arbitration clauses in various types of contracts. Most common among these examples have been business-to-business contracts (e.g., customer –supplier), employment contracts, and securities broker–investor con- tracts. In the 21st century arbitration impacts more people than ever before and the U.S. Supreme Court consistently has demonstrated that it is willing to enforce arbitration agreements of all kinds (see Sidebar 5.11 for a discussion of four recent cases). Not all lower courts and groups of people have the same faith in arbitration as the best tool for resolving disputes as the Supreme Court does.
The #MeToo movement brought public attention to the fact that provisions in employment contracts to arbi- trate claims may exacerbate the problem of a discrimina- tory workplace. In response, several states introduced legislation that would prohibit enforcement of arbitration clauses in instances of sexual abuse or sexual harass- ment. Even if states pass such legislation, it likely is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Some large corporations have announced that they will not enforce
arbitration agreements in instances of sexual assault and harassment. Should these be the only instances when arbitration agreements are not used to keep workplace discrimination private?
Lower courts split on the question of whether Uber provided its customers with adequate notice of a man- datory arbitration agreement in its terms and conditions link. The First Circuit noted that the hyperlink to the agree- ment did not appear in blue and underlined, as typically expected. The Second Circuit, however, upheld the Uber arbitration agreement that customers accept by clicking on agreement with terms and conditions when creating an account. Notice of the arbitration agreement is impor- tant to the courts. In another recent case, the Second Circuit refused to enforce the arbitration agreement in a service contract for lack of adequate notice given that the agreement was in an obscure hyperlink.
Sources: “Federal Arbitration Law Poses Barriers to #MeToo State Laws,” Bloomberg Law, Aug. 7,2019; Cullilane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017); Starke vs. SquareTrade, No. 17-2474-cv (2d. Cir. Jan. 10, 2017).
sidebar 5.4
Trends in Arbitration
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SUBMISSIONS Submission by contract occurs if the parties enter into an agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute. The arbitration agreement is the submission in this case. In addi- tion, the parties may contractually agree to submit to arbitration all issues that may arise in the future. Submission in these circumstances occurs when a demand to arbitrate is served on the other party.
Most state statutes authorizing voluntary arbitration require the agreement to arbitrate to be in writing. Because the goal of arbitration is to obtain a quick resolu- tion of disputes, most statutes require submission within a stated time period, usu- ally six months, after the dispute arises.
In the absence of a statute, the rights and duties of the parties to a submission are described and limited by their agreement. Parties that have contracted to arbi- trate are not required to arbitrate any matters other than those they contractually agree to arbitrate. Sidebar 5.5 contains an example of an agreement to arbitrate.
All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relat- ing to this contract shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by the parties from an American Arbitration Association list of qualified arbitrators. This arbi- tration contract is made pursuant to a transaction in inter- state commerce, and it shall be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act. The parties voluntarily and knowingly waive any right they have to a jury trial. The parties agree and understand the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law and this contract. These powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, including, but not limited to, money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
sidebar 5.5
Sample Arbitration Clause
The issues submitted to arbitration, as framed in the submission, may be ques- tions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. They may include the interpretation of the arbitration agreement. Sometimes a dispute arises as to whether the parties have agreed to submit an issue to arbitration. In such a case, one party refuses to arbitrate and the other files suit to compel arbitration. The court hearing the case decides the issue of arbitrability but does not decide the basic issue between the parties. The U.S. Supreme Court explained these distinct roles of the court and the arbitrator in a case summarized in Sidebar 5.6.
ARBITRATORS Arbitrators generally are chosen by the disputing parties. A provision in the agree- ment to arbitrate or in the statute that requires the arbitration describes how the arbitrator is selected. Of concern in the selection process are the expertise of the arbitrator and the number of arbitrators to be chosen.
Expertise One reason arbitration is frequently preferable to litigation is the use of an expert to resolve the dispute. Appraisers can be used to decide disputes about the value of real estate, medical doctors can be used to decide health care disputes, and academicians can be used to decide issues within their area of expertise.
This use of experts is especially important in labor–management relations. Arbi- tration is the technique used in collective-bargaining contracts to settle grievances of
For information about available arbitrators and their expertise, examine the following websites: • American Arbitra-
tion Association www.adr.org
• JAMS www.jamsadr. com/professionals
• National Arbitration Forum www.arb- forum.com
• Arbitrator.com (list- ing by states) www .arbitrator.com
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130 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
The communication workers union, as the bargaining agent of employees working for AT&T Tech. Inc., negoti- ated a contract that contained an arbitration clause cov- ering disputes that might arise. Another provision of the contract allowed management to make decisions regard- ing hiring, placement, and termination of employees. Exer- cising its authority, management laid off 79 employees due to a lack of work. The union challenged this action by claiming there was no lack of work justifying the layoffs. The union sought to have this dispute arbitrated; how- ever, management refused to arbitrate claiming its author- ity to terminate employees was clear. The union filed suit and asked the court to compel arbitration.
Does a judge or an arbitrator decide what issues should be submitted to arbitration?
The question of whether the parties agreed to arbi- trate is decided by a judge, not an arbitrator. However, in deciding what issues can be arbitrated, a judge is not to rule on the merits of the underlying claim. Judges should presume arbitration is appropriate; thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration over litigation. Later, the Supreme Court discussed “gateway issues” and whether an arbitrator or judge decides such matters. The Court ruled the application of a statute of limitations should be decided by the arbitrator. However, the Court has held that a judge must determine the ratification date of a col- lective bargaining agreement. Sources: AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 106 S. Ct. 1414 (1986); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 588 (2002); Granite Rock Company v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
sidebar 5.6
To Arbitrate or Litigate
employees against their employers. Arbitration is able to resolve disputes arising out of labor contracts without resorting to judicial intervention. It is quick and efficient and minimizes disruption in the workplace. Labor arbitration has attracted a large number of experts—both lawyers and academicians.
Arbitration provides for decision making by experts with experience in the par- ticular industry and with knowledge of the customs and practices of the particular work site. Parties expect the arbitrator to look beyond strictly legal criteria to other factors that bear on the proper resolution of a dispute. These factors may include the impact of a particular result on productivity, its consequences to morale, and whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. The ablest judge usually does not bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance because the judge cannot be as informed as the expert arbitrator.
Number Chosen Another issue relates to the number of arbitrators to hear a dis- pute. It is common to use one arbitrator who is considered objective and impartial. Any person the disputing parties agree upon can be an arbitrator. There are no licensing requirements an arbitrator must satisfy. However, an arbitrator often is chosen from a list of qualified arbitrators provided by the arbitration service. The disputing parties are not limited to the list unless they have agreed to make their selection from this list.
It is also common to have a panel of three arbitrators. In such cases, each party selects an arbitrator and the two so selected choose a third. It is not surprising that when this procedure is used, allegations of bias are often made by the losing party. Courts generally do not allow such allegations to form a basis for overturning a panel’s award unless there is evidence of overt corruption or misconduct in the arbi- tration proceedings. Because such evidence usually is difficult to obtain, allegations of bias normally do not impact the results of arbitration.
Authority over Certain Matters What arbitrators have authority to decide has been a topic of controversy and litigation. Case 5.1 attempts to clarify whose
The number of arbitrators is based on the agreement of the parties.
“Although arbitration does not guarantee well-reasoned decisions or moderate damage awards, the conven- tional wisdom is that arbitrators tend to be both more predictable in decision-making and reasonable in awarding damages than juries.”
—Robert M. Shea at www.mbbp.com/
resources/employment/ pdfs/arbitration.pdf
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case 5.1
RENT-A-CENTER, WEST, INC., v. ANTONIO JACKSON 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010)
Antonio Jackson works for Rent-A-Center. As a condition of this employment, Jackson signed a Mutual Agreement to Arbi- trate Claims (Agreement). This Agreement provides that all disputes arising out of Jackson’s employment will be submitted to arbitration. The Agreement specifically states that claims for discrimination and claims for violations of any federal law would be arbitrated, not litigated. Furthermore, the Agreement provided that the “Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforce- ability or formation of this Agreement including, but not lim- ited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.” On February 1, 2007, Jackson filed a federal lawsuit claiming that Rent-A-Center had discriminated against Jackson based on his race.
Rent-A-Center filed a motion to dismiss or stay the law- suit and to compel arbitration. Jackson responded, claim- ing that the Agreement to arbitrate is unconscionable under Nevada law and is unenforceable. Rent-A-Center argued that the issue of unconscionability and unenforceability are mat- ters for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide. The District Judge agreed with Rent-A-Center and compelled arbitration. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, deciding that the threshold question of unconscionability is for the court to decide. Upon Rent-A-Center’s petition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
SCALIA, J.: . . . The [Federal Arbitration Act] FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a mat- ter of contract. Section 2, the primary substantive provision of the Act, provides:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a trans- action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca- tion of any contract.
Federal Arbitration Act
The FAA thereby places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and requires courts to enforce them according to their terms. Like other con- tracts, however, they may be invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.
The Act also establishes procedures by which federal courts implement §2’s substantive rule. Under §3, a party may apply to a federal court for a stay of the trial of an
action “upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.” Under §4, a party “aggrieved” by the failure of another party “to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration” may petition a federal court “for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” The court “shall” order arbitration “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the fail- ure to comply therewith is not in issue.”
The Agreement here contains multiple written provi- sions to settle by arbitration a controversy. Two are relevant to our discussion. First, the section titled “Claims Covered By The Agreement” provides for arbitration of all “past, present or future” disputes arising out of Jackson’s employ- ment with Rent-A-Center. Second, the section titled “Arbi- tration Procedures” provides that “[t]he Arbitrator . . . shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . . . enforceability . . . of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agree- ment is void or voidable.” The current controversy between the parties is whether the Agreement is unconscionable. It is the second provision, which delegates resolution of that controversy to the arbitrator, that Rent-A-Center seeks to enforce. Adopting the terminology used by the parties, we will refer to it as the delegation provision.
The delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement. We have recognized that parties can agree to arbitrate “gate- way” questions of “arbitrability,” such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy. . . . An agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent agree- ment the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on this additional arbitra- tion agreement just as it does on any other. The additional agreement is valid under §2 “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” and federal courts can enforce the agreement by staying federal litigation under §3 and compelling arbitration under §4. The question before us, then, is whether the delegation provision is valid under §2.
There are two types of validity challenges under §2: One type challenges specifically the validity of the agree- ment to arbitrate, and the other challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract’s
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responsibility it is to decide preliminary matters prior to the actual arbitration. You should read this case as clarification of the cases discussed in Sidebar 5.6.
AWARDS Generally an arbitrator’s award does not need to set forth findings of fact, conclu- sions of law, or the reasons for the award. However, a disclosure of findings and the reasons must be given if the applicable statute, arbitration agreement, or submission so requires. When the arbitrator does provide the basis for decision in the form of an opinion or letter, that document becomes a part of the award.
An award is the decision by an arbitrator.
provisions renders the whole contract invalid. In a line of cases neither party has asked us to overrule, we held that only the first type of challenge is relevant to a court’s deter- mination whether the arbitration agreement at issue is enforceable. . . .
If a party challenges the validity under §2 of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the federal court must con- sider the challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement under §4. . . . [I]f the claim had been fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, then the court would have considered it. . . . In some cases the claimed basis of invalidity for the contract as a whole will be much easier to establish than the same basis as applied only to the severable agreement to arbitrate. Thus, in an employment contract many elements of alleged unconscionability appli- cable to the entire contract (outrageously low wages, for example) would not affect the agreement to arbitrate alone. But even where that is not the case, . . . we nonetheless require the basis of challenge to be directed specifically to the agreement to arbitrate before the court will intervene.
Here, the written provision to settle by arbitration a controversy, that Rent-A-Center asks us to enforce is the delegation provision—the provision that gave the arbitrator
“exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . . . enforceability . . . of this Agreement.” . . . [U]nless Jackson challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid under §2, and must enforce it under §3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agree- ment as a whole for the arbitrator.
The District Court correctly concluded that Jackson challenged only the validity of the contract as a whole. Nowhere in his opposition to Rent-A-Center’s motion to compel arbitration did he even mention the delegation provision. . . .
Jackson’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit confirms that he did not contest the validity of the delegation provision in particular. His brief noted the existence of the delegation provision, but his unconscionability arguments made no mention of it. . . . At oral argument, counsel stated: “There are certain elements of the arbitration agreement that are unconscionable and, under Nevada law, which would ren- der the entire arbitration agreement unconscionable.” . . .
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Reversed.
KEY POINTS • Jackson filed his race discrimination lawsuit in federal court instead of arbitrating his
claim because he claimed that the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable and unen- forceable under Nevada law. He took the position that this was an issue for the court to decide.
• Rent-A-Center took the position that Jackson was required to arbitrate any claims arising out of the contract, including the issue of unconscionability and unenforceability.
• The Supreme Court held that, because Jackson challenged the contract as a whole as opposed to just the delegation provision (i.e., the provision that delegates resolution of the controversy to an arbitrator), the matter should be resolved by an arbitrator.
Opinion of the Court; RENT-A-CENTER, WEST, INC. V. JACKSON 561 U. S. ____ (2010). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-497.
[continued]
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Because the parties themselves, by virtue of the submission, frame the issues to be resolved and define the scope of the arbitrator’s powers, the parties are generally bound by the resulting award. A court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of the arbitration award and the arbitrator’s acts and proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court favors a broad scope of the arbitrators’ authority. Restrictions on this authority will be allowed only when the disputing parties clearly state such limits.
An arbitrator’s award is final on all issues submitted, and it will be enforced by the courts as if it were a judgment of the court. As is discussed later, awards are not subject to judicial review on the merits of the decision. Only when fraud or other clearly inappropriate action by the arbitrator can be shown is a court willing to reverse the award granted in a voluntary arbitration proceeding.
After the award is made by the arbitrator, it is usually filed with the clerk of an appropriate court. If no objections are filed within a statutory period, it becomes final and enforceable, like a judgment.
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT The important role and positive perception of arbitration among businesses today probably would not exist without the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Prior to the enactment of the FAA, our common law system preferred litigation over arbitration as a means of resolving disputes. In 1925, congressional enactment of the FAA began to change this presumed way of dispute resolution. However, it was not until after the revision and reenactment of the FAA in 1947 that courts began to encourage disputing parties to use arbitration instead of litigation. Clearly, the FAA changed public policy perceptions of arbitration and how states can regulate its use. These two impacts of the FAA are discussed now.
Impact on Policy The FAA covers any arbitration clause in a contract that involves interstate commerce. Under it, courts are “rigorously” to enforce arbitration agreements. A court assumes arbitration was intended unless it can say with positive assurance that the arbitration clause was not intended to include the particular dis- pute. The federal policy clearly favors arbitration of commercial disputes. The FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
As illustrated by Case 5.2 and Sidebar 5.8, the U.S. Supreme Court, through its decisions, gives strong support to the use of arbitration.
Can the strong support of arbitration have negative ramifications? Sidebar 5.7 examines that issue.
Impact on State Laws The federal policy favoring arbitration frequently conflicts with state laws favoring litigation as the means to resolve a dispute. Sometimes a state law specifically provides that designated matters are not to be submitted to arbitration. Are these state laws constitutional when applied to businesses engaged in interstate commerce? The Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution are often used to set aside such state laws that deny arbitration of certain disputes.
STATUTORILY MANDATED ARBITRATION Another reason arbitration has become more widespread during the last few decades is that legislation may require disputing parties to submit to arbitration. A grow- ing number of states have adopted statutes that require mandatory arbitration for
The Federal Arbitration Act encourages disput- ing businesses to utilize arbitration.
State laws cannot pre- vent arbitration of dis- putes if the parties are engaged in or impact interstate commerce.
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case 5.2
14 PENN PLAZA LLC. v. PYETT 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009)
The Service Employees International Union is the exclusive bargaining representative of its members. These members are building cleaners, porters, and doorpersons working in New York City. The union has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations Inc. (RAB), a multiemployer bargaining association for the New York City real estate industry.
The CBA contains a commitment to nondiscrimination based on race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any other characteristic protected by law. The CBA further states that all claims of discrimination shall be subject to arbitration procedures specified in the CBA as the sole and exclusive remedy for such violations.
14 Penn Plaza LLC is a member of the RAB. As an owner of an office building, 14 Penn Plaza hired unionized workers as night lobby watchmen. Later, 14 Penn Plaza, with the union’s consent, employed licensed security guards to staff the lobby and entrances of its building. This hiring resulted in the night lobby watchmen being reassigned as night porters and cleaners. These latter jobs paid less than the watchmen positions. These union members, including Mr. Pyett, filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- sion (EEOC) on the grounds of age discrimination by 14 Penn Plaza, their employer. The EEOC did not find a violation but granted the employees/union members the right to sue their employer.
A lawsuit alleging age discrimination was filed, and 14 Penn Plaza sought to have the case dismissed. A motion to compel arbitration, as required under the CBA, was denied by the District Court for the Southern District of New York. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this decision stating that a CBA cannot deny an employee’s opportunity to litigate federal statutory protected right. The Supreme Court granted certio- rari to review that decision.
THOMAS, J.: The question presented by this case is whether a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) is enforceable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that this Court’s decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), forbids enforcement of such arbi- tration provisions. We disagree and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. . . .
In this instance, the Union and the RAB, negotiat- ing on behalf of 14 Penn Plaza, collectively bargained in
good faith and agreed that employment-related discrimina- tion claims, including claims brought under the ADEA, would be resolved in arbitration. This freely negotiated term between the Union and the RAB easily qualifies as a condition of employment that is subject to mandatory bar- gaining. . . . The decision to fashion a CBA to require arbi- tration of employment-discrimination claims is no different from the many other decisions made by parties in designing grievance machinery.
Respondents, however, contend that the arbitration clause here is outside the permissible scope of the collective- bargaining process because it affects the employees’ indi- vidual, non-economic statutory rights. We disagree. Parties generally favor arbitration precisely because of the econom- ics of dispute resolution. As in any contractual negotiation, a union may agree to the inclusion of an arbitration provi- sion in a collective-bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from the employer. Courts generally may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange. Judicial nullifica- tion of contractual concessions . . . is contrary to what the Court has recognized as one of the fundamental policies of the National Labor Relations Act—freedom of contract.
As a result, the CBA’s arbitration provision must be honored unless the ADEA itself removes this particular class of grievances from the NLRA’s broad sweep. It does not. This Court has squarely held that the ADEA does not preclude arbitration of claims brought under the statute. . . .
Gardner-Denver mistakenly suggested that certain features of arbitration made it a forum well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, but a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights cre- ated by Title VII. . . .
These misconceptions have been corrected. For exam- ple, the Court has recognized that arbitral tribunals are read- ily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision and that there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law. An arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law extends with equal force to discrimination claims brought under the ADEA. Moreover, the recognition that arbitration procedures are more streamlined than federal litigation is not a basis for finding the forum somehow inad- equate; the relative informality of arbitration is one of the chief reasons that parties select arbitration. Parties trade the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
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the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. In any event, it is unlikely that age discrimination claims require more extensive discovery than other claims that we have found to be arbitrable, such as RICO and antitrust claims. . . .
We hold that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to
arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of fed- eral law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
KEY POINTS • Members of the Service Workers International Union filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimi-
nation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). • The defendant, a member of the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations Inc. (RAB),
asserted that the union members were required to arbitrate their claims pursuant to a col- lective bargaining agreement with RAB.
• The Supreme Court held that the provision in the collective bargaining agreement that “clearly and unmistakably” required union members to arbitrate claims under the ADEA is enforceable.
Opinion of the Court; 14 PENN PLAZA LLC V. PYETT 556 U. S. ____ (2009). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-581
[continued]
In Chapter 2, Sidebar 2.1 described the Wells Fargo sham account scandal in which Wells Fargo employees used customer identity information to create multiple additional accounts without customer permission. In federal and state courts around the country, Wells Fargo is seeking the enforcement of arbitration clauses in account agree- ments in response to lawsuits filed by customers, includ- ing class-action lawsuits.
Customers affected by fake accounts argue that it was impossible for them to agree to the arbitration clauses in accounts they did not authorize. The bank’s response is that the accounts customers originally authorized included arbitration agreements and those authorized agreements also cover disputes related to the accounts
established through customer identity theft. One of the reasons the scope of the sham account scandal was not identified earlier was because courts enforced the arbi- tration clauses in customer complaints, such as a lawsuit filed in 2013 by a Wells Fargo customer, a full three years before the extent of the fake accounts was made public. The private nature of arbitration allowed for the ongoing practice of using customer information to sign them up for multiple bogus accounts with fees. The policy of enforc- ing arbitration agreements limits the ability for customers to recover in a class action and prevents the exposure of wrong-doing in the more public forum of litigation. Source: Michael Corkery and Stacy Cowley, “Wells Fargo Killing Sham Account Suits by Using Arbitration,” The New York Times, December 6, 2016.
sidebar 5.7
Enforcing Arbitration in Cases of Identity Theft?
certain types of disputes. Those whose disputes fall within the boundaries of the mandatory arbitration statute must submit the dispute to arbitration prior to being allowed to litigate. On the basis of studies showing that a dispute requiring three days for resolution before a 12-person jury takes only two to four hours for resolution
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136 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
The Supreme Court continued to strictly enforce the terms of arbitration agreements in a case involving American Express’s arbitration agreement with merchants. In Ameri- can Express, Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant [133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013)], the Supreme Court held that a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, even if the cost of proving an individual claim in arbitra- tion exceeds the potential recovery. Unless there is specific
legislation to the contrary or evidence (such as unconsciona- bility under state law) that could establish grounds for revoca- tion of the contract, class-action waivers are “ironclad.”
Source: David Garcia and Leo Caseria, “Opinion Analysis: A Class Action Waiver in an Arbitration Agreement Will Be Strictly Enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act,” SCOTUSblog, June 21, 2013, www.scotusblog. com/2013/06/opinion-analysis-a-class-action-waiver-in-an-arbitration-agreement- will-be-strictly-enforced-under-the-federal-arbitration-act/.
sidebar 5.8
Strict Enforcement of a Class-Action Waiver in an Arbitration Agreement
by an arbitrator, the mandatory arbitration statute is clearly a viable alternative for controlling court congestion.
The arbitrators in the mandatory arbitration process are retired judges and practicing lawyers, usually experienced trial attorneys. A list of eligible arbitrators is maintained by court officials in charge of the mandatory process. Although the parties may agree on using only one arbitrator, mandatory arbitration cases are usu- ally presented to a panel of three. Arbitrators are paid a per-diem fee. The parties involved in the arbitration are responsible for paying these costs.
Types of Cases Mandatory arbitration statutes cover only a few types of cases. A typical statute might apply the procedure to claims exclusively for money of a small amount, such as those for less than $15,000, not including interest and costs. Some statutes require arbitration of specific subject matter, like issues arising out of divorces. In addition, arbitration is required only in those cases in which a party has demanded a jury trial, as it can be assumed that a judge hearing a case is basically as efficient as an arbitrator.
Procedures Mandatory arbitration, while requiring substantially less time than litigation, does not necessarily provide speedy justice. The usual procedure for a claim filed in court that is covered by the mandatory arbitration law is to place the claim in the arbitration track at time of filing. At this time, the date and time of hear- ing are assigned, typically eight months from the date of filing.
Discovery procedures may be used prior to the hearing on arbitration. Because no discovery is permitted after the hearing without permission of the court, an early and thorough degree of preparation is necessary to achieve a full hearing on the mer- its of the controversy. This preparation also prevents the hearing from being used as an opportunity to discover the adversary’s case en route to an eventual trial. Most discovery is by interrogatories rather than by deposition.
The arbitrators have the power to determine the admissibility of evidence and to decide the law and the facts of the case. Rulings on objections to evidence or on other issues that arise during the hearing are made by the arbitrators. States have different rules relating to the admissibility of evidence. In most states the estab- lished rules of evidence must be followed by the arbitrators. Several jurisdictions, however, do not require hearings to be conducted according to the established rules
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of evidence. New Jersey law, for example, provides: “The arbitrator shall admit all relevant evidence and shall not be bound by the rules of evidence.” Other states leave to the discretion of the arbitrator the extent to which the rules of evidence apply.
VOLUNTARY/CONTRACT-BASED ARBITRATION Although the statutes that mandate arbitration of certain types of disputes clearly have increased the use of this ADR method, the larger growth in the number of arbi- tration cases comes from disputing parties agreeing to arbitrate, not litigate.
These agreements to voluntarily arbitrate come in two basic forms. One is known as the predispute arbitration clause. Such clauses commonly appear in business contracts. In essence, the contracting parties show good judgment in understand- ing conflicts exist, conflicts give rise to disputes, and disputes are better resolved through arbitration rather than by litigating.
People often view a contract as the beginning of a productive business relation- ship. They do not want to lessen the forthcoming opportunities with any expectation that problems might occur. And they view including an arbitration clause in the con- tract as an indication that bad things will happen. These people may need to utilize a postdispute arbitration agreement. Such agreements arise when parties already in dispute decide that arbitration is better than litigation.
On the basis of your study of this chapter, we trust you understand why a predis- pute arbitration is the wiser and ultimately more efficient approach to ADR than the postdispute agreement. An obvious disadvantage to relying on the latter approach is that disputing parties may not be able to find the common ground to agree to arbitrate.
To encourage business people to use voluntary arbitration, the goal of an effi- cient and affordable alternative to litigation must be achieved. When arbitration is as expensive and time-consuming as litigation, the attractiveness of the ADR system declines. Sidebar 5.9 discusses how the Supreme Court interprets arbitration agree- ments that limit claims to single parties, thereby prohibiting class-action arbitrations.
JUDICIAL REVIEW The arbitration process is less time consuming and less costly than litigation only if the parties are limited in seeking judicial review of the arbitrators’ awards. From this perspective, voluntary arbitration is a more effective alternative to litigation than mandatory arbitration. The following subsections discuss the extent of judicial review of awards depending on the type of arbitration.
Review of Voluntary/Contract-Based Arbitration Awards Generally, the award resulting from the voluntary arbitration procedure is final. The arbitrator’s findings on questions of both fact and law are conclusive. The judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is quite restricted and is more limited than the appellate review of a trial court’s decision.
Arbitration clauses are liberally interpreted when the issue contested is the scope of the clause. If the scope of an arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the clause is construed in favor of arbitration.
The fact that the arbitrator made erroneous rulings during the hearing, or reached erroneous findings of fact from the evidence, is no ground for setting aside the award because the parties have agreed that he or she should be the judge of the
Don’t rely on getting a party to sign a postdispute arbitration agreement; relying on a predispute arbitration clause is smarter.
LO 5-5
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138 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
When a party with a complaint suffers a small amount of damages, it is not feasible to litigate. The same might be said of arbitration, even though this process is intended to be simpler and less expensive than a lawsuit. To increase the chance of a satisfactory result, a party claiming a wrong with little damages would like to create a class action involving similarly situated parties.
This was the situation after the Concepcions enrolled for cellular phone service with AT&T. As a part of the sub- scription for this service through AT&T, the Concepcions signed a voluntary arbitration agreement indicating they would arbitrate any dispute with AT&T. This arbitration clause clearly stated the process would be limited to only the Concepcions’ dispute.
As a party of the contract with AT&T, the Concepcions were told they would receive two “free” phones. Instead of getting the phones free of all charges, the Concep- cions were billed for the sales tax on the retail value of these phones. The total amount of this tax was $30.22. When the Concepcions discovered this charge, they filed a class-action suit in federal district court claiming they and other customers had been defrauded. AT&T sought to have this action dismissed, claiming the Concepcions’ dispute had to be arbitrated.
The impact of AT&T’s argument would be to prohibit class-action litigation and even class-action arbitration. The Concepcions sought to have the arbitration agree- ment declared invalid, arguing it was unconscionable under California law to deny them the right to bring this class action. Even though the District Court and Ninth Cir- cuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Concepcions, holding the prohibition of class actions was unconscionable, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and upheld the arbitration agreement. The Court’s majority found that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the California law on unconscio- nability as it applies to this situation. The Court’s deci- sion upheld the belief that arbitration is preferred over litigation.
The impact of this decision and a previous one by the Court appears to be that consumers will have to negotiate to preserve the right to arbitrate class-action claims. If the arbitration agreement clearly states that the parties limit the arbitration to their personal claims, such class actions will be prohibited. Sources: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011);
Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
sidebar 5.9
Single Claims v. Class Actions
facts. An erroneous view of the law no matter how egregious is binding because the parties have agreed to accept the arbitrator’s view of the law. Error of law renders the award void only when it requires the parties to commit a crime or otherwise to violate a positive mandate of the law. Courts do not interfere with an award by examining the merits of the controversy, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award, or the reasoning supporting the decision. Were it otherwise, arbitration would fail in its chief purpose: to preclude the need for litigation. Instead of being a substitute for litigation, arbitration would merely be the beginning of litigation. Broad judicial review on the merits would render arbitration wasteful and superfluous.
Judicial review can correct fraudulent or arbitrary actions by an arbitrator. Fur- ther, courts of review are sometimes called upon to set aside an award when the decision is allegedly against public policy. In such cases, the reviewing court must establish that an arbitration award is contrary to the public policy which arises from laws and legal precedents. A reviewing court cannot reject an award simply because that court bases public policy on general considerations of presumed public inter- ests. In essence, the scope of review by courts of an arbitrator’s award in a voluntary/ contract-based arbitration is extremely limited, as discussed in Sidebar 5.10.
Review of Statutorily Mandated Arbitration Although a party may voluntarily consent to almost any restriction upon or deprivation of a right, a similar restriction
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or deprivation, when compelled by government, must be in accord with procedural and substantive due process of law. Therefore, statutorily mandated arbitration requires a higher level of judicial review of the award.
Laws providing for mandatory arbitration are subject to numerous constitutional challenges. Many courts have generally held that mandatory arbitration statutes that effectively close the courts to the litigants by compelling them to resort to arbitra- tors for a final and binding determination are void as against public policy and are unconstitutional in that they:
1. Deprive one of property and liberty of contract without due process of law. 2. Violate the litigant’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and/or the state’s
constitutional access to courts’ provisions. 3. Result in the unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power in viola-
tion of state constitutional separation-of-powers provisions.
Mandatory arbitration may be constitutional, however, if fair procedures are pro- vided by the legislature and ultimate judicial review is available. Courts throughout the United States have uniformly upheld mandatory arbitration statutory schemes as against the constitutional challenges previously mentioned where a dissatisfied party can reject the arbitrator’s award and seek a de novo judicial review of that award. De novo review means that the court tries the issues anew as if no arbitration occurred.
In mandatory arbitrations, a record of proceedings is required. Also, findings of fact and conclusions of law are essential if there is to be enough judicial review to sat- isfy due process. Judicial review of mandatory arbitration requires a de novo review of the interpretation and application of the law by the arbitrators.
The right to reject the award and to proceed to trial is the sole remedy of a party dissatisfied with the award. In a sense, the award is an intermediate step in resolving the dispute if the trial itself is desired. The right to reject the award exists without regard to the basis for the rejection. Many jurisdictions authorize fee and cost sanctions to be
Can a judge reject an arbitrator’s factual findings and award and substitute a decision by that judge? This is the issue that the Supreme Court resolved in a case involv- ing major league baseball. Steve Garvey sought dam- ages of $3,000,000 after his contract with the San Diego Padres was not extended because of the team’s alleged collusion with other teams. This collusion was supposedly in violation of the Major League Baseball Players Asso- ciation collective bargaining agreement with the various Major League baseball clubs.
Garvey’s claim was submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrator denied the claim stating that Garvey had failed to establish proof of the fact that his contract was not extended because of collusion. Garvey sought review
at the district court level, and that judge denied Gar- vey’s motion to set aside the arbitrator’s award. Garvey appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision, vacated the arbitrator’s award, and decided the case on the basis of record established by the arbitrator.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. It held when a court finds that the arbitra- tor made a mistake, that court should vacate the award and remand the matter to the arbitrator for further arbitra- tion proceedings. The court should not resolve the merits of the parties’ dispute.
Source: Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey, 121 S. Ct. 1724 (2001).
sidebar 5.10
Judicial Review of Arbitrator’s Award
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140 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
imposed on parties who fail to improve their positions at the trial as compared to the arbitration. Hopefully, the quality of the arbitrators, the integrity of the proceedings, and the fairness of the awards will keep the number of rejections to a minimum.
The failure of a party to be present, either in person or by counsel, at an arbitra- tion constitutes a waiver of the right to reject the award and seek de novo judicial review. In essence, a party’s lack of participation operates as a consent to the entry by the court of a judgment on the award. Because the procedure of mandatory-court- annexed arbitration is an integral part of the judicial process of dispute resolution, its process must be utilized either to resolve the dispute or as the obligatory step prior to resolution by trial. To allow any party to ignore the arbitration would permit a mockery of this deliberate attempt to achieve an expeditious and less costly resolu- tion of private controversies.
Review under the Federal Arbitration Act When the arbitration is pur- suant to state statute, that statute determines what, if any, grounds are available to challenge an award in court. In cases that involve interstate commerce issues, the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act control.
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration award may be vacated or set aside on any one of four grounds:
1. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means. 2. Where the arbitrators were obviously partial or corrupt. 3. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or by engaging in any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
4. Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
As set in subsection (a), the Federal Arbitration Act provides that an award can be vacated if it can be proved that it was procured by “corruption, fraud, or other undue means.” “Undue means” goes beyond the merely inappropriate or inadequate nature of the evidence and refers to some aspect of the arbitrator’s decision or deci- sion-making process that was unfair and beyond the normal process contemplated by the arbitration act. The courts tend to interpret “undue means” in conjunction with the terms “corruption” and “fraud” which precede it, and thus, “undue means” requires some type of bad faith in the procurement of the award.
When the disputing parties each choose an arbitrator and these arbitrators choose a third to make up a three-person panel, the disputing parties may be inclined to charge that the arbitrator chosen by the parties is partial or corrupt. Under sub- section (b), the use of “partial or corrupt” in the FAA means that an arbitrator lacks the ability to consider evidence and to reach a fair conclusion.
Subsection (c) covers arbitral misconduct. The concept of arbitral “miscon- duct” does not lend itself to a precise definition. Among the actions found to consti- tute such misconduct on the part of an arbitrator that justify vacating an arbitration award are the following:
1. Participation in communications with a party or a witness without the knowl- edge or consent of the other party.
2. Receipt of evidence as to a material fact without notice to a party.
The grounds for over- turning an arbitrator’s award are very limited; being disappointed with an award is not a basis for changing the award.
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3. Holding hearings or conducting deliberations in the absence of a member of an arbitration panel or rendering an award without consulting a panel member.
4. Undertaking an independent investigation into a material matter after the close of hearings and without notice to the parties.
5. Accepting gifts or other hospitality from a party during the proceedings.
An award may likewise be set aside on the basis of procedural error if an arbi- trator denies a reasonable request for postponement of a hearing or commits an egregious evidentiary error, such as refusing to hear material evidence or precluding a party’s efforts to develop a full record.
Finally, subsection (d), involving the question of whether the arbitrators exceeded their power, relates to the arbitrability of the underlying dispute. An arbitrator exceeds powers and authority when attempting to solve an issue that is not arbitrable because it is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. Conversely, if the issues presented to the arbitrators are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, subsection (d) does not require the court to review the merits of every construction of the contract.
Sidebar 5.11 describes four recent Supreme Court decisions further defining the parameters of the Federal Arbitration Act.
As more arbitration agreements impact consumers, employees and business organizations, the Supreme Court continues accepting a number of arbitration cases on its dockets to resolve matters related to both domes- tic and international arbitration. In just over one year, four cases were recently decided.
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis: This is an important case because it addresses how the FAA interacts with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In a 5-4 decision with Justice Gorsuch writing for the majority, the Court held that the NLRA did not include the right for employees to bring collective or class litigation. Since the employees had an arbitration agreement that prevails and the par- ties must arbitrate their claims. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, objected that the court “subordinat[ed] employee-protective legislation to the [FAA].”
Henry Schein v. Archer & White Sales Inc.: A unani- mous Court held if the parties “clearly” and “unmistakably” delegated arbitrability of so-called “gateway issues” to an arbitrator, a court cannot decide those issues. “Gateway issues” involve claims that the question in dispute is cov- ered by an arbitration agreement. Even if a court believes that it is “wholly groundless” that the issue is one covered by the parties arbitration agreement, arbitrators make that decision if that is what the agreement provides. This
decision reinforces that the Court wants parties’ arbitration agreements to be binding without judicial interference.
New Prime Inc v. Oliveira: Another unanimous opin- ion, the Court held that courts should decide whether the FAA applies to a transaction and that “contracts of employ- ment” include those for an independent-contractor rela- tionship. Under the FAA the courts may compel arbitration only in arbitration agreements involving commerce or maritime transactions. Thus, a court must make the thresh- old determination whether the FAA applies to the contract at issue, notwithstanding any delegation clause.
Lamps Plus Inc v. Varela: In a 5-4 decision, with the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the FAA requires courts to “enforce arbi- tration agreements according to their terms.” An ambigu- ous agreement cannot provide the necessary “contractual basis” for compelling class arbitration. Class arbitration is different from the “traditional individualized arbitration” addressed by the FAA. Therefore, an agreement that is ambiguous does not provide the necessary contractual basis for compelling class arbitration. Sources: Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1612; 200 L. Ed. 2d 889 (2018); Henry Schein v. Archer & White Sales Inc., 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 524; 202 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2019); New Prime Inc v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 532; 202 L. Ed. 2d 536 (2019); Lamps Plus Inc v. Varela, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
sidebar 5.11
Supreme Court Continues to Develop Arbitration Law
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142 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
Mediation
As the preceding sections document, arbitration has played a significant role in ADR, particularly throughout the last half of the 20th century. More recently, individuals and businesses have been utilizing the process of mediation as a preferred means of ADR. Mediation is the process by which a third person, called a mediator, attempts to assist disputing parties in resolving their differences. A mediator cannot impose a binding solution on the parties. However, as an unbiased and disinterested third party, a mediator is often able to help the parties bring about an understanding of a dispute and thus avoid litigation of it. Typically, mediators utilize the principles of interest-based negotiations, discussed earlier in this chapter.
The process of mediation may be utilized by the disputing parties as a result of their agreement to mediate. This agreement may have been made as a part of a contract before a dispute arose. On the other hand, parties to a dispute may agree that mediation should be attempted as an alternative to litigating their controversy.
A trial judge can require the disputing parties to submit to the mediation pro- cess before a complaint can be litigated formally. There is a growing movement in this court-annexed mediation as one means of controlling the heavy caseload faced by courts. Rules related to court-annexed mediation are local in nature; thus, there are wide variations as to the type of cases that courts require to be mediated. Gener- ally, cases involving domestic-relations issues (such as divorce and child custody) and cases involving a dollar amount in dispute below a stated threshold level are examples of those that are subject to court-annexed mediation.
The number of mediations has increased for three primary reasons. First, and perhaps most important, the disputing parties retain control over when to settle and when to continue disputing. This fact allows an effective mediation procedure to help parties address the conflicts that cause the dispute to erupt. An arbitrator’s award may benefit one party while punishing another; however, the award likely does not assist the parties in developing a constructive, ongoing business relationship.
LO 5-3
LO 5-4
Parties in a mediation are the decision mak- ers; mediators provide a procedure of facilitated negotiation; and the par- ties are responsible for finding a solution to the dispute.
“Mediation has emerged as the primary ADR pro- cess in federal courts.”
—ADR and Settlement in Federal District
Courts
Mediation often allows disputing parties to preserve or reestablish relationships.
VOLUNTARY MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Submission Based on parties’ agreement after dispute arises or on contract clause before dispute arises.
Required by statute.
Procedures Because process is not tied to a court, it is quick, informal, often with no discovery, and not bound by rules of evidence.
The procedure is associated with a court’s supervision; discovery usually is done, and many states require arbitrators to follow the formal rules of evidence.
Review of award The award is final with no judicial review, unless a party can prove that the arbitrator engaged in fraudulent, arbitrary, or other inappropriate actions.
The court will conduct a de novo hearing as if the arbitration process had not occurred.
concept summary
Voluntary versus Mandatory Arbitration
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Because mediation typically focuses on getting the parties to negotiate through an interest-based method, existing and potential conflicts can be handled productively. Sidebar 5.12 attempts to capture this point.
The second reason mediation is growing in popularity relates to the cost savings compared to litigation and even arbitration. Because there is no presentation of evi- dence in a mediation, the active role of lawyers is reduced. The resulting savings in time and money can be quite substantial. In mediations, parties are actively engaged in negotiation, which allows these parties to be more efficient with their time.
A third reason businesses are relying more and more on mediation is found in the reduction of the legal system governing the process.
PROCEDURES Despite the fact that mediations are informal and controlled by the disputing parties, the odds for a successful mediation occurring increase greatly when the mediator follows some basic procedures. Sidebar 5.13 summarizes the typical steps of the mediation process, and a more complete description follows.
“The good news today is that there are many different ways to resolve disputes. Within a gen- eration, the default method has moved from litigation to mediation.”
http://www.adrtool- box.com/library/
adr-decision-tree/
Earlier in this chapter, you were introduced to the busi- ness transactions and resulting disputes between Bill’s Discount Centers and M&N TV Inc. Let’s suppose these parties litigated or arbitrated the dispute involving the quality of M&N’s TVs and the reduced purchases, over time, by Bill’s. What would be the likely result? The court’s judgment or arbitrator’s award probably would take the form of a dollar amount in favor of one party or the other.
Would such a judgment or award address the underlying concerns of the parties, thereby helping them continue to do business? Probably not!
To achieve some creative result, like the one sug- gested earlier, the parties will have to negotiate. The mediation form of ADR is the process that focuses on the parties negotiating.
sidebar 5.12
Bill’s and M&N Revisited
1. Mediator’s introduction and explanation of mediation. 2. Parties’ opening statements. 3. Parties’ exchange (or dialogue or negotiation). 4. Brainstorming possible options (or solutions).
5. The agreement (written and signed). 6. Private sessions or caucuses. (These are optional at
the mediator’s discretion.)
sidebar 5.13
Steps in the Mediation Process
First, the mediator usually makes an opening statement. During this state- ment, mediators should explain the procedures to which they are asking the par- ties to agree. In essence, the mediator explains much of what you are reading in
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144 PART 1 Introduction: Legal Foundations for Business
this section. Also, any “rules”—such as the common courtesy of not interrupting the party speaking—are specified.
Second, all parties are allowed to make a statement about their views of this dispute. These statements are made in the presence of each other and the mediator. A party’s attorney may be the spokesperson; however, it often is more enlightening when the parties speak for themselves.
Third, the mediator attempts to get the parties talking to one another in what some refer to as the dialogue or exchange phase of mediation. Through an exchange based on open communication, the parties “clear the air” and hopefully begin to shift their focus from “the wrongs done in the past” to “how can business be con- ducted in the future.”
Fourth, once the parties concentrate on how to work together or how best to end a relationship, the mutual generation of possible solutions should occur. Brain- storming options that resolve the dispute becomes the purpose of this stage of the mediation process. Skillful mediators assist parties in evaluating the possible solu- tions. Through productive questioning (some call this reality testing) by the media- tor, parties should be able to make informed choices as to the best solution. At this point, the parties hopefully are ready to make a realistic commitment to resolve their dispute and conflict.
Sometimes, the mediator may decide that the process will be more productive if the parties and their attorneys meet with the mediator outside the presence of the other disputant. This private meeting is called a caucus. After each side caucuses with the mediator, the mediator may call the parties back together for continued discussions, or the mediator may begin to act as a shuttle diplomat, moving back and forth between the parties who are in separate rooms. Especially during these cau- cuses, the mediator must win the trust and confidence of each party to the dispute.
Through the good judgment and experience of the mediator, the differences between the parties hopefully will be resolved and a common agreement can be pro- duced. The final step to a successful mediation is the writing of the agreement and the signing of the agreement by the parties.
ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES The basic advantage of mediation over litigation and arbitration is that the disputing parties retain full control over the resolution (or lack thereof) of their controversy. Through retaining this control, the parties can decide how much time and effort to put into the mediation process. The fact that mediation is party driven and does not involve even an informal presentation of evidence makes the process much more efficient than other ADR systems. If parties are making progress toward a settle- ment, the mediation can be continued and perhaps expanded to involve a possible agreement on other potential disputes. When the mediation is not aiding the parties, any of them can stop the process by simply stating that they will not participate further.
This same aspect of the parties controlling the mediation process may be viewed as a disadvantage rather than as an advantage when compared to other ADR sys- tems. Even in the court-annexed mediations, a party usually satisfies the court’s order to mediate by simply showing up. Generally, there is no enforcement mecha- nism that ensures the parties will mediate in good faith.
A caucus in mediation occurs when the mediator meets privately with one party without the other party.
Do weigh the benefits and detriments of the mediation process. Remember, some disputes can involve issues that need to be litigated for society’s gain.
“Mediators must have the facility to listen to what the negotiators are saying and to hear pri- orities and demands that may not be articulated explicitly. When they start making progress, more tradeoffs follow pretty quickly, once you can break the ice.”
Jerome Lefkowitz, a labor lawyer, on the
end of the New York City Transit strike
in December 2005 (Source: Sewell Chan
and Steven Green- house, “From Back-
Channel Contacts, Blueprint for a Deal,” The New York Times, December 23, 2005)
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An additional disadvantage relates to the selection of the neutral mediator. The parties must be able to agree at least on who will be their mediator. The parties can avoid the need to agree on a mediator by allowing the person or orga- nization that administers the mediation program to select the mediator. If the disputing parties cannot “get together” to select a mediator, the mediation process cannot begin.
Finally, the requirements for training as a mediator are not universally defined. Furthermore, licensing requirements are nonexistent at present. Therefore, anyone can serve as a mediator. The disputing party should be aware of the experience (or lack thereof) of the party chosen as their mediator. The Federal Mediation and Con- ciliation Service, the American Arbitration Association, and other similar organiza- tions are valuable sources of credible mediators.
LACK OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT There is no need for judicial review of the mediation process. If mediation is suc- cessful, it is the parties’ agreement that resolves the dispute. If the parties are not pleased with the mediation, they are free to end their voluntary involvement. A court- mandated mediation either will result in the parties settling their differences and dis- missing the lawsuit or will result in no agreement being reached, which likely means the litigation process continues.
In essence, mediations do not involve the legal issues found in the arbitration process. Typically, the conduct of the mediator is not subject to judicial review. Fur- thermore, mediators usually have the disputing parties sign a consent to mediate that states the mediator cannot be subpoenaed or otherwise be made to testify in any judicial hearing.
COMBINATION OF ADR SYSTEMS The benefit of flexibility related to mediation allows parties to utilize this process in conjunction with other dispute resolution systems. For example, in the middle of heated litigation, parties can agree to mediate just one issue. The resolution of one issue may help the litigation of the remaining issues proceed in a more efficient manner.
One of the more popular variations has given rise to what some people are call- ing an additional ADR technique. This variation involves the mediation of a dispute. The parties resolve all the matters of contention that they can and they agree to arbitrate the unresolved matters. This variation has become known as Med-Arb. The opportunities to use mediation in beneficial ways are limited only by the creativity of the parties involved.
Some laws encourage the parties to be creative in utilizing ADR systems. For example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides that if a business adopts an informal dispute resolution system to handle complaints about its product warran- ties, then a customer cannot sue the manufacturer or seller for breach of warranty without first going through the informal procedures. This law does not deny consum- ers the right to sue, nor does it compel a compromise solution. It simply allows a manufacturer to require mediation, for instance, before the complaining consumer can litigate.
LO 5-5
LO 5-4
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Key Terms Arbitration 127 Arbitrator 127 Award 128 Caucus 144 Conflict 120 De novo judicial review 139 Dispute 120
Focus groups 126 Mandatory arbitration 128 Med-Arb 145 Mediation 142 Mediator 142 Negotiation 121 Positional bargaining 122
Postdispute arbitration agreement 137
Predispute arbitration clause 137 Principled, interest-based
negotiations 123 Submission 127 Voluntary arbitration 127
Review Questions and Problems Conflicts and Negotiation
1. Conflicts and Disputes What are the distinguishing characteristics of a conflict versus a dispute? Think about recent conflicts that did and did not become a dispute. Think about a recent dispute and describe how you handled it.
2. Styles and Methods of Negotiation List the five instinctive responses used in negotiation and describe how each of these applies to you.
3. Positional Negotiation In business disputes, what two items are most likely to dominate a position-based negotiation?
4. Principled Negotiation A. Summarize the seven elements of principled, interest-based negotiations. B. How does focusing on these elements assist the negotiation process?
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Systems 5. Range of Options
What are the various items along the spectrum of ADR systems between litigation and negotiated settlements?
6. Settlements Why do businesses have incentives to settle disputes rather than relying on jury verdicts in the litigation process?
7. Focus Groups What is the benefit to lawyers and parties of conducting a focus group?
Arbitration 8. Submissions
A. What is the purpose of a submission in an arbitration? B. What is the proper role of the courts in determining whether a submission to arbitrate is valid?
9. Arbitrators As a client of a brokerage firm, Howsam invested in four limited partnerships. These investments were made between 1986 and 1994. The client agreement signed by Howsam required all disputes with the brokerage firm to be arbitrated. When she lost money on her investments, Howsam filed for arbitration, claiming the firm misrepresented the investments in the limited partnerships. The arbitration agreement has a six-year statute of limitations. The brokerage firm filed a lawsuit seeking to have the arbitration submission enjoined because the statute of limitations had run out. Who—a judge or an arbitrator—makes the decision concerning the application of a statute of limitations to an arbitration proceeding? Why?
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10. Awards Generally, what does an arbitrator have to include in the award to make it valid?
11. The Federal Arbitration Act A. A dispute arose between partners. The partnership agreement provided that if
the parties were unable to agree on any matter, it would be submitted to arbitra- tion. One partner filed suit asking a court to appoint a receiver for the business. The other insisted on arbitration. How will the dispute be resolved? Why?
B. What impact does the FAA have on state laws that prefer the litigation process to arbitration?
12. Statutorily Mandated Arbitration A. What is meant by the phrase statutorily mandated arbitration? B. Is arbitration required in all cases? Why or why not?
13. Voluntary/Contract-Based Arbitration The contract arising from Randolph’s purchase and financing of a mobile home contained an arbitration clause covering all disputes that might arise. When a dispute arose, Randolph filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Randolph claimed the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it did not specify what Ran- dolph might have to pay associated with an arbitration proceeding. Is an arbitration agreement that doesn’t specify anything about costs enforceable? Why?
14. Judicial Review A. Explain why there are different standards of review of arbitration awards
depending on whether the arbitration is voluntary or statutorily mandated. B. Barbara and Cole Inc. disputed the amount of money due as “minimum royal-
ties” under a mineral lease. They submitted the dispute to arbitration, and the arbitrators awarded Barbara $37,214.67. The court held that there was no sub- stantial evidence in the record to support an award of less than the minimum royalty of $75,000 and directed entry of a judgment for that amount. Was it proper for the court to increase the award? Why or why not?
Mediation 15. Procedures
What steps usually are followed to provide an effective and efficient mediation? Explain.
16. Advantages/Disadvantages A. How is mediation fundamentally different from an arbitration? B. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of the mediation process?
17. Lack of Judicial Involvement What is the nature of mediation that reduces the degree of judicial supervision?
18. Combination of ADR Systems Describe how mediation can be used in conjunction with arbitration.
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1. Your employer, Let’s-Get-It-Done, has a history of multiple employee disputes. These disputes range from claims of illegal discrimination to general complaints of worker dissatisfaction with supervisors. You have been assigned the task of changing the organization’s culture. Since litigation is the typical method of resolving company dis- putes, you are considering alternatives to litigation.
• What are possible alternative dispute resolution systems (ADRs)? • Should employees be required to sign a contract that an ADR method will be used
before any lawsuit is filed against the organization? 2. As the vice president for sales of a company that manufactures and sells commercial
carpet, you notice an alarming increase in the number of customers filing complaints with your company service representatives. Of particular importance is the number of complaints that involve claims in excess of $10,000. Because these large dollar amounts can lead to lawsuits being filed, you want to investigate what is causing the increase in complaints and how your company can be processing these complaints to avoid burdensome litigation.
• What steps should you take to discover, in the most accurate and efficient manner, the reasons customers are filing complaints?
• What is the distinction between mediation and arbitration? • Should your company’s sales contracts include a clause that requires the par-
ties to attempt resolution of dispute by mediation? By arbitration? By some other mechanisms?
• If your company’s sales contracts did include a dispute resolution (other than litiga- tion) clause, when can the courts still be used?
3. After working as a consultant for the “We Can Help You” firm for seven years, you recently received a promotion to manager. In this new role, you report to a partner and are responsible for various consulting teams. You now create these teams in collabo- ration with the partner. These teams typically consist of four to seven consultants with a senior consultant serving as the team leader. Teams are organized or adjusted as the client demands dictate. As a new manager, you are becoming increasingly aware of conflicts among team members and disputes between the teams and clients.
• What is the difference between a conflict and a dispute? • What steps should you take to discover, in an accurate and efficient manner, the
reasons conflicts and disputes exist? • Should your consulting firm’s contracts with employees contain a dispute resolu-
tion clause? What about the firm’s consulting agreement with clients? If so, what system of dispute resolution should be included?
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
6-1 To appreciate how the structure of the U.S. Constitution provides the framework for our federal government.
6-2 To understand the importance of the supremacy clause and the contracts clause for business.
6-3 To understand the power of the federal government to regulate business.
6-4 To recognize the major amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
6-5 To analyze the basic protections created by the First, Second, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Constitution6 Source: Carol M. Highsmith Archive, Library of Congress [LC-DIG-highsm-12945]
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T he U.S. Constitution provides the legal
framework of our federal government and
the authority it has to regulate business
activities. Reading the Constitution and its amend-
ments in Appendix III will give you an appreciation
for the thoughtfulness of this document. Although it
is relatively short, it evidences an enormous degree
of forethought. The original document was drafted
in 1787 as an alternative to the Articles of Confed-
eration. Today, the U.S. Constitution is upheld as a
cherished document of democracy. However, the
Constitution was an experiment in government
because the states, under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, were not acting as a nation.
In some ways, the genius of the Constitution
is in its simplicity. In other ways, the Constitution
is hailed for the way it balances the complexity of
government. There are seven articles in the original
Constitution. The first three articles establish the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial branches, respectively.
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A key aspect of Article I is the commerce clause, the constitutional provision that gives the power to the government to regulate business. In the 21st century, exam- ples of expansion of government regulation include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, eco- nomic recovery legislation, and financial and health care reforms. Article IV ensures one nation versus individual states will provide the framework for citizenship and commercial activities. This article contains the full faith and credit clause and the privileges and immunities clause. Article V provides the process governing the amendment of the Constitution. Article VI describes how this Constitution will be the supreme law of the land. This article also clarifies that federal laws take priority when there is a conflicting state or local law.
Finally, Article VII states the Constitution will become effective upon ratifica- tion of the states. This ratification occurred in 1789. Two years later, in 1791, the first ten amendments also were ratified. These amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, provide clear statements of individuals’ freedoms and protections from government action. Some of the key provisions of the Bill of Rights related directly to business are discussed in this chapter. Other provisions from these amendments are found in Chapter 13 on criminal law.
There have been a total of 27 amendments to the Constitution; thus, only 17 amendments have been approved since 1791. Twelve of these 17 amendments relate to how the federal government operates or who has the right to vote. This leaves five amendments, beyond the Bill of Rights, that substantially impact the government and the rights of individuals. Of these five, one amendment operates to cancel out or repeal another. The 18th Amendment made the manufacture and sale of alcohol illegal. This is known as the Prohibition amendment. The 21st Amendment repealed Prohibition and the 18th Amendment. Table 6.1 highlights the first 14 amendments to the Constitution.
It can be argued that only three amendments influence social policy. The 13th Amendment abolished slavery. The 14th Amendment provides protection to
The Constitution creates the Congress, the presi- dency and vice presi- dency, and the Supreme Court.
Do understand that an amendment must be ratified by 38 states through legislative action or by a constitutional convention. The United States has never held a convention for the purposes of amending the Constitution.
I. Freedom of Speech, Press, Religion and Petition (1791) II. Right to Keep and Bear Arms (1791) III. Conditions for the Quarters of Soldiers (1791) IV. Right of Search and Seizure (1791) V. Provisions Regarding Prosecution (1791)
VI. Right to a Speedy Trial, Witnesses, etc. (1791) VII. Right to a Trial By Jury (1791) VIII. Excessive Bail and Cruel Punishment (1791) IX. Rule of Construction of the Constitution (1791) X. Rights of States (1791) XI. State Sovereign Immunity (1798) XII. Electoral College (1804) XIII. Abolishment of Slavery and Involuntary Servitude (1865) XIV. Due Process and Equal Protection (1868)
table 6.1 First 14 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
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citizens against the actions of the states. This amendment contains three impor- tant clauses—privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection. The Sixteenth Amendment authorizes the federal income tax.
Basic Concepts
The Constitution contains many concepts that frame how the federal government operates and interacts with state and local governments. Three of these are of great significance to the creation of a strong centralized, federal government. They are the separation of powers concept, the supremacy clause, the commerce clause, and the contract clause. Each is discussed in the following sections.
SEPARATION OF POWERS Historians describe the success of “the constitutional experiment” as founded in the division of powers. The concept of checks and balances among the three branches of the federal government is well known. A lesser emphasized separation of powers is that between the federal government and governments at the state and local levels.
This separation of powers between levels of government is known as federalism. This concept recognizes that each level of government has a separate and distinct role to play. The federal government recognizes that it was created by the states and that states have some sovereignty. The 10th Amendment reserves some powers to the states and to the people. Congress may not impair the ability of state government to function in the federal system. Likewise, state government may not limit the federal government’s exercise of powers. Federalism, the separation of pow- ers between the federal and state/local governments, is an important topic facing the Supreme Court every year.
SUPREMACY CLAUSE In allocating power between federal and state levels of government, the Constitu- tion, in Article VI, makes it clear that the Constitution is supreme over all laws and that federal law is supreme over a state law or local ordinance. Under the supremacy clause, courts may be called upon to decide if a state law is invalid because it conflicts with a federal law. They must construe or interpret the two laws to see if they are in conflict. A conflict exists if the state statute would prevent or interfere with the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec- tives of Congress.
It is immaterial that a state did not intend to frustrate the federal law if the state law in fact does so. For example, an Arizona statute provided for the suspension of licenses of drivers who could not satisfy judgments arising out of auto accidents, even if the driver was bankrupt. The statute was declared unconstitutional because it was in conflict with the federal law on bankruptcy. The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to give debtors new opportunity unhampered by the pressure and discourage- ment of preexisting debt. The challenged state statute hampers the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the Bankruptcy Act enacted by Congress.
LO 6-1
LO 6-2
When various laws are not consistent, the order of priority is (1) U.S. Con- stitution, (2) U.S. laws, (3) state and local laws.
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Preemption Sometimes a federal law is said to preempt an area of law. If a fed- eral law preempts a subject, then any state law that attempts to regulate the same activity is unconstitutional under the supremacy clause. The concept of preemption applies not only to federal statutes, but also to the rules and regulations of federal administrative agencies. Sidebar 6.1 lists several examples of business-related cases in which the courts have found federal preemption of areas involving business regula- tions. The federal laws in this list are covered throughout this book. When you study these laws, remember the constitutional issues related to preemption. This concept helps explain the vast authority of the federal government.
In an important decision for business, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the state of Michigan cannot regulate the mortgage lending subsidiary of a major national bank.1 This ruling reaffirms that the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has greater authority than a state to regulate banks and associ- ated activities. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an Arizona law that penal- izes employers who knowingly hire unauthorized foreign workers. In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting (563 U.S. 582), the Court ruled that federal immigration law does not preempt the Arizona statute. These are important cases to understand the concept of preemption.
sidebar 6.1
Examples of State Laws Preempted by Federal Law STATE OR LOCAL LAW PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW
A city conditions renewal of taxicab franchise on settlement of a labor dispute. National Labor Relations Act Municipal zoning ordinance governs size, location, and appearance of satellite dish antennas.
Federal Communications Commission Regulation
A state statute permits indirect purchasers to collect damages for overcharges resulting from price-fixing conspiracies.
Sherman Antitrust Act
A state law authorizes a tort claim by workers that a union has breached its duty to ensure a safe workplace.
Labor-Management Relations Act (Landrum-Griffin)
A state law prohibits repeat violators of labor laws from doing business with the state.
National Labor Relations Act
A state nuisance law purports to cover out-of-state sources of water pollution. Clean Water Act State criminal prosecution for aggravated battery is filed against corporate officials because of unsafe workplace conditions.
Occupational Safety and Health Act
State statute prohibits use of the direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls or knowing sale of hulls so duplicated.
Patent Law
1Watters v. Wachovia Bank NA, 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007).
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Federal Government’s Authority to Regulate Business—The Commerce Clause
The commerce clause can be found in Article 1, Section 8, of the United States Constitution. This clause declares “The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” The commerce clause gives rise to the federal government’s power to regu- late business activity.
This simple-sounding clause requires analysis in the following four areas:
• Regulation of foreign commerce. • Regulation of interstate commerce. • Impact on interstate commerce. • Possible limitations on federal regulatory authority.
The next four sections focus on these areas and the impact on businesses and busi- ness people.
REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE The first part of the commerce clause grants the federal government power to regu- late foreign commerce. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested exclusively in the federal government, and it extends to all aspects of foreign trade. In other words, the power to regulate foreign commerce is total. The federal government can prohibit foreign commerce entirely. For example, the federal government has imposed trade embargoes on countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. It can also allow commerce with restrictions.
That the federal power to regulate foreign commerce is exclusive means state and local governments may not regulate such commerce. State and local govern- ments sometimes attempt directly or indirectly to regulate imports or exports to some degree. Such attempts generally are unconstitutional. However, a state may regulate activities that relate to foreign commerce if such activities are conducted entirely within the state’s boundaries. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a state tax on the leases of cargo containers used in international trade. This decision was based on the tax being fairly apportioned to the use of the cargo con- tainers within the state. Hence, the Court concluded that the state tax did not violate the foreign commerce clause.2
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE Among the most significant early decisions by the United States Supreme Court was one involving the meaning of “Commerce among the several States.” As a result of Robert Fulton achieving success with the steam engine, he and Robert Livingston, his father-in-law, were granted by the New York legislature the exclusive right to oper- ate steamboats in New York waters. This monopoly right was operated by Aaron Ogden.
Several potential competitors to this monopoly operated steam-powered ferries that transported people from the New Jersey shores to the harbors in New York.
LO 6-3
2Itel Containers In’t Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095 (1993).
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Among the more aggressive competitors was Thomas Gibbons, who hired Cornelius Vanderbilt to run steamboats between New Jersey and New York. Mr. Ogden filed a lawsuit against Mr. Gibbons alleging the latter was violating the legal monopoly granted by the State of New York. This lawsuit eventually ended up before the rela- tively new United States Supreme Court.
In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall announced what has been called one of the Court’s landmark decisions when he concluded that the Commerce Clause pro- hibits one state from interfering with commerce that crosses state lines. In short, the case of Gibbons v. Ogden3 stands for the proposition that states cannot impede interstate commerce.
IMPACT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE It has been clear since the early 1800s that Congress has the power to regulate com- merce that passes across state lines. Less clear has been the federal government’s power to regulate business activities that are not engaged in interstate commerce. While there was little litigation during the rest of the 19th century on this issue, the first half of the 20th century created a clearer picture. In a series of judicial decisions, the power of the federal government expanded through interpretation to include not only persons engaged in interstate commerce but also activities affecting interstate commerce.
The power of Congress over commerce is very broad; it extends to all com- merce, be it great or small. Labeling an activity a “local” or “intrastate” activity does not prevent Congress from regulating it under the commerce clause. The power of Congress to regulate commerce “among the several states” extends to those intra- state activities that affect interstate commerce as to make regulation of them appro- priate. Regulation is appropriate if it aids interstate commerce. Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, when the activity, com- bined with like conduct by others similarly situated, substantially affects commerce among states. As a result of various Supreme Court decisions, it is hard to imagine a factual situation involving business transactions that the federal government cannot regulate.
LIMITATION ON FEDERAL AUTHORITY The scope of the federal government’s power to regulate commerce has become so broad that the focus, in the early 21st century, turns to whether there is any limita- tion on this authority. This topic requires examination from two perspectives. First, does the commerce clause contain any unstated restriction on the federal govern- ment? Second, are there areas of regulation of commerce that require the federal government to defer to the states or local governments?
CONTRACT CLAUSE Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution says, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of contracts.” This is the contract clause. It does not apply to the federal government, which does, in fact, frequently enact laws and adopt regulations that affect existing contracts. For example, the Department of
Do appreciate the significant grant of power given to the federal government through the commerce clause.
322 U.S. 1 (1824).
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Agriculture from time to time embargoes grain sales to foreign countries, usually as a result of problems in foreign affairs. Prohibitions of sales of electronic equipment to certain nations are upheld if the federal government prohibits such sales.
Under the contract clause, states cannot enact laws that impact rights and duties under existing contracts. Suppose your company has a contract to provide natural gas to customers for stated minimum costs. A state or local government cannot impose new lower minimum prices on these existing contracts. The new minimum prices would be applicable only to newly created contracts.
The limitation on state action impairing contracts has not been given a literal application. As a result of judicial interpretation, some state laws that affect exist- ing contracts have been approved, especially when the law is passed to deal with a specific emergency situation. On the other hand, this constitutional provision does generally limit alternatives available to state government and prevents the enactment of legislation that changes existing contract rights.
State and Local Government’s Authority to Regulate Business—Police Powers
Whereas the authority of the federal government to regulate business activity comes from the express language of the commerce clause, state and local government authority arises from a concept known as police powers. These powers can be sum- marized as requiring state legislation and regulation to protect the public’s health, safety, morals, and general welfare. These words, particularly the last phrase, give state government expansive power to regulate business activities.
LIMITATION OF POLICE POWERS The police powers are not limitless. For example, state regulations must not be arbi- trary, capricious, or unreasonable. Furthermore, the state regulation must not vio- late the commerce clause. These limitations imposed by the U.S. Constitution are referred to as the dormant commerce clause concept.
Three distinct subject areas of government regulation of commerce emerge from Supreme Court decisions. Some areas are exclusively federal, some are said to be exclusively state, and still other are such that regulation of them may be dual.
Exclusively Federal The subject area that is exclusively federal concerns those internal matters where uniformity on a nationwide basis is essential. Any state regula- tion of such subjects is void whether Congress has expressly regulated the area or not.
A classic example of a regulatory area that needs to be limited to the federal govern- ment is the opening and closing of airports. Because airlines need access to airports consistent with their routes, havoc could ensue if local authorities were allowed to set the hours that their airports operate. The regulation of the operating hours of airports is best left to the Federal Aviation Administration so that a coordinated effort is present.
Exclusively State In theory, those matters that are exclusively within the states’ power are intrastate activities that do not have a substantial effect on inter- state commerce. This topic of what is solely within the domain of the states’ regula- tory authority creates both interesting history and current-day controversy. Prior to 1937, Supreme Court opinions frequently upheld the authority of states to regulate
The contract clause regulates state and local government; it does not restrict the federal government’s power to impact contractual relationships.
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business activities. Court decisions declaring federal legislation to be unconstitu- tional as interfering with state regulation caused Franklin Roosevelt to propose increasing the number of Supreme Court justices. Although his efforts to “pack the Court” failed, Roosevelt may have convinced the sitting justices and subsequent ones that society was looking to the federal government to get the economy growing to overcome the negative impact of the Great Depression.
Beginning in 1937, the one consistent outcome of Supreme Court cases consid- ering the commerce clause has been that federal authority is unlimited and there is nothing reserved exclusively for the states. Throughout the past several years, the jus- tices seem to signal that the federal authority under the commerce clause must have limitations. Sidebar 6.2 summarizes an important case along this line of analysis.
The state of Oregon, in 1994, legalized doctor-assisted suicide when voters approved a ballot issue enacting the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA). This act allows an Oregon resident to request a prescription under the ODWDA to hasten death. The law specifies the following requirements: • The resident’s attending physician must determine
the patient has an incurable and irreversible disease that will cause death within six months.
• The physician must decide the patient’s request is voluntary.
• The physician must determine the patient is informed. • The physician must refer the patient to counseling. • A second physician must examine the patient, the
medical records, and confirm the attending physi- cian’s decision.
• Any prescription that a physician provides must be administered by the patient and not by the physician.
In 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft inter- preted the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as pro- hibiting any physician the legal right to prescribe controlled substances for the purpose of assisting suicide. Under this interpretation, the attorney general concluded that it is not a legitimate medical practice to assist any patient with has- tening death. In essence, this interpretation subjected any Oregon physician complying with ODWDA to punishment for violating the federal CSA.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6–3 opinion, found Con- gress, through the CSA, did not grant the attorney general authority to interpret this federal law in a way to override a state’s standards of acceptable medical practice. The Court rejected the attorney general’s decision to criminal- ize doctor-assisted suicide. In doing so, the Court stated “the CSA’s prescription requirement does not authorize the Attorney General to ban dispensing controlled sub- stances for assisted suicide in the face of a state medical regime permitting such conduct.” Source: Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
sidebar 6.2
Federalism and State Rights under the Commerce Clause
Commentators on the Gonzales decision speculate that it is a signal that the Supreme Court will not approve every federal action as being justified by the com- merce clause. Other cases, including ones involving drug- and gun-free school zones and violence against women, have resulted in the Court limiting federal regulation in favor of state legislation. However, Gonzales v. Oregon is closer to a decision directly affecting businesses and professionals. This case may be a trendsetter. What is even more interesting about this particular case is its illustration of the complexities of labeling justices philosophically. The three dissenters (Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas) traditionally advocate states’ rights over federal regulation. In this case they seem to value preservation of life over state rights.
Do look back at Chapter 3 for discussion of judicial philosophies.
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Dual Regulation Between the two extremes, joint regulation is permissible. This area can be divided into the following three subparts:
• Federal preemption. • Federal regulation but no preemption. • No federal regulation.
Federal Preemption The first subpart concerns those subjects over which the fed- eral government has preempted the field. By express language or by comprehensive regulation, Congress has shown that it intends to exercise exclusive control over the subject matter. When a federal state preempts a particular areas of regulation, any state or local law pertaining to the same subject matter is unconstitutional under the commerce clause and the supremacy clause, and the state regulation is void. The net effect of a law that preempts an area of regulation is to make that subject matter of the law exclusively federal. In essence, the commerce clause combines with the supremacy clause to prohibit any state regulation.
No Preemption The second subpart includes situations in which the federal regula- tion of the a subject matter is not comprehensive enough to preempt the field. Here state regulation is permitted. However, when state law is inconsistent or conflicts irreconcilably with the federal statute, it is unconstitutional and void. Irreconcilable conflicts exist when it is not possible for a business to comply with both statutes. If compliance with both is not possible, the state law must fall under the supremacy clause and the commerce clause. If compliance with both is reasonably possible, dual compliance is required. This usually has the effect of forcing business to meet the requirements of the law with the greatest burden. For example, if the state mini- mum wage is $15.00 per hour and the federal is $7.25, employers would be required to pay $15.00 because the conflict can be reconciled.
The commerce clause also invalidates state laws imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce. The commerce clause does not prohibit the imposing of bur- dens on interstate commerce—only the imposition of undue burdens. The states have the authority under the police power to regulate matters of legitimate local concern, even though interstate commerce may be affected.
State statutes fall into two categories: those that burden interstate commerce only incidentally and those that affirmatively discriminate against such transac- tions. For cases in the first category, courts weigh the burdens against the benefits and find undue burdens only if they clearly exceed the local benefits. Cases in the second category are subject to more demanding scrutiny. If a state law either in substance or in practical effect discriminates against interstate commerce, the state must prove not only that the law has a legitimate purpose, but also that the purpose cannot be achieved by nondiscriminatory means. If a state law is pure economic protectionism, the courts apply a virtual per se or automatic rule of invalidity.
No Federal Regulation The third area of possible joint regulation exists where there is no federal law at all. When there is no federal regulation of a subject, state regulation of interstate commerce is permissible, providing, of course, that it does not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce and does not discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local business.
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The commerce clause also has been construed as prohibiting discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce. State and local govern- ments frequently attempt by legislation to aid local business in its competition with inter- state business. The commerce clause requires that all regulations be the same for local businesses as for businesses engaging in interstate commerce. A state may not place itself in a position of economic isolation from other states.
Amendments and Basic Protections
The original seven constitutional articles created basic, fundamental concepts or principles of a centralized government. However, the language of the original Consti- tution was criticized for not restricting the newly formed federal government in some important ways. The first ten amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, establish a variety of important protections. Instead, we think of them as the personal rights of individuals living in a free society. Indeed, many of the basic protections are referred to as freedoms. As you read this chapter, keep in mind how constitutional protec- tions relate to economic opportunity and business activities.
As you study the impact of these basic protections, keep four important aspects in mind. First, basic constitutional rights are not absolute. Second, the extent of any limitation on a basic constitutional guarantee depends upon the nature of the competing public policy. Cases involving the Bill of Rights almost always require courts to strike a balance either between some goal or policy of society and the constitutional protection involved or between competing constitutional guarantees. For example, such cases may involve conflict between the goal of protecting an individual’s or business’s reputation and the right of another to speak freely about the reputation. The courts are continually weighing the extent of con- stitutional protections.
Third, constitutional guarantees exist in order to remove certain issues from the political process and the ballot box. They exist to protect the minority from the majority. Freedom of expression (press and speech) protects the unpopular idea or
Key analysis of state regulation relates to the undue burden on or discrimination against interstate commerce activities.
LO 6-4
Do remember constitutional rights protect individuals from government action (not other entities, such as private businesses).
Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas This important case involved a challenge to Tennes-
see’s requirement that only residents who had lived in the state for at least two years could obtain a retail liquor license. The 21st Amendment ended Prohibition and gave states the broad power to regulate alcoholic bev- erages. For nearly 90 years that power was interpreted broadly but, as this case makes clear, that power is not unlimited.
In a 7-2 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Tennessee’s requirement that anyone who seeks
a retail license to sell alcohol in the state must have lived there for at least two years. Writing for the major- ity, Justice Alito concluded that the residency requirement “expressly discriminates against non residents and has at best a highly attenuated relationship to public healthy or safety.” The Commerce Clause restricts state protection- ism. Under the dormant Commerce Clause, if a state law discriminates against our-of-state goods or nonresident economic actors, it must be narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate local purpose. The court found that require- ment was not met.
sidebar 6.3
State Protectionism Struck Down:
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viewpoint. Freedom of assembly allows groups with ideologies foreign to most of us to meet and express their philosophy.
Finally, constitutional rights vary from time to time and may be narrowly inter- preted during emergencies such as war or civil strife. Even during peacetime, consti- tutional principles are constantly reapplied and reexamined.
The next four sections cover topics arising from the Bill of Rights. Then the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment that extend constitutional protections by restricting the authority of state and local governments are examined.
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS Freedom of Religion The First Amendment states that Congress shall make no law “respecting an establishment of religion” (the establishment clause) “or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (the free exercise clause). These clauses guar- antee freedom of religion through the separation of church and state. Sidebar 6.4 details characteristics generally attributed to churches. In the context of nongov- ernment workplaces, the issue is not a constitutional one. Instead, it is generally whether there is discrimination under Title VII, which is discussed in Chapter 20. Sincerely held religious beliefs are protected by Title VII.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected a challenge by a California church to California guidelines that restricted attendance at religious services during the 2020 pandemic.
LO 6-5
The term church is found, but not specifically defined, in the Internal Revenue Code. Certain characteristics are generally attributed to churches. These attributes of a church have been developed by the IRS and by court decisions. They include:
1. Distinct legal existence. 2. Recognized creed and form of worship. 3. Definite and distinct ecclesiastical government. 4. Formal code of doctrine and discipline. 5. Distinct religious history. 6. Membership not associated with any other church or
denomination. 7. Organization of ordained ministers. 8. Ordained ministers selected after completing pre-
scribed courses of study. 9. Literature of its own.
10. Established places of worship. 11. Regular congregations. 12. Regular religious services.
13. Sunday schools for the religious instruction of the young.
14. Schools for the preparation of its members. The IRS generally uses a combination of these char-
acteristics, together with other facts and circumstances, to determine whether an organization is considered a church for federal tax purposes.
Important note about activity that can jeopardize Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status: such organizations, including churches and religious organizations, must abide by these rules 1) their net earnings may not inure to any private shareholder or individual; 2) they must not pro- vide a substantial benefit to private interests; 3) they must not devote a substantial part of their activities to attempt- ing to influence legislation; 4) they must not participate in, or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office; and 5) the organization’s purposes and activities may not be illegal or violate any fundamental public policy. Source: IRS, 501 (c)(3) Tax Guide for Churches & Religious Organizations, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
sidebar 6.4
How Does the IRS Define “Churches”?
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Freedom of religion has been used to challenge legislation requiring the clos- ing of business establishments on Sunday. Although the motive for such legislation may be, in part, religious, there are also economic reasons for such legislation. As a result, if a law is based on economic considerations, it may be upheld if its classifica- tions are reasonable and in the public interest. See Sidebar 6.5 for information about the Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. regarding religious objections to certain forms of contraception.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 US. 682 (2014), the Supreme Court considered whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
permits the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to demand that three closely held corporations provide health-insurance cover-
age for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners.
The contraception methods at issue are drugs or devices that may operate after the fertilization of an egg.
In this 5–4 case, Justice Alito wrote the majority opin- ion, holding that as applied to closely held corporations, the regulations promulgated by HHS under the Afford- able Care Act requiring employers to provide their female employees with no-cost access to contraception violate the RFRA. In other words, closely held companies can invoke religious objections to avoid covering four specific kinds of contraception in their health care plans. The deci- sion prompted spirited dissenting opinions by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagen.
sidebar 6.5
Business and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Jerome Wilson/ Alamy Stock Photo
Freedom of Speech Freedom of speech, sometimes referred to as freedom of expression, covers both verbal and written communications. This protection relates to governmental action that restricts our ability to express ourselves. The Amend- ment protection does not apply to private action, such as non-government employ- ers. Whether a restriction is imposed by the government or a private company is critical to understand. The First Amendment does not apply to action by private companies.
Free speech also covers conduct or actions considered symbolic speech. Although freedom of speech is not absolute, it is as close to being absolute as any constitutional guarantee. It exists to protect the minority from the majority. It means freedom to express ideas antagonistic to those of the majority. Freedom of speech exists for thoughts many of us hate and for ideas that may be foreign to us. It means freedom to express the unorthodox, and it recognizes that there is no such thing as a false idea.
Not all speech, however, is protected. “Fighting words,” or speech inciting a hostile reaction, is unprotected. In Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire (1942), the Court held words that “inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” are not subject to First Amendment protection. The Court held “that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Similarly, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court held that to be unprotected, such speech must be an “incitement to imminent lawless action.”
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Obscenity is also unprotected speech. To determine if speech is legally obscene, the following test should be applied from the perspective of the “average person, applying contemporary community standards:”
• Whether the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex. • Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by applicable state law. • Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value [Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)].
This test for obscenity evolved in the 20th century as the result of a number of challenges to laws and ordinances prohibiting a range of speech in books, records, films, and pamphlets. Well-known literary works by writers such as James Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, Allen Ginsberg, and Henry Miller formed the basis of obscenity prosecutions. With the exception of child pornography, very little material is prohibited in the United States as legally obscene. See Sidebar 6.6 for examples of art exhibits challenged as obscene.
Art exhibits can also be subject to obscenity challenges. One notorious trial involved the photography exhibit Rob- ert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Moment in Cincinnati. Of the approximately 175 photographs in the exhibit, seven portraits were at issue, primarily depicting sadomasoch- istic acts. The Contemporary Arts Center and its director, Dennis Barrie, were indicted for displaying obscene mate- rial. The openly homosexual nature of Mapplethorpe’s work generated negative public attention. Ultimately, Bar- rie and the museum were acquitted at trial.
Another high-profile action involved an exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum, Sensation: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection. Then-mayor Rudolph Giuliani threatened to cut off city funding for the museum if it did
not remove a number of works from the exhibit. One work at issue, Chris Ofili’s painting “The Holy Virgin Mary,” uses elephant dung and cut-outs from pornographic maga- zines. Viewed as “Catholic-bashing” and an attack on religion, the mayor wanted it removed from the exhibit. The Brooklyn Museum refused to remove the piece. After New York City stopped funding the museum, the direc- tor filed a First Amendment lawsuit. Many actors, artists, and writers spoke out in support of the museum. A federal judge subsequently ordered New York City to restore the denied funding and to refrain from continuing its ejection action.
Both cases are viewed as reaffirming First Amend- ment protection of art.
sidebar 6.6
Art and Obscenity
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has the power to restrict cer- tain speech. It prohibits legally obscene broadcasts at all times, and it is a violation of FCC rules to air “indecent programming or profane language” between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. on broadcast radio and television. The FCC defines “indecency” as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as mea- sured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities.” Although this material does not rise to the level of being legally obscene, its broadcast may be restricted during the day when children may be in the audience. Sidebar 6.7 contains examples of high-profile FCC actions.
The issue of freedom of speech arises in many other business situations. Sidebar 6.8 discusses several situations that arise when considering the protec- tion of picketing and the limitation of free speech. Case 6.1 and Case 6.2 illus- trate the scope of the First Amendment to protect speech.
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During the 2004 Super Bowl, MTV, a Via- com subsidiary, produced the half-time show, featuring Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake. According to the FCC decision, the “joint performance by Ms. Jackson and
Mr. Timberlake culminated in Mr. Timberlake pulling off part of Ms. Jackson’s bustier and exposing her bare breast.” The FCC was not persuaded by CBS’s argument that “the exposure . . . was unexpected and the duration of the exposure was for only 19/32 of a second.” The FCC found that “the nudity here was designed to pander to, titillate and shock the viewing audience.” The FCC fined CBS $550,000 for violating indecency rules. It received over 500,000 complaints over the incident.
After several tame Super Bowl half-time shows, another controversy erupted in 2012 after singer M.I.A. was seen on live TV flipping her middle finger and mouth- ing “I don’t give a s**t” at a cameramen during her appear- ance with Madonna and Nicki Minaj. The FCC levied a $1.5 million fine, and the NFL filed an arbitration action against M.I.A., claiming that she made an “offensive
gesture” that was “in flagrant disregard for the values that form the cornerstone of the NFL brand and the Super Bowl.”
Continuing the tradition of outrage over the Super Bowl, over 1,300 complaints were filed with the FCC in response to the Jennifer Lopez and Shakira 2020 halftime show. Despite a number of strong opinions, so far, no fines have been levied.
Other FCC fines: • Jimmy Kimmel Live: $395,000 for misusing a tone
from the emergency alert system in a sketch that satirized the presidential alert system. The tones are only to be used in an actual emergency, authorized tests, or qualified public service announcements.
• Clear Channel Communications: $755,000 for graphic drug and sex talk on a “Bubba the Love Sponge” radio program
• Clear Channel: $175 million for indecency complaints against Howard Stern and other radio personalities For more examples of FCC actions, see http://fcc.gov.
sidebar 6.7
The FCC Is Not Amused: Controversies over the Super Bowl & More
AP Photo
Cases involving picketing, for example, especially with unions, often are concerned with the issue of free speech. The right to picket peacefully for a lawful purpose is well recognized. A state or local law that prohibits all picketing would be unconstitutional since the act of picketing, itself, is a valuable form of communication. However, a state law that limits picketing or other First Amendment freedoms may be constitutional if: • The regulation is within the constitutional power of
government. • It furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest. • It is unrelated to suppression of free expression. • The incidental restriction on First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to further the government’s interest.
Under these principles, laws that prevent pickets from obstructing traffic and those designed to prevent vio- lence would be constitutional. For example, a Texas stat- ute that prohibits “mass picketing,” defined as picketing by more than two persons within 50 feet of any entrance or of one another, does not violate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that a city ordinance pro- hibiting picketing in front of an individual residence was constitutional. The law was enacted to prevent picketing of the homes of doctors who perform abortions.
Courts may limit the number of pickets to preserve order and promote safety, but they will not deny pickets the right to express opinions in a picket line. For example, a court order preventing a client from picketing her lawyer was held to be a violation of the First Amendment. Freedom of speech even extends to boycotts of a business for a valid public purpose such as the elimination of discrimination.
sidebar 6.8
Picketing as Free Speech
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case 6.1
SNYDER v. PHELPS 131 S.CT. 1207 (2011)
Father of deceased military service member brought action against fundamentalist church and its members, stemming from defendants’ anti-homosexual demonstration near ser- vice member’s funeral, and asserting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. A jury awarded Snyder $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages. Following jury’s verdict for father, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland remit- ted aggregate punitive damages award to $2.1 million, but otherwise denied posttrial motions. Defendants appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Westboro’s statements were entitled to First Amendment protection. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiori.
ROBERTS, C. J., A jury held members of the West- boro Baptist Church liable for millions of dollars in dam- ages for picketing near a soldier’s funeral service. The picket signs reflected the church’s view that the United States is overly tolerant of sin and that God kills American soldiers as punishment. The question presented is whether the First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability for their speech in this case. . . .
Fred Phelps founded the Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, in 1955. The church’s congregation believes that God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military. The church frequently communicates its views by picketing, often at military funerals. In the more than 20 years that the members of Westboro Baptist have pub- licized their message, they have picketed nearly 600 funer- als. Brief for Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae 7, n. 14. Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. Lance Corporal Snyder’s father selected the Catholic church in the Snyders’ hometown of West- minster, Maryland, as the site for his son’s funeral. Local newspapers provided notice of the time and location of the service. Phelps became aware of Matthew Snyder’s funeral and decided to travel to Maryland with six other Westboro Baptist parishioners (two of his daughters and four of his grandchildren) to picket. On the day of the memorial ser- vice, the Westboro congregation members picketed on pub- lic land adjacent to public streets near the Maryland State House, the United States Naval Academy, and Matthew Snyder’s funeral. The Westboro picketers carried signs that were largely the same at all three locations . . . The church
had notified the authorities in advance of its intent to picket at the time of the funeral, and the picketers complied with police instructions in staging their demonstration. . . . Although Snyder testified that he could see the tops of the picket signs as he drove to the funeral, he did not see what was written on the signs until later that night, while watch- ing a news broadcast covering the event. . . .
Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. “[S]peech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” . . .
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of politi- cal, social, or other concern to the community,” . . .
Deciding whether speech is of public or private con- cern requires us to examine the “‘content, form, and con- text’” of that speech, “‘as revealed by the whole record.’” . . .
The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than mat- ters of “purely private concern.” . . .
The placards read “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” “Maryland Taliban,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You.” App. 3781–3787. While these messages may fall short of refined social or political commen- tary, the issues they highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public import. The signs cer- tainly convey Westboro’s position on those issues, in a man- ner designed, unlike the private speech in Dun & Bradstreet, to reach as broad a public audience as possible. And even if a few of the signs—such as “You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates You”—were viewed as containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public issues.
. . . Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to “special protection” under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or
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arouses contempt. “If there is a bedrock principle underly- ing the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” . . .
Snyder argues that even assuming Westboro’s speech is entitled to First Amendment protection generally, the church is not immunized from liability for intrusion upon seclusion because Snyder was a member of a captive audi- ence at his son’s funeral. . . . As a general matter, we have applied the captive audience doctrine only sparingly to pro- tect unwilling listeners from protected speech. . . .
Here, Westboro stayed well away from the memorial service. Snyder could see no more than the tops of the signs when driving to the funeral. And there is no indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service itself. We decline to expand the captive audience doctrine to the circumstances presented here. Because we find that the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for inten- tional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon seclusion—the alleged unlawful activity Westboro conspired to accomplish—we must likewise hold that Snyder cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts . . . Our holding today is narrow. . . .
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here— inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have
chosen a different course to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.
1. It is so ordered. 2. Justice ALITO, dissenting.
Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case. Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a pub- lic figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted what is surely the right of any parent who experi- ences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son in peace. But respondents, members of the Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of that elementary right. They first issued a press release and thus turned Matthew’s funeral into a tumultuous media event. They then appeared at the church, approached as closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a result, Albert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury . . . The Court now holds that the First Amendment protected respondents’ right to brutalize Mr. Snyder. I can- not agree.
[continued]
KEY POINTS • The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected the picketing because it
pertained to a matter of “public concern.” Although many may consider the messages problematic, the Court found that they address a range of issues, including political and moral conduct, which pertain to broad public issues.
• The Court declined to expand the captive audience doctrine to a situation such as this one, in which the protesters stayed in the authorized location, away from the memorial service, and there were no facts that suggested that the picketing disrupted the funeral service.
• This decision underscores a level of protection afforded to the First Amendment. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito expresses a very different stance.
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case 6.2
BROWN v. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION 564 U.S. _____ (2011)
Respondents, representing the video-game and software indus- tries, filed a pre-enforcement challenge to a California law that restricts the sale or rental of violent video games to minors. The Federal District Court concluded that the Act violated the First Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit decision. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Jus- tices Thomas and Breyer filed dissenting opinions.
SCALIA, J.: We consider whether a California law imposing restrictions on violent video games comports with the First Amendment.
I California Assembly Bill 1179 (2005), Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§1746–1746.5 (West 2009) (Act), prohibits the sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors, and requires their packaging to be labeled “18.” The Act covers games “in which the range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being, if those acts are depicted” in a manner that “[a] reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid inter- est of minors,” that is “patently offensive to prevailing stan- dards in the community as to what is suitable for minors,” and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious lit- erary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.” §1746(d)(1)(A). Violation of the Act is punishable by a civil fine of up to $1,000. §1746.3.
Respondents, representing the video-game and software industries, brought a preenforcement challenge to the Act in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. That court concluded that the Act violated the First Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari.
California correctly acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment protection. The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public mat- ters, but we have long recognized that it is difficult to dis- tinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try. “Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.” Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social
messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interac- tion with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection. Under our Constitution, “esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.” United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). And whatever the challenges of applying the Con- stitution to ever-advancing technology, “the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amend- ment’s command, do not vary” when a new and different medium for communication appears.
. . . Last Term, in Stevens, we held that new categories of
unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legis- lature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated. Stevens concerned a federal statute purporting to criminalize the creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty. See 18 U. S. C. §48 (amended 2010). The statute covered depictions “in which a living ani- mal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed” if that harm to the animal was illegal where the “the creation, sale, or possession t[ook] place,” §48(c)(1). A saving clause largely borrowed from our obscenity juris- prudence, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), exempted depictions with “serious religious, political, scien- tific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value,” §48(b). We held that statute to be an impermissible content- based restriction on speech. There was no American tradi- tion of forbidding the depiction of animal cruelty—though States have long had laws against committing it.
. . . That holding controls this case. As in Stevens, Cali-
fornia has tried to make violent-speech regulation look like obscenity regulation by appending a saving clause required for the latter. That does not suffice. Our cases have been clear that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of “sexual conduct” . . . Because speech about violence is not obscene, it is of no consequence that California’s statute mimics the New York statute regulating obscenity-for-minors that we upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). That case approved a prohibition on
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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In some free-speech cases, an individual whose own speech or conduct may not be prohibited is nevertheless permitted to challenge a statute limiting speech because it also threatens other people not before the court. The person is allowed to challenge the statute because others who may desire to engage in legally protected
the sale to minors of sexual material that would be obscene from the perspective of a child . . .
The California Act is something else entirely. It does not adjust the boundaries of an existing category of unpro- tected speech to ensure that a definition designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children. California does not argue that it is empowered to prohibit selling offensively violent works to adults—and it is wise not to, since that is but a hair’s breadth from the argument rejected in Ste- vens. Instead, it wishes to create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is permissible only for speech directed at children. That is unprecedented and mistaken . . .
California’s argument would fare better if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restrict- ing children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none. Certainly the books we give children to read—or read to them when they are younger—contain no shortage of gore. Grimm’s Fairy Tales, for example, are grim indeed. As her just deserts for trying to poison Snow White, the wicked queen is made to dance in red hot slippers “till she fell dead on the floor, a sad example of envy and jealousy.” The Complete Brothers Grimm Fairy Tales 198 (2006 ed.). Cinderella’s evil stepsisters have their eyes pecked out by doves. Id., at 95. And Hansel and Gretel (children!) kill their captor by baking her in an oven. Id., at 54.
High-school reading lists are full of similar fare [citing The Odyssey of Homer, the Inferno and Lord of the Flies] . . . California claims that video games present special problems
because they are “interactive,” in that the player partici- pates in the violent action on screen and determines its out- come. The latter feature is nothing new: Since at least the publication of The Adventures of You: Sugarcane Island in 1969, young readers of choose-your-own adventure stories have been able to make decisions that determine the plot by following instructions about which page to turn to . . .
Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can dem- onstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is jus- tified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest . . . California cannot meet that standard . . . The State’s evidence is not compelling . . . [The studies relied on by California] do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively (which would at least be a beginning) . . . California cannot show that the Act’s restrictions meet a substantial need of parents who wish to restrict their children’s access to violent video games but cannot do so. The video-game industry has in place a voluntary rating system designed to inform consum- ers about the content of games. . . . California’s legislation straddles the fence between (1) addressing a serious social problem and (2) helping concerned parents control their children. Both ends are legitimate, but when they affect First Amendment rights they must be pursued by means that are neither seriously under inclusive nor seriously over inclusive . . . Legislation such as this, which is neither fish nor fowl, cannot survive strict scrutiny.
Affirmed.
KEY POINTS • The Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a California law prohibiting
the sale or rental of violent video games to minors and requiring their packaging to be labeled “18.”
• The Court held that the law did not meet the requirements of strict scrutiny. Although the law may have had worthwhile intentions, California did not demonstrate a compel- ling interest that is narrowly drawn to serve that interest. As such, the law was deemed unconstitutional.
• Should the First Amendment protect violent speech? If not, where should the line be drawn?
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expression may refrain from doing so. They may fear the risk of prosecution, or they may not want to risk having a law declared to be only partially invalid. This is known as the overbreadth doctrine. It means that the legislators have gone too far in seek- ing to achieve a goal.
For example, an airport authority resolution declared the central terminal area “not open for First Amendment activities.” The resolution was unconstitutional under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. The resolution reached the “uni- verse of expressive activity” and in effect created a “First-Amendment-Free Zone” at the airport. Nearly every person who entered the airport would violate the resolu- tion, since it bars all First Amendment activities, including talking and reading.
As you can see, the freedom of speech is cherished as a fundamental right of citizenship. While this right’s importance provides significant protection, it some- times can contradict other critical interests. Sidebar 6.9 highlights the balance that courts often seek to find.
The overbreadth doctrine was used by the courts to declare certain versions of child por- nography laws unconsti- tutional. Governmental restrictions on expres- sion must be narrowly drafted.
Under federal law, it is a crime to transmit in interstate com- merce “any communication containing a threat . . . to injure the person of another.” In Elonis v. United States, Anthony Douglas Elonis was convicted of violating this law under instructions that required the jury to find that he communi- cated what a reasonable person would regard as a threat. The Supreme Court considered “whether the statute also requires that the defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the communication, and—if not—whether the First Amendment requires such a showing.”
Elonis was an active user on Facebook under the pseudonym “Tone Dougie.” He posted self-styled rap lyrics containing graphically violent language and imagery about his soon-to-be ex-wife, co-workers, boss, a kindergarten class, and also state and federal law enforcement. The posts included crude, degrading, and violent material, as well as assertions that he was exercising his First Amend- ment rights.
In an 8–1 opinion, the Court held in favor of Elo- nis, stating, “The jury was instructed that the Govern- ment need prove only that a reasonable person would regard Elonis’s communications as threats, and that was error . . . ‘wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.’”
Justice Thomas dissented, stating that “the commu- nications transmitted by Elonis were ‘true threats’ unpro- tected by the First Amendment.”
SUBSEQUENT CASE: Jamal Knox, a rap music artist who performs under the name “Mayhem Mal” was con- victed for his rap song “F*** the Police.” In the song he referred to Pittsburg police officers (who had arrested him for other alleged offenses) by name and said “Let’s kill these cops cuz they don’t do us no good/Pullin your Glock out cause I live in the hood.” Knox was convicted on two counts of terroristic threats and two counts of witness intimidation. The conviction was upheld, including by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In his petition for certiorari, Knox asked the Court to decide “whether, to establish a statement is a true threat unprotected by the First Amend- ment, the government must show that a ‘reasonable per- son’ would regard the statement as a sincere threat of violence, or whether it is enough to show only the speak- er’s subjective intent to threaten.” In 2019, the Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding his conviction. Sources: Eliott C. McLaughlin, “Hip-Hop wants Supreme Court to rule, again, on when threatening to kill constitutes art,” CNN Mar. 19, 2019; Knox v. Pennsylvania, Supreme Court Docket No. 18-949 (2018); Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. __ (2015).
sidebar 6.9
When Does a Communication Become a Threat Unprotected by the First Amendment?
Commercial Speech Historically, commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment. However, in the 1970s the Supreme Court began to recognize that free commercial speech was essential to the public’s right to know. Therefore, today, freedom of speech protects corporations as well as individuals. The public
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interests served by freedom of expression protect the listener as well as the speaker. Freedom of expression includes freedom of information or the rights of the public to be informed. Since corporations may add to the public’s knowledge and informa- tion, they also have the right to free speech.
Freedom of speech for corporations may not be as extensive as the right of an individual. However, a government cannot limit commercial speech without a com- pelling state interest expressed to justify the restriction. State regulatory commis- sions often seek to limit the activities of public utilities. Such attempts usually run afoul of the First Amendment. Sidebar 6.10 is an interesting example of the FDA’s failed attempt to require graphic warnings on cigarette packaging.
Do realize that the concept of prohibiting prior restraints means a community must allow a performance to occur; the community can charge the actors with violating a local ordinance if the performance is inappropriate.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sought to require very graphic labels and warnings on all cigarette packages. R.J. Reynolds and other tobacco companies opposed the labels, which included photos of a man exhaling smoke through a hole in his throat, a mouth with cancerous sores, and diseased lungs juxtaposed with healthy lungs. Under the proposal, the word and image warnings would have covered half of the cigarette pack- aging and 20 percent of cigarette advertising.
After a federal judge ruled in favor of the tobacco companies and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia panel affirmed the ruling, the FDA backed off of the proposal.
In 2020, the FDA signed off on a new set of warning labels for traditional cigarettes. By June 2021, the labels must cover the top 50 percent of the front and rear panels of the packages, as well as at least 20 percent of the top of
advertisements. The warnings do not apply to electronic ciga- rettes, which are an ongoing source of controversy as vaping grows in popularity, especially among teens and young adults.
Over 120 other countries, such as Canada, Austra- lia, and member nations of the European Union, have had shockingly graphic warning labels (including text and photos) on cigarette packs for a number of years. Most recently, Canada joined Britain and Australia to make plain packaging of cigarettes compulsory. The rules require a uniform, standardized color and font on packages in lieu of logos and trademarks. The tactic is to undermine brand loyalty, especially with children. Sources: U.S. Food & Drug Administration, “Required Cigarette Health Warn- ings, 2020,” fda.gov/media/136157/download (2020); “Canada to Enforce Plain Cigarette Packaging in Attempt to Curb Smoking,” The Guardian, May 31, 2016; Steve Almasy, “FDA Changes Course on Graphic Warning Labels for Ciga- rettes,” CNN, March 20, 2013.
sidebar 6.10
The Controversy over Cigarette Warning Labels
Freedom of the Press The publishing business is the only organized private business given explicit constitutional protection. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . the press.” This guarantee essentially authorizes a private business to provide organized scrutiny of government.
Freedom of the press is not absolute. The press is not free to print anything it wants without liability. Rather, freedom of the press is usually construed to prohibit prior restraints on publications. If the press publishes that which is illegal or libel- ous, it has liability for doing so. This liability may be either criminal or civil for damages. See Sidebar 6.11 about how WikiLeaks is presenting challenges to this doctrine.
A major area of litigation involving freedom of the press involves defamation. The tort theory known as libel is used to recover damages as a result of printed defamation of character. Libel cases compensate individuals for harm inflicted by
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defamatory printed falsehoods. Defamation is discussed in full detail in Chapter 10 in the context of torts.
Second Amendment: The Right to Possess Guns Unlike the extensive litigation that defines the meaning of the First Amendment, there have been very few Supreme Court opinions involving the Second Amendment. The language of this amendment is as follows: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security for a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the Second Amend- ment as it applies to the maintenance of a militia versus individuals’ right to possess and use guns in their homes.4 By a 5–4 margin, the Court ruled that the Second Amendment is not limited by its introductory phrase. The Court struck down, as unconstitutional, the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns and its requirement that other guns, such as rifles, be kept unloaded or disassembled, or subject to a trig- ger-locking mechanism. The Court’s majority concluded individuals in the District of Columbia can possess handguns in their homes and can have their guns loaded and ready for use in self-defense.
Even as this opinion was announced, commentators speculate that this deci- sion will lead to increases in litigation under the Second Amendment. Regulation of guns by states and cities will be challenged since this Supreme Court opinion is very narrow even as it strikes down, as unconstitutional, a very broad restriction. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion simply affirms the right to possess guns, includ- ing handguns, in one’s home and to have them ready for use in self-defense. Left unanswered are many questions. For example, can individuals carry guns, especially
Guns are big business. According to industry reports, the U.S. gun and ammunition manufactur- ing industry consists of about 600 establish- ments with combined annual revenue of about $11 billion.
According to its website, WikiLeaks is a non-profit media organization dedicated to bring- ing important news and information to the public. We provide an innovative, secure and anonymous way for independent sources around the world to leak information to our journal- ists. We publish material of ethical, political and historical sig- nificance while keeping the identity of our sources anonymous, thus providing a universal way for the revealing of suppressed and censored injustices.
WikiLeaks is challenging the bounds of freedom of the press. Its release of thousands of confidential messages about controversial subjects, such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as thousands of U.S. Embassy diplomatic cables, sparked international debate. Simi- larly, Edward Snowden disclosed information about U.S.
intelligence activities, including the NSA’s widespread warrantless surveillance of domestic and international communications. Snowden is charged with violations of the Espionage Act.
What are the implications for traditional media out- lets? Under U.S. law, even if government documents are illegally obtained, news organizations may publish the material. The most famous case on this point is New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), uphold- ing the right to publish the Pentagon Papers (about U.S. involvement in Vietnam), which were classified at the time. Sources: Christina Wells, “Edward Snowden, the Espionage Act and First Amendment Concerns,” JURIST—Forum, July 25, 2013; WikiLeaks, http:// www.wikileaks.ch/; Alan Greenblatt, “WikiLeaks Fallout: Unease over Web Press Freedoms,” NPR, December 8, 2010.
sidebar 6.11
WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden, and Freedom of the Press
4District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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concealed handguns, in public places like restaurants, parks, transit systems, and even airports? These and other issues related to the language of the Second Amend- ment should become a significant part of future constitutional cases. Two years after the Heller case, the Court considered a challenge to Chicago’s gun laws. See Sidebar 6.12 for details about this case.
In District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570 (2008)), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and it struck down a Washington, DC, law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. This decision led to a challenge of Chicago and Oak Park, Illinois, laws effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens. In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the states. In other words, the right to keep and bear arms rec- ognized in the Heller case applies to the states. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor dissented, contending that the Heller decision remains incorrect, that “the Framers did not write the Second Amendment in order to protect a private right of armed self-defense.”
The key question following both of these cases is: “Under what framework should Second Amendment challenges be evaluated?” This question is central to the determination of New York State Rifle & Pistol Associa- tion Inc. v. City of New York, New York, which is currently pending before the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court was asked to decide whether New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked and unloaded handgun to a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the commerce clause and the constitutional right to travel.
Sources: Congressional Research Service, “Post-Heller Second Amendment Jurisprudence,” March 25, 2019; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
sidebar 6.12
The Second Amendment After the Heller Case
The Fifth Amendment: Takings Clause Zoning and many regulatory limi- tations on property protect some owners from being harmed by other owners. Emi- nent domain, however, is quite different. This important concept specifically exists to limit the exclusive right of property in order to serve the common good by allow- ing the government to take away property-protected resources from owners.
Eminent Domain and the Common Good Jeremy Bentham, a philoso- pher who lived a century after John Locke, thought that Locke’s ideas about prop- erty being a natural right from God were “nonsense upon stilts.” He called the right of property the “noblest triumph” but believed that property served only the com- mon good, which he defined as the “greatest happiness for the greatest number.” This definition is similar to the one expressed earlier that the common good reflects the maximum conditions for providing what people need and want. It assumes only that satisfying what people need and want makes them happy.
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution allows the gov- ernment to take specific resources (usually but not always land) away from private owners for “public use” upon the payment of “just compensation.” The clause recog- nizes the existence and importance of private ownership, but allows the government to “condemn” and take specific private resources for money under the power called eminent domain.
Eminent domain means the government can take private property for public use upon paying just compensation.
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Three significant questions of interpretation arise:
• What constitutes a “taking”? • What is a “public use”? • What is “just compensation”?
As to the first question, it is clear that when the government builds a public road through private land, it has taken the land and must pay compensation. But what if the government merely limits specific uses of the land, perhaps for environmental purposes? Does it have to pay compensation? The cases have been unclear, but they seem to say that as long as some economic use has been left to the landowner, no taking has occurred. One way to determine whether regulation is a taking is to see if it is necessary to protect an established property right of others that concerns safety, health, or other general welfare. The courts do not consider such regulation a taking. It is merely determining the location of boundaries, often boundaries of use.
Public Use The easiest way to define public use is to say it is a use by the public. A public road, a public park, a public building, a public sewage treatment plant or landfill—taking a private owner’s land for any of these uses is a public use. What about the government’s taking a right to string power wires across your land, then selling it to a private electric company that charges you for electricity? Is that a pub- lic use?
Courts have certainly allowed the government to take private property right for use by electric and other private utility companies. These companies benefit the public greatly. Over the years public use has come to mean public purpose, that is, any purpose that benefits the public, whether the public uses the resource or not.
What about the government’s taking of land in order to sell it for private devel- opment in order to stimulate employment and increase the public tax base? Is employment stimulation and increased tax revenue a public use, or at least a public purpose? Consider Case 6.3.
Over the years, public use has come to mean public purpose.
case 6.3
KELO v. CITY OF NEW LONDON, CONNECTICUT 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005)
In 2000, the city of New London, Connecticut, approved a development plan that was projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, increase tax and other revenues, and revitalize an economically distressed community. In assembling the land needed for this project, the city’s development agency, the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), purchased property from willing sellers and initiated condemnation pro- ceedings against the plaintiffs for the remainder of the land. The plaintiffs are nine landowners of property within the area where the new development was planned.
The trial court prohibited NLDC from taking part of the land but on appeal the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, allowing the NLDC to take all of the land. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Ms. Kelo’s petition for a writ of certio- rari to decide the question of whether a city’s decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
STEVENS, J.: . . . Two polar propositions are per- fectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the
Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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sole purpose of transferring it to another private property B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a famil- iar example. Neither of these propositions, however, deter- mines the disposition of this case.
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the ques- tion whether the City’s development plan serves a “public purpose.” Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of def- erence to legislative judgments in this field.
In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), this Court upheld a redevelopment plan targeting a blighted area of Washington, D.C., in which most of the housing for the area’s 5,000 inhabitants was beyond repair. Under the plan, the area would be condemned and part of it utilized for the construction of streets, schools, and other public facili- ties. The remainder of the land would be leased or sold to private parties for the purpose of redevelopment, including the construction of low-cost housing.
The owner of a department store located in the area challenged the condemnation, pointing out that his store was not itself blighted and arguing that the creation of a “better balanced, more attractive community” was not a valid public use. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas refused to evaluate this claim in isolation, defer- ring instead to the legislative and agency judgment that the area “must be planned as a whole” for the plan to be successful. The Court explained that “community redevel- opment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by building.” The public use underlying the taking was unequivocally affirmed:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it repre- sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized that the needs of society have varied between different parts of the Nation, just as they have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances. . . . For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power. . . .
The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable
benefits to the community, including but by no means lim- ited to new jobs and increased tax revenue. . . . To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that specifi- cally authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote eco- nomic development.. . . Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
To avoid this result, petitioners urge us to adopt a new bright-line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use. Putting aside the unpersuasive suggestion that the City’s plan will provide only purely economic benefits, neither precedent nor logic supports petitioners’ proposal. Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. There is, moreover, no prin- cipled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that we have recognized. . . . It would be incongruous to hold that the City’s interest in the economic benefits to be derived from the development has less of a pub- lic character than any of those other interests. Clearly, there is no basis for exempting economic development from our tradi- tionally broad understanding of public purpose.
Petitioners contend that using eminent domain for economic development impermissibly blurs the boundary between public and private takings. Again, our cases fore- close this objection. Quite simply, the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties. . . . The owner of the department store in Berman objected to “taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman,” referring to the fact that under the redevelopment plan land would be leased or sold to private developers for redevelopment. Our rejection of that conten- tion has particular relevance to the instant case: The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of govern- ment—or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects. . . .
It is further argued that without a bright-line rule noth- ing would stop a city from transferring citizen A’s prop- erty to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay more taxes. Such a one-to-one transfer of property, executed out- side the confines of an integrated development plan, is not presented in this case. While such an unusual exercise of government power would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot, the hypothetical cases posted by petitioners can be confronted if and when they arise. They do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use. . . .
Just as we decline to second-guess the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline to second-guess the City’s determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project. It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary
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line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch. . . .
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is affirmed.
It is so ordered. DISSENT: THOMAS, J.: Long ago, William Black-
stone wrote that “the law of the land . . . postpone[s] even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of pri- vate property.” The Framers embodied that principle in the Constitution, allowing the government to take property not for “public necessity,” but instead for “public use.” Defy- ing this understanding, the Court replaces the Public Use Clause with a “‘[P]ublic [P]urpose’” Clause, a restriction that is satisfied, the Court instructs, so long as the purpose is “legitimate” and the means “not irrational.” This deferen- tial shift in phraseology enables the Court to hold, against all common sense, that a costly urban-renewal project whose stated purpose is a value promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue, but which is also suspiciously agree- able to the Pfizer Corporation, is for a “public use.”
I cannot agree. If such “economic development” tak- ings are for a “public use,” any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution. I do not believe that this Court can eliminate liberties expressly enumerated in the Constitution. Regrettably, however, the Court’s error runs deeper than this. Today’s decision is sim- ply the latest in a string of our cases construing the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the slightest nod to its original meaning. In my view, the Public Use Clause, originally understood, is a meaningful limit on the govern- ment’s eminent domain power. Our cases have strayed from the Clause’s original meaning, and I would reconsider them.
The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall. . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use with- out just compensation.” (Emphasis added.)
In my view, it is “imperative that the Court main- tain absolute fidelity to” the Clause’s express limit on the power of the government over the individual, no less than with every other liberty expressly enumerated in the Fifth Amendment or the Bill of Rights more generally. . . .
The most natural reading of the Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever. . . .
More fundamentally, Berman erred by equating the eminent domain power with the police power of States. . . . The question whether the State can take property using the power of eminent domain is therefore distinct from the question whether it can regulate property pursuant to the police power. . . .
The consequences of today’s decision are not difficult to predict, and promise to be harmful. So-called “urban renewal” programs provide some compensation for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only sys- tematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful. . . .
I would reverse the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.
KEY POINTS • The Supreme Court considered the scope of the “public use” requirement in connection
with the taking of private property. The specific consideration was whether a city’s devel- opment plan serves a “public purpose.”
• The Court concluded that the city of New London designed its plan to provide significant benefits to the community, including new jobs and increased tax revenue.
• Accordingly, the Court held that the public use requirement of the takings clause was satisfied because the development plan serves a public purpose.
• In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas declined to view “economic development” takings as a “public use” and expressed concern about the ramifications of the Majority opinion.
Case Icon: McGraw-Hill Education.
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A national uproar arose after the 2005 Supreme Court case Kelo v. New London, Connecticut, over whether private property interest should ever be taken and turned over for private development. In that case, the Court held that the city’s decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfied the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Note that state and local governments have been taking private land and turning it over in this way for many years. The Kelo case merely represents the first time the Supreme Court has squarely decided the issue. The Supreme Court did not require that state governments take anyone’s land for private development. It merely decided that it was a constitutional public use to do so under the given circumstances. Under pressure from voters, a number of states have passed laws preventing the units of government from taking private land for private development purposes.
Just Compensation The government can only take what belongs to private owners upon payment of “just compensation.” The courts have generally defined just compensation in terms of market value. In most instances the government offers compensation to an owner, a negotiation follows, and an amount is agreed upon as a just compensation. However, courts have ruled that due process requires that an owner can go to court and have a jury determine a just compensation if the owner cannot agree with the government’s offer.
Do you understand now how eminent domain illustrates that property right is limited by the common good? Public use means basically the same thing as common good. When the state decides to take an owner’s resources, it is determining that the right of property in these resources no longer serves the common good and that the greater common good requires that the resources be taken. Even so, the owner who has lost a property interest through eminent domain must receive just compensation.
The Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection and Due Process of Law The 14th Amendment to the Constitution states, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, with- out due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec- tion of the laws.” Two of this amendment’s provisions are of very special importance to businesspeople—the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
Prior to reading about these clauses, look again at the language quoted in the preceding paragraph. It is critical to understand that the first ten amendments describe individual protections against action by the federal government. The 14th Amendment explicitly clarifies that certain restrictions also apply to state (and local) governments.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW The term due process of law as used in the 14th Amendment probably arises in more litigation than any other constitutional phrase. It cannot be narrowly defined. The term describes fundamental principles of liberty and justice. Simply stated, due pro- cess means “fundamental fairness and decency.” It means that government may not act in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The clause does not prevent private individuals or corporations, including public utilities, from acting in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. The due process clause applies only to govern- mental bodies; it does not apply to the actions of individuals or businesses.
A number of states have passed laws preventing the units of government (cities and counties) from taking private land for private development purposes.
Public use means basi- cally the same thing as common good. These terms are also similar to general welfare.
The 14th Amendment restricts actions by state and local governments.
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Procedural due process cases involve whether proper notice has been given and a proper hearing has been conducted. Such cases frequently involve procedures established by statute. However, many cases involve procedures that are not created by statute. For example, the due process clause has been used to challenge the procedure used in the dismissal of a student from a public university.
In essence, the due process clause can be invoked any time procedures of gov- ernment are questioned in litigation. For example, in recent years, the Supreme Court has used the due process clause as its justification for defining the limits for a jury awarding punitive damages to a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit.
Incorporation Doctrine The due process clause has played a unique role in constitutional development—one that was probably not anticipated at the time of its ratification. This significant role has been to make most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. The first phrase of the First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law.” How then are state and local governments prohibited from making such a law? Jurists have used the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to “incorporate” or “carry over” the Bill of Rights and make these con- stitutional provisions applicable to the states. Starting in 1925, the Supreme Court began applying various portions of the first eight amendments to the states using the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the reason for this incorpora- tion and application.
The role of the due process doctrine goes well beyond incorporation. For exam- ple, the Fifth Amendment contains a due process clause applicable to the federal government. The 14th Amendment contains a due process clause applicable to state and local governments. Due process essentially means the same thing under both amendments. Through the due process clause, all of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms we discuss in this chapter and in Chapter 13 have been incorporated into the 14th Amendment and are applicable to the state government’s regulation of our personal and professional lives.
EQUAL PROTECTION The 14th Amendment’s equal protection language is also involved in a great deal of constitutional litigation. No law treats all persons equally; laws draw lines and treat people differently. Therefore, almost any state or local law imaginable can be challenged under the equal protection clause. It is obvious that the equal pro- tection clause does not always deny states the power to treat different persons in different ways. Yet the equal protection clause embodies the ethical idea that law should not treat people differently without a satisfactory reason. In decid- ing cases using that clause to challenge state and local laws, courts use three dis- tinct approaches. One is the traditional rational basis, or minimum rationality, approach, and a second is called the strict scrutiny approach. Some cases are analyzed as falling in between these approaches. Courts in these cases use the intermediate or quasi-strict scrutiny approach.
As a practical matter, if the traditional (minimum rationality) approach is used, the challenged law and its classifications are usually found not to be a viola- tion of equal protection. On the other hand, if the strict scrutiny test is used, the classifications are usually found to be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.
The concept of incor- poration through the due process clause has made the protec- tions of the Bill of Rights applicable to individuals subject to state and local regulations.
Do understand the role of each test under the equal protection clause.
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Minimum Rationality Under the minimum rationality approach, a law cre- ating different classifications will survive an equal protection challenge if it has a rational connection to a permissible state end. A permissible state end is one not prohibited by another provision of the Constitution. It qualifies as a legitimate goal of government. The classification must have a reasonable basis (not wholly arbi- trary), and the courts will assume any statement of facts that can be used to justify the classification. These laws often involve economic issues or social legislation such as welfare laws.
Such laws are presumed to be constitutional because courts recognize that the legislature must draw lines creating distinctions and that such tasks cannot be avoided. Only when no rational basis for the classification exists is it unconstitu- tional under the equal protection clause. For example, a state law restricting advertis- ing to company-owned trucks was held valid when the rational-basis test was applied to it because it is reasonable to assume less advertising on trucks provides for safer roads. Therefore, under this state law, a trucking company could not use the sides of its trucks to carry other companies’ ads.
Strict Scrutiny Under the strict scrutiny test, a classification will be a denial of equal protection unless the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state purpose. It is not enough that a classification be permissible to achieve any state interest; it must be a compelling state objective. To withstand constitutional challenge when this test is used, the law must serve important governmental objectives and the classification must be substantially related to achieving these objectives.
The strict scrutiny test is used if the classification involves either a suspect class or a fundamental constitutional right. A suspect class is one that has such disabilities, has been subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or has been placed in such a position of political powerlessness that it commands extraordinary protection from the political process of the majority. For example, classifications directed at race, national origin, and legitimacy of birth are clearly suspect. As a result, the judiciary strictly scrutinizes laws directed at them. Unless the state can prove that its statutory classifications have a compelling state interest as a basis, the classifications will be considered a denial of equal protection. Clas- sifications that are subject to strict judicial scrutiny are presumed to be unconstitu- tional. The state must convince the court that the classification is fair, reasonable, and necessary to accomplish the objective of legislation that is compelling to a state interest.
Strict judicial scrutiny is applied to a second group of cases involving clas- sifications directed at fundamental rights. If a classification unduly burdens or penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right, it will be stricken unless it is found to be necessary to support a compelling state interest. Among such rights are the right to vote, the right to travel, and the right to appeal. Doubts about such laws result in their being stricken by the courts as a denial of equal protec- tion. Two cases involving same-sex marriage and the Constitution are discussed in Sidebar 6.13.
Quasi-Strict Scrutiny Some cases actually fall between the minimum ratio- nality and strict scrutiny approaches. These cases use what is sometimes called quasi-strict scrutiny tests because the classifications are only partially suspect or
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the rights involved are not quite fundamental. For example, classifications directed at gender are partially suspect. In cases involving classifications based on gender, the courts have taken this position between the two tests or at least have modified the strict scrutiny approach. Such classifications are unconstitutional unless they are substantially related to an important government objective. This modified ver- sion of strict scrutiny has resulted in holdings that find laws to be valid as well as unconstitutional.
Equal protection cases run the whole spectrum of legislative attempts to solve society’s problems. For example, courts have used the equal protection clause to require the integration of public schools. In addition, the meaning and application of the equal protection clause have been central issues in cases involving:
• Apportionment of legislative bodies. • Racial segregation in the sale and rental of real estate. • Laws distinguishing between the rights of legitimates and illegitimates. • The makeup of juries. • Voting requirements. • Welfare residency requirements. • Rights of aliens.
Sidebar 6.14 summarizes the legal approaches courts use when analyzing equal pro- tection cases.
The equal protection clause is the means to the end, or goal, of equality of opportunity. As such, it may be utilized by anyone claiming unequal treatment in any case. At the same time the clause will not prevent states from remedying the effect of past discrimination.
In a 5-4 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ 2015, the Supreme Court held that states cannot ban same-sex marriage. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated “No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and fam- ily. . . marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say that they disrespect the idea of marriage. . . Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. they ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”
Two earlier major cases helped to establish a foun- dation for Obergefell and represented significant victories for gay rights:
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), held the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is
unconstitutional as a depravation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. DOMA defined “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-sex partners. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated, “[t]he federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”
In Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013), although the Supreme Court ruled that the opponents of same-sex marriage lacked standing to appeal a lower court ruling, the result of the case is to leave in place the California trial court decision that held Proposition 8 unconstitutional and reinstated same-sex marriage in California.
sidebar 6.13
Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution
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RATIONAL BASIS or MINIMUM RATIONALITY
INTERMEDIATE or QUASI-STRICT SCRUTINY STRICT SCRUTINY
Classifications Must Be
Rationally connected to a permissible or legitimate government objective
Substantially related to an important government interest
Necessary to a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to achieve its result
Presumed Valid Quasi-Suspect Classes Suspect Classes
Examples Height Gender Race
Weight National origin
Age Legitimacy
Testing Fundamental Rights
School desegregation To vote
Veteran’s preference To travel
Marriage To appeal
sidebar 6.14
Analysis of Equal Protection
Key Terms Commerce clause 155 Commercial speech 169 Contract clause 156 Defamation 170 Dormant commerce clause
concept 157 Due process clause 176 Eminent domain 172 Equal protection clause 176
Establishment clause 161 Federalism 153 Free exercise clause 161 Irreconcilable conflicts 159 Libel 170 Minimum rationality 177 Obscenity 163 Overbreadth doctrine 169 Police powers 157
Preemption 154 Prior restraints 170 Procedural due process 177 Prohibiting discrimination 160 Quasi-strict scrutiny 177 Separation of powers 153 Strict scrutiny 177 Supremacy clause 153 Symbolic speech 162
Review Questions and Problems Basic Concepts
1. Separation of Powers Describe the two concepts that (a) balance power within the federal government and (b) provide distinc- tions in the role of the federal, state, and local governments.
2. Supremacy Clause In 1916, the federal government passed a law that allows national banks to sell insurance in towns with a population of less than 5,000. In 1974, Florida passed a law prohibiting insurance agents from
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associating with financial institutions that are owned by or affiliated with a bank holding company. A bank located in a small Florida town is affiliated with a national bank. This bank wants to sell insurance through licensed insurance agents. Can the bank successfully challenge the Florida prohibition as being preempted by the federal law? Explain your reasoning.
3. Commerce Clause (a) What is the legal analysis used by the courts to grant the federal government
broad authority to regulate business activity? (b) Why is it necessary to find the limits of the federal government’s authority to
regulate commerce? 4. Contract Clause
(a) Does this provision of the Constitution apply to the federal government, state government, or both? Explain.
(b) Does this provision of the Constitution apply to present contractual relation- ships, future ones, or both? Explain.
Amendments and Basic Protections
5. Freedom of Religion Explain the purposes of and distinction between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.
6. Freedom of Speech Silvia, an attorney in Florida, also was a licensed certified public accountant (CPA) and a certified financial planner (CFP). Silvia placed an ad in the yellow pages listing her credentials, including the CPA and CFP designations. The Flor- ida Board of Accountancy reprimanded Silvia for using both the CPA and CFP credentials in an ad essentially emphasizing her legal work. Silvia challenged the board’s right to issue this reprimand. What is the legal basis for Silvia’s challenge? Explain.
7. Freedom of the Press (a) A promoter of theatrical productions applied to a municipal board (charged
with managing a city-leased theater) for a license to stage the play Hair. Relying on outside reports that because of nudity the production would not be in the best interests of the community, the board rejected the application. The pro- moter sought a court order permitting it to use the auditorium. Why should the court allow the production to proceed?
(b) What are the distinctions in how the law treats public persons versus private persons with respect to defamation?
8. Right to Possess Guns The Supreme Court recently interpreted the Second Amendment for the first time in decades. Based on that decision, can individuals have guns in their homes for self-defense or is the right to possess guns limited only to members of a governmen- tally approved militia unit?
9. Due Process of Law Explain what is meant by the incorporation doctrine and how it was used to expand the impact of the due process clause.
10. Equal Protection There are three levels of judicial scrutiny under this clause. Describe what these levels are and when they are applicable.
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1. Other retail businesses in the mall in which your sports shoes shop is located have decided to open on Sundays from 12 noon to 6 P.M. You decide to follow suit, but two of your employees refuse to go along, saying it is against their religious beliefs to work on the Sabbath. You terminate their employment. They apply for unemployment compensation and contend their unemployed status is your fault. If the state grants them benefits, you will be penalized because your unemployment compensation taxes will go up. • Should you contest their claim? • What would be the result if the employees refuse to work on Sunday because of their
desire to play golf on that day? 2. The mayor of the City of New York took issue with a number of works in a Brooklyn Museum temporary exhibit titled “Sensation: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection.” Especially troubling to him was a painting by Nigerian artist Chris Ofili, entitled “The Holy Virgin Mary.” In that work, Ofili depicted Mary with African features and attached a clump of elephant dung as well as photographs of female genitalia to his work. The mayor termed Ofili’s painting “sick” and “disgusting.” He insisted that a city-supported museum had no right to display the exhibit. • Could the mayor prohibit the work from appearing in the show? • Why or why not? Explain your answer using the appropriate legal standard.
business discussions
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Part Basic Legal Principles
A complex, modern economy cannot function well without the private market, often called the free market. This market, which is guided
by the “invisible hand” of competition, requires the rules of a legal system to achieve the maximum con- ditions for production and distribution. Part Two introduces the principal areas of law that set the rules for the private market.
Chapter 7 introduces you to the concept of property. It explains how ownership is acquired and details different common applications of ownership. Chapter 7 broadly defines “property” to include the ownership of security interests and describes the rules for mortgages and secured transactions. The chapter concludes by describing limitations on property that promote the common good.
Contracts are the binding agreements under which owners buy and sell goods and services. Chapter 8 examines contract terminology and the rules of con- tract formation. It discusses common mistakes that may result in unenforceable contracts. Chapter 9 cov- ers the performance of contracts and remedies for their breach. It concludes with a discussion of third-party contract rights.
Torts are legal wrongs other than breaches of contract. In business, the law of torts sets boundaries for how business owners and managers can use what they own in the private market by defining when that use wrongfully injures others. Chapter 10 discusses
these concepts and also provides liability rules of “damages” or compensation for wrongful injuries.
Chapter 11 examines the important application of the exclusionary right of property in the areas of trade secrets, patents, trademarks, and copyrights. The nations that lead the world in producing new products and services all have strong protection of intellectual property. Chapter 11 explores the incen- tive goal of intellectual property rights and describes the rules for gaining protection in each of its forms.
Chapter 12 considers business at an interna- tional level. It looks at the sources of international law, the various methods of transacting business internationally, different types of risks involved in international trade, and how businesses resolve dis- putes at the international level. Note that the con- cepts of property and the rule-based exchange of privately owned resources are almost as important internationally as they are nationally.
Tort law and criminal law have much in com- mon, and torts are also often (but not always) crimes. But tort law mostly concerns private enforcement of compensation for behavior that injures what belongs to others, whereas criminal law involves the govern- ment’s punishment of wrongful acts through fines and/or imprisonment.
Chapter 13 examines criminal law issues rel- evant to business and addresses constitutional issues of criminal law like search and seizure, the protection
TWO
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against self-incrimination, and the famous “Miranda rights.” It focuses on various specific business-related crimes such as endangering workers, obstruction of justice, Internet crime, and, particularly, fraud.
Part Two concludes with Chapter 14 on busi- ness organizations. This chapter explains the laws
that set boundaries within which private owners can join their resources into business organizations called corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and limited liability partnerships. These organizations are the driving force behind modern business production. •
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
7-1 To distinguish property from other legal rights.
7-2 To understand the legal scope of property.
7-3 To understand how property is legally acquired.
7-4 To categorize different types of ownership interests.
7-5 To organize and apply the rules of security interests.
7-6 To appreciate the limits on property rights that serve broader societal interests.
The Property System
amygdala_imagery/Getty Images7
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A t the Constitutional Convention in 1789, no
fewer than five of the 55 delegates asserted
without any opposition that the state (or gov-
ernment) comes into being to protect property, meaning
what is privately proper to people. Likely, all or almost
all of the delegates held this opinion, which was not
controversial in the late 1700s. As you read this chap-
ter and study many of the specific rules applying the
legal fence that is property, keep in mind that property
is something very basic and important to U.S. history.
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Introduction to the Property-Based Legal System
A common definition of property is “something that is owned” or simply “owner- ship.” However, a more useful definition of property is the legal right to exclude others from resources that are originally possessed or are acquired without force, theft, or fraud. What follows are some additional definitions that will help you to understand property:
• By “exclude,” we mean that you can have the police or courts keep someone from interfering with what is yours. You can exclude those who would interfere. Property, then, is a type of legal fence that surrounds and protects resources the law recognizes as belonging to you. People who interfere with what properly belongs to you can often be punished or required to compensate you.
• “Resources” include anything that someone may need or want. It includes land, widgets, and other physical things, but it also includes the uses of those things. Physical things do not mean much to us unless we can use them. “Property” protects the uses of things.
• “Originally possessed” resources refer to what comes from you, like your work or expressions. The philosopher John Locke said that people own themselves and that this self-ownership is the basis for all property.
• Acquiring resources “without force, theft, or fraud” means basically that if we illegally take away what belongs to others, we lack the protections of the legal fence regarding those resources.
Property is absolute but not infinite, and its boundaries can be ambiguous. By “absolute” we mean that legally you can either seek the police or the courts to protect some resource or you cannot. You either have the protections of the legal fence or you do not. By “is not infinite” we mean that the uses protected by the legal fence do not go on forever. The resources you own must stop short of harm- ing the resources that I own. Further, exactly where your boundaries stop and mine begin can be “ambiguous”—that is, unclear or uncertain. This is why we have courts to resolve the disputes that arise from ambiguous property boundaries, especially boundaries involving the uses of something. Legislation and regulation also help resolve issues of ambiguous or disputed property boundaries.
This definition makes property very central to the whole legal system. Refer back to Chapter 1 and Figure 1.1 to help you understand that property is the hub of our entire legal system. We defined property in this very broad way to help business students fully appreciate its importance to the study of business. Many legal scholars define property as something analogous to “a bundle of sticks” that can be used sep- arately and even divided. If you have “property,” you have the right to possess some resource, to control it, to use it in various ways, to transfer it, to gain income from it, and so forth. This perspective is valid and useful in many respects. However, it is fair to say that the true essence of property is the right to exclude. If you can legally exclude others from some resource, whether it is a physical resource or various uses of something physical, you have a private property in that resource. The legal system will protect you and allow you to exclude others from interfering with that resource.
Exactly what resources can or cannot be the objects of property protection is very important in society. For instance, in every state you can own a piece of land, but you cannot own the use of that land to manufacture illegal weapons. That is not a private resource that is protected by the exclusive legal fence of property. Likewise,
Think of property not as a physical fence but as a legal fence that protects resources inside the fence from acquisition by others.
LO 7-1
“It is true that ‘property’ is frequently used as a shorthand method of referring to a thing which is owned, but . . . when we refer to an object [resource] as ‘property’, we are forgetting that the ‘property’ is not the object itself, but rather a legal category which gives a person certain rights over the object.”
–Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings,
Histories, Theories (2007)
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under federal law, you cannot own as a resource bald eagle feathers for sale. The same thing is true of prescription drugs, which you cannot sell or even give away so that another person will have property in them. Which resources society protects by the private property fence are determined in our legal system by tradition, decisions of courts, legislation, and regulation. In our legal system, many resources can be pri- vately owned, and property is the foundation of the “free” market (see Sidebar 7.1), but be very clear that people cannot privately own every resource, especially not every resource use.
People often talk about the “free” market when what they really mean is the “private” market—that is, the private property market. What we call the free market is actually a market in the resources people privately own that oth- ers want and need. Economists know that we can have a market in things we do not own, but we would not want to live in a system where society did not legally define and protect private property in the resources that people want and need. In a market system without private property, the transfer of goods and services would be way too costly because everyone could take what everyone else held. Each person would have to protect what he or she held all the time to keep it from being taken by others.
We often do not think about the importance of our legal system, but in parts of the world that are poor, there is inadequate enforcement of the law establishing private property. The market is “free,” but it does not produce goods and services nearly so well as a system where the law enforces private property fences adequately. People in truly free markets have to spend most of their time guarding what they possess and have very little time to produce more than they can consume and to transfer it to others, which is what business is all about. Business is truly based on law, the law of private property, and the modern private market arises out of which resources soci- ety legally protects by the private property fence.
sidebar 7.1
Property as the Foundation of the Private Market
Property law does not function well when it is not adequately enforced. Honest police are needed to deter robbery and theft. Impartial courts are required to settle disputes over who owns what and whether X has wrongfully injured Y’s resources. Property becomes not just an exclusionary right but also an entire system, and it is upon this property system of law that business depends.
This chapter explores the benefits of the property system and many of the rules that apply the property fence to different kinds of resources. It concludes with an examination of how various principles of property protect the common good. As you read the chapter, you should note that the various rules you study are not them- selves “property,” which is the principle of the legally exclusive private fence. The rules you study simply describe different ways of applying the fence. You should fin- ish this chapter with a deeper knowledge of the central significance of property law to business. Quite simply, property is the necessary foundation for private enterprise and the market in the modern nation.
Rationale for the Property System
Arguably, the most significant issue for any society is how it orders the relation- ships among people concerning limited and valued resources, resources needed to survive and flourish. As long as people need or want more resources than they have
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available to them, society will order how people relate to each other in acquiring and possessing these resources. Such resources include land, food, raw materials, manufactured products, and even some types of information. Importantly, limited resources also include useful applications of the physical world and the human effort necessary for these applications. In other words, limited resources include the uses of physical raw materials and of yourself.
THE PROBLEM OF LIMITED RESOURCES In Western political theory, the state comes into being in response to the problem of limited resources. Through law, the state establishes a framework for handling the problem. At least two basic legal frameworks exist. In one framework, the state itself, represented by a ruler or legislature, makes the major decisions about the production and distribution of resources. The state takes ownership of resources or acquires them through taxation. It also may direct people in how, when, and where to work, thus assuming rights over the resources people have in themselves, their efforts, and talents. Distribution of resources occurs through state planning.
Communism is one system providing such a framework. The state requires that its citizens produce according to their abilities and share according to the needs of everyone else. The communist state expects people to want to do this, but it legally coerces them when necessary.
A second legal framework that orders how people relate to each other concern- ing scarce resources is private property. Private property, which we will just call “property,” is a system of law under which the state recognizes and enforces an individual’s rights to acquire, possess, use, and transfer scarce resources. (As for property other than private property, see Sidebar 7.2.) In the property system, the state does not plan what people should have nor does it acquire and redistribute resources to them. Rather, the people themselves determine how resources are dis- tributed through voluntary exchange, usually for money that they use to acquire other resources they need or want. The role of the state is to recognize legally when people have exclusive property rights in scarce resources and to allow them to enforce their rights through legal institutions like courts.
Legal scholars divide the word “property” into three main usages: private, public, and common. Private property protects private persons and allows them to exclude others—including, in most instances, the state—from interfering with resources that are acquired without force, theft, or fraud. Public property refers to the state’s right under various circumstances to exclude people from state monuments, buildings, equipment, land, and other public resources.
Common property has two meanings. First, it refers to the right we all have to common resources like the air,
rivers, or oceans. However, this meaning is appropriate only to the extent we can legally exclude others from interfering with our usage of these resources, for exam- ple, as when anyone who uses a river can sue to prevent or stop its illegal pollution. Second, “common property” sometimes refers to the private ownership by two or more people of a specific resource such as a piece of land.
For studying the legal and regulatory environment of business, private property is most important. It provides the foundation for the conduct of the modern market, and it is often just called “property.”
sidebar 7.2
The Three Faces of Property
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All nations recognize some applications of private property. Even the most communist society may allow individuals some right as to how they use their pro- ductive efforts, and it usually allows them exclusive control over limited personal possessions and food consumption. On the other hand, societies founded on private property law always have legal limitations on how owners can use their resources, prohibiting harm to others and recognizing both some state taxation and regulation over property. The difference in the two frameworks is a matter of degree, and most societies have mixed frameworks for dealing with the reality of limited resources.
However, if the goal of society is to produce more of what people need and want (i.e., to increase the total amount of limited resources), one of the legal frameworks is superior to the other. The available evidence suggests that a property system pro- duces more for a society than a state planning system. And if “freedom” is measured as individual autonomy and the absence of state coercion, then a property system also makes people more free.
For the property system to function most effectively in promoting prosperity, it should be applied according to the rule of law, which means it should be applied gen- erally and equally to everyone. All members of society must have an equal guarantee of exclusive rights to their resources. The following section discusses more specifi- cally how property promotes prosperity.
PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY Property is central to the legal environment of business. It is also central to society’s achievement of prosperity. In fact, property creates some of the maximum condi- tions known for producing and sustaining prosperity. Because property refers to a particular system of laws, rather than to useful resources, it is fair to conclude that certain laws are a major contributing factor to prosperity. Let us examine how prop- erty helps generate prosperity.
First, property powerfully provides an incentive. By allowing people to keep and benefit from what they produce, property motivates effort in a way that Chapter 1 suggested is very natural to human beings. Whether the activity is growing crops, manufacturing cars, or starting a new business, people will generally expend more effort when they have a protected property in what they produce than when they do not. Likewise, they are willing to produce more when they do not have to spend much of their time defending their homes or other acquisitions from those who may desire to take them. Under conditions where others are likely to take through force, theft, fraud, or even government mandate what people have or produce, there comes a point at which people will simply not work as hard, take as many risks, nor innovate as much. We may debate where that point is (e.g., how much people can be taxed before they slow their efforts), but the fact that property and incentive bear a direct relationship seems beyond debate.
Next, property helps generate prosperity by establishing the conditions neces- sary for capital formation, which refers to that quality of resources that produces new or different resources. For example, property enables people to borrow money at reasonable cost. In the United States most entrepreneurs start businesses by capital- izing the resource they have in their houses. They borrow money, and in a mortgage agreement put up their houses to secure the loans. (See the subsequent discussion of security interests in property.)
Lenders are willing to loan money at affordable rates primarily because prop- erty law guarantees (1) that a borrower’s house is on an identifiable piece of land
What does it mean to say that all nations rec- ognize private property?
Private property establishes maximum conditions for wealth creation by providing an incentive.
Private property also promotes capital formation.
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recognized by the state, (2) that the state recognizes a borrower’s claim to the house, and (3) that the state permits lenders to enforce the mortgage agreement through the courts and sell a borrower’s house to satisfy the loan if the borrower fails to repay it. The law of property enables entrepreneurs to change the form of their resources from houses to money, so they can start a business. This type of capital formation may seem curiously obvious to business students in the United States. However, as Sidebar 7.3 discusses, it is virtually unavailable in the poorer nations of the world due to the absence of adequate property law.
Of course, the relationship of capital formation to property law means more than just mortgages or other collateral-secured loans. Large-scale businesses are capital- ized by investors who buy ownership shares. For instance, corporations capitalize by selling stock shares, which are legally recognized property interests in a corporation. This method of capitalization is feasible only because the law recognizes stockhold- ers’ property interests in corporations (see Chapter 14). Likewise, securities markets (i.e., markets for stocks, bonds, and other ownership interests in businesses) are not possible without law enforcing the property interests in what these markets sell. Secu- rities markets are vital to capital formation and prosperity in modern nations. Both corporate stock shares and securities markets enable businesses to change a property interest in future profit potential into the money necessary for business operation.
A final contribution property makes to prosperity is to make resources easily divisible. Divisibility also relates to capital formation and refers to how property per- mits resources to be broken into parts and used in many ways while the owner still retains a property interest in each part. Under property law, an owner of a single piece of land can sell part of it outright (change it into money), sell another part of it on credit and hold a mortgage to ensure payment, lease part of it to tenants who pay rent, incorporate part of it and sell shares to investors, and secure a loan against part of it in order to start an Internet business. In each of these transactions regarding the single piece of land, the owner retains identifiable and protected property interests. Each transaction is made practically possible because the law of property enables resources to be subdivided as an owner may find advantageous.
In the book The Mystery of Capital, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto asserted that the reason “why capitalism triumphs in the West but fails everywhere else” is because of the secure system of property law that exists in Western nations. Not new technology, hard work, a superior culture, better management techniques, nor “exploitation” account principally for prosperity in the West, but rather the willing- ness of lenders in an adequate property system to risk their money to entrepreneurs with business ideas. De Soto’s research team estimated that in less-developed coun- tries there exists $9 trillion of “dead capital”—resources
that people possess that they cannot capitalize because the laws in their countries do not adequately guarantee property in these resources, and affordable collateral- secured loans are unavailable. Without the legal recogni- tion of property, many resources may also be difficult to sell since a buyer cannot be sure that the state will recognize and protect a seller’s right to transfer the resources. This problem is especially acute with the sale of land and build- ings. The lack of an adequate property law system may not account totally for poverty in less-developed countries, but it is arguably the most important contributing factor.
sidebar 7.3
The Mystery of Capital
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This feature of property facilitates the development of resources, which creates new wealth and causes prosperity. The next section further elaborates the divisibility of property.
Defining Property in the Legal System
The preceding section asserted that the easy divisibility of property contributes to prosperity, and it gave several examples of how property can be divided. This sec- tion introduces the two basic legal divisions of property: real property and personal property. It describes how tangible property is defined in the physical world and how interests in property are delineated with respect to other people.
TWO BASIC DIVISIONS OF PROPERTY Real property law applies ownership to land and interests in land such as mining rights or leases (Figure 7.1). Because of the historical importance of land, real prop- erty rules are very formal. As Chapter 8 on contracts discusses, agreements transfer- ring interests in land ownership should be written, and many special rules apply to the registration and taxation of land ownership. Land ownership is also known as real estate or realty.
Personal property applies to movable resources, those things that people do not annex to the land. The law divides personal property into rules applying to tangible and intangible resources. Tangible personal property applies to things one can touch, that is, to physical things. Computers, cars, and carrots are such touchable things. The sale of tangible things, also known as “goods,” is controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code, a type of contract law explained in Chapter 8. Intangible personal property applies to nonphysical things, particularly various types of valuable information. Intellectual property—patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets—is an important form of intangible property. The rules relating to
LO 7-2
Real property law applies to land and interests in land. All other resources are protected by personal property law.
Real Property Personal Property
Tangible (physical)
Intangible
Examples
Rights Included
Method of Selling (Alienation)
Land, fixtures, apartment leases, easements, etc.
Right to use and exclude
Deed for ownership transfer
Cars, food, extracted coal, computers, clothing, etc.
Right to use and exclude
Contract or gift for intentional ownership transfer
Intellectual property, securities
May only include right to exclude
Contract for ownership transfer
Figure 7.1 Divisions of property.
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intellectual property are discussed in Chapter 11. Securities are another important form of intangible property, and they are discussed in Chapter 17. Real property rules and personal property rules are often different, as are rules applying personal property to tangible or intangible things.
PROPERTY BOUNDARIES IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD We think of physical property as a three-dimensional object that can be possessed and protected. In the legal system, it is important to define exactly what the boundar- ies of this three-dimensional object are so that we know when another interferes with the property owner’s rights. For example, if we determine that you own a field that extends to the edge of a public road, someone who drives onto your field from that road without permission has committed a trespass (a tort explained in more detail in Chapter 10). If the federal government claims part of your field for military equip- ment storage, it has exercised its eminent domain powers (explained in more detail in Chapter 6) and owes just compensation. If someone steals a tractor that you have parked on your field (or anywhere else), they have committed the tort of conversion (Chapter 10) and the crime of larceny (Chapter 13). To enforce your rights against any of these wrongdoers, we must first know what you own. As you read on, keep in mind that, as described in Sidebar 7.4, the task of defining intangible property can present even more complications.
Because the same issues regarding interference (infringe- ment) exist with intangible property, the law must define the boundaries of those rights as well. In the case of intellectual property and securities, the law first sets forth the rights associated with ownership. For example, the owner of a copyright in a song possesses the right to exclude others from copying the author’s original expres- sion in that song. Second, the law provides a structure for identifying the specific property actually controlled by the intangible property owner. For example, a patent owner has rights over an invention as it is defined by the patent claims. The patent is infringed if someone makes, uses, or sells something that replicates the invention in the claims.
One aspect of some intangible rights that can be more complex than tangible property is the tendency for society (the courts and the legislature) to revise the rules for what can be owned. For example, in 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that patents are a specific type of property right termed a “public franchise” that is more open to chal- lenge than real property rights (Oil States Energy Services v. Green’s Energy Group, 138 S.Ct. 1365 (2018)). The ten- dency to revise creates a measure of uncertainty that does not exist in tangible property. Cases like Briggs v. Southwest- ern Energy Production Company, described in Case 7.1, in which land ownership is reinterpreted, are relatively rare. But, as Chapter 11 details, cases reinterpreting intellectual property subject matter have been quite frequent.
sidebar 7.4
Additional Complexity in Defining Intangible Property
The physical dimensions of tangible personal property are generally easy to define. We understand what it means to own a car or a smartphone and realize imme- diately when someone interferes with it. Real property is more complex. Because land is not fully contained when owned, or transported when sold, law rather than intuition must define the physical boundaries. States can differ in their specific land rules, but the following are general concepts that are applicable in most jurisdictions.
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Defining Land At the outset, it is important to understand that land ownership consists of more than the surface of the property. In English common law, as famously articulated by Lord Coke more than 300 years ago, ownership in land was understood to extend from the surface to the heavens and back down to the center of the earth. When the practical use of land was limited to near the surface, it was possible to pres- ent ownership in such grand terms without impacting societal interests. However, with the advent of aircraft as well as subsurface drilling for minerals, oil, gas, and water, it has become necessary to place reasonable limits on a landowner’s rights.
Air Rights The owner of real property also possesses the air above the land to the extent that the owner can occupy or use it in connection with the land. This means that although you cannot exclude a jetliner from flying overhead, you can prevent a neighbor’s deck or tree from extending over the surface of your land. Importantly, you do not need to touch the surface of the land to infringe or trespass on another’s air rights. It may be possible to sell your air rights to another for development. Addition- ally, some municipalities allow landowners to forego development on their own land and transfer the air development right for use on another piece of property. New York City has a well-established system for trading or transferring air development rights.1
What happens when a property owner’s conception of air rights meets new aerial technologies? Sidebar 7.5 considers how drones are challenging traditional notions of property boundaries.
In recent years, the use of drones— small, pilot-less aircraft driven by remote control—has exploded. Com- panies such as Amazon and UPS have already begun using them as a means for remote package delivery. This has proven particularly important when
individuals are practicing social distancing. Insurance companies also use them to inspect damaged property. And of course they are now standard equipment in jour- nalism. But as the technology has improved and prices have fallen, drones are increasingly in the hands of pri- vate individuals. On any given day, one might see multiple drones flying around a neighborhood or park.
Certainly one of the most important legal issues raised by drones is the potential for invasion of privacy (this tort is discussed in Chapter 10). However, an emerging concern is the fact that drones often drift into the airspace of another’s private property. Traditional property rules would consider such an intrusion a common law trespass. Although the own- ership of the airspace above land has been limited by the
recognition of a public domain for aircraft [see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)], and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued operation regulations, the line between public and private property remains unclear.
A 2015 case illustrates the problem. John Boggs was flying his camera-equipped drone in Bullitt County, Kentucky, when it traveled over William Merideth’s prop- erty. The drone hovered at approximately 200 feet above the land. Irritated at the intrusion, Merideth shot the drone down with a shotgun. In defense to Boggs’ claim of destruction of property, Merideth claimed self-defense to trespass. To decide the case, a court would be required to determine the boundary between public and private air- space in Kentucky. Unfortunately, the federal court hearing the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction before rendering a decision. However, the articulation of the parties respec- tive positions has inspired a great deal of commentary and may lead to clarifying regulation and legislation. Sources: Boggs v. Merideth, 2017 WL 1088093 (W.D. Ky. 2017); Nanci K. Carr, Look! It’s a Bird! It’s a Plane! No, It’s a Trespassing Drone, 23 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 147 (2019).
sidebar 7.5
Trespassing Drones?
Juanma Aparicio/ Getty Images
1New York State, “Transfer of Development Rights,” James A. Coon Local Govt. Technical Series (Rev. 2010).
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Subsurface Rights A landowner may also own the liquids, gases, and minerals beneath the land. Like air rights, an owner may be able to separate subsurface rights and sell them. An energy company could have the right to extract coal under the land while allowing another owner the right to occupy the surface. In many cases, the subsurface owner has the right to utilize some part of the surface of the land to extract minerals.
Subsurface rights have additional complications in that many below-ground sub- stances are not stationary. Liquids, like oil and water, and gases, like natural gas, can flow from one parcel to another. Should the owner of an adjacent property be permitted to drill and extract fluids and gases that flow from underneath another’s property? States that apply the so-called rule of capture say yes. The strict rule of cap- ture may be limited by additional rules that preserve the rights of adjoining owners.
A current topic of interest in subsurface rights involves the extraction of natu- ral gas through a process called hydraulic fracturing. Is such gas extraction—which involves pumping water and solids (proppants) into the ground under high pressure to fracture and release trapped gas—the same as capturing a natural flow? The court in Case 7.1 was compelled to address that very question.
case 7.1
BRIGGS v. SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY PRODUCTION CO. 224 A.3d 334 (PA 2020)
The Briggs family are the owners of property in northeastern Pennsylvania. Although many Pennsylvania landowners have leased their land to natural gas extractors, the Briggs have never done so. However, an adjacent piece of land was leased to South- western Energy Production (“Southwestern”). According to the Briggs, Southwestern used “hydraulic fracturing” techniques to extract natural gas from underneath the Briggs’ land by pull- ing it over to the adjacent land. The process is something like a using a sophisticated straw. The Briggs sued Southwestern for trespass for intruding on their subsurface rights and taking “their” natural gas. The court had to determine whether South- western’s acts were protected by the “rule of capture.” Although followed in some other states, a lower court determined that Pennsylvania would not apply this rule to hydraulic fracturing.
SAYLOR, Chief Judge: Oil and gas are minerals, and while in place they are considered part of the land. They differ from coal and other substances with a fixed situs in that they are fugacious in nature—meaning they tend to seep or flow across property lines beneath the surface of the earth. Such underground movement is known as “drain- age.” Drainage stems from a physical property of fluids in that they naturally move across a pressure gradient from high to low pressure. Indeed, the extraction of oil or gas by drilling is based, at least in part, on creating a low-pressure
pathway from the mineral’s subterranean location to the earth’s surface.
Oil and gas have thus been described as having a “fugitive and wandering existence,” and have been compared to wild ani- mals which move about from one property to another. Accord- ingly, such minerals are subject to the rule of capture, which is
“[a] fundamental principle of oil-and-gas law hold- ing that there is no liability for drainage of oil and gas from under the lands of another so long as there has been no trespass . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1358 (8th ed. 2004).
The reference to “the lands of another” in the above quote does not suggest a developer may invade the subsur- face area of a neighboring property by drilling at an angle rather than vertically (referred to as slant drilling or slant wells), or by drilling horizontally beneath the surface. This is because the title holder of a parcel of land generally owns everything directly beneath the surface. Rather, and as sug- gested by the “no trespass” predicate, it refers to the poten- tial for oil and gas to migrate from the plaintiff’s property to the developer’s land when extracted from a common pool or reservoir spanning both parcels. . . .
One of the central questions in this matter involves how these principles apply where hydraulic fracturing is used to extract oil or gas from subsurface geological formations.
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Drillers have enhanced the output of oil and gas wells by fracturing the geological formations for over a century. . . .
In terms of how the technique works, the [United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states]:
“Fractures are created by pumping large quantities of fluids at high pressure down a wellbore and into the target rock formation. Hydraulic fracturing fluid commonly con- sists of water, proppant and chemical additives that open and enlarge fractures within the rock formation. These fractures can extend several hundred feet away from the wellbore. The proppants—sand, ceramic pellets or other small incom- pressible particles—hold open the newly created fractures.”
After injection, fluid is withdrawn from the well while leaving the proppants in place to hold the fissures open. This enhances the drainage of oil or gas into the wellbore where it can be captured.
* * * In Pennsylvania, a trespass occurs when a person who
is not privileged to do so intrudes upon land in possession of another, whether willfully or by mistake. . . .
First, Plaintiffs did not assert—in their pleadings, in their brief to the common pleas court, in their [appeal] statement, or in their brief to the Superior Court—that Southwestern had effectuated a physical intrusion onto (or into) their property.
* * * The issue [of whether Southwestern is liable for extract-
ing gas from under the Briggs’ land] as stated by Southwestern should nonetheless be resolved for purposes of this dispute— and to provide guidance to the bench and bar—because at least part of the Superior Court’s opinion can reasonably be construed as setting forth a per se rule foreclosing applica- tion of the rule of capture in hydraulic fracturing scenarios, and that rule rests on faulty assumptions. In particular, and most saliently, the panel appears to have indicated that one litmus for whether the rule of capture applies is whether the defendant’s gas extraction methodology relies only on the natural drainage of oil or gas within a conventional pool or reservoir, or whether instead those methods utilize some means of artificial stimulation to induce drainage.
The Superior Court’s position in this respect logically rests on one of two grounds: (a) the act of artificially stimu- lating the cross-boundary flow through the use of hydraulic fracturing solely on the developer’s property in and of itself renders the rule of capture inapplicable; or (b) as Plaintiffs argue, any time natural gas migrates across property lines resulting, directly or indirectly, from hydraulic fracturing, a physical intrusion into the plaintiff’s property must necessarily have taken place.
As to the first proposition, all drilling for subsurface fugacious minerals involves the artificial stimulation of the flow of that substance. The mere act of drilling inter- feres with nature and stimulates the flow of the minerals toward artificially-created low pressure areas, most notably, the wellbore. This Court has held that the rule of capture applies although the driller uses further artificial means, such as a pump, to enhance production from a source com- mon to it and the plaintiff—so long as no physical invasion of the plaintiff’s land occurs. There is no reason why this precept should apply any differently to hydraulic fracturing conducted solely within the driller’s property.
* * * In summary, the parties to the appeal are in
agreement—and we concur as well—that the rule of cap- ture remains extant in Pennsylvania, and developers who use hydraulic fracturing may rely on pressure differentials to drain oil and gas from under another’s property, at least in the absence of a physical invasion. The Superior Court panel erred to the extent it assumed that either (a) the use of hydraulic fracturing alters this rule, or (b) where hydraulic fracturing is utilized, such physical invasion is a necessary precondition in all cases for drainage to occur from under- neath another property. More broadly, insofar as the panel’s decision may be construed to suggest that a natural-versus- artificially-induced-flow litmus should be employed to deter- mine whether the rule of capture applies in a given situation, that standard rests on a false distinction and is disapproved.
The order of the Superior Court is vacated and the matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KEY POINTS • The court refused to hold Southwestern liable for a technical trespass under the Briggs’
land. It determined that the nature of subsurface rights required a showing of some physi- cal intrusion.
• The court determined that, even though hydraulic fracturing is more sophisticated and powerful than traditional well drilling, the “rule of capture” still applies.
• Other jurisdictions that are home to significant gas and oil extraction activities, such as Texas, follow the same rule.
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Fixtures on Land A particular kind of interest in land is the fixture. A fixture is an object of personal property that has become an object of real property (1) by physical annexation (attachment) to the land or its buildings or (2) because its use has become closely associated with the use to which the land is put. Unless sellers and buyers agree differently when they sell land, the fixtures go with the land to the buyers. Manufacturing equipment is a fixture when it is sold along with a manufac- turing plant. Carpeting is a fixture if it is nailed down or glued to the floor. Not being attached to the land, rugs are usually not fixtures. To prevent misunderstandings in land sales, sellers and buyers should identify which things are fixtures and stay with the buyers and which things remain protected under personal property and go with the sellers.
Interests in Property with Respect to Others and Time
TYPES OF OWNERSHIP The law allows division of resource ownership into various types, or degrees. This division is another indication of how sensitive property law is in allowing owners to do exactly what they need and want with their resources: Not all states still use the common law terms that follow, but all states recognize the various aspects of owner- ship that the terms represent. These terms usually apply to land ownership, but owner- ship of movable and intangible things can be held practically in the same way.
Fee Simple The bundle of rights and powers of land ownership are called an estate. Fee simple represents the maximum estate allowed under law, the owner having the fullest legal rights and powers to possess, use, and transfer the land. The fee simple absolute estate has no limitations or conditions attached. The fee simple defeasible estate may have a condition attached to its conveyance (transfer). For example, a seller may convey land to a buyer “as long as it is used for agricultural purposes.” If the new owner (buyer) develops the land for other than agricultural purposes, the ownership goes back to the original owner (seller).
Life Estate A life estate grants an ownership in land for the lifetime of a speci- fied person. “To Brodie Davis for her life” grants such an estate. Upon Brodie Davis’s death, the land reverts to the original grantor who is said to keep a reversion interest in the land. If the land goes to someone other than the grantor upon Brodie Davis’s death, that person has a remainder interest. Reversion and remainder property inter- ests are also called future interests as opposed to the life estate, which is a present interest. Subject to any attached conditions, all of these estates can be capitalized or transferred. For example, it is possible to borrow upon or sell a future interest.
Leasehold Estate A leasehold estate is simply the property right granted to tenants by a landlord. Although it is not common to think of tenants as “owners,” they do in a meaningful way have an estate or property. Tenants have a qualified possession, use, and transfer of the land, qualified in that they cannot waste the land, which means do something that substantially reduces the value of the land. For an apartment tenant to rip up carpeting and knock holes in the walls would be a waste of the interest in the land. The landlord could terminate the lease and sue the tenant.
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Having a life estate means that the property fence only protects your interest in something for your lifetime.
When you lease an apartment for a year, what is it that you own?
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Unless prohibited by the lease, the rights owned by tenants can be capitalized by transfer to someone else. Thus, unless prohibited, a tenant who is paying $3,000 per month under a two-year lease of an office can sell the balance of time remaining on the lease at $5,000 per month. Many leases, however, do require that a tenant obtain approval from a landlord, or even of the other tenants, before transferring lease rights.
A landlord may lease land for a definite duration of time like two years, or for an indefinite duration with rent payable at periodic intervals like monthly, or simply at will, which means “for as long as both shall agree.” State law generally specifies that the landlord and tenant must give each other written notice of 30 days or 60 days in order to terminate a lease that does not run for a definite duration.
Concurrent Ownership Both personal and real property interests can have concurrent owners. That is, more than one person can own the same thing. The own- ership is undivided, meaning that no concurrent owner owns a specific piece of the resources that are owned. The shareholders of a corporation are concurrent owners as are the partners of a partnership. In fact, concurrent ownership greatly facilitates almost all forms of modern private enterprise.
Other forms of concurrent ownership include the joint tenancy and the tenancy in common. In both of these forms of ownership, the property interest is undivided, but the tenants in common can own different shares of the resource (e.g., two-thirds and one-third), whereas the joint tenants must have equal ownership shares (e.g., one- half and one-half). On the other hand, joint tenants, but not tenants in common, can have the right of survivorship. This right means that if one of the joint tenants dies, the remaining tenant becomes the sole owner of the entire resource. To create a joint tenancy requires special words, such as “convey to X and Y as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common, together with the right of survivorship.”
The owners themselves, or the creditors, of a joint tenancy or tenancy in com- mon can usually force the separation of these concurrent ownerships under the doc- trine of partition.
Specialty Applications of Property
The following sections discuss specialty applications of property. Generally, the private legal fence of property allows an owner to exclude others from interfering with (1) the possession of an object or resource, (2) the transfer of the object or interest by gift or through exchange with other owners, and (3) all uses of the object that do not harm other owners in what belongs to them. However, a number of specialty applications are quite narrow, and one or more of the three general property characteristics may be lacking. In fact, many scholars do not recognize some of the specialty applications discussed here to apply to property at all. However, we note that all of these specialty applications involve some object or interest that is legally exclusive in some important fashion, leading us to believe these applications deserve the name “property.”
EASEMENTS An easement places a particular use of land behind the exclusive legal fence. Usu- ally, this use involves the right of passage across the land—for example, when a timbering company has purchased the right to bring its harvest of trees out across
The surviving tenant in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship becomes the sole owner of the entire resource, usually interests in land.
An easement is often a right to cross over land.
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an owner’s land. Once the easement has been acquired, the timbering company can exclude others, especially the titleholder of the land, from interfering with pas- sage of its trucks across the land. An easement can also be reserved in a deed—for example, when Martina sells a piece of her land to George and the deed reserves an easement for George to cross over Martina’s remaining land. Easements can also involve such uses as the laying of water pipes or the stringing of power wires across land.
An easement can be acquired in various ways. For instance, it can be bought directly from a titleholder or reserved in a deed as part of the purchase and sale of land. At common law, owners of land also had a natural easement (also called easement by necessity) to get from their land to the nearest public road. A negative easement means that an adjoining landowner cannot do anything that would cause your land to cave in or collapse, such as digging a ditch that would cause the land on your side to collapse. Finally, an easement by prescription arises when one person has used another’s land, such as by crossing it openly, wrongfully, and continuously for a period of years (frequently 20), and once an easement by prescription arises, a titleholder of the land can no longer prevent a person from continuing to use the land by crossing it. The titleholder cannot now use the land in such a way to prevent the easement holder from crossing it, and the easement holder can legally exclude a titleholder from trying to prevent passage.
Statutes in many states set standards for easements and their acquisition. The easements mentioned here merely give you a general idea about these specialty appli- cations of property.
Case 7.2 involves the common case of an easement across property for the routing of electric and telephone utility lines. As detailed in the next section on acquiring property, an encroachment by another may reduce or restrict an owner’s property through adverse possession if sufficient time passes. This case merges the concepts.
BAILMENTS In many common situations, an owner puts an object protected by personal property into the intentional possession of another person with the understanding that the other person must return the object at some point or otherwise dispose of it. This property arrangement is known as a bailment, with the owner known as the bailor and the possessor of the object known as the bailee. Bailments arise when you store something in a warehouse, rent furniture from the rental store, lease a piece of equip- ment, loan your lawnmower to a neighbor, or store your car in a friend’s garage while you are on vacation. Bailments fall into three categories:
• For the sole benefit of the bailor. • For the sole benefit of the bailee. • For the mutual benefit of both parties.
Think about the examples mentioned above. Do you understand that storing your car in a friend’s garage while you are on vacation is a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor and that the furniture and equipment rentals are mutual benefit bailments? The loan of your mower to your neighbor to mow the grass is a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee. Consider the following situation: You go to a business meeting at a hotel, removing your expensive leather coat,
Can you explain the three different types of bailments?
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case 7.2
DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS v. GRAY 789 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 2016)
In 2006, a part of Herbert Gray’s new house was inadvertently built on Duke Energy’s power line easement—referred to as an “incorporeal hereditament”—that was conveyed 50 years ear- lier. Duke wanted Gray to move his house, but Gray argued that Duke did not act quickly enough to reclaim its right to the easement. To determine the outcome, the North Carolina Supreme Court had to confront two real property concepts. First was the notion of an easement as a formal, permanent property conveyance. To what extent is it accorded the same protections against encroachment as a complete land transfer (like a fee simple)? The second was the question of whether Gray’s interference with the easement is more like a trespass (or some other damage to land) or an attempt to claim prop- erty in adverse possession. If it is merely damage, the injured energy company would likely receive monetary damages and have only a short time to bring a lawsuit. However, if the encroachment is viewed as a permanent attempt to claim the energy company’s land, the harm is more like an adverse pos- session. Such harm allows the energy company a much lon- ger period of time to bring a lawsuit for ejection before Gray’s claim to a piece of the easement would become permanent.
EDMUNDS, JUSTICE: J.L. and Pearl D. Wallace, defen- dant’s predecessors in title, executed a duly recorded ease- ment agreement with Duke Power Company, now plaintiff Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, on 18 May 1951. The agree- ment granted plaintiff certain rights in a two hundred-foot- wide strip of land, including “the right to enter said strip . . . and to construct, maintain and operate within the limits of same, poles, towers, wires, lines, apparatus and appliances for the purpose of transmitting electric power and for tele- phone purposes,” and “the right to keep said strip of land free and clear of any or all structures . . . except those placed in or upon same by said Power Company.” The agreement also stated that “[t]he right of way and easements hereby granted shall be binding upon and shall inure to the parties hereto, their successors, heirs and assigns.” Plaintiff there- after constructed an overhead 100,000 volt electrical trans- mission line within the easement in 1951. A 230,000 volt transmission line was constructed in 1957 and 1958.
In September 2005, Yarbrough-Williams & Houle, Inc. (Yarbrough-Williams), a corporation specializing in professional land surveying, created a plat titled “Skybrook Phase 8 Map 1” and recorded it in Mecklenburg County. At the same time, Yarbrough-Williams physically staked out the boundaries of the surveyed property, including the boundaries of Lot 533, the property at issue. The following
month, John Wieland Homes and Neighborhoods of the Carolinas, Inc. (Wieland), now Builder Support Services of the Carolinas, Inc., purchased the Skybrook development, including Lot 533. In December 2005, Wieland contracted with Lucas-Forman, Inc. (Lucas-Forman), another corpora- tion specializing in land surveying, to plot and stake the loca- tion of the building footprint for Lot 533. In January and February 2006, Wieland dug the footings and poured the foundation for a house on the Lot. On 16 February 2006, Wieland contracted with Carter Land Surveyors & Planners, Inc. (Carter Land Surveyors), yet another company special- izing in land surveying, to conduct a foundation survey of Lot 533. The purpose of this week-long foundation survey was to confirm that no setback, easement, right-of-way, or boundary violations existed.
Thereafter, Wieland completed construction of the house in question on Lot 533, and the county issued a cer- tificate of occupancy on 11 October 2006. In early 2007, defendant purchased the house and lot from Wieland for $608,667.00. During the process, Wieland provided defen- dant a copy of the foundation survey. Defendant remains the owner of Lot 533, which now bears the address of 14440 Salem Ridge Road, Huntersville, North Carolina.
Three years later, around 17 February 2010, defendant received a letter from Duke alleging that a portion of his home was encroaching on Duke’s right-of-way and asking defendant to remove the encroachment. When defendant did not comply, plaintiff filed suit in Superior Court, Meck- lenburg County, on 12 December 2012, seeking injunctive and other relief. On 3 January 2013, defendant filed an answer and counterclaim, adding a third-party complaint against Wieland. . . .
Wieland filed a motion seeking partial summary judg- ment on 10 September 2013, and defendant followed with a motion for summary judgment on 2 October 2013. Both argued that the six-year statute of limitations for an injury to an incorporeal hereditament set out in N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(3) had run and that, as a result, plaintiff had no legal remedy. After conducting a hearing, the trial court on 1 November 2013 granted the motions for summary judgment filed by defendant and by Wieland, finding that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations pertaining to incorporeal her- editaments. The court further found that the limitations peri- ods set out in N.C.G.S. §§ 1-40 and 1-47(2) did not apply. . . .
The key issue before us is whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in identifying the applicable statute of limitations. . . .
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and hanging it on a hanger in a small room provided by the hotel. The coat turns up missing. Is the hotel responsible as a bailee? Would the situation have been different if the hotel had someone taking care of coats? The answers depend on whether or not the hotel has taken intentional possession of the coat, and it is likely that merely by providing a coat hanger, the hotel is not taking intentional possession of the coat. But if a hotel employee hangs up the coat for you, the hotel becomes a bailee.
Defendant argues that the appropriate limitation period is the six years set out in N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(3), while plaintiff contends that the twenty-year statute of limitations found in N.C.G.S. § 1-40 is proper. The for- mer, set out in Chapter 1, Article 5 (“Limitations, Other Than Real Property”), applies to actions for “injury to any incorporeal hereditament.” N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a) (3) (2015). The latter, set out in Chapter 1, Article 4 (“Limitations, Real Property”), applies to “action[s] for the recovery or possession of real property.” Id. § 1-40 (2015). As a result, we must determine whether this action involves injury to an incorporeal hereditament or recovery of real property.
We begin our analysis by considering the character- istics of an incorporeal hereditament, which has been defined as “[a]n intangible right in land, such as an ease- ment.” Incorporeal Hereditament, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) . . . Consistent with this definition, we have observed that “[a]n easement always implies an interest in the land. It is real property, and it is created by grant.” Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589, 600 (1925) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the easement in this case, while an incorpo- real hereditament, is also real property.
Next, we review the nature of plaintiff’s action. Plain- tiff’s easement gives plaintiff a property right to a degree of control over the use of an identified swath of land, spe- cifically including “the right to keep said strip of land free and clear of any or all structures.” Plaintiff alleges that the encroachment of defendant’s home into that strip interferes with and invades its rights over that tract. While
plaintiff has alleged an injury to its rights as possessor of the easement, the remedy plaintiff pursues is not damages for any injury to the easement. Instead, plaintiff wishes to regain control over the part of its easement now occupied by defendant’s house. Because plaintiff seeks to recover full use of its easement, and because the easement is real property, we conclude that this action is for the recovery of real property. By definition, the statutes of limitation [for injury to property] do not apply to the recovery of real property. . . . Consequently, we conclude that plaintiff’s claim is subject to the section 1-40 twenty-year statute of limitations. . . .
Not only do we conclude that this result is dictated by the language found in the applicable statutes and cases, we acknowledge that utility facilities crisscross the state above, on, and beneath the ground. Their accompanying ease- ments are not always readily subject to routine inspection by the owning utility. We do not believe that the drafters of N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(3) intended that a utility’s right to maintain such easements could be successfully challenged in a time as short as six years.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and Wieland upon find- ing that Duke’s claims were barred by N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a) (3). . . .
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for remand to the trial court for proceedings not inconsis- tent with this opinion.
KEY POINTS • An easement is entitled to the same legal respect as other forms of real property. • One may acquire another’s real property by claiming the property and occupying it
(adversely possessing) for a long period of time so long as the original owner does not take action to evict.
• The time period required to acquire ownership in real property through adverse posses- sion is typically much longer than the time period to be free of liability in a trespass case.
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In the business world, most bailments are of mutual benefit to both parties. Although the bailee has an absolute duty to return the object to the bailor (or to dispose of it as the bailor directs), and becomes liable to the bailor for failing to do so correctly, an issue often arises when something happens to the object while it is in the bailee’s possession and control. What if someone steals it? What if a natural disaster, called “an act of God,” destroys it, or it is damaged in an accident? To understand the potential liability from these events, you have to understand the legal duty the bailee is under. In a mutual benefit bailment, such as a rental arrangement, the bailee is under a duty to use “reasonable care” in taking care of the object in pos- session, but if an Act of God destroys or damages the object, the bailee is not likely liable to the bailor.
In a bailment for the sole benefit of a bailor, the bailee owes only a slight duty of care while the object is in the bailee’s possession, but in a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee, such as where the bailee has borrowed the object, the bailee owes a very high duty of care, one that is greater than merely what is “reasonable.” These duties of care become important when the parties are negotiating a settle- ment, or when a judge is instructing a jury about the bailee’s responsibility to the bailor. Many times it may be difficult for a bailor who sues a bailee to prove why the object in the bailee’s possession has been damaged and how the bailee has breached the duty of care. Therefore, the law presumes that the bailee has breached the duty of care when the bailee cannot return the object to the bailor in proper condition, placing the burden of proof on the bailee to prove that he or she has met the duty of care.
The bailor also has duties to the bailee. In a mutual benefit bailment, the bailor must pay the bailee for storing or otherwise keeping possession of some- thing, such as when the bailee is a warehouse. According to the type of bailment, the bailor also warrants or guarantees that she has no knowledge of defects in the objects bailed or no knowledge of defects that could have been discovered through reasonable inspection. In a number of states, courts have made merchants in mutual benefit bailments liable for any defect in a bailed object that causes per- sonal injury.
Many states have laws that apply to particular kinds of bailments, such as those involving common carriers, warehouses, and innkeepers (hotels). In particular, these bailees are often able to limit their potential liability to bailors for damage to the bailed objects, for example, by inserting contractual terms that limit compensation to a certain value. Common carriers, which include airlines, railroads, and public trucking companies, carry packages for the public. Common carriers are also not responsible for acts of God or of public enemies, the acts of the bailor in failing to package properly, defects in the packaged object itself, or acts of the public authority (such as the stopping of a truck carrying produce at a state border because of con- cern about plant disease).
In legal terms, a bailee is usually not considered to have “property” regarding the bailed object. However, the bailee has both possession and control over the object and can exclude the rest of the world, including the bailee in some instances, from interfering with this possession and control. For this reason, we are treating bailments as a specialty application of property, although they are often a very nar- row one.
Because a bailment must involve property, it can be important to determine whether something you own that is held by another fits that legal definition. Sidebar 7.6 considers whether financial data is property.
When your roommate borrows your car and returns it with a dent in it, the law makes your roommate liable unless she can prove she has met the duty of extremely high care.
You should read the terms of a bailment con- tract very carefully.
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Acquiring Resources in a Property System
How do you come to own resources in a property system? In other words, how does the right of property to something attach to a specific person? Although you can acquire resources in many ways, including by force (called “robbery”), theft (var- ious forms of stealing), and fraud (intentionally lying and harming others to get what belongs to them), there are only five basic legal ways to become an owner of something in a property system. As you read what follows, consider that ownership means the same thing as “property.” Both terms refer to the legal right that makes resources exclusive, that makes resources “mine,” instead of “yours,” or “no one’s.”
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH EXCHANGE The most common way of coming to have a property in something is through exchang- ing resources. For example, when you buy a car, or buy a company, you exchange one form of resources you own (money) for another form of resources (car or company). You are now the legal owner of the car or company. Resources have been switched but property (or ownership) remains. Likewise, when you exchange your services for a paycheck, you become the owner of the paycheck and the money it represents. The employer becomes the owner of your services and what they produce.
The rules under which people exchange resources in a property system are called the rules of contract. Contract rules are the subject of Chapters 8 and 9, but you should understand now that contract rules make agreements to exchange resources between owners legally binding and enforceable. In particular, the rules of contract make it possible for owners to commit legally to future exchange of resources. These rules also make it possible for one owner to sue another if agreements to exchange resources in the future are broken by one of the owners. Further, contract rules allow lawsuits against those who have not adequately performed their agreements. If owner A agrees to sell goods to owner B in 30 days and then does not deliver them, owner B may sue owner A for damages. Likewise, owner B may sue owner A if owner
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Contract rules control the way owners make agreements to exchange resources in the property-based legal system.
Providing adequate protection for consumer data is an important concern for firms in every industry. This is par- ticularly the case for companies that work in high-tech financial services, or Fintech. The breach of such data protections can lead to identity theft, which imposes sig- nificant economic harm on consumers. Unfortunately, mis- takes happen—hackers crack poor security, laptops are lost, etc.—and a criminal may gain access to confidential data. If this happens, could a financial institution face lia- bility for breach of bailment duties?
To date, courts have been reluctant to embrace a bailment theory for data breaches. Some question the
essential premise that consumer information is prop- erty that can be bailed. Others note that, even if finan- cial information is property, it was never meant to be “returned” to a consumer as in a traditional bailment. However, this creative theory is relatively new and may receive more favorable treatment in some jurisdictions as cases arise. Sources: Douglas H. Meal, “Private Data Security Breach Litigation in the United States,” in Privacy and Surveillance Legal Issues (2014). In re Target Corporation Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014).
sidebar 7.6
Is Your Financial Data “Property” That Is Bailed?
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A does deliver the goods, but they turn out to be defective. In addition to damages, contract rules may specify other remedies for contract breach.
It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of contract rules in the property system. Professor Philip Nichols of the Wharton School asserts that observing legally enforceable contracts is the single most significant indicator that a country’s economy is ready for international trade. If the right of property is the foundation for the mod- ern private market, the rules of contract are perhaps the keystone of that foundation.
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH POSSESSION Sometimes you can become an owner of something merely through possession, that is, by physically holding and controlling it. The rule of first possession is that the first person to reduce previously unowned things to possession becomes their owner. In Sylacauga, Alabama, a meteorite crashed through the roof of a rented house in 1954 and struck the tenant on the leg, the only recorded instance in history when a meteorite has struck a person. Initially, both the owner of the house and the tenant (owner of the lease) claimed the meteorite, but because the tenant was the first per- son to reduce it to possession, she acquired the right of property to it.
Similar to the rule of first possession is the rule that when someone has aban- doned what they own, the first person to reduce it to possession owns it. The law determines whether or not someone has abandoned what they previously owned by measuring intent, whether the previous owner intended to abandon something. The law measures intent by the circumstances of the situation. If it looks like someone meant to abandon something, we say they intended to do it. When it is not clear who is the first person to reduce previously unowned or abandoned resources to posses- sion, lawsuits may follow. See Sidebar 7.7.
The rule of first possession is that the first person to reduce previously unowned things to possession becomes their owner.
When Barry Bonds blasted his record-setting 73rd home run ball into the stands of PacBell Park on October 7, 2001, ownership of the ball was abandoned. Unlike in football, where a ball that goes into the stands must be returned, Major League Baseball—the association of team owners—deliberately abandons the balls and allows fans to keep them. But who had the right of property in the record-setting ball—Alex Popov who initially appeared to catch it before a wild crowd of fans knocked him to the ground, or Patrick Hayashi who shortly afterward saw the ball rolling free, grabbed it, and stuck it in his pocket?
Popov sued Hayashi, arguing that he was the owner because he had caught and first possessed the ball, which had an estimated value of $1 million. After trial, Judge Kevin McCarthy recognized that the principle of first pos- session applied to the ball, but did Popov or Hayashi first possess it? The facts were not clear as to whether Popov
caught or dropped the ball. The judge stated, “An award of the ball to Mr. Popov would be unfair to Mr. Hayashi. It would be premised on the assumption that Mr. Popov would have caught the ball. That assumption is not sup- ported by the facts. An award of the ball to Mr. Hayashi would unfairly penalize Mr. Popov. It would be based on the assumption that Mr. Popov would have dropped the ball. That conclusion is also unsupported by the facts.”
With the facts unclear, Judge McCarthy ruled that it was fairest to divide the ownership of the ball. “The court there- fore declares that both plaintiff and defendant have an equal and undivided interest in the ball. . . . In order to effectuate this ruling, the ball must be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.” Rather than appeal, Popov and Hayashi agreed they would sell the ball and divide the proceeds. Source: Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).
sidebar 7.7
Barry Bonds’s Home-Run Ball
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Lost Items Things that are lost also can acquire a new owner through possession. The finder of a lost item becomes its owner by reducing it to possession and follow- ing a statutory procedure, which may require the finder to turn the item over to the police and to advertise it in a local paper for a period of time to allow the original owner to claim it. But at the end of the specified statutory period the finder becomes the new owner.
The law distinguishes things that have been lost from things that have simply been mislaid. Things that have been lost go to the first person who subsequently reduces them to possession, but things that have been mislaid go to the person who owns the premises where the item was mislaid. A $100 bill on the table in the library has been mislaid, but if it is on the floor it has been lost. The difference in the way the law treats these two situations is based on an assumption that the original owner will know where to come back and reclaim mislaid things.
Adverse Possession Another form of ownership through possession arises through adverse possession. Adverse possession gives you ownership of land (and it only applies to land) under state statute when the possession is as follows:
• Open and notorious. The possessor must occupy the land in such a way as to put the true owner of the land on notice.
• Actual and exclusive. The possessor must physically occupy the land. However, the building of a fence around the land or construction of a building on it consti- tutes physical occupation.
• Continuous. Possession must not be interrupted. • Wrongful. The possessor must not have the owner’s permission to be on the
land, for example, under a lease. • For a prescribed period of time. Most states specify an adverse possession of
between 10 and 20 years before the possessor becomes the new owner.
Adverse possession encourages land use and prevents an absent owner from claiming rights many years down the road. The rule may be applied to a part of a person’s property. For example, if a landowner builds a wall extending five feet over a neighbor’s property, the landowner can eventually gain ownership over the five feet, but not the rest of the property. As described in Sidebar 7.8, adverse possession has even been proposed as a means for dealing with vacant, foreclosed properties.
Can you distinguish between things that are lost and things that are merely mislaid?
As a result of the financial crisis in 2008 and beyond, many homeowners fell behind in mortgage payments. Some abandoned their property or were foreclosed upon. The result has been many vacant homes in distressed areas where new buyers are scarce. Such homes reduce property values and create dangerous conditions. One solution may be to encourage individuals to occupy the homes and attempt to eventually gain ownership through
adverse possession. The required period of possession would seem to be an impediment to this scheme. How- ever, in areas in which the true owners seem uninterested in reclaiming the property, it may end up serving as a via- ble urban renewal mechanism. Source: Catharine Skipp and Damien Cave, “At Legal Fringe, Empty Houses Go to the Needy,” New York Times, November 8, 2010, p. A1.
sidebar 7.8
Curing Blight through Adverse Possession?
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Perhaps the most common way to destroy a claim of adverse possession is to sue for trespass. But the easiest way may be to simply give permission to occupy for a period of time.
The Homestead Act of 1862 illustrates the historical significance of owner- ship through possession. This act allowed those who lived on certain public land to obtain legal ownership of it by possessing it for five years and making certain improvements. Upward of a half million settlers possessed and then gained title to the 160-acre homesteads under the act.
In parts of the world today, governments are granting ownership of land to “squatters” who possess it without legal right. Studies show that this is one of the best ways to distribute land in poor nations. Squatters become owners and can then capitalize land by selling it or borrowing money and putting up the land as collateral.
Some have criticized the “squatter-to-owner” process because many of the new owners sell their land. However, the process enables poor squatters to raise money for the first time. It is also less violent than a situation where squatting alone occurs, and squatters may have to defend their possession by force. Further, it is more effi- cient than for the government to specify that the land cannot change ownership. In U.S. history there were numerous instances in which legal title was given to settlers who at first possessed land by squatting. Many of them, too, sold their land after receiving legal title to it.
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH CONFUSION Ownership through confusion arises when fungible goods (i.e., goods that are identi- cal) are mixed together. The common example involves grain in a silo when two or more batches of separately owned grain are mixed together. If the confusion occurs by honest mistake or agreement, the owners of the originally separate goods now own a proportional share of the confused goods. Careful records of who owned what grain must be kept since lacking evidence, a court in the case of dispute will assume that everyone claiming the confused mass owns an equal share. If a court determines that the confusion was intentionally wrongful, perhaps done by someone willfully attempting to defraud another, the court will grant ownership of the entire confused mass to the innocent party.
The doctrine of confusion also illustrates the importance of boundaries to the concept of property (see earlier discussion), and it explains one determination of ownership when resource boundaries are not certain. Problems of where boundaries lie are common, however, to various types of resources. Boundaries to the ownership of the water in a creek that crosses your land may be measured by a certain volume of water per minute. Landowners upstream may legally not be able to divert that flow.
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH ACCESSION When the owner of an old airplane engine has it restored and has an airplane built around it, the owner of the engine now owns the entire airplane through the doctrine of accession, which refers to something “added.” Normally, this is not a problem, but suppose a thief steals the engine, repairs it, and builds it into an airplane. A court will likely grant ownership of the entire airplane to the engine’s owner.
However, if the builder accidentally picked up someone else’s engine and builds it into an airplane, a court will probably give ownership of the airplane to the builder,
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto believes that nations can strengthen their economies through the “squatter-to-owner” process.
Be aware that disputes arise concerning not only boundary problems involving physical loca- tion but also boundaries of permissible uses of things.
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requiring only that the builder adequately compensate the engine’s original owner. An exception gives ownership of the entire airplane to the engine’s owner if the engine is substantially more valuable than the additions to it. The court may even require the engine’s owner to pay for the valuable additions.
The law of accession also explains that when you apply your efforts or ingenuity to any raw materials you own and change their nature into finished products, you own the finished products. Generally, because you own your efforts, you own what they produce, whether it is an airplane, a paycheck (through exchange), or a work of art. Much of the property foundation of the modern private market arises from the right to exclude others legally from what you own and what you add to that.
The philosopher John Locke, whose ideas were very important to the framers of the U.S. Constitution, said that the principle of property was justified when some- one contributed labor to a previously unowned natural resource. In other words, if people own themselves and their work efforts and transform something previously unowned into something new by their work, they also own the new thing. This view and the rule of accession have strong similarities.
ACQUIRING RESOURCES THROUGH GIFT Receiving a gift is also a way of acquiring ownership. In the making of a gift, no mutual exchange of resources occurs. Instead, a donor, who owns something, gives it to a donee, who becomes the new owner. The rules of gifts specify that the gift does not generally take place until the donor (1) intends to make the gift and (2) delivers the gift by physical transfer to the donee. Note that in some instances, a construc- tive delivery, like turning over the keys to a car or the deed to land, constitutes an adequate delivery. A particular kind of gift is a testamentary gift, or one that is made through a will. The rules of such a gift pass ownership not by delivery but upon the death of the donor (called a “testator”) and the proving of a valid will that specifies the gift. Some people believe that the purpose of a property system is to stimulate efforts to gener- ate further wealth which benefits society. They argue that permitting people to pass property to vast fortunes through testamentary gifts does not give incentive to those who receive such gifts.
TITLE AND PROPERTY REGISTRATION Ownership is frequently referred to by the term title. Thus, someone who owns something has title to it. When an owner transfers ownership, the owner is said to “pass title.” For specific types of resources the law requires that the title be repre- sented by a physical document registered with the state. The title to an automobile is one example of such an ownership document that must be registered with the state. Many states also require the registration of boat titles.
A deed is the document of title that transfers ownership of land. The deed contains a precise legal description of the land that specifies the exact location and boundaries according to a mapping or surveying system. Without this description, few buyers or lenders would be willing to risk their money on the land. The fact that exact, accepted boundaries identify land ownership provides the basis for much capital formation.
Even knowing the precise location of the land does not always ensure that there are no problems with the ownership. A lender may have a mortgage claim against the
Can you explain how Locke used the con- cept of accession to justify how people come to own previously unowned things?
In your opinion, what justifies people being able to pass large wealth on to their chil- dren through testamen- tary gifts?
Land, automobiles, and in many states, boats, require a registration of ownership called title.
What does it mean to say that a quitclaim deed does not convey ownership?
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land, or the grantor of a deed may have conveyed the land to more than one person. There are two protections against these problems. First, the kind of deed the buyer receives from the seller can protect the buyer. A warranty deed promises the grantee (usually, the buyer) that the grantor (seller) has good ownership and the full power to convey it. The buyer can sue the seller if someone else claims the land. A special warranty deed specifies that certain legal claims against the land, like mortgages, exist but guarantees that no other claims exist. A quitclaim deed makes no guarantees other than that the grantor surrenders all claim against the land. Several other types of deeds may apply in certain states.
Second, buyers and lenders are protected by registration statutes. The law enables buyers to register their deeds to land and lenders to register their mortgage claims against land. Potential buyers or other lenders are thus put on notice regard- ing the land, and the legal owner or claimant is legally and publicly identified. By going to the county courthouse or other place of record, you can often trace the ownership history of a piece of land for 200 years or more.
Property and Security Interests
In a property-based legal system resources can be highly divisible. Importantly, they are divisible both in specific type and by time. Sellers can transfer resources to buy- ers now and depend upon getting paid for these resources later. That is a subject of contract law, which begins in the next chapter. The following sections, however, deal with how sellers can increase their confidence in the risky business of transferring goods, rendering services, and making loans by securing particular types of property interests in something usually possessed by the buyer. These property interests are usually conditional and end when a buyer-debtor fulfills some condition, frequently repayment of what is owed. The two principal types of security interests are mort- gages and secured transactions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Many scholars do not appreciate that these security interests are in fact property applications because these interests are not physical objects. But they involve a legal fence that protects the holder of the security interest from the general claims of all other persons, and if the buyer-debtor (from here on, just debtor) fails to comply with the condition, the seller-creditor (from here on, just creditor or secured party) can usually seize (and/or sell) the object of the security interest to help satisfy the obli- gation of repayment. Identifying security interests as applications of property helps explain why we say that property, the concept of the private fence, is the central concept of capitalism and private markets.
SECURITY INTERESTS IN LAND Security interests in land and the structures on the land include mortgages, deeds of trust, and land sales contracts. As observed at the beginning of this chapter, the major way that small business owners raise money to begin their businesses is through mortgaging their homes. They borrow money from a bank or financial insti- tution and in return give that creditor a security interest called a mortgage on their homes and the land associated with their homes. In recent years it has also become quite common for homeowners in their capacity as consumers to take out a mort- gage on their homes in order to access the value of their homes for purchases they wish to make.
LO 7-5
How is a security interest a property arrangement?
The major way that small business owners raise money to begin their businesses is through mortgaging their homes.
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Similar to mortgages are deeds of trust. Under the deed of trust, a borrower signs a note, which shows the borrower’s debt to the lender, and then signs a deed of trust, which grants the lender a security interest in the building and land put up to secure the loan. The deed is held by a third party called a trustee who holds full legal ownership to the land. Under this arrangement the debtor will obtain legal owner- ship, or title, only when the deed has been repaid.
Unimproved land and farmland are often sold through land sales contracts. Under a land sales contract, the owner of land sells it by contract subject to the condition that the seller retains title to the land until the buyer pays the purchase price. Until that time, the buyer has the legal right to possess and use the land and is responsible for paying taxes and insurance.
Recording Statutes Generally, mortgages and deeds of trust must be registered in a recording office in the county where the land is located. Recording gives notice of the security interest to potential buyers of the land and to potential lenders who will then consider that fact in determining whether or not to buy the land or to loan money. That potential buyers or lenders become aware of the mortgage is important because the land is subject to satisfy the mortgagee’s debt whether or not the land is sold or a subsequent mortgage is taken out on the land.
If mortgagees (the creditors) fail to record mortgages, new buyers of the lands who are unaware of mortgages will take the lands free and clear of the mortgages, although the debts will still be owed by the mortgagors (debtors). Likewise, a credi- tor who registers a subsequent mortgage on land, being unfamiliar with the unre- corded first mortgage, will have priority over the first mortgage.
Foreclosure, Deficiency, and Redemption Almost all states regulate how mortgagees can exercise their property interest when the obligation owed to them is not satisfied. Foreclosure is the term used for the exercise of the secured property interest, and foreclosure usually means that the creditor must go through the court system to ensure that procedures are properly followed before debtors lose their homes and land. Foreclosure as it relates to land sales contracts is generally simpler and less expensive to exercise than foreclosure of mortgages and deeds of trust. Foreclosure means that the court will order the land sold to satisfy the debt owed, usually by auction to the highest bidder, with any excess after payment of what is owed to the secured creditor going to the debtor.
You should appreciate that the property represented by these types of security interests is separate from the loan obligation owed by the debtor-mortgagor. In many states, if foreclosure and auction do not produce enough money to satisfy the debt owed by the mortgagor, the creditor-mortgagee can still sue the debtor for the bal- ance owed, called a deficiency. Some states, however, have passed statutes, called antideficiency judgment statutes, that prevent mortgagees from obtaining anything else from mortgagors once the land has been foreclosed and auctioned. These stat- utes generally only apply to protect homeowners.
Before the actual foreclosure, most states permit a right of redemption, which allows the mortgagor to get back the land upon payment of the full amount of the debt, including all interest and costs. Even after foreclosure some states have a statutory period of redemption, usually six months or one year after fore- closure, in which the mortgagor can redeem the land from a new buyer. If a first mortgagor fails to redeem, most states permit second mortgage holders to redeem the land.
If mortgagees failed to record mortgages, new buyers of the lands who are unaware of mort- gages will take the lands free and clear of the mortgages.
The right of redemption allows a mortgagor, before foreclosure, to get back the land upon payment of the full amount of the debt. Statutory redemption allows a mortgagor to regain ownership of the land upon payment of all interest and costs for a period of time after foreclosure.
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is the principal set of laws control- ling security interests in objects of personal property. Article 9 contains the law of secured transactions. This law is highly complicated and technical, and what follows merely introduces you to some of the concepts found in Article 9. A secured transaction involves a creditor who has sold something on credit or made a loan to a debtor who agrees to give the creditor a security interest in a valuable object, called collateral.
Secured transaction law applies to a variety of things, including consumer goods (which are not bought for business purposes), farm products, inventory, equipment, stocks, bonds, negotiable instruments (orders or promises to pay in a certain form, such as checks), valuable documents such as those transferring goods, accounts receivable (money owed, but not in a certain form like negotiable instruments), and “general intangibles” like interests in patents, trademarks, and copyrights. A security interest in any of these things arises when it attaches. Attachment takes place when (1) a secured party has given value, (2) the debtor owns the collateral, and (3) a security agreement is given. This agreement must be in writing, signed by the debtor, and contain a reasonable description of the collateral. The collateral may include not only things currently owned by the debtor but also after-acquired property that the debtor acquires in the future. Proceeds realized from the sale of the collateral can also be covered by the security interest.
Perfection As soon as the security interest attaches it is effective against the debtor, but to be effective against third parties, such as other creditors and people to whom the collateral may be sold or transferred, the secured party must perfect the security interest. Perfection arises when a security interest has attached and the creditor has taken all proper steps required by Article 9. A creditor perfects a secu- rity interest differently according to the type of collateral.
The general way of perfecting a security interest under Article 9 is to file a financing statement. The form of the financing statement differs from state to state, but the statement should contain the names and addresses of the creditor and debtor, a reasonable description of the collateral, and the signature of the debtor. Financing statements expire five years after the date of filing unless a maturity date is stated and are usually filed in the county where the collateral is located or with an office of the state government, depending on the state and the type of collateral. Financing statements are appropriate to perfect any type of collateral except nego- tiable ones, which can always be transferred free of a secured creditor’s claim unless they are kept in the creditor’s possession.
Some types of security interests are perfected by attachment alone, for example, a purchase money security interest (PMSI) in consumer goods, meaning a secu- rity interest that secures the purchase price of goods bought for personal or house- hold use. Such security interests perfect as soon as they properly attach. Similarly, there is a temporary 21-day perfection in negotiable instruments or documents as soon as they attach, which allows the creditor time to take possession of these valu- ables. An automatic 10-day perfection in proceeds realized from the sale of collateral also exists even if the perfected security interest in the original collateral did not mention proceeds.
Generally, a creditor with an attached security interest has priority over a creditor without a security interest. Additionally, a creditor with a perfected security interest
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code cov- ers the law of secured transactions.
Explain to yourself how attachment takes place.
Be able to discuss all the different ways that perfection can take place.
A PMSI secures the purchase price of goods bought for personal or household use.
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has priority over one whose security interest has not been perfected. When two credi- tors have perfected security interests, the one whose interest was perfected first has priority. However, a secured creditor does not have priority over a purchaser who gives value for collateral and takes it before a security interest is perfected. A buyer in the ordinary course of business also has priority over a perfected security interest.
After a debtor has defaulted, which usually means it has failed to repay the credit that the secured creditor extended, the secured creditor may peacefully repossess the collateral without going to court unless the debtor orally protests the repossession. In this case, the secured party will have to obtain a court order to repossess. Follow- ing repossession, the secured creditor can dispose of the collateral in any “commer- cially reasonable” fashion, such as sale or lease, and must return to the debtor any excess money realized over the amount owed. The secured party can also propose to keep the collateral in complete satisfaction of the debt.
ARTISAN’S LIENS AND MECHANIC’S LIENS An artisan’s lien on a property interest arises when someone who contributes parts and/or services to an object of personal property is not paid. For example, if an automobile owner takes the vehicle to a repair shop but cannot pay when the work is finished, the garage can legally refuse to release vehicle. This lien has priority over even an Article 9 perfected security interest held by the bank that loaned the buyer the money to purchase the car. This result is so because the service provider (the “artisan”) has added value with goods and labor. The artisan may be able to realize the value of the goods and labor added if he or she eventually sells the property. An artisan’s lien is possessory, meaning that generally, the lien has priority only as long as the creditor keeps possession of the collateral.
A mechanic’s lien arises when someone contributes materials and/or services to real estate, usually a building, and is not paid. Unlike the artisan’s lien, this lien is not possessory and has priority only if it is perfected by the filing of a written notice, usually in the county where the real estate is found. This lien also has priority over an Article 9 perfected security interest when a fixture, an object of personal property like a carpet, is incorporated into real estate by becoming a physical part of it. The carpet can be subject to a perfected security interest that will follow the carpet’s incorporation into the real estate if the owner of the real estate receives the required notice. However, a mechanic’s lien that adds value to the real estate has priority over a perfected security interest in a fixture.
Limitations on Property and the Common Good
As discussed earlier, private property serves the common good or general welfare of the nation. However, private property also has limits, and these limits tell us that an individual private property right is always subject at some point to the rights of others.
PROPERTY, THE USE OF RESOURCES, AND THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS In law, property is not a thing. It is an owner’s right to exclude others from resources. One of the most important resources is the use owners can make of another resource, for example, a piece of land. Owners can build a house, a shopping mall,
A secured creditor can repossess collateral only if the repossession is peaceful.
LO 7-6
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or a skyscraper on their land. Or farm it. Or leave it unoccupied. They can take their money and open a computer store with it, or save it for retirement, or invest it in the stock market. All of these ways of using resources come within the legal guarantee of property. Implied in the exclusive rights to private resources is the legal protection to use them in many ways. This quality helps make the marketplace dynamic and responsive to needs and wants.
In an important and meaningful sense, owners also have a property in using their efforts. They have an exclusive right to direct their resource in themselves any way they wish. They can use it to pursue any line of employment, or they can leave the job market and do volunteer work for Meals on Wheels. Or go back to school for an MBA. Or retire on their savings and garden, travel, or watch football.
Having a property right to direct the resources of one’s efforts and to be able to exclude others from the further resources one acquires with these efforts is closely related to other concepts like “freedom” and “liberty.” The American colonists and the framers of the Constitution certainly thought so. John Dickinson, who helped draft the Constitution, observed that Americans “cannot be happy, without freedom; nor free, without security of property; nor so secure, unless the sole power to dispose of it be lodged within themselves.” Revolutionary War diplomat Arthur Lee wrote, “The right of property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.” In 1768 a colonial American observed, “Liberty and Property are not only join’d in common discourse, but are in their own natures so nearly ally’d [allied], that we cannot be said to possess the one without the other.” The early Americans firmly believed that they had a property not only in their material possessions but also in liberty, speech, and other rights. In summary, they had an exclusive right to use freely their resource in themselves and the resources produced by their efforts.
Generally speaking, owners are prohibited from using their resources in ways that harm or injure the resources of other owners. As James Madison explained, the concept of property “leaves to everyone else a like advantage.” Under the rule of law, a property system protects the equal right of all to their resources, including the resources they have in themselves. Tort law (Chapter 10), criminal law (Chapter 13), and much of the regulatory law discussed throughout this book attempt to prevent owners from using their resources to injure the resources that belong to others.
Two limits on land use that protect the equal right of all landowners are espe- cially relevant to this chapter. They involve the law of nuisance and zoning.
NUISANCE AND ZONING The law limits certain uses of one’s land through the doctrine of nuisance. What constitutes a nuisance is somewhat vague, but in most jurisdictions, the common law cases have been put in statutory form. Several common elements exist in the law of nuisance in most states. To begin with, there are two types of nuisance: public and private.
A public nuisance is one arising from some use of land that causes inconve- nience or damage to the public. For example, discharging industrial waste from one’s land that kills the fish in a river constitutes a public nuisance since fishing rights are publicly held. Public nuisance claims may be brought only by a public official, not private individuals, unless the latter have suffered some special damage to their property as a result of the public nuisance. Note that many public nuisances can also violate various regulatory laws, such as environmental laws (see Chapter 19).
Explain what it means to say that you have a property in your efforts. How is such a property related to liberty?
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Any unreasonable use of one’s property so as to cause substantial interference with the enjoyment or use of another’s land establishes a common law private nuisance. The unreasonableness of the interference is measured by a balancing pro- cess in which the character, extent, and duration of harm to the plaintiff is weighed against the social utility of the defendant’s activity and its appropriateness to its loca- tion. Because society needs industrial activity as well as natural tranquility, people must put up with a certain amount of smoke, dust, noise, and polluted water if they live in concentrated areas of industry. But what may be an appropriate industrial use of land in a congested urban area may be a private nuisance if it occurs in a rural or residential location. The difficulty courts face in addressing certain kinds of prop- erty intrusions is described in Sidebar 7.9.
A private nuisance is an unreasonable use of one’s property so as to cause substantial inter- ference with the enjoy- ment or use of another’s land.
We often think of a property owner’s rights against the world as relatively strong and complete. Trespass makes one legally liable even when property is not physically damaged. It is a property owner’s right to exclude that is harmed, and that is sufficient. However, we may not consider every intrusion as equivalent to walking onto another’s land without permission. One might reason- ably consider unauthorized entry of light, odor, or noise as a different species of intrusion (even though argu- ably something physical is occurring). Does nuisance law appropriate address the harm?
Cases involving the intrusion of light, odor and noise provide somewhat mixed results on liability. For example, in October 2013, several Irwindale, California residents complained of sore throats, nosebleeds, and burning eyes that were allegedly due to Sriracha production. The city council considered the complaints and declared the factory a “public nuisance,” shutting down the plant
pending a trial on the issue. Conversely, when a labor union protested against a Nevada restaurant by project- ing messages alleging health code violations on the side of the restaurant, a court in 2016 found no liability .
What courts seem to be struggling with is a classic property rights problem. Should one property owner have the power to enjoin (stop) another’s activity, potentially con- straining economic value or speech (a property rule). Or should a light, odor or noise intruder simply be required to compensate for proven injuries, while being permitted to make its own decision on the economics of continuing the activity (a liability rule)? Importantly, in some cases, the former rule could end up limiting the intruder’s use of their own property. Perhaps for that reason, courts so far seem to favor liability rules. But the issue remains open for debate. Source: Maureen E. Brady, Property and Projection, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1143 (2020); Jenn Harris, “Irwindale Declares Sriacha Factory a Public Nuisance,” Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2014.
sidebar 7.9
Light, Odor, Noise, and the Property Fence
Once the plaintiff establishes a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of his or her property, the court must decide what remedy the plaintiff is entitled to. The court may award damages if the plaintiff has suf- fered economic loss, but when damages are inadequate the court may also order the defendant to do something, like correct the problem, or else cease the nuisance- creating activity. In determining whether to issue an injunction, the court will take into consideration (1) the relative economic hardship that will be placed upon the parties if such relief is granted and (2) the public interest in the continuation of the defendant’s activity. This balancing of interests required by nuisance law can bring about some unusual remedies.
In Case 7.3, the court requires the defendants to move their house. Nuisance law attempts to balance the equal right of all in the property system. It
does so by preventing landowners from unreasonably interfering with other publicly
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case 7.3
COOK v. SULLIVAN 829 A.2d 1059 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 2003)
DALIANIS, J.: . . . The defendants, John and Diane Sul- livan, appeal a decision of the Superior Court finding that they created a nuisance on the plaintiffs’ property by filling in wetlands and constructing a home on their property.
Since 1946, the plaintiffs [the Cooks] have owned property on Lake Winnipesaukee in Moultonboro. Over the years, they have built various structures on the prop- erty, including a main house, a garage, and a guest house. In 1996, the defendants purchased adjoining property.
At the time of the purchase, the defendants [Sullivans] . . . had a three-bedroom modular house placed on their prop- erty. In the course of construction, the defendants used large quantities of fill in the area where they were building the house. In 1997, the plaintiffs began experiencing increased wetness, which they claim lasted for extended periods of time, on their property. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that, since the construction, standing water accumulated in their garage and underneath the house, and that the water has interfered with their ability to use their property as they had in the past. They also claimed that this condition persisted each summer from 1997 to 2001.
In 1999, the plaintiffs complained to the defendants, who attempted to remedy the problem by removing some fill along the parties’ common boundary line, digging a drainage ditch and moving a wall. The plaintiffs, however, claimed that the condition of their land did not change [and they sued].
The trial court ruled that the defendants’ construction activities constituted a nuisance that damaged the plaintiffs’ property, and that the remedy was to remove the fill and foundation from the jurisdictional wetlands, which would necessarily require the defendants’ house to be moved. . . . [T]his appeal followed.
A private nuisance exists when an activity substan- tially and unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoy- ment of another’s property. “To constitute a nuisance, the defendants’ activities must cause harm that exceeds the customary interferences with land that a land user suffers in an organized society, and be an appreciable and tangi- ble interference with a property interest.” In determining whether an act interfering with the use and enjoyment is so unreasonable and substantial as to amount to a nuisance and warrant an injunction, a court must balance the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the defen- dant’s conduct, both to himself and to the community. It is the plaintiffs’ burden to prove the existence of a nuisance by a preponderance of the evidence.
The evidence supports the trial court’s finding of nui- sance. At trial, witnesses testified that large portions of the defendants’ lot were swampy and had pools of standing water prior to construction. The plaintiffs’ expert, Randall Shuey, a certified soil scientist, testified that he conducted extensive testing of the defendants’ property subsequent to their construction and stated that the defendants’ activities had had caused subsurface waters to divert to the plaintiffs’ property.
Further, the plaintiffs testified that their property was substantially wetter after the defendants built their house. The defendants assert that there was insufficient evidence to support this finding, or that the wetness problems con- tinued to exist at the time of final hearing, because the plaintiffs’ property was wet before construction. While there was evidence that portions of the plaintiffs’ property were wet prior to the defendants’ construction, numerous witnesses testified that the water levels increased following the defendants’ construction. This testimony was corrobo- rated by Shuey’s statement that the defendants’ construc- tion altered the elevation of the defendants’ land as well as the flow of subsurface waters, causing increased wetness on the plaintiffs’ property. While there was evidence intro- duced of flooding in 1998, Shuey stated that, while having a short-term effect, the flooding did not cause the prolonged wetness the plaintiffs experienced in later years. Moreover, the plaintiffs testified that this condition on their property repeated each spring and early summer from 1997 to 2001.
The plaintiffs also illustrated various problems associ- ated with the increased wetness. For example, they testified that following the construction, there was standing water on their property, both on a large portion of the lawn, includ- ing the backyard between the house and the garage, and under the garage and chalet. They explained that because of the increased wetness, they were forced to move dog pens that they traditionally kept in the lower part of their prop- erty, and that they could no longer hang a clothesline or stack firewood in the backyard, or use the backyard for rec- reational activities. Plaintiffs testified that they had trouble mowing the lawn because of the water. The plaintiffs also explained that they could no longer store things directly on their garage floor due to standing water in the spring and early summer months. Further, they testified that there was a strong, musty odor in the house after water began col- lecting under the foundation, which prevented them from using the house during those months when the windows are closed.
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and privately owned resources. Determining what is unreasonable is an ongoing and controversial process in a property-based legal system. You should understand now that property boundaries of use are not infinite and may be ambiguous until a court order or legislature sets them.
Through their exercise of the police powers, states and local governments pro- tect the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. It is under the police pow- ers that a major governmental regulation of land use takes place: zoning. Zoning ordinances are generally laws that divide counties or municipalities into use districts
Do you agree with the principle of zoning ordinances or not?
Given the evidence in the record, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in finding that the defendants’ con- struction created a nuisance resulting in damages to the plaintiffs’ property.
Having concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the defendants’ activities constitute a nuisance, we now must determine whether the remedy was appropriate. In evaluating the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the court utilizes the same balancing test that is used to first identify whether a nuisance exists, “although the scales must weigh more heavily in the [plaintiff’s] favor because of the extraor- dinary nature of this form of relief.” The propriety of affording relief in a particular case rests in the sound dis- cretion of the trial court. . . . We will uphold a trial court’s order unless its decision constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion. If the defendants’ activity can be carried on without causing unreasonable interference to the plaintiffs, then they should not be required to remove their house. On the other hand, an order requiring such removal is justified if there is no other way to abate the private nuisance.
The defendants challenge the ordered remedy, argu- ing that the trial court neglected to balance the hardships between the parties and that there was insufficient evidence to support its decision.
With regard to remedying the nuisance, Shuey stated specifically that “the only way to guarantee that we’re not going to have any additional impacts on the property, or to restore it to what it was previously, is to move that house
and all that fill out of the jurisdictional area, out of the jurisdictional wetlands.” He also stated that this could be accomplished by moving the defendants’ house and founda- tion back forty or fifty feet on the property.
The defendants did propose a less stringent remedy to the trial court, which involved removing fill within twenty feet of the plaintiffs’ boundary and constructing a ditch near the boundary for water discharge. Shuey testified, however, that he could not guarantee that the plaintiffs’ property would be restored to its condition prior to the defendants’ construction. The defendants did not offer any expert testi- mony at trial in support of their proposed remedy nor did they offer any other alternate remedies.
The record reflects that the trial court took the hard- ships of both parties into consideration when deciding the remedy. For example, the trial court explained in its final verdict that it was prepared to decide what remedy “would be equitable and fair under all the circumstances.” Further, the court told the parties during trial that it was consider- ing the equities of both parties when considering the appro- priate remedy. Moreover, the court adopted the unusual procedure of viewing the property both before and after it took testimony and reviewed the exhibits. Having consid- ered the evidence before the trial court, we agree that the gravity of harm to the plaintiffs resulting from the defen- dants’ nuisance is significant enough to support the trial court’s remedy.
Consequently, we find sufficient evidentiary sup- port for the trial court’s remedy and uphold its decision. Affirmed.
KEY POINTS • The Sullivans transformed their property to support a new house, but this had the effect of
unreasonably and substantially harming the Cooks’ property. They did not internalize the costs of their behavior.
• The water that flooded the Cooks’ property did not necessarily flow from the Sullivans’ property. If it had, the water might have constituted a trespass rather than a nuisance.
• If the Sullivans had provided the court with another option other than moving their house, the balance of hardships might have come out differently.
[continued]
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designated residential, commercial, or industrial. Zoning limits the use to which land can be put to that specified. For instance, industrial facilities cannot be built in resi- dential districts. Zoning may also specify the height, size, number, and location of buildings that can be built on land. Restricting buildings in a commercial district to no more than eight stories in height is an example. Zoning may additionally impose aesthetic requirements concerning color and exterior design. Zoning boards (or com- missions), which are generally agencies of local governments, enforce the zoning ordinances. Owners should always check to determine how zoning limits land use.
An owner can ask a zoning board for a variance to allow use of land in a way not permitted under a zoning ordinance. The board is likely to grant a variance only when the owner can prove that the ordinance prevents a reasonable economic return on the land as zoned. Zoning ordinances allow uses of land that existed prior to pas- sage of the ordinances. Such uses are called “nonconforming” uses.
Like nuisance law, zoning regulations are highly controversial because they involve limits on how owners can use their land. The purpose of zoning laws may be to protect the right of all to their lands, but not everyone is going to agree with the limits that zoning laws establish.
PROPERTY LIMITATIONS AND THE COMMON GOOD The fact that there are limitations on property illustrates that this exclusive right serves the common good. The property-related concepts of duration limitations and taxa- tion illustrate that when society believes that property no longer promotes the general public welfare, owners lose the resources it protects. “Additionally, as exemplified by Sidebar 7.10, property owners can agree to limit their rights in the public interest.”
Duration Limitations on Property Do not believe for a minute that when you own something you own it forever. For instance, the Constitution grants patents and copyrights—only for “limited Times.” The reasoning behind the limitation is to ensure that inventions and creative expressions enter the public domain so as to serve the common good as quickly as possible after allowing for the profit necessary to encourage people to create new things in the first place.
Patents and copyrights, however, are not the only property concept that lim- its the duration of an owner’s exercise of exclusive right over resources. The rule against perpetuities limits all exercise of property over resources to a duration of “lives in being plus twenty-one years.” The rule prevents an owner from controlling resources through many future generations by setting up trust arrangements, under which trustees are legally required to carry out the wishes of the owner for extended duration. As it is, a trust may not extend the control of an owner beyond 21 years of the death of someone who is alive at the time of the owner’s death.
Taxation The justification for property may be the common good. And the common good may consist primarily of setting conditions for the maximum private production of what people need and want. However, the government provides other resources that people need and want, including public roads, public education, law enforcement, a judicial system, defense of the nation, and public assistance for the poor. These ser- vices are also a part of the general welfare (or common good) of the nation, and they are expensive. Some people believe that in the common good the government should provide even more public services such as more public health care. The taxes to sup- port these services limit the right of private property and suggest that property’s claim to promoting the common good is not absolute.
The rule against perpetuities serves the common good by preventing dead owners from indefinitely limit- ing the new productive ways that resources can be used.
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Federal taxation is a specified power of Congress, contained in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution: “The Congress shall have the Power to lay and col- lect Taxes . . . to . . . provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States. . . .” Because the Supreme Court ruled that Article 1, Section 8, did not authorize indirect taxes, like the progressive income tax, the Constitution was amended in 1913 by the Sixteenth Amendment, which permits such taxes.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the top one percent of federal income taxpayers pay more dollars of tax than the bottom 60 percent of taxpayers do. On the other hand, poorer taxpayers pay a higher percentage of their incomes in state and local sales taxes than do wealthier taxpayers. The fairness of the tax system and the adequacy of public services are frequent issues around election time. One thing is certain, however: These issues intertwine with perceptions of the common good, which in turn connects with the exclusive right called property. They illustrate that property, which promotes the common good, is also limited by it.
The wealth produced by the property system must actually reach people in order to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Exclusive right is not an ethical or moral end in itself. Although there can be much debate about its extent, taxation of wealth generated by the incentives of the property system is part of what contributes to the common good.
PROPERTY: A CONCLUSION AND COMMENT This chapter has introduced the law of property as it orders society’s limited resources. Although many chapter sections have explained the rules making up property law, the chapter has also focused on the general importance of the legal
CBO data show that the top 20 percent of taxpayers have expe- rienced an increasing burden, paying nearly 70 percent of all federal tax liability in 2016.
Can property exist both as an individual right and for the common good? Discuss.
Consumers and businesses increasingly embrace sus- tainability as an important and desirable outcome for their property ownership and use. Buildings are frequently promoted as “green” according to certifications such that from the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program. Landowners may farm according to specific sustainable standards in order to obtain the U.S. Department of Agri- culture’s “organic” seal. And of course, goods may be produced using materials that are recyclable, biodegrad- able or compostable.
There is evidence that people value sustainability. For example, researchers find that buildings with a green rating command higher rental rates. And according to a New York University report, 50 percent of the sales growth in consumer packaged products is from sustain- ability-marketed goods. More broadly, many studies sug- gest that environmental, social and governance (ESG)
criteria are positively correlated with corporate financial performance.
Importantly, the sustainable use of property can be a voluntary or mandatory objective. The decision to pursue LEED certification or install renewable energy tools like solar panels is entirely up to the individual property owner. Though there may be substantial economic incentives to choose such sustainable options, the ultimate decision relies on the ethics of the owner and the market. In some cases, the state may act to protect a property owner’s investment. A recent trend in some states is to convey easements for light on adjacent property to ensure that solar panels have sufficient access to the sun’s energy. On the other hand, recycling of individual property such as aluminum cans or glass bottles is frequently mandated by local governments. A failure to comply results in a fine, which constitutes a limitation in alienation rights to some extent.
sidebar 7.10
Property Restrictions for a More Sustainable Future
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property system to private enterprise and society. The key to the most rapid increase of total wealth—the greatest expansion of limited resources—is a property system that applies generally and equally to everyone’s resources.
In the modern nation, property law founds the marketplace by establishing an essential framework for the voluntary and certain exchange of identifiable private resources. There is strong reason to think that a prime determinant of wealth in the world today is the presence or absence of an adequate property system under the rule of law. Thus, it is significant that business students appreciate the fundamental role of law in business and the necessity for a strong legal system even when they oppose the wisdom of specific rules or regulations.
Although effective property law may be the foundation for society’s material flourishing and the liberty of the individual, it also has another side to it. Property law permits the accumulation of unequal exclusive resources, and as James Madison wrote in The Federalist: “The most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.” A property system functions best when there is a large middle class with adequate resources, or at least a well-educated populace that understands the benefits of property. Otherwise, in a democracy the temptation is great to redistribute resources through taxation, and at some point the motivation to produce additional limited resources diminishes.
The major issues of poverty and prosperity in the new millennium involve the understanding of property law’s effects on society. To deal knowledgeably with the legal environment of business, students must grasp how law founds the private mar- ketplace for the common good.
Chapters 8 and 9 introduce you to the rules of contract law. As you read these chapters, keep in mind the important connection between property and contract. The rules of contract law concern the legally binding promises by which owners exchange resources in our property-based legal system. When you sign a contract to buy a new smartphone you promise to exchange the ownership of money for the ownership of the smartphone.
Why does a property system function best when there is a large middle class with ade- quate resources?
Key Terms Accession 207 Adverse possession 206 Artisan’s lien 212 Attachment 211 Bailee 200 Bailment 200 Bailor 200 Buyer in the ordinary course of
business 212 Collateral 211 Confusion 207 Contract 204 Deed 208 Deeds of trust 210 Deficiency 210 Easement 199 Estate 198
Fee simple 198 Financing statement 211 Fixture 198 Foreclosure 210 Gift 208 Intangible personal
property 193 Joint tenancy 199 Land sales contract 210 Leasehold estate 198 Life estate 198 Mechanic’s lien 212 Mortgage 191 Mortgagees 210 Mortgagors 210 Ownership 204 Perfection 211
Personal property 193 Private nuisance 214 Property 188 Public nuisance 213 Purchase money security interest
(PMSI) 211 Real property 193 Right of redemption 210 Rule against perpetuities 217 Rule of first possession 205 Secured transactions 211 Security interest 209 Tangible personal
property 193 Tenancy in common 199 Title 208 Zoning ordinance 216
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Review Questions and Problems The Property System
1. The Problem of Limited Resources The Soviet Constitution guaranteed the citizens’ private property. Why then was the former Soviet Union so poor?
2. Property and Prosperity (a) How does property help generate prosperity? Discuss. (b) Explain the importance of the visibility of resources to the wealth of nations.
Defining Property in the Legal System 3. Two Basic Divisions of Property
(a) Explain the two basic divisions of property. (b) Martin sold his house to Cheryl. Later, when he tried to take the beautiful
chandelier in the dining room, which had belonged to his grandparents, with him, Cheryl objected. What is the issue here? Legally, who is likely to win this dispute? Discuss.
Property Boundaries in the Physical World 4. Defining Land
(a) Real estate is no longer defined as extending from the center of the earth to the heavens. Explain how modern property law imposes more limits.
(b) If David tosses a ball across Laura’s yard, but it does not touch the surface of her yard, has it infringed (trespassed) on her property?
(c) If WaterCo drills a horizontal well next to (but not over) Lee’s property line and drains water from under Lee’s land, has WaterCo interfered with Lee’s rights? Consider the application of the rule of capture.
(d) Property law distinguishes between land (real property) and personal property. Decide whether the following are land or personal property and explain why.
I. A porch light II. A lamp next to a bed III. A song about a porch light Interests in Property with Respect to Others and Time
5. Types of Ownership (a) What does it mean to have a fee simple defeasible estate? (b) What is the difference between a remainder interest and a reversion? (c) Arla and Jack own a house as joint tenants with right of survivorship. What is
the legal significance of this? 6. Easements
(a) In what way is an easement protected by a property fence? (b) Explain an easement by prescription.
7. Bailments (a) Is a lease of a mowing tractor a bailment? Explain. (b) A warehouse contract requires that your equipment be stored in “warehouse
314.” For its own convenience the warehouseman moves your equipment to warehouse 212, and your equipment is destroyed by a tornado that sweeps through town. Is the warehouse liable to you for the value of the equipment? What if the equipment had been destroyed in warehouse 314? Would your
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answer be different? Because of these types of problems, what sort of arrange- ments do bailors and bailees often make regarding bailed goods?
(c) How are common carriers different from other sorts of bailees?
Acquiring Resources in a Property System
8. Acquiring Resources through Exchange (a) How does the law of contracts fit into our property-based legal system? (b) Explain why more resources are exchanged by contracts than by any other method.
9. Acquiring Resources through Possession (a) Along a winding dirt road, Lee finds an old, rusty car with no license plates.
Looking through the car, which is unlocked, he finds a valuable diamond ring. Later, the original buyer of the ring comes forward and admits that he has dumped the old car along the road, but wants his ring back. Who is legally entitled to the ring? Explain.
(b) The owner of Downtown Condos discovers that Schuyler Skyscraper actu- ally extends 6 inches on to land belonging to Downtown. Discuss the legal ramifications.
10. Acquiring Resources through Confusion (a) What are fungible goods? Give an example. (b) Discuss why boundaries of use are sometimes difficult to determine.
11. Acquiring Resources through Accession (a) Explain what it means to acquire ownership by accession. (b) Discuss why to John Locke a doctrine similar to accession justifies who owns what.
12. Acquiring Resources through Gift (a) In terms of a gift, explain delivery and constructive delivery. (b) What is a testamentary gift?
13. Title and Property Registration (a) Name three kinds of deeds to land and explain what they mean. (b) Why is it important to register a deed? Discuss.
Property and Security Interests
14. Security Interests in Land (a) Name three types of security interests in land and explain them. (b) Discuss why recording mortgages and deeds of trust is so important. Why is
recording less important in the case of the land sales contract? 15. Secured Transactions
(a) Describe the requirements for attachment of a security interest under UCC, Article 9.
(b) Describe four different instances that demonstrate perfection of a security interest. (c) Roger sells his expensive mowing tractor to his neighbor Zan. Shortly after
Zan takes possession, someone representing the lawn equipment company tells Zan that the store holds a purchase money security interest (PMSI) in the tractor. Does the store have priority regarding the mower, meaning does the security interest continue on the mower following Zan’s purchase of it?
(d) Olaf loans Lisa $500 and attaches a security interest in Lisa’s printing machin- ery. If a judgment creditor attempts to seize the machinery to satisfy a damage award, does Olaf’s interest take priority?
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16. Artisan’s Liens and Mechanic’s Liens Laura is hired to build an addition onto David’s house. After completion of the addition, David refuses to pay Laura. Does Laura have the option of an artisan’s lien or a mechanic’s lien? What is the consequence for David’s property?
Limitations on Property and the Common Good
17. Property, the Use of Resources, and the Equal Right of Others Discuss why it is important to have a property right in the uses of things.
18. Nuisance and Zoning (a) Distinguish a public nuisance from a private nuisance. What does nuisance
have to do with the common good? Discuss. (b) What is the “coming to the nuisance” doctrine?
19. Property Limitations and the Common Good What is the rule against perpetuities? What does it have to do with the common good?
20. Taxation Why is taxation of private property legal?
21. Property: A Conclusion and Comment (a) What does James Madison think is the problem with a private property system,
a system he nevertheless supported? (b) Suppose you say to your roommate, “I have as much property as Bill Gates,”
although more accurately in terms of law you should say, “I have the same property as Bill Gates.” What do you mean by this statement? Answer by explaining the basic confusion about the term “property.”
1. While you are attending a business conference in South America, someone approaches you and says, “A private property system might work well in your country, but it will never work in mine. There are only a few wealthy families in my country who own almost everything. Our only hope for the people is for the government to confiscate their lands and administer our resources through socialism.” • What do you say to this person in light of what you have read in this chapter? • What strategy might you suggest regarding getting more private land into the hands of
the poor in that country? 2. Richard Epstein, a University of Chicago law professor, said in his book Takings that the principles of nuisance illustrate more clearly than any other doctrine how our property- based legal system functions. • What did he mean by this statement? Discuss. • Explain what it means to say that property is the central concept in our legal system.
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
8-1 To describe the rationale and legal basis for contracts.
8-2 To classify contracts and understand the terminology used to describe contracts.
8-3 To describe the requirements needed to create an enforceable contract.
8-4 To identify instances in which mutual agreement cannot exist.
8-5 To know when a contract must be in writing.
Contract Formation8 kenishirotie/123RF
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T he average person’s day is filled with agree-
ments. Consider these activities:
• Updating a social networking page while adher-
ing to the use rules.
• Promising to meet a friend for lunch.
• Purchasing a cup of coffee.
• Committing to work with a colleague on a group
assignment.
• Downloading an app to a cell phone.
Do all of these interactions create contracts?
Would we expect a court to enforce them? What
are the consequences if one party refuses to follow
through with his or her promise?
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These and many other issues related to contracts are important because they are fundamental to the business environment. At the outset, understanding the basic definition of a contract is essential. Simply stated, a contract is a legally enforceable promise or an exchange of promises. Although this chapter and the next contain many important details of contract classifications, terminology, formation, and per- formance, it is important to remember that the heart of this topic is a promise or commitment to do or not to do something.
Every day, millions of contracts are created and performed by both businesspeo- ple and consumers. Without contracts and the court systems to enforce contracts, buyers and sellers would not be able to account for future risks or have confidence in exchanging valuable property interests. In fact, it is fair to say that no other area of the law has been as important as contracts in supporting private enterprise. As you read and study this chapter and the next, keep in mind the fundamental role that contracts have in making business possible.
There are also nonlegal business considerations in every contract. If your company tries to avoid a deal that a customer believes was settled, you risk losing that customer’s future business. Moreover, a company that uses contracts aggres- sively to trap customers in agreements that are unexpected or unfair risks nega- tive publicity that can undermine a good reputation for products or services. In so many ways, your business acumen is enhanced when you know the rules of contract law.
In this chapter, you will study the following topics:
• The legal foundation of contracts. • When communications become a contract. • What parties have to do when changes to a contract occur. • Who has the capacity to create contracts. • The necessary format of a contract. • When fraud or mistake prevents enforcement of a contract.
Chapter 9 continues with an examination of the performance and breach of contracts.
Basic Concepts
When was the last time you entered into a contract? You might be thinking of your most recent computer purchase or apartment lease. But, in fact, we enter into a con- tract even when doing something as mundane as buying a meal or even surfing the web. Most people contract daily for a great variety of goods and services. The rules of contract law underlie the private enterprise system at every turn.
CONTRACT LAW IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE A contract need not be a formal, written document, and those who make such an agreement do not have to use the word “contract” or recognize that they have made a legally enforceable promise. The rules of contract law still apply. If the expecta- tions of the parties to a contract are not met, these rules affect legal negotiations and may result in a lawsuit. For instance, contract law says that a restaurant makes an implied “promise” that its food is fit to eat (see Sidebar 8.2 later in the chapter).
LO 8-1
Contracts involve prom- ises that are enforce- able, with predictable consequences for per- formance failures.
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Should the restaurant serve a meal that gives the buyer food poisoning, it could be liable for the injury caused by breaking its promise.
Contract law enables private agreements to be legally enforceable. Enforce- ability of agreements is desirable because it gives people the certainty they need to rely on promises contained in agreements. For instance, a shirt manufacturer in Los Angeles must know that it can rely on the promise of a store in Boston to pay for a thousand specially manufactured shirts. The manufacturer is more likely to agree to sew the shirts if it can enforce payment from the buyer, if necessary, under the law of contracts. In an important sense, the law of contracts is vital for our private enterprise economy. It helps make buyers and sellers willing to do business together.
Contract law provides enormous flexibility and precision in business dealings. It provides flexibility in that you can agree (or require agreement) to literally anything that is not illegal or against public policy. It gives precision in that, with careful thinking, you can make another agree to exactly the requirements that accomplish even a very complex business purpose.
SOURCES OF CONTRACT LAW Most of the contract law outlined in this chapter is common law. Recall from Chap- ter 1 that common law comes from judges’ decisions. Through common law, the courts have developed principles controlling contract formation, performance, breach, and remedies. This judge-made law affects many types of contracts, includ- ing real property, service, employment, and general business contracts.
Another source of contract law is legislation. Various states have enacted com- mon law rules in statutes. In some cases, legislatures have replaced common law rules with different statutory requirements. Perhaps the most important example of state-based legislation affecting contract law is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Article 2 of the UCC covers the sale of goods. Goods are tangible, mov- able items of personal property. The UCC applies to individuals as well as firms. Every state has adopted some version of Article 2 of the UCC, thereby making state contract law relatively uniform in the area of goods contracts. Through- out this chapter and the next, you will study both the common law principles of contracts, which governs most other contracts, and the UCC. Remember the distinction between these two primary sources of contract law. Table 8.1 provides a preview to the differences between common law and UCC contracts discussed in this chapter.
Contractual Classifications and Terminology
We use a number of terms to help classify different types of contracts. Learning these terms will greatly help you understand contract law. This section introduces the following contractual terminology:
• Bilateral and unilateral contracts • Express and implied-in-fact contracts • Implied-in-law or quasi-contracts • Enforcement terminology • Performance terminology
Remember that the Uniform Commercial Code creates special rules applicable to the sale of goods.
LO 8-2
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BILATERAL AND UNILATERAL CONTRACTS Contracts involve either an exchange of promises by the parties or a promise con- ditioned on the performance of an act. A bilateral contract is an agreement con- taining mutual promises. For example, suppose David promises to sell his laptop computer to Laura in exchange for her promise to pay $1,000 to David for the equip- ment. When Laura makes her promise in response to David’s, a bilateral contract is formed. This relationship is depicted in Figure 8.1. Notice that a bilateral contract involves two promises, two rights, and two duties.
While a bilateral contract involves a promise for a promise, a unilateral contract is an agreement with only one promise, and only one party is committed to perform. The maker of such a promise seeks an action rather than a promise in return. If that action does not occur, there is no breach. Suppose Lisa tells Olaf, “If you sell 100 units this year, I will pay you a bonus of $1,000.” Here, Olaf is not committed to per- form, but if he does, Lisa is bound to pay the promised amount. In Figure 8.2, notice that there is only one promise, one duty, and one right.
Most business contracts take the bilateral form. Indeed, courts presume a bilat- eral nature of an agreement whenever there is doubt about the form. Nevertheless, the party making a promise can control the application of many concepts of con- tract law by understanding the distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts.
Bilateral contracts involve a promise- for-promise exchange.
Unilateral contracts exist when a promise is made in exchange for performance.
Issue Common Law UCC
Agreement Acceptance must be the “mirror image” of the offer.
Acceptance containing different terms will form a contract, with treatment of differing terms depending on whether both parties are merchants.
Implied terms Depends on the particular agreement. All contracts have the following as a default • Warranty of merchantability. • Warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. • Warranty of title and against
infringement. Undefined terms Essential terms must be included. Nonquantity open terms (such as price)
can be determined in the future. Consideration Necessary for agreement, modifications,
and option contracts. Necessary for agreement, but not for modifications or a merchant’s firm offer.
Contract Form (Statute of Frauds)
Writings required for certain types of agreements such as real property transfers, promises that cannot be performed within a year, and collateral promises.
Writing required for sale of goods $500 or more, unless • Partial performance occurs. • Goods are specially manufactured. • Contract between merchants later
confirmed. • Existence of contract admitted in court.
table 8.1 Selected Differences between Common Law and UCC Contracts
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EXPRESS AND IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS Many contracts arise from interactions in which parties actually discuss the prom- ised terms of their agreement. These are called express contracts. A negotiated pur- chase of land for construction of a manufacturing plant is an example of an express contract. Both written and oral agreements are express if the terms are described.
There are also implied-in-fact contracts. These contracts arise from the con- duct of the parties rather than from words. For instance, asking a person such as an accountant for professional advice implies a promise to pay the going rate for this advice even though you do not make an express promise to pay for it. Case 8.1 involves a possible implied-in-fact contract in the context of a job in which certain promises were made about employment protection for whistleblowing.
As a result of cases like Leyden, firms desiring at-will relationships are extremely careful to avoid listing conditions or rules in a manner that suggests continued employment when followed. Another context in which implied-in-fact contracts arise is when a party submits an idea to a firm, then later accuses the firm of using the idea without proper compensation to the submitter (see Sidebar 8.1).
Agreements that are largely express may nonetheless contain implied provisions when parts of the transaction are left out. This is particularly likely when business people get in a hurry to complete contractual arrangements to begin doing business.
In general, parties should always strive for written agreement with terms as complete as possible. Relying on implied terms is risky.
Figure 8.1 Bilateral contract.
David’s promise to deliver the laptop computer to Laura and
Laura’s right to receive the computer
Laura’s promise to pay David’s $1,000 and
David’s right to receive the money
Both parties have a duty to perform when contract is formed.
Figure 8.2 Unilateral contract.
One party has duty to perform if contract is formed by performance. But the other party may elect not to perform.
Lisa’s promise to pay Olaf $1,000 if 100 units are sold at the end of the year and
Olaf’s right to receive the money if he performs
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case 8.1
LEYDEN v. AMERICAN ACCREDITATION HEALTHCARE COMMISSION 83 F.Supp.3d 241 (D.D.C. 2015)
Christine Leyden was a registered nurse who worked for the American Accreditation Healthcare Commission (referred to in the case as “URAC”), a non-profit that accredits health care plans and providers. She was ostensibly a non-contract, or “at-will,” employee. In addition to explicit statements that employees in Leyden’s position were at-will, URAC had con- tradictory company policies that claimed to protect employees from retaliation from serving as whistleblowers or for express- ing grievances.
In 2012, URAC hired a new CEO. Leyden stated that she had acknowledged to human resources that the CEO and his deputy were fostering a workplace environment that was biased against women. Additionally, she raised concerns about the allegedly improper conduct of two UPAC board members. Leyden was terminated in 2013. At that point, she argued that the termination was in response to her complaints and violated the company policies against retaliation. She claimed that the termination was, therefore, a breach of an implied contract. URAC argued that Leyden’s at-will status precluded such a claim. The court was called upon to determine whether the promise of non-retaliation changed Leyden’s at-will status in the context at issue.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, U.S. DIST. JUDGE: Leyden acknowledges that she did not have a written employment contract with URAC. Nevertheless, she argues in Counts 3 and 6 that URAC breached implied contracts arising under two of its personnel policies when it terminated her. She further alleges, in Count 5, that URAC breached a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in these contracts and, in Count 4, that it is bound to fulfill the terms of one of the policies under a theory of promissory estoppel. URAC retorts that the policies are not applicable to Leyden’s alleged conduct and, in any event, did not create implied contracts because URAC’s employee handbook explicitly disclaims the creation of any contractual rights. URAC further contends that Leyden was not protected by the policies because she did not put her concerns in writing.
A plaintiff may rebut the D.C. law presumption of at-will employment by showing that “the parties intended that termination be subject to specific preconditions.” . . . One way to do so is to show that the terms of a personnel manual or employee handbook create contractual rights. An employer may disclaim that it is bound by the terms of those documents. But if the disclaimer is “rationally at odds” with other language in the document, a reasonable
jury could conclude that the employer intended to be bound by the substantive terms. . . . Any implied contract would also contain an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which requires “that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” . . . . Finally, even in the absence of a contract, an organization may be liable under a theory of promissory estoppel if a plaintiff establishes “(1) a promise; (2) that the promise reasonably induced reliance on it; and (3) that the prom- isee relied on the promise to his or her detriment.” . . .
Leyden locates implied contracts in two URAC poli- cies: a whistleblower policy and an employee grievance policy. URAC’s whistleblower policy invites employees “to report allegations of known or suspected Improper Activi- ties.” . . . “Improper Activities” are defined to include a non-exclusive series of specific acts, such as questionable accounting and fraud, as well as a catch-all category includ- ing “malfeasance” and “gross misconduct.” And most importantly, the policy concludes with an anti-retaliation provision: “No URAC employee who in good faith reports any Improper Activities in accordance with this policy shall suffer, and shall be protected from threats of harassment, retaliation, discharge, or other types of discrimination.” . . .
Leyden’s alleged complaints about a board member’s requests for proprietary information—supplied to URAC by an accredited entity with the expectation that URAC would not share it with board members from competing man- aged care organizations—implicates URAC’s whistleblower protections. In other words, conduct by board members in violation of an organization policy specifically designed to prevent breaches of confidentiality plausibly falls within the scope of the non-exclusive “Improper Activities” the whistle- blower policy invites employees to report. And Leyden may be protected by the whistleblower policy, despite raising her concerns verbally, because it merely “encourage[s]”—but does not require—employees to report improper activities in writing. . . . The Court further concludes that, to the extent the “at-will” disclaimer in the URAC employee handbook applies to the whistleblower policy (which is found in a different document), the handbook disclaimer is “ratio- nally at odds” with the whistleblower policy and therefore does not serve to retract URAC’s commitment to protect employees from retaliation for reporting suspected improper activity. . . . Any other conclusion would render the whis- tleblower policy meaningless. Having made the promise, URAC cannot now argue it was not bound to honor it.
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[continued]
The same is true of URAC’s grievance policy. That policy encourages URAC employees to raise complaints or suggestions concerning their work conditions. Like the whistleblower policy, it contains a non-retaliation provision promising that “[n]o employee will be penalized, formally or informally, for voicing a complaint with URAC in a rea- sonable, professional manner.” . . . Leyden alleges that she was fired for doing just that: raising concerns about manage- ment’s treatment of women and about conduct she thought undermined the integrity of the accreditation programs she oversaw. Again, because the “at-will” disclaimer contradicts
the grievance policy, it does not prohibit Leyden from seek- ing to enforce URAC’s promise not to penalize employees for lodging reasonable complaints.
Accordingly, Leyden has adequately pled that URAC entered into implied contracts, along with the implicit cov- enant of good faith and fair dealing included in those con- tracts. . . . She has also adequately pled, in the alternative, a valid claim for promissory estoppel based on the anti- retaliation provision of the whistleblower policy. The Court therefore will deny URAC’s motion to dismiss [the implied contract and promissory estoppel claims].
KEY POINTS • Enforcing implied-in-fact agreements is an important means of ensuring that two parties’
intent to make binding promises is honored. • Implied-in-fact agreements must contain the same elements as express contracts, including
acceptance and consideration. • Employers can weaken the presumption of an at-will employment relationship (covered in
Chapter 21) by making statements about employee rights and expectation in policies and manuals.
[continued]
A common concern for businesses is the creation of an unintended contractual obligation on receipt of an unso- licited idea. For example, imagine that an inventor devel- ops a new idea for an improved toothbrush design and submits it to a firm that manufactures dental care prod- ucts. But suppose that firm already has a similar idea in development. If the firm eventually markets the improved toothbrush design, it may appear that the idea was taken from the inventor without compensation. In such a case, it is easy to see how the inventor could perceive a breach of an implied-in-fact contract—acceptance of an idea with the understanding by both parties that compensation is owed if the idea is used—and sue on that basis.
Some businesses address this problem by refusing to accept external idea submissions. Although they may
miss out on a few business opportunities, they avoid costly litigation over allegedly stolen ideas.
The issue of implied agreements to compensate for the use of ideas is particularly problematic in the enter- tainment industry. The news is full of cases in which a writer pitches an idea to a production company that later seems close to a finished film or television show by that same company. Although the company claims no connec- tion, a writer may argue the pitch gave rise to an implied obligation to compensate. Famous Hollywood figures such as director James Cameron have been the target of such suits. A prominent case, Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., cemented the viability of such claims and distinguished them from cases involving copyright. Source: Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011).
sidebar 8.1
Idea Submission
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For example in a typical customer-supplier relationship, a written contract may omit specific terms of delivery. These terms will be implied by the courts to ensure the contractual relationship is ongoing. Details about delivery terms, as an aspect of per- forming contractual promises, are presented in Chapter 9. In addition, as described in Sidebar 8.2, the law automatically adds terms to certain types of contracts unless specifically excluded by the parties. For now, you should understand courts will try to fill in the gaps the parties fail to expressly state.
IMPLIED-IN-LAW OR QUASI-CONTRACTS When one party is unjustly enriched at the expense of another, the law may imply a duty on the first party to pay the second even though there is no contract between the two parties. The doctrine that requires this result is based on an implied-in-law contract. Since there really is no actual contractual agreement, the phrase quasi-contract is also used.
If a debtor overpays a creditor $5,000, the debtor can force the creditor to return that amount by suing under quasi-contract. It would be an unjust enrichment to allow the creditor to keep the $5,000. Likewise, when John has paid taxes on land, thinking that he owns it, and Mary comes along with a superior title (ownership) to the land and has John evicted, the remedy of quasi-contract requires that Mary reimburse John for the taxes paid.
It is important to understand that the remedy of quasi-contract generally applies only when no actual contract exists to cover the dispute. But note that quasi-contract is not an answer to every such situation. Over the years, courts have come to apply quasi-contract in a fairly limited number of cases based on unjust enrichment. More often, it is applied when parties clearly intended a contract, but that contract is not valid or is unenforceable for some reason (such as a lack of capacity). After an exchange has taken place, it would be unjust for a court to leave the parties without a remedy.
Quasi-contracts are not true contracts, but rather a judicial remedy to prevent one party from receiving unjust enrichment.
Some contracts contain additional, implied warranties (promises) that are dictated by statute. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code states that the following war- ranties are implied in contracts for the sale of goods: • Merchantability—if the seller is a merchant, the goods will be of fair average quality and conform to any labeling (U.C.C. § 2-314).
• Fitness for a Particular Purpose—the goods are suit- able for the buyer’s purpose if the seller is aware of it (U.C.C. § 2-315).
These promises are made even if the parties do not explicitly state them (or even know of them). However, warranties can be disclaimed in writing if the parties so choose. Other types of contracts contain warranties as well. For example, many states dictate that residential leases include an implied warranty of habitability, which means that a dwelling must have a minimum level of livability.
sidebar 8.2
Implied Warranties
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CONTRACTUAL ENFORCEMENT TERMINOLOGY Terms used in contract law related to the enforceability of agreements include enforceable, unenforceable, valid, void, and voidable.
The ultimate purpose of a contract is the creation of an agreement that courts will order parties to perform or to pay consequences for the failure of performance. When courts uphold the validity of such promises, the resulting agreement is an enforceable contract. If a nonperforming party has a justifiable reason for noncom- pliance with a promise, the result is an unenforceable contract. In essence, in this latter situation, a defense exists that denies the legal enforcement of an agreement.
When an agreement is enforceable because all the essential requirements (discussed later in the chapter) are present, courts refer to a valid contract. At the other end of the spectrum, a void contract is one that appears to be an agree- ment but lacks an essential requirement for validity and enforceability. A typical example of a void contract is an apparent agreement that has an illegal purpose. For example, a business contract that involves the shipment of contraband is void and unenforceable. As described in the legality section in more detail, courts usu- ally refuse to hear arguments of parties to a void contract. Courts simply leave these parties where they are regardless of whether the illegal agreement has been partially or fully performed. The parties are in pari delicto, which means equally at fault. Thus, in states where gambling is illegal, a bet on a football game is void. Courts will not enforce the betting agreement and do not care if the losing party has or has not paid off the bet.
A voidable contract is an agreement when at least one party has the right to withdraw from the promise made without incurring any legal liability. That party has the power to end the enforcement of a voidable contract. In some cases, a contract is voidable by both parties and either one can withdraw. An interesting aspect of voidable contracts involves the fact that these agreements are enforceable in court until a party with the legal right to do so decides to void the contract, thereby mak- ing the agreement unenforceable. Typically, this middle-ground situation arises when a party to the contract lacks capacity or is disadvantaged by specific situations such as mistake.
CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE TERMINOLOGY In addition to issues related to enforcing contracts in court, the topic of parties performing their commitments is vital to contract law. The key terms related to per- formance are executed and executory. An executed contract is one in which the par- ties have performed their promises. When the parties have not yet performed their agreement, it is called an executory contract.
Because most business contracts are bilateral in nature involving an exchange of promises by the parties, most contracts are executory at some time. For example, if you promise your new employer to begin working next month and that employer promises to pay you at the end of the first month’s work, this employment contract is executory from both parties’ perspective.
Contracts cover a multitude of situations, and these performance terms may be more or less relevant. Suppose you take a grocery item to the cashier and pay for it. The resulting contract is executed at the time of its creation. In fact, there probably was no exchange of spoken promises. The exchange of money for the item results in the performance being the proof of the contract.
Valid contracts are enforceable; void contracts are unenforceable; voidable contracts are enforceable until a party with the right to do so elects to void the agreement.
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In more complicated business transactions, the performance or lack thereof by one party becomes very important in determining the rights and duties under the contracts. A supplier of raw materials may ship its product and await the buyer’s pay- ment. The seller’s performance is executed while the buyer’s performance remains executory. How these terms affect enforceability issues is a part of the discussion in Chapter 9.
Contract Formation
How a contract is formed is one of the most important issues to understand about contract law. Many agreements are void, and thus unenforceable, because they lack some essential element of contract formation.
The following sections focus on the essential elements and how they come together to form contracts (see Figure 8.3). Before an agreement can become a legally binding contract, someone must make a specific promise to another and also a specific demand of that person. This is the offer. The other person must accept the terms of the offer in the proper way. Both parties must give consideration to the other. Consideration is the promise to give, or the actual giving, of a requested ben- efit or the incurring of a legal detriment (i.e., doing something one does not have to). Both parties must be of legal age and sound mind, and the purpose of the agreement cannot be illegal or against public policy.
LO 8-3
Offer to enter into a contract
Elements of an Enforceable Contract
Acceptance of the offer
Consideration for each promise
Capacity of each party to enter into a binding agreement
Legality of subject matter
Improper form when a writing is required
Defenses to Contract Enforcement
No true meeting of the minds due to fraud or mistake
Figure 8.3 Contract elements and defenses.
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OFFER TO CONTRACT An offer contains a specific promise and a specific demand. “I will pay $15,000 for the electrical transformer” promises $15,000 and demands a specific product in return. An offeror (person making the offer) must intend to make the offer by making a commitment to the offeree (the person to whom the offer is made). Many issues about an offer can and do arise. For example, is the language of the offer clear enough to conclude that a valid contract can result? What if a person makes a state- ment (“I’ll give you $100 for a ride to the mall”), intending it as a joke. Is this an offer? Courts answer this question by measuring intent from a reasonable person’s perspective in the position of the offeree. This standard is known as the objective, rather than the subjective, intent of the offeror. Sidebar 8.3 provides a recent exam- ple in which the seriousness of the alleged offer was in question.
People often use jokes and hyperbole to make their points. But when someone makes a shocking statement that also appears to be a unilateral offer for performance, how can one really know whether it is a serious intent to make an offer? The standard, based on the objective the- ory of contracts, is what would a reasonable person in the position of the offeree believe to be the offeror’s intent?
Consider the case of Kolodziej v. Mason. It involved a lawyer, James Mason, who argued that his client was incapable of committing several murders because travel to and from the site of the murder during the established timeline was impossible. He said on national television
that no one could make such a trip and “I’ll pay them a million dollars if they can do it.” A law student, Dustin Kolodziej, attempted to take Mason up on the purported offer by completing the trip and requesting the money. In the lawsuit to collect, the court denied Kolodziej’s claim. Although Mason’s statement looked like an offer in the abstract, the court determined that it was not objectively serious and was not sufficiently definite. Rather, Mason’s alleged offer was actually just an exaggerated statement made in vigorous defense of his client’s alibi.
Source: Kolodziej v. Mason, 774 F.3d 736 (11th Cir. 2014).
sidebar 8.3
Are You Serious?
When does the language used in negotiation become an offer? Suppose a seller asks a potential buyer, “Would you be willing to pay $1,500 for this?” Is this an offer or an invitation to continue negotiating? The answers to these questions relate to the specificity of the language used to state a commitment or willingness to be bound. An offer is much more likely to exist when a seller says, “I will sell this to you for $1,500.”
Definite Terms Under the common law of contracts, contractual terms must be definite and specific. An offer to purchase a house at a “reasonable price” cannot be the basis for a contract because of indefiniteness. Most advertisements, catalog, and web page price quotes are considered too indefinite to form the basis for a con- tract unless they are specific about the quantity of goods being offered, as well as the intended offeree. Otherwise, the retailer would be required to have sufficient stock to supply all readers of the advertisement or face multiple contract breaches.
Sidebar 8.4 presents an interesting case that emphasizes the importance of determining whether or not a definite offer exists.
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Under the UCC, contracts for the sale of goods can leave open nonquantity terms to be decided at a future time (§2-305). For example, an agreement for the sale of 500 hats will bind the parties even though they leave open the price to be decided on delivery in six months. Note that this rule applies only to sales of goods. It does not apply to sales of real estate or services.
Termination of Offer Offers create a legal power in the offeree to bind the offeror in a contract. However, that legal power does not last forever. When an offer terminates, the offeree’s legal power to bind the offeror ends.
Offers can terminate due to an explicit act of one of the parties. This means that either the offeror or offeree has done something before the acceptance to destroy the offer. The following acts terminate offers:
• Revocation—when the offeror retracts the offer before the acceptance. • Rejection—when the offeree rejects the offer. • Counteroffer—when the offeree makes a counterproposal. Due to the mirror
image rule described later, a counteroffer has the effect of rejecting the original offer and sending back a new offer for a different contract (but note the UCC flexibilities on additional terms, also described later).
• Lapse of time—when the offeree fails to accept by a deadline defined in the offer or after a reasonable period of time.
Even if the parties do not act to terminate the offer, there are circumstances in which contract law automatically dictates that an offer has expired. Again, they must occur before the acceptance. Termination by operation of law occurs in the following situations:
• Subject matter destruction—when the object of the contract is destroyed or legally eliminated.
• Offeror death or insanity—when the offeror no longer has the capacity to make the offer.
• Subject matter illegality—when a change in the law renders the agreement illegal, acceptance is no longer possible.
Do be very thoughtful in the choice of spoken words; decide whether you are ready to make an offer or want to continue discussions about possible arrangements.
Many websites, including those for social networking ser- vices, have privacy policies that are separate from the so-called “terms of service” or “terms of use.” Although it is generally acknowledged that the terms of service are an attempt to contractually set the conditions for website access, the effect of additional privacy policies is less clear. Is a website operator contractually bound to adhere to its promises to respect privacy? Or are such policies merely an aspirational expression without legal effect?
Interestingly, courts have issued inconsistent rulings in this area. In some cases, they have found that privacy
policies are a part of the terms-of-service contract, and that a failure to adhere to the promises constitutes a breach. In other cases, courts have found that the policies are insufficiently definite to provide a basis for fashioning a remedy.
Even in cases where courts find a sufficiently definite offer as well as the intent to contract, damages resulting from any breach must be shown. Without any established monetary loss, the breach of contract claim may fail. Source: Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, “Contractual Nature of Online Policies Remains Unsettled,” New York Law Journal, August 10, 2010.
sidebar 8.4
Is an Online “Policy” a Definite Offer?
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ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER Acceptance of an offer is necessary to create a valid, enforceable contract. An offer to enter into a bilateral contract is accepted by the offeree’s making the required promise. When Toni offers Aaron certain vinyl flooring for $2,500 to be delivered by November 30 on 90-day credit terms, and Aaron accepts, Aaron is promising to pay $2,500 on 90-day credit terms.
Unilateral contracts are accepted by performing a requested act, not by mak- ing a promise. A company’s offer of a $2,500 reward for information leading to the conviction of anyone vandalizing company property is not accepted by promising to provide the information. Only the act of providing information accepts such an offer.
The language of the offer determines whether acceptance should be a promise resulting in a bilateral contract or an act resulting in a unilateral contract. The rights and duties of the contracting party can turn on the form of the acceptance.
Mirror Image Rule For an acceptance to create a binding contract, standard contract law requires that it must “mirror” the offer -- that is, the acceptance must match the offer exactly. This is the mirror image rule. If the acceptance changes the terms of the offer or adds new terms, it is not really an acceptance. It is a counteroffer, and negotiations continue.
UCC Battle of the Forms Section 2-207 of the UCC changes the mirror image rule for contracts involving the sale of goods. In general, an expression of acceptance or a written confirmation is treated as an acceptance, even if such com- munication adds or changes terms in the offer. If at least one party to the contract is a non-merchant, the new or revised terms are considered proposals for additions to the contract. When the contract is between two merchants, the additional terms become a part of the contract unless one of the following takes place:
1. The offer expressly limits acceptance to the original terms. 2. The proposed terms materially (importantly) alter the contract. 3. The offeror rejects the proposed terms.
This provision of the UCC most often comes into play when merchants exchange form documents such as purchase orders and invoices with different terms. Courts must decide which terms are included in the final contract. This “battle of the forms” is depicted in Case 8.2.
Silence Not Acceptance In general, an offeree’s failure to reject an offer does not imply acceptance. Another way to say this is that silence alone is not acceptance. The offeree has no usual duty to reply to the offer even if the offer states that the offeror will treat silence as acceptance. Note, however, that an action, such as using an Internet search engine after having the opportunity to review contractual terms of use, may constitute acceptance.
There are major exceptions to this rule. For instance, parties may have a con- tract that specifies that future shipments of goods be made automatically unless the offeree expressly rejects them.
A related doctrine looks at the parties’ prior course of dealing—the way they have done business in the past. Silence may well imply acceptance if the parties previously dealt with each other by having the buyer take shipments from the seller unless the buyer notified the seller in advance not to ship.
Don’t change the terms of the offer in an acceptance unless you want to create a counteroffer.
Between merchants means both parties to a contract do business in the goods being bought and sold.
Don’t rely on the other party’s silence as evidence of acceptance. It can mislead you concerning the existence of a contract.
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case 8.2
GOTTLIEB & CO., INC. v. ALPS SOUTH CORPORATION 985 So. 2d 1 (Fla. App. 2007)
Gottlieb was in the business of supplying specialty knitted fabrics to manufacturers. Alps was a manufacturer of medi- cal devices such as prosthetic limbs. Alps purchased Gottlieb’s fabric for use as a liner in certain devices. In its finished goods form provided in response to Alps’s order, Gottlieb limited its liability to exclude consequential damages.
During the course of the parties’ relationship, Gottlieb substituted the yarn used in making the fabric. This resulted in complaints from Alps’s customers and caused Alps to suffer severe economic loss. To obtain compensation, Alps requested consequential damages from Gottlieb related to the customer complaints. Gottlieb claimed that its finished goods form excluded such liability. The court was required to determine whether the limitation on consequential damages became part of the parties’ final contract.
CASANUEVA, JUDGE: This dispute arises from the com- mon, but risky, commercial practice where the seller and buyer negotiate a contract involving goods by exchanging each others’ standardized forms. The transactions of this type involved here are governed by section 2-207 of the U.C.C., codified in section 672.207, Florida Statutes (2000).
Here, Gottlieb first contends that the trial court erred by failing to enforce the limitation of liabilities clause found on the back of its finished goods contract. The clause in contention reads:
Buyer shall not in any event be entitled to, and seller shall not be liable for indirect or consequential damages of any nature, including, without being limited to, loss of profit, promotional or manufacturing expenses, injury to reputation or loss of customer.
The Battle of the Forms “[T]he rules of engagement for the ‘battle of the forms’ are set out in the Uniform Commercial Code (‘U.C.C’), s. 2-207.” Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading, 215 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2000). The same rules of engage- ment apply in Florida and are codified in section 672.207. Subsections (1) and (2) of the statute are intended, accord- ing to the Florida Code Comments provided with the 1965 Enactment, to end the battle by eliminating the uncertainty that often results from the exchange of conflicting purchase order forms and acknowledgment and acceptance forms. The battle lines are frequently created where, as here, “the seller’s form contains terms different from or addi- tional to those set forth in the buyer’s form.” . . . Despite the differences in the forms, the parties proceed with the
commercial transactions and fight the battle after the trans- action concludes. . . .
These statutory provisions allow the formation of a contract where an acceptance contains additional or differ- ent terms than the original offer. While such an acceptance ordinarily would not meet the strict requirements of the common law mirror image rule, the U.C.C. provides a more flexible approach. Under section 672.207(2), additional terms included in an acceptance are construed as proposals for addition to the contract. . . . Between merchants, the terms become part of the contract unless they fall into an exception. . . . Within the context of section 672.207(2), the parties do not dispute that they are merchants, that Gottlieb’s offer did not expressly limit acceptance to its terms, and that Alps did not object to the additional terms within a reasonable amount of time. The remaining issue is whether the limitation of damages clause, as an additional term, materially altered the contract. If the additional term materially alters the contract, it is excluded. . . .
Surprise or Hardship Having determined [that Alps] bears the burden of proof, we next address the nature of proof that a party must offer to meet its burden. Unfortunately, the law in this area is not yet clearly developed. For example, Official Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 2-207 offers examples of “typical clauses which would normally ‘materially alter’ the contract” and that would “result in surprise or hardship if incorporated with- out express awareness by the other party.”
. . . Alps must prove “that, under the circumstances, it cannot be presumed that a reasonable merchant would have consented to the additional term.” See Bayway Refining, 215 F.3d at 224. The finished goods contract at issue was the sixth in a series between the two parties and each contract included the limitation of liability term. Each proposed contract contained the terms, which were visible on its face. The sole evidence presented at trial to establish surprise was that Alps had not read the contract before the dispute arose. Florida law has never excused a party from a con- tract simply because it failed to read the contract terms. . . . The record in this case does not allow a conclusion that Gottlieb’s limitation of liability clause was an unreasonable surprise to Alps.
The record is similarly lacking with respect to hard- ship as a result of surprise. . . . Gottlieb never represented that, in the event of a breach, it would reimburse Alps for any or all consequential damages it sustained resulting
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Finally, in an implied-in-fact contract, both the offer and the acceptance may be made without explicit language. Additionally, the UCC says that a contract may arise from the conduct of a buyer and seller of goods. Emphasis is placed on how the parties act rather than on a formal offer and acceptance of terms.
Mailbox Rule When does the acceptance become legally binding on the offeror? Unless the offeror specifies a particular time, the acceptance usually binds the parties when the offeree dispatches it. Because the offeree frequently mails the acceptance, the acceptance becomes binding when it is “deposited” with the postal service—hence the mailbox rule, also called the deposited acceptance rule.
The importance of the mailbox rule is that the offeror cannot revoke the offer once the offeree has accepted it. An added significance is that an offeror’s revocation is not effective until the offeree actually receives it. Thus, a deposited acceptance would create a binding contract even though a revocation is also in the mail.
Sidebar 8.5 highlights the relevance of the mailbox rule in modern business transactions.
from the breach. Instead, the evidence showed that Alps previously had returned a sample of nonconforming fab- ric to Gottlieb with a letter insisting on conforming goods. This letter did not mention or make claim for additional costs or damages resulting from Gottlieb’s prior breach of performance. The evidence shows that Alps never informed Gottlieb of any consequences other than discon- tinuing their relationship. Alps did not inform Gottlieb of the specific manner in which the subject fabric would be used or what product would be crafted. Thus, Got- tlieb could not foresee the greater extent of its potential liability, should a subsequent breach occur. Because Alps neglected to inform Gottlieb of the larger consequences of the breach, we conclude that Alps cannot maintain that incorporating the limitation of liability clause would result in a severe economic hardship. Thus, Alps failed to carry the burden of proof on hardship.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by not enforcing the limitation of consequential dam- ages clause. The award of consequential damages must be stricken.
Finally, we note that enforcing of the clause at issue only bars consequential damages. The limitation in this clause does not exclude other damages available under the law. . . .
We hold that the trial court erred in awarding Alps consequential damages. We reverse and remand with instructions to strike the consequential damages and lost profits awards and order the circuit court to hold a hearing on the limited question of damages only. As outlined above, these damages include incidental and certain benefit-of-the- bargain (direct) damages stemming from Gottlieb’s undis- puted breach.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
KEY POINTS • The court found that Gottlieb’s term (the consequential damages limitation) was included
in the contract even though it appeared only on Gottlieb’s forms and was not specifically discussed by the parties.
• Alps’s failure to read Gottlieb’s forms was irrelevant, according to the court. This is gener- ally true as a contract law principle.
• If Alps foresaw the likelihood of certain outcomes, such as consequential damages from customer complaints, it should have addressed it with Gottlieb.
[continued]
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As this section and the prior one illustrate, understanding the nature of the par- ties’ mutual assent to a contract can become complex. Despite the variety of rules associated with offers and acceptances, the purpose of these essential contractual elements remains simple: determining if the parties made a binding agreement and defining its terms.
CONSIDERATION Not all promises are enforceable through legal action. There must be some incen- tive or inducement for a person’s promise or it is not binding. The legal mechanism for evaluating the existence of this incentive is consideration, the receipt of a legal benefit or the suffering of a legal detriment. Courts will not enforce contractual promises unless they are supported by consideration.
Before Laura can enforce a promise made by David, Laura must have given consideration that induced David to make the promise. In a bilateral contract, each party promises something to the other. The binding promises are the consideration. In a unilateral contract, the consideration of one party is a promise; the consider- ation of the other party is performance of an act. When it is not clear whether there is consideration to support a promise, a court will often examine a transaction as a whole.
Consideration need not be money, though a promise to pay a certain amount is one type of consideration. Valid consideration can include any promise to:
• Do something one has no obligation to do. • Refrain from doing something one has the legal right to do. • In the case of a unilateral contract, a performance when there is no obligation to
do so.
That is the definition of a legal detriment. The amount of the consideration is generally irrelevant. An important part of consideration is that it must be bargained for. In other words, the consideration must be contemporaneous and a part of both parties’ understanding of the contract terms.
To be valid, a contract must involve the exchange of consideration between the parties.
Many modern contracts are not accepted through the U.S. Mail or other physical delivery service, but rather through an electronic means like e-mail, a web page or potentially even a text message. Is the mailbox rule relevant in any of these situations? In general, the answer is yes. In any case where the contracting parties are not interacting simulta- neously, the mailbox rule applies. While the time between an offeree’s acceptance and the offeror’s receipt is extremely short, the exact point at which acceptance occurs is still governed by the mailbox rule. Although
this will often have little impact in electronic transactions, there may be cases where it is important.
Two states employ a modified mailbox rule when the transaction involves computer information, like software. Under the Uniform Commercial Information Transac- tions Act (UCITA), which only Maryland and Virginia have adopted, acceptance of such contracts is valid only when received. Source: Valerie Watnick, “The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Com- mon Law ‘Mailbox Rule,’” 56 Baylor Law Review 175 (2004).
sidebar 8.5
Is the Mailbox Rule Still Relevant?
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Agreement Not to Sue When reasonable grounds for a lawsuit exist, an agree- ment not to sue is consideration to support a promise. If Maria is at fault in an auto- mobile accident with Peter, and Peter accepts $100 from Maria as full compensation for his damages on the spot, Peter has been given compensation. He has promised to surrender his legal right to sue Maria.
Likewise, suppose that a consulting firm bills a client $5,000 for 50 hours of work at $100 per hour. The client disputes the bill and contends that the consulting firm worked only 25 hours and should get only $2,500. If the two parties compro- mise the bill at $3,500 for 35 hours, this agreement binds them both. Each has sur- rendered the right to have a court determine exactly what amount is owed. Such an agreement and the payment of the $3,500 to resolve a dispute over the amount owed is an accord and satisfaction.
Occasionally, parties will try to avoid consideration by drafting one-sided con- tracts that obligate one party but allow the other party to escape performance. Such clever drafting may backfire. A court may determine that a one-sided contract is illusory because one party is not truly bound. Case 8.3 is an example of a contract that initially appears to include consideration by both parties but, on closer exami- nation, obligates only one.
The phrase “paid in full” placed on a check offered in settlement of a disputed amount acts as an accord and sat- isfaction if the check is cashed or deposited.
case 8.3
VASSILKOVSKA v. WOODFIELD NISSAN, INC. 830 N.E.2d 619 (Ill. App. 2005)
Nadejda Vassilkovska purchased a used car from Woodfield Nissan. In an agreement separate from the purchase contract, Vassilkovska promised to arbitrate any claim against Wood- field instead of suing in court. Woodfield promised to arbitrate claims against Vassilkovska as well, but excluded several dif- ferent types of claims from the agreement. In fact, the excluded claims were the only circumstances in which Woodfield would ever be likely to sue a customer. Subsequently, Vassilkovska sued Woodfield for misrepresenting the price of the car in a financing agreement. Woodfield argued that Vassilkovska was required to arbitrate the claim. The court had to address whether the arbitration agreement was valid.
JUSTICE GARCIA DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT: An agreement to arbitrate is treated like any other contract. . . . However, without a contract to arbitrate, there can be no forced arbitration. . . .
The plaintiff contends that the Arbitration Agreement is not a contract at all because any promise to arbitrate by Wood- field was illusory and, therefore, the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable because of the absence of the essential require- ment of consideration to make out an enforceable contract. . . .
Woodfield asserts that the parties’ Arbitration Agreement was supported by consideration and argues its retention of certain rights does not invalidate that consideration.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that Wood- field’s promise to arbitrate was “illusory” and there was no consideration because Woodfield “made sure that as to every conceivable right that it might want to press, the arbi- tration provision did not stand as a bar to [Woodfield’s] going to court.”
We agree with the plaintiff. A legally enforceable con- tract is an exchange, and the elements of a contract include offer, acceptance, and consideration. . . . “It is a basic tenet of contract law that in order for a promise to be enforce- able against the promisor, the promisee must have given some consideration for the promise.” Gibson, 121 F.3d at 1130. Consideration is defined as a bargained-for exchange, whereby the promisor, here, the plaintiff, receives some benefit, or the promisee, here, Woodfield, suffers detri- ment. . . . Thus, in order for the plaintiff’s agreement to arbitrate, rather than to litigate, any claim against Wood- field, there must be some detriment to Woodfield, or some
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benefit to the plaintiff, that was bargained for in exchange for the plaintiff’s promise to arbitrate all disputes. Clearly, what is required is consideration, as with any contract . . . .
. . . Woodfield cannot point to its own promise to arbi- trate in order to make enforceable the plaintiff’s promise to do likewise. . . . The Arbitration Agreement contains no promise on Woodfield’s part to submit claims to arbitration. . . . In fact, the Arbitration Agreement, by virtue of the exceptions outlined in it, leaves no claim that Woodfield would be required to submit to arbitration. . . . The language of the Arbitration Agreement makes clear that its purpose is to force the plaintiff to arbitrate any claim she may assert against Woodfield, while excluding Woodfield from that same prom- ise. There is nothing in the Arbitration Agreement to suggest that Woodfield was required to forgo a judicial forum in favor of arbitration. Therefore, we conclude that the Arbitration Agreement itself did not contain consideration for the plain- tiff’s promise in the form of a promise by Woodfield to submit disputes to arbitration. . . .
We further note that Woodfield is correct in asserting that, often, consideration for one party’s promise to arbi- trate is the other party’s promise to do the same. A mutual promise to arbitrate would be sufficient consideration to support an independent arbitration agreement. . . . Mutual- ity of obligation is required only to the extent that both par- ties to an agreement are bound or neither is bound; that is, if the requirement of consideration has been met, mutuality of obligation is not essential. The converse, of course, is where there is no consideration independent of the mutu- ality of obligation, then both parties to an agreement are bound or neither is bound. If there is no consideration and no mutuality of obligation, then neither party is bound.
Although both parties signed the Arbitration Agree- ment in which they “waived all rights to pursue any legal action in a court of law,” Woodfield exempted itself from arbitration by specifically securing its right to seek assis- tance in a court of law for a host of issues, primarily those dealing with the recoupment of money from the plaintiff. Specifically, Woodfield retained the right to pursue the fol- lowing claims: (1) the plaintiff’s failure to pay according to the purchase contract; (2) a check not being honored by the plaintiff’s bank; (3) the plaintiff’s failure to provide good title on a trade-in vehicle; (4) the plaintiff’s misrepresentation
concerning the loan amount due on any trade-in vehicle; (5) any claim relating to possession, repossession, or replevin of the automobile; and (6) any action to enforce any retail installment contract executed by the purchaser. Thus, the plaintiff, as purchaser, waives any right to sue Woodfield in a court of law, but Woodfield, as seller, retains the right to sue the plaintiff for a laundry list of reasons. . . .
Accordingly, we hold that where the agreement to arbi- trate is itself a separate document, purporting to bind each party to the arbitration agreement, but subsequently creates a total exclusion of one party’s obligation to arbitrate, the obligation to arbitrate is illusory and unenforceable. . . . At the time the Arbitration Agreement in this case was signed, there was no consideration on the part of Woodfield to sup- port the plaintiff’s promise to arbitrate and “waive any and all rights to pursue any legal action in a court of law.”
While we agree with Woodfield that “parties do not have to agree to identical obligations to nonetheless have a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement,” in this case, Woodfield’s promise to arbitrate was an empty one because Woodfield completely exempted issues that could arise from its sale of the automobile to the plaintiff. Effectively, in its Arbitration Agreement with the plaintiff, Woodfield enumerated all the reasons it would have to sue the plain- tiff and, thus, exempted itself from the parties’ Arbitration Agreement. What claims, other than those related to the purchase of the plaintiff’s vehicle, would Woodfield pur- sue? We can think of no specific claim, and Woodfield was unable to provide us with a specific example, either in its brief or during questioning in oral argument, of a claim that it would be compelled to submit to arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement. . . .
We find that the Arbitration Agreement, as a separate and distinct contract between the parties, lacked consider- ation from Woodfield as it exempted itself from arbitrating all conceivable claims against the plaintiff. It is Wood- field that, by virtue of excluding every conceivable claim it may have had against the plaintiff from the arbitration process, has made the Arbitration Agreement a nullity, which, in effect, goes against Illinois’s public policy favor- ing arbitration. . . .
We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Wood- field’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.
KEY POINTS • Contracts require consideration for both promises. Care must be taken in limiting one’s
obligations, particularly if the result is no legal detriment at all. • The amount of consideration is generally not an issue, but it must be more substantial
than simply an acknowledgment or statement.
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Preexisting Obligation A party to an agreement does not give consideration by promising to do something that he or she is already obligated to do. For example, suppose a warehouse owner contracts to have certain repairs done for $20,000. In the middle of construction, the building contractor demands an additional $5,000 to complete the work. The owner agrees, but when the work is finished, he gives the contractor only $20,000. If the contractor sues, he will lose. The owner’s promise to pay an extra $5,000 is not supported by consideration. The contractor is under a pre- existing obligation to do the work for which the owner promises an additional $5,000. If the contractor promises to do something he was not already obligated to do, there would be consideration to support the promise of the additional $5,000. Promising to modify the repair plans illustrates such new consideration.
Sidebar 8.6 discusses how the UCC changes the legal requirement of consideration.
Many contractual modifications are not enforceable because there is a lack of consid- eration. If Gerald agrees to paint your house for $2,000 and halfway through the job insists on receiving another $1,000, what consider- ation would you receive if you agree to pay the additional amount?
The preexisting obligation rule does not apply to a sale- of-goods contract. The UCC states that parties to a sale- of-goods contract may make binding modifications to it without both parties giving new consideration. If a buyer of more than $500 of supplies agrees to pay your com- pany an additional $500 over and above the amount already promised, this buyer is bound, although your company gives only the consideration (supplies) that it is already obligated to give (§2-209(1)).
Under the UCC, the rules of consideration also do not apply to a firm offer. A firm offer exists when a mer- chant offering goods promises in writing that the offer will not be revoked for a period not to exceed three months. This promise binds the merchant, although the offeree buyer gives no consideration to support it (§2-205).
sidebar 8.6
Consideration Not Necessary
Past Consideration Past consideration is no consideration; performance made before the parties discuss their agreement does not count. For instance, after many years of working at Acme Co., Bigman retires as vice president for financial plan- ning. The company’s board of directors votes him a new car every year “for services rendered.” One year later, the board rescinds this vote. If Bigman sues for breach of contract, he will lose. He gave no consideration to support the board’s promise. The past years of service were not “bargained for” by the company’s board when it took its vote. The board merely promised to give an unenforceable gift to Bigman.
Promise to Make a Gift The promise to give something to another—in other words, a promise to make a gift—is not binding as a contract because no bargained- for consideration supports the promise. In some cases, insignificant consideration in return for a great one may raise concerns that the exchange is actually a gift. For example, a promise of $1 might be made in return for a promise to convey 40 acres of land. In such situations, a court must decide whether the party promising to con- vey the land really bargained for the $1 or merely promised to make a gift. Note that a true gift can be enforceable as a property transfer (not a contract), but it requires delivery of the item. Moreover, even a promise to make a gift may be enforceable under a non-contract theory called promissory estoppel (as described later).
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Option Contract In contracts that are not between merchants selling goods, a promise to keep an offer open for a certain time period must be supported by the offeree’s consideration. Such agreement to not revoke an offer is called an option. A typical use of options is found in real estate transactions. A seller of land may promise to let a prospective buyer have two weeks to study the deal and accept the offer at a specific price. The buyer must provide some consideration (usually a small sum of money) to the seller, or the seller’s offer is not an enforceable option because it can be revoked.
Promissory Estoppel An important exception to the rule requiring consider- ation to support a promise is the doctrine of promissory estoppel (also known as “detrimental reliance”). This doctrine arises when a promisee justifiably relies on a promisor’s promise to his or her economic injury. The promisor must know that the promisee is likely to rely on the promise.
Promissory estoppel may be used when the facts of a business relationship do not meet the requirements of an express or implied contract. For example, a pledge to a charity elicits no consideration from the other party and is not enforceable as a contract. Similarly, an oral promise to pay another’s student loan if that person enrolls in graduate school is not enforceable under the statute of frauds. But a court may enforce these promises based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The extent to which promissory estoppel can create liability for an employer that withdraws a job offer is another common issue. As courts may consider reliance on an at-will job offer to be unjustified, plaintiffs are likely to experience difficulty recovering under this theory.
CAPACITY OF PARTIES TO CONTRACT Capacity refers to a person’s ability to be bound by a contract. Courts have tradi- tionally held the following three classes of persons to lack capacity to be bound by contractual promises:
• Minors (also called “infants”). • Intoxicated persons. • Mentally incompetent persons.
Minors In most states, a minor is anyone under age 18. Minors usually cannot be legally bound to contractual promises. A contract into which a minor has entered is voidable at the election of the minor. The minor can disaffirm the contract and legally recover any consideration given to the other party, even if the minor cannot return the consideration he or she received. On the other hand, the adult is bound by the contract unless the minor elects to disaffirm it.
The minor may disaffirm a contract any time before reaching the age of majority (usually 18) and for a reasonable time after reaching majority. If the minor fails to disaffirm within a reasonable time after reaching majority, the minor is said to ratify the contract. In addition, a minor can explicitly ratify a contract and forego disaf- firmance, but only after reaching the age of majority. Upon ratification, the minor loses the right to disaffirm.
Courts often make an exception to the standard capacity rule for minors when a contract involves necessaries of life such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, —and in some states—education. In this case, a minor may still disaffirm, and he or she will
Promissory estoppel often is used to prevent a party who has made a unilateral offer from withdrawing the offer after the requested work has begun.
Don’t enter into contracts with minors without considering their lack of capacity; they have the power to affirm or avoid the agreement.
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not be liable for the contract price. But the minor will be liable for the reasonable value of what was received under a theory of quasi-contract. This rule ensures that adults are willing to provide minors with necessaries without concern that the minor will subse- quently attempt to escape any obligation. Additionally, in a number of states, courts will hold a minor who has misrepresented his or her age liable for contractual promises.
Intoxicated and Mentally Incompetent Persons Except when a court has judged an adult to be mentally incompetent, that adult does not lose capacity to contract simply because of intoxication or mental impairment. In most cases involv- ing adult capacity to contract, courts measure capacity by whether the adult was capable of understanding the nature and purpose of the contract. Obviously, the more complex a contractual transaction gets, the more likely a court is to decide that an intoxicated or mentally impaired person lacks capacity to contract and has the right to disaffirm the contract. In such factual situations, the contracts are voidable by the intoxicated or mentally impaired person.
Traditionally, the descriptive phrase mentally impaired applies to adults with a his- tory of medically documented disabilities. With the aging of the population, the num- ber of cases involving elderly citizens claiming contractual incapacity grows. These cases will develop additional nuances in the law of capacity to contract. Practical business advice is to be aware when contracting with an elderly person. It may be best to insist that a friend or family member assist (if not cosign with) an older contracting party. Take steps to ensure you will not be accused of taking advantage of the elderly.
LAWFUL PURPOSE A basic requirement of a valid contract is legality of purpose. A “contract” to murder someone is obviously not enforceable in a court of law. Contracts that require com- mission of a crime or tort or violate accepted standards of behavior (public policy) are void. Courts will generally take no action on a void contract, and they will leave the parties to a contract where they have put themselves. Sidebar 8.7 gives a com- mon example of a contract with legality issues.
Beware of signs that an elderly person may have difficulty understanding the nature of the con- tractual agreement.
As the spread of COVID-19 developed into a global pan- demic in early 2020, some individuals attempted to take advantage of short supply and high demand for essential goods like hand sanitizer. News reports described instances in which sellers amassed stockpiles of such items and attempted to sell them for multiple times the normal price. Unfortunately for the sellers, a price escalation for an essen- tial good can run afoul of state laws or rules against “price gouging.” A typical such rule makes an increase of over 10-20 percent during a declared state of emergency illegal. A state attorney general (or in some jurisdictions, a private citizen) can bring a case to penalize the price gouger.
It is possible that a court would also refuse to enforce a contract for an essential good at a “gouging” price on the basis that it is not legal. Because the substance of the deal violates state law, an essential element of the con- tract would appear to be missing. Moreover, a court would likely deem the price term unconscionable. The options available to a court in these circumstances range from reform of the offending price to complete invalidation of the agreement. Source: Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 stan. l. rev. 869 (2011); Jack Nicas, He Has 17,700 Bottles of Hand Sanitizer and Nowhere to Sell Them, n.y. times, Mar. 15, 2020.
sidebar 8.7
Overcharging Into Invalidity
Contracts that courts find “unconscionable” are unenforceable as illegal. This is true as a matter of common law contracts as well as the UCC. Source: UCC §2-302.
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There are several exceptions to the general rule that courts will take no action on an illegal contract. A contract may have both legal and illegal provisions to it. In such a case, courts will often enforce the legal provisions and refuse to enforce the illegal ones. For instance, a contract providing services or leasing goods sometimes contains a provision excusing the service provider or lessor from liability for negli- gently caused injury. Courts usually will not enforce this provision but will enforce the rest of the contract.
Often, courts will allow an innocent party to recover payment made to a party who knows (or should know) that a contract is illegal. For example, courts will allow recovery of a payment for professional services made by an innocent person to a person who is unlicensed to provide such services.
In some cases courts may allow a person to recover compensation under quasi- contract for services performed on an illegal contract. Recovery may be allowed when an otherwise qualified professional lets his or her license expire and provides services to a client before renewing the license.
Contracts That Restrain Trade Contracts that restrain trade often are ille- gal and void. They include contracts to monopolize, to fix prices between competi- tors, and to divide up markets. Chapter 16 on antitrust law discusses these contracts and their illegality.
Other contracts that restrain trade are important to the efficient operation of business. Covenants not to compete or “non-competes” are important in protect- ing employers from having the employees they train leave them and compete against them. They also protect the buyer of a business from having the seller set up a com- peting business.
However, some covenants not to compete are illegal. Courts will declare such agreements illegal unless they have a valid business purpose, such as to protect the goodwill a business buyer purchases from the seller of the business. Covenants not to compete must also be “reasonable as to time and space.” If they restrain competition for too long or in an area too large, the courts will declare them unreasonable and void them as being illegal. Four or five years is generally as long a time as the courts are willing to find reasonable, and even then the length of time must be justified. As to space, the courts will void covenants not to compete any time the area restrained exceeds the area in which the restraining business operates. A specific example of potential overreach in covenants not to compete is discussed in Sidebar 8.8.
When a “Meeting of the Minds” Is Lacking
In addition to the basic elements described earlier, we also require that the parties to a contract have a mutual understanding of the essential terms and underlying facts. This is often referred to as a “meeting of the minds.” On the other hand, if it is clear that the parties had fundamentally different beliefs about the contract, it may be voidable. In most cases, a mutual understanding is assumed unless evidence to the contrary exists. A party usually raises the lack of mutual agreement as a defense to enforcement.
FRAUD OR INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATION Contracts based on fraud or misrepresentation are important examples of agree- ments in which a mutual understanding is lacking. Fraud involves an intentional
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misstatement of fact that induces another to enter into a contract to which they would not otherwise agree. The specific elements that must be demonstrated to establish fraud are (1) a misrepresentation of fact (as opposed to an opinion), (2) an intent to deceive, (3) justified reliance on the misstatement by the innocent party, and (4) injury resulting from the reliance. You will note that fraud is also described in Chapter 10. Here, it specifically functions as a tort that acts as a barrier to forma- tion of a legitimate contract.
Intent is one of the most important elements of fraud. For example, if a person selling a ring with a glass stone states that it is a diamond ring instead, the misstate- ment must be a knowing lie to constitute fraud. But also note that the innocent party must reasonably believe that lie. If the stone in a ring is obviously glass, then the purchaser did not justifiably rely on the deception.
Fraud can be explicit as described earlier. It can also arise from a deceptive act by a party, such as tampering with the odometer on a car. In general, silence does not constitute fraud. However, failing to disclose a material fact that creates a dan- gerous condition may rise to that level. For example, if a seller removes the airbag from a car and does not inform the buyer, fraud may be found.
A party who is injured due to another’s fraud generally has the option to avoid the contract and seek return of any consideration conveyed. In addition, the injured
Many companies require prospective employees to sign agreements containing restrictions that cover conduct beyond pure job performance. Such agreements may apply even if the employer–employee relationship is “at will” and subject to termination without cause. One of the most important types is an employee’s commitment to refrain from working for a competitor, otherwise known as a “covenant not to compete” or, simply, a “non-compete.” The agreement may be in the form of a standalone con- tract or a clause in a broader employment agreement. The purpose is nominally to protect an employer’s investment in hiring and training employees. Without a contract, a com- petitor could free-ride on the investment by hiring away valuable employees. On the other hand, non-competes necessarily limit competition in the market for skilled labor. Traditionally, only higher-level employees were subject to non-competes, reflective of the personal value they bring to a firm. But in recent years, non-competes have spread to a much broader group of employees. This raises com- petition and public policy issues.
One of the most extreme examples of the use of non- competes for low-wage-employees involved the sand- wich chain Jimmy John’s. In 2014, it was widely reported that some Jimmy John’s franchisees required employees
to sign an agreement preventing them from working for a competitor “selling submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches” within two miles of the franchise for two years after termination. The agreement applied to all employees, including entry- level sandwich makers and delivery drivers. This struck many as unnecessarily oppressive. After facing lawsuits from former employees, the Illinois Attorney General, and the New York Attorney General, Jimmy John’s agreed to remove the clauses from hiring packets.
In a very few states, like California, non-competes have long been unenforceable. But as a result of cases like Jimmy John’s, new states have passed laws that limit when non-competes will be enforced or the types of employees who can be subject to them. For example, in 2020, Virginia joined Maryland (2019) in specifically preventing low-wage employees from restrictive non-competes. In addition to rendering the non-compete provision unenforceable, a vio- lating employer can be subject to civil fines.
Sources: J. J. Prescott, Norman Bishara, and Evan Starr, “Understanding Non-Competition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project,” 2016 Michigan State Law Review 369; Samantha Bomkamp, “Illinois AG Sues Jimmy John’s Over Noncompete Pacts,” Chicago Tribune, June 8, 2016; S.B. 480 Va. gen. assembly (Reg. Session 2020) (enacted as of Apr. 9, 2020).
sidebar 8.8
Restraining Competition in Sandwiches?
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party may enforce the contract and sue for damages resulting from the fraud. It may also be possible to seek punitive damages based on the fraud.
When a party misrepresents a material fact without intent to mislead, harm still occurs. However, this “innocent” misrepresentation simply makes the contract voidable by the innocent party. Heightened remedies such as punitive damages are inappropriate without the intent to deceive. Due to the difficulties an individual may experience in establishing all of the elements of fraud or innocent misrepresentation, the government may step in (see Sidebar 8.9).
Many firms see an advantage in promoting their products or services as sustainable, recyclable, biodegradable or simply “green.” If there truly is something more sustain- able in a company’s offering, this is obviously a net win for the transacting parties and society. However, some companies make such claims in order to dupe consumers (see Sidebar 18.1). Others may be too far in front of the evidence supporting their environmental claims. In either case, if “green” products are not truly green, consumers may end up purchasing something that does not satisfy their needs or they may pay more than necessary. Regu- lators can step in to help consumers avoid this result.
In general, consumer protection agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) play an important role in addressing deceptive advertising because the government can act when consumers have insufficient incentive to sue. If the misrepresentation is widespread—such as through a national advertisement— the FTC can act on behalf of all consumers to address the harm. The FTC has the power to prevent deceptive acts or practices that involve a misrep- resentation or omission that is likely to mislead consumers
and is material to the decision to purchase a product. The agency can bring an enforcement action without the need to demonstrate an intent to deceive. If deceptive advertis- ing is found, the agency can impose civil penalties, con- sumer compensation, and corrective advertising. State consumer protection agencies may have similar powers. Government regulation of deceptive advertising can be an important complement to consumer fraud cases.
In the case of environmental claims, the FTC has spe- cifically articulated its intent to pursue deceptive adver- tising. The agency has issued Green Guides (revised in 2012) that set forth principles for distinguishing between honest and deceptive statements. For example, the agency does not permit unqualified claims that a product is “eco-friendly;” any firm wishing to use such a term must explain exactly how the product is particularly sustain- able. To date, the FTC has brought a significant number of actions against companies who claim to be green, but are something less. Source: FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (Green Guides), 16 C.F.R. §260.8(a) (2012)
sidebar 8.9
How Green is My Ad?
MISTAKE What happens when each party misunderstands something very basic and material about a contract? Although no tortious act has occurred, such a situation goes right to the heart of whether there has been voluntary consent to a single set of terms. If it is clear that there has been a mutual mistake as to a material fact relating to the contract, rescission by either party is appropriate. The test of materiality is whether the parties would have contracted had they been aware of the mistake. If they would not have contracted, the mistaken fact is material. In addition, the mistake must be one of fact as opposed to value. When parties misconstrue only the value of their transaction but fully appreciate the subject matter, the contract is not voidable.
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Significantly, both parties must be mistaken in their understanding. For exam- ple, if both a seller and buyer believe they have made an agreement concerning an original Picasso painting, but it turns out to be the work of another artist, both should have the right to avoid the contract. On the other hand, if only one party is mistaken about some aspect of the contract (a unilateral mistake) no remedy is generally available. We do not want to impose the costs of one party’s mistake on the other party who acted with complete knowledge. For example, suppose that Royal Carpet Co. bids $8.70 per yard for certain carpet material instead of $7.80 per yard as it had intended. If the seller accepts Royal Carpet’s bid, a contract results even though there was a unilateral mistake.
DURESS OR UNDUE INFLUENCE Other examples of contracts in which a mutual agreement is lacking include those induced by duress or undue influence. Duress means force or threat of force. The force may be physical or, in some instances, economic. However, duress cannot be based on one’s assertion of legitimate business consequences; it must rise to the level of a tort. For example, if a seller informs a buyer that his or her offer is so advanta- geous the buyer’s business will suffer if the buyer does not form a contract, no duress has occurred. Similarly, threatening to sue unless the parties reach a settlement is also not duress.
Undue influence occurs when one is taken advantage of unfairly through a con- tract by a party who misuses a position of relationship or legal confidence. Contracts voidable because of undue influence often arise when persons weakened by age or illness are persuaded to enter into a disadvantageous contract. Someone who has a special relationship of power and trust over the other party, such as a psychiatrist or lawyer, may also exert undue influence.
Contract Form
Knowing what elements must exist to form a valid contract is only the beginning of understanding the use of contracts in business transactions. Among the other impor- tant topics is whether contracts have to be in writing and signed by the parties. The following sections examine the formality of contracts.
ORAL CONTRACTS Because of the importance of contracts in our personal and professional lives, many people believe a contract must be written and signed to be valid. Typically, this impression is wrong. Oral contracts generally are as enforceable as written ones. Many of our everyday transactions involve informal contracts.
This does not mean we should ignore reasons for greater formality. When con- tracts are of significant importance or the dollars involved are larger than typical day-to-day transactions or it is important to have a record of the precise agreement, writing and signing a contract is best. In certain situations, the law requires contracts to be in a written, signed format. The next two sections discuss this requirement and explain the types of agreements that must be in writing. The impact of oral changes to written contracts is examined later, in Chapter 9.
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Oral contracts generally are valid and enforce- able. Certain types of contracts must be evi- denced by a writing that is signed by the party to be bound.
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS The law requiring that certain contracts be in writing is known as the statute of frauds. Note, however, that this rule does not address fraud in the formation of a contract. Rather, it is designed to prevent potential deception or fraud from oral contracts. The original English statute was adopted in 1677, and, today, every state has its own statute of frauds. The role of these statutes requiring certain written contracts is to minimize confusion in court whenever a party claims a contract is breached. If courts have to decide the validity of an oral agreement, parties can make allegations that contradict one another. One party says to the judge, “We have a con- tract.” The other party says, “We never finalized a contract” or “the terms are differ- ent.” Judges can have difficulty knowing whom to believe. Written contracts reduce the potential for confusion, fraud, and deceit. If the required writing is not met, the parties are left with an unenforceable contract. The statute of frauds requires certain types of business-related contracts to be in writing. Sidebar 8.10 provides a list of these agreements.
In some states, the statute of frauds requires that the actual contract between the parties must be in writing. However, most states merely require that the con- tract be evidenced by writing and be signed by the party against whom enforce- ment is being sought. This requirement means that the party being sued must have signed a note, memorandum, or another written form short of a formal con- tract that describes with reasonable certainty the terms of the oral agreement. In sales of goods between merchants, the writing may not need to be signed by the party being sued. Despite these rules, the best practice is to have contracts care- fully written and signed. Written documentation will save time and expense if a dispute arises. Chapter 9 provides more detail about how written contracts get interpreted.
Sale of an Interest in Land Sales of interests in land are common contracts covered by the statute of frauds. Although “sales of interests in land” covers a con- tract to sell land, it includes much more. Interests in land include contracts for mort- gages, mining rights, and easements (rights to use another’s land, such as the right to cross it with electric power wires). However, a contract to insure land or to erect a building is not an interest in land.
Collateral Promise to Pay Another’s Debt A collateral promise is a sec- ondary or conditional promise. Such a commitment arises when one person, a friend of a small business owner, for example, promises to repay a loan of the business if
Exchange of e-mail mes- sages may satisfy the requirement of a writing.
• Contracts involving an interest in land. • Collateral contracts to pay the debt of another
person.
• Contracts that cannot be performed within one year from the date of the agreement.
• Contracts for the sale of goods totaling $500 or more.
sidebar 8.10
Examples of Contracts Required to Be Evidenced by a Signed Writing
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and only when that organization does not make payments. This collateral promise usually arises at a time different from the original obligation. Suppose the business borrows money from a bank and later finds it is having trouble making payments on time. To avoid the bank’s calling the entire loan in default, the friend may promise to pay if the business does not. Because the promise does not directly benefit the friend, it will likely be considered collateral in nature and must be in writing to be enforced by the bank.
An exception to the writing requirement for collateral promises exists when the promisor’s intention is to directly further his or her own interests. This is known as the leading object rule. For example, if the owner of 100 percent of the shares of a firm personally promises to repay a loan to the firm if it defaults, it is likely that a court will find that the primary purpose of the commitment is to benefit the share- holder. The benefit to the shareholder is the leading object of the promise, which obviates the need for a writing.
Cannot Be Performed within One Year The statute of frauds applies to a contract the parties cannot perform within one year after its making. Courts usually interpret the one-year requirement to mean that the contract must specify a period of performance longer than one year. Thus, an oral contract for services that lasts 20 months or a lease of longer than one year are generally not enforceable. But an oral contract for services to be completed “by” a date 20 months away is enforceable. The difference is that the latter contract can be performed within one year, even if it actually takes longer than that to perform it.
As interpreted by the courts, the statute of frauds applies only to executor con- tracts that the parties cannot perform within a year. Once one of the parties has completed his or her performance for the other, that party can enforce an oral mul- tiyear contract.
Sale of Goods of $500 or More Under the UCC, the statute of frauds covers sales of goods of $500 or more. Modifications to such are also included and must be in writing. While this provision appears arbitrary with respect to the $500 amount, its purpose is clear. Contracts involving the sale and purchase of goods that are less than $500 usually are performed quickly. There is very little room for disputes about terms or performance that arise. As the dollar amount increases, the need for a written agreement also increases. This is particularly true if the contract will remain executory (not performed) for an extended period of time.
As you think about this requirement in sale of goods transactions, ponder a typical transaction. Assume you go into an electronics store and buy a new laptop computer for $1,500. You probably do not sign a written contract before complet- ing the purchase. The reason is there is no need for a written contract. The agree- ment to buy and the actual sale occur almost simultaneously—at least in very quick order. Suppose, instead of going to the store, you go online to order a laptop. The online transaction contains information telling you the laptop will be prepared and shipped within three weeks. The paperwork generated through the website likely will include a contract for you to sign electronically. This writing is needed to satisfy the statute of frauds (see Sidebar 8.11). The written agreement governs the parties’ relationship until the contract is performed—you pay and the manufacturer delivers the laptop.
Remember the differ- ence between guar- anteeing a person’s performance and agree- ing to become liable if a person fails to perform.
If it is possible, even if unlikely, to perform a contract within one year, an oral contract involv- ing that performance is enforceable.
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Other Contracts In addition to the basic contracts covered by the statute of frauds, other contracts must be in writing in various states. For example, a promise made in consideration of marriage (such as a prenuptial agreement) must generally be in writing. A promise by an executor to pay the debts of an estate requires a writ- ing. Most states require insurance policies to be written. And several states require written estimates in contracts for automobile repair.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE WRITING REQUIREMENT In addition to understanding that the statute of frauds requires certain types of con- tracts to be in writing, it is important to know there are exceptions to the writing requirement. If an agreement is orally stated, parties may be able to convince a judge that a contract does exist. If such proof can be established in a way that convinces the judge the contract was agreed upon, there is little chance of fraud. Under certain circumstances, oral contracts are enforceable.
Such exceptions fall into the following categories:
• Part performance. • Rules involving goods. • Judicial admissions.
Part Performance The doctrine of part performance creates an exception to the requirement that sales of interests in land must be in writing. When a buyer of land has made valuable improvements in it, or when the buyer is in possession of it and has paid part of the purchase price, even an oral contract to sell is enforceable. The courts will enforce an oral agreement involving land title if the part performance clearly establishes the intent of the parties as buyer and seller. If a court can envision the parties in some other relationship, such as landlord and tenant, the part perfor- mance is not sufficient to substitute for a written agreement.
The part performance exception sometimes is called promissory estoppel.
When one imagines a “written” contract, one usually has in mind terms printed on paper with handwritten signa- tures at the end. However, many business transactions that formerly took place face-to-face or through the mail now occur electronically. Is it possible for an elec- tronic exchange to constitute a writing, and if so, can it be signed? The trend in the courts has been to answer in the affirmative: electronic contracts are generally as enforceable as paper contracts. A signature need not be the stylized, handwritten letters of one’s name, but merely an indication that a party intends to be bound to the contract. A typed name or even a check-box will usu- ally suffice.
Legislation at the state and national level supports the enforceability of electronic contracts. The federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN) ensures that contracts and other documents are not considered invalid solely because they are in electronic form. States have passed similar laws, such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), which complements ESIGN in guaranteeing that electronic con- tracts satisfy the writing requirement. Therefore, consider the impact of sending that e-mail message, fax or even text message; a written contract may be the result. Source: Jay M. Zitter, “Construction and Application of Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign Act),” 29 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 519 (2008).
sidebar 8.11
Are Electronic Contracts Considered Writings?
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Rules Involving Goods The UCC creates a number of situations that allow the enforcement of oral agreements involving the sale of goods. In essence, the law strives to facilitate transactions involving goods as long as the parties cannot deceive the judge who is asked to determine a contract’s validity. Sidebar 8.12 lists exceptions to the writing requirement for transactions involving the sale of goods.
The first exception is known as the specifically manufactured goods rule. If a buyer places an oral order for more than $500 worth of goods that are made especially for this buyer, the seller who has started production on this special order can enforce this agreement to avoid undue hardship. Since the seller would not be able to resell these special goods to other buyers, courts enforce the oral contact. A written confirmation between merchants is another example of how the law facilitates business transactions. A merchant can avoid the impact of this provi- sion by simply noting its objection to any written confirmation within ten days of receiving it.
Judicial Admissions If one party sues another party for failing to perform promises that are made orally, the defendant might argue the contract cannot be enforced because it must be in writing under the statute of frauds. This defense asks the judge to dismiss the lawsuit. Based on the historical background of the statute of frauds, a judge does not want the burden of deciding which party is telling the truth about the existence or nonexistence of an oral contract. However, if the defendant admits in court or in documents filed in court that an oral contract does exist, the judge does not have to guess about the contract’s existence.
This judicial admissions exception is most important when the acknowledged oral contract is for the sale of goods. The UCC explicitly recognizes this exception [2-201(3)(b)]. Does this exception apply when the oral contract involves the sale of an interest in land, a collateral promise to pay another’s debt, or performances that cannot be completed in one year? The answer is mixed among the states. Courts in a number of states permit the plaintiff to ask the defendant to admit the oral contract exists. If there is a judicial admission, the statute of fraud-based defense disappears. The judge proceeds to decide whether the oral contract is valid and enforceable.
• Contract for goods specially manufactured for the buyer on which the seller had begun performance.
• Contract for goods for which payment has been made and accepted or that have been received and accepted.
• Contract for goods in which the party being sued admits in court or pleadings that the contract has been made.
• Contract for goods between merchants in which the merchant sued has received a written notice from the other merchant confirming the contract and in which merchant sued does not object to the confirmation within 10 days.
Source: UCC §2–201.
sidebar 8.12
Exceptions to Statute-of-Frauds Requirement That Sale-of-Goods Contracts Be in Writing
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Key Terms Acceptance 237 Accord and satisfaction 241 Bilateral contract 228 Capacity 244 Consideration 240 Counteroffer 236 Covenants not to compete 246 Deposited acceptance rule 239 Duress 249 Enforceable contract 233 Executed contract 233 Executory contract 233 Express contract 229 Firm offer 243 Fraud 246 Goods 227
Implied-in-fact contract 229 Implied-in-law contract 232 Indefiniteness 235 In pari dilecto 233 Lapse of time 236 Leading object rule 251 Mailbox rule 239 Mirror image rule 237 Misrepresentation 247 Mutual mistake 248 Offer 235 Offeror death or insanity 236 Option 244 Promise 226 Promissory estoppel 244 Quasi-contract 232
Rejection 236 Rescission 248 Revocation 236 Subject matter destruction 236 Subject matter illegality 236 Undue influence 249 Unenforceable contract 233 Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) 227 Unilateral contract 228 Unilateral mistake 249 Valid contract 233 Void contract 233 Voidable contract 233
Review Questions and Problems Basic Concepts 1. Contract Law in Private Enterprise
Discuss the importance of contract law to the private market system. How does contract law provide flexibility and precision in business dealings?
2. Sources of Contract Law (a) What is meant by the common law of contracts? (b) What is the UCC?
Contractual Classifications and Terminology 3. Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts
(a) What is the distinction between a bilateral and a unilateral contract? (b) Which type is more common in business?
4. Express and Implied-in-Fact Contracts (a) Using an instance in which you bought or sold something in the last week, describe the terms of an
express contract that might arise between the supplier and the seller. (b) When would an implied-in-fact contract arise between a seller and a buyer?
5. Implied-in-Law or Quasi-Contracts Why are courts willing to apply contractual principles when the parties fail to create contractual relationships?
6. Contractual Enforcement Terminology How can someone reasonably say that a voidable contract is both enforceable and unenforceable?
7. Contractual Performance Terminology Pat hires a tailor to make a suit. The tailor completes all the sewing and now waits for Pat to pick up the suit and pay for it. Is this contractual agreement executed or executory? Explain.
Contract Formation 8. Offer to Contract
Condor Equipment Company offers to sell a dough cutting machine to Snappy Jack Biscuits Inc. The offer states: “This offer expires Friday noon.” On Thursday morning, the sales manager for Condor
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calls the president of Snappy Jack and explains that the machine has been sold to another purchaser. Discuss whether Condor has legally revoked its offer to Snappy Jack.
9. Acceptance of Offer Fielding Bros. offers to ship six furnaces to Central City Heating and Cooling Co. for $4,500 cash. Central City accepts on the condition that Fielding give 120 days’ credit. Has a contract resulted? Explain.
10. Consideration Jefferson and Goldberg enter a contract for the sale of five acres of land at $10,000 per acre. Later, Goldberg, the buyer, asks if Jefferson will agree to modify the con- tract to $9,000 per acre. (a) Jefferson agrees. Is Jefferson’s promise binding on him? (b) Would your answer be different if five used cars were being sold instead of five
acres of land? 11. Capacity of Parties to Contract
Describe the circumstances under which an adult lacks the capacity to contract. 12. Lawful Purpose
Hunt signs an equipment lease contract with Edwards Rental. The contract con- tains a clause stating: “Lessor disclaims all liability arising from injuries caused by use of this equipment.” Because the equipment has been improperly serviced by Edwards Rental, Hunt is injured while using it. If Hunt sues, will the disclaimer clause likely be enforced? Explain.
When a Meeting of the Minds Is Lacking 13. Fraud or Innocent Misrepresentation
Chatter is a social networking service that promises to keep its users’ data private. However, Chatter sells its data to a data broker who then sells it online. A Chatter user experiences a career impact from the disclosure. State whether this situation involves fraud, or innocent misrepresentation, and explain your answer.
14. Mistake Laura advertises a used car for $20,000. David asks why it is so expensive and Laura states that it is only two years old. David agrees to purchase the car for $20,000. But when he arrives home, he discovers the book value of the car is only $12,000. May David avoid the contract under the doctrine of mutual mistake?
15. Duress or Undue Influence Olaf wishes to hold his investment seminar at a local hotel. He offers $50,000 for conference rooms and food for a week. The hotel responds that this price is far too low. Olaf tells the hotel that if it does not agree to his price, Olaf will tell his employees to write hundreds of negative reviews on a hotel rating site and destroy the hotel’s reputation. If the hotel agrees to Olaf’s terms, may it avoid the contract under the doctrine of duress?
Contract Form 16. Oral Contracts
(a) In general, are oral contracts as valid and enforceable as written ones? (b) Why should contracting parties consider reducing their agreement to writing?
17. Statute of Frauds (a) Explain the purpose of requiring certain types of contracts to be in writing. (b) List four types of contracts covered by the traditional statute of frauds.
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18. Exceptions to the Writing Requirement Elegante Haberdashery telephones an order to Nordic Mills for 500 men’s shirts at $15 each. Each shirt will carry the Elegante label and have the Elegante trade- mark over the pocket. After the shirts are manufactured, Elegante refuses to accept delivery of them and raises the statute of frauds as a defense. Discuss whether this defense applies to these facts.
You are the Marketing Manager for We-Can-Furnish-It Office Supply Company. In your role, you work with your company’s sales staff. This staff is divided between personnel who travel to make face-to-face calls and those who answer the phones and accept orders during these conversations. In addition to the sales staff, you also are responsible for the technicians who ensure online orders can be placed and filled.
The transactions with customers range from supplying an entire office building with furniture and everything that allows an office to function to delivering small amounts of basic office supplies. As you study the documentation, including purchase order forms and confirmation statements, of these various transactions, you wonder about the answers to the following questions: • When does the negotiation end and a binding contract exist? • If there is conflicting language in the buyer’s purchase order and the seller’s confirma-
tion, which language controls? • How can you determine when a contract has been performed fully?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
9-1 To understand how courts interpret contracts.
9-2 To identify when contract performance duties arise.
9-3 To understand how contractual duties are discharged through performance.
9-4 To understand that nonperformance of contracts results in a breach unless performance is excused.
9-5 To evaluate the consequences of a breach of contract.
9-6 To understand how contracts can benefit third parties.
Contractual Performance and Breach9 Robert Daly/Getty Images
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I n the preceding chapter, you studied the basics
of contract terminology and classifications.
You learned about the essential elements and
form required to create a valid, enforceable contract.
Finally, you read about how contracts impact third
parties.
In this chapter, your study of contracts contin-
ues as you learn about the performance of contracts
and the consequences of breach. In addition, you will
learn the basic principles of agency authority related
to contracts and other legal contexts. These topics are
of critical importance to businesspeople. After study-
ing this chapter, you should have answers to the fol-
lowing questions:
• Are there rules that businesspeople should know
that determine what contract language means?
• How do parties (and courts) decide if promises
in a contract have been fully performed?
• What happens if a contract is not fully performed?
• Can someone besides the contracting parties
enforce the agreement?
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Interpretation of Contracts
If each party is satisfied with the other’s performance under a contract, interpreta- tion of the contract is generally not an issue. But when there is disagreement about what a term means or whether additional promises were made, interpretation often becomes necessary. How do we decide who is right?
One of the most important interpretation principles is that courts decide what a contract means. The meaning of a contract is a question of law, which means that a judge makes the final determination. However, depending on the circumstances and issues, that determination may require factual information from the parties or other witnesses. To guide their interpretation, courts use established rules designed to reduce ambiguity in a predictable manner. Understanding these rules can ensure that a contract is not interpreted differently than you predict.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION Common words are given their usual meaning. “A rose is a rose is a rose” wrote Gertrude Stein, and a court will interpret this common word to refer to a flower. If the meaning of the word is clear on the face of the contract, courts will usually reject a party’s attempt to reinterpret it later. However, if there is evidence that a word has a particular trade usage, courts will give it that meaning. In a contract in the wine trade, the term rose would not refer to a flower at all but to a type of wine.
Many businesses today use printed form contracts. Sometimes, the parties to one of these printed contracts type or handwrite additional terms. What happens when the typed or handwritten terms contradict the printed terms? What if the printed terms of a contract state “no warranties,” but the parties have written in a 90-day warranty? In such a case, courts interpret handwritten terms to control typed terms and typed terms to control printed ones. The written warranty will be enforced because the writing is the best evidence of the parties’ true intention.
Another rule is that when only one of the parties drafts (writes) a contract, courts will interpret ambiguous or vague terms against the party that drafts them. Courts often apply this rule to the adhesion contracts (discussed in Sidebar 8.7 in Chapter 8) as well as insurance contracts and interpret the contract to give the non- drafting party the benefit of the doubt when deciding the meaning of a confusing term or phrase.
Sidebar 9.1 illustrates how the interpretation of contractual language can have a major impact on the parties’ businesses.
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE Like the statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule influences the form of contracts. This rule states that parties to a complete and final written contract cannot intro- duce oral evidence in court that changes the intended meaning of the written terms.
The parol evidence rule applies only to evidence of oral agreements made at the time of or prior to the written contract. It does not apply to oral modifications com- ing after the parties have made the written contract (although the statute of frauds may apply).
Suppose that Chris Consumer wants to testify in court that a merchant of an Ultima washing machine gave him an oral six-month warranty on the machine, even though the $450 written contract specified “no warranties.” If the warranty was
LO 9-1
In the interpretation of contract terms, handwrit- ing is the best evidence of intention.
Preprinted terms/forms
control
control
TYPED terms
terms
The parol evidence rule prohibits testimony about the oral nego- tiation that results in a written contract; thus, read the contract before signing.
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made after Chris signed the contract, he may testify about its existence. Otherwise, the parol evidence rule prevents him from testifying about an oral agreement that changes the terms of the written contract.
An exception to the parol evidence rule allows evidence of oral agreement that merely explains the meaning of written terms without changing the terms. Also, oral evidence that changes the meaning of written terms can be given if necessary to prevent fraud.
Performance
The fundamental reason any of us enter into a contract is to assure the performance of the promise made or to secure the performance of the action desired. What we want is the other party’s duty of performance. In turn, they want this same duty to be performed by us. An extremely high percentage of contracts are performed in such a way that makes the contracting parties happy. Thus, the most simple (and realistic) statement concerning performance of contracts is that it typically happens. When the parties perform, the obligations of the contract are discharged. A party to a contract is discharged when that party is relieved from all further responsibility of performance.
LO 9-2
sidebar 9.1
Judging What the Contract Says
When an arrangement does not progress the way one hopes, or when a party believes something additional is owed from a deal, the natural strategy is to conduct a closer review of the contract. Perhaps the other party is misinterpreting a key term. Or perhaps they failed to appropriately satisfy an obligation or condition. The two contracting parties are likely to disagree about it, of course. For this reason, disputes over contract interpreta- tion are frequently the underlying basis of many business litigations. Thankfully, every dispute does not dissolve into a morass of conflicting testimony and opposing experts. Because contracts are a question of law, judges have the primary responsibility to interpret their meaning. If contractual language is clear, juries are not necessary to resolve ambiguities or weigh outside (extrinsic) evidence. As a result, a determination of who is right and who is wrong is often achieved quite early in a case.
The significance of the judge’s role was highlighted in a recent dispute between famed music producer Quincy Jones and the company that oversees deceased singer Michael Jackson’s catalogue of works. Jones sued Jackson’s company (MJJ Productions) in 2013 for failure to pay the appropriate share of royalties from the docu- mentary “This is It.” The parties disagreed on whether an
existing contract dictated that Jones was owed a greater share of the royalties from the film that was the product of a new joint venture with Sony Music. However, rather than interpret the contract and decide the issue, the trial court allowed the jury to determine its meaning. The jury eventually awarded Jones over $9 million.
In 2020, the California Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the trial court erred in delegating inter- pretation to the jury when the contract was not ambigu- ous. “When there is no conflict as to the facts, but there are conflicting inferences, contract interpretation remains a judicial function and is not a jury function,” the court stated. There were no factual conflicts, according to the court, and moreover a plain reading indicated that Jones’s proposed interpretation was largely incorrect. The appeals court reduced the original verdict by nearly $7 million, preserving only about $2 million related to more narrow activities.
This case demonstrates the importance of using clear language in contracts. It also highlights the danger in counting on a court to support a technical interpretation down the road, after the parties have made investments. Source: Quincy Jones v. MJJ Productions, Inc., 2020 WL 2140759 (Cal. App., May, 5, 2020) (unpublished).
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However, not all contractual obligations are fully performed. When less than full performance occurs, a number of legal issues arise. For example, a complete lack of performance results in a breach of the contract. As summarized in Figure 9.1, less than full performance results in issues about the level of performance and excuses for nonperformance. As you study this figure and read the next sections, keep in mind that contracting parties ultimately arrive at one of two conclusions: (1) they are discharged from the obligation to perform or (2) they are liable for breaching the contract.
Figure 9.1 Contractual performance flow chart.
Is there a valid, enforceable Contract?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No— Anticipatory breach
No
No
No
Was first party’s performance triggered? · Condition satisfied? · Precedent · Concurrent · Subsequent
Performance discharged
But consider remedies for second party’s breach and quasi
contract
Has first party substantially performed? · Complete performance · Tender of performance · Substantial of performance · Divisibility of performance
Is first party’s performance excused? · Impossibility · Commercial impracticability · Waiver · Release
First party liable for breach Consider appropriate remedy
Will second party substantially perform?
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CONDITIONS OF PERFORMANCE Parties typically put conditions in their contracts to clarify when performance is due. While conditions reflect the creativity of the contracting parties, classifications of conditions usually take three forms.
If something must take place before a party has a duty to perform, it is a condi- tion precedent. For example, a building developer may contract to buy certain land “when the city annexes it.” The annexation is a condition precedent to the devel- oper’s duty to purchase the land. Parties should think through their business envi- ronment and state clearly the conditions governing their performance. For example, in a supplier-customer contract, the parties should state whether payment by the customer is a condition precedent for the seller to deliver or is delivery by the seller a condition precedent for payment. Failure to satisfy a condition precedent excuses performance even if the condition is a minor part of the transaction. Case 9.1 illus- trates this point.
As an employee, you usually have a respon- sibility to work for a certain amount of time (equivalent to a pay period) before your employer is obligated to pay you. You are entitled to be paid before work- ing the next period. The performance of work is a condition to be paid, and receiving your pay is a condition for you to continue working.
case 9.1
ST. LOUIS PRODUCE MARKET V. HUGHES 735 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2013)
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge: Hughes was the property manager for the Market from 1990 until the Market elimi- nated his position in August 2009. The Market drafted and sent Hughes a separation agreement that granted him a lump sum payment equal to fourteen weeks of his salary. The agreement provided:
As a condition precedent to Company’s obligations under this Agreement and prior to Company making any additional separation payments hereunder, Former Employee agrees to return to the Company all Com- pany-owned property, including the company camera, company tools, and the like, and certify that he has returned all such property of Company in writing. . . .
In October 2009, the Market sued Hughes in Mis- souri state court and sought a declaratory judgment that the signed agreement was void. The Market claimed that Hughes secured the agreement through fraud or negligent misrepresentation. Hughes removed the case to the district court and filed a counterclaim for breach of contract in an effort to enforce the agreement.
After protracted discovery, during which the district court sanctioned Hughes for discovery abuses, the court granted summary judgment for the Market on two alterna- tive grounds. First, assuming for the sake of analysis that
the separation agreement was valid, the court ruled that the Market had no obligations under the agreement because Hughes failed to fulfill a condition precedent. The agree- ment required that he return all company property, which included the hard drive and other parts to his company lap- top, and Hughes failed to do so. . . .
Hughes challenges both of the district court’s reasons for granting summary judgment. We conclude that the court’s decision was sound.
Hughes first argues that the failure to return the lap- top was not a material breach of the contract. According to Hughes, the relatively minimal value of the laptop— compared to the more than $200,000 that he claims the Market owes him—makes return of the laptop immaterial. Hughes contends, therefore, that the Market’s performance under the agreement is not excused.
As a matter of general contract law, conditions prec- edent are different from other contract terms: “Unlike a mere contract term, the breach of which must be material before it excuses another party from performing, one par- ty’s failure to fulfill a condition precedent entirely excuses any remaining obligations of the other party.” AIG Cen- tennial Ins. Co. v. Fraley-Landers, 450 F.3d 761, 763 (8th Cir. 2006). . . . “If the breach is material or if the breach- ing party’s performance is a condition to the aggrieved party’s
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performance, the aggrieved party may cancel the contract.” Curt Ogden Equip. Co. v. Murphy Leasing Co., 895 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). Hughes cites no Missouri case in which a court has relied on imma- teriality to enforce a contract despite an unfulfilled condi- tion precedent, and we have found none. Hughes is correct that one party’s breach of a contract term must be material to excuse the other party’s performance . . . but the failure to fulfill a condition precedent need not.
Hughes agreed to return all company property as an explicit condition precedent to the Market’s obligation to pay him under the agreement. Because it is undisputed that Hughes failed to return all company property, including the battery, power cord, and hard drive of the laptop, he failed to fulfill the condition precedent. This failure means that the Market had no duty to perform under the agreement . . . so the Market was entitled to judgment. . . .
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
KEY POINTS • The failure of a condition precedent can excuse a party’s performance, even if it is insig-
nificant. Similarly, the existence of a minor condition subsequent can cut off a party’s obligation to perform.
• Parties often use conditions to ensure that a transaction occurs under favorable and antici- pated circumstances.
• Parties should carefully consider whether conditions are necessary and understand that they may, at times, provide hold-up power to one side.
[continued]
A condition subsequent excuses contractual performance if some future event takes place. A marine insurance policy might terminate coverage for any shipping losses “if war is declared.” This is a condition subsequent. Another typical example of this type of condition is the requirement that an insured motorist or homeowner must notify the insurance company of a claim (from a car accident or homeowner’s loss) within a short time period (five days perhaps) of the claim arising from the accident of the loss. Failure to provide this notice relieves the insurance company of its duty to provide coverage.
The distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent can appear quite subtle. The key difference is found in the timing of the duty to perform. A contracting party has no duty to perform prior to a condition precedent being sat- isfied. Once the condition precedent is met, the duty to perform is owed. The failure to meet a condition subsequent relieves the other contracting party from having to perform the duties previously promised.
What happens if the parties do not have express conditions governing per- formance specified in their contract? Courts may be asked whether implied condi- tions can be read into the parties’ obligations to perform. When courts decide the conditions of performance, a common decision can be the parties have a simultane- ous duty to perform. In essence, there is a concurrent condition of performance. In a contract for the transfer of title to land, the buyer and seller usually expect to meet at a closing event and perform their obligations concurrently. The buyer provides the necessary funds to cover the purchase price while, at the same time, the seller signs and delivers the legal documents transferring ownership.
Most of our everyday purchases involve implied concurrent conditions of per- formance. While shopping you take items to a cashier and expect to pay and take
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the items with you. Your contractual duty to pay and the store’s contractual duty to deliver are exchanged simultaneously. As business contracts often involve more complicated transactions, issues related to performance require further examination.
PAYMENT, DELIVERY, SERVICES TENDERED IN GOODS CONTRACTS The preceding sections’ content on conditions allows us to examine more fully the order of performance by the parties. Performance often is based on one or more con- ditions occurring or being satisfied. For example, in a typical contract involving the delivery of goods by a seller and payment of money by a buyer, what is the required order of performance? In essence, who goes first? The best way to answer these ques- tions is to have the contracting parties provide specific guidance in the contract. When the parties fail to provide this level of detail, the law states the buyer’s payment is a condition that must be satisfied before the seller has the duty to deliver (§2-511(1)).
Delivery is a legal term referring to the transfer of possession from the seller to the buyer. The buyer and seller may presume to know implicitly how and when the goods will be delivered. Sidebar 9.2 illustrates how the UCC serves as a gap-filler, thereby not leaving the terms of delivery of goods to the parties’ uncertain presumptions.
Suppose your company sells office equipment to a buyer. Further suppose that the contract carefully describes the equipment and the purchase price. However, the contract provides no specific guidance as to when or where the equipment is to be delivered.
The UCC permits and encourages the enforceability of this contract by providing a series of gap-filling provi- sions. In essence, if the parties fail to write clear instruc- tions on delivery of the equipment, the UCC controls.
The seller’s obligation is to tender delivery of the goods, and the buyer’s duty is to accept and pay for them (§2-301). The phrase tender of delivery means the seller must make the goods available to the buyer. If, as in our example, the contract makes no statement about delivery, the presumption is the buyer must make arrangements to pick up the goods at the location the seller designates (§2-503(1)).
Many buyers may not want to assume the burden of picking up the goods at the seller’s location. Thus, it is common for the buyer and seller to agree the goods will be shipped to the buyer. If the contract does not provide additional details, how does the seller satisfy its obliga- tion to ship the goods? The UCC states the seller satisfies its obligation to ship goods once they are transferred to the shipper for transportation (§2-504). If the goods are damaged in transit, the liability rests on the buyer, not the seller.
To avoid the assumption of risk, experienced buyers may insist on what is called a destination contract. This contract requires the seller to get the goods shipped and delivered to a specific place of business designated by the buyer. The risk of loss for damage to the goods remains with the seller until the goods safely arrive at the buyer’s destination (§2-310(1)(b)).
sidebar 9.2
Terms of Delivery in the UCC
The UCC provides valuable guidance to performance issues in contracts for the sales of goods. However, when a contract involves the performance of services, the parties to the contract should take time to provide specific conditions. If their agreement lacks specificity, reasonableness needs to govern the relationship and
One party’s tender of performance may satisfy a required condition leading to the other party’s duty to perform.
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performance. For example, let’s assume your manufacturing company hires software consultants to oversee the installation and implementation of new programs that hopefully will enhance your overall efficiency. The contract specifies the date for the completion of this work by the consultants; however, the contract does not provide a beginning date. Reasonable standards should govern your company and these con- sultants. Hopefully, effective negotiation will overcome the lack of direction in the contract. The concept of tendering performance may help. To tender performance means to offer to perform. When the consultants offer to send a team to your plant next week, they are tendering performance. A reasonable response is to permit this work to begin by allowing the consultants access to your facility. Once work begins, the contract’s provisions on when payment is owed will govern your performance.
DISCHARGE OF DUTIES THROUGH PERFORMANCE Beyond the order of performance as determined through conditions, the degree or amount of performance can become an issue. A party to a contract may not always perfectly perform the duties owed. The more complex a contract is, the more dif- ficult it is for a party to complete every aspect of performance. Courts generally recognize three levels of performance. These levels are summarized in Sidebar 9.3.
LO 9-3
1. Complete performance recognizes that a contracting party has fulfilled every duty required by the contract. Payment of money, for example, is a contractual duty of performance that a party can perform completely. A party that performs completely is entitled to a com- plete performance by the other party and may sue to enforce this right.
2. Material breach is a level of performance below what is reasonably acceptable. A party that has materially
breached a contract cannot sue the other party for performance and is liable for damages arising from the breach.
3. Substantial performance represents a less-than- complete performance. However, the work done is sufficient to avoid the claim of a breach. A party who substantially performs may be entitled to a partial recovery under the contract.
sidebar 9.3
Levels of Performance
Complete performance means that a party does everything required under the contract. As a result, the other party is obligated to engage in complete performance. Anything less than complete performance is a breach.
When performance is materially deficient or nonexistent, a material breach has occurred. In the case of a material breach, the non-breaching party is relieved (or discharged) from performance. The non-breaching party may also sue for any dam- ages that result from the breach.
Substantial performance is a middle ground between full performance and nonperformance. It is even greater than significant performance. Substantial per- formance is technically a breach of contract. However, the non-breaching party will, nonetheless, be required to perform and may sue for any damages resulting from the breach. A very typical example when substantial performance is applicable occurs in
Substantial performance is close to, but less than, full performance. It is, nevertheless, a breach of contract, but the non-breaching party’s options are more limited than in the case of a material breach.
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service-oriented contracts. The consultants in the software installation/implementa- tion contract should recover for work performed even if the entire contract is not completed on time.
Likewise, a construction contractor who gets a home built but has not finished all the landscaping and finishing details by the due date is not denied a financial recovery. This builder can recover under the contract but remains liable for any dam- ages to the homeowner for delays. It would be unfair, from the legal perspective, to allow the homeowner to refuse to pay the builder because a deadline is missed.
DIVISIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE Up to this point, we have assumed a contract specified aspects of performance by one party followed by the next party’s performance. Alternatively, a contract may call for both parties to perform concurrently. It is possible, and indeed quite com- mon, for a contract to be divided into segments or installments. An employment contract is a good example. One party (the employee) performs services for a period of time followed by the other party (the employer) paying the wages that are due. This pattern of recurring conditions precedent allows the employment contract to be divided into parts. This contract is considered to be divisible, typically into segments timed as pay periods.
Many contracts that, at first glance, appear divisible actually are not. While our consulting contract example may look to be divided into monthly or quarterly periods, the manufacturer would have a good argument that it wants the installa- tion and implementation of the software complete. A portion of the work is not what is desired. The contract calls for all the work to be done. Thus, this contract is not divisible. Similarly, most construction contracts are viewed as a whole and not as divisible into installments. The fact that the contract may call for payment to be forthcoming following certain benchmarks are met does not make the contract divisible.
With respect to performance, the benefit of divisibility is to view the duty to perform as a series of smaller contracts. This may reduce the amount of disputes (numbers of them and the dollar figures involved) that arise due to nonperformance of the contract.
Excuses for Nonperformance
Generally speaking, in contracts, the party who refuses to perform a promise can expect to be sued for breaching the agreement. However, even beyond the special sit- uations related to performance presented in the previous sections, the law may pro- vide for nonperforming with a valid excuse. If such an excuse for nonperformance exists, there can be no legitimate claim of a breach. In other words, a legitimate excuse for nonperformance can result in a party being discharged from contractual performance.
FORCE MAJEURE A force majeure clause is a specifically negotiated part of a contract that excuses or delays a party’s obligation to perform if a certain extreme event occurs. The event must be outside of either parties’ control and understood to be a risk that is not foreseeable
The divisibility or entirety of a contract helps determine when performance of duties should occur.
LO 9-4
Remember, a discharge relieves a party from the obligation to perform contractual promises.
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and would be very difficult or impossible to internalize. Typical force majeure events include natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods or epidemics, and political tur- moil, such as strikes, terrorist attacks, war or even government expropriation (eminent domain). If the listed event occurs, the affected party may notify the other party and take advantage of the relief spelled out in the contract. That may include total excused performance (more common for natural disasters) or permissible delay (more common for a political event). Timely notification as detailed in the contract is often an essential condition for triggering the force majeure clause. In fact, the failure to notify on time may be fatal to a claim for relief, even if the impact of the event is not in question.
Not all contracts have force majeure clauses, and they are not implied by courts. Some contracts even go as far as to specifically state that a force majeure will not alter contract performance. Even when force majeure language is present, courts read the list of triggering events narrowly. For example, if an earthquake occurs, but this category of disaster is not listed in the clause, it likely will not count, even if a party cannot perform. Sidebar 9.4 explains that even a pandemic that creates a global busi- ness interruption may not qualify. Some force majeure clauses have catch-all “act of God” language, but many do not. Therefore, if the parties believe a significant event could interfere with contractual performance, it is essential to discuss it in advance and add the appropriate language to the contract. Of course, even if a force majeure clause does not provide relief, a court may nonetheless consider the common law excuses of impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose described below.
When the COVID-19 pandemic struck the world in 2020, many businesses found themselves in situations in which their contractual obligations could not be met. Factories were compelled to prioritize the production of personal protective equipment over existing orders, stores were temporally closed in ways that snarled supply chains, and firms and organizations were forced to cancel meetings and events due to mandated social distancing. Faced with a breach of their contractual commitments, many parties looked to their contracts in the hope that a force majeure clause could provide relief. Unfortunately, not every con- tract has such flexibility baked in.
Most importantly, if an epidemic or pandemic is not specifically listed as a force majeure trigger, an aggrieved party may be out of luck. Of course, one would not expect COVID-19 to be specifically listed in any contract. But
courts generally require some indication that the parties intended the general type of event or to be covered. Alternatively, the associated government government action (business closings, lockdown, forced production for the government) may be a force majeure, but again only if covered by the clause. Moreover, the speed at which a pandemic spreads may preclude the required notice. Despite the huge impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, not every party reasonably delayed or prevented from per- forming can look to their agreement for clear relief. Source: David J. Marmins, “Is the Coronavirus a Force Majeure that Excuses Performance of a Contract?” American Bar Association Section on Litigation, March 19, 2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/ real-estate-condemnation-trust/articles/2020/winter2020-coronavirus-force- majeure-clauses-real-estate-contracts/
sidebar 9.4
Is a Global Pandemic Considered a Force Majeure?
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE AND FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE A party’s nonperformance is excused because of impossibility of performance. If the subject matter of the contract is destroyed, the contract becomes impossible to perform. For example, when a contract exists for the sale of a building, and the
Impossibility of performance is less likely to occur compared to impracticability.
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building burns, the seller is discharged from performance. Likewise, when there is a contract for personal services, and the party promising the services becomes ill or dies, the party receives discharge from performances. The party that promises performance that becomes illegal is also discharged because of impossibility of performance.
Frustration of purpose is similar to impossibility, differing primarily in the effect of the event in question on performance. When it is still technically possible for a party to perform, but the result would be dramatically different than the parties intended, the doctrine of frustration of purpose may provide relief.
Mere increased difficulty or reduced profitability, however, does not constitute impossibility of performance or frustration of purpose. Moreover, the impossibility or frustration must be objective and apply to any party in a similar circumstance. Case 9.2 provides a good example of a court’s assessment of the alleged impossibility of a party’s performance due to financial hardship.
case 9.2
EAST CAPITOL VIEW COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. ROBINSON 941 A.2d 1036 (D.C. App. 2008).
WASHINGTON, CHIEF JUDGE: East Capitol hired Denean Robinson pursuant to a written employment contract for a one-year term. Before the end of that term, however, East Capitol informed her that her employment would be terminated early for lack of funding. Although the employment contract stated that Robinson’s “continued employment with [East Capitol] will be contingent on suc- cessfully achieving all performance goals and outcomes,” there was no language stating that a lack of funding could excuse appellant from prematurely terminating appellee’s contract. Robinson filed suit against appellant for breach of contract. . . . The jury returned a verdict in favor of appel- lee. This appeal followed. . . .
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in fail- ing to instruct the jury on the impossibility of performance defense. In essence, appellant argues that it was entitled to an impossibility of performance instruction because “the central issue in the case was whether appellant had an excuse for terminating the contract with appellee because its [g]rant funding had been cancelled and it was no lon- ger able to pay her salary.” . . . Accordingly, in order to receive an impossibility of performance instruction, East Capitol must demonstrate that there was record evidence that could at least support such a defense. . . .
A party’s obligation to perform under a contract may be excused if performance is rendered impossible . . . To establish impossibility or commercial impracticability, “a
party must show (1) the unexpected occurrence of an inter- vening act; (2) the risk of the unexpected occurrence was not allocated by agreement or custom; and (3) the occur- rence made performance impractical.” National Ass’n of Postmasters of the United States v. Hyatt Regency Washington, 894 A.2d 471, 477 n.5 (D.C. 2006). . . .
The doctrine of impossibility relieves non-performance only in extreme circumstances. . . . The party asserting the defense of impossibility bears the burden of proving “a real impossibility and not a mere inconvenience or unexpected difficulty.” . . . Moreover, courts will generally only excuse non-performance where performance is objectively impos- sible—that is, the contract is incapable of performance by anyone—rather than instances where the party subjectively claims the inability to perform. . . . Indeed, “[i]t is generally well settled that subjective impossibility, that is, impossibil- ity which is personal to the promisor and does not inhere in the nature of the act to be performed, does not excuse nonperformance of the contractual obligation.” . . .
Under this analysis, a party’s alleged financial inabil- ity to perform a contract that it voluntarily entered would rarely, if ever, excuse non-performance . . . Although this court has not directly ruled on whether financial inability to meet a contractual obligation excuses non-performance, most, if not all, other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue agree that it does not. . . . Indeed, even insolvency is unlikely to excuse performance: “In short, it must be
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deemed an implied term of every contract that the promi- sor will not permit himself, through insolvency or acts of bankruptcy, to be disabled from making performance.” Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass’n, 240 U.S. 581, 591, 36 S. Ct. 412, 60 L. Ed. 811 (1916). . . .
Nor does the promisor’s reliance on some third party for the ability to perform convert financial inability to perform into an objective impossibility. “[T]he rationale is that a party generally assumes the risk of his own inability to perform his duty. Even if a party contracts to render a performance that depends on some act by a third party, he is not ordinarily dis- charged because of a failure by that party because this is also a risk that is commonly understood to be on the obligor.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. e; . . . Thus, the anticipation of funding from one source does not alter the party’s duty to perform. . . .
Of course, parties may contractually reallocate risk to the other party. However, in this case, there is no evidence that appellant assigned the risk of its financial instability
to the appellant. . . . Though appellant maintained that the revocation of funding deprived the corporation of sufficient assets to continue paying its employees, it failed to include such a possibility as a condition precedent in the employ- ment agreement. Indeed, while appellant specifically included language warning appellee that her continued employment was contingent upon successful performance, it failed to address funding in any way. . . . The agreement does not mention the source of the salary, let alone warn appellee that her continued employment was contingent upon continued grant funding.
Robinson’s employment contract was objectively capa- ble of performance, and East Capitol did nothing to reallo- cate the risk of its own inability to pay. As East Capitol was not entitled to a defense of impossibility, the trial court’s decision to withhold the impossibility defense jury instruc- tion was not error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.
KEY POINTS • Courts are reluctant to excuse performance due to impossibility or impracticability. • The court specifically distinguishes between objective impossibility and personal impos-
sibility. Only the former excuses performance. • Contracting parties have the ability to allocate known risks in the contract. For that rea-
son, impossibility must be an unexpected occurrence.
[continued]
COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY Under the UCC, a party to a sale-of-goods contract receives discharge from perfor- mance due to commercial impracticability (§2–615). The impracticability standard is not as difficult to meet as the impossibility standard. What constitutes impractica- bility of performance depends upon the circumstances of the situation. For instance, a manufacturer may be discharged from an obligation to make goods for a buyer when the manufacturer’s major source of raw materials is unexpectedly interrupted. But if the raw materials are reasonably available from another supplier, the manufac- turer may not receive discharge because of impracticability.
WAIVER OR RELEASE A party may be excused from not performing contractual obligations by the other party to the agreement. When a party intentionally relinquishes a right to enforce the contract, a waiver occurs. When a party announces the other party does not have to perform as promised, a release exists. The distinction between a waiver and a release is not important when examining the resulting discharge of the contract. Nonperformance of the contract is forgiven, and there is no liability for a breach of contract.
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To gain some clarity regarding these closely related terms, focus on the timing of the nonperformance. Waivers generally occur after a contracting party fails to perform. In this situation, nonperformance by one party may cause the other party to waiver its right to enforce the contract. The waiver typically is unilateral. The non- breaching party grants the waiver. A landlord may waive the right to collect a late payment fee when the rent is only two days overdue.
Releases usually occur before a contracting party fails to perform. A release often takes the form of a negotiated contract. The release is bargained for and is sup- ported by consideration. A borrower may seek the lender’s release to avoid having to make an interim payment. This borrower may have to agree to pay the entire debt before its original due date to get the lender’s release from the interim payment.
Breach of Contract
A party that does not live up to the obligation of contractual performance is said to breach the contract. There are several remedies or solutions available for a breach of contract. One party may, of course, attempt to reach a voluntary, negotiated settle- ment with the other party. The parties may also agree to arbitration, as outlined in Chapter 5, and have a neutral third party decide a fair outcome. In many cases, how- ever, a court’s intercession is required to determine the appropriate remedy. Options include the following:
• Damages awards, including compensatory, consequential, and liquidated damages.
• Equitable remedies including specific performance, injunction, and rescission.
Figure 9.2 provides a summary of these remedies for breach of contract. Note that the choice of one remedy may exclude others. For example, if one chooses rescission, one cannot also make a claim for damages.
DAMAGES Awarding money damages is the more common way courts provide remedies to non- breaching parties. The theory behind such an award rests in putting the damaged person in the same financial position as if the contract was fully performed. Usually, compensatory damages suffice to achieve this objective of making a party whole. Compensatory damages may be calculated in a variety of ways, depending on the losses the defendant suffered:
• Contract price—if a defendant fails to pay for goods or services provided. • Lost profits—if a defendant fails to pay but plaintiff makes a replacement sale for
a lower price. • Difference in market price versus contract price—if a defendant fails to deliver
product or service and it must be secured from a higher-priced source.
Occasionally, courts will add consequential damages to create a fair outcome. Such damages reflect the downstream impact of the breach, such as having to close your restaurant because a new refrigerator does not arrive. Consequential damages are awarded only if the consequence was foreseeable.
Punitive damages, which exceed the amount needed to compensate a non- breaching party, are rarely awarded in contract cases. Such damages are essentially
LO 9-5
You contract with P to paint your house for $2,000. P does not com- plete the job, and you hire R and pay $3,000. You are entitled to $1,000 from P as com- pensatory damages.
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Figure 9.2 Remedies for breach of contract.
Damages Default remedy for breach
Compensatory Damages
Court-awarded damages to put the plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had been performed. Includes lost profits on the contract and the cost of getting a substitute performance.
Consequential Damages
Court-awarded damages arising from unusual losses that were foreseeable (the parties knew, would result from breach of the contract).
Injunction
Court order for a party to do something or refrain from doing something. Often employed when a license to property or intellectual property is at issue.
Rescission
Requires each party to return the consideration given the other. Often used in fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake cases. May be coupled with restitution, which requires a party to compensate for something that cannot be returned.
Remedies for Breach of Contract
Liquidated Damages
When real damages for breach of contract are likely to be uncertain, parties may specify in the contract what the damages would be. Courts will enforce unless they appear to penalize instead of compensating for uncertain losses.
Equitable Relief If damages are not adequate (no adequate remedy at law)
Specific Performance
Court-ordered remedy when subject matter of the contract is unique. Parties are compelled to perform their promised acts.
intended to punish one party for wrongful behavior. The most common context for such damages is a case of fraudulent misrepresentation (fraud).
Liquidated damages, which are agreed-upon when the contract is formed, can simplify disputes when a breach occurs. However, it is important to understand that liquidated damages cannot constitute a penalty for breach; they must be a reasonable attempt to assess actual damages in the face of uncertainty when the contract is formed.
The victim of a contract breach must mitigate damages when possible. Mitigat- ing damages requires the victim to take reasonable steps to reduce them. For exam- ple, when a tenant breaches a house lease by moving away before the lease expires, the landlord must mitigate damages by attempting to rent the house to another will- ing and suitable tenant if such a person is available.
Keep in mind that if a contract involves an agreement by one party not to sue, breach of that contract by the other party may permit the suit to go forward. This means that the breaching party is potentially liable for damages beyond any contract payments. Such cases can even arise in licensing (see Sidebar 9.5.)
Mitigation is the purposeful reduction of damages; it usually is the responsibility of the non-breaching party.
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EQUITABLE REMEDIES At times, money damages are not satisfactory as a remedy. In such a case, a party may be allowed to request an equitable remedy. For example, the non-breaching party might desire the return of the value given, which involves the equitable remedy of rescission or restitution. Or a party may desire an injunction to compel another party to do some- thing or not do something agreed to under the original contract. The aforementioned quasi-contract (discussed in detail in Chapter 8) is also a form of equitable remedy.
In some cases, a party might request an order that the breaching party specifically perform the contractual promise made, which is known as specific performance. In essence, the breaching party is compelled to carry through on his or her promise. Importantly, specific performance is not available for the breach of a service contract by the party failing to carry out the service. Rather, it is typically awarded in cases where a very unique piece of property is at issue. Case 9.3 involves a court’s consider- ation of specific performance as a remedy in a case involving real property.
Equitable remedies are only available in contract cases if money damages are not adequate (“no adequate remedy at law”).
In some cases, a breach of contract may coincide with liability for related actions. For example, when software is loaded onto your computer, you have almost certainly agreed to an electronic license for the program’s copy- right. If you violate the terms of that license in a way that impacts a copyright owner’s exclusive rights—e.g., by making more copies of the software than permitted— you not only breach the contract, but also infringe upon the copyright (discussed in more detail in Chapter 11). The license was your relief from copyright claims by the software owner, and by breaching it you remove that protection. On the other hand, if you breach your license agreement in a way that has no impact on a copyright owner’s rights, infringement may not be an issue.
The liability for actions associated with a breach of contract can be quite severe. The U.S. Department of Jus- tice (DOJ) has brought cases under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act based in part on a violation of a website’s terms of use. In general, terms of use grant access to a website in exchange for the user agreeing to follow cer- tain rules. When those rules are not followed, the user is engaged in unauthorized access. Criminal prosecution may result depending on what the user does with that access.
Sources: MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010); Nick Akerman, “When a Breach of Contract Is Evidence of Computer Fraud,” The National Law Journal, November 29, 2010.
sidebar 9.5
Opening the Door to Related Liability
case 9.3
OLIVER V. BALL 136 A.3d 162 (Pa. Super. 2016).
OPINION BY STABILE, JUDGE: The facts and proce- dural history underlying this case are undisputed. Appellant entered into a sale of real estate contract with Appellees Larry M. Ball, Danny R. Ball, Larry J. Ball, and Mary
H. Ball (“Balls”) for the purchase of two tracts of land in Cranberry Township, Butler County, containing approxi- mately 71.5 acres (“the Property”). Balls failed to convey the Property. Appellant filed suit against Balls for breach
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of contract, seeking specific performance and/or monetary damages. . . .
With respect to specific performance, our Supreme Court explained in Payne v. Clark . . . :
From the moment an agreement of sale of real estate is executed and delivered it vests in the grantee [(pur- chaser)] what is known as an equitable title to the real estate. Thereupon the vendor [(seller)] is considered as a trustee of the real estate for the purchaser and the latter becomes a trustee of the balance of the purchase money for the seller. Hence, if the terms of the agree- ment are violated by the [seller], [the purchaser] may go into a court of equity seeking to enforce the contract and to compel specific performance.
In other words, a request for specific performance is an appeal to the court’s equitable powers. . . . Specific per- formance generally is described as the surrender of a thing in itself, because that thing is unique and thus incapable—by its nature—of duplication. . . . “A decree of specific perfor- mance is not a matter of right, but of grace.” . . . Such a decree will be granted only if a plaintiff clearly is entitled to such relief, there is no adequate remedy at law, and the trial court believes that justice requires such a decree. “Inequity or hardship may be a valid defense in an action for specific performance and such decree refused if in the exercise of a sound discretion it is determined that, under the facts, specific performance would be contrary to equity or jus- tice.” . . . Mere inadequacy of price, however, will not defeat specific performance, unless grossly disproportionate. . . .
Courts in this Commonwealth consistently have deter- mined that specific performance is an appropriate remedy to compel the conveyance of real estate where a seller vio- lates a realty contract and specific enforcement of the con- tract would not be contrary to justice. . . . As explained in the second restatement:
Contracts for the sale of land have traditionally been accorded a special place in the law of specific performance. A specific tract of land has long been regarded as unique and impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §360 cmt. e. As is obvious, specific performance for the sale of land
is available because no two parcels of land are identical. An award of damages will not suffice to allow a plaintiff to acquire the same parcel of land anywhere else. Thus, in the context of realty agreements breached by a seller, “we can assume that [a buyer] has no adequate remedy at law.” . . .
Instantly, we note that the parties do not dispute that a valid, enforceable contract for the Property existed and that Balls breached the same by failing to convey the Prop- erty. The parties also do not argue that hardship or injustice would ensue if Appellant’s request for specific performance were granted. Rather, the issue on appeal concerns only the adequacy of a remedy at law, and as such, involves a ques- tion of law.
Appellant points out that the Property is unique because it had a wet weather stream running through it, was hilly, featured timber and other minerals, and provided opportunities to him for further development. . . . It also was important that the Property was only five miles away from his home so that he could keep his investments within a reasonable distance from home and work. . . Appellant adequately testified to the unique aspects of the Property and to attributes that made the parcel valuable to him. The trial court dismissed this testimony upon the basis that Appellant did not demonstrate that these attributes could not be duplicated elsewhere. Given that all tracts of land long have been regarded as unique, and Appellant further testified to the Property’s unique characteristics vis-a-vis his needs, we agree with Appellant that a remedy at law is inad- equate. Accordingly, we reject the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to specific performance because the Property did not have any unique character- istics that could not be found or purchased elsewhere. We conclude that, based on our review of pertinent case law, the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s claim for spe- cific performance and granting Balls’ motion for nonsuit. As stated, courts in this Commonwealth must enforce spe- cifically realty agreements breached by sellers, except in cases where hardship or injustice would result. . . .
In sum, we conclude that the trial court erred in deny- ing Appellant’s post-trial motion for removal of nonsuit when the Appellant clearly established that his remedy at law was inadequate under the circumstances of this case.
KEY POINTS • When a contract involves unique subject matter, courts may award specific performance
because there is no amount of money that can make up for the failure of the contractual promise.
• Land is a common context for the award of specific performance because it is such a unique asset.
[continued]
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EFFICIENT BREACH Should you always perform your contractual obligations if at all possible? Scholars have long debated whether performance of contractual duties should be predicated on more than economic benefit. One school of thought suggests that if one mon- etarily compensates the non-breaching party according to the contract terms, noth- ing more is required. You may be able to breach, fully compensate the non-breaching party, and still end up better off. That scenario is termed an efficient breach, because all parties end up either indifferent or in a better position than if the contract was performed. But another view argues that one is morally obligated to carry through on one’s promises.
Mortgage contracts provide a current context for considering the issue of effi- cient breach. This is discussed in Sidebar 9.6.
In essence, a mortgage is a contract. In such an arrange- ment, a bank or other lender (mortgagee) has provided the funds for purchasing property (a home) in exchange for the homeowner’s (mortgagor) agreement to make payments with interest. Property is pledged as security for the loan. In a “title” state, the lender actually holds the deed until the mortgage is paid, but in a “lien” state, the lender merely has a right to obtain title if payments are not made. In either case, the failure to make payments on a mortgage—a breach of contract—can result in a “foreclo- sure” wherein the lender takes ownership of the property. In some states, the mortgagor has no further obligation after the mortgagee forecloses.
In a strong economy, when home prices rise, making payments on a mortgage seems like a good economic
arrangement for all involved. However, in a bad economy, home prices may fall so quickly that a mortgagee’s pay- ments will cover only the inflated portion of the loan for many years. Such a mortgage is said to be “underwater,” with the property being worth far less than the amount owed to the lender. When this happens, a homeowner may be inclined to simply walk away from the mortgage, permitting the lender to take over the property and recoup only a part of the amount loaned. To many, this makes economic sense, at least from the perspective of the homeowner. But is it morally wrong?
Consider whether it is acceptable to walk away from a mortgage that is substantially underwater. What would be the impact on the housing market if many people did this? Try to imagine arguments for both sides.
sidebar 9.6
Walking Away from a Mortgage
Third Parties’ Rights
Parties usually negotiate and enter into contracts for personal or organizational rea- sons. The purpose of the contractual agreement is to gain a direct benefit. Despite this common practice, sometimes third parties become involved in the performance of the contract. This occurrence could be anticipated by the original contracting parties, or it could arise due to the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances. Regard- less of the factual situations, third parties and contract rights provide the focus of the concluding part of this chapter. The next two sections discuss third-party ben- eficiaries and assignments. The final section examines how a novation impacts the liability of the original contracting parties.
LO 9-6
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BENEFICIARIES One or more of the original parties to a contract may intend for their agreement to benefit a third party. Such parties are called third-party beneficiaries. In general, persons who are not parties to a contract have no rights to sue to enforce the con- tract or to get damages for breach of contract. However, a third-party beneficiary can sue if the parties to the contract intended to benefit that person.
Intended third-party beneficiaries fall into two distinct categories; however, any intended beneficiary has rights to enforce the contract to gain the intended benefit. The first category involves a creditor beneficiary. Suppose Carl owes Terry $10,000 for work Terry already has performed. Also assume Carl does work for Chris and contracts to have Chris pay Terry. Terry is a creditor beneficiary of the Carl–Chris contract and can sue Chris for the payment owed.
When the performance under a contract is meant as a gift to a third party, that person is a donee beneficiary. Donee beneficiaries can sue the party who owes them a performance under a breached contract, but they cannot sue the party who con- tracted to make them a gift. The beneficiary of a life insurance policy is usually a donee beneficiary.
An incidental beneficiary is a third party who unintentionally benefits from a contract. The incidental beneficiary has no rights under a contract. If merchant A contracts to have security service patrol her property—a contract that will likely also protect the other merchants on the block—and if one evening when the service fails to show up merchant B on the block is burglarized, B cannot sue the security service for breach of contract. B is only an incidental beneficiary of the contract between A and the service.
ASSIGNMENT AND DELEGATION IN CONTRACTS Contracts often are thought of as involving only two parties—the offeror and the offeree. In business, such a view is overly simplistic. Contracts may involve many original parties and sometimes third parties who are not a part of the negotiation resulting in the original contract. This section discusses how these third parties become involved in the contract’s performance through the process of assignment or delegation.
Imagine Pineapple Inc. sells 250 smartphones on credit at $200 apiece to WalCo Retail. Pineapple then sells its rights under the contract to Manufacturers’ Credit Co. When payment is due, can Manufacturers’ Credit legally collect the $50,000 owed to Pineapple by WalCo? This transaction is controlled by the law of assign- ment, which is a transfer (generally a sale) of rights under a contract. Figure 9.3 shows the transaction and introduces important terminology.
As Figure 9.3 illustrates, in an assignment one of the original contracting parties becomes an assignor and assigns rights to a third party, known as the assignee. If the assignment is properly structured, the assignee can enforce the original con- tract. When an assignor assigns rights, an implied warranty is made that the rights are valid and enforceable. If the assignee is unable to enforce the rights against the obligor (the original party responsible for satisfying the right) because of illegality, incapacity, or breach of contract, the assignee can sue the assignor for breach of the implied warranty. However, if the obligor simply refuses to perform for the assignee, the assignee’s legal claim is against the obligor, not the assignor.
You are a donee benefi- ciary if a parent buys a car for you. If the seller does not deliver the car, you can sue.
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Pineapple transfers to Manufacturers’ Credit the right to collect $50,000
WalCo contracts to buy 250 smartphones from Pineapple and becomes obligated to pay $50,000
Manufacturers’ Credit has the right to collect $50,000 from WalCo
Paym ent
Pineapple, Inc. (assignor)
Phones WalCo Retail
Manufacturers’ Credit (assignee)
Figure 9.3 Assignment.
Additionally, a party to a contract can also delegate duties. When one of the original parties transfers duties to a third party, the original party is the delegator and the receiving party is the delegatee. For example, if a manufacturer has the obligation to manufacture and ship T-shirts from a factory to a department store, the manufacturer may delegate the shipping duty to a delivery company. The delegatee (the shipping company) will perform under the original contract. However, unlike the case with assignees, the delegator generally remains liable under the contract. Thus, for a breach of contract by the delivery company, the department store may sue either the manufacturer or the delivery company.
The basic rules of assignment and delegation are detailed specifically in the UCC and are a common facet of many goods transactions (UCC §2-210). However, the rules may apply in common law contract situations as well.
Notice of Assignment When an assignment is made, an assignee should notify the obligor immediately. Otherwise, the obligor may perform for the obligee- assignor. If WalCo pays Pineapple before being notified by Manufacturers’ Credit of the assignment, WalCo cannot be held liable to Manufacturers’ Credit.
A dishonest or careless assignor may assign the same contract rights to two dif- ferent assignees. Notification of the obligor is especially important in this situation. In most states, the law says that the first assignee to notify the obligor has priority no matter which assignee receives the first assignment of rights.
Contracts That Cannot Be Assigned or Delegated Although most con- tracts can be assigned or delegated, certain ones cannot. An assignment or delega- tion that increases the burden of performance to the obligor is not allowed. For instance, a right to have goods shipped to the buyer’s place of business cannot be assigned by an Atlanta buyer to a Miami buyer if a New York seller has to ship the goods to Miami instead of Atlanta. Similarly, a requirements contract to supply a retail buyer with all the radios needed cannot be assigned because it depends upon the buyer’s personal situation.
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Most states regulate the assignment of wages. They limit the amount of wages a wage earner can assign to protect wage earners and their families.
A party to a contract cannot delegate the performance of duties when such performance depends on the character, skill, or training of that party. For example, a famous speaker hired for an event cannot simply delegate to another person the duty to speak, no matter how objectively qualified. It is presumed that only the original speaker will satisfy the contractual obligation.
To eliminate any confusion about the ability to assign or delegate, the parties may include a nonassignment or nondelegation clause (sometimes referred to as an anti-assignment clause) in the contract. By doing so, the parties agree in advance that no transfer of rights or obligations can take place without the permission of the nontransferring party.
NOVATIONS Typically, a delegator who delegates duties under a contract is not automatically relieved of future liability. In your current role as a student, suppose you find some- one to take your place on your lease of an apartment or house. Assume you have six months left under the original term of the lease when you assign rights and delegate duties to the friend substituting for you. If the friend moves out and stops paying rent after only two months, you are still liable to the landlord for the last four months of rent. How can you avoid this lingering responsibility? The answer lies in understand- ing the impact of a novation. A novation is a three (or more) party contract wherein the original contracting parties agree to relieve the obligor from liability by substitut- ing another in the place of this party. For example, in your landlord-tenant-friend situation, when you have your friend take your place, you could seek an agreement with the landlord to remove you from the lease and to make your friend liable for the remainder of the lease period. This arrangement is a novation. Such agreements usually are found in business contracts when an organization is acquired through purchase or merger transactions.
Practical Perspective on Contracts
Before concluding your study of contracts, the point made at the beginning of Chapter 8 should be reemphasized. Understanding contracts is critical because they are the key to transacting business. Having an appreciation for contract law may make you a more effective negotiator in some instances. However, as your career advances and you get involved in more complicated business transactions, you will work closely with lawyers to create contractual documentation. Sidebar 9.7 offers some concluding guidance on how to maintain a balanced relationship with your lawyer. Remember, your goal should always be to create contracts that enhance your business activities.
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• Contracts are business documents; they should be in writing whenever possible. • Use plain English. • Tell the story of the relationship; provide timeline of obligations. • Avoid legalese (whereas; party of the first part, etc.); be careful with “and,” “or,” “before,” “on,” “after,” “each,” “every,” etc. • There should be a flow from section to section. • Create clear definitions, if necessary. • Proofread carefully. • Ask questions about language or issues you do not understand. • Consistently redraft to update.
sidebar 9.7
Suggestions for Businessperson/Lawyer Relationship on the Drafting of Contracts
Key Terms Anti-assignment clause 278 Assignee 276 Assignment 276 Assignor 276 Commercial impracticability 270 Compensatory damages 271 Complete performance 266 Concurrent condition 264 Condition precedent 263 Condition subsequent 264 Consequential damages 271 Delivery 265 Delegate 277
Delagatee 277 Delagator 277 Discharge 261 Duty of performance 261 Equitable remedy 273 Express conditions 264 Force majeure clause 267 Frustration of purpose 269 Implied conditions 264 Impossibility of performance 268 Injunction 273 Liquidated damages 272 Material breach 266
Mitigate 272 Novation 278 Parol evidence rule 260 Punitive damages 271 Quasi-contract 273 Release 270 Rescission 273 Restitution 273 Specific performance 273 Substantial performance 266 Tender performance 266 Third-party beneficiary 276 Waiver 270
Review Questions and Problems Interpretation of Contracts
1. Rules of Interpretation Gus contracts to buy a used car from Cars Galore Inc. The printed contract specifies “no warranties.” But Gus and the sales manager of Cars handwrite into the contract a 90-day guarantee on the transmis- sion. If the transmission fails after 60 days, is there a warranty protecting Gus? Explain.
2. The Parol Evidence Rule Caryn negotiates to buy 50 washers and 50 dryers from the We-Clean-It Company. These machines are going into laundromats that Caryn operates with her family. Because these machines will be heavily used, Caryn got the company to agree to a one-year warranty instead of the standard 90-day warranty. Following the negotiation, Caryn signs a written contract. Only later, Caryn realizes there is no warranty provision in the written contract. What should Caryn do to be able to enforce the original extended war- ranty agreement?
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Performance
3. Conditions of Performance (a) Why are conditions important in understanding how and when contracts are
performed? (b) List the three types of conditions that are most common in contractual
performance. 4. Payment, Delivery, Services Tendered
(a) Explain the role of tender of performance. (b) What is the impact of one party tendering its performance?
5. Substantial Performance Ace Contracting constructs an office building for Realty Enterprises. Realty’s tenants quickly find a number of minor problems with the plumbing and insulation of the new building. When Realty contacts Ace about bringing its work up to standard, Ace promises to correct the problems, but never does. (a) Can Realty rescind the contract? (b) What are Realty’s legal remedies?
6. Divisibility of Performance Why is an employment contract usually viewed as being divisible while a construction contract is not considered divisible?
Excuses for Nonperformance
7. Force Majeure A force majeure clause must be negotiated by the parties and is typically limited to the language in the contract. Write a force majeure clause that would excuse one or both parties to a contract due to an unforeseeable event outside of their control. Consider what specific categories to include or exclude.
8. Impossibility of Performance To be a legitimate excuse for nonperformance, impossibility must be real and absolute. What are three examples of factual situations involving real impossibility of performance?
9. Commercial Impracticability A tripling of prices by an illegal cartel of uranium producers caused Westinghouse Electric Corp. to default on uranium delivery contracts to a number of utility companies. The companies sued and Westinghouse settled. If the case had gone to trial, what defense might Westinghouse have raised to excuse its nonperformance under the contracts?
10. Waiver or Release What do waivers and releases have in common?
Breach
11. Damages and Equitable Remedies (a) How are damages different than equitable remedies? (b) If David breaches his agreement to pay $5000 to Laura for her car, and she
later sells the car to Ellysa for $4000, what is the measure of Laura’s damages from David’s breach?
(c) Explain one’s duty to mitigate contract damages. (d) If Olaf breaches his obligation to deliver a new car to Lisa, is it likely that
a court will require Olaf to deliver the car through the remedy of specific performance?
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12. Efficient Breach Is it legitimate (fair or moral) for one party to breach his or her agreement with another to take advantage of a better opportunity, so long as the non-breaching party can be fully compensated? In other words, does the law create a duty to keep our promises beyond economic consequences?
Third Parties’ Rights
13. Beneficiaries What is the distinction between an intended and an incidental beneficiary?
14. Assignment and Delegation in Contracts (a) Franchetti Rifle Distributors assigns a $20,000 claim against Top Gun Inc. to
the Zenith Collection Agency. When Zenith sues Top Gun, Top Gun asserts that it rejected a shipment of rifles from Franchetti out of which the claim arose because they had defective trigger guards. Explain whether Top Gun can properly assert its defense against plaintiff Zenith.
(b) If Peter moves out of his apartment and delegates his duty to pay rent to a new sublessee, Jenny, will Peter still be obligated to pay if Jenny breaches?
15. Novations Explain the purpose of a novation and who must be party to it.
As a new sales representative for Misco Equipment Corporation, you take a customer out to dinner. Before dinner is over, you have shaken hands on a deal to sell the customer nearly a half-million dollars’ worth of industrial equipment. In writing up the formal contract the next morning, you discover that you misfigured the equipment’s price. Your error could cost Misco $60,000. You telephone your customer and explain the situation. • Is the “deal” you made an enforceable contract? • Does the mistake you made permit you to get out of an enforceable contract? • What do you think will happen in this situation?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
10-1 To categorize torts into three main types and to compare what actions create legal responsibility in the three tort categories.
10-2 To explain the elements of negligence and to relate these elements to the development of negligence law.
10-3 To analyze damages awarded in tort litigation and to understand why tort damage awards generate controversy.
Torts Affecting Business10 Nick White/Digital Vision/Getty Images
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T he word tort means “wrong.” Legally, a
tort is a civil wrong other than a breach of
contract. Unlike contract law, the basis for
the wrong is not an agreement between the parties
involved, but an obligation imposed by common law
and legislation. Tort law sets limits on how people
can act and use their resources so they do not violate
the right others have to their resources. If a person is
injured or suffers a monetary loss based on the wrong-
ful actions of another, tort law establishes a way for
that person who has suffered a loss to receive com-
pensation, known as “damages.”
Legal wrongs inflicted on the resources of others
may be crimes as well as torts (see Chapter 13), but
the law of tort itself is civil rather than criminal. The
usual remedy for a tort is dollar damages. Behavior
that constitutes a tort is called tortious behavior. One
who commits a tort is a tortfeasor.
This chapter divides torts into three main cat-
egories: intentional torts, negligence torts, and strict
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liability torts. Intentional torts involve deliberate actions that cause injury. Negli- gence torts involve injury following a failure to use reasonable care. Strict liability torts impose legal responsibility for injury even though a liable party neither inten- tionally nor negligently causes the injury.
Important to torts are the concepts of duty and causation. One is not liable for another’s injury unless he or she has a duty toward the person injured. And, of course, there is usually no liability for injury unless one has caused the injury. We explain these concepts under the discussion of negligence, where they are most relevant.
This chapter also covers the topic of damages. The topic concerns the busi- ness community because large damage awards, frequently against businesses, have received a great deal of attention in recent years.
Intentional Torts
An important element in the following torts is intent, as we are dealing with inten- tional torts. Intent is usually defined as the desire to bring about certain results. But, in some circumstances, the meaning is even broader, including not only desired results but also results that are “substantially likely” to result from an action. Recently, employers who knowingly exposed employees to toxic substances without warning them of the dangers have been sued for committing the intentional tort of battery. The employers did not desire their employees’ injuries, but these injuries were “substantially likely” to result from the failure to warn.
The following sections explain the basic types of intentional torts. Sidebar 10.1 lists these torts.
Torts are divided into intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability.
LO 10-1
Intent is the desire to bring about certain results.
• Assault • Battery • Intentional infliction of mental distress • Invasion of privacy • False imprisonment and malicious prosecution
• Trespass • Conversion • Defamation • Fraud • Interference with business relations
sidebar 10.1
Types of Intentional Torts
ASSAULT AND BATTERY An assault is the placing of another in immediate apprehension for his or her physical safety. “Apprehension” has a broader meaning than “fear.” It includes the expectation that one is about to be physically injured. The person who intentionally creates such apprehension in another is guilty of the tort of assault. Many times, but not always, a battery follows an assault. A battery is an illegal touching of another. As used here, “illegal” means that the touching is done without justification and without the consent of the person touched. These definitions concern the torts of
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assault and battery. In the criminal context, the definitions of assault and battery may differ.
A store manager who threatens an unpleasant customer with a wrench, for example, is guilty of assault. Actually hitting the customer with the wrench would constitute battery.
Hitting someone with a wrench causes physical injury, but, as the following case illustrates, the “touching” that constitutes part of a battery need not cause physical injury.
case 10.1
HARPER V. WINSTON COUNTY 892 So.2d 346 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 2004)
Sandra Wright, the revenue commissioner of Winston County, Alabama, fired her employee, Sherry Harper. Harper sued, claiming among other things that Wright had committed an assault and battery in grabbing her and jerking her arm in trying to force her to go to Wright’s office. Before trial, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Wright. The plaintiff Harper appealed, and the case reached the Alabama Supreme Court.
SEE, Judge: . . . Harper argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Wright, on Harp- er’s assault and battery claim, because, she claims, she pre- sented substantial evidence in support of her claim. Harper argues that Wright admits that she intentionally grabbed Harper’s arm and, she asserts, Wright’s grabbing of her arm was offensive. Harper states: “[Wright] jerked my arm and tried to pull me back.” She argues that Alabama law does not require that Wright strike or hit her in order for a battery to occur. In response, Wright argues that she merely “took a hold of [Harper’s] hand.” Wright states that she did not touch Harper in an offensive manner and that she was only trying to coax Harper into stepping into her office so that they could continue their conversation away from the view of the customers and the employees of the Depart- ment. The trial court stated in its summary-judgment order that “the undisputed evidence from Sandra Wright clearly points out that the touching was not in any way harmful or offensive, but was instead done in an attempt to bring [Harper] under control.”
The plaintiff in an action alleging assault and battery must prove “(1) that the defendant touched the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant intended to touch the plaintiff; and (3) that the touching was conducted in a harmful or offen- sive manner.” In Atmore Community Hospital, the plaintiff presented evidence indicating that the defendant “touched her waist, rubbed against her when passing her in the hall, poked her in the armpits near the breast area, and touched
her leg.” The plaintiff also presented evidence indicating that “each of these touchings was intentional, was con- ducted with sexual overtones, and was unwelcome.” We held that these factual assertions constituted substantial evidence that the defendant had committed a battery.
In Surrency, we stated that an actual injury to the body is not a necessary element for an assault-and-battery claim. We also stated that when the evidence as to whether a bat- tery in fact occurred is conflicting, the question whether a battery did occur is for the jury. Quoting Singer Sewing Machine Co., this Court stated:
To what acts will constitute a battery in a case like this, the rule is well stated by Mr. Cooley in his work on Torts. He says: “A successful assault becomes a bat- tery. A battery consists in an injury actually done to the person of another in an angry or revengeful or rude or insolent manner, as by spitting in the face, or in any way touching him in anger, or violently jostling him out of the way, or in doing any intentional violence to the person of another.” The wrong here consists, not in the touching, so much as in the manner or spirit in which it is done, and the question of bodily pain is important only as affecting damages. Thus, to lay hands on another in a hostile manner is a battery, although no damage follows; but to touch another, merely to attract his attention, is no battery and not unlawful. And to push gently against one, in the endeavor to make way through a crowd, is no battery; but to do so rudely and insolently is and may justify damages proportioned to the rudeness. . . .
Alabama courts have recognized that privilege can be a defense to a plaintiff’s claim that the defendant battered her. This Court has held that when a merchant suspects a customer of shoplifting, it is reasonable for the merchant’s employee to use reasonable force to ensure that the sus- pected shoplifter is detained.
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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS Intentional infliction of mental distress is a battery to the emotions. It arises from outrageous, intentional conduct that carries a strong probability of causing mental distress to the person at whom it is directed. Usually, one who sues on the basis of an intentional infliction of mental distress must prove that the defendant’s outrageous behavior caused not only mental distress, but also physical symptoms such as head- aches or sleeplessness.
The most common cases of intentional infliction of mental distress (also called emotional distress) have concerned employees who have been discriminated against or fired. Many such cases, however, do not involve the type of outrageous conduct necessary for the mental distress tort.
In the business world, other examples of infliction of mental distress come about from the efforts of creditors to extract payment from their debtors. Frequent, abusive, threatening phone calls by creditors might provide the basis for a claim of intentional infliction of mental distress. As torts go, this one is of fairly recent ori- gin. It is a judge-made tort, which furnishes a good example of how the courts are increasingly sensitive to the range of injuries for which compensation is appropri- ate. In some states, courts have established liability for carelessly inflicted mental distress, such as the distress of a mother who sees her child negligently run down by a delivery truck.
This tort usually requires the plaintiff to prove not only mental distress, but also physical symptoms.
In this case, there is no question that Wright intended to touch Harper’s arm; it is the “manner or spirit” in which Wright touched Harper’s arm that is in dispute. Harper testified at the June 13, 2000, hearing that Wright force- fully grabbed her arm. Wright testified that she reached for Harper’s arm in an attempt to lead her into her office so they could continue their discussion away from the public area. In Surrency, we noted that “to touch another, merely to attract his attention, is no battery and not unlawful. While it is certainly conceivable that this type of touching is all that occurred in this case, Harper presents substantial evidence to the contrary. Harper testified at her hearing that Wright “jerked” her arm. In her response to Wright’s motion for a summary judgment, Harper states that Wright’s touch
KEY POINTS • Harper was not physically injured, but she still can claim battery if she was touched in an
offensive or hostile way, like being “grabbed” and “pulled.” • The trial court ruled that Wright was touching merely to gain control of Harper. However,
there is no legal exception for offensive touching to gain control of an employee like there may be for a merchant detaining a shoplifter.
• The appeals court ruling in favor of Harper does not mean that she prevailed on her bat- tery claim. The case can go back to a trial court so that Harper has an opportunity to prove her claim of battery at trial.
[continued]
greatly offended her and that this fact is evidenced by the fact that she filed her complaint with the Winston County Commission on May 9, 2000. In her complaint, Harper states that “[Wright] grabbed my arm and tried to force me to go with her.” Reviewing the facts in the light most favor- able to Harper, as this Court is required to do on an appeal from a summary judgment, we conclude that the ques- tion whether a battery occurred in this case—specifically, whether Wright touched Harper in a harmful or offensive manner—is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
We reverse the summary judgment in favor of Wright on Harper’s assault-and-battery claim; and we remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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INVASION OF PRIVACY The tort of invasion of privacy is one that is still in the early stages of legal devel- opment. As the statutes and court cases recognize it, the tort at present comprises three principal invasions of personal interest. An invasion of any one of these areas of interest is sufficient to trigger liability.
Most commonly, liability will be imposed on a defendant who appropriates the plaintiff’s name or likeness for his or her own use. Many advertisers and marketers have been required to pay damages to individuals when pictures of them have been used without authorization to promote products or when their names and identities have been used without permission for promotional purposes. In one recent case, EA Sports ended its popular NCAA College Football video game series and settled a lawsuit filed by former and current student-athletes for using their images in the video games without compensating them. Before using anyone’s picture or name, an advertiser must obtain a proper release from that person to avoid possible liability. The ability to manipulate photos and audio recordings creates potential basis for misappropriation claims in the digital age.
A second invasion of privacy is the defendant’s intrusion upon the plaintiff’s physical solitude. Illegal searches or invasions of home or possessions, illegal wire- tapping, and persistent and unwanted telephoning can provide the basis for this invasion-of-privacy tort. In one case, a woman even recovered damages against a pho- tographer who entered her sickroom and snapped a picture of her. Employers who enter their employees’ homes without permission have also been sued successfully for invasions of privacy. If the invasion of privacy continues, it may be enjoined by the court. Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis sought and obtained an injunction that forbade a certain photographer from getting too close to her and her children. Under this tort, the invasion of physical solitude must be highly objectionable to a reasonable person.
Social media is often a factor in recent invasion of privacy claims. Case 10.2 con- siders whether an individual has an expectation of privacy in a posting to social media.
That you can recover damages for misap- propriation of likeness illustrates that you own your name and likeness in certain respects.
case 10.2
EHLING V. MONMOUTH-OCEAN HOSPITAL SERVICE CORP. 961 F.Supp. 2d 659 (D. N. J. 2013)
Monmouth-Ocean Hospital (MONOC) provides emergency medical services, and employed Deborah Ehling as a regis- tered nurse and paramedic. Ehling maintained a Facebook account for social networking. Ehling did not invite any mem- bers of MONOC management to be her Facebook “friend” and without that “friend” invitation, the postings on her Facebook “wall” were not accessible. Many non-management co-workers, however, were invited by Ehling to be Facebook friends. The plaintiff Ehling claims that MONOC supervisors accessed her Facebook wall that included a posting regarding a shooting at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC, that stated: “An 88 yr old sociopath white supremacist opened fire in the Wash D.C.
Holocaust Museum this morning and killed an innocent guard (leaving children). Other guards opened fire. The 88 yr old was shot. He survived. I blame the D.C. paramedics. I want to say 2 things to the DC medics 1. WHAT WERE YOU THINKING? and 2. This was your opportunity to really make a difference!”
MONOC sent letters regarding Ehling’s Facebook post to the New Jersey Board of Nursing and Department of Health stating concern that the posting showed a disregard for patient safety. Ehling filed a lawsuit for common law invasion of pri- vacy and MONOC asked the court to dismiss the claim.
The court denied the motion to dismiss, noting “[a] lthough most courts hold that a communication is not
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The third invasion of personal interest that gives rise to the invasion-of-privacy tort is the defendant’s public disclosure of highly objectionable, private information about the plaintiff. A showing of such facts can be the basis for a cause of action, even if the information is true. Thus, publishing in a newspaper that the plaintiff does not pay his or her debts has been ruled to create liability for the defendant creditor. Communicating the same facts to a credit-reporting agency or the plaintiff’s employer usually does not impose liability, however. In these cases, there has been no disclosure to the public in general. Also, the news media are protected under the First Amendment when they publish information about public officials and other public figures.
Don’t forget that the First Amendment protects you when you publish even highly personal truthful information about public officials and public figures.
necessarily public just because it is accessible to a number of people, courts differ dramatically in how far they think this theory extends. . . . What is clear is that privacy determina- tions are made on a case-by-case basis, in light of all the facts presented.” After discovery was completed, MONOC filed a motion for summary judgement.
MARTINI, Judge: A claim for invasion of privacy under New Jersey law will succeed if a plaintiff brings forth evi- dence showing that (1) there was an intentional intrusion “upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs,” and that (2) this intrusion would highly offend the reasonable person. Under the first prong, a defendant must commit an intrusive act. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977) (“The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability”); O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989) (according to the Restatement, an actor must “commit [an] intrusive act” to be liable for invasion of privacy). “The converse of this principle is, however, of course, that there is no wrong where defendant did not actually delve into plaintiff’s concerns.” Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 186 N.J. Super. 335, 339, 452
A.2d 689 (App. Div. 1982). Plaintiff faces a high burden in asserting a cause of action based on intrusion of seclusion.
In this case, Plaintiff failed to show that there was an intentional intrusion by any of the Defendants. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants gained access to her Facebook page because a “member of upper management summoned a MONOC employee. . . into his office” and “threatened this employee into access- ing his Facebook account.” Now that discovery is complete, it is clear that there is no evidentiary support for these allegations. The evidence does not show that Defendants obtained access to Plaintiff’s Facebook page by, say, log- ging into her account, logging into another employee’s account, or asking another employee to log into Facebook. Instead, the evidence shows that Defendants were the pas- sive recipients of information that they did not seek out or ask for. Plaintiff voluntarily gave information to her Face- book friend, and her Facebook friend voluntarily gave that information to someone else. This may have been a viola- tion of trust, but it was not a violation of privacy.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgement . . . is granted.
KEY POINTS • Courts determine what is reasonable privacy based on the facts of each case. Disclosure to
one or more people does not mean that a plaintiff has forfeited privacy rights, but where to draw the line is very specific to the circumstances of each case.
• Invasion of privacy requires an intentional intrusion. Information available on social media accounts may result in an intrusion if accessed information is adequately protected.
• If negative information is freely shared with an employer by others who have access to protected social media accounts, this is not an intrusive act that gives rise to an invasion of privacy claim.
[continued]
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FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Shoplifting accounts for some $18 billion a year in business losses, or almost one per- cent of retail sales. Claims of false imprisonment stem most frequently in business from instances of shoplifting. This tort is the intentional unjustified confinement of a nonconsenting person. Although most states have statutes that permit merchants or their employees to detain customers suspected of shoplifting, this detention must be a reasonable one. The unnecessary use of force, lack of reasonable suspicion of shoplifting, or an unreasonable length of confinement can cause the merchant to lose the statutory privilege. The improperly detained customer is then able to sue for false imprisonment. Allegations of battery are also usually made if the customer has been touched. Not all false imprisonment lawsuits arise because of shoplifting. In one instance, a KPMG employee sued for false imprisonment alleging that his manager blocked a door with a chair during a performance review and caused the employee to have to remain in the room against his will.
The tort of malicious prosecution is often called false arrest. Malicious pros- ecution arises from causing someone to be arrested criminally without proper grounds. It occurs, for instance, when the arrest is accomplished simply to harass someone. A former bank teller at Bank of America reached a $600,000 settlement with the bank in a malicious prosecution case. When two incidents of money miss- ing from bank vaults occurred, the corporate security officer had the teller arrested although several other bank employees had access to the vaults. The security officer misled investigators and provided only evidence incriminating the teller, who was found not guilty at trial.
TRESPASS The tort of trespass includes trespass to land (or real property) and trespass to per- sonal property (also known as trespass to chattels). To enter another’s land without consent or to remain there after being asked to leave constitutes the tort of trespass to land. Variation on this trespass tort arises when something (such as particles of pollution) is placed on another’s land without consent. Although the usual civil action for trespass asks for an injunction to restrain the trespasser, the action may also ask for damages.
Everyone who enters land, of course, is not a trespasser. When someone enters commercial property to transact business, that person is considered a business invi- tee, and the business must use reasonable care not to harm the invitee.
Union pickets walking on company property (in most instances), customers refusing to leave a store after being asked to do so, and unauthorized persons enter- ing restricted areas are all examples of trespass. Note that trespass is often a crime as well as a tort. Intentional wrongdoing is frequently criminal.
Trespass concerns the crossing of an owner’s boundaries. Today, trespass refers not only to violating the physical boundaries of an owner’s land but also to material possessions. Therefore, trespass to personal property addresses when someone uses personal property without permission or otherwise interferes with the owner’s pos- session of personal property.
The famous British constitutional historian Frederick Maitland wrote, “Trespass is the fertile mother of actions.” By this he meant that many of our modern day
One false imprisonment lawsuit arose when a tow-truck operator towed a car with the driver still in it.
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causes of action in tort—like battery—come from trespass. In an important sense, we own ourselves and various things we have acquired, and those who violate our boundaries become liable to compensate us.
CONVERSION Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion (power) and control over the personal (nonland) resources that belong to another. Conversion deprives owners of their lawful right to exclude others from such resources. The deprivation may be either temporary or permanent, but it must constitute a serious invasion of the owner’s legal right. This requirement for a serious invasion of an owner’s legal right distinguishes conversion from trespass to personal property.
Abraham Lincoln once convinced an Illinois court that a defendant’s action in riding the plaintiff’s horse for 15 miles was not sufficiently serious to be a conver- sion because the defendant had returned the horse in good condition. The plaintiff had left the horse with the defendant to be stabled and fed. Although the defendant may have committed trespass on personal property, the court found the invasion was not serious enough to constitute conversion, which is a civil wrong similar to the criminal wrong of theft.
Conversion often arises in business situations. Stealing something from an employer is conversion, as is purchasing—even innocently—something that has been stolen. Failing to return something properly acquired at the designated time, deliver- ing something to the wrong party, and destruction or alteration of what belongs to another are all conversions when a deprivation of ownership is serious or long-lived. Even if you intend to return something, if you have converted it you are absolutely liable for any damage done to it. A warehouse operator who improperly transfers stored goods from a designated to a nondesignated warehouse is absolutely liable when a tornado destroys the goods or when a thief steals them.
DEFAMATION Defamation is the publication of untrue statements about another that hold up that individual’s character or reputation to contempt and ridicule. “Publication” means that the untruth must be made known to third parties. If defamation is oral, it is called slander. Written defamation, or defamation published over radio or televi- sion, is termed libel.
False accusations of dishonesty or inability to pay debts frequently bring on defamation suits in business relationships. Sometimes such accusations arise during the course of a takeover attempt by one company of another through an offering to buy stock. In a recent instance, the chairman of one company called the chairman of a rival business “lying, deceitful, and treacherous” and charged that he “violated the standards by which decent men do business.” If untrue, these remarks provide a good example of defamation of character. At one major university, a former business professor received a multi-million-dollar settlement following allegations made by university administrators that he had vandalized the new business school. The allega- tions cost him a deanship at another university. Punitive or punishment damages, as well as actual damages, may be assessed in defamation cases.
Individuals are not the only ones who can sue for defamation. A corporation can also sue for defamation if untrue remarks discredit the way the corporation conducts
In one case, a student drove a rental car into Mexico although the lease specifically pro- hibited cross-border driving. When an earth- quake destroyed the car while it was parked in Mexico City, the rental company successfully sued the student for conversion.
Is it defamation of char- acter to say that some- one is gay or lesbian? How about that some- one is of a different race than is correct? Is calling someone a “communist” defamatory?
In 2019, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos was sued for defamation by his girl- friend’s brother, Michael Sanchez. The lawsuit claimed that Bezos spread the false rumor to journalists that San- chez was responsible for leaking nude photo- graphs of Bezos to the National Enquirer.
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its business. Untruthfully implying that a company’s entire management is dishonest or incompetent defames the corporation.
Nearly one-third of all defamation suits are currently brought by employees against present and former employers. Often these suits arise when employers give job references on former employees who have been discharged for dishonesty. As a result, many employers will now not give job references or will do no more than verify that former employees did work for them.
There are two basic defenses to a claim of defamation. One defense is that the state- ments made were true. Truth is an absolute defense. The second defense is that the statement arose from privileged communications. For example, statements made by legislators, judges, attorneys, and those involved in lawsuits are privileged under many circumstances.
Defamation and the First Amendment Because of the First Amendment, special rules regarding defamation apply to the news media. These media are not liable for the defamatory untruths they print about public officials and public fig- ures unless plaintiffs can prove that the untruths were published with “malice” (evil intent, that is, the deliberate intent to injure) or with “reckless disregard for the truth.” The rules that apply to news media, however, do not apply to website plat- forms. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act gives websites greater pro- tection from liability for defamation than news media. (See Sidebar 10.2.)
Traditional media outlets, such as the New York Times, can be sued for defamatory statements in articles but Twitter is not similarly liable for defamatory statements written by its users. Why? The answer can be found in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Passed by Congress in 1996, Section 230 grants broad protections to Twitter and all other internet providers for content posted by users. Some credit Section 230 with creating the modern internet and others describe it as a gift to free speech.
Section 230 has two major provisions. The first clearly places liability for defamatory content on website users and not the platform or site hosting the content. The second provision provides that if the website moderates its content to meet its terms of service, such as delet- ing content that is not “family friendly,” it is not liable for
choices made in moderating its content as long as the choices are made in “good faith.”
The first provision provides broad protection to web- site platforms and courts have interpreted it broadly. The second provision of 230 receives more critical review. Most recently, the Executive Order Preventing Online Censorship, issued by President Trump on May 28, 2020, focused on the “good faith” requirement of the second provision and warned that failure to meet that standard for editorial decisions made by internet providers could remove the liability shield and expose providers to defa- mation claims. Sources: Jess Miers, “A Primer on Section 230 and Trump’s Executive Order,” Brookings, June 8, 2020; https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/all- about-section-230-what-it-does-and-doesnt-say/id842818711?i=100047736347 9?i=1000477363479
sidebar 10.2
Section 230 and President Trumps Executive Order
Plaintiffs’ verdicts in media defamation cases are often overturned by trial or appellate judges. In one instance, a Houston investment firm, now defunct, sued The Wall Street Journal, claiming that a story published by the newspaper caused the
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firm to go out of business. Following a huge jury verdict, the trial judge threw out $200 million in damages, ruling that the firm had not proved the newspaper pub- lished certain statements with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.
Plaintiffs’ verdicts in defamation cases are often overturned by appellate courts. Because of the constitutional protection given to speech and the media, appellate judges reexamine trial evidence very closely to determine whether the necessary ele- ments of defamation had been proven.
FRAUD Business managers must be alert to the intentional tort of fraud, also known as deceit. A fraud is an intentional misrepresentation of a material fact that is justifiably relied upon by someone to his or her injury. An intentional misrepresentation means a lie. The lie must be of a material fact—an important one. The victim of the fraud must justifiably rely on the misrepresentation and must suffer some injury, usually a loss of money or other resource one owns.
Fraud applies in many different situations. Business frauds often involve the intentional misrepresentation of property or financial status. Lying about assets or liabilities in order to get credit or a loan is a fraud. Likewise, intentionally misrep- resenting that land is free from hazardous waste when the seller knows that toxic chemicals are buried on the land constitutes fraud.
You can also prove fraud by giving evidence that another has harmed you by failing to disclose a material (important) hidden fact. The fraud of failure to disclose arises when the defendant is under a legal duty to disclose a fact, such as when a defendant seller knows that the foundations of a house are weakened by termites and must disclose this to the buyer.
Likewise, a defendant who has intentionally concealed an important fact and has induced reliance on it to the plaintiff’s injury is liable for fraud. Follow- ing the financial collapse that began in 2007, hundreds of plaintiffs filed fraud lawsuits against banks, other financial institutions, and a variety of their execu- tives based on concealment. In one such case, the former chief executive of Countrywide Financial agreed to pay $67.5 million to settle a fraud case brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The alleged fraud was the inten- tional concealment of the risks of subprime mortgages from investors in the then-largest national mortgage lender. Note that not only the common law but also many statutes regulating the financial industry provide for causes of action based on fraud.
In another concealment case, New York State filed a lawsuit based on fraud against Guidant Corporation. The complaint alleged that heart defibrillators manu- factured by the company were defective and that the implanted devices had already failed in 28 patients. Further, the complaint asserted that Guidant had known of the defect for several years and concealed this information while continuing to sell the defibrillators. Said New York’s former attorney general, “Concealment of negative facts that might influence a consumer to purchase another manufacturer’s product is the essence of fraud.”
Fraud is a broad term that is used in many different areas of the law. Fraud is not only a tort but a crime as well. Do you understand the difference between torts and crimes? (See Sidebar 10.3.)
According to a survey by the Association of Certified Fraud Examin- ers, U.S. companies lose an average of six percent of their profit to fraud.
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Some torts are crimes and some are not. How do we make sense out of this? Crimes, which you will study in Chapter 13, generally require intent (also called willfulness). The pros- ecutor has to prove that the defendant intended to cross the proper boundaries established by law. These cross- ings injure or harm what belongs to people and the state punishes such harm, often through imprisonment or other limitations on personal freedom such as probation. But people also deserve compensation because of the injury. That is where tort law comes in.
The most serious torts like assault, battery, conver- sion, and fraud, which are also frequently crimes, are all intentional. Accidental boundary crossings are usually not criminal unless they are extremely reckless, but, when they injure what belongs to an owner, the owner can still get compensation through tort law, for example, through proof of unreasonable and careless boundary crossing called negligence (discussed later in this chapter). Like- wise, certain other accidental boundary crossings that cause injury, like the sale of a defective product, result in the person crossing the legal fence being held strictly
liable, that is, liable even in the absence of unreasonable behavior in the crossing. However, because these torts are unintentional, they are usually not crimes as well.
Because torts are civil and crimes are, well, criminal in nature, they have different burdens of proof, as explained in Chapter 4. The judge instructs the jury that the plaintiff must prove the tort by a preponderance of the evidence but instructs the jury in a criminal case that the prosecutor must prove the victim’s intentional injury by the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The burdens of proof are different because to deprive criminal defendants of their freedom is considered much more serious than merely to deprive them civilly of their money. And burdens of proof exist in both civil and criminal cases because to punish a criminal defendant to protect the proper order of the state or to compensate a civil plaintiff for a wrongful boundary crossing involves the taking of something that was previ- ously proper to defendants, whether it is their freedom, their money, or some other resource belonging to them.
Do you understand better now why the same tres- pass across a legal fence can be both a tort and a crime?
sidebar 10.3
Tort or Crime? or Both?
INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS Specific claims under tort are made when intentional acts cause interference with existing business relations or potential business relations. The same basic facts of a case can give rise to a number of different tort claims. (See Sidebar 10.4.)
Injurious Falsehood Injurious falsehood, also known as product disparage- ment or trade disparagement, is a common business tort. It consists of the publica- tion of untrue statements that disparage the business owner’s product or its quality. General disparagement of the plaintiff’s business may also provide basis for liability. As a cause of action, injurious falsehood is similar to defamation of character. It dif- fers, however, in that it usually applies to a product or business rather than character or reputation. In disparagement cases, the plaintiff must establish the falsity of the defendant’s statements. The plaintiff must also show actual damages arising from the untrue statements.
As an example of injurious falsehood, consider the potential harm to Procter & Gamble of the assertions that associated its former logo of moon and stars with satanism. The company threatened to sue a number of individuals. In another instance, Warnaco sued Calvin Klein, alleging that Klein had made publicly dis- paraging remarks about how Warnaco made Calvin Klein clothing under license.
Do remember that you can be sued for making statements about a competitor’s product that the competitor considers false.
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The lawsuit alleged that Klein “falsely accused [Warnaco] of effectively ‘counterfeit- ing’ Calvin Klein apparel.”
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations A second type of business tort is intentional interference with contractual relations. Probably the most common example of this tort involves one company raiding another for employees. If employees are under contract to an employer for a period of time, another employer cannot induce them to break their contracts. In a variation on this tort, the brokerage firm PaineWebber Group sued Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Company over PaineWebber’s merger agreement with J. C. Bradford & Company. PaineWebber claimed that Morgan Stanley pursued “a carefully planned, broad- based campaign to raid Bradford personnel and interfere with the merger agreement between PaineWebber and Bradford.”
One of the most famous tort cases in history involved interference with a contract of merger. In that case, a jury awarded Pennzoil more than $10 billion against Texaco for persuading Getty Oil to breach an agreement of merger with Pennzoil. After Tex- aco filed for bankruptcy, Pennzoil accepted a settlement of around $3 billion.
Negligence
The second major area of tort liability involves unreasonable behavior that causes injury. This area of tort is called negligence. In the United States, more lawsuits allege negligence than any other single cause of action.
Don’t induce the employees of another company to come to work for you when they are under contract to work for a period of time.
LO 10-2
When you consider the examples used to illustrate inten- tional torts in this section, the facts may suggest a claim based on another tort described in this chapter. Oftentimes the same set of facts alleging tortious behavior potentially includes several claims that fall under the legal concept of tort. For example, in Hayne vs. Innocence Project, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5586 (S.D. Miss. 2011), a doctor sued The Innocence Project, a not-for-profit organization that works to exonerate those wrongfully convicted. The Innocence Proj- ect had sent a letter to the state medical licensing board asking for the doctor’s license to be revoked because, “by providing false and misleading autopsy reports and tes- timony in criminal prosecutions which carry a death sen- tence, [he] has played a critical role in improperly sending an unknown number of people to death row or prison for life.” The doctor, a pathologist who had testified at numerous trials, was a “public figure,” and claimed the letter sent to the licensing board constituted defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and injurious falsehood. The parties settled the lawsuit.
A different set of facts in Greico v. Sean & Co. L.P., 9 Pa. D. & C.5th 477 (2009) brought claims of trespass, con- version, and fraud against owners building a new Trac- tor Supply Company store. The Tractor Supply Company wanted trees and other vegetation removed from adjoin- ing property so that the signs for the store could be seen from the major road. Negotiations with property owners resulted in a general agreement to remove certain trees with the property owners supervising. When the property owners were out of town, however, contractors for the store removed a significant amount of vegetation from the adjoining property. The court determined that, given the vague nature of the agreement between the parties, there was no contract claim, but the property owners could proceed with the tort claims.
It is important to understand the specific elements of each tort to determine what claim is appropriate given a certain set of facts, but it is possible the facts meet the elements of more than one tort claim.
sidebar 10.4
One Set of Facts but Several Tort Claims?
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Negligence takes place when one who has a duty to act reasonably instead acts carelessly and causes injury to another. Actually, five separate elements make up negligence, and the following sections discuss these elements. Sidebar 10.5 also sum- marizes them. In business, negligence can occur when employees cause injury to customers or others; when those conducting business on premises, known as busi- ness invitees, are injured because the business fails to protect them; when products are not carefully manufactured; when services, such as accounting services, are not carefully provided; and in many other situations.
• Existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
• Unreasonable behavior by the defendant that breaches the duty
• Causation in fact • Proximate causation • An actual injury
sidebar 10.5
Elements of Negligence
DUTY OF CARE A critical element of the negligence tort is duty. Without a duty to another person, one does not owe that person reasonable care. Accidental injuries occur daily for which people other than the victim have no responsibility, legally or otherwise.
Duty usually arises out of a person’s conduct or activity. A person doing some- thing has a duty to use reasonable care and skill around others to avoid injuring them. Whether one is driving a car or manufacturing a product, she or he has a duty not to injure others by unreasonable conduct.
Usually, a person has no duty to avoid injuring others through nonconduct. There is no general duty requiring a sunbather at the beach to warn a would-be surfer that a great white shark is lurking offshore, even if the sunbather has seen the fin. There is moral responsibility but no legal duty present.
When there is a special relationship between persons, the situation changes. A person in a special relationship to another may have a duty to avoid unreasonable nonconduct. A business renting surfboards at the beach would probably be liable for renting a board to a customer who was attacked by a shark if it knew the shark was nearby and failed to warn the customer. The special business relationship between the two parties creates a duty to take action and makes the business liable for its unreasonable nonconduct.
In recent years, negligence cases against businesses for nonconduct have grown dramatically. Most of these cases have involved failure to protect customers from crimes. The National Crime Prevention Institute estimates that such cases have increased tenfold since the mid-1970s.
One famous case involved the Tailhook scandal. A group of male naval avia- tors were sexually groping female guests as they walked down the hallway at a Hil- ton hotel. (Remember that an unconsented-to touching is an intentional tort.) One of the females who was sexually touched sued the Hilton hotel for negligence in
A person doing some- thing has a legal duty to act reasonably to avoid injuring others.
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knowing of the aviators’ behavior and failing to protect her. A jury awarded her a total of $6.7 million against Hilton.
The extent of a business’s duty to protect customers is still evolving. Note that in Case 10.3, the New Hampshire Supreme Court says that the defendant restaurant has no special relationship to the plaintiff but still rules that it may have a duty to protect restaurant customers.
case 10.3
IANNELLI v. BURGER KING CORP. 200 N. H. Lexis 42 (N. H. Sup. Ct. 2000)
MCHUGH, Judge: The plaintiffs, Nicholas and Jodiann Iannelli, individually and on behalf of their three children, brought a negligence action against the defendant, Burger King Corporation, for injuries sustained as a result of an assault at the defendant’s restaurant. During the late after- noon or early evening hours of December 26, 1995, the Ian- nelli family went to the defendant’s restaurant for the first time. Upon entering the restaurant, the Iannellis became aware of a group of teenagers consisting of five males and two females, whom they alleged were rowdy, obnoxious, loud, abusive, and using foul language. Some in the group claimed they were “hammered.” Initially this group was near the ordering counter talking to an employee whom they appeared to know. The Iannellis alleged that one of the group almost bumped into Nicholas. When that fact was pointed out, the teenager exclaimed, “I don’t give an F. That’s his F’ing problem.”
Nicholas asked his wife and children to sit down in the dining area as he ordered the food. While waiting for the food to be prepared, Nicholas joined his family at their table. The teenagers also moved into the dining area to another table. The obnoxious behavior and foul language allegedly continued. One of the Iannelli children became nervous. Nicholas then walked over to the group intend- ing to ask them to stop swearing. As Nicholas stood two or three feet from the closest of the group, he said, “Guys, hey listen, I have three kids.” Whereupon, allegedly unpro- voked, one or more of the group assaulted Nicholas by hit- ting him, knocking him to the ground and striking him in the head with a chair.
The plaintiffs argue that a commercial enterprise such as a restaurant has a general duty to exercise reasonable care toward its patrons, which may include a duty to safe- guard against assault when circumstances provide warn- ing signs that the safety of its patrons may be at risk. The most instructive case, given the issues presented, is Walls v.
Oxford Management Co. In Walls, a tenant of an apartment complex alleged that the owner’s negligent maintenance of its property allowed her to be subjected to a sexual assault in the parking lot. We held that as a general principle land- lords have no duty to protect tenants from criminal attacks. In as much as landlords and tenants have a special rela- tionship that does not exist between a commercial estab- lishment and its guests, it follows that the same general principle of law extends to restaurants and their patrons. We recognized in Walls, however, that particular circum- stances can give rise to such a duty. These circumstances include when the opportunity for criminal misconduct is brought about by the actions or inactions of the owner or where overriding foreseeability of such criminal activity exists.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we must decide whether the behavior of the rowdy youths could have created an unreasonable risk of injury to restaurant patrons that was foreseeable to the defendant. If the risk of injury was reasonably foreseeable, then a duty existed. We hold that the teenagers’ unruly behavior could reasonably have been anticipated to escalate into acts that would expose patrons to an unreasonable risk of injury. The exact occurrence or precise injuries need not have been foreseen.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evi- dence could support a finding that the teenagers’ obnoxious behavior in the restaurant was open and notorious. Because the group was engaging in a conversation at times with a res- taurant employee, it could be found that the defendant was aware of the teenagers’ conduct. The near physical contact between one teenager and Nicholas Iannelli at the counter and the indifference expressed by the group member there- after could be deemed sufficient warning to the restaurant manager of misconduct such that it was incumbent upon him to take affirmative action to reduce the risk of injury.
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Note that the duty to act reasonably also applies to professional providers, like doctors, lawyers, CPAs, architects, engineers, and others. In most negligence cases, however, the standard of reasonableness is that of a reasonable person. In negligence cases involving professionals, the negligence standard applied is that of the reason- able professional. The negligence of professionals is called malpractice.
As Sidebar 10.6 suggests, professional negligence is a controversial area of tort law.
The plaintiffs allege that at least one other restaurant patron expressed disgust with the group’s actions prior to the assault. The manager could have warned the group about their behav- ior or summoned the police if his warnings were not heeded.
In summary, the trial court’s ruling that as a matter of law the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiffs to protect
them from the assault was error. While as a general prin- ciple no such duty exists, here it could be found that the teenagers’ behavior in the restaurant created a foreseeable risk of harm that the defendant unreasonably failed to alle- viate. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
[continued]
KEY POINTS • A restaurant has a duty of reasonable care to those who are eating in the restaurant, but pro-
tecting them from assault does not normally fall within the duty owed to diners at a restaurant. • When warning signs indicate that individuals eating in the restaurant may not be safe, the
manager of the restaurant has a duty to take action to try to prevent injury. Warning signs in this case included obnoxious behavior by teenagers and one of them almost bumping into a child yet expressing indifference to the encounter.
• The court found that a duty to protect diners from assault might exist if restaurant employ- ees become aware of the danger and do not take basic measures to prevent it.
Few people would disagree that physicians are extremely unhappy about the medical malpractice liability. Some physicians have gone on strike; others have left the prac- tice of medicine. The exact causes of the situation, how- ever, are difficult to determine. Consider the following and make your own evaluation. • In 2018, a Johns Hopkins study estimated that 250,000 people die annually in the United States from medical errors.
• A study in the New England Journal of Medicine found that nine out of 10 patients who suffer disabil- ity from medical errors go uncompensated.
• The rate of medical professional liability claims declined 27 percent from 5.1 cases per 100 physi- cians to 3.7 cases from 2007 to 2016.
• As of 2019, 30 states have capped malpractice awards.
• Physician medical malpractice premiums have seen little increase in over a decade. Question: What would be the impact on the cost
of malpractice insurance if physicians had patients sign arbitration clauses before providing service in all but emergency cases? These clauses might provide that dis- putes with a physician be resolved before an arbitration board appointed by the state medical association. These clauses are currently not widely used and are specifically prohibited by several states. But under the Federal Arbi- tration Act, the state prohibitions are likely preempted by the federal law because medical practice has a substan- tial impact on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has already ruled that law practice has such an impact, so it is likely that medical practice does as well. Source: Aaron E. Carroll, “Death by Medical Error: Adding Context to Scary Headlines,” New York Times (Aug. 15, 2016).
sidebar 10.6
Medical Malpractice Claims
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UNREASONABLE BEHAVIOR—BREACH OF DUTY At the core of negligence is the unreasonable behavior that breaches the duty of care that the defendant owes to the plaintiff. The problem is how do we separate reason- able behavior that causes accidental injury from unreasonable behavior that causes injury? Usually, a jury determines this issue, but negligence is a mixed question of law and fact. Despite the trend for judges to let juries decide what the standard of reasonable care is, judges also continue to be involved in the definition of negli- gence. A well-known definition by Judge Learned Hand states that negligence is determined by “the likelihood that the defendant’s conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.”
Examples of Negligence Failure to exercise reasonable care can cost a com- pany substantial sums. In one instance, the licensed owner of a National Car Rental agency in Indianapolis was ordered to pay $5.5 million to a man who slipped on the floor and broke his hip. To save overtime pay, the rental agency had had its floors mopped during, instead of after, normal working hours. Unaware that someone was mopping the floors behind him, the plaintiff had stepped backward, slipped, and fallen on the wet floor.
In another case arising from unreasonable behavior, Wal-Mart Stores agreed to pay two young girls a settlement of up to $16 million. A store employee had sold the girls’ father a shotgun used to kill their mother in spite of the fact that a federal form filled out by the buyer indicated that he was under a restraining order. Federal law bars those under restraining orders from purchasing guns.
Even before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, New York’s World Trade Center (WTC) had been bombed. In 2005, a Manhattan jury determined that the Port Authority of New York was negligent in the earlier attack, which involved a blast from a truck filled with explosives that terrorists had driven into the public parking lot under the WTC. Six people died and more than a thousand were injured. Is it an example of litigation gone wild to hold the Port Authority liable for a terrorist act? Consider that before the bombing, a report commissioned by the Port Authority, which controlled the WTC parking, had specifically warned against such a bombing and recommended: “Eliminate all public parking at the World Trade Center.” Cit- ing potential loss of revenue, the Port Authority had declined to follow the report’s recommendation.
Willful and Wanton Negligence A special type of aggravated negligence is willful and wanton negligence. Although this does not reveal intent, it does show an extreme lack of due care. Negligent injuries inflicted by drunk drivers show will- ful and wanton negligence. The significance of this type of negligence is that the injured plaintiff can recover punitive damages as well as actual damages. For exam- ple, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, commercial fishers sued Exxon for damage to their livelihoods. A jury awarded substantial actual and punitive damages when it found that Exxon was willful and wanton in allowing the ship captain to be in charge of the ship when they knew he was an alcoholic.
In 2005, a New Jersey state court awarded a two-year-old boy $105 million for an accident that left him permanently paralyzed from the neck down. A drunken Giants football fan had caused the accident. Before driving, the fan consumed at least 12 beers sold to him by a Giants Stadium concessionaire. The award for willful
A train rounds a bend but cannot stop in time to avoid running over an intoxicated person who has fallen asleep on the track. A jury is not likely to find the railroad’s behavior “unreasonable.”
Willful and wanton negli- gence allows an injured plaintiff to recover puni- tive as well as actual damages.
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and wanton negligence against the concessionaire is the largest ever for the careless sale of alcohol. The award included $30 million in compensatory and $75 million in punitive damages.
Because employers are also liable for the intentional torts of employees in advancing the interests of their employers (see Chapter 21), employers face punitive damage awards in those instances even when they are also liable for simple negli- gence, or have not acted negligently at all. (See Sidebar 10.7.)
The caller identified himself as a police officer and told the McDonald’s assistant manager that Louise Ogburn had stolen the purse of a customer who had recently left the restaurant and should be searched. For more than an hour, the assistant manager and other McDonald’s employees detained, searched, and even committed sex- ual battery against Ogburn at the instruction of the caller. However, the caller was not a police officer and the call was a hoax.
Ogburn sued McDonald’s and the jury awarded her a million dollars in actual damages for pain and suffer- ing and $5 million in punitive damages against the com- pany. To understand why McDonald’s is liable, you have to understand that numerous instances of such hoaxes were
known to the company involving various fast-food restau- rants, yet the jury found that the company had not reason- ably trained its employees such calls might be hoaxes.
If McDonald’s negligence were extreme, that is will- ful and wanton, that would justify the $5 million punitive damage award, but McDonald’s is also liable for the inten- tional torts of its employees that justify awarding punitive damages. In this case, the employees committed such intentional torts as false imprisonment and battery in the course of Ogburn’s detention. Such detention advanced the interests of McDonald’s in dealing with dishonest employees and made the intentional acts accompanying Ogburn’s treatment the company’s responsibility when they turned out to be wrongful.
sidebar 10.7
Strip Search Hoax Costs McDonald’s $6.1 Million
CAUSATION IN FACT Before a person is liable to another for negligent injury, the person’s failure to use reasonable care must actually have “caused” the injury. This observation is not so obvious as it first appears. A motorist stops by the roadside to change a tire. Another motorist drives past carelessly and sideswipes the first as he changes the tire. What caused the accident? Was it the inattention of the second motorist or the fact that the first motorist had a flat tire? Did the argument the second motorist had with her boss before getting in the car cause the accident, or was it the decision of the first motorist to visit one more client that afternoon? In a real sense, all these things caused the accident. Chains of causation stretch out infinitely.
Still, in a negligence suit the plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually caused the injury. The courts term this cause in fact. In light of the many possible ways to attribute accident causation, how do courts determine if a plaintiff’s lack of care, in fact, caused a certain injury? They do so very practically. Courts leave ques- tions of cause in fact almost entirely to juries as long as the evidence reveals that a defendant’s alleged carelessness could have been a substantial, material factor in bringing about an injury. Juries then make judgments about whether a defendant’s behavior in fact caused the harm.
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A particular problem of causation arises where the carelessness of two or more tortfeasors contributes to cause the plaintiff’s injury, as when two persons are wres- tling over control of the car which strikes the plaintiff. Tort law handles such cases by making each tortfeasor jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment. The plaintiff can recover only the amount of the judgment, but she or he may recover it entirely from either of the tortfeasors or get a portion of the judgment from each.
Approximately 40 states have limited joint and several liability in certain cases, for example, medical injury cases. In these states and types of cases, multiple defen- dants are each liable usually only for that portion of the damages juries believe they actually caused.
PROXIMATE CAUSATION It is not enough that a plaintiff suing for negligence prove that the defendant caused an injury in fact. The plaintiff also must establish proximate causation. Proximate cause is, perhaps, more accurately termed legal cause. It represents the proposition that those engaged in activity are legally liable only for the foreseeable risk that they cause.
Defining proximate causation in terms of foreseeable risk creates further prob- lems about the meaning of the word foreseeable. In its application, foreseeability has come to mean that the plaintiff must have been one whom the defendant could reasonably expect to be injured by a negligent act. For example, it is reasonable to expect, thus foreseeable, that a collapsing hotel walkway should injure those on or under it. But many courts would rule as unforeseeable that someone a block away, startled upon hearing the loud crash of the walkway, should trip and stumble into the path of an oncoming car. The court would likely dismiss that person’s complaint against the hotel as failing to show proximate causation.
Another application of proximate cause doctrine requires the injury to be caused directly by the defendant’s negligence. Causes of injury that intervene between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury can destroy the necessary proximate causation. Some courts, for instance, would hold that it is not foreseeable that an owner’s negligence in leaving keys in a parked car should result in an intoxicated thief who steals the car, crashing and injuring another motorist. These courts would dismiss for lack of proximate cause a case brought by the motorist against the car’s owner. For one of the most famous tort cases in history, see Sidebar 10.8.
DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE There are two principal defenses to an allegation of negligence: contributory neg- ligence and assumption of risk. Both these defenses are affirmative defenses, which means that the defendant must specifically raise these defenses to take advantage of them. When properly raised and proved, these defenses limit or bar the plaintiff’s recovery against the defendant. The defenses are valid even though the defendant has actually been negligent.
Contributory Negligence As originally applied, the contributory negligence defense absolutely barred the plaintiff from recovery if the plaintiff’s own fault con- tributed to the injury “in any degree, however slight.” The trend today, however, in the great majority of states is to offset the harsh rule of contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative responsibility (also called comparative negligence and comparative fault). Under comparative principles, the plaintiff’s contributory
Many states are cur- rently modifying the common law of torts regarding rules like that of joint and several liability.
British Petroleum prom- ised $20 billion to pay for claims arising from its oil spill in the Gulf. The payout by claims adjusters has been very slow. Part of the problem relates to proximate cau- sation. How do claim- ants prove, for instance, that a falloff in business miles inland is directly caused by the oil spill instead of poor business practice, or for some other reason?
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negligence does not bar recovery. It merely compares the plaintiff’s fault with the defendant’s and reduces the damage award proportionally. For example, a jury deter- mined damages at $3.1 million for an Atlanta plaintiff who was run over and dragged by a bus. But the jury then reduced the damage award by 20 percent ($620,000) on the basis that the plaintiff contributed to his own injury by failing reasonably to look out for his own safety in an area where buses come and go.
Adoption of the comparative negligence principle seems to lead to more fre- quent and larger awards for plaintiffs. This was the conclusion of a study by the Illinois Insurance Information Service for the year following that state’s adoption of comparative negligence.
Assumption of Risk If contributory negligence involves failure to use proper care for one’s own safety, the assumption-of-the-risk defense arises from the plaintiff’s knowing and willing undertaking of an activity made dangerous by the negligence of another. When professional hockey first came to this country, many spectators injured by flying hockey pucks sued and recovered for negligence. But as time went on and spectators came to realize that attending a hockey game meant that one might occa- sionally be exposed to flying hockey pucks, courts began to allow the defendant own- ers of hockey teams to assert that injured spectators had assumed the risk of injury from a speeding puck. It is important to a successful assumption-of-the-risk defense that the assumption was voluntary. Entering a hockey arena while knowing the risk of flying pucks is a voluntary assumption of the risk. However, that the injured person has really understood the risk is also significant to the assumption-of-the-risk defense. In one 2007 case, a university softball coach smacked his player in the face with a bat while demonstrating a batting grip to her. She required surgery for multiple fractures of her face and sued the coach and his employer, the university. The court denied the assumption-of-the-risk defense, asserting that it was up to the jury to determine whether the coach had acted negligently in hitting his player. The court observed that the player did not appreciate the risk of being hit by her coach with the bat.
Contractual notices regarding assumption of the risk are more likely to be enforced if they prominently bring to attention the risk involved.
Helen Palsgraf stood on the loading platform on the Long Island Railroad. Thirty feet away, two station guards were pushing a man onto a departing train when one guard dis- lodged an unmarked package held by the man. The pack- age, which contained fireworks, fell to the ground with a loud explosion.
The explosion caused a heavy scale to fall on Helen Palsgraf, injuring her. She sued the railroad for the negli- gence of its guard and won at trial and in the appellate court. Three justices of the Court of Appeals (New York’s supreme court) agreed with the lower courts: “The act [of the guard] was negligent. For its proximate consequences the defendant is liable.”
However, four justices of the Court of Appeals decided that proximate causation was “foreign to the case before us.” The majority ruled that what the guard did could not be considered negligence at all in relation to the plaintiff Palsgraf. The guard owed no duty to some- one 30 feet away not to push a passenger—even care- lessly—onto a train. The Court of Appeals reversed the damage award to the plaintiff.
The famous Palsgraf case illustrates the complexity of legal analysis. Question: Was it negligent for the passenger to carry fireworks in a crowded railroad station? Why didn’t the plaintiff just recover damages from the passenger? Source: Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
sidebar 10.8
Explosion on the Long Island Railroad
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Courts have often ruled that people who imperil themselves while attempting to rescue their own or others’ property from a risk created by the defendant have not assumed the risk voluntarily. A plaintiff who is injured while attempting to save his possessions from a fire negligently caused by the defendant is not subject to the assumption-of-the-risk defense.
Assumption of the risk may be implied from the circumstances, or it can arise from an express agreement. Many businesses attempt to relieve themselves of poten- tial liability by having employees or customers agree contractually not to sue for negligence, that is, to assume the risk. Some of these contractual agreements are legally enforceable, but many will be struck down by the courts as being against pub- lic policy, especially where a business possesses a vastly more powerful bargaining position than does its employee or customer.
Strict Liability in Tort
Strict liability is a catchall phrase for the legal responsibility for injury-causing behavior that is neither intentional nor negligent. There are various types of strict liability torts, some of which are more “strict” than others. What ties them together is that they all impose legal liability, regardless of the intent or fault of the defendant. The next sections discuss these torts and tort doctrines.
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY A major type of strict tort liability is strict products liability, for the commercial sale of defective products. In most states, any retail, wholesale, or manufacturing seller who sells an unreasonably dangerous defective product that causes injury to a user of the product is strictly liable. For example, if a forklift you are using at work malfunctions because of defective brakes and you run off the edge of the loading dock and are injured, you can sue the retailer, wholesaler, and manufacturer of the product for strict liability. The fact that the retailer and wholesaler may have been perfectly careful in selling the product does not matter. They are strictly liable.
Strict products liability applies only to “commercial” sellers, those who nor- mally sell products like the one causing injury, or who place them in the stream of commerce. Included as commercial sellers are the retailer, wholesaler, and manufac- turer of a product, but also included are suppliers of defective parts and companies that assemble a defective product. Not included as a commercial seller is your next door neighbor who sells you her defective lawnmower. The neighbor may be negli- gent, for instance, if she knew of the defect that caused you injury and forgot to warn you about it, but she cannot be held strictly liable.
An important concept in strict products liability is that of “defect.” Strict lia- bility only applies to the sale of unreasonably dangerous defective products. There are two kinds of defects. Production defects arise when products are not manu- factured to a manufacturer’s own standards. Defective brakes on a new car are a good example of a production defect. Another example involves the clam chowder in which a diner found a condom, which led in 2005 to a rapid settlement between the diner and a seafood restaurant chain. Design defects occur when a product is manufactured according to the manufacturer’s standards, but the product injures a user due to its unsafe design. Lawsuits based on design defects are common but often very controversial. Recent such lawsuits have included one against Ford that claimed Ford should have designed its vans to have a heat-venting system so children accidentally locked in the vans would be safe. Lack of adequate warnings concerning
People injured by a baseball at a baseball game or a golf ball on the golf links also usu- ally assume the risk. Does someone assume the risk of a racing car veering off a race track and going over a barrier and into the crowd?
Don’t forget that strict products liability applies only against commercial sellers.
In one case, a jury found the defendant liable when its cleaning product warned users to “vent” rooms being cleaned but failed to say “vent to outside.” Vapors from the product injured several people when it was used in a room with a closed circulation venting system.
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inherently dangerous products can also be considered a design defect. American Home Products settled a wrongful death lawsuit for an estimated $10 million. The lawsuit alleged that the company had not adequately warned users of its diet drug about the risks of hypertension, which had been linked to diet-drug use.
In practice, strict products liability is useful in protecting those who suffer per- sonal injury or property damage. It does not protect businesses that have economic losses due to defective products. For instance, a warehouse that loses profits because its defective forklift will not run cannot recover those lost profits under strict prod- ucts liability. The warehouse would have to sue for breach of contract. However, if the forklift defect causes injury to a worker, the worker can successfully sue the fork- lift manufacturer for strict products liability.
Under strict products liability, contributory negligence is not a defense but assumption of the risk is. The assumption-of-the-risk defense helped protect tobacco manufacturers from health injury liability for many years. Misuse is another defense that defendants commonly raise in product liability cases. Removing safety guards from equipment is a common basis for the misuse defense. Defendants have also argued that if a product meets some federally required standard, it cannot be con- sidered defective. Most courts, however, have ruled that federal standards only set a minimum requirement for safe design and that meeting federal standards does not automatically keep a manufacturer from being sued for strict products liability.
In recent years, many states have changed or modified the rules of product liabil- ity. See Sidebar 10.9. These changes to the rules of products liability (and modifica- tions to the rules of medical malpractice) are often known generally as “tort reform.” The federal government has also enacted tort reform that applies to product liability.
Another important development in products liability is that in nearly every state product liability case based on design defects, failures to warn adequately and test- ing inadequacies are now decided according to “reasonableness” standards, mak- ing these product liability cases based on negligence standards. Consider Case 10.4 involving Ford Motor Company’s failure to test a seatbelt sleeve.
Defenses available under strict product liability are different from defenses available for negligence.
The rapid growth of products litigation during the past two decades has brought forth many calls for “tort reform.” Numerous states have changed their laws to modify the tort doctrines discussed in this section and chapter. At the federal level, comprehensive tort reform has been strongly advocated although it has not moved forward over several years. Some of the tort reforms proposed or passed by the states include the following: • Permitting only negligence actions against retailers and wholesalers unless the product manufacturer is insolvent.
• Eliminating strict liability recovery for defective prod- uct design.
• Barring products liability claims against sellers if products have been altered or modified by a user.
• Providing for the presumption of reasonableness defense in product design cases in which the prod- uct meets the state-of-the-art; that is, the pre- vailing industry standards at the time of product manufacture.
• Creating a statute of repose that would specify a period (such as 25 years) following product sale after which plaintiffs would lose their rights to bring suits for product-related injuries.
• Reducing or eliminating punitive damage awards in most product liability cases. Importantly, note that not all, or even most, of these
reforms have been adopted by every state.
sidebar 10.9
Tort Reform
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case 10.4
BRANHAM v. FORD MOTOR CO. 701 S.E.2d 5 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 2010)
Hale was driving several children to her house in her Ford Bronco. No one was wearing a seatbelt. Hale admittedly took her eyes off the road and turned to the backseat to ask the children to quiet down. When she took her eyes off the road, the Bronco veered toward the shoulder of the road, and the rear right wheel left the roadway. She responded by overcor- recting to the left. Her overcorrection caused the Bronco to roll over. One of the children, Jesse Branham, was thrown from the vehicle, was severely injured, and sued Ford Motor Company and Hale. At trial, Branham did not seriously pursue the claim against Hale. The case against Ford was based on two product liability claims: one for failing to test the seatbelt sleeve and the other a design defect claim related to the vehicle’s tendency to rollover. Both of these claims were pursued in negligence and strict liability. The jury found both Ford and Hale respon- sible and awarded Branham $16 million in actual damages. Ford appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The court found that the seatbelt sleeve claim should have been dismissed. It then turned to the “handling and stability” design defect claim in strict liability and negligence.
KITTREDGE, Judge: We next address Ford’s two-fold argument that: (1) Branham failed to prove a reasonable alternative design pursuant to the risk-utility test; and (2) South Carolina law requires a risk-utility test in design defect cases to the exclusion of the consumer expectations test. For a plaintiff to successfully advance a design defect claim, he must show that the design of the product caused it to be “unreasonably dangerous.” In South Carolina, we have traditionally employed two tests to determine whether a product was unreasonably dangerous as a result of a design defect: (1) the consumer expectations test and (2) the risk-utility test.
In Claytor v. General Motors Corp., this Court phrased the consumer expectations test as follows: “The test of whether a product is or is not defective is whether the prod- uct is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user given the conditions and circumstances that foreseeably attend use of the product.” The Claytor Court articulated the risk- utility test in the following manner: “[N]umerous factors must be considered when determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, including the usefulness and desirability of the product, the cost involved for added safety, the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of danger.” In Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., our court of appeals phrased the risk-utility test as follows: “[A] product is unreasonably dangerous and defective if the
danger associated with the use of the product outweighs the utility of the product.”
Ford contends Branham failed to present evidence of a feasible alternative design. Branham counters, arguing that under Claytor he may prove a design defect by resort to the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility test. Bra- nham also argues that regardless of which test is required, he has met both, including evidence of a feasible alternative design. We agree with Branham’s contention that he pro- duced evidence of a feasible alternative design. Branham additionally points out that the jury was charged on the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test.
As discussed above, Branham challenged the design of the Ford Bronco II by pointing to the MacPherson suspen- sion as a reasonable alternative design. A former Ford vice president, Thomas Feaheny, testified that the MacPher- son suspension system would have significantly increased the handling and stability of the Bronco II, making it less prone to rollovers. Branham’s expert, Dr. Richardson, also noted that the MacPherson suspension system would have enhanced vehicle stability by lowering the vehicle center of gravity. There was further evidence that the desired sport utility features of the Bronco II would not have been com- promised by using the MacPherson suspension. Moreover, there is evidence that use of the MacPherson suspension would not have increased costs. Whether this evidence sat- isfies the risk-utility test is ultimately a jury question. But it is evidence of a feasible alternative design, sufficient to survive a directed verdict motion.
While the consumer expectations test fits well in man- ufacturing defect cases, we do agree with Ford that the test is ill-suited in design defect cases. We hold today that the exclusive test in a products liability design case is the risk- utility test with its requirement of showing a feasible alterna- tive design. . . . Some form of a risk-utility test is employed by an overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions in this country. . . . States that exclusively employ the consumer expectations test are a decided minority. By our count 35 of the 46 states that recognize strict products liability use some form of risk-utility analysis in their approach to deter- mine whether a product is defectively designed. Four states do not recognize strict liability at all. Those four states are Delaware, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia.
We believe that in design defect cases the risk-utility test provides the best means for analyzing whether a prod- uct is designed defectively. Unlike the consumer expecta- tions test, the focus of a risk-utility test centers upon the
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alleged defectively designed product. The risk-utility test provides objective factors for a trier of fact to analyze when presented with a challenge to a manufacturer’s design. Conversely, we find the consumer expectations test and its focus on the consumer ill-suited to determine whether a product’s design is unreasonably dangerous.
As we observed in Marchant v. Mitchell Distributing Co.: “Most any product can be made more safe. Automo- biles would be safer with disc brakes and steel-belted radial tires than with ordinary brakes and ordinary tires, but this does not mean that an automobile dealer would be held to have sold a defective product merely because the most safe equipment is not installed. By a like token, a bicycle is safer if equipped with lights and a bell, but the fact that one is not
so equipped does not create the inference that the bicycle is defective and unreasonably dangerous. There is, of course, some danger incident to the use of any product.”
In a product liability design defect action, the plaintiff must present evidence of a reasonable alternative design. The plaintiff will be required to point to a design flaw in the product and show how his alternative design would have prevented the product from being unreasonably dangerous. This presentation of an alternative design must include con- sideration of the costs, safety and functionality associated with the alternative design. On retrial, Branham’s design defect claim will proceed under the risk-utility test and not the consumer expectations test.
[Reversed and remanded]
[continued]
KEY POINTS • The court reviewed the two major tests used by state courts to determine if a design defect
made a product unreasonably dangerous: the consumer expectations test and the risk- utility test.
• Branham used expert testimony to show that Ford could have used the “McPherson sus- pension” system to significantly increase the Bronco II’s handling and stability. This alter- native suspension would not have resulted in increased costs or compromised the sport utility features of the Bronco II.
• The court determined that, in South Carolina, the risk-utility test is now the standard for all product design defect cases because it focuses on the design of the product rather than the consumer of the product. In addition to using the risk-utility standard, the plaintiff must present evidence of a reasonable alternative design that considers the cost, safety, and functionality of the product.
ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITY In most states, the courts impose strict liability in tort for types of activities they call ultrahazardous. Transporting and using explosives and poisons fall under this cat- egory, as does keeping dangerous wild animals. Injuries caused from artificial stor- age of large quantities of liquid can also bring strict liability on the one who stores. For an example of the unusual dangers of ultrahazardous activity, see Sidebar 10.10.
OTHER STRICT LIABILITY TORTS The majority of states impose strict liability upon tavern owners for injuries to third parties caused by their intoxicated patrons. The acts imposing this liability are called dram shop acts. Because of the public attention given in recent years to intoxicated drivers, there has been a tremendous increase in dram shop act cases.
Common carriers, transportation companies licensed to serve the public, are also strictly liable for damage to goods being transported by them. Common car- riers, however, can limit their liability in certain instances through contractual agreement, and they are not liable for (1) acts of God, such as natural catastrophes;
Some states have analyzed fireworks- related explosions that cause accidental injury by the standard of ultra- hazardous activity.
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(2) action of an alien enemy; (3) order of public authority, such as authorities of one state barring potentially diseased fruit shipments from another state from entering their state; (4) the inherent nature of the goods, such as perishable vegetables; and (5) misconduct of the shipper, such as improper packaging.
Damages
One legal scholar concludes that “the crucial controversy in personal injury torts today” is in the area of damages. For dramatic examples of the size of recent awards, refer to Sidebar 10.11. Juries determine the size of damage awards in most cases, but judges also play a role in damages, especially in damage instructions to the jury and in deciding whether to approve substantial damage awards.
LO 10-3
The Purity Distilling Co. had filled the enormous steel tank on the Boston hillside with 2 million gallons of molasses to be turned into rum. Unusually warm weather caused the molasses to expand. On January 15, 1919, with sounds like gunfire as the restraining bolts sheared, the tank exploded. A wave of hot molasses 30 feet high raced down the street toward Boston Harbor, faster than people could run, engulfing entire buildings. Before it subsided,
150 people were injured and 21 drowned. “The dead,” reported the Boston Herald, “were like candy statues.”
It took months to clean up the harbor. It took six years to resolve the 125 lawsuits that followed. The artificial storage of large quantities of liquid can be a sticky matter indeed.
Source: Anthony V. Riccio, Portrait of an Italian-American Neighborhood (1998).
sidebar 10.10
The Great Molasses Flood
EVENT CAUSING INJURY JURY AWARD IN BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS
1. Pharmaceutical company marketing of a drug to adolescent patients $8 2. Products liability for talcum powder link to cancer. $4.7 3. Failure to warn of bladder risks associated with a diabetes drug $9 4. Products liability for failure to warn of cancer risks associated with an
herbicide product. $2
5. Cigarette manufacturers products liability for lung cancer deaths. $28
Note: Although virtually ignored in news media headlines, the damages in almost all of these large jury verdicts were reduced significantly. In some instances, the judge reduced the damages as a matter of law. In other cases, appeals courts reduced damages or reversed the trial court. In many cases, however, the parties simply negotiated a reduced settlement to avoid the risk of an appeal that upheld or reversed the damages entirely. In reading about large jury verdicts, this final outcome is an important point for you to remember.
sidebar 10.11
The Rise of Billion Dollar Jury Verdicts
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COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Most damages awarded in tort cases compensate the plaintiff for injuries suffered. The purpose of damages is to make the plaintiff whole again, at least financially. There are three major types of loss that potentially follow tort injury and are called compensatory damages. They are:
• Past and future medical expenses. • Past and future economic loss (including property damage and loss of earning
power). • Past and future pain and suffering.
Compensatory damages may also be awarded for loss of limb, loss of consor- tium (the marriage relationship), and mental distress.
Calculation of damage awards creates significant problems. Juries frequently use state-adopted life expectancy tables and present-value discount tables to help them determine the amount of damages to award. But uncertainty about the life expectancy of injured plaintiffs and the impact of inflation often makes these tables misleading. Also, awarding damages for pain and suffering is an art rather than a sci- ence. These awards measure jury sympathy as much as they calculate compensation for any financial loss. The recent dramatic increases in the size of damage awards help underline the problems in their calculation. One result is that many individuals and businesses are underinsured for major tort liability.
Currently, compensatory damage awards for pain and suffering are very contro- versial. How do you compensate injured plaintiffs for something like pain which has no market value? Many plaintiffs suffer lifelong pain or the permanent loss of vision, hearing, or mobility. No amount of damages seems large enough to compensate them, yet no amount of damages, however high, will cause their pain and suffering to stop. Several states have enacted caps, or limits, on noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering. Other states cap both noneconomic and economic damages, or those damages that are quantifiable like a medical bill. In 2003, President Bush called for the limitation of tort damages for pain and suffering in a case to $250,000 per person. Do you agree or disagree?
PUNITIVE DAMAGES Compensatory damages are not the only kind of damages. There are also punitive damages. By awarding punitive damages, courts or juries punish defendants for committing intentional torts and for negligent behavior considered “gross” or “will- ful and wanton.” The key to the award of punitive damages is the defendant’s motive. Usually the motive must be “malicious,” “fraudulent,” or “evil.” Increasingly, puni- tive damages are also awarded for dangerously negligent conduct that shows a con- scious disregard for the interests of others. These damages punish those who commit aggravated torts and act to deter future wrongdoing. Because they make an example out of the defendant, punitive damages are sometimes called exemplary damages.
Presently, there is much controversy about how appropriate it is to award puni- tive damages against corporations for their economic activities. Especially when com- panies fail to warn of known danger created by their activities, or when cost- benefit decisions are made at the risk of substantial human injury, courts are upholding substantial punitive damage awards against companies. Yet consider that these dam- ages are a windfall to the injured plaintiff who has already received compensatory
“[T]he law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or mea- sure.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)
Punitive or exemplary damages arise from intentional torts or extreme “willful and wanton” negligence.
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damages. And instead of directly punishing guilty management for wrongdoing, punitive damages may end up punishing shareholders by reducing their dividends.
Many court decisions also overlook a very important consideration about puni- tive damages. Most companies carry liability insurance policies that reimburse them for “all sums which the insured might become legally obligated to pay.” This includes reimbursement for punitive damages. Instead of punishing guilty compa- nies, punitive damages may punish other companies, which have to pay increased insurance premiums, and may punish consumers, who ultimately pay higher prices. As a matter of public policy, several states prohibit insurance from covering punitive damages, but the great majority of states permit such coverage. This fact severely undermines arguments for awarding punitive damages against companies for their economic activities.
Consider also that an award of punitive damages greatly resembles a criminal fine. Yet the defendant who is subject to these criminal-type damages lacks the right to be indicted by a grand jury and cannot assert the right against self-incrimination. In addition, the defendant is subject to a lower standard of proof than in a criminal case. However, defendants in tort suits have challenged awards of punitive damages on a constitutional basis. See Sidebar 10.12.
“If you were to talk to foreign businesses about what scares them the most about the U.S. judicial process, they would say class actions and punitive damages.”
–Carter G. Phillips, Sidney Austin Brown &
Wood (law firm)
In 2003, the Supreme Court determined that $145 mil- lion in punitive damages in a case was unconstitutional. In State Farm v. Campbell, the Court decided that the large difference between punitive and compensatory damages violated due process. The Court suggested that a single- digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages (9:1 or less) would be more constitutionally appropriate than a 145:1 ratio.
State Farm v. Campbell also reaffirmed general puni- tive damage guidelines from an earlier case. The Court
stated, in evaluating the appropriateness of punitive dam- ages, that courts should consider: • “the responsibility of the defendant’s conduct (how bad it was),
• the ratio of punitive to actual damages, and • how the punitive damages compare with criminal or civil penalties for the same conduct.” Note that juries award punitive damages in only
about two percent of litigated cases.
sidebar 10.12
Punitive Damage Guidelines
Finally, note that almost no other country in the world except the United States permits civil juries to award punitive damages. For instance, in 2007 an Italian court refused to enforce a $1 million award against an Italian helmet maker whose defec- tive helmet had caused the death of a 15-year-old motorcyclist in Alabama because the award contained punitive damages. However, a few courts in other countries have enforced U.S. punitive damage awards even though courts in their own coun- tries cannot award them.
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Key Terms Assault 284 Assumption-of-the-risk 301 Battery 284 Cause in fact 299 Comparative responsibility 300 Compensatory damages 307 Contributory negligence 300 Conversion 290 Defamation 290 Design defect 302 Dram shop acts 305 Duty 295
False imprisonment 289 Fraud 292 Infliction of mental distress 286 Injurious falsehood 293 Intent 284 Intentional interference with
contractual relations 294 Invasion of privacy 287 Libel 290 Malicious prosecution 289 Negligence 294 Production defects 302
Proximate cause 300 Punitive damages 307 Slander 290 State-of-the-art 303 Statute of repose 303 Strict liability 302 Strict products liability 302 Tort 283 Trespass 289 Willful and wanton
negligence 298
Review Questions and Problems Intentional Torts
1. Assault and Battery Under what theory can an employee sue her employer for merely touching her? Explain.
2. Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress In business, the intentional infliction of mental distress tort has most often involved what type of situation?
3. Invasion of Privacy Explain the three principal invasions of personal interest that make up invasion of privacy.
4. False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution Explain the difference between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. In what business situa- tion does false imprisonment most frequently arise?
5. Trespass In recent months, homeowners downwind from International Cement Company have had clouds of cement dust settle on their property. Trees, shrubbery, and flowers have all been killed. The paint on houses has also been affected. Explain what tort cause of action these homeowners might pursue against International Cement Company.
6. Conversion Bartley signs a storage contract with Universal Warehouses. The contract specifies that Bartley’s household goods will be stored at Universal’s midtown storage facility while he is out of the country on business. Later, without contacting Bartley, Universal transfers his goods to a suburban warehouse. Two days after the move, a freak flood wipes out the suburban warehouse and Bartley’s goods. Is Universal liable to Bartley? Explain.
7. Defamation Acme Airlines attempts to get control of Free Fall Airways by making a public offer to buy its stock from shareholders. Free Fall’s president, Joan, advises the shareholders in a letter that Acme’s president, Richard, is “little better than a crook” and “can’t even control his own company.” Analyze the potential liability of Free Fall’s president for these remarks.
8. Fraud Fraud can be used to void a contract and as a basis for intentional tort. What is the advantage to a plain- tiff of suing for the tort of fraud as opposed to using fraud merely as a contractual defense?
9. Interference with Business Relations You are concerned because several of your employees have recently broken their employment contracts and left town. Investigation reveals that Sly and Company, your competitor in a nearby city, has paid bonuses to your former employees to persuade them to break their contracts. Discuss what legal steps you can take against Sly.
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Negligence 10. Duty of Care
(a) Do you have a duty of care to warn a stranger on the street of the potential dan- ger of broken glass ahead?
(b) Do you have a duty to warn an employee of similar danger at a place of employ- ment? Explain.
11. Unreasonable Behavior—Breach of Duty In litigation, who usually determines if the defendant’s behavior is unreasonable?
12. Causation in Fact (a) What does it mean to say that “chains of causation stretch out endlessly”? (b) What is the standard used by the judge in instructing the jury about causation?
13. Proximate Causation Explain the difference between proximate causation and causation in fact.
14. Defenses to Negligence A jury finds Lee, the defendant, liable in a tort case. It determines that José, the plaintiff, has suffered $200,000 in damages. The jury also finds that José’s own fault contributed 25 percent to his injuries. Under a comparative negligence instruction, what amount of damages will the jury award the plaintiff?
Strict Liability in Tort 15. Strict Products Liability
While driving under the influence of alcohol, Joe runs off the road and wrecks his car. As the car turns over, the protruding door latch hits the ground and the door flies open. Joe, who is not wearing his seat belt, is thrown from the car and badly hurt. Joe sues the car manufacturer, asserting that the door latch was defectively designed. Discuss the legal issues raised by these facts.
16. Ultrahazardous Activity Through no one’s fault, a sludge dam of the Phillips Phosphate Company breaks. Millions of gallons of sludge run off into a nearby river that empties into Pico Bay. The fishing industry in the bay area is ruined. Is Phillips Phosphate Company liable to the fishing industry? Explain.
17. Other Strict Liability Torts Explain when common carriers are not strictly liable for damage to transported goods.
Damages 18. Compensatory Damages
Explain the three types of loss that give rise to compensatory damages. 19. Punitive Damages
During a business lunch, Bob eats salad dressing that contains almond extract. He is very allergic to nuts and suffers a severe allergic reaction. There are complica- tions and Bob becomes almost totally paralyzed. Because Bob had instructed the restaurant waiter and the chef that he might die if he ate any nuts, he sues the res- taurant for negligence. Discuss the types of damages Bob may recover.
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1. You own University Heights Apartments, a business that rents primarily to students. One evening, your tenant Sharon is attacked by an intruder who forces the lock on the sliding glass door of her ground-floor apartment. Sharon’s screams attract the atten- tion of Darryl, your resident manager, who comes to Sharon’s aid. Together, he and Sharon drive the intruder off, but not before they both are badly cut by the intruder.
• Is the intruder liable for what he has done? • Do you have legal responsibilities to Sharon and Darryl? • What should you consider doing at your apartments?
2. You manufacture trunk locks, and your major account is a large car company. When an important piece of your equipment unexpectedly breaks, you contact Mayfair Inc., the only manufacturer of such equipment, and contract to replace it. The Mayfair sales representative assures you orally and in writing that the prepaid equipment will arrive by October 1, in time for you to complete your production for the car company. Instead, there is a union strike in the Mayfair trucking division, and the equipment does not arrive until December 1.
By December 1, the car company has made an agreement with another lock manufacturer. You threaten to sue Mayfair for their failure to deliver on time, but May- fair reminds you of a contract term that relieves them of contractual liability because of “labor difficulties.” Then you learn from a former secretary to the Mayfair sales rep- resentative that Mayfair knew that its trucking division was likely to strike. In fact, the sales representative and the sales vice president had discussed whether or not to tell you of this fact and decided not to out of concern that you would not place your order.
• Has Mayfair done anything legally wrong? • Is your legal remedy against Mayfair limited to breach of contract? • Will you be able to get damages from Mayfair other than a refund of your prepay-
ment? Explain.
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
11-1 To recognize why intellectual property is important to our economy and explain how it creates incentives for investment.
11-2 To identify the type of information that is protected by trade secret law and characterize circumstances that constitute misappropriation.
11-3 To list the requirements for a valid patent and recognize important issues in the enforcement of patents.
11-4 To categorize source indicators as trademark types and to differentiate between trademark dilution and infringement.
11-5 To define copyright protection and fair use limitations.
11-6 To describe the basic elements of the international system for protecting intellectual property rights.
Intellectual Property
Source: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Reproduction number LC-USZ62-127779 (b&w film copy neg.)11
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I n reading the previous chapters, you should
have come to understand that the essence of
“property” is a certain system of law. Property
establishes a relationship of legal exclusion between an
owner and other people regarding limited resources. It
makes a particular resource like a new discovery legally
“proper” to the owner rather than someone else.
The concept of ownership is easiest to under-
stand in the context of something physical. You can
readily intuit what it means to own a plot of land sur-
rounded by a fence or an automobile, and laws that
protect such ownership seem natural. Of course, it is
a mistake to think that you can always know the exact
boundaries of what is legally proper to you. Your
property includes the legal uses of what you own, and
the full extent of these uses is frequently unclear. By
using what you own, you will, at some point, collide
with the equal right of others to what they own. It is
the job of both common law and statutory tort law
to determine when you cross the boundary separating
your proper use from wrongful injury to what belongs
legally to others.
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If defining boundaries is a daunting task in the tangible world, consider how much more difficult it is for the intangible. Should individuals or firms be permitted to own information as if it were property? If so, how do we determine the limits? These are important questions because when property boundaries are unknown or difficult to determine and to enforce, much concern arises about the property system.
Modern businesses count on the advantage of controlling inventions, expres- sions, marks, designs, and business secrets like marketing plans or a list of custom- ers. The different kinds of intangible, mostly knowledge-based assets that businesses may possess include the following:
• Employee skills and talents. • Production designs, inventions, and technologies. • Processes and methods of business operation. • Customer lists and data about preferences and purchasing habits. • Relationships with suppliers. • Brand identity and logos. • Software, including webpages and apps. • New product or service research. • Marketing plans.
To provide the necessary control, we apply property law to such information through rights like trade secrets, patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Today, intellec- tual property represents protection of some of the most valuable resources that busi- nesses have. Sidebar 11.1 provides more detail on the economic benefits of intellectual property in the modern business world. However, against this backdrop of economic significance, we continue to explore the proper boundaries of information ownership.
Knowledge assets are among the most valuable resources of modern businesses. How to make things, how to do things, where to get things, how to sell things, how to buy things, and how to manage people are all vitally important to a firm, no matter what the industry. To some extent, knowledge assets can be protected by property, and property enables businesses to capture or realize the value of these assets.
Although it is impossible to know the exact value of all of the intellectual property owned by a firm at any given time, there is a general consensus that it constitutes an ever- greater percentage of firm assets. In fact, the value of some firms may consist almost entirely of information assets.
According to a 2016 joint report by the Econom- ics and Statistics Administration and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, IP-intensive industries are a “major, integral and growing” part of the U.S. economy. Such industries directly account for nearly 28 million jobs and indirectly support 17.6 million supply chain jobs. Workers
in IP-intensive industries earn on average 30 percent more in salary than those in non-IP industries. The contribution to GDP by IP-intensive industries is increasing each year, and stood at 38.2 percent in 2014. The report concludes that “IP use permeates all aspects of the economy with increasing intensity and extends to all parts of the U.S.”
The work of economist Paul Romer adds further sup- port to the idea that intellectual property is essential for growth. In 2018, he won the Nobel Prize for his articu- lation of “endogenous growth theory.” An aspect of that theory is that information drives growth because it can be shared. However, it is necessary to provide some limited protection (legal rights) to ensure sufficient information is produced.
Sources: Econ. & Statistics Admin. and U.S. Pat & Trademark Off., Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: 2016 Update, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept2016.pdf; Paul M. Romer – Facts – 2018, Nobel Media AB 2020, May 20, 2020, https://www.nobelprize.org/ prizes/economic-sciences/2018/romer/facts/.
sidebar 11.1
The Importance of Intellectual Property (IP)
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The information economy, in which some successful businesses never produce a single physical product, has increased the importance of intangible information. In addition, the business community has become more aware of the advantages of intel- lectual property ownership. Firms are seeking portfolios that are striking in their breadth and diversity. Sports teams and universities vigorously protect trademarks. Even social networking services and new economy firms like Facebook and Uber own patents. In the modern business world, it is critical to understand the basics of intellectual property just to compete.
This chapter begins by considering the justification for intellectual property. It then explores the importance of knowledge assets to businesses, followed by the major forms of intellectual property: trade secrets, patents, trademarks, and copy- rights. It concludes by reviewing the international legal environment and examining how intellectual property serves the common good.
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY The justification for intellectual property is the same as for the private property system generally. Property relationships are believed to be more productive in allo- cating scarce resources and producing new ones than legal relationships that merely divide resources equally.
Abraham Lincoln said that intellectual property couples “the fuel of interest with the fire of genius.” He was referring to how an exclusive right to what you acquire and produce gives incentive to create new things, new ways of doing things, and new invention generally. As the only U.S. president to own a patent (no. 6,469), Lincoln may have been particularly well suited to comment on the topic. But the sentiment in the United States extends back to the framers of the U.S. Constitution, who made sure that Congress could protect intellectual property. Article 1, Sec- tion 8, of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven- tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Note that the justification for “securing” an “exclusive Right” is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science [knowledge and creativity] and the useful Arts [inventions].” The Constitu- tion recognizes that exclusive property boundaries promote, or give incentive to, the business production of what people need and want. However, the Constitution also ensures that after “limited Times” defined by Congress, the resources of new expres- sion and invention, which were formerly exclusive to “Authors and Inventors,” will be freely available to everyone.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION The basic economic system of intellectual property is grounded in the idea of incen- tives. We give firms and individuals the ability to secure property rights if they pro- duce certain types of information. Those property rights provide exclusivity that can lead to market advantages such as the ability to charge premium prices or utilize customer recognition. The possibility of economic return on investment encour- ages firms and individuals to create more information than they otherwise would. For some types of intellectual property, information is disclosed to the public in exchange for exclusive rights, which supports, follow-on research efforts.
Conversely, without intellectual property, the pace of creative research and development (R&D) in business would slow dramatically. R&D is expensive. If busi- nesses have to finance R&D and then compete against others who quickly copy
LO 11-1
“The American view, as enshrined in the Consti- tution and reflected in over two hundred years of practice, is that inven- tors should be able to patent their inventions and creators should be able to copyright their works. That view is also informed by a sense of balance, of the impor- tance of matching incen- tives for innovation with mechanisms to assure access and dissemina- tion as well.”
–Remarks by U.S. Trade Representative
Michael Froman at the Center for American
Progress, February 18, 2014
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the resulting new invention, the businesses paying for R&D will be at a competitive disadvantage.
Countering the benefits of intellectual property protection are certain costs. Property rights in information reduce competition (at least temporarily) that could otherwise increase availability and keep prices low for consumers. Intellectual prop- erty systems presume that the long-term benefits of increased information and investment are greater than the short-term costs.
Is intellectual property protection necessary for the production of all informa- tion? Intuitively, you know this is not true. An artist may paint simply to express herself without any notion of making a profit or excluding others from the work. A university scientist may investigate the mechanism of disease for the distinction of discovery and the desire to benefit humanity. A blogger may write a post solely for the satisfaction of knowing that it will be shared widely and many people will read it. Sidebar 11.2 describes the fact that open source software facilitates innovation with- out strict exclusion. It is fair to say that intellectual property is believed to incremen- tally increase the production of information and investment over that which would normally occur. Society obtains this benefit in exchange for allowing some informa- tion to be controlled through property. The great debate regarding our intellectual property laws is whether they are truly calibrated to provide a net benefit to society.
You may have heard of information products like soft- ware being distributed under an open-source model. This means that the information is shared freely, and individu- als and firms are able to build upon it outside of the strict control of the creator. Open-source models of information development have been particularly successful in net- worked communities as exist across the Internet. Some believe that it is a better alternative than intellectual prop- erty or contract for producing certain types of information.
Note that open-source products are not neces- sarily divorced from intellectual property rights. For
example, open-source software is often accompanied by a license that sets certain use limitations. The pur- pose of the license may be to ensure continued open access and to prevent unauthorized commercialization, which is usually not a property-centric goal. Yet, these open-access provisions may be enforced through intel- lectual property. Failure to adhere to the terms consti- tutes infringement. Source: Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale Law Journal 369 (2002).
sidebar 11.2
The Open-Source Alternative
CAPTURING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY The protections of property often do not apply automatically to intangible knowl- edge resources all information you or your business create. Depending on the type of information, you may be required to undertake certain steps to protect the time, effort, and money spent in developing knowledge in order to transform it into valu- able intangible assets. Some intellectual property forms have very strict deadlines for asserting rights or other formal requirements. The failure to follow the rules may mean that information that could have been captured is instead dedicated to the public domain, meaning that anyone can use it. In general, once information is in the public domain, an intellectual property right cannot be applied to recapture it. Firms that do not have an intellectual property strategy in place risk losing valuable assets.
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The sections that follow describe the forms of property that protect knowledge- based intangible business resources. Some general principles are conveyed that should help you determine when more detailed information is necessary. The basic characteristics listed in Figure 11.1 should provide a roadmap as you read on.
Trade Secrets
One of the most common ways of asserting property in knowledge-based intan- gible business resources is through the trade secret. Trade secret law developed in the common law industrial revolutions of the 1800s. Before this time, the relationship of confidence and trust between skilled artisans (craftspersons) and their apprentices (as well as the guild system) protected what the artisans knew from harmful competition by their former apprentices. But the 1800s brought large factories to the economy. The employees of these factories were not apprentices and at first were free to take their employers’ knowledge, leave employment, and compete against their former employers. Trade secret law arose to protect the employers’ valuable knowledge. It also facilitated economic development by making employers willing to hire employees who might come into contact with the employers’ knowledge. As described in Sidebar 11.3, trade secrets are now an essential part of the global economy and a key component of international trade.
A trade secret is any form of knowledge or information that has economic value from not being generally known to others or readily ascertainable by proper means and has been the subject of reasonable efforts by the owner to maintain secrecy. To violate another’s trade secret rights, one must misappropriate the information. This
LO 11-2
“More than ever before, information is what gives businesses their com- petitive edge, and they want to make sure that inside dope on products and services doesn’t walk out the door.”
–BusinessWeek, November 12, 2007,
p. 76
Figure 11.1 Major U.S. Intellectual Property Rights.
New, nonobvious, useful invention
20 years from filing Mousetrap; genetically
modified seed; chemical formula, delivery system
Yes; U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
Valuable, secret information
No limit, as long as still secret
KFC’s original recipe; Apple’s new products;
customer lists No
Source indicator No limit, as long as still in
use and not abandoned
UPS’s use of brown; Coke logo; phrase
“You’re fired”
Optional; U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office or state
Image, voice, representation
Depends on state—up to 100 years after death
Albert Einstein’s image No
Original expression
Life of author + 70 years or 95 years from publication, 120
from creation
Books; music; movies; paintings; sculptures;
video games
Optional; U.S. Copyright Office
Ornamental object of
manufacture 15 years from issuance
Shoe designs; auto wheel shape; phone shape
Yes; U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
Right Standard Term Examples Registration
Utility patent
Trade secret
Trademark
Right of publicity
Copyright
Design patent
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is an important distinction from intellectual property rights that impose liability sim- ply for unauthorized use. Wrongful behavior—some would call it theft—is necessary for a trade secret violation.
All states except New York and North Carolina have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) as the basis of their protection. North Carolina has its own trade secret statute and New York continues to rely on common law rules, though they are both very similar to the UTSA in practice. The essence of a trade secret case requires the establishment of two primary elements: (1) establishing that a trade secret exists and (2) demonstrating misappropriation. A federal law enacted in 2016, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), also applies the two basic elements of state trade secret law, though it can provide more consistent nationwide protection through a single federal statute. Although there is not a great deal of difference between state law and the new federal civil protections, some advantages of the DTSA are worth noting. The DTSA contains a civil seizure mechanism that allows a trade secret owner to secure property that may allow unauthorized dissemination of the secret. Addition- ally, the DTSA carves out whistleblower immunity for those who disclose secrets to a government official when reporting a suspected violation of law.
ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE OF A TRADE SECRET As described above, businesses may possess many different forms of valuable knowl- edge. It may be financial, technical, scientific, economic, or engineering knowledge. When a business has spent time, effort, or money in employee training, preparing materials, making plans, or developing relationships with customers and suppliers, the business may wish to keep competitors away from this knowledge. However, not all of this knowledge is protected by the law of trade secrets. To protect information as a trade secret, the information must actually be secret, and the business must take reasonable measures to keep it so.
A first step in protecting trade secrets is to identify confidential knowledge- based resources. It is useful for all businesses to conduct a trade secret audit, which simply identifies all the valuable forms of information possessed by the business, including formulas, plans, reports, manuals, research, and knowledge of customers and suppliers. Note that trade secrets do not have to be unique; two businesses may
The theft of trade secrets has become an important com- ponent of international trade negotiation. The United States in particular has forcefully argued that the valuable secrets of its domestic industries are routinely targeted by foreign governments and firms. Perhaps no conflict has burned as bright as that between the United States and China. It was a motivating factor in a trade war between the two coun- tries that expanded significantly in 2018. According to administration officials and firms with experience in China, secrets were lost as a result of forced joint ventures with
Chinese firms that required technology transfer (in addi- tion to outright espionage). A 2020 trade deal between the United States and China was intended to address some of these concerns by explicitly including promises from the Chinese government to better enforce trade secret rights and curb joint venture requirements. This case is an impor- tant example of how central intellectual property can be to global trade and the overall relations between nations. Source: Keith Bradsher, “How China Obtains American Trade Secrets,” New York Times, Jan. 15, 2020.
sidebar 11.3
Trade Secrets and International Relations
Trade secret audits help you identify the valuable information that a busi- ness produces.
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have trade secret property in substantially the same knowledge. For example, they may each have customer lists that overlap with many of the same names. As long as there are actual or potential competitors who are not aware of all the customer names, the knowledge still has economic value.
Having identified potential trade secrets, a business must next work to preserve secrecy. Reasonable measures include physically locking away written material, secur- ing computer-stored knowledge with protective “firewalls” and encryption to keep hackers from obtaining access, and imposing confidentiality restrictions on those who have contact with the firm. Some companies maintain two different computer systems in order to protect proprietary (owned) knowledge, one connected to the Internet and one networked only internally. Employees use the internal network to send messages about matters that are not for public consumption. To protect trade secrets from out- siders, companies often also carefully regulate who can visit the business and what areas of the business visitors can see. Visitors are sometimes required to sign agree- ments not to disclose to the public what they see and learn in a company they visit.
Prospective business partners, customers, suppliers, and repair technicians may also have access to knowledge that a company values and protects. These parties may also be asked to sign nondisclosure agreements (NDAs). As long as a company takes such reasonable measures to prevent the public dissemination of trade secrets, it does not lose its property in knowledge-based resources merely because customers, suppliers, repair technicians, or even visitors come into contact with the secrets.
Establishing the existence of a trade secret is a critical step in controlling valu- able knowledge resources. The failure to maintain secrecy, or to prove that the knowl- edge was secret in the first place, can mean that competitors may be able to access it. Case 11.1 is an illustration of how broad the concept of a trade secret can be.
case 11.1
AL MINOR & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. MARTIN 881 N.E.2d 850 (Ohio, 2008)
O’DONNELL, Judge: . . . AMA is an actuarial firm that designs and administers retirement plans and that employs several “pension analysts” who work with approximately 500 clients. Al Minor Jr., who founded AMA in 1983 and serves as its president and sole shareholder, developed AMA’s clientele, for which the firm maintains a confiden- tial list.
In 1998, AMA hired Martin as a pension analyst but did not require him to sign either an employment con- tract or a noncompete agreement. In 2002, while still employed by AMA, Martin organized his own company, Martin Consultants, L.L.C., with the purpose of pro- viding the same type of services as AMA. In 2003, he resigned from AMA and, without taking any documents containing confidential client information, successfully solicited 15 AMA clients with information from his memory.
After learning of Martin’s competing business, AMA filed the instant action against him for monetary and injunctive relief, claiming that he had violated Ohio’s Trade Secrets Act by using confidential client information to solicit those clients. . . .
In this court, Martin asserts that a client list memo- rized by a former employee cannot be the basis of a trade secret violation. . . .
In 1937, this court acknowledged that “[t]he authori- ties are quite uniform that disclosures of trade secrets by an employee secured by him in the course of confidential employment will be restrained by the process of injunction, and in numerous instances attempts to use for himself or for a new employer information relative to the trade or busi- ness in which he had been engaged, such as lists of custom- ers regarded as confidential, have been restrained.” Curry v. Marquart 11 N.E.2d 868. (1937).
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In 1994, the General Assembly enacted UTSA . . . which [in part R.C. 1333.61(D)] defines a “trade secret” as follows:
[I]nformation, including the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, pattern, compilation, pro- gram, device, method, technique, or improvement, or any business information or plans, financial informa- tion, or listing of names, addresses, or telephone num- bers, that satisfies both of the following:
“(1) It derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”
“(2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”
Furthermore, in The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. 687 N.E.2d 661 (1997), we established a six-factor test for determining whether information constitutes a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61(D): “(1) The extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the business, i.e., by the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the holder of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings effected and the value to the holder in having the information as against competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended in obtaining and developing the information; and (6) the amount of time and expense it would take for others to acquire and duplicate the information.” . . .
Neither R.C. 1333.61(D) nor any other provision of the UTSA suggests that for purposes of trade secret protec- tion, the General Assembly intended to distinguish between information that has been reduced to some tangible form and information that has been memorized. R.C. 1333.61(D) refers only to “information,” including “any business infor- mation or plans, financial information, or listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbers,” and the statute makes no mention of writings or other physical forms that such infor- mation might take. Furthermore, nothing in our six-factor test . . . indicates that the determination whether a client list constitutes a trade secret depends on whether it was capable of being memorized or had been memorized. . . .
In addition, more than 40 other states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in substantially similar form, and the majority position is that memorized informa- tion can be the basis for a trade secret violation . . . .
We recognize that the protection of trade secrets involves a balancing of public policies, and as stated in E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp, 200 A.2d 428. (1964), “Among the substantial and conflicting policies at play . . . are the protection of employers’ rights in their trade secrets . . . versus the right of the individual to exploit his talents.” However, by adopting the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, with the express purpose “to make uniform the law with respect to their subject among states,” the General Assembly has determined that public policy in Ohio, as in the majority of other jurisdictions, favors the protection of trade secrets, whether memorized or reduced to some tangible form. . . .
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the determina- tion of whether a client list constitutes a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61(D) does not depend on whether it has been memorized by a former employee. Information that consti- tutes a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61(D) does not lose its character as a trade secret if it has been memorized. It is the information that is protected by the UTSA, regardless of the manner, mode, or form in which it is stored—whether on paper, in a computer, in one’s memory, or in any other medium.
Every employee will of course have memories casually retained from the ordinary course of employment. The Uni- form Trade Secrets Act does not apply to the use of memo- rized information that is not a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61(D).
Moreover, we recognize that no conflict exists between the appellate court’s decision in this case and the decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals in Greenwald, because the latter case predated the legislature’s adoption of the UTSA.
In this case, AMA’s client list constituted a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61(D), and the fact that Mar- tin had memorized that client list before leaving AMA does not change its status as a trade secret or remove it from the protection of the UTSA. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment accordingly.
KEY POINTS • A client list can serve as a trade secret because it provides value to the owner. • The court found that even information that was memorized and not written down can be
subject to trade secret protection. • It is important to understand that all information used within a company is not necessarily
a trade secret.
[continued]
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DEMONSTRATING MISAPPROPRIATION To be liable in a trade secret case, a defendant must have misappropriated the informa- tion in question. Misappropriation obviously occurs when one improperly acquires secret information through burglary, espionage, or computer hacking. However, mis- appropriation also occurs when one discloses information that one had a duty to keep secret, even if the original acquisition was proper. Such a duty may arise from an employment relationship or a contractual agreement. Additionally, if one acquires a secret from another who has a duty to maintain secrecy, and one knows of that duty, misappropriation has occurred. On the other hand, innocently acquiring a secret from another without knowledge of their theft is generally not misappropriation.
Importantly, independent creation does not constitute misappropriation. If, through your own effort, you are able to recreate the same information that another considers to be a trade secret, no misappropriation has occurred. In addition, reverse engineering a secret by looking at a product and figuring out how it works or how it is formulated is not misappropriation. An exception to this principle would be if one contractually agreed to keep the information secret. For example, it is common in the software industry to make users promise not to decompile (take apart) pur- chased software to figure out how the code works.
The fact that secrets can get out through normal product marketing is an impor- tant limitation on trade secret rights. For that reason, as discussed below, a patent may provide better protection for a valuable invention embodied in a product, assum- ing the stringent requirements can be met. But if the valuable information relates to processes or techniques that will not be disclosed when a product or service is sold, trade secret rights may be a viable, relatively inexpensive, and long-lived option.
Employee Mobility and Trade Secrets Businesses have to take reasonable measures to protect trade secrets even from employees. Employees may leave an employer and use the knowledge they have gained to compete against their former employer, or they may go to work for their former employer’s competitors.
Increasingly, employers require employees to sign confidentiality contracts promising not to disclose what they learn in confidence in the workplace. This prom- ise, however, applies only to knowledge that is unknown publicly and amounts to trade secrets. Additionally, not all states presume that former employees are likely to disclose confidential information in a new position. This creates difficulty in establishing misappropriation. As an additional measure of protection, employers frequently request that employees agree not to compete against them if the employ- ees leave their employment (discussed in more detail in Sidebar 8.8 in Chapter 8).
The law states that employers can enforce agreements (or contractual “cove- nants”) not to compete only when there is a “valid business purpose” for the con- tract. Generally, this means that employers are protecting trade secrets, or, at least protecting their investment in the training of their employees, which itself can be a trade secret. However, laws of unfair competition limit the extent to which employers can prevent employees from competing against them.
CIVIL ENFORCEMENT OF TRADE SECRETS The owner of a trade secret may go into court and get an injunction to prevent others— often former employees—from divulging or using a trade secret. An injunction is an order by a judge either to do something or to refrain from doing something. In the
Do remember that contractual confidentiality agreements and noncompete agreements have a role in trade secret protection but are not always required.
The wrongful taking of any kind of intellec- tual property is called misappropriation or infringement.
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case of trade secrets, the injunction orders those who have misappropriated the trade secret to refrain from using it or telling others about it. In rare instances, the injunc- tion may also order that one delay in taking a new job.
Trade secret owners can also obtain damages against those who misappropri- ate trade secrets. And those damages can be quite large. In 2016, a Wisconsin jury awarded Epic Systems Corporation nearly $1 billion in a dispute against Tata Con- sulting Services Ltd., one of India’s largest companies. Tata allegedly exceeded its access authorization when consulting on Epic software for a client. The jury found Tata improperly acquired Epic documents that represented years of research and development in its database software.
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF TRADE SECRETS In addition to civil enforcement of trade secret boundaries, criminal prosecution can also result from misappropriation of trade secrets. Although various state laws make intentional trade secret misappropriation a crime, most criminal prosecutions today take place under the federal Economic Espionage Act (EEA). The act makes it a crime to steal (intentionally misappropriate) trade secrets and provides for fines and up to ten years’ imprisonment for individuals and up to a $5 million fine for organizations. Only the federal government can bring a case under the EEA. The Coca-Cola case in Sidebar 11.4 is an example of an EEA criminal prosecution.
The Coca-Cola Company considers the formula for its namesake drink, also known as Coke, to be a valuable secret. Even though it was created more than 100 years ago, the company refuses to disclose the original formula and continues to undertake measures to maintain its secrecy. Through various reformulations, the basic recipe remains confidential according to the company.
However, is it possible to discern the formula for Coca-Cola from a purchased bottle? Science provides the means for characterizing the various elements of chemical compounds, and one would assume that such techniques could be applied to a soft drink to learn its composition. Absent a contract, patent, or employee relationship, this type of reverse engineering does not violate the law. In fact, over the years, several people have claimed to be in possession of the secret formula for Coca-Cola through
disclosure or reverse engineering, including the host of the radio program This American Life in 2011. Without a confirmation from the Coca-Cola Company, it is difficult to know for certain how accurate such claims are.
Regardless of whether the actual formula for Coca- Cola is known outside the company, it is certainly true that Coca-Cola can possess protectable trade secrets on newer products. In 2007, a jury convicted a former Coca- Cola secretary for conspiring with others to steal secrets for products in development and sell them to rival Pepsi for $1.5 million. She was sentenced to eight years in prison. The scheme came to light when Pepsi informed the FBI that it received an offer to obtain Coca-Cola’s product secrets.
Sources: Robbie Brow and Kim Severson, “Recipe for Coke? One More to Add to the File,” The New York Times, February 19, 2011; “Ex-Secretary Gets 8-Year Term in Coca-Cola Secrets Case,” The Associated Press, May 24, 2007.
sidebar 11.4
Soda Secrets
Although one provision of the EEA makes one liable for standard trade secret misappropriation, another provision addresses misappropriation to benefit a foreign government—true espionage. Penalties are enhanced in this case. There is a great deal of concern that foreign governments may be spying on U.S. companies to make
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their domestic industries more competitive. In recent years, the U.S. government has promised to crack down on such acts. For example, in 2015 the FBI launched an online awareness campaign directed to the business community (“The Company Man”). With the additional attention, the number of prosecutions has increased sig- nificantly. The U.S. government’s effort to coordinate the work of various agencies is noted in Sidebar 11.5. Of course, it is not always easy to prosecute those who commit espionage from abroad due to jurisdictional issues. Even if prosecution is remote, indictments can serve as a political statement as well as a legal tool.
Although private parties carry out much enforcement of state and federal intellectual property laws, govern- ments also play an important role. In particular, the fed- eral government prosecutes criminal cases involving copyright infringement (referred to as piracy in some cases), trademark infringement (also known as counter- feiting in some cases), and trade secret misappropriation. In 2008, the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act (PRO IP Act) became law, creat- ing a new position for coordinating federal agency intel- lectual property enforcement known as the Intellectual
Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC). Agencies that enforce the nation’s intellectual property laws include the Department of Justice, through its Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Customs and Border Protection, as well as many others. CCIPS conducts the actual pros- ecution of intellectual property cases, and a significant amount of information on its work and the relevant laws can be found at www.cybercrime.gov.
Source: PRO IP Act, Pub. L. No. 110-403 (2008).
sidebar 11.5
Federal Government Intellectual Property Enforcement
Patent Law
Patents have existed for hundreds of years as property rights. Historically, a patent was any legal monopoly openly issued by the government, and it was not necessarily associated with a new idea. However, there is evidence of patents being associated with invention at least as early as the 1400s. The Venetian Patent Act of 1474 is generally considered to be the world’s first patent statute for the purpose of reward- ing new ideas. Many of its basic principles for protecting inventions are present in modern patent law.
Today, a patent is firmly associated with an inventive act, and conveys a right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or importing the covered invention. The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to create patents, and Congress has passed numerous laws providing for exclusive patent rights as a form of property. Since colonial times, the United States has been a world leader in establishing patent law, and many of the constitutional framers were interested in technology and new invention. For example, during the Constitutional Convention in Phila- delphia, the framers apparently took time off one afternoon to watch a newly invented steamboat cruising on the Delaware River. George Washington signed the first U.S. patent statute into law in 1790, and none other than Thomas Jef- ferson served on the three-member board that reviewed applications and issued patents.
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OBTAINING A PATENT A patent is an exclusive right created by statute and conveyed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for a limited period of time. This property applies to inven- tions, which are new applications of information.
Patent Type It is important to understand that, in the United States, there are actually three types of patents granted by the PTO, each with its own distinct subject matter (see Figure 11.2). An easy way to remember the distinction between a utility patent and a design patent is that the former applies to useful, functional inven- tions. Such inventions are what most of us think of when we see the word “patent.” On the other hand, design patents apply to the appearance of an article of manufac- ture, unrelated to its function. They cover subject matter more similar to copyrights (discussed later in this chapter). Plant patents apply to new varieties of asexually reproduced plants. However, note that many inventions related to plants may also be protected as utility patents. For example, one or more utility patent rights often cover genetically modified plants. Therefore, just because the subject matter is a plant, the relevant property right is not necessarily a plant patent.
To obtain a patent, an inventor must pay a filing fee and file an application with the PTO. As explained in Sidebar 11.6, the inventor must be a living individual, not a computer. In the case of a utility patent the application must, in words and drawings, (1) explain how to make and use the basic invention; (2) show why the invention is different from prior art, that is, from all previous and related inventions or state of knowledge; and (3) precisely detail the subject matter that the inventor regards as the invention (called claims). The PTO assigns a patent examiner to consider the application, and there is usually a great deal of communication between the exam- iner and the applicant over the adequacy of the application’s explanations, the scope of the proposed patent (exactly what the patent applies to), and whether the inven- tion even qualifies for a patent. The applicant can amend the application, and the process can take several years from start to finish.
In 2011, President Obama signed into law the America Invents Act, the first substantial revision to U.S. patent law since 1999. Among the law’s many changes is the eventual switch from a first-to-invent system to a first-inventor-to-file system. This means that, in a contest between two inventors claiming the same patentable idea,
Don’t forget that patents last for only a limited period of time: 20 years from the date the application is filed in the Patent and Trademark Office.
In 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office granted a record 354,430 utility patents. This was not only an increase over the previous year, but more than double the number issued in 2000. One company, IBM, was granted more than 9,000 patents.
Figure 11.2 Types of U.S. patents. Utility
Patent
New, non- obvious, useful
processes, machines,
compositions of matter or
improvements thereof
Term: 20 years from filing date
New, original, and ornamental
design for an article of
manufacture
Term: 15 years from issue date
Design Patent
New variety of plant that can be reproduced
asexually
Term: 20 years from filing date
Plant Patent
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the first to get to the patent office will win. On the other hand, the law increases the ability of companies to keep some internal processes secret and avoid infringing another’s patent through “prior user rights.”
Another provision in the law that has had unintended effects is a change that makes it harder to join several defendants together in a single case (joinder). This has contributed to a significant rise in patent litigations in the years after the AIA was passed, while the number of defendants sued has not changed that much.
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER After the PTO issues a patent, the patent owner may choose to maintain its exclusiv- ity in the invention. Alternatively, the patentee may license others to use the inven- tion. However, if another infringes the patent by making, using, selling, or importing the invention without permission, the patent owner may have to defend its property. When the patent owner threatens a lawsuit, it is common for the alleged infringer to respond by attacking the validity of the patent. Validity can be challenged in court or the PTO. If the patent is found invalid, the alleged infringer will win. A finding that a patent is completely invalid in one case is very significant, as it renders the patent invalid against all future defendants, essentially eliminating it.
Attacking the “subject matter” of a patent is one common way of testing the validity of a patent. Although not unlimited, the subject matter for a potential patent is quite broad. This is particularly true for utility patents. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that a scientist could cover with a util- ity patent a genetically modified bacterium that ate hydrocarbons found in oil spills. The Court said, “Congress is free to amend §101 [the subject matter section of the general patent law] so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced by genetic engineering. . . . Or it may choose to craft a statute specifically designed for such living things. But until Congress takes such action, the language of §101 fairly embraces the respondent’s invention.” In an example of such congressional action, the 2011 revisions to the Patent Act explicitly preclude patents covering humans.
The validity of a pat- ent can be challenged in court by an alleged infringer, or challenged by any individual or busi- ness in the PTO.
Artificial intelligence (AI) has been taking the tech world by storm, with many viewing it as the future for more natu- ral human-computer interfaces, and others fearing the havoc it may create if we lose control. What makes AI par- ticularly intriguing is its ability to problem solve and even create new ideas. Appropriately targeted AI can even arguably invent. However, if AI is the genesis of an inven- tion, should it be named on a patent application?
The legal status of AI is actually quite a serious ques- tion in the United States, where individuals are named as inventors on patents rather than corporations. Section 100(f) of the Patent Act limits inventorship to the individual
or individuals who invented or discovered the subject matter. Although one might argue that AI could fit within the definition of an “individual,” the US Patent and Trade- mark Office has rejected this position. In April 2020, the PTO rejected two applications for inventions by an AI sys- tem called DABUS on the basis that only “natural persons” were eligible. Despite this decision, the status of AI may change in the future if Congress revises the law to allow AI inventions. Source: In re Application 16/524,350 (USPTO, April 22, 2020), https://www.uspto. gov/sites/default/files/documents/16524350_22apr2020.pdf; W. Michael Schuster, “Artificial Intelligence and Patent Ownership,” 75 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 1945 (2018).
sidebar 11.6
Can AI be an Inventor?
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The courts have carved out categories of subject matter that cannot be patented because they do not represent true inventions. One of the most controversial areas of potentially patentable subject matter concerns “processes.” What is a process? Is a computer program a process? Are ways of doing business a process? Mere abstract ideas are not a patentable process. Nor are mathematical algorithms or formulas like E = mc2 that express truths about the universe. Historically, business methods like double-entry bookkeeping were considered unpatentable, but they are after all pro- cesses, methods for doing things. The Supreme Court’s recent inquiry into the patent- ability of a general business concept enabled by computers is detailed in Case 11.2. Sidebar 11.7 describes the impact of this case on software inventions.
Laws of nature, natu- ral phenomena, and abstract ideas are unpatentable.
case 11.2
ALICE CORPORATION PTY. LTD. v. CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)
Alice Corporation owns several patents that disclose a method, system, and computer program for mitigating settlement risks in financial transactions like currency trades. In such trans- actions, it is possible that one party will default on its obli- gation before the trade is completed. The invention in Alice’s patents solves this problem by using a computer to act as a trusted third party to monitor the accounts of the parties and permit a transaction to proceed only if both parties have suf- ficient funds. CLS Bank sued Alice in 2007 for a declaration that Alice’s patents were invalid, and Alice countersued for infringement. A key argument in CLS’s case was that Alice’s patents claimed subject matter that is not patentable. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this patentability question in its far- reaching decision on the case.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court. Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject mat-
ter eligible for patent protection. It provides:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro- cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require- ments of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
“We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phe- nomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” . . . We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of pre-emption. . . . Laws of nature, natu- ral phenomena, and abstract ideas are “the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” . . . “[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,”
thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 182 L. Ed. 2d 321, 327 (2012); see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress “shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). We have “repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of” these building blocks of human ingenuity. . .
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. . . . At some level, “all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” . . . Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. . . . “[A]pplication[s]” of such concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’” we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. . . .
* * * We must first determine whether the claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept . . .The “abstract ideas” category embodies “the longstanding rule that ‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.’” . . .
It follows from our prior cases . . . that the claims at issue here are directed to an abstract idea. Petitioner’s claims involve a method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mit- igate settlement risk. The intermediary creates and updates “shadow” records to reflect the value of each party’s actual accounts held at “exchange institutions,” thereby permit- ting only those transactions for which the parties have suf- ficient resources. At the end of each day, the intermediary issues irrevocable instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the permitted transactions.
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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Many of the Supreme Court’s opinions on patentable subject matter refer to the idea of idea or concept “preemption.” Would an inventor’s patent go beyond protecting something she invented and lock down an entire field of discovery? If so, it is likely that the patent claims have overstepped the Court’s limits on appropriate subject matter.
NOVELTY, NONOBVIOUSNESS, AND UTILITY To be patentable, it is not enough for something to be appropriate subject matter. An invention must also have certain characteristics. Namely, it must be novel, nonobvi- ous, and useful. An alleged infringer can always defend against an infringement law- suit by proving that the patent is invalid because the invention is previously known, obvious, or lacks utility.
Perhaps the most com- mon way of challenging a patent’s validity is to claim that the invention is obvious to someone with knowledge in the field.
On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. . . . [T]he concept of inter- mediated settlement is “‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’” . . . The use of a third-party intermediary (or “clearing house”) is also a building block of the modern economy. . . . Thus, interme- diated settlement, like hedging, is an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. . . .
At . . . step two, we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an “‘inventive con- cept’” sufficient to “transform” the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. . . . A claim that recites an abstract idea must include “additional features” to ensure “that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].” . . .
[Prior] cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. . . . Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’” . . . Stat- ing an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” . . . that addition cannot impart pat- ent eligibility. . . .
In light of the foregoing, . . . the relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermedi- ated settlement on a generic computer. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function per- formed by the computer at each step of the process is “[p] urely conventional.” Using a computer to create and maintain “shadow” accounts amounts to electronic recordkeeping— one of the most basic functions of a computer. . . . In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.
Considered “as an ordered combination,” the computer components of petitioner’s method “ad[d] nothing . . . that is not already present when the steps are considered sepa- rately” . . . Viewed as a whole, petitioner’s method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated settlement as per- formed by a generic computer. . . . Under our precedents, that is not “enough” to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. . . .
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
KEY POINTS • The Court is concerned about allowing patents on inventions that would “preempt” (com-
pletely control) an entire area of discovery. • To demonstrate if an invention is patentable, a patent owner must survive the Alice “two-
step”: (1) determine if the invention covers an ineligible concept, and if it does, (2) consider whether it adds something sufficiently inventive to transform the claims into something more than just the concept itself.
• Even if an invention is considered proper subject matter under Alice, that is only the first step; it must still be novel, nonobvious, and useful to be patentable.
[continued]
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The characteristic of novelty indicates that something is new and different from the prior art (the previous state of knowledge in the field). The test is met when no single piece of prior art meets all of the elements of an invention’s claims. However, under patent law, even if an invention is otherwise new, it fails the novelty test if it has been described in a publication, sold, or put to public use more than one year before a patent application on it is filed (the one-year grace period). This limitation exists even if it is the inventor who undertakes such actions. The 2011 revisions to the law apply the one-year grace period only to an inventor’s publication, use, or sale. Activity by others before a patent is filed precludes patentability, even within a year. While this may seem harsh, many countries have no grace period at all.
Nonobviousness refers to the ability of an invention to produce surprising or unexpected results; that is, results not anticipated by prior art. The nonobviousness standard is measured in relation to someone who has ordinary skill in the prior art. For instance, to be patentable, a computer hardware invention would need to be nonobvious to an ordinary computer engineer. But how does one determine if an advancement is obvious? In hindsight (after an invention is known), most ideas seem obvious. Instead of looking backward, courts consider all of the references and knowledge (“prior art”) that existed when the inventor filed the patent. If a combina- tion of this information produces the invention, a prima facie case of obviousness is established. A patentee then has the opportunity to establish that it was not obvious as evidenced by factors such as the invention was commercially successful or satis- fied a long-felt need in the industry.
Importantly, obviousness is assessed as of the date of the application as opposed to later in an infringement case. Courts are careful to avoid “highlight” bias, which is the tendency to see any invention as obvious after it is revealed and its significance is known. Patent litigation over the obviousness of an invention is typically very subjec- tive, with each side producing experts who disagree. Ultimately it is up to the court to determine the state of knowledge existing when the inventor filed the application and whether the invention is nonobvious.
Except for patents issued on designs or plants, a valid invention must have utility— that is, it must do something useful. Suppose that Acme Laboratory scientists invent
Where does software fall in the subject matter inquiry? At base, software is nothing more than computer code that instructs an electronic device to do something. That sounds like a mathematical algorithm that should be unpatentable. On the other hand, software is often more complex and creative than a traditional formula. It transforms how certain problems are solved and infor- mation is produced. Traditional patents rules are an imperfect fit.
Another problem with software is that patentees tend to claim it by the functions it performs rather than the code that an inventor first developed. This means that a
software patent might cover dozens of different programs that accomplish the same task.
The resolution to these issues is important because software patents already exist and are important to many segments of the economy. The Supreme Court’s deci- sion in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International (see Case 11.2) sets a tough standard for software but does not declare it unpatentable. Subsequent cases have found software patentable when it improves the way a computer or other electronic device functions. But pro- grams that simply operate to gather and recombine data are often found to be abstract.
sidebar 11.7
Is Software Patentable? Maybe.
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a new chemical compound. Until the compound has a use, say, ridding pets of fleas, Acme will be unable to get a utility patent on it. Generally speaking, establishing utility is not difficult. Any utility is sufficient, even if it is not the use that is eventually com- mercialized by the patentee. One major category of patent claims that lack utility are those that do not work. An inoperable invention, by definition, is not useful.
PATENT ENFORCEMENT As the U.S. Constitution specifies, the property represented by patents runs for limited duration. Statutes limit utility patents and plant patents to 20 years from the filing date, and design patents to 15 years from the issue date. When a patent expires, the invention is in the public domain, and others may use it without the permission of the patentee. Remember that at this point, it is easy to use the invention because the patent applica- tion explains exactly how the invention works, including drawings of its construction. The explicit purpose of patent law is to make inventions public following the limited period of legal property right. For the duration of a patent, the owner can sue those who infringe on it. If successful, the owner can get an injunction prohibiting future infringe- ment and collect damages, including triple damages for willful infringement. Of course, one is not required to enforce a patent in all cases of infringement. Sidebar 11.8 describes how intellectual property owners may share their rights to address a public emergency.
Complicating the business environment for patents is the fact that inventions can cover methods and articles that can overlap. Simply owning a patent is not a license to produce a product or service. A fundamental concept in patent law is that patents only convey the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, and importing the invention. They do not include the right to use the invention. At first glance, the latter point may seem counterintuitive. Can you really own a patent and have no right to make a product that is covered by it? The answer, surprisingly, is yes, and the key to understanding it is to realize that multiple intellectual property rights can cover the same article. There is often more than one patent to a product.
Consider an average smartphone. Imagine that you own a patent that covers touchscreen technology, enabling you to open programs and type by placing your fin- gers on the screen. Now, imagine that another firm owns a patent on technology that allows a phone to switch between hardware buttons and a touchscreen. Add another firm that has a patent and perhaps a copyright that cover the phone’s operating system (see Figure 11.3). Even though you own a patent that covers part of a smartphone,
When a patent expires, the invention is in the public domain, and others may use it with- out permission of the patentee.
The consequences of patent infringement can be high, with recent cases involving jury awards of more than $1 billion. Such awards are often reduced on appeal but still amount to millions in damages.
12:00
Patent on touch screen
Patent and copyright on
operating system
Patent on hardware
switch
Figure 11.3 Overlapping intellectual property rights.
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you cannot produce the smartphone with the characteristics described above without using the rights of others. In reality, of course, cell phones are covered by hundreds of patents as well as other rights. Many licenses are required to produce a single phone. This situation of overlapping patents exists to varying degrees with other products.
PATENT TROLLS AND THE LITIGATION THREAT As described earlier, patents may overlap to cover a single product, and in some fields the number overlapping rights can be quite large. In addition, it can be hard to know whether the functional descriptions of some patent claims apply to one’s products or business. This makes it difficult to identify and license all of the patents one might infringe. The ambiguity provides an opportunity for investment firms to purchase patent rights and threaten to sue existing companies. Because the damages (from trial or settlement) can be great and the risk to the patent owners relatively small, an early, quick settlement is the most common result. Essentially, it is easier and cheaper for most businesses to simply pay the patent owner to go away. Out of the belief that such non-practicing patent owners are nothing more than a self- appointed toll-taker on a bridge, they have been widely referred to as patent trolls. The pejorative term suggests that non-producing patent owners do not contribute as much to the innovation environment compared to the costs imposed by their enforcement.
As a counter to the patent troll rhetoric, one might consider the fact that non- practicing entities are exercising a legitimate right under their property grants. Pat- ents do not require their owners to actually make and sell a product. This concept is similar to land property, wherein one may own a plot land but decide not to build anything. However, the overlapping nature of intellectual property sets the stage for greater conflict than with non-producing landowners.
Judges have some ability to reduce trolling incentives by forcing the losing party to pay the winning side’s costs (“fee-shifting”). A troll who has no real case will be less likely to make a threat under these circumstances. In 2014, the Supreme Court held that a court may permit fee-shifting in cases that are exceptional in terms of their baseless nature or plaintiff’s bad faith (Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749). This is an easier standard for the defendant to meet. At least two aspects of the 2011 reforms to patent law may reduce troll behavior. The new law prevents patent owners from suing multiple parties merely because they infringe the same patent, a change that makes litigation more expensive for trolls. Going forward, patent owners must show a common set of facts or a case arising out of the same occurrence to join multiple parties in a suit. Additionally, business method patents, as described above, are subject to a new review proceeding if liti- gated. Finally, in recent years, patent owners have funneled many cases to favorable courts like the Eastern District of Texas due to broad jurisdiction rules for patent cases. The Supreme Court modified the jurisdiction rules in 2017 in T.C. Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, ensuring that cases will be spread more evenly around the country in the future. Now the District of Delaware is the top venue for patent litigation due to the number of firms incorporated there, but the Eastern Dis- trict of Texas is still second.
In addition to measures in the federal courts and legislature, state governments have taken action against patent trolls under their consumer protection laws. A troll that makes vague and unsupported assertions of infringement in letters sent to individuals may be considered to be acting in bad faith and subject to fines.
Some non-practicing patent entities have quite large portfolios, raising concerns on their impact on the market- place. For example, a company called Intellec- tual Ventures claims to own more than 70,000 patents.
In 2018, approximately 40 percent of all patent cases were filed in two district courts, the Dis- trict of Delaware and the Eastern District of Texas.
“In most [industries], the cost of invention is low; or just being first confers a durable competitive advantage because consumers associate the inventing company’s brand name with the product itself; or just being first gives the first company in the market a head start in reducing its costs as it becomes more experi- enced at producing and marketing the product; or the product will be superseded soon any- way, so there’s no point to a patent monopoly that will last 20 years; or some or all of these fac- tors are present. Most industries could get along fine without patent protection.”
–Judge Richard A. Posner, “Why There
Are Too Many Patents in America,” The Atlan-
tic, July 12, 2012
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Trademark Law
For thousands of years, people have used marks on what they produce to represent the origin of goods and services. Pottery from ancient Greece, Rome, and China often bears the mark of its maker. The same is true for ancient building materials like brick and tile. Today, we generally call such marks trademarks, and when they indicate a specific producer, the law protects them against use by others.
Trademarks are a form of intellectual property. Like patents, you can register them with the PTO, and also like patents, trademarks are some of the most valuable properties that businesses own. McDonald’s golden arches; the Nike “swoosh”; the Olympic rings; the names Amazon, Ford, and Exxon—the list of famous trademarks is almost endless, but always recognizable.
Although registration systems exist at the federal and state level, it is important to understand that trademark rights come from use of the mark in association with goods or services. One can have rights in an unregistered trademark and even sue for infringement. You cannot presume that, simply because a mark is unregistered, it is open for use in your field. However, this is not to say that registration is irrel- evant. Particularly at the federal level under the Lanham Act, registration conveys important advantages. Therefore, it is advisable for a business to pursue a federal trademark registration for its source indicating marks whenever possible.
Recognizability or distinctiveness is the function of trademarks. In a world cluttered with stimulation, information, and advertising, trademarks pierce through the clutter and let people know that the goods or services represented are “the real thing”—that
LO 11-4
According to a 2019 study by Forbes, the five most valuable brands belong to Apple, Google, Microsoft, Ama- zon, and Facebook.
Although the patent innovation system is intended to benefit society overall by creating incentives to invent, it has the disadvantage of potentially restricting access to important information for a period of time. When an inven- tion provides an essential solution in a time of emergency, the stakes are raised significantly. Consider, for example, a ventilator part or a critical pharmaceutical treatment dur- ing the COVID-19 pandemic. Or imagine how important a climate change technology like heat resistant crops might be during an extreme drought. The public may demand immediate access beyond that which the patent owner can supply. But because there is no “fair use” in patent law, a patent owner must be on board with another’s use. Complicating this situation is that many products are cov- ered by multiple patents. It can be difficult to even identify all of the owners, let alone negotiate for access.
One solution that has been employed in past pub- lic health emergencies has been the voluntary pooling of rights into a single entity for free or low-cost licensing. For example, in response to the AIDS crisis that impacted the
globe in the last century, an organization called Unitaid (affiliated with the World Health Organization) formed the Medicines Patent Pool. This initiative serves as a voluntary repository for patent rights that can be used by the inter- national community to create and deploy AIDS treatments. The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic spawned a similar pool- ing of rights to fight the coronavirus. The Open COVID Pledge launched in April of 2020, allowing participants to promise to share patents and related technology on non- exclusive, royalty free terms until the COVID-19 pandemic ends. Over twenty firms, including IBM, Microsoft, Amazon and AT&T initially signed the pledge and many more fol- lowed. Other pooling efforts beside the Pledge emerged as well. Such intellectual property sharing in terms of a public emergency may become more common as high technology solutions to health and climate impacts are increasingly necessary.
Sources: Unitaid, The Medicines Patent Pool, https://unitaid.org/project/medicines- patent-pool/#en; Open COVID Pledge, https://opencovidpledge.org.
sidebar 11.8
Invention Sharing During a Public Emergency
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they come from one source. They are an information property, exclusively distinguish- ing the reputation and goodwill of a particular business from that of all other busi- nesses. Trademarks protect both businesses and consumers from confusion regarding who makes or provides what. As one Federal Court of Appeals case observed:
Trademarks are designed to inform potential buyers who makes the goods on sale. Knowledge of origin may convey information about a product’s attributes and quality, and consistent attri- bution of origin is vital when vendors reputations matter. Without a way to know who makes what reputations cannot be created and evaluated, and the process of competition will be less effective. Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Operating Co., 509 F. 3d 380, 381 (7th Cir. 2007).
Trademark infringement, which may involve intentional use of the owner’s mark or an accidental design of one’s own mark too similar to another’s, is a major busi- ness problem, especially in the digital age when often the only point of contact peo- ple have with a goods or service provider is a computer or smartphone screen.
TYPES OF TRADEMARKS Although state law protects trademarks, this chapter focuses on the federal protec- tion given trademarks by the Lanham Act of 1946. The Lanham Act protects the following marks used to represent a product, service, or organization:
• Trademark—any mark, word, picture, or design that attaches to goods to indicate their source.
• Service mark—a mark associated with a service, for example, LinkedIn. • Certification mark—a mark used by someone other than the owner to certify
the quality, point of origin, or other characteristics of goods or services, for example, the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.
• Collective mark—a mark representing membership in a certain organization or association, for example, the National Football League logo.
For convenience, all of these marks will be referred to as trademarks. The law generally treats them the same. Whether the terms “brand” and “trademark” mean the same thing is addressed in Sidebar 11.9.
In a marketing class, you may have heard the term “brand” used quite frequently. However, in law, the term “trade- mark” is used. Do these terms have the same meaning, and are they completely interchangeable?
The terms have a long history of association. Brand- ing as a means of marking animals to designate ownership could be considered the original form of trademark. And its modern use related to marking products is derived by analogy to this ancient practice. The term “brand” actually comes from the Anglo-Saxon verb that means “to burn.”
In the modern business context, a mark, symbol, or pic- ture that someone refers to as a brand would also qualify
in almost all cases as a trademark. A brand is a market- ing concept that invokes a corporate strategy to capture a family of products or services in a readily identifiable man- ner. A trademark is the legal designation given to a mark that serves as a source identifier. It may not be as broad as a brand. Consider, for example, the different models of cars sold under the Ford brand. Each model name likely qualifies as a trademark itself, but may not be considered a separate brand. It is probably fair to say that most brands are trademarks, but not all trademarks are brands. Source: Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 Trademark Reporter 265 (1975).
sidebar 11.9
Brands vs. Trademarks
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Trade Dress Similar to trademarks, and also protected by the Lanham Act, is trade dress. Trade dress refers to a color or shape associated with a product or service. The red color scheme of Coca-Cola, when associated with the general design of Coca-Cola labeling, constitutes trade dress. Trade dress protection pre- vents Coca-Cola competitors from designing a shape that resembles a “Coca-Cola” bottle and attaching the characteristic Coke red to the design in such a way as to confuse potential Coke customers about what they are getting. Trade dress also includes distinctive store decorating motifs (e.g., McDonald’s) or package shapes and colors.
An important trade dress case is Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). In that case the Supreme Court defined trade dress as “the total image and overall appearance” of a business. The Court upheld a decision that Two Pesos had violated Taco Cabana’s trade dress. The Court stated that “trade dress [in this case] may include the shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restau- rant, the identifying sign, the interior kitchen floor plan, the décor, the menu, the equipment used to serve food, the servers’ uniforms and other features reflecting on the total image of the restaurant.” The law protects trade dress from being copied as long as it is distinctive. If it is distinctive and registered, the law protects it even with- out proof that the public has come to identify the trade dress with a specific source.
TRADEMARK REGISTRATION If one wishes to register a trademark with the PTO, one must use the mark in inter- state commerce. Posting the trademark on an Internet website in association with a product or service meets this qualification. Alternatively, an intent-to-use application may be filed, followed by an amended application when actual use begins. To be registerable, a trademark must be distinctive. The PTO will deny registration in the following circumstances:
• If the mark is the same or similar to a mark currently used on similar related goods, for example, a computer company’s cherry mark that resembles the apple mark of Apple Inc.
• If the mark contains certain prohibited or reserved names or designs, includ- ing the U.S. flag, other governmental symbols, the names or likenesses of liv- ing persons without their consent, and the names or likenesses of deceased American presidents without the permission of their spouses. Sidebar 11.10 describes the recent relaxation in rules prohibiting the registration of offensive marks.
• If the mark merely describes a product or service, for example, “Fast Food” for a restaurant franchise.
• If the mark is generic and represents a product or service, for example, “cell phone” for a wireless communication company.
Note that a mark that is descriptive or generic in one context may be unique and distinctive in another. “Apple” appears to be an arbitrary term in the context of consumer electronics because it easily distinguishes the source of one company’s products and services from another’s. However, it would not be registerable for a fruit stand that sells apples.
As part of the trademark application process, the PTO places a proposed mark in the Official Gazette, which gives existing mark owners notice and allows them to
The distinctive “wasp- shaped” Coca-Cola bottle is part of its trade dress.
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object that the proposed mark is similar to their own. If existing mark owners object to the proposed mark’s registration, the PTO holds a hearing to resolve the objection and, possibly, to deny registration. Finally, if the PTO determines the mark accept- able, it registers the mark on the Principal Register. This registration provides notice of official trademark registration status. All of the documents relating to registration and the application back and forth are available online at www.uspto.gov. Given the easy access to such an electronic record, it is worth investigating anyone’s claim that they have an exclusive registration for a particular trademark.
Unlike a patent, which specifies a limited property duration, the trademark enjoys a potentially unlimited protection period. But after six years, the trademark
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has traditionally lim- ited the registration of offensive or vulgar trademarks. Under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, the PTO is directed to refuse registration of any trademark that “Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely
suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institu- tions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into con- tempt, or disrepute . . ..” The PTO read this prohibition to include not only profanity and nudity, but also racial slurs and immoral messages, such as those promoting drug use. But not everyone agreed with the PTO’s determina- tions over the years. And more broadly, many believed that a government agency making decisions on what is immoral or scandalous will necessarily be exercising a certain viewpoint. This could violate the First Amend- ment rights of the trademark owner. The Supreme Court resolved much of this controversy in two recent cases featuring arguably offensive marks.
The first case involved a dance-rock band that attempted to register a name that consisted of a racial slur. In 2011, frontman Simon Shiao Tam applied to register “The Slants” for use in “entertainment in the nature of live perfor- mances by a musical band.” Far from embracing the slur, as the leader of an Asian American rock band, Mr. Tam adopted the name to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of Asian stereo- types. The PTO denied Tam’s application as disparaging, and he appealed. A federal appeals court reversed the PTO, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In June 2017, the Court issued its decision in Matal v. Tam, finding that the
prohibition of registrations for disparaging marks is view- point discrimination. According to the Supreme Court, this violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. As a result, the primary objection to Tam’s mark was eliminated and it was eligible for registration.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Matal v. Tam left intact other parts of the Lanham Act that permitted the PTO to reject “immoral” or “scandalous” marks. Those restrictions were eventually eliminated in the subse- quent case of Iancu v. Brunetti (previous discussed and excerpted as Case 3.1). That decision involved applicant Erik Brunetti’s effort to secure a registration on the mark “FUCT.” Although not a profanity per se, the PTO originally rejected the mark as immoral or scandalous. Using rea- soning similar to Tam, the Supreme Court held that such a determination by the PTO was inherently viewpoint dis- crimination and struck (eliminated) that part of the statute. Brunetti was permitted to move ahead, and he registered his mark in December of 2019.
An open question after the Tam and Brunetti cases is whether any restriction on registering offensive marks can withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment. In the Brunetti decision, Justice Kagan, suggested that a law narrowly written to exclude “sexually explicit or profane” terms might be constitutional. Congress may be com- pelled to draft such a provision at some point in the future. In any case, it is important to understand that, even if the PTO rejects certain registrations, the trademark owner is not required to stop using the mark. This is because trademark rights are derived from use, not registration. The owner of an unregistered trademark may even sue those who use the mark without authorization. Sources: Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294 (2019).
sidebar 11.10
Can you Register an Offensive Mark?
Anthony Pidgeon/ Redferns/Getty Images
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owner must notify the PTO that the trademark is still in use. Currently, every ten years, the owner must renew the trademark registration.
The attempt to register certain descriptive terms, or a person’s name, presents a special problem. Generally, the PTO will not accept a person’s name or a descrip- tive term for protection on the Principal Register. However, there is a process by which a name or descriptive term can achieve full trademark status and protec- tion. If it is listed on the PTO’s Supplemental Register for five years and acquires a secondary meaning, it can then be transferred to the Principal Register for full protection.
Secondary meaning refers to a public meaning that is different from its meaning as a person’s name or as a descriptive term, a public meaning that makes the name or term distinctive. In the public mind, “Ford” now refers to an automobile rather than a person, “Levi’s” means jeans rather than a family, and “Disney” refers to a specific entertainment company rather than its founder.
TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT Trademark law protects the trademark’s owner from having the mark used in an unauthorized way. Using a mark that is confusingly similar to the trademark own- er’s mark violates the law. The standard for liability is proof that a defendant’s use has created a “likelihood of confusion” with the plaintiff’s trademark. To make this determination, courts use a multifactored test that considers elements such as the defendant’s intent and proof of actual consumer confusion. The law establishes both civil and criminal trademark causes of action.
Civil violation of a trademark (or a patent) is termed infringement. The vio- lator infringes on the trademark’s property right through an unintentional or a willful unauthorized use, misappropriating the goodwill and reputation that the trademark represents and confusing the public about the identity of the user. Remedies for civil infringement include a variety of damages, injunctions prohib- iting future infringement, and orders to destroy infringing products in anyone’s possession.
Case 11.3 illustrates the application of the likelihood of confusion in the con- text of a case wherein parties with strong marks in different areas may be in conflict when selling products in the same stores.
Trademark owners must be vigilant in protecting their marks because if a trade- mark becomes generic, if it loses its distinctiveness, it also loses its status as a pro- tected trademark. A trademark becomes generic when, through the owner’s actions or another’s inappropriate use, the mark becomes synonymous in the consumers’ mind with the name of the goods or services. Due to concern that its famous trade- mark not become generic, Coca-Cola seeks to prevent trademark infringement by employees at soda fountains who without comment give customers other colas when asked for a “Coke.” Employers are warned to advise employees to specify that another cola will be substituted if Coke is not available.
As Table 11.1 illustrates, a number of trademarks have been lost because the public came to think of them as generic terms.
To win a trademark infringement lawsuit, a defendant will usually present one of three basic defenses: (1) the mark is not distinctive, (2) there is little chance of the public being confused by use of a term trademarked by someone else, or (3) the use is a “fair use.” In arguing the first defense, the defendant maintains that the mark is descriptive or generic and that the PTO should not have protected it in the first
It is possible to use one’s name as a trade- mark if it indicates the source of goods or ser- vices and is more than merely descriptive of the business owner’s iden- tity. The name “Trump” for hotels is an obvious example.
Don’t forget that generic marks cannot be protected as trademarks.
The use of trademarked names in this textbook is a “fair use.”
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case 11.3
KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC. v. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC. 735 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2013)
POSNER, Circuit Judge: Kraft is a well-known manufac- turer of food products sold in grocery stores. Its products include a wide variety of packaged cheeses, a number of them sold under the trademarked “Cracker Barrel” label. Kraft has been selling cheese in grocery stores under that name for more than half a century. Thousands of grocery stores carry Kraft cheeses bearing that label. Kraft does not sell any non-cheese products under the name Cracker Barrel.
[Cracker Barrel Old Country Store (CBOCS)] is a well- known chain of low-price restaurants (it opened its first res- taurant in 1969), 620 in number at last count, many of them just off major highways. Upon learning recently that CBOCS planned to sell a variety of food products (not including cheese, however), such as packaged hams, in grocery stores under its logo, “Cracker Barrel Old Country Store” (the last three words are in smaller type in the logo), Kraft filed this suit. It claims that many consumers will be confused by the similarity of the logos and think that food products so labeled are Kraft products, with the result that if they are dissatisfied with a CBOCS product they will blame Kraft.
Kraft acknowledges that a trademark does not entitle its owner to prevent all other uses of similar or even identical marks. . . . And likewise identical marks used on similar prod- ucts sold through different types of sales outlet might cause no confusion—indeed Kraft does not question CBOCS’s right to sell the food products at issue under the name Cracker Barrel in CBOCS’s restaurants, in CBOCS’s small “country stores” that adjoin the restaurants, or by mail order or on the Web. It objects only to their sale in grocery stores. . . .
Below, copied from CBOCS’s website, is a picture of the logo that appeared on CBOCS food products shipped to grocery stores.
Up close at least, it looks different from the label “Cracker Barrel” that appears on Kraft’s cheeses. Yet even if a Cracker Barrel cheese and a CBOCS ham (or other food products) were displayed side by side in a grocery store, which would make a shopper likely to notice the
difference between the labels, the words “Cracker Barrel” on both labels—and in much larger type than “Old Country Store” on CBOCS’s label—might lead the shopper to think them both Kraft products.
Most consumers of Cracker Barrel cheese must know that it’s a Kraft product, for the name “Kraft” typi- cally though not invariably appears on the label, as in the [below] picture. . . .
Kraft is concerned with the potential for confusion of shoppers at the 16,000 or so grocery stores (or similar retail entities) that sell Cracker Barrel cheeses, if the stores also carry CBOCS food products under the CBOCS logo (not only ham but also delicatessen meats, bacon, sausages, jerky, meat glazes, baking mixes, coating mixes, oatmeal, grits, and gravies—all are sold by CBOCS). Were Cracker Bar- rel cheeses and Cracker Barrel meats exhibited side by side on the shelf, the difference in the appearance of the logos of the two brands might as we said lead some consumers to think they were made by different companies—but might lead others to think the opposite, since different products of the same manufacturer are often exhibited together. If on the other hand the Kraft cheeses and CBOCS food prod- ucts are at different locations in the store, some consum- ers might forget the difference between the logos and think all the products Kraft products. . . . Even savvy consumers might be fooled, because they know that producers often vary the appearance of their trademarks.
It’s not the fact that the parties’ trade names are so similar that is decisive, nor even the fact that the products are similar (low-cost packaged food items). It is those simi- larities coupled with the fact that, if CBOCS prevails in this suit, similar products with confusingly similar trade names will be sold through the same distribution channel—grocery stores, and often the same grocery—advertised together. (In the brief period before the preliminary injunction was issued, in which CBOCS hams were sold in grocery stores, an online ad for Cracker Barrel Sliced Spiral Ham
(Left): E. Murphy/Shutterstock; (right): Bloomberg/Getty Images
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by a coupons firm provided a link to a coupon for Kraft’s Cracker Barrel cheeses.) The competing products would also be likely to appear in the same store circulars. Such similarities and overlap would increase the likelihood of consumer confusion detrimental to Kraft. . . .
Still another reason to expect confusion is that both Cracker Barrel cheeses and most meat products that CBOCS has licensed for sale to grocery stores are inexpensive—under $5. Generally only very cost-conscious consumers are apt to scrutinize carefully the labels of the less expensive items sold in a grocery store. Familiarity is likely to have made the name Cracker Barrel salient to grocery shoppers, and so any product bearing that name might be attributed to Kraft even if close scrutiny of the label would suggest that the product might well have a different origin.
If a significant number of consumers confused the names and thought CBOCS’s products were made by Kraft, Kraft could be badly hurt. A trademark’s value is the sav- ing in search costs made possible by the information that the trademark conveys about the quality of the trademark owner’s brand. The brand’s reputation for quality depends on the owner’s expenditures on product quality and quality control, service, advertising, and so on. Once the reputation is created, the firm will obtain greater profits because repeat
purchases and word-of-mouth endorsements will add to sales and because consumers will be willing to pay a higher price in exchange for a savings in search costs and an assurance of consistent quality. These benefits depend on the firm’s ability to maintain that consistent quality. When a brand’s quality is inconsistent, consumers learn that the trademark does not enable them to predict their future consumption experiences from their past ones. The trademark does not then reduce their search costs. They become unwilling to pay more for the branded than for the unbranded good, and so the firm no longer earns a sufficient return on its expen- ditures on promoting the trademark to justify them.
The particular danger for Kraft of CBOCS’s being allowed to sell food products through the same outlets under a trade name confusingly similar to Kraft’s “Cracker Barrel” trade name is that if CBOCS’s products are inferior in any respect to what the consumer expects—if a consumer has a bad experience with a CBOCS product and blames Kraft, thinking it the producer—Kraft’s sales of Cracker Barrel cheeses are likely to decline; for a consumer who thinks Kraft makes bad hams may decide it probably makes bad cheeses as well. . . .
So the grant of the preliminary injunction must be affirmed.
KEY POINTS • Both Kraft and Cracker Barrel restaurants have legitimate trademarks. Their use in the
same location is what creates the problem. • Even though Kraft and Cracker Barrel may not use identical marks on identical products,
a likelihood of confusion can still exist, according to the court. • The court suggests that sophisticated consumers for luxury products would look more
closely at labels.
[continued]
The following generic terms were once trademarks: Aspirin Lite beer Cellophane Refrigerator Cola Thermos Escalator Zipper To ensure that its well-known trademark not be lost to generic use, the Xerox Corporation spent millions of dollars advertising to the public that xerox is a registered trademark and that the term should not be used as a verb (to “xerox” a copy) or as a noun (a “xerox”). Note that a term that is generic in one country may be protectable in another. For example, the term “aspirin” is a protected trademark of Bayer AG in many countries, including Canada.
table 11.1 Trademarks Lost due to Generic Use
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instance. Alternatively, the defendant argues that the mark has become generic since its first use and that it now stands for a class of items. Note that a court can declare a mark invalid even if the PTO accepted registration.
The second defense argues that there is little chance of public confusion over two uses of the same mark. For example, the public is not likely confused between the Ford automobile and the Ford Modeling Agency. But the confusion defense does not always work. In 2010, a federal district court awarded the owners of the Rolls- Royce trademark $2 million against a defendant calling itself “Rolls-Royce USA” for willful infringement in the context of clothing such as T-shirts. Despite the fact that the trademark owners primarily manufacture airplane engines and automobiles, not clothing, confusion was established.
The third defense raised in trademark infringement lawsuits is that of fair use. Fair use of a registered trademark is allowed by the Lanham Act and relates to a dis- cussion, criticism, or parody of the trademark, the product, or its owner, for example, in the news media, on the Internet, or in a textbook. The courts have been explicit that the use of a rival’s trademark in comparative advertising is also a fair use. You can legally advertise the results of a study that show your product to be superior to a competitor’s, even if you mention the competitor’s trademarked product by name.
Criminal trademark penalties apply to those who manufacture or traffic in counterfeit trademarked products such as imitation “Rolex” watches or “Levi” jeans. What makes counterfeiting criminal is the deliberate intent to pass off, or palm off, fake products as real by attaching an unauthorized trademark. Sidebar 11.11 details the severe economic effects of counterfeiting.
If you see someone selling a fake purse or watch on the streets of a large city, you might think the harm is small. How much impact can such activities have? As it turns out, quite a bit. A study conducted by the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) determined that international trade in such products represented $461 bil- lion in 2013 alone. Moreover, the impact is more severe in developed countries, with counterfeit and pirated products constituting up to 5% of imports into the European Union.
The problem is not limited to luxury goods. The OECD study found that a range of products are affected, includ- ing business-to-business products such as machines, chemicals, and spare parts, as well as common consumer products like toys and pharmaceuticals. Most brands are hit by counterfeiting, no matter where in the world they are headquartered. The global reach and broad scale of counterfeiting suggests that better international coordina- tion is required to reduce the harm.
Source: “Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2016).
sidebar 11.11
Counterfeiting Has a Global Economic Impact
AP Photo
Trademarks and the Internet The Internet creates a combination of old and new trademark issues. One new issue concerns the relationship between a web- site domain name registered with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and a trademark registered with the PTO. There have been
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numerous instances in which people attempt to register domain names containing well-known trademarks that did not belong to them. Generally, it is a violation of trademark law to use another’s registered mark in your domain name. Further, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 provides a remedy of statu- tory damages and transfer of a trademark domain name to its owner if it was regis- tered in “bad faith.” As an alternative to litigation, a trademark owner can pursue an arbitration against an improper domain name registrant. ICANN, an international organization that administers the Internet’s addressing system, has a formal dispute resolution policy. ICANN has the authority to cancel or transfer the registration of the losing party.
TRADEMARK DILUTION In 1995, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. This law prohibits you from using a mark the same as or similar to another’s “famous” trademark so as to dilute its significance, reputation, and goodwill. Even if an owner of a famous trademark cannot prove that the public is confused by another’s use of a similar mark (called a “junior” mark), the owner of the “senior” famous trademark can still get an injunction prohibiting further use of the junior mark on the basis of trade- mark dilution. The court also has discretion to award the owner the infringer’s prof- its, actual damages, and attorney’s fees if the infringer “willfully intended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark.”
There are two types of dilution that are recognized under federal law: blurring and tarnishment. Blurring occurs when firm uses another trademark in a way that blurs the distinctiveness of a famous mark. For example, even if a reasonable per- son would know the company behind “Google Lawn Service” was different than the search engine giant, Google would have a good argument that permitting the lawn service’s use would blur or reduce its trademark’s power. Tarnishment occurs when a firm uses a trademark in a way that creates a negative impression about the famous company. For example, Ben & Jerry’s sued a distributer of adult films who wished to use the name “Ben & Cherry’s.” Even if no one would believe an actual connection existed, the ice cream company’s reputation for family fun could be tarnished.
Because allowing companies to pursue dilution cases in the absence of con- sumer confusion could create significant speech issues, dilution is limited to famous marks. Additionally, federal law specifically carves out exceptions for non-commer- cial speech, news reporting, comparative advertising, and parody.
In 2006, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, which estab- lished that dilution exists when a defendant creates a “likelihood of dilution.” The law was designed, in part, to overrule an earlier Supreme Court decision, Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), which set a higher standard of actual dilution. Thus, it is now slightly easier to win a dilution case.
Copyright Law
Like patents, a copyright gives those who have this property a monopoly over the right to exclude others from copying and marketing for a limited period of time. Unlike patents, copyright deals with original expression rather than inven- tion. The importance of copyright began with the development of the printing
Remember: only the owners of famous marks can prevail under the Federal Trademark Dilu- tion Act.
LO 11-5
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press in the early 1400s, but the first copyright law was the Statute of Anne, enacted in England in 1710. In the United States, copyright is authorized in the Constitution, and Congress has revised copyright several times. Until the late 1800s, however, the United States did not recognize foreign copyright laws as they protected the works of foreign authors. As a result, U.S. publishers felt free to publish the works of foreign authors without permission or the payment of fees called royalties.
Today, the United States has joined most other countries in international agreements, such as the Berne Convention, in protecting the copyright of other nations, but, once again, copyright has come to a turning point in the road. Digi- tal technology makes it ever easier to copy not only printed material but music, movies, and software as well. No longer is a large business necessary to copy and distribute copyrighted materials illegally. Individuals can copy materials quickly and almost without cost and send them around the world in a blink of an eye. Emerging technologies present new issues, and copyright law continually evolves to keep up.
COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP Copyright law grants property in certain creative expressions that keeps others from reproducing it without the owner’s permission. The copyright attaches not to an idea or to facts but to the original expression of an idea or facts. Three criteria are neces- sary for copyright protection to occur:
• A work must be original. It must be created, not copied. Facts are not original, though collections of facts may be, depending on the selection and arrangement.
• The work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression like a book, canvas, compact disk, hard drive, or flash memory.
• The work must show some creative expression. For example, the Supreme Court ruled in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) that the mere effort and alphabetic arrangement of names that went into a telephone directory’s white pages was insufficiently creative to warrant a copyright.
It is a fundamental principle that copyright does not cover functional or utilitar- ian aspects of a product, as that is the domain of patents and trade secrets. However, it is possible for useful items to have copyrightable attributes, so long as the creative aspect is conceptually separable. For example, a PEZ dispenser may have a copy- righted character like Darth Vader as its head piece even though the device functions to deliver candy. The line between utilitarian and expressive can be difficult to draw as discussed in Sidebar 11.12.
Copyright laws protect authors rather than inventors. An author creates works of a literary, dramatic, musical, graphic, choreographic, audio, or visual nature. Ranging from printed material to photographs to records and motion pictures, these works receive automatic federal protection under the Copyright Act of 1976 from the moment the author creates them. Importantly, no registration is required to obtain a copyright under federal law. Additionally, notice—for example, a copyright symbol or the word “copyrighted”—is also not required. For that reason, businesses are often advised to assume that a work created by another is copyrighted, no matter if it appears freely available without notice.
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Companies can be considered authors under copyright law. In fact, when an employee creates a work within the scope of their employment, the employer is automatically the owner and author. This type of work is called a “work-for-hire.” It eliminates the need for companies to negotiate the rights to letters, documents, web pages, etc., that employees produce in the course of everyday work.
The copyright allows the holder to control the reproduction, display, distribution, and performance of a protected work. The copyright runs for the author’s lifetime, plus 70 additional years for an individual, and 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation for a work by a company. Congress has occasionally extended the term for copyrights in existence. The last time was in 1998 under the Copyright Term Extension Act, which added 20 years to the term. Copyright expirations that were delayed under the 1998 law resumed in 2019, as detailed in Sidebar 11.13.
Varsity Brands is a well-known manu- facturer of sports uniforms, including those used by cheerleaders. Varsity’s cheerleading uniforms have unique designs that include chevrons, lines, stripes, coloring, and shapes. One of Varsity’s competitors, Star Athletica, copied uniform designs and Varsity sued for copyright infringement. How- ever, Star argued that no infringe-
ment occurred because the designs were part of the function of cheerleading uniforms and could not be separated.
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided in Varsity’s favor and set forth a test for determining the separability of copy- rightable aspects of useful items. According to the Court, the copyrightable features must have the ability to “exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article.” The features must be able to be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art and qualify for copyright protection on their own. Applying this test to Varsity’s uniforms, the court found that the pictorial and graphic qualities were indeed separable, as they could exist on a canvas, for example. Thus, Star was potentially liable for infringing the designs it copied.
Source: Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016).
sidebar 11.12
When Is a Uniform Expressive?
Avpics/Alamy Stock Photo
When the Copyright Term Extension Act was enacted in 1998, it not only added 20 years to existing copy- rights, but it also effectively put the addition of expiring works into the public domain on hold. That hold ended in January 1, 2019. On that day, the copyright on works published in 1923 expired and they became part of the public domain, which means they are free for all to copy and use. The works included Cecil B. DeMille’s film, “The Ten Commandments,” Agatha Christie’s “The Murder on the Links,” and Frank Silver’s and Irving Cohn’s “Yes! We Have No Bananas.” The expirations will continue each
year on January 1st in the same manner (e.g., on January 1, 2020, works from 1924 expire, on January 1, 2021, works from 1925 expire, etc.). Regardless of what specific day an expiring year a work was originally published, all of those from the relevant year expire on January 1. Those who enjoy older works or anticipate remaking or remixing them into new works are pleased that can finally make use of the limit on copyright term. Sources: Duke University Center for the Study of the Public Domain, “Public Domain Day 2019.” https://web.law.duke.edu/cspd/ publicdomainday/2019/#fn1text.
sidebar 11.13
Public Domain Day Finally Arrives
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The U.S. government cannot own copyrights in works created by its employees within the scope of their duties. However, state governments can own copyrights. Their unusual position with respect to infringement and enforcement is detailed in Sidebar 11.14.
COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT Although copyright protection attaches at the moment a work is created, an action for copyright infringement cannot be undertaken unless the author has properly registered the work with the Copyright Office. To make a case of infringement, a copyright owner must establish that a defendant violated one of the owner’s exclusive rights, which can be generally stated as: (1) reproduction; (2) creation of derivative works; (3) distribu- tion; (4) performance, in the case of literary, musical, and audiovisual works; or (5) dis- play, in the case of literary, musical, audiovisual, pictorial, or graphical works. Because there is no accidental infringement in copyright—your own expression cannot infringe, even if it is similar to another’s—it is essential to prove that an infringer actually used the copyrighted work. Some cases may involve direct evidence of a defendant’s copying. But most cases require circumstantial proof. We look to see if the defendant had access to the original work and then produced something that was substantially similar.
The determination of infringement based on access and similarity can be par- ticularly difficult when the two works are naturally similar because they appear in the same creative genre. So-called music “plagiarism” cases commonly present a problem, particularly if the judge or jury hearing the case is not familiar with the standard elements of the genre. Case 11.4 presents a relatively typical music infringe- ment case, wherein one party claims the other copied elements of a song to make a more famous hit. The court considered whether greater access to the original work mean that a lower amount of infringement proof was necessary.
State governments and their associated units and agen- cies (including public universities) have an interesting position in the copyright scheme. On one hand, they have more rights than a private actor because the 11th Amend- ment to the US Constitution prevents them from being sued in federal court for infringement damages. Because federal court is the only permitted venue for copyright infringement, state governments essentially have a form of immunity. This was confirmed in the 2020 case of Allen v. Cooper, in which a videographer named Frederick Allen sued the state of North Carolina for posting videos and pictures without permission. Allen’s works depicted the salvage of the shipwreck of the pirate Blackbeard’s flag- ship, Queen Anne’s Revenge, off the state’s coast. The state posted Allen’s videos and photos to official websites without permission, and he sued. The Supreme Court confirmed that the 11th Amendment prevents a federal court from hearing a case against a non-consenting state, and this precluded Allen’s lawsuit.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court also deter- mined in 2020 that states have less copyright protec- tion than private actors, at least when the works concern “government edicts.” In Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., the Supreme Court consider whether the State of Georgia could use copyright to control the publication of its annotated state statutes (statutes with case inter- pretations added). The state wished to limit access to its annotated statutes to permit a private publisher to profit from its organization and publication of statute books. Because the Supreme Court determined that the “gov- ernment edicts doctrine” precludes copyright over the official works of state judges and legislatures, Georgia’s annotated statutes were in the public domain and free for all to use. Note that federal government works have always been understood to be excluded from copyright by statute. Sources: Allen v. Cooper, 140 S.Ct. 994 (2020); Georgia v. Public.Resource. Org, Inc., 140 S.ct. 1498 (2020).
sidebar 11.14
State Governments and Copyright: the Supreme Court Giveth and Taketh Away
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case 11.4
SKIDMORE v. LED ZEPPELIN 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020)
Randy Wolfe, professionally known as Randy California, wrote the instrumental song Taurus in 1966 or 1967. He was a guitarist in the band Spirit. Spirit signed a recording contract in August 1967 and released its first eponymous album—which included Taurus—a few months later. . . .
Around the same time, across the Atlantic, another rock band, Led Zeppelin, was formed by Jimmy Page, Rob- ert Plant, John Paul Jones, and John Bonham. Led Zep- pelin released its fourth album in late 1971. The untitled album, which became known as “Led Zeppelin IV,” con- tained the now iconic song Stairway to Heaven. Stairway to Heaven was written by Jimmy Page and Robert Plant.
It is undisputed that Spirit and Led Zeppelin crossed paths in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The bands per- formed at the same venue at least three times between 1968 and 1970. Led Zeppelin also performed a cover of a Spirit song, Fresh Garbage. But there is no direct evidence that the two bands toured together, or that Led Zeppelin band members heard Spirit perform Taurus. . . .
Fast forward forty-three years from the release of Stairway to Heaven to May 2014. Skidmore [the trustee of Wolfe’s estate] filed a suit alleging that Stairway to Heaven infringed the copyright in Taurus . . .
Skidmore alleged direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement. He also sought equitable relief for a claim that he titled “Right of Attribution—Equitable Relief—Falsification of Rock n’ Roll History.” Skidmore’s claims are not based on the entire Taurus composition. Rather, Skidmore claims that the opening notes of Stairway to Heaven are substantially similar to the eight-measure pas- sage at the beginning of the Taurus deposit copy . . .
* * * Proof of copyright infringement requires Skidmore to
show: (1) that he owns a valid copyright in Taurus; and (2) that Led Zeppelin copied protected aspects of the work. Skidmore’s ownership of a valid copyright in Taurus was not challenged on appeal . . .
Because independent creation is a complete defense to copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove that a defen- dant copied the work. In the absence of direct evidence of copying, which is the case here, the plaintiff “can attempt to prove it circumstantially by showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work and that the two works share similarities probative of copying.” . . .
[T]he hallmark of “unlawful appropriation” is that the works share substantial similarities. In our circuit, we use a two-part test to determine whether the defendant’s
work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. The first part, the extrinsic test, compares the objec- tive similarities of specific expressive elements in the two works. Crucially, because only substantial similarity in pro- tectable expression may constitute actionable copying that results in infringement liability, “it is essential to distinguish between the protected and unprotected material in a plain- tiff’s work.” The second part, the intrinsic test, “test[s] for similarity of expression from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable observer, with no expert assistance.”
* * * When Page testified, he candidly admitted to owning “a
copy of the album that contains ‘Taurus,’ . . . in [his] collec- tion,” though still denying “any knowledge of ‘Taurus.’” The jury found that both Page and Plant “had access to the musical composition Taurus before Stairway to Heaven was created.” Once the jury made that finding, the remaining questions on the jury verdict form related to substantial similarity of the works. . . .
Copyright infringement cases often boil down to the crucial question of substantial similarity. We have stated that “substantial similarity is inextricably linked to the issue of access,” and have adhered to “what is known as the ‘inverse ratio rule,’” which requires “a lower standard of proof of substantial similarity when a high degree of access is shown.” That is, “the stronger the evidence of access, the less compelling the similarities between the two works need be in order to give rise to an inference of copying.” . . .
The circuits are split over the inverse ratio rule, but the majority of those that have considered the rule declined to adopt it. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the rule. . . .
As a practical matter, the concept of “access” is increasingly diluted in our digitally interconnected world. Access is often proved by the wide dissemination of the copyrighted work. Given the ubiquity of ways to access media online, from YouTube to subscription services like Netflix and Spotify, access may be established by a trivial showing that the work is available on demand.
To the extent “access” still has meaning, the inverse ratio rule unfairly advantages those whose work is most accessible by lowering the standard of proof for similarity. Thus the rule benefits those with highly popular works, like The Office, which are also highly accessible. But nothing in copyright law suggests that a work deserves stronger legal protection simply because it is more popular or owned by better-funded rights holders. . . We join the majority of our
Rob Verhorst/Redferns/Getty Images
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If successful, the copyright owner may be able to obtain an injunction to stop the defendant’s infringement. An owner may request actual damages for any losses. Significantly, copyright law also allows a plaintiff to elect statutory damages as an alternative to actual damages. This is a certain amount set by the judge for each work infringed, regardless of any lost revenue. It is through this provision that copyright defendants may end up owing thousands of dollars for sharing a few movie files, even if a studio cannot prove that it lost theatre revenue. Although, as noted earlier, registration is optional until a lawsuit is considered, a copyright owner can obtain statutory damages only if the work is registered before a defendant’s infringement.
There are also criminal penalties for willful copyright infringement. Large-scale copyright infringement is often referred to as piracy. In these criminal cases, ille- gally reproduced copies may be seized, fines may be imposed, and defendants may actually be sent to jail. Remember that only the U.S. government can pursue a case of criminal copyright infringement. Due to the number of instances each year, most litigation takes place in the civil courts.
sister circuits that have considered the inverse ratio rule and have correctly chosen to excise it from copyright analysis.
* * * To conduct a copyright infringement analysis, the fact-
finders ask “whether ‘the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially similar’” and “disregard the non-protectible elements.” Jury Instruction No. 16 correctly listed non-pro- tectable musical building blocks that no individual may own, and did not, as Skidmore claims, exclude the particular use of musical elements in an original expression.
For example, despite Skidmore’s challenge to the characterization of descending chromatic scales as unpro- tectable, even his own expert musicologist, Dr. Stewart, agreed musical concepts like the minor chromatic line and the associated chords have been “used in music for quite a long time” as “building blocks.” This candid acknowledge- ment was echoed by Led Zeppelin’s expert. Dr. Ferrara described the “chromatic scale, descending or ascending,” as “a musical building block. This is something that no one can possibly own.” The commonality of descending scales and arpeggios has been reinforced by the Copyright Office, which lists “[d]iatonic or chromatic scales” and “arpeg- gios” as common property musical material. Emphasizing the importance of original creation, the Copyright Office notes that “a musical work consisting entirely of common
property material would not constitute original author- ship.” Just as we do not give an author “a monopoly over the note of B-flat,” descending chromatic scales and arpeg- gios cannot be copyrighted by any particular composer.
We have never extended copyright protection to just a few notes. Instead we have held that “a four-note sequence common in the music field” is not the copyrightable expres- sion in a song. In the context of a sound recording copy- right, we have also concluded that taking six seconds of the plaintiff’s four-and-a-half-minute sound recording—spanning three notes—is de minimis, inactionable copying. . . . At the same time, we have not foreclosed the possibility that “seven notes” could constitute an original expression. . . .
Skidmore appears to want less than the law demands. In his closing and on appeal, he argued that a work is original as long as it was independently created. Not quite. Though not demanding, originality requires at least “minimal” or “slight” creativity—a “modicum” of “creative spark”—in addition to independent creation
* * * The trial and appeal process has been a long climb up
the Stairway to Heaven. The parties and their counsel have acquitted themselves well in presenting complicated ques- tions of copyright law. We affirm the judgment that Led Zeppelin’s Stairway to Heaven did not infringe Spirit’s Taurus.
KEY POINTS • Skidmore claimed that Led Zeppelin copied a relatively small part of its earlier song.
Infringement is possible even though the defendant copied only part of the work. You can find comparisons of these two works online.
• The court rejected the idea that, the more access a defendant has, the less similarity is necessary to prove infringement
• If a plaintiff claims a defendant copied a part of a work that is standard or “stock” for a particular kind of music, there is no infringement.
[continued]
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COPYRIGHT FAIR USE The Copyright Act specifies that a fair use of copyrighted materials is not an infringe- ment of the owner’s property. Fair use includes copying for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.” In determining whether a particular use is a fair one, a court will con- sider the following four factors:
• The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is for com- mercial or nonprofit educational purposes.
• The nature of the copyrighted work. • The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole. • The effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.
The assessment of fair use is made on a case-by-case basis, which can lead to uncertainty. Put another way, businesses that depend on using another’s copyrighted work on the hope that a court will find fair use are taking a risk. For that reason, parties often prefer to rely on the other explicit exceptions in copyright law if at all possible. For example, under section 110 of the Copyright Act, a college instructor at a non-profit institution can show a lawfully-made copy of a motion picture or televi- sion program in face-to-face teaching activities without paying a license.
COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE Under copyright law, it is illegal not only to make copies that violate the law, but also to assist others in doing so. When copyright holders challenged certain pro- grams that assisted file sharing of materials—mostly, copyrighted music—one case went to the Supreme Court. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), the Court asserted: “We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” In addition to inducing others to infringe, one can be liable for materially contributing to another’s infringement with knowledge of the infringement. Obtaining financial benefit with the ability to supervise the infringe- ment also makes one vicariously liable.
Criminal prosecutions and civil lawsuits for “file sharing” copyrighted mate- rial over the Internet continue. The motion picture and recording industries have been particularly active over the years in pursuing individuals for file sharing. Some excuse file sharing by saying that intellectual property does not diminish the way that tangible property does when someone misappropriates it. But consider this: Property is a legal right to exclude, not a physical thing, and the object of a property copyright includes the reproduction of music for commercial profit. The holder of a copyright owns the right to exclude others from what is copyrighted, and the market resource is diminished for the copyright owner when file sharers misappropriate music. In the early years of this century, the volume of sales for copyrighted music has declined significantly, largely due to misappropriation.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Because copyrighted property is easily misappropriated over the Internet, Congress passed a law in 1998 that prohibits cer- tain activities leading to copyright violation. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) makes illegal the effort to get around (circumvent) devices used by copy- right owners to keep their works from being infringed. In particular, the act prevents
International piracy of copyrighted material is a major problem, but inter- national enforcement efforts are improving slowly.
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the production, marketing, or sales of a product or service designed to circumvent technological protections of computer software, videos, and compact disks. The act also prevents circumvention of access protections for such products.
A second part of the DMCA enlists the help of Internet service providers (ISPs) to curb infringement. The law provides a safe-harbor for ISPs, protecting them from liability (1) for illegal copies that pass temporarily through their systems and (2) for permanent illegal copies stored in their systems, for example, at a website, but only if the service provider removes the offending material upon request of a copyright owner. Finally, the act relieves service providers from liability for unintentionally linking to a website that contains infringing materials. As explained in Sidebar 11.15, ISPs gen- erally do not have the obligation to address user copyright infringement without knowledge of the activity.
Internet service providers (ISPs), which include com- panies that provide Internet access as well as those that host content like videos, have protection against claims of contributory infringement so long as they act to address copyright owner claims. For hosting services, the DMCA requires content removal when a copyright owner provides notice. However, ISPs may be obligated to act even before a copyright owner notifies them. Under the act, actual knowledge of infringing works posted by users requires action. Additionally, knowl- edge of facts or circumstances from which infringement
is apparent requires that an ISP remove the infringing content.
When do facts and circumstances make infringement apparent? Is a general knowledge that some users post infringing content enough? This question was addressed in the district court case, Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F.Supp.2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Viacom con- tended that YouTube was aware of infringing activity on its service and did not work sufficiently to eliminate it. The court rejected that argument, finding that YouTube was protected by the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions.
sidebar 11.15
Knowledge of Users’ Infringing Activity
Violations of the DMCA permit civil remedies, including injunction, actual damages, and statutory damages. A court can assess triple damages against a repeat offender. Willful circumvention for financial gain can also result in up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
International Intellectual Property Rights
To this point, this chapter has presented the basic rules of U.S. intellectual property rights. You may be aware that you can obtain similar rights in other countries. Is such protection automatic once you have protection in the United States? Is there an international system for protecting intellectual property? These are essential ques- tions for any modern business. As commerce becomes global, the protection of intel- lectual property internationally is increasingly important.
There are in fact no fully international intellectual property rights, per se. Local or regional law controls the creation and ownership of patents, copyrights, trade- mark, and trade secrets. However, there are international standards that most indus- trialized nations have agreed to uphold. The most important source for standards
LO 11-6
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is an international treaty known as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This agreement was formed in 1994 as part of the treaty that created the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United States has been a member since the agreement’s inception and was a major force in draft- ing its provisions. TRIPS requires that member countries provide protection for all of the forms of intellectual property discussed in this chapter. In addition, it sets forth baseline rules for that protection in terms of subject matter, procedure, and enforcement. By virtue of the TRIPS agreement, businesses can count on being able to obtain similar protection for intellectual property in other countries. However, differences in the manner in which counties comply with TRIPS require that compa- nies exercise due care in pursuing international rights.
In addition to substantive protection, international treaties exist that can facili- tate filing for rights in several countries at the same time. In the context of patents, there is the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), which allows an applicant to obtain a preliminary international examination and then pursue final rights in multiple countries at the same time. Similarly, trademark owners can pursue rights in several countries at the same time through the Madrid System for International Registra- tion of Marks. Because members of the Berne Convention, described above, are not required to undertake any formalities to obtain copyright protection, no interna- tional filing system is necessary. Members agree to provide rights if similar rights are obtained in an author’s home country.
In order to monitor and administer certain aspects of international intellectual property agreements, countries have provided authority to certain independent international organizations. The most important two organizations are the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The WTO administers the TRIPS agreement, including the settlement of disputes concerning its interpreta- tion. The WIPO administers the PCT and Madrid System in addition to many other international intellectual property treaties. Both organizations provide much useful information to businesses, and it is worth consulting their respective web resources before pursuing international protection.
A Conclusion about Intellectual Property
Intellectual property, like property itself, serves the common good. The U.S. Con- stitution points this out in Article 1, Section 8, by asserting that the purpose for Congress granting “to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec- tive writings and discoveries” is to promote the progress of science and business, which society believes promotes the common good. The framers of the Constitu- tion believed, as do modern economists, that property, including intellectual prop- erty, gives incentive for private production of goods and services, which benefits not only the owners providing goods and services, but also the overall wealth of society.
A property system is only as effective as the mechanism for enforcing it. With- out adequate enforcement, a property system cannot function for the common good, and enforcement relies upon more than laws and courts. It depends also on the attitudes of people toward legitimacy of the property. Without social recognition of the exclusive legal fences that are at the heart of the property system and without adequate enforcement of property, the system cannot provide the incentive neces- sary for private productive effort.
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Increasingly, we live in a global society, and the information that is the resource of intellectual property moves easily across national borders. This means that the enforcement of intellectual property is something important to all nations that are part of the global trading system.
Key Terms Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 347
Blurring 339 Copyright 339 Design patent 324 Digital Millennium Copyright
Act 345 Economic Espionage Act
(EEA) 322
Fair use 345 Generic 333, 335 Infringement 335 Injunction 321 Intellectual property 315 Lanham Act of 1946 332 Likelihood of confusion 335 Misappropriation 321 Patent 323 Patent trolls 330
Piracy 344 Plant patents 324 Property 313 Tarnishment 339 Trade dress 333 Trade secret 317 Trademark 331 Trademark dilution 339 Utility patent 324
Review Questions and Problems 1. The Justification for Intellectual Property
(a) What is the purpose of patents and copyrights as identified in the Constitution? (b) Explain the claim that the pace of research and development of new products would slow if intellec-
tual property right did not protect it. 2. Intellectual Property and Competition
(a) Explain the balance between intellectual property’s rights of exclusion and competition. (b) Articulate alternatives to intellectual property for encouraging information creation.
3. Capturing Intellectual Property Explain the assertion that businesses can lose rights if they do not diligently assess and pursue intellec- tual property protection.
Trade Secrets
4. Trade Secret: Taking Reasonable Measures to Keep the Secret (a) How do trade secrets differ from other applications of property? (b) Discuss several ways of preserving trade secrets.
5. Demonstrating Misappropriation What types of actions constitute misappropriation under trade secret law?
6. Trade Secret: Civil Enforcement What are the remedies available for the civil enforcement of trade secrets?
7. Trade Secret: Criminal Enforcement Why has criminal misappropriation of trade secrets become an issue of greater concern in recent years?
Patent Law
8. Obtaining a Patent Describe the process for obtaining a patent.
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9. Patentable Subject Matter Through long, expensive research you determine that both a bowling ball and a feather fall at the rate of 32 feet per second in a vacuum. Can you patent this knowledge? Explain.
10. Nonobviousness, Novelty, and Usefulness (a) Imagine that you discover a long-ignored cure for headaches in an old U.S.
medical journal from the 1800s, and you apply for a patent. Explain why a pat- ent examiner would likely reject your application.
(b) Discuss the patent requirement of nonobviousness. 11. Patent Enforcement
Is it possible for two utility patents owned by different people to cover the same product? Explain.
12. Current Issues in Patent Law (a) Discuss the propriety of entities that acquire and assert patents but make no
product. (b) You discover a specific human gene that determines male pattern baldness.
Explain what it means to say that you cannot patent this gene. Trademark Law
13. Types of Trademarks Name four types of marks that are often called “trademarks.”
14. Trademark Registration (a) Can you register the name “Fast Food” as a trademark? Explain. (b) Under what conditions can you not register a mark?
15. Trademark Enforcement Do you ever “google” something on the Internet? Is the company Google in danger of losing its name as a trademark? Explain.
16. Trademark Dilution Articulate an example that would constitute trademark dilution, but not infringe- ment. Can you come up with one that constitutes infringement but not dilution?
Copyright Law
17. Copyright Ownership (a) If you spend the time and effort necessary to alphabetize the names of the stu-
dents at your school and list their e-mail addresses, can you copyright a printed version? Explain.
(b) Explain the rights a company has to the works created by its employees. 18. Copyright Enforcement
Imagine that you are making a presentation to a class on the occurrence of product advertising in film. You display a short clip of a recent film to illustrate your point. Explain how one would argue that this use constitutes a “fair use” of the copy- righted material.
19. Copyright in the Digital Age Explain why digital copies of works create greater difficulties in controlling infringement.
20. Digital Millennium Copyright Act Are file-hosting sites like YouTube liable for infringing videos posted by their users?
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Colonel Cars Inc. plans to introduce a new speaker complex in the steering wheels of its automobiles. It believes the change will revolutionize the drivers’ music-listening enjoy- ment. The company is also preparing an advertising campaign around the improved listen- ing experience. Both the new steering-wheel speakers and the ad campaign are carefully kept secrets. But Colonel Cars’ vice president for marketing is hired by European Motor Works (EMW) to be the president of its international division. Before Colonel Cars can begin its advertising, EMW comes out with an ad campaign centered on—you guessed it—speakers in the steering wheels of its new model cars. • Can a company have property in its marketing plans the way you can have property in
your car? • Can EMW use Colonel Cars’ marketing plans without permission?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
12-1 To understand the legal risk inherent in international transactions, includ- ing the requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
12-2 To identify the basic sources of international law and major institutions.
12-3 To consider the importance of free trade agreements on the global economy.
12-4 To grasp the basic methods of transacting international business.
12-5 To realize the complexity of resolving international disputes.
Global Expansion and International Law12 Damien Te Whiu/Flickr/Getty Images
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T he risks of engaging in global transactions
are apparent in the news on a daily basis.
From increased prosecutions for bribery to
lawsuits involving global operations, the international
marketplace is fraught with potential legal issues.
Major world events such as the COVID-19 pan-
demic and the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers
illustrate the interconnectedness of international busi-
ness. Although the effects of the pandemic were just
beginning to be known at the time this book went to
press, few have forgotten how Lehman’s bankruptcy
triggered a “cash crunch” around the world, precipi-
tating losses and accelerating the demise of other
businesses. In turn, U.S. laws and regulations govern-
ing financial institutions were subjected to interna-
tional scrutiny. No one is sure how long it will take for
the global economy to recover from new challenges
associated with the pandemic.
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One thing, however, is certain. Law is fundamental to business in the United States and throughout the globe. As American businesses become increasingly global in a very competitive international marketplace, some understanding of legal issues in this context is essential. Throughout this text, the importance of the rule of law is emphasized. This concept is particularly important for companies doing business abroad. Property rights and contracts must be enforced to minimize risk in interna- tional transactions.
The United States enters into treaties and trade agreements to govern competi- tion and the way goods and technology are sold from one country to the next. Every country is interested in developing rules that make its products and services more competitive in the global market. Nation-states and corporations alike are protected by a mutual respect for property and contractual rights.
The goal of American trade policy is to open markets throughout the world. The idea is to create new opportunities for business and also higher living standards. The United States is a party to many trade agreements and is continually negotiating new ones to further open markets to free trade. National economies rely on their ability to export products and services abroad to create jobs and economic growth at home. Companies likewise are continually looking for productive ways to expand their international business. Overall, however, the United States has a huge trade deficit because it buys more than it sells abroad. At the end of 2019, the trade deficit was $616.8 billion. For a chart of the top trading partners with the United States, see Figure 12.1.
This chapter discusses the risks of global trade, with an emphasis on the pres- sure for bribes and the problem of money laundering. It then provides a basic under- standing about international law and organizations that affect trade, including major trade agreements. Next, it provides an overview of methods of transacting interna- tional business and concludes with ways of resolving international disputes. Overall, this chapter should help you understand the issues affecting business in the interna- tional landscape.
“Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness . . . Broad, wholesome, charitable views of men and things cannot be acquired by vegetating in one little corner of the earth all one’s lifetime.” – Mark Twain, American
humorist (1857)
Figure 12.1 Top ten trading partners with the United States.
0 CanadaMexico Japan Germany India TaiwanFrance
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
$95.20
United Kingdom
$132.30
South Korea
$134.40 $92.10 $85.50
Country
T ot
al in
$ bi
lli on
s
$612.40
China
$614.50
$558.90
$218.30 $187.80
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Statistics, Year to Date Totals, December 2019.
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Risks Involved in International Trade
Because international trade means dealing with different legal systems, cultures, and ways of doing business, there are a number of risks involved. For example, when a firm expands globally, a host of potential risks and concerns are raised, such as:
• What U.S. laws have an “extraterritorial” reach? • Are property rights enforced? • Will foreign courts uphold the validity of contracts? • Is intellectual property protected or is it vulnerable to infringement? • Are there export or import restrictions on the firm’s products? • Are there risks associated with political instability and/or war? • What international trade agreements will affect the firm’s expansion? • What national laws (e.g., labor and environmental) affect the firm? • How should language and cultural differences be bridged? • What are the ethical standards associated with the firm’s transactions?
This section addresses specific concerns about pressures for bribes, expropria- tion and nationalization, and export controls. See Sidebar 12.1 as an example of problems that can arise with outsourcing manufacturing.
LO 12-1
One of the risks associated with international trade is the reliability of vendors. During the COVID-19 pandemic, concern was expressed when the Food and Drug Admin- istration halted its usual inspection of drugs and medical devices being produced overseas. China and India are the largest sources of raw ingredients for many pharma- ceutical products, including common ones such as aspi- rin, ibuprofen, and penicillin. There have been instances of drugs recalled due to production-level contamination,
including those containing ingredients made outside of the U.S. The F.D.A sus-
pension created concerns about quality and the potential ramifi- cations for human health.
In a very different kind of example, in 2007 Mattel Inc. recalled more than 10 million
Chesnot/ Getty Images
Frank Franklin II/AP Photo
toys manufactured in China. What was at issue? Lead paint and tiny magnets presented safety hazards for chil- dren. At least one U.S. child died and 19 others required surgery after swallowing magnets in the toys. The recall included some of Mattel’s most popular toys, including Barbie, Dora, Thomas the Train, Polly Pocket, and Cars movie items. The over $33 billion U.S. toy industry heav- ily relies on manufacturing in China for approximately 80 percent of its toys.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR BUSINESS
Who is responsible if there is injury? What is the best way to address the problem? Should there be tighter consumer standards? How can companies better control outsourced manufacturing?
i studio/ Alamy Stock Photo
sidebar 12.1
Pharmaceutical Products to Toys: Issues Related to Sourcing
PRESSURES FOR BRIBES Following widespread disclosure of scandalous payments by domestic firms to officials of foreign government, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977. The law is designed to stop bribery of foreign officials and
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to prohibit U.S. citizens and companies from making payments to foreign officials whose duties are not “essentially ministerial or clerical” for the purpose of obtaining business. Since 2009, FCPA enforcement has increased substantially. Any company trading on a U.S. stock exchange can be prosecuted for FCPA violations.
This statute has the following two principal requirements:
1. Financial records and accounts must be kept “which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of assets” of the business.
2. The business must “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting con- trols sufficient to provide reasonable assurances” that transactions are being carried out in accordance with management’s authorization.
These provisions are intended to correct the previously widespread practice of accounting for bribes as commission payments, payments for services, or other normal business expenses and then illegally deducting the payments on income tax returns.
Many legal observers criticized the FCPA for creating a significantly chilling effect on U.S. companies seeking business in many developing countries where under-the-table payments to government officials are an accepted practice. Indeed, many civil servants in other nations are expected to supplement their salaries in this manner. The U.S. prohibition of such payments is perceived as an attempt to impose U.S. standards of morality in other parts of the world, and it has caused resentment and discrimination against U.S. businesses. Moreover, the FCPA arguably puts U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage with businesses in other countries that are not operating under similar constraints. See Sidebar 12.2 for a sample of how countries are ranked according to how corrupt they are perceived to be.
An international group known as Transparency Interna- tional generates the Corruption Perceptions Index annu- ally. It ranks 180 countries and territories according to perception of corruption in the public sector. This global coalition against corruption measures perceptions as a reliable measure of the degree of corruption of a country. Here is a sampling of countries from the 2019 report:
New Zealand & Denmark 1 Vietnam 96 Germany 9 Mexico 130 United Kingdom 12 Russia 137 United States 23 Bangladesh 146 Cuba 60 Somalia 180 China 80
1 = least corrupt 180 = most corrupt
Transparency International has also released infor- mation about the relationship between the corruption scores and social exclusion. In general, they found that there is a close relationship between corruption and social inequality, which is also a source of popular discon- tent. For more information, see Finn Heinrich, “Corruption and Inequality: How Populists Mislead People,” Transpar- ency International (January 25, 2017).
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, www.trans- parency.org (2019).
sidebar 12.2
Turning Back the Tide of Corruption
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As a result of intensive lobbying by the U.S. business community, Congress amended the FCPA in 1988 in an effort to eliminate ambiguity and uncertainty over what constitutes improper conduct. Although the law still prohibits bribery and corruption, the amendments establish clearer standards for firms to follow in over- seas operations. The amendments limit criminal liability for violations of account- ing standards to those who “knowingly” circumvent accounting controls or falsify records of corporate payments and transactions. The amendments also clarify the level of detail required in such record keeping and should improve compliance by businesses and enforcement by the government. Moreover, under the new law oth- erwise prohibited payments to foreign officials may be defended if they were legal under the written laws of the host country or if they cover “reasonable and bona fide” expenses associated with the promotion of the product and the completion of the contract (see Table 12.1).
The FCPA also prohibits corrupt payments through intermediaries. It is unlaw- ful to make a payment to a third party, while knowing that all or a portion of the payment will go directly or indirectly to a foreign official. The term knowing includes conscious disregard and deliberate indifference. Additionally, the antibribery provi- sions of the FCPA apply to foreign firms and persons who take action in furtherance of a corrupt payment while in the United States.
Criminal penalties may be imposed for violations of the FCPA: Corporations and other business entities are subject to a fine of up to $2,000,000; officers, directors, stockholders, employees, and agents are subject to a fine of up to $100,000 and impris- onment for up to five years. Fines imposed on individuals may not be paid by their employer or principal. The attorney general or the SEC, as appropriate, may also bring a civil action for fines against any firm, as well as any officer, director, employee, or agent of a firm or stockholder acting on behalf of the firm who violates the antibribery provisions. The conduct that violates the antibribery provisions of the FCPA may also give rise to a private cause of action for treble damages under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). For example, a RICO action could be brought by a competitor who alleges that the bribery caused the defendant to obtain a foreign contract. See Sidebar 12.3 for examples of successful FCPA prosecutions.
MONEY LAUNDERING Firms need to be aware of the perils of money laundering, which is the generic term for the process of taking the proceeds of criminal activity and making them
Payment of a bribe in violation of the FCPA can buy you jail time.
The following payments are permissible under the FCPA: “Facilitating,” “expediting,” or “grease” payments for “routine government action.” Examples include obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents; processing governmental papers (e.g., visas and work orders); providing police protection; loading and unloading cargo; and scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or transit of goods across country. Any payments permitted under the written laws of the foreign country. Travel expenses of a foreign official for the purpose of demonstrating a product or for performing a contractual obligation.
table 12.1 FCPA: Legal or Permissible Payments
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appear legal. In other words, criminals disguise their ownership and control of the funds generated by criminal conduct by making the proceeds appear to have come from a legitimate source or business. Financial institutions may unwittingly partici- pate in large-scale laundering of money. Similarly, the financial services industry is vulnerable to abuse by money launderers by virtue of the kinds of services and prod- ucts they offer. Financial institutions are required to comply with regulations and to conduct audits to verify compliance.
There is an increasing level of sophistication associated with trade-based money laundering. Some financial institutions are using advanced analytical and statistical techniques to head off potential violations of the law. Although illicit transactions
A number of well-known companies have been prose- cuted successfully for FCPA violations:
Ericsson, the multinational telecommunica- tions company agreed to pay more than $1 billion to the SEC and DJ to resolve charges that it violated the FCPA by engaging in a large-scale bribery scheme involving the use of sham consultants to secretly funnel money to government officials in multiple countries. Siemens AG paid $800 million for FCPA vio- lations. This tops the list of the enforcement actions. The total consisted of a $450 million fine to the Department of Justice and $350 million in disgorgement of profits to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Siemens allegedly violated the FCPA by paying $1.36 billion in bribes around the world in connection with obtaining contracts. According to the prosecution, the corruption implicated all levels of manage- ment, including senior management, and involved elabo- rate payment schemes and off-book accounts to conceal payments. The Department of Justice described the level of corruption at Siemens as a “pattern of bribery” that was “unprecedented in scale and geographic reach.” Och-Ziff Capital Management Group agreed to pay $412 million for civil and criminal violations related to business transactions in Libya and a number of coun- tries in Africa, including Chad, Niger, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In January 2017, the SEC charged two former Och-Ziff executives with being the master- minds behind the bribery scheme. Walmart, Inc. agreed to pay more than $144 million to settle the SEC’s charges involving violating books and
records and internal accounting provisions of the FCPA and approximately $138 million to resolve parallel crimi- nal charges by the DOJ for a combined total of more than $282 million.
Hewlett-Packard agreed to pay $108 million to settle charges that employees at subsidiaries bribed govern- ment officials in Poland, Russia, and Mexico to win and retain lucrative public contracts.
Daimler paid a $93.6 million fine and $91.4 million fine for disgorgement of profits. The company and its subsidiaries allegedly made hundreds of improper payments in at least 22 countries, including China and Russia.
Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay $70 million to settle civil and criminal bribery charges involving bribes paid to public doctors and public hospital administrators in Greece, Poland, and Romania.
Other companies paying record amounts for viola- tions include: Alstom (France), $772 million in 2014; KBR/ Haliburton (United States), $579 million in 2009; and Teva Pharmaceutical (Israel), $519 million in 2016.
For additional information and ongoing information, see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, sec.gov, and The FCPA Blog, www.fcpablog.com.
INVESTIGATIONS CAN BE EXPENSIVE Wal-mart Stores Inc. reported in March 2014 that it spent $439 million in the last two years to investigate possible payment of foreign bribes. It projects investigation and compliance costs of $200 to $240 million for fiscal year 2015. The retailer was under investigation for bribery in Mexico, China, India, and Brazil.
sidebar 12.3
FCPA Prosecutions: U.S. Government Success Stories
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Joan Cros/ NurPhoto via Getty Images
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can be very convoluted, big data analytics can offer crucial monitoring to help pro- tect companies from being ensnared in money laundering schemes.
The Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section of the U.S. Department of Justice leads the government’s asset forfeiture and anti-money laundering efforts. They have engaged in a number of successful prosecutions. Most recently, in 2019, four former executives and two former employees of Outcome Health, a Chicago- based health technology startup company founded in 2006, were charged with their alleged roles in a fraud scheme that targeted the company’s clients, lenders, and investors. The alleged scheme involved approximately $1 billion in fraudulently obtained funds.
EXPROPRIATION AND NATIONALIZATION If a domestic firm is involved in a foreign country to the extent of locating assets there (whether through branches, subsidiaries, joint ventures, or otherwise), it may be subject to the ultimate legal and political risk of international business activity— expropriation. Expropriation, as used in the context of international law, is the sei- zure of foreign-owned property by a government. When the owners are not fairly compensated, the expropriation is also considered to be a confiscation of property. Usually, the expropriating government also assumes ownership of the property, so the process includes nationalization as well. In the United States, the counterpart of expropriation is called the power of eminent domain.
This power of a government to take private property is regarded as inherent; yet it is subject to restraints upon its exercise. The U.S. Constitution (as well as the con- stitutions and laws of most nations) prohibits the government from seizing private property except for “public purposes” and upon the payment of “just compensation.”
However, the extent of such protection varies widely. Treaties (or other agree- ments) between the United States and other countries provide additional protec- tion against uncompensated takings of property. It is customary for international law to recognize the right of governments to expropriate the property of foreigners only when accompanied by “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.” This so-called modern traditional theory is accepted by most nations as the international standard and requires full compensation to the investor including fair market value as a going concern.
EXPORT CONTROLS Another risk involved in doing business abroad is export controls placed on the sale of U.S. strategic products and technology abroad. Controlling the export of such items has been the cornerstone of Western policy since the conclusion of World War II. Most of the attention was focused on preventing the acquisition of technol- ogy by the former Soviet Union and its allies. However, since the end of the Cold War the policy rationale behind export controls has been drawn into question, with many Western countries contending they should be eliminated to increase trading opportunities with Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Indeed, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), an organiza- tion created by the major Western nations (including the United States, Europe, and Japan) to control exports, came to an end in 1994.
Since that time, a new organization supported by 33 countries, known as the Wassenaar Arrangement, has come into existence to help control the spread of
Creeping expropriation is a series of acts, such as taxes, regulation, or other changes in law that have an expropriatory effect, reducing or eliminating foreign investments.
Exports from the United States to countries such as Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are restricted.
Query: Should the United States lift its trade embargo with Cuba? The EU lifted its sanctions against Cuba in 2008.
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both military and dual-use technology to unstable areas of the world. Participat- ing nations seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfer of conven- tional arms and strategic goods and technologies do not destabilize regional and international security. The 2002 plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement, held in Vienna, resulted in several significant initiatives to combat terrorism. The member countries agreed on several measures aimed at intensifying cooperation to prevent terrorist groups and individuals from acquiring arms and strategic goods and technologies.
The U.S. export control system currently is regulated by the Department of State and the Department of Commerce. The Department of Defense and U.S. Customs Service also play key enforcement roles. Significant criminal and administrative sanctions may be imposed upon corporations and individuals convicted of violating the law. See Sidebar 12.4 for examples of major investigations.
The U.S. Department of Justice coordinated investigations involving multiple other agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Homeland Security Inves- tigations (HSI), the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and the Pentagon’s Defense Criminal Investigative Services (DCIS). The following is a sample of key cases brought in the last few years:
• Cryptocurrency for North Korea • Monsanto Trade Secrets • Military-Style Boats to China
• Scuba Equipment to Libya • Industrial Equipment to Iran • Military-Grade Technology to China • U.S. Aviation Trade Secrets • Anti-Aircraft Missiles Scheme • General Electric Trade Secrets • Electronic Components to Russia
Source: Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, and Sanctions-Related Criminal Cases (2016-19),” Nov. 2019, https://www.justice.gov/nsd/page/file/1044446/download.
sidebar 12.4
U.S. Export Enforcement and Economic Espionage: Sample of Major Cases
According to the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program, exporters should be aware of the following “red flags”:
• A customer is reluctant to provide end-use/user information, is willing to pay cash for high-value shipments, has little background in the relevant business, declines normal warranty/service/installation, or orders products incompatible with the business.
• A shipment involves a private intermediary in a major weapons sale, shipments are directed to entities with no connection to the buyer, requests for packing are inconsistent with the normal mode of shipping, or there is circuitous or illogical routing.
• The end-user requests equipment inconsistent with inventory; spare parts are in excess of projected needs; the end-use is at variance with standard practices; a middleman from a third country places the order; or the end-user refuses to state whether the goods are for domestic use, export, or re-export.
In 2000, the U.S. government extended the Export Administration Act and raised the penalties for violators. The export control agenda for the 21st
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century remains focused on maintaining national security and reducing the pro- liferation of weapons, while also facilitating U.S. competitiveness in the global economy.
The successful prosecution of two leading American aerospace companies, Hughes Electronics and Boeing Satellite Systems, illustrates the government’s com- mitment to vigorous export control to prevent harmful proliferation of weapons. The companies paid a record $32 million in penalties to settle charges in connection with 123 alleged violations of export control laws regarding the transfer of rocket and satellite data to China.
However, the future of the U.S. system remains in doubt with many proposals pending in Congress to reform and limit the current export control system. Over the past several years, these controls have become an extremely controversial topic in the international business community. Export controls make successful business deals more difficult because foreign buyers may be reluctant to trade with a U.S. firm due to the red tape involved in obtaining governmental approval as compared with Europe or Japan.
For an example of other risks involved in international trade, see Sidebar 12.5.
1. The FCPA seeks to stop the bribery of foreign gov- ernment officials.
2. Companies need to have high standards of compli- ance to avoid the perils of money laundering.
3. Expropriation and nationalization are risks involved in international business.
4. Export controls seek to balance national security interests against global trade.
concept summary
Risks Involved in International Trade
Although kidnapping is down from the record amount of attacks in 2011, there was a spike in hijacking activity by Somali pirates in early 2017. (In 2013, there were 264 actual and attempted attacks on ships, down 41 percent from
2011.) In 2019, 82 percent of maritime kidnappings in the world occurred in the Gulf of Guinea. Southeast Asia also continues to be an increasingly dangerous area, particularly near Indonesia. The reason may be a result of overfishing and pollution, which is resulting in declining fish stocks. Unable to earn a living fishing, some fishermen may be turning to piracy. A study by
One Earth Future estimates that maritime piracy costs between $7 and $12 billion a year. Many shipping firms have increased security measures and are now using lookouts, blocking easy entry points with barbed wire and installing panic rooms with communication equipment. Sources: Silja Frohlich, “Who will help solve Africa’s piracy problem in the Gulf of Guinea?” DW.COM, Feb. 14, 2020; “Emboldened Somali Pirates Hijack Second Boat in a Month to use as a Mothership,” The Independent (March 24, 2017); “Pirates Seized Record 1,181 Hostages in 2010,” Report BBC News (January 1, 2011); One Earth Future at www.oneearthfuture. org/; Lily Kuo, “Why Pirate Attacks Are Falling Everywhere in the World Except for Southeast Asia,” Quartz (April 23, 2014), http://qz.com/202157/ why-pirate-attacks-are-falling-everywhere-in-the-world-except-for-southeast-asia/.
sidebar 12.5
Twenty-First-Century Pirates
Farah Abdi Warsameh/AP Photo
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International Law and Organizations
What is “international law”? Inasmuch as there is no “world government” or “world legislature,” international law is not created the same way as domestic law. Inter- national law is found in a variety of sources, including U.S. domestic law, national laws of other countries, international agreements, treaties, and even in what is called “customary international law.” Customary international law involves principles that are widely practiced and acknowledged by many civilized nations to be law.
In the landmark case of The Paquette Habana (1900), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and admin- istered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”
International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Orga- nization (WTO), and the European Union (EU), directly impact international business transactions. Agreements entered into by the United States, including the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), formerly known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Cen- tral America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) also affect the global sale of goods. These agreements facilitate trade and minimize risk for business.
Corporate codes of conduct are voluntary standards that help establish a founda- tion for companies engaged in global trade. See Sidebar 12.6 for more information.
Corporate codes of conduct are policy statements adopted by companies to define ethical standards for their conduct. These are completely voluntary, often addressing topics such as follow: • Forced labor • Child labor • Discrimination • Health and safety of workers • Freedom of association and collective bargaining • Hours of work, wages, benefits, and overtime
compensation • Working conditions • Environmental issues • Monitoring and enforcement of the code of conduct
Recognizing that there are different legal and cul- tural environments around the world, companies often develop a code of conduct to establish a foundation for their standards in international business. Seeking to promote global corporate citizenship, the UN devel- oped the Global Compact, a voluntary code of conduct supported by companies and organizations around the world. For a list of participants, see www.globalcompact. org. Many major corporations engaging in global opera- tions, including Microsoft, GAP Inc., and Cisco Systems Inc., also have supplier or vendor codes of conduct. These codes allow companies to set standards for their suppliers and vendors consistent with the companies’ mission and values.
sidebar 12.6
What Are Corporate Codes of Conduct?
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW What are the principles or rules of international law that apply to a particular con- tract or dispute? Generally, international law is classified as either public inter- national law or private international law. Public international law examines
LO 12-2
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relationships between nations and uses rules that are binding on all countries in the international community. Private international law examines relationships created by commercial transactions and utilizes international agreements, as well as the laws of nations to resolve business disputes. Business managers are primarily concerned with private international law issues.
Public International Law Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the traditional source for ascertaining what is public inter- national law. However, in contrast to what you learned in Chapter 1 regarding U.S. cases, the decisions made by the ICJ, the World Court, do not create binding rules of law or precedent in future cases.
The ICJ is the judicial branch of the UN and sits at The Hague in the Nether- lands. It consists of 15 judges representing all of the world’s major legal systems. The judges are elected by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council after hav- ing been nominated by national groups, not governments. No more than one judge may be a national of any country.
The ICJ has not been a major force in settling disputes since it began func- tioning in 1946. The ICJ renders, on average, only one contested decision per year and one advisory opinion every two years. There has been widespread reluctance to resort to the ICJ as a forum for resolving international disputes for several rea- sons. First, only countries have access to the Court. Private parties or corporations may not directly present claims before the Court. No device exists under U.S. law by which a firm or individual can compel the U.S. government to press a claim on its behalf before the ICJ. Furthermore, only countries that have submitted to the Court’s jurisdiction may be parties because there is no compulsory process for forc- ing a country to come before the Court. A country may choose to accept the Court’s jurisdiction only when the use of the Court may suit its own interests. Moreover, the ICJ has no enforcement authority and must rely on diplomacy or economic sanc- tions against countries that breach international law. For these reasons, infractions of international law often are settled through diplomacy or arbitration, rather than by the presentation of formal charges to the ICJ.
Of course, deciding whether international law has been violated is often a very difficult question. Article 38 sets forth the following order of importance for deter- mining what is international law in a given case:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. International Conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. International Custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. The General Principles of Law recognized by civilized nations; d. Judicial Decisions and the Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists of
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
International Conventions are similar to legislation or statutes and represent formal agreements between nations. International Custom describes common legal practices followed by nations in working with each other over a long period of time. General Principles of Law may be found in national rules common to the countries in a dispute. Finally, Judicial Decisions and Teachings, although not binding, may be used for guidance in resolving a dispute.
The ICJ’s hearings are open to the public, unless one of the parties asks for the proceed- ings to be in camera or the Court so decides. The hearings take place in the Great Hall of Jus- tice in the Peace Palace, in The Hague.
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Private International Law Private international law is represented by the laws of individual nations and the multilateral agreements developed between nations to provide mutual understanding and some degree of continuity to inter- national business transactions. Even in purely domestic business deals, the law is rarely predictable or certain. When different national laws, languages, practices, and cultures are added to the transaction, the situation can become very unstable for international business.
International law can be complicated and a single business transaction can involve several companies in different nations. For example, a contract dispute among a Chinese manufacturer, an American wholesaler, and a Canadian retailer could potentially involve the law of all three countries. Which law controls? The answer could affect the outcome of the case. Determining which nation’s court may hear the case can be difficult. For this reason, most international contracts contain choice of law and forum provisions to eliminate this uncertainty.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Several international organizations play important roles in the development of politi- cal, economic, and legal rules for the conduct of international business. The two primary organizations are the UN and the WTO. Additionally, the EU plays an important role in international trade.
United Nations Established after World War II, the United Nations has grown considerably from the 51 founding nations. Almost every country in the world is a member today. The Charter of the UN sets forth as its primary goal “to save suc- ceeding generations from the scourge of war” and, to that end, authorizes “collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppres- sion of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.”
The General Assembly is composed of every nation represented in the UN and permits each country to cast one vote. The real power in the UN rests in the Security Council, which is composed of 15 member states. The Security Council has the power to authorize military action and to sever diplomatic relations with other nations. The five permanent members of the Council (United States, Russia, China, France, and United Kingdom) have veto power over any action proposed in the Council. France and Russia used the threat of a veto in 2003 to force the United States to go forward with the war in Iraq without clear United Nations’ authority. Although the United States contended that its authority for war came from pre- viously passed UN resolutions regarding Iraq, the U.S. government was disturbed by the veto threat. The failure of the UN to dictate the resolution of the U.S.-Iraq conflict created serious questions about the future authority and role of the UN in international conflicts.
A number of organizations affiliated with the UN have authority over activities that directly affect international business. The United Nations Commission on Inter- national Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was created in 1966 to develop standardized com- mercial practices and agreements. One of the documents drafted by the UNCITRAL is the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The UNCITRAL has no authority to force any country to adopt any of the conventions or agreements that it proposes. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) deals with international trade reform and the redistribution of income through trading with developing countries.
Do include choice of law and forum selection clauses in all international contracts.
Eight UN Millennium Development Goals: 1. Eradicate extreme
poverty and hunger. 2. Achieve universal
primary education. 3. Promote gen-
der equality and empower women.
4. Reduce child mortality.
5. Improve maternal health.
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.
7. Ensure environmen- tal sustainability.
8. Develop a global partnership for development.
“The human spirit is indomitable. Each individual matters. The seeds of policies and innovations planted today can influence tomorrow. And free men and women can move the world.”
–Robert B. Zoellick, president of the World
Bank Group (2008)
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The UNCTAD drafted both the Transfer of Technology Code and the Restrictive Business Practices Code, which are largely ignored by most nations.
At the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, two important institutions were also created under the auspices of the United Nations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) encourages international trade by maintaining stable foreign exchange rates and works closely with commercial banks to promote orderly exchange policies with members. The World Bank promotes economic development in poor countries by making loans to finance necessary development projects and programs.
For more information about current projects at the World Bank and IMF, see www.worldbank.org/ and www.imf.org/.
World Trade Organization Every nation has the right to establish its own trading policies and has its own national interests at stake when dealing with other nations. Ultimately, after years of economic conflict, many countries concluded that their own interests could be served best by liberalizing trade through reduced tariffs and free markets. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was origi- nally signed by 23 countries after World War II and represented the determination of a war-weary world to open trade and end the protection of domestic industries. Since GATT was created in 1948, it has undergone eight major revisions, including the 1994 Uruguay Round, which culminated in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an umbrella organization to regulate world trade. The 1994 agreement was signed by 125 countries.
The WTO is an international organization that, as its primary purpose, seeks to resolve trade disputes between member nations. The WTO administers the GATT but does not have the authority to regulate world trade in any manner it desires. The WTO expects nations to avoid unilateral trade wars and rely on GATT dispute settlement procedures to avert conflict. At the heart of the 1994 Uruguay Round are several enduring GATT principles:
1. Nondiscrimination (treating all member countries equally with respect to trade). 2. National treatment (countries not favoring their domestic products over
imported products). 3. Elimination of trade barriers (reducing tariffs and other restrictions in foreign
products).
Under the WTO, existing tariffs are reduced and the agreement extends GATT rules to new areas such as agricultural products and service industries. The WTO further restricts tariffs on textiles, apparel, and forest products. It also requires coun- tries to upgrade their intellectual property laws to protect patents and copyrights and to guard against the piracy of items such as computer software and videotapes.
Another important aspect of the WTO is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), including trade in counterfeit goods. Recognizing that there are widely different standards for the protection of intellectual property, as well as a lack of a multilateral framework of rules for deal- ing with counterfeit goods, the WTO directly addressed this issue with TRIPS. This agreement discusses the applicability of GATT principles and those of relevant inter- national property agreements in an effort to strengthen the protection of intellectual property in the international sphere.
The WTO has the power to hear disputes involving member states. The United States has been involved in a number of disputes. For example, the United States
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brought an action against the EU claiming that the Europe-wide restrictions on genetically modified food violate WTO rules. Additionally, the United States brought a successful challenge against Mexico; the WTO held that Mexico’s beverage tax on soft drinks made with imported sweeteners is discriminatory. Under the beverage tax, soft drinks made with cane sugar are tax exempt. Because the beverage tax dis- criminates against U.S. products, it is contrary to WTO rules.
If a nation does not comply with a WTO ruling, the organization has the power to impose sanctions. Like any international institution, compliance by the most pow- erful trading nations is necessary to give the WTO credibility.
The WTO faces opposition from antiglobalization protesters. There are many reasons to support the WTO and the important role it plays in trade. Concerns, however, are raised by opponents who are concerned about human rights, envi- ronmental, and labor issues. Tensions between developed and developing nations are hindering negotiations to cut tariffs. Overall, the future of the WTO is uncer- tain. The cooperation of member states is critical to its success in liberalizing trade.
The European Union The EU is an economic and political partnership among 27 democratic European countries. In 1957, six European countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Rome, creating the European Community. Six successive enlargements created the European Union (EU), as it is known today. See Table 12.2 for a complete list of states, accession dates, and those countries using the euro as legal tender. Negotia- tions are ongoing with Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey about pos- sible membership in the EU.
Europe’s mission in the 21st century is to:
• Provide peace, prosperity, and stability for its peoples. • Overcome the divisions on the continent. • Ensure that its people live in safety. • Promote balanced economic and social development. • Meet the challenges of globalization and preserve the diversity of the peoples of
Europe. • Uphold the values that Europeans share, such as sustainable development
and a sound environment, respect for human rights, and the social market economy.
For more detailed information about these goals, see the official website of the EU at http://europa.eu.
The major institutions of the EU are the Council of Ministers, the Commis- sion, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice. The Council is composed of one representative from each member state. The Council coordinates the policies of the member states in a variety of areas from economics to foreign affairs. The Commission consists of individuals who represent the will and interests of the entire EU, rather than specific national concerns. Elected representatives from each member state compose the Parliament, which plays an active role in drafting legislation that has an impact on the daily lives of its citizens. The Parliament, for
The WTO is the only global international trade organization deal- ing with the rules of trade between nations.
The aims of the EU are: Peace, prosperity and freedom for its 446 million citizens—in a fairer, safer world.
* In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU. Known as “Brexit,” this historic referendum started the process of from the EU, which was completed in 2020.*
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table 12.2 Twenty-Eight European Union Member States
Original Members 1957 Belgium €
France €
Germany €
Italy €
Luxembourg €
Netherlands €
Accession in 1973 Denmark
Ireland €
United Kingdom
Accession in 1981 Greece €
Accession in 1986 Portugal €
Spain €
Accession in 1995 Austria €
Finland €
Sweden
Accession in 2004 Cyprus €
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta €
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia €
Accession in 2007 Bulgaria
Romania
Accession in 2013 Croatia
€ Notes member countries in which the euro is the legal tender.
Source: European Union, April 2020. http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm.
example, has addressed environmental protection, consumer rights, equal oppor- tunities, transport, and the free movement of workers, capital, services, and goods. Parliament also has joint power with the Council over the annual budget of the EU. Finally, the Court of Justice decides the nature and parameters of EU law. Justices are appointed by the Council, and each member state has a justice seated on the Court.
MAJOR AGREEMENTS AFFECTING TRADE In addition to the international institutions discussed in this chapter, a number of international agreements also facilitate trade.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) out- lines standard international practices for the sale of goods. Effective in 1988, it has
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been adopted by the United States and most of the other countries that engage in large quantities of international trade. The CISG represents the cumulative work of more than 60 nations and international groups and is widely accepted around the globe.
The CISG applies to contracts for the commercial sale of goods (consumer sales for personal, family, or household use are excluded) between parties whose businesses are located in different nations, provided that those nations have adopted the convention. If a commercial seller or buyer in the United States, for example, contracts for the sale of goods with a company located in another country that also has adopted the CISG, the convention and not the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to the transaction.
Under the CISG, a significant degree of freedom is provided for the individ- ual parties in an international contract. The parties may negotiate contract terms as they deem fit for their business practices and may, if desired, even opt out of the CISG entirely. One of the most interesting provisions in the CISG includes a rule that contracts for the sale of goods need not be in writing. The CISG also provides that in contract negotiations an acceptance that contains new provisions that do not materially alter the terms of the offer becomes part of the contract, unless the offeror promptly objects to the change. The CISG sets forth the fun- damental elements that will materially alter a contract such as price, payment, quality, and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery of goods, provisions related to one party’s liability to the other, and methods for settling disputes. Since international transactions typically involve sophisticated parties, the CISG also makes it easier to disclaim warranties on goods than under traditional U.S. law. The CISG does not resolve all areas of contract law; parties are still subject to local laws and customs, which makes international agreements complex and tricky to negotiate.
North American Free Trade Agreement The passage of the North Ameri- can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 set in motion increased trade and foreign investment and opportunities for economic growth in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. In 2019, NAFTA was revised and updated and is now known as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Free trade is at the core of this agreement, through the reduction and eventual elimination of tariffs and other barriers to business between these three countries. USMC/NAFTA also provides for a dispute settlement mechanism that makes it easier to resolve trade disputes between the three countries. Based upon concerns that cheap labor and poor environmental controls might cause U.S. firms to relocate to Mexico, side agreements also were reached to improve labor rights and environmental protec- tion in Mexico. Since its enactment, this trade agreement has expanded shipments of U.S. goods to Mexico and Canada, as well as Mexican and Canadian exports to the United States. See Sidebar 12.7 for information about key achievements in the USMCA.
Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement Sim- ilar to NAFTA, the passage of the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2005 opened up many opportunities for business in Central America. CAFTA-DR is a comprehensive trade agreement among Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and the United States. This agreement is designed to eliminate the barriers on products
The U.S. Trade Represen- tative is a Cabinet mem- ber who serves as the president’s principal trade adviser, negotiator, and spokesperson on trade issues. See www.ustr.gov for current trade news.
U.S. Trade Representa- tive Robert Lighthizer said that phase one of the U.S.-China trade deal is “totally done” and it will nearly double U.S. exports to China over the next two years. –Robert Lighthizer U.S.
Trade Representative (2019)
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trades between the member countries. Prior to CAFTA-DR, many exports of Ameri- can goods to Central America faced high tariffs. This trade agreement is a step to create a fairer playing field for American exports.
Other Important Trade Agreements The United States ratified trade agree- ments with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia in 2011. Negotiations are ongoing for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a trade agreement between the United States and the EU. The United States was in the process of negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement with 11 nations (Australia, Brunei Darus- salam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam) but pulled out of the negotiations in early 2017.
In addition to trade agreements, local laws can affect companies doing business globally. See Sidebar 12.8 for an example of how anti-smoking laws have created issues for tobacco companies.
In late 2019, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agree- ment went into effect, which revised North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The new agreement known as USMCA or NAFTA 2.0, incorporates the following key provisions are designed to expand exports for American agricultural products, including: • Expanding market access for American food and agri-
cultural products, including poultry and dairy products. • Eliminating Canada’s Milk classes which allowed low
priced dairy ingredients to undersell United States dairy sales in Canada and third country markets
• Setting standards for biotechnology, including gene editing
• Committing to reduce trade distorting policies, improving transparency, and ensuing discriminatory treatment
• Treating wheat and other agricultural products fairly and without discrimination
• Enhancing rules for science-based sanitary and phy- tosanitary measures
• Prohibiting barriers for alcohol beverages • Protecting proprietary food formulas
Source: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States-Mexico- Canada Trade Fact Sheet Strengthening North American Trade in Agriculture, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/fact-sheets/strengthening.
sidebar 12.7
Key Achievements of the U.S-Mexico-Canada Agreement
1. International law is classified as either public or private. 2. The ICJ is the traditional place for determining public
international law. 3. The WTO regulates world trade for member nations. 4. The Convention on the International Sale of Goods
governs international practices for the sale of goods.
5. The EU has evolved into the most important eco- nomic force in Europe.
6. The NAFTA has substantially expanded trade with Mexico and Canada.
concept summary
International Law and Organizations
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Methods of Transacting International Business
A U.S. business that wants to engage in international trade is presented with an almost limitless array of possibilities. Choosing a method of doing business in for- eign countries not only requires understanding the factors normally involved in selecting an organization and operating a business domestically, but also demands an appreciation of the international trade perspective. Depending upon the country, type of export, and amount of export involved in a particular transaction, interna- tional trade may involve direct foreign sales, licensing agreements, franchise agree- ments, or direct foreign investment.
FOREIGN SALES The most common approach for a manufacturer to use when trying to enter foreign markets is to sell goods directly to buyers located in other countries. However, with foreign sales, increased uncertainty over the ability to enforce the buyer’s prom- ise to pay for goods often requires that more complex arrangements for payment be made than with the usual domestic sale. International sales involve many risky legal issues. Commonly, an irrevocable letter of credit is used to ensure payment. Transactions using such a letter involve, in addition to a seller and buyer, an issu- ing bank in the buyer’s country. The buyer obtains a commitment from the bank to
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Do learn more about the traditions, culture, and etiquette of a host nation before you travel, including business card protocol.
With more and more anti-smoking laws in the United States and general public opposition to smoking, global markets are increasingly important to tobacco giant Philip Morris. What kinds of issues does it face abroad? • Limits on cigarette advertising in Britain. • More detailed health warnings in South America. • Higher cigarette taxes in the Philippines and Mexico. • Prohibitions on store displays in Ireland and Norway. • The World Health Organization Framework Conven-
tion on Tobacco Control, a public health treaty rati- fied by 171 nations.
• Mandatory health warnings that cover 80 percent of cigarette packages in Uruguay. Alleging that its tobacco regulations are excessive,
Philip Morris sued the government of Uruguay. In 2016, a three-person arbitration panel sided with Uruguay (2–1), upholding the measures to control tobacco. Philip Morris has also brought an action against Brazil, arguing that the
images the government wants to put on cigarette pack- ages “vilify” tobacco companies.
The next smoking frontier to watch is the rise in vap- ing. Philip Morris and other major tobacco companies are entering the e-cigarette market. There is a lot at stake in terms of regulation: Should the devices be regulated as a drug? As a tobacco product? Should flavorings be lim- ited? Should advertising be restricted? Regulatory agen- cies in Australia, Brazil, Canada, the EU, and the United States are actively working on these issues. Before the 2020 Olympics, Japan is expected to propose strict anti- smoking measures that would restrict smoking in many restaurants and public facilities.
Sources: “With Strict Anti-Smoking Legislation, Japan Tries to Kick the Habit,” NDTV (March 10, 2017); Pratap Chatterjee, “Uruguay Defeats Philip Morris in Major Win for Anti-Smoking Advocates,” CorpWatch (July 11, 2016); Duff Wilson, “Cigarette Giants in Global Fight on Tighter Rules,” The New York Times (November 13, 2010); World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, www.who.int/fctc/en/; Saundra Young, “FDA Proposes Crackdown on e-cigarettes,” CNN (April 24, 2014).
sidebar 12.8
Philip Morris: Restrictions Affecting Their Global Business
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advance (pay) a specified amount (i.e., the price of the goods) upon receipt, from the carrier, of a bill of lading, stating that the goods have been shipped. The issu- ing bank’s commitment to pay is given, not to the seller directly, but to a confirm- ing bank located in the United States from which the seller obtains payment. The confirming bank forwards the bill of lading to the issuing bank in order to obtain reimbursement of the funds that have been paid to the seller. The issuing bank releases the bill of lading to the buyer after it has been paid, and with the bill of lad- ing the buyer is able to obtain the goods from the carrier. Use of a letter of credit in the transaction thus reduces the uncertainties involved. The buyer need not pay the seller for goods prior to shipment, and the seller can obtain payment for the goods immediately upon shipment.
There is no room in documentary transactions for substantial performance. All of the duties and responsibilities of parties must be evaluated based upon the documents tendered, and these documents must comply strictly with the letter of credit.
LICENSES OR FRANCHISES In appropriate circumstances, a domestic firm may choose to grant a foreign firm the means to produce and sell its product. The typical method for controlling these transfers of information is the license or franchise contract. In this manner, intan- gible property rights, such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, or manufacturing processes, are transferred in exchange for royalties in the foreign country. A licens- ing arrangement allows the international business to enter a foreign market without any direct foreign investment. Licensing often is used as a transitional technique for firms expanding international operations since the risks are greater than with foreign sales but considerably less than with direct foreign investment. Licensing and franchise agreements also must follow the local laws where they operate. See Sidebar 12.9 for examples of successful international franchises.
Licensing technology or the sale of a product to a foreign firm is a way to expand the company’s market without the need for substantial capital. The foreign
According to The Top 100 Global Franchise 2020 Report, the top ten global franchises are:
1. McDonald’s 2. KFC 3. Mariott International 4. Pizza Hut 5. Burger King 6. Domino’s 7. Dunkin’ 8. SUBWAY
9. Circle K 10. Intercontinental Hotels & Resorts
Each day, McDonald’s serves an average of 69 million customers in approximately 38,000 restaurants in more than 100 countries. Subway is one of the fastest- growing franchises with more than 42,000 restaurants in 111 countries.
Airbnb Phenomenon Although it is not a franchise model, Airbnb has a massive and fast-growing interna- tional reach with more than 400 million guests in more than 81,000 cities and 191 countries.
sidebar 12.9
Successful International Franchising Ventures
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firm may agree to this arrangement because it lacks sufficient research and develop- ment capability or the management skills or marketing strategies to promote the product alone. Of course, as with all international trade agreements, there is some level of risk. The licensor must take care to restrict the use of the product or tech- nology to agreed-upon geographic areas and must take adequate steps to protect the confidential information that is licensed to the foreign firm so that third parties cannot exploit it.
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT As a business increases its level of international trade, it may find that creation of a foreign subsidiary is necessary. Most countries will permit a foreign firm to con- duct business only if a national (individual or firm) of the host country is designated as its legal representative. Since this designation may create difficulties in control and result in unnecessary expense, the usual practice for multinational corporations is to create a foreign subsidiary in the host country. The form of subsidiary most closely resembling a U.S. corporation is known as a société anonyme (S.A.) or, in German-speaking countries, an Aktiengesellschaft (AG). Other forms of subsidiaries may also exist that have characteristics of limited liability of the owners and fewer formalities in their creation and operation.
Creation of a foreign subsidiary may pose considerable risk to the domes- tic parent firm by subjecting it to foreign laws and the jurisdiction of foreign
Chiquita Brands International pled guilty to doing business with the United Self- Defense Forces of Colombia (UAC), a right-wing paramilitary group in Colombia. Prosecutors said the banana company made $1.7 million in “protection payments” to this death squad, which is reportedly
responsible for some of Colombia’s worst massacres. In 2001, the U.S. State Department declared that UAC was an “international terrorist group,” making it a violation of U.S. law to conduct business with the group. To settle the charges, Chiquita paid $25 million, arguing that it had no choice but to pay protection money to prevent the UAC from turning death squads loose on its banana workers.
Families of more than 350 people thought to have been killed by UAC are suing Chiquita in U.S. federal court, seeking $7.86 billion in civil damages. The fami- lies claim that Chiquita aided and abetted terrorism, war crimes, and crimes against humanity because of its
financial support of UAC. In May 2011, the seven pending lawsuits were consolidated into one action involving alle- gations of more than 4,000 killings of Colombian nation- als. In June 2011, the federal judge in Florida overseeing the litigation denied Chiquita’s motion to dismiss some of the claims brought under the ATCA and Torture Victim Protection Act. The judge rejected Chiquita’s argument that the case should be dismissed because it could have foreign policy implications. In 2016, the court ruled that claims against executives, including claims for torture and extrajudicial killing under the Torture Victim Protection Act, could continue.
In May 2017, human rights organizations asked the International Criminal Court to investigate 14 former and current Chiquita executives and employees for their alleged roles in crimes against humanity.
In 2018, Colombia’s Prosecutor General announced it would prosecute Chiquita executives on charges of alleged financing of paramilitary groups.
sidebar 12.10
Chiquita Brands International: Ongoing Actions Related to Alleged Payments to Death Squads for “Protection”
Ulrich Baumgarten/ Getty Images
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courts. An industrial accident in Bhopal, India, where hundreds of people were killed and thousands injured as a result of toxic gas leaks from a chemical plant, resulted in lawsuits against both the Indian subsidiary corporation and Union Carbide, the parent firm in the United States. Union Carbide agreed to pay more than $450 million to settle outstanding claims and compensate the victims of the disaster. See Sidebar 12.10 for another example of liability.
In many instances, however, the only legal or political means a firm has to invest directly in a foreign country is to engage in a joint venture with an entity from that host country. A host country’s participant may be a private enterprise or, especially in developing countries, a government agency or government-owned corporation. Many foreign countries favor joint ventures because they allow local individuals and firms to participate in the benefits of economic growth and decrease the risk of foreign domination of local industry. Many of the developing countries require that the local partner have majority equity control of the venture and also insist on joint ventures with government participation.
Resolving International Disputes
International law can be complicated, and a single business transaction may involve several companies in different nations, creating questions such as: Which law con- trols? What jurisdiction has the power to resolve the dispute? The answers to these questions could affect the outcome of the case. As such, most international con- tracts contain choice of law and forum provisions to eliminate this uncertainty. This section addresses the limitations on suing foreign governments in the United States, issues raised when suing foreign firms in the United States, and international arbitra- tion options.
ALIEN TORT STATUTE The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), enacted in 1789, grants jurisdiction to U.S. federal district courts over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola- tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” For nearly 200 years, the law lapsed into obscurity. In the last 20 years, however, it has been revived in a num- ber of human rights contexts, including claims brought against U.S. global compa- nies. An essential aspect of a successful claim under the ATS is to demonstrate that the acts committed violate the law of nations. This prompts many unanswered legal questions in the international labor context. What constitutes the “law of nations”? In general, the law of nations is embodied in international agreements, treaties, and conventions. ATS actions have been alleged against many U.S. companies, includ- ing Bridgestone, Chevron, Del Monte, Drummond Company, DynCorp, Exxon- Mobil, Gap Inc., Texaco Inc., Unocal Corp., Wal-Mart Stores, and, most recently, Yahoo. Claims typically involve allegations of forced labor, but may also include other human rights abuses such as murder, rape, torture, unlawful detention, and kidnapping. It is not unusual for these cases to also allege that acts were committed by paramilitaries hired by the company.
The legal landscape shifted substantially, however, with the Supreme Court deci- sion Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (see Case 12.1). Pursuant to this case, it is not very difficult to litigate human rights claims using the ATS.
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The ATS is viewed by some as a way to hold U.S. companies respon- sible for their participa- tion in human rights abuses abroad.
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case 12.1
KIOBEL v. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM, CO. 569 U.S. ___ (2013)
The petitioners, Nigerian nationals residing in the United States, filed suit in federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) alleging that respondents (certain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations) aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.
The District Court dismissed several of the petitioners’ claims, but on interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit dis- missed the entire complaint, reasoning that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered supplemental briefing on whether and under what circum- stances courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the terri- tory of a sovereign other than the United States.
ROBERTS, C.J.: The question presented is whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States. . . .
Throughout the 1990’s, the complaint alleges, Nige- rian military and police forces attacked Ogoni villages, beat- ing, raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying or looting property. Petitioners further allege that respon- dents aided and abetted these atrocities by, among other things, providing the Nigerian forces with food, transporta- tion, and compensation, as well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’ property as a staging ground for the attacks. . . .
According to petitioners, respondents violated the law of nations by aiding and abetting the Nigerian Government in committing (1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture and cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction. . . .
The question here is not whether petitioners have stated a proper claim under the ATS, but whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in a territory of a foreign sovereign. Respondents contend that the claims under the ATS do not, relying primarily on a canon of statutory
interpretation known as the presumption against extrater- ritorial application. The canon provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial appli- cation, it has none” . . . and reflects the “presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” . . .
Indeed, the danger of unwarranted judicial interfer- ence in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS, because the question is not what Con- gress has done but instead what courts may do. This court in Sosa repeatedly stressed the need for judicial caution in considering which claims could be brought under the ATS, in light of foreign policy concerns. . . .
The question under Sosa is not whether a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action provided by foreign or even international law. The question is instead whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under U.S. law to enforce a norm of international law. . . . In the end, nothing in the test of the ATS evinces the requisite clear intention of extraterritoriality. Nor does the historical background against which the ATS was enacted overcome the presumption against application to conduct in the territory of another sovereign. . . . This court has generally treated the high seas the same as foreign soil for purposes of the presumption against extraterritorial application. . . .
Finally, there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms. . . .
We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption . . . and petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred. . . . On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside of the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. . . . Corporations are often pres- ent in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that a foreign sovereign is immune from suit in the United States. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the foreign sovereign claims to be immune from suit entirely based on its status as a state.
Until approximately 1952, this notion was absolute. From 1952 until 1976, U.S. courts adhered to a restrictive theory under which immunity existed with regard to sovereign or public acts but not with regard to private or commercial acts. In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which codifies this restrictive theory and rejects immunity for commercial acts carried on in the United States or having direct effects in this country.
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine should not be extended to foreign governments acting in a commercial capacity and “should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities.” This interpretation recognizes that govern- ments also may act in a private or commercial capacity and, when doing so, will be subjected to the same rules of law as are applicable to private individuals. A national- ization of assets, however, probably will be considered an act in the “public interest” and immune from suit under the FSIA.
SUING FOREIGN FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES As foreign products and technology are imported into the United States, disputes may arise over either the terms of contract or the performance of the goods. To sue a foreign firm in the United States, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must establish “minimum contacts” between the foreign defendant and the forum court. The plaintiff must demonstrate that exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defen- dant “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Once the plaintiff decides to sue in the United States, he or she also must comply with the terms of the Hague Service Convention when serving the foreign defendant notice of the lawsuit. The Hague Service Convention is a treaty that was formulated “to provide a simpler way to serve process abroad, to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive actual and timely notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad.” Many countries, including the United States, follow this convention. The primary requirement of the agreement is to require each nation to establish a central authority to process requests for service of documents from other countries. After the central authority receives the request in proper form, it must serve the documents by a method prescribed by the internal law of the receiving state or by a method designated by the requester and compatible with the law.
See Sidebar 12.11 for an example of the reach of U.S. law.
Sovereignty is defined as the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any state is governed.
Although punitive dam- ages may be awarded in U.S. courts against a foreign company doing business in the United States, it may be difficult or impossible to enforce the award in the com- pany’s home country. Outside of the United States, very few coun- tries allow punitive dam- age awards, which are viewed as a “peculiarity of American law.”
KEY POINTS • In accordance with Kiobel, the ATS only applies to conduct within the United States or on the
high seas. Arguably, however, if a substantial aspect of the “relevant conduct” occurs within the United States along with acts outside of the United States, a claim may be sustainable.
• The Supreme Court also found that there was nothing in the history of the ATS demonstrating the intention to make the United States a forum for the enforcement of international norms.
[continued]
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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION International businesses now are focusing on the need for new methods of resolving international commercial disputes and, as a result, are frequently resorting to the use of arbitration. The advantages of arbitration in domestic transactions, previously discussed in Chapter 5, are more pronounced in international transactions where differences in languages and legal systems make litigation costs still more costly. See Sidebar 12.12 for a substantial matter involving both litigation and arbitration.
Issue: Whether foreign-flagged cruise ships serving U.S. ports must comply with the public accommodations pro- visions in Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Key Facts: Disabled plaintiffs and their companions alleged that physical barriers on the Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (NCL) ships denied them access to various equipment, programs, and facilities on the ships. They
sought injunctive relief requiring NCL to remove certain barriers that obstructed their access to the ships’ facilities.
Procedural History: The district court found that foreign-flagged cruise ships are subject to the ADA. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Outcome: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, hold- ing that Title III of the ADA is applicable to foreign-flagged cruise ships in U.S. waters.
sidebar 12.11
The Reach of U.S. Law: Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd. 545 U.S. 119 (2005)
In February 2011, an Ecuadorian court in Lago Agrio rendered an $18 billion judg- ment against Chevron for alleged envi- ronmental damage. Chevron’s subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum Co. (TexPet), conducted oil operations in Ecuador. Chevron claims that TexPet fully remediated its share of environmental impacts arising from oil pro- duction and that any remaining environmen- tal issues are the responsibility of Ecuador’s state-owned oil company, Petroecuador.
Chevron is appealing the Ecuadorian verdict on the grounds that it “lacks scien- tific merit and that it ignores overwhelming evidence of fraud and corruption.” Chevron also claims that it was not afforded due pro- cess in Ecuador.
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
• Southern District of New York Judge Lewis Kaplan issued a preliminary injunction “enjoining and restraining” the plaintiffs from enforcing the ruling anywhere in the world.
• An International Tribunal from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ordered Ecuador to suspend the enforcement or recognition of the judgment.
• Chevron filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against Steven Donziger (the plaintiffs’ lead U.S. lawyer), Ecuadorian lawyer Pablo Fajardo, environmental activist Luis Yanza, and three organizations, including Amazon Watch.
• In March 2014, Judge Kaplan found Donzinger liable under RICO. Chevron subsequently asked Judge Kaplan to order Donzinger to pay $32.3 mil- lion in legal fees incurred in connection with the RICO case.
• In August 2016, a federal appeals court blocked enforcement in the United States of an $8.65 billion Ecuadorian judgment based on allegations that the judgment was obtained through bribery and fraud. U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
The documentary Crude presents the controversial story of the environmental damage and the ensuing com- plicated litigation.
sidebar 12.12
Chevron and Texaco in Ecuador: $18 Billion Judgment
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Wendell Teodoro/ WireImage/ Getty Images
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The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For- eign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (New York Convention), adopted in more than 50 countries, encourages the use of arbitration in commercial agreements made by companies in the signatory countries. Under the New York Convention it is easier to compel arbitration, where previously agreed upon by the parties, and to enforce the arbitrator’s award once a decision is reached.
Once the parties to an international transaction agree to arbitrate disputes between them, the U.S. courts are reluctant to disturb that agreement. In the case of Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth (1985), the Supreme Court upheld an international agreement even where it required the parties to arbitrate all disputes, including federal antitrust claims. The Court decided that the international charac- ter of the undertaking required enforcement of the arbitration clause even as to the antitrust claims normally heard in a U.S. court.
There are many advantages to arbitrating international disputes. The arbitra- tion process likely will be more streamlined and easier for the parties to understand than litigating the dispute in a foreign court. Moreover, the parties can avoid the unwanted publicity that often results in open court proceedings. Finally, the parties can agree, before the dispute even arises, on a neutral and objective third party to act as the arbitrator. Several organizations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris and the Court of International Arbitration in London, provide arbitration services for international disputes.
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Com- mission (CIETAC) is a permanent arbitration institution established to resolve economic and trade disputes arising in China. The parties must agree in writing to submit their dispute for arbitration. Here is a sample arbitration clause recom- mended by CIETAC:
Any dispute arising from or in connection with this Contract shall be submitted to CIETAC for arbitration, which shall be conducted in accordance with the Commission’s arbitration rules in effect at the time of applying for arbitration. The arbitral always is final and binding upon both parties.
Frequently, the parties will also stipulate the location of the arbitration, the lan- guage of the proceeding, the number of arbitrators, the nationality of the arbitrators, the method of selecting the arbitrators, and the law governing the contract. For more information, including a current list of arbitrators and their areas of expertise, see www.cietac.org.
The World Intellectual Property Organization: Arbitration and Mediation Center The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center hears cases involving domain name disputes and cybersquatting. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) went into effect in 1999. Since that time, more than 8,350 disputes involving 127 countries and some 16,000 domain names have been handled by the WIPO.
Many UDRP cases involve high-value, well-known brands. In fact, cases involving most of the 100 largest international brands by value have been heard by the WIPO. Well-known individuals, including Madonna, Julia Roberts, Eminem, Pamela Anderson, J K Rowling, Morgan Freeman, and Lance Armstrong have used the WIPO’s services. For more information about WIPO cases, see www. wipo.int.
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Key Terms Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 365
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 373 Bill of lading 371 Central America-Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 368
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 367
European Union (EU) 366 Export controls 359 Expropriation 359
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 355
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 375
Foreign subsidiary 372 Franchise 371 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 365 International Court of Justice
(ICJ) 363 International Monetary Fund
(IMF) 365 Irrevocable letter of credit 370 Joint venture 373
License 371 Money laundering 357 Nationalization 359 North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) 368 Private international law 362 Public international law 362 Sovereign immunity 375 United Nations 364 World Bank 365 World Trade Organization
(WTO) 365
Review Questions and Problems Risks Involved in International Trade
1. Pressures for Bribes XYZ Company, a U.S. firm, is seeking to obtain business in Indonesia. XYZ learns that one of its major competitors, a German firm, is offering a key Indonesian governmental official a trip around the world for choosing their firm in the transaction. Can XYZ report this bribe to the Department of Justice and have the German firm prosecuted under the FCPA?
2. Expropriation and Nationalization Explain the “modern traditional theory” of compensation related to the taking of private property by a foreign government.
3. Export Controls (a) Why is the future of export controls in doubt? (b) What are some of the dangers associated with having an inadequate export control regime as nations
combat terrorism? International Law and Organizations
4. Sources of International Law (a) What are the essential differences between the ICJ and the U.S. Supreme Court? (b) How does the ICJ determine international law?
5. International Organizations (a) What are the three major principles of the WTO? (b) Has adherence to those principles improved international trade? (c) Describe the organization of the EU. (d) How is it similar to the structure of the government of the United States?
6. Major Agreements Affecting Trade (a) How does the CISG facilitate international sales of goods? (b) How do free trade agreements, such as NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, benefit U.S. businesses?
Methods of Transacting International Business
7. Foreign Sales BMW, a German buyer, opens an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Goodyear, an American seller, for the purchase of tires on BMW automobiles. BMW confirms the letter of credit with Goodyear’s bank in New York, JPMorgan Chase. How will the seller obtain payment?
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8. Licenses or Franchises (a) How should a licensor protect its investment in a foreign country? (b) Is licensing a less risky approach for the seller than direct foreign investment?
9. Direct Foreign Investment What are the advantages and disadvantages of a joint venture with a foreign firm?
Resolving International Disputes
10. Alien Tort Statute Several citizens of Colombia filed an action in the United States against Super Bananas, a U.S. company that owns the banana plantation where the individuals worked. In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that they were threatened, beaten, and tortured by Super Banana’s security guards when they tried to unionize. Do they have an actionable claim under the ATS?
11. Suing Foreign Governments in the United States Belgium arrests an American citizen, while he is visiting Brussels, on suspicion that he is an international drug smuggler. After a thorough investigation, Belgium real- izes that it has arrested the wrong person. Can the American citizen successfully sue Belgium in the United States for false arrest?
12. Suing Foreign Firms in the United States What is the primary requirement of the Hague Service Convention and how does it help a plaintiff when filing a lawsuit?
13. International Arbitration Why are arbitration clauses in international agreements favored by the courts and likely to be enforced when conflicts arise between the contracting parties?
1. XYZ Company is a U.S. firm that makes communication software used in a variety of consumer goods manufactured and sold in the United States. XYZ recently learned that one of the manufacturing firms it supplies, ABC Company, is exporting finished goods to a country where U.S. goods and component parts are prohibited because of numerous conflicts with the U.S. government.
• Does XYZ have any moral or legal responsibility in this case? • How should XYZ protect itself under these circumstances? • Should American business practices be impacted by conflicts between governments?
2. Hello-Hello is a U.S. telecommunications company with global operations. Sophia is an assistant vice president of Hello-Hello. She is dispatched to China to handle two situations. First, a shipment of 500 cases of cell phones is stalled in customs. She is assigned the task of getting the goods out of customs and into retail stores. Sophia learns through the grapevine that customs officials expect $5 (U.S.) per case to help “speed things along.” Second, she is instructed by her boss to do “whatever is necessary” to secure cell tower permits from local officials in two outlying areas. A local agent suggests that she give him $500,000 in cash so they can get to know the officials better. When Sophia asks him what the money will be used for, he tells her that he wants to take them out to dinner, maybe on a weekend outing in the city, and that he generally needs “flexibility.”
• Should Sophia call the home office to ask for advice? • If her boss says to pay the money, should she do it? • What potential legal problems are presented by the payments?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
13-1 To recognize the basic terms and procedures relevant to criminal conduct.
13-2 To explain Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights.
13-3 To identify the elements of specific crimes.
13-4 To understand the far-reaching impact of criminal behavior as the same acts can give rise to both civil and criminal liability.
Criminal Law and Business13 ZUMA Press, Inc./Alamy Stock Photo
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O ver the past decade, ongoing government
investigations of financial fraud and brib-
ery of foreign officials prompted many
large law firms to increase their capacity to handle
white-collar defense. It is unclear if there will be less
regulation and scrutiny in the next few years, but less
enforcement could lead to violations that only come
to light when they become significant problems.
Just as civil law protects an individual’s property,
criminal law punishes wrongdoers who affect the
ownership of property. Crimes are wrongs against
society, and the government has the power to impose
punishment and fines on individuals and corpora-
tions convicted of crimes. Federal and state penal
codes define criminal acts and omissions.
Criminal conduct is extremely destructive for busi-
ness. In the most extreme cases, legal costs and settle-
ments can cost billions of dollars. The worldwide crisis,
which was estimated to cost more than $20 trillion,
resulted in millions of people losing investments,
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homes, and jobs. The fraud perpetrated by Wells Fargo has had far-reaching effects. In 2020, Wells Fargo agreed to pay $3 billion to resolve criminal and civil investiga- tions into its sales practices involving opening unauthorized customer accounts from 2002 to 2016. Likewise, the fall of Bernie Madoff, the energy firm Enron, and the telecommunications company WorldCom illustrate the devastating effects of crimi- nal wrongdoing. Documentaries, such as The Big Short, Inside Job, and Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room, detail the devastating effect and impact on business, employees, consumers, and investors.
Civil law allows individuals to bring actions for damages, and criminal law allows society, or “the people,” to punish wrongdoers. Some crimes, such as rape or murder, are said to be malum in se, or inherently wrong. They are universally recognized as wrongful conduct that society must punish even where the victim is a single person.
A legislative body can, however, decide that it is in the interest of society to criminalize conduct that is not inherently wrongful. By passing laws declaring cer- tain conduct to be criminal, legislative bodies purport to act in the interest of all society. An example of such a crime is price fixing among competitors. In 1890, price fixing was made illegal by the Sherman Antitrust Act when it became apparent that such behavior was an impediment to fair competition.
Crimes can involve acts of violence, such as arson, burglary, and robbery. Busi- nesses are often the target of these crimes, which are often perpetrated by persons who have no connection to the business. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center is an example of a crime of violence against the resident businesses and their employees. That crime also immediately impacted many of the businesses in New York City, as well as many international businesses, ultimately affecting the econo- mies of countries throughout the world.
Many crimes against businesses do not involve acts of violence. Sometimes, employees of a business will commit nonviolent crimes against their employer. Crimes by employees can have a significant negative impact on business. In addi- tion, society is financially harmed by criminal conduct that injures business. In the 1930s, Edwin H. Sullivan coined the term white-collar crime to apply to crimi- nals of high socioeconomic status, such as corporate executives who commit fraud. Today, white-collar crime usually means any illegal offense that occurs in a business or professional setting. Such crimes are generally committed for personal financial gain. These crimes are not dependent on the threat of physical force or violence. They are committed to obtain money, property, or services; to avoid the payment or loss of money, property, or services; or to achieve a personal or business advantage. White-collar crime is estimated to cost business more than $300 billion annually. See Table 13.1 for examples of white-collar crimes.
One out of five prisoners in the world is incar- cerated in the United States.
Bribery Fraud (accounting, bankruptcy, mail and wire, and securities)
Obstruction of justice
Conspiracy Income tax evasion Price fixing Forgery Insider trading Racketeering False statements Kickbacks Larceny Counterfeiting Money laundering Embezzlement
table 13.1 Examples of White-Collar Crimes
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Employees may commit white-collar crime for personal gain or to harm the busi- ness. Other times, the criminal activity benefits the business and there is no inten- tion to harm others, such as competitors or customers. White-collar crime takes many forms. Common examples include embezzling money, making electronic advances to fictitious employees, accepting kickbacks from suppliers in exchange for orders, rigging bids, selling trade secrets, falsifying inventories to conceal theft, and paying false invoices. White-collar crime affects the targeted companies as well as consumers who must pay higher prices to make up for the losses.
Although a corporation cannot be put in jail or in a prison, it can be fined and can face other criminal penalties. Ordering a company out of business is a type of “death sentence” for business. Individuals found guilty of a crime can be sent to jail or prison, ordered to pay fines, or excluded from certain types of work.
To raise awareness and combat the effects of criminal activity on business, most business schools include courses on business ethics. Most major corporations have ethical codes and extensive compliance programs. Despite these efforts, television and print media regularly depict executives in handcuffs, pictures that mark a surge in white-collar crime in recent years.
Many of the examples of criminal activity in this chapter are the result of greed replacing integrity. The purpose of this chapter is to help you understand what activity is criminal, the penalties that can result, and the effect on business. See Sidebar 13.1 for examples of successful prosecutions.
Terms and Procedures
CLASSIFICATIONS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT There are several ways to classify criminal conduct. Some crimes are violations of fed- eral law, some crimes violate state laws, and other crimes violate both federal and state laws. Although many crimes involve violence, nonviolent conduct may also be criminal.
LO 13-1
The U.S. Department of Justice actively investigates and prosecutes fraud. In connection with COVID-19, the DOJ urged the public to report suspected fraud by contacting the National Center for Disaster Fraud hotline. Only weeks into the pan- demic, the DOJ announced its first fraud enforcement action involving COVID-19 when it sought a tempo- rary restraining order against opera- tors of a website offering to sell an allegedly fraudulent coronavirus vaccine.
Here are some of their major financial fraud settlements: • Bank of America fined $16.65 billion for financial
fraud leading up to the financial crisis. • JPMorgan Chase fined $13 billion and CitiGroup fined $7 billion for their involvement in the sale of mortgage-backed securities.
• Credit Suisse fined $2.6 billion after it pled guilty to aid- ing and assisting U.S. taxpayers in filing false tax returns.
Sources: Alexander Canizares and Barak Cohen, “INSIGHT: Coronavirus Puts DOJ on Heightened Alert for Potential Fraud,” Bloomberg Law, March 24, 2020; Anello, Robert, “The Year In White-Collar Crime: A Look Back Helps Us See Ahead,” Forbes, January 7, 2015, p. 160.
sidebar 13.1
U.S. Department of Justice: Fraud Prosecutions
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Crimes are classified as felonies or misdemeanors. This classification is based on the punishment imposed if the person is convicted of the alleged crime. Felo- nies are punishable by fine or imprisonment in a penitentiary for a period of one year or more. Misdemeanors are punishable by a fine or jail sentence of less than one year.
Felony cases are commenced by a grand jury indictment; misdemeanor cases are usually commenced when the government files a charge called an information. Grand juries are different from petit juries. A grand jury determines if there is suffi- cient evidence to warrant a trial. A petit jury determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The role of the grand jury is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
BASIC CONCEPTS Intent is an important element of many criminal laws. Many laws use either the term willfully or knowingly to define criminal intent. If an act is done willfully, it is committed voluntarily and purposefully with the specific intent to do something. A person does not act willfully if there is a good-faith misunderstanding of the require- ments of the law. Similarly, if an act is done knowingly, it is voluntary and inten- tional, not because of mistake or accident.
Knowledge usually cannot be established by demonstrating that the accused was negligent, careless, or foolish; knowledge, however, can be inferred if the accused deliberately ignored the existence of a fact.
Some laws provide that reckless conduct is a crime even though the one doing the act does not intend to do harm. Reckless driving is an obvious example of such a crime. Reckless disregard for the truth is often the basis of white-collar criminal conduct.
Criminal cases are brought or prosecuted by public officials such as a U.S. attor- ney or a state’s attorney (often called a district attorney) on behalf of the people. In the case of federal crimes, the United States brings an action against the individual defendant. Imagine your feelings if a case style read: “The United States v. you.”
In a criminal case, the defendant has three possible pleas to enter: guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere. The last plea, Latin for “no contest,” allows sentencing just as if the defendant pleaded guilty or was found guilty. Pleading “nolo,” as it is sometimes referred to, advantages the defendant by avoiding the cost of trial and avoiding the effect of a guilty plea or finding in a subsequent civil action. Crimi- nal convictions may provide a basis for civil damage suits. This can be avoided by the nolo contendere plea. The high cost of white-collar crime is illustrated in Sidebar 13.2.
THE GRAND JURY The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that before anyone can be tried for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, there must be a presentment or an indictment by a grand jury. This protection prevents political trials and unjusti- fied prosecutions by placing a group of citizens between prosecutors and persons accused of major crimes.
A federal grand jury must have 16 to 23 members. At least 12 persons must con- cur for the court to issue an indictment. For an indictment to be returned the grand jury must find that there is a reasonable basis that a crime has occurred or probable cause. Although states are not required to charge using a grand jury, many states do.
In 1973, Vice President Spiro Agnew made one of the most famous nolo contendere pleas (to tax evasion) on the condi- tion that he resign from office.
It is a felony for prosecu- tors, court reporters, and grand jury members to leak testimony heard in grand jury proceedings.
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The grand jury does not attempt to determine if the accused is guilty, only that probable cause exists to believe the accused committed the crime. Because probable cause is the standard for grand jury action, it is not difficult to obtain an indictment. Even an indicted person, however, is entitled to the presumption of innocence—to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a petit jury.
Grand juries also serve as an investigative body and occupy a unique role in our criminal justice system. Law enforcement officials such as agents for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Postal Service, and Secret Ser- vice often act as arms of federal grand juries investigating possible criminal activi- ties. Persons who are the targets or subjects of investigations may be called before grand juries and may be questioned under oath about possible illegal conduct. In such cases, the persons subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury are entitled to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and refuse to answer questions. Although they are entitled to have the benefit of legal advice, defense counsel is not allowed to accompany a witness before a grand jury. However, counsel may be outside the grand jury room and thus available for consul- tation whenever a witness desires it.
Grand jurors may also subpoena business records. Witnesses may be called and questioned about documents and records delivered in response to a subpoena. How- ever, grand juries are not authorized to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions and may not select targets of criminal probes out of malice.
Proper functioning of the grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the proceedings. This secrecy protects the innocent accused from disclosure of the accu- sations made against him or her before the grand jury. In judicial proceedings, how- ever, transcripts of grand jury proceedings may be obtained if necessary to avoid
After testifying before the grand jury in the Valerie Plame case, New York Times reporter Judith Miller broke her silence and spoke with reporters on the court- house steps.
Bernard J. Ebbers, the former chief executive officer, president, and a director of WorldCom Inc., was con- victed of securities fraud, conspiracy, and filing false documents with regu- lators. The acts at the heart of the case were fraudulent adjustments
to WorldCom’s books and records, false statements and misleading omissions in WorldCom’s SEC filings and pub- lic statements, and fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.
Federal prosecutors argued that Ebbers was moti- vated to commit fraud during a time when there was tremendous pressure on the company’s share price. Ebbers’s personal fortune was largely based on World- Com shares, and he borrowed nearly $400 million using the shares as collateral.
Scott Sullivan, former WorldCom CFO, testified that Ebbers knew about the massive accounting fraud. Sulli- van also testified that Ebbers intimidated him into com- mitting fraud so that the company could meet Wall Street expectations.
Ebbers, who was known as the “telecom cowboy,” served 13 years of his 25-year sentence in a minimum- security Louisiana prison. He was released in late 2019 due to deteriorating health and died about two months later.
This $11 billion accounting scandal also resulted in nearly 30,000 employees losing their jobs. Ebbers was deemed by Time magazine to be one of the Top 10 Crooked CEOs. The scandal was a major impetus for the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See, Jim Zarroli, “Bernard Ebbers, Telecom CEO Sent to Prison in Accounting Scandal Dies,” NPR, February 3, 2020. Recommended Reading: Cynthia Cooper, Extraordinary Circumstances: The Journey of a Corporate Whistleblower (New York: Wiley, 2008).
sidebar 13.2
One of the Worst Accounting Scandals of All Time: $11 Billion Accounting Fraud at WorldCom
James Leynse/Corbis via Getty Images
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possible injustice. For example, a defendant may use a grand jury transcript at a trial to impeach a witness, to refresh the witness’s recollection, or to test his or her cred- ibility. The disclosure of a grand jury transcript is appropriate only in those cases where the need for it outweighs the public interest in secrecy, and the burden of demonstrating this balance rests upon a private party seeking disclosure.
Constitutional Issues
Before covering the elements of some of the more important business-related crimes, it is essential to understand the protections all individuals have under the U.S. Con- stitution. These protections are in the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution. The Bill of Rights was Congress’s response to concerns that the Con- stitution gave too much power to a central government at the expense of the indi- vidual citizen. Often referred to as “civil liberties,” these rights protect individuals from the power of government, including individuals accused of crimes. The Bill of Rights also protects businesses from excessive regulation. As you study the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, pay particular attention to their impact on the regulatory process.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE The Fourth Amendment protects individuals and corporations from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. It primarily protects persons from unwarranted intrusions on their privacy by requiring the police to obtain a court order called a search warrant. As a general rule, the search warrant must be obtained by the police prior to a search of a person, any premises, or other property such as the trunk of an automobile. Before a court issues a search warrant, the police must offer evidence that a crime has been committed and there is cause to believe that the intended search will assist in its investigation.
To protect police officers, courts have held that officers making an arrest do not need a search warrant to search that person and the immediate area around that person for weapons. Officers are given far more latitude in searching an auto- mobile than in searching a person, a home, or a building. The right to search for evidence also extends to the premises of persons not suspected of criminal conduct. Such premises may include offices of newspapers and attorneys. Electronic surveil- lance may not violate the Fourth Amendment if used pursuant to a court-authorized order. If “exigent circumstances” exist, in which police believe that evidence may be destroyed, they may conduct a search without a warrant. See Sidebar 13.3 for a recent case about this doctrine.
Fourth Amendment protection also extends to certain civil matters. For exam- ple, building inspectors do not have the right to inspect for building code violations without a warrant if the owner of the premises objects. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) cannot use confidential reports obtained in the course of its rou- tine operations to establish a violation of federal law. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) inspectors must go to court and obtain a search warrant if an owner of a business objects to an inspection. To obtain this warrant, inspectors must show that the standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied; they do not need to show probable cause that a violation exists.
LO 13-2
The Fourth Amendment protects persons and corporations from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
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The protection of the Fourth Amendment provides an expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court has said that warrantless searches of junkyards are constitu- tional because operators of commercial premises in closely regulated industries have a reduced expectation of privacy. In pervasively regulated industries the privacy interests of the business are weakened and government interests in regulating par- ticular businesses are heightened. Generally, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, whereas a warrantless inspection of a private residence may be unconstitutional.
Many business operations do not have an expectation of privacy. For example, nursing homes that receive Medicaid funds are presumed to have voluntarily con- sented to warrantless searches. Random surveys for compliance with federal stan- dards should be expected by businesses required to conform to the standards.
Today’s increased security at airports and at border crossings does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Neither a warrant, probable cause, nor any level of suspicion is required to search vehicles, persons, or goods arriving in the United States. Present- ing oneself at an airport checkpoint is an irrevocable consent to a warrantless search.
Employees of some businesses also do not have Fourth Amendment protection because of public policy. For example, alcohol and drug testing of railroad employees and airline pilots cannot be successfully challenged using the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit drug testing in most workplaces.
Key facts involving exigent circumstances: Police offi- cers followed a suspected drug dealer to an apartment complex. They smelled marijuana outside an apartment door, knocked loudly, and announced their presence. As soon as the officers began knocking, they heard noises coming from the apartment. The officers believed that the noises were consistent with the destruction of evidence. The police announced their intent to enter the apartment, kicked in the door, and found the defendant and drugs in plain view. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. He was convicted.
The law: “Exigent circumstances,” including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police offi- cers to conduct a search without first obtaining a warrant. Under the “police-created exigency” doctrine, exigent cir- cumstances do not justify a warrantless search when the exigency is “created” or “manufactured” by the police.
The issue: Does this rule apply when police, by knock- ing on the door of a residence and announcing their pres- ence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence?
Holding: Warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is allowed where the police do not create the exigency through an actual or threatened Fourth Amend- ment violation. In this case, the conduct of the police prior
to their entry into the apartment was lawful and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Dissent by Justice Ginsburg: “The Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in drug cases. In lieu of presenting their evidence to a neutral magistrate, police officers may now knock, listen, then break the door down, never mind that they had ample time to obtain a warrant. I dissent from the Court’s reduction of the Fourth Amendment’s force.”
Identification Checks: In many states, a police officer may stop an individual and require identification, even if there is no reason to suspect that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Drivers in all states must furnish identi- fication when stopped for driving infractions. Moreover, in Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. __ (2020), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the reg- istered owner has a revoked driver’s license. When the offi- cer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable.
Source: Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011).
sidebar 13.3
The Fourth Amendment: Exigent Circumstances and Identification Checks
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case 13.1
RILEY v. CALIFORNIA 573 U.S. __ (2014)
Petitioner Riley was stopped for a traffic violation, which even- tually led to his arrest on weapons charges. An officer search- ing Riley in connection with the arrest seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. The officer accessed information on the phone and, based in part on information found in the phone, Riley was charged in connection with a shooting that had occurred a few weeks earlier, and the prosecution also sought enhanced sentence based on Riley’s alleged gang mem- bership. Riley moved to suppress all evidence obtained from his cell phone. The trial court denied the motion. Riley was convicted and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the con- viction. In the following opinion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the major- ity opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Note that this decision also involved a second similar case.
ROBERTS, CHIEF JUSTICE: These two cases raise a common question: whether the police may, without a war- rant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. . . .
Petitioner David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired registration tags. In the course of the stop, the officer also learned that Riley’s license had been sus- pended. . . . An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found items associated with the “Bloods” street gang. He also seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. According to Riley’s uncontradicted assertion, the phone was a “smart phone,” a cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capac- ity, and Internet connectivity. The officer accessed informa- tion on the phone and noticed that some words (presumably in text messages or a contacts list) were preceded by the let- ters “CK”—a label that, he believed stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang terms for members of the Bloods gang.
At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a detective specializing in gangs further examined the con- tents of the phone . . . he “went through” Riley’s phone “looking for evidence, because . . . gang members will often video themselves with guns or take pictures of themselves with guns.” [Incriminating videos and photographs were found on the phone.]
Riley was ultimately charged, in connection with [an] earlier shooting, with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder. The State alleged that Riley had committed those crimes for the
benefit of a criminal street gang, an aggravating factor that carries an enhanced sentence. . . .
Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all evidence that police obtained from his cell phone. He contended that the searches of the phone violated the Fourth Amendment, because they had been performed without a warrant and were not otherwise justified by exigent circumstances. The trial court rejected the argument . . . Riley was convicted and received an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison. . . .
In 1914, this Court first acknowledged in dictum “the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.” Since that time, it has been well accepted that such a search constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement. Indeed, the label “exception” is something of a misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches incident to an arrest occur with far greater fre- quency than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. . . .
These cases require us to decide how the search inci- dent to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude that they were an important feature of human anatomy. . . . Cell phones place vast quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals. A search of information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in [a previous case].
We therefore . . . hold that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such a search.
The United States asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is “materially indistinguishable” from searches of physical items [such as a billfold, address book, or purse]. That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together. Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. . . . We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. Cell phones have become important tools in facili- tating coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incrimi- nating information about dangerous criminals. Privacy comes at a cost.
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a war- rant is generally required before such a search, even when a
cell phone is seized incident to arrest. We reverse the judg- ment of the California Court of Appeal and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
KEY POINTS • In general, the police must obtain a warrant to search a cell phone. • In cases involving exigent circumstances, such as when there is an immediate risk to pub-
lic safety or a risk of loss of evidence, police may be able to act without a warrant. • The digital data stored in cell phones involve a more substantial privacy interest than
other items that may be found in an arrestee’s pockets.
For an interesting related case, see: Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018) in which the Supreme Court held that the government’s acquisition of cell-site records from an individual’s wireless carriers was a Fourth Amendment search. As such, the government needed to meet the bar for probable cause for a warrant. The Court rejected the government’s argument that a warrant was not needed to obtain cell phone records from the service provider because it is a third party.
[continued]
Despite challenges, the rights set forth in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) are still the law. If you are taken into custody, the law enforcement officer must read you your “Miranda Rights” and make sure that you understand them.
WARNING OF RIGHTS
1. You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions. Do you understand?
2. Anything you do say may be used against you in a court of law. Do you understand?
3. You have the right to consult an attorney before speaking to the police and to have an attorney
present during questioning now or in the future. Do you understand?
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. Do you understand?
5. If you decide to answer questions now without an attorney present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to an attorney. Do you understand?
6. Knowing and understanding your rights as I have explained them to you, are you willing to answer my questions without an attorney present?
sidebar 13.4
Know Your Miranda Rights
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION The Fifth Amendment is best known for its protection against compulsory self- incrimination. When a person giving testimony pleads “the Fifth,” he or she is exer- cising the right to this protection. The privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused from being compelled to testify against himself or herself. The Fifth Amendment does not protect the accused from being compelled to produce real or physical evidence. Fingerprints can be taken, as can voice samples and bodily fluids.
“The Fifth Amendment” protects the accused from being compelled to testify against himself or herself. See Sidebar 13.4 for an elaboration of Miranda rights.
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In order to be testimonial and protected, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate to a factual assertion or disclosure information. Impor- tantly, criminal suspects must speak up and make it clear that they are invoking their Miranda rights. See Sidebar 13.5; mere silence does not invoke Miranda protections.
Issues concerning the Fifth Amendment protection as it relates to a business may arise when a businessperson is called to testify about a business matter or is served with a subpoena requiring the production of records. A businessperson may not be called upon to testify against himself or herself in any governmental hear- ing such as a congressional proceeding. But the protection against compulsory self- incrimination does not protect a businessperson from having to produce, in court, records prepared in the ordinary course of business. Because the production of records does not compel oral testimony, the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of written evidence, including documents in the hands either of the accused or of someone else such as an accountant. Of course, corporate officials, union officials, and partners cannot be required to give oral testimony if such testimony may tend to incriminate them. However, these individuals must produce subpoenaed documents. Therefore, business records can be obtained even if they are incriminating.
Obviously, a corporation or other collective entity cannot be called upon to testify; only individuals can do so. Therefore, the protection against compulsory self- incrimination does not apply to corporations, including professional corporations and partnerships. These collective entities have no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to sub- mit their books and records in response to a subpoena. The only business protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is a sole propri- etorship. A closely held corporation with only one shareholder is not protected.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: DOUBLE JEOPARDY The Fifth Amendment provides in part that no “person [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” This language is known as the double jeopardy clause. Courts do not allow individuals to be tried twice by
The same offense may give rise to both a crimi- nal prosecution and a civil suit for damages.
Key facts: Police advised the murder suspect of his Fifth Amendment Miranda rights. They then interrogated him for several hours. During that time, the defendant did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did or did not want to speak with an attorney. He was largely silent, until he was asked “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?” At that point, the defendant answered, “Yes.” He refused to make a written confession and the interrogation ended about 15 minutes later. This statement was used at trial where he was convicted of first-degree murder. The issue: Should this statement have been excluded at trial? Did the defendant waive his right to remain silent? Holdings: In this 5–4 decision, the Court held: (1) defen- dant’s silence was insufficient to invoke his right to remain
silent under Miranda; (2) the defendant waived his right to remain silent by responding to questions by the inter- rogating officer; (3) police are not required to obtain a waiver of a defendant’s right to remain silent before com- mencing an interrogation. Dissent by Justice Sotomayor: In her first major dissent, Justice Sotomayor said that the majority decision cre- ated a kind of paradox in which a “suspect who wished to guard his right to remain silent . . . must, counter intui- tively, speak.” As such, the majority “turns Miranda upside down” and bodes poorly for the fundamental principles that Miranda protects.” (Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the dissent.)
Source: Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
sidebar 13.5
Fifth Amendment Rights: Mere Silence Does Not Invoke Miranda
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the same governmental entity for the same crime based on the same factual situa- tion. If an illegal activity violates both federal and state laws, double jeopardy does not prohibit two trials, one in federal court and the other in the state court system. Although federal and state governmental prosecutors may cooperate resulting in only one conviction, the double jeopardy clause does not prevent two prosecutions. In its essence, this clause keeps a U.S. district attorney from having a second trial on the same facts if a defendant is found innocent or has the charges dismissed. The same prohibition of a second trial holds true for state prosecutors also. Note that in civil law, the doctrine of res judicata bars subsequent civil actions involving the same parties, claims, demands, or causes of action.
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: RIGHTS IN A CRIMINAL CASE The Sixth Amendment, like the Fifth, provides multiple protections in criminal cases. Its protections give you the right:
• To a speedy and public trial. • To a trial by jury. • To be informed of the charge against you. • To confront your accuser. • To subpoena witnesses in your favor. • To have the assistance of an attorney.
The American concept of a jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The jury guards against the exercise of arbitrary power by using the common sense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor. The jury’s perspective on facts is used in preference to the professional, or perhaps biased, response of a judge.
Community participation in administering criminal law is consistent with our democratic heritage, and it is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Therefore, a state may not restrict jury service only to special groups or exclude identifiable segments playing major roles in the commu- nity. Likewise, minorities may not be systematically excluded from jury duty. As discussed in Chapter 4, peremptory challenges during voir dire examination cannot be used to deny a defendant a jury of one’s peers.
The right to a jury trial does not extend to state juvenile court delinquency pro- ceedings because they are not criminal prosecutions. However, juveniles do have the right to counsel, to confront the witnesses against them, and to cross-examine them.
The right to an attorney exists in any cases where incarceration is a possible pun- ishment. It exists at every stage of the proceeding, beginning with an investigation that centers on a person as the accused. There are many technical aspects to the Sixth Amendment, and numerous cases still arise concerning it. For example, a criminal defendant’s right to counsel of his or her choice may be limited in certain situations by the attorney’s prior representation of a corporation. By representing the corpora- tion, an attorney may obtain potentially privileged information from employees who later become adverse witnesses against the corporation or individual officers in crimi- nal prosecutions. These potential conflicts of interest also become very complicated when employees provide incriminating information to corporate counsel on the mis- taken belief that he or she represents their interests as well as those of the corporation.
To further complicate the issue of representation, a 1994 U.S. Department of Jus- tice rule allows government lawyers to contact workers who are not “high level” in
Consider: What is a “jury of one’s peers”?
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a company without going through the company’s legal department. Prosecutors may interview middle managers or line workers about company practices and try to persuade them to blow the whistle on upper management in criminal investigations. Normally, ethical rules would bar an attorney from directly contacting a person who is already represented by counsel. The Justice Department has rejected that rule in the context of corporate counsel primarily on the ground that it would frustrate the development of successful criminal investigations against corporations and corporate officials.
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the federal government from imposing excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment. The purpose of bail is to provide a way for an individual who is accused of a crime to be released from custody pending the trial. Bail is set at the discretion of the court, with the idea that it should be high enough to discourage a defendant from fleeing, but not prohibitively high. When setting bail, a judge will typically consider if the defendant has meaningful ties to family and the community, employment, and also whether the defendant has financial resources to flee. Bail can be denied in the case of very serious crimes or if it is reasonable to believe that the defendant may pose a danger to the community.
Fines should not be arbitrary or grossly disproportional to the crime. They also should not be so excessive as to amount to depriving a person of property without due process of law. There is much ongoing debate about what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238 1972), the Supreme Court held that four basic principles should be used to determine if a punishment should be deemed cruel and unusual:
• Punishment that is so severe as to degrade human dignity. • Punishment that is inflicted completely in an arbitrary manner. • Punishment that is largely rejected by society. • Punishment that is patently unnecessary.
There has been much discussion about the death penalty and the Eighth Amend- ment. The Supreme Court has held that the death penalty should not be applied to anyone who was under 18 years old at the time the crime was committed, and no one who is mentally handicapped should be executed.
Specific Crimes
Specific crimes relevant to business are discussed below. Such crimes may be pros- ecuted at the federal level, and many states also have laws prohibiting these acts. Federal crimes are set forth in the U.S. Code. As illustrated by numerous media examples over the past 10 years, these crimes are committed by individuals at all levels. Many crimes against business may also result in civil suits for money damages against a company. An individual convicted of a crime may face jail time and may also be required to pay money damages in a civil case.
FRAUD As you learned earlier in the text, fraud can be a defense to a contract and can also form the basis of a civil tort action. The same fraudulent acts can also create criminal liability. The U.S. Code contains a number of provisions making it a crime to carry out a scheme
LO 13-3
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to defraud. In general, whoever knowingly and willfully (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or docu- ment knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent state- ment or entry can face fines and/or imprisonment. There are many examples of fraud. After Hurricane Katrina, for example, federal criminal investigations of fraud exceeded 1,000. The cases involved using debit cards meant for Katrina victims, claims submitted by individuals who did not live in affected areas, fraud by contractors submitting fake claims, and organized rings of criminals submitting multiple fake claims to maximize the amount of money they could fraudulently receive from the government. Similar kinds of fraud are expected in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Fraud is also actionable under state criminal codes. For example, in many states, “theft by deception” is a crime. Theft by deception may occur when a per- son intentionally creates or reinforces an impression that is false; fails to correct an impression that is false and that the person does not believe to be true if there is a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties; prevents another from acquiring information that is relevant to a transaction; and fails to disclose a known lien or other legal impediment to property being transferred.
Federal law outlaws fraud in many specific contexts, including mail and wire transac- tions, securities transactions, health care, use of counterfeiting devices, and bankruptcy. A prosecutor must establish the presence of a scheme to defraud—a plan or program designed to take from a person the tangible right of honest services. In essence, a scheme involves a course of action to deceive others. See Sidebar 13.7 for examples of fraud schemes. Nearly all major white-collar criminal prosecutions involve some type of fraud.
See Sidebar 13.6 for an example of a Ponzi scheme.
Bernard L. Madoff started his firm with $5,000 he saved by working as a lifeguard. For years, he surrounded him- self with formidable socialites and Wall Street power brokers. Madoff served as NASDAQ’s chairman in 1990, 1991, and 1993. He was responsible for managing bil- lions of dollars for individuals and foundations. Unfor- tunately, instead of investing the money, Madoff used the money to advance a massive Ponzi scheme, which resulted in over 16,000 investors filing claims against him. According to bankruptcy court filings, victims of Madoff’s fraud include a wide range: Fairfield Greenwich Group ($7.5 billion); HSBC ($1 billion); Jewish Commu- nity Foundation of Los Angeles ($18 million); Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity ($15.2 million); Yeshiva Univer- sity ($100 to 125 million); and Korea Teachers Pension ($9.1 million); as well as Zsa Zsa Gabor, Jeffrey Katzen- berg, Larry King, John Malkovich, and Steven Spielberg (amounts unknown).
Despite concerns expressed to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Madoff was not caught until
2008, when his sons reported him to federal authorities. In 2009, Madoff pleaded guilty to 11 federal felonies, including securities fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, making false statements, perjury, and making false filings with the SEC. He was sentenced to 150 years in prison. In February 2020, Madoff asked for a compas- sionate release from prison based on his deteriorating health due to terminal kidney failure.
Irving Picard, the trustee appointed to recover money for Madoff’s victims maintains a website where viewers can track his progress. As of April 2017, recoveries and settlement agreements totaled $11.590 billion for about $17.5 billion in claims. (See http://www.madofftrustee.com/.)
Sources: “Bernard Madoff Fast Facts,” CNN, February 5, 2020; for more information about the guilty plea, see the March 2009 press release from the U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, at www.justice.gov/usao/nys/ pressreleases/March09/madoffbernardpleapr.pdf; for detailed information about the Madoff case, see the New York Times focus and chronology of coverage, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/ bernard_l_madoff/index.html?inline=nyt-per.
sidebar 13.6
Madoff’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Ponzi Scheme
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Mail and Wire Fraud Various provisions of the U.S. Code make it illegal to use either the U.S. Postal Service or electronic means of interstate communication to carry out a scheme to defraud. These provisions provide significant criminal pen- alties for mail or wire fraud. The statutory penalties involve fines set by judges and up to 20 years in prison. If mail or wire fraud affects a financial institution, the fine may be as high as $1 million and imprisonment may be up to 30 years. Each use of the mail or wire communication constitutes a separate violation. Thus, the criminal sanctions can be enormous.
“To mail” means a communication is sent or received through use of the U.S. Postal Service or any interstate carrier. A “wire transmission” includes the use of radio, television, telephone, Internet, or other wired form of communication. Pros- ecutors must prove the person accused of mail or wire fraud used the mail or wire communication. However, the government has substantial leeway in proving its case. Courts have held that the use of mail or wire communication can be proven by cir- cumstantial evidence. For example, evidence of business custom and practice may establish that a mailing or wire communication occurred. The accused does not have to actually place a letter in the mail or send an e-mail message. Others may do so as long as the mailing is a part of the fraudulent scheme; the accused person does not have to be the party using the mail.
Legal Aspects of Mail and Wire Fraud A statement or representation is false or fraudulent if it is known to be untrue or is made with reckless indifference as to
Common Fraud Schemes Telemarketing Fraud: Use care when sending money to people you do not know personally, and never give per- sonal or financial information to unknown callers.
Advance Fee Scheme: This fraud occurs when the victim pays money to someone in anticipation of receiving something of greater value, then receives little or nothing in return.
Fraudulent Cosmetics and Counterfeit Prescrip- tion Drugs: Health and beauty products, including anti-aging products are common, as are counterfeit pre- scription drugs.
Funeral and Cemetery Fraud and Other Fraud Against Seniors: Many fraud schemes target senior citi- zens, including those involving prepaid funeral services.
Impersonation/Identity Fraud: This fraud occurs when someone assumes your identity to perform a fraud or other criminal act.
Illegal Sports Betting: Action can be taken against those placing and receiving wagers.
Ponzi Schemes: These frauds are a kind of invest- ment fraud where the operator promises high financial returns or dividends that are not available through tra- ditional investments. Instead of investing the funds, the operator pays “dividends” to initial investors, then once he has a sufficient number of new investors, the operator flees with the remainder of the money.
Ransomeware: This malicious software can prevent you from accessing your computer files, systems, or net- works, and demands that ransom be paid for their return.
Romance Scams: These scams occur when a crimi- nal adopts a fake online identity to gain a victim’s affection and trust. The scammer then uses the illusion of a roman- tic relationship to manipulate and/or steal from the victim.
Caveat: Callers can use services such as bluffmycall. com to change their caller ID to control what other people see when they receive a call. This can be very misleading and is illegal when it is used to commit a crime.
For more examples, see the FBI’s list of “Com- mon Scams and Crimes,” fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/ common-scams-and-crimes.
sidebar 13.7
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Report:
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its truth or falsity. A statement or representation may also be false or fraudulent if it constitutes a half-truth or effectively conceals a material fact with intent to defraud. A material fact is a fact that would be important to a reasonable person in deciding whether to engage or not to engage in a particular transaction.
Intent to defraud means to act knowingly and with the specific intent to deceive someone, ordinarily for the purpose of causing some financial loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to oneself. In many fraud cases the defendant asserts a good-faith defense to the allegations of the indictment. Good faith is a complete defense because good faith on the part of a defendant is inconsistent with intent to defraud or willfulness, purposes essential to the charges. A person who expresses an opinion honestly held or a belief honestly entertained does not have fraudulent intent even though the opinion is erroneous or the belief is mistaken. Evidence that establishes only that a person made a mistake in judgment or an error in management or was careless does not establish fraudulent intent. Honest services is another important concept. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1346, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right to honest services. Case 13.2 addresses this scope of honest ser- vices, limiting it to only bribery and kickback schemes.
case 13.2
SKILLING v. UNITED STATES 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010)
Defendant, the former chief executive officer of Enron Cor- poration, a bankrupt corporation, was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading, and he appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed defendant’s convictions. Certio- rari was granted.
GINSBURG, Justice: In 2001, Enron Corporation, then the seventh highest-revenue-grossing company in America, crashed into bankruptcy. We consider in this opinion two questions arising from the prosecution of Jeffrey Skilling, a longtime Enron executive, for crimes committed before the corporation’s collapse. First, did pretrial publicity and community prejudice prevent Skilling from obtaining a fair trial? Second, did the jury improperly convict Skilling of conspiracy to commit “honest-services” wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§371, 1343, 1346? Answering no to both questions, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Skilling’s convictions. We con- clude, in common with the Court of Appeals, that Skilling’s fair-trial argument fails; Skilling, we hold, did not establish
that a presumption of juror prejudice arose or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him. But we disagree with the Fifth Circuit’s honest-services ruling. In proscribing fraudulent deprivations of “the intangible right of hon- est services,” §1346, Congress intended at least to reach schemes to defraud involving bribes and kickbacks. Con- struing the honest-services statute to extend beyond that core meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal. We therefore hold that §1346 covers only bribery and kickback schemes. Because Skilling’s alleged misconduct entailed no bribe or kickback, it does not fall within §1346’s proscription. We therefore affirm in part and vacate in part.
Founded in 1985, Enron Corporation grew from its headquarters in Houston, Texas, into one of the world’s lead- ing energy companies. Skilling launched his career there in 1990 when Kenneth Lay, the company’s founder, hired him to head an Enron subsidiary. Skilling steadily rose through the corporation’s ranks, serving as president and chief operating officer, and then, beginning in February 2001, as chief executive officer. Six months later, on August 14, 2001, Skilling resigned from Enron. Less than four months
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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after Skilling’s departure, Enron spiraled into bankruptcy. The company’s stock, which had traded at $90 per share in August 2000, plummeted to pennies per share in late 2001. Attempting to comprehend what caused the corporation’s collapse, the U.S. Department of Justice formed an Enron Task Force, comprising prosecutors and FBI agents from around the Nation. The Government’s investigation uncov- ered an elaborate conspiracy to prop up Enron’s short-run stock prices by overstating the company’s financial wellbeing. In the years following Enron’s bankruptcy, the Government prosecuted dozens of Enron employees who participated in the scheme. In time, the Government worked its way up the corporation’s chain of command: On July 7, 2004, a grand jury indicted Skilling, Lay, and Richard Causey, Enron’s for- mer chief accounting officer. These three defendants, the indictment alleged, “engaged in a wide-ranging scheme to deceive the investing public, including Enron’s sharehold- ers, . . . about the true performance of Enron’s businesses by: (a) manipulating Enron’s publicly reported financial results; and (b) making public statements and representa- tions about Enron’s financial performance and results that were false and misleading.” Skilling and his co-conspirators, the indictment continued, “enriched themselves as a result of the scheme through salary, bonuses, grants of stock and stock options, other profits, and prestige.” . . .
In November 2004, Skilling moved to transfer the trial to another venue; he contended that hostility toward him in Houston, coupled with extensive pretrial publicity, had poi- soned potential jurors. To support this assertion, Skilling, aided by media experts, submitted hundreds of news reports detailing Enron’s downfall; he also presented affidavits from the experts he engaged portraying community attitudes in Houston in comparison to other potential venues. . . .
Pointing to “the community passion aroused by Enron’s collapse and the vitriolic media treatment” aimed at him, Skilling argues that his trial “never should have proceeded in Houston.” And even if it had been possible to select impartial jurors in Houston, “[t]he truncated voir dire . . . did almost nothing to weed out prejudices,” he contends, so “[f]ar from rebutting the presumption of prejudice, the record below affirmatively confirmed it.” . . .
Important differences separate Skilling’s prosecution from those in which we have presumed juror prejudice. . . .
First, we have emphasized in prior decisions the size and characteristics of the community in which the crime occurred. . . . Second, although news stories about Skill- ing were not kind, they contained no confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight. . . . Third, unlike cases in which trial swiftly followed a widely reported crime [citation omitted] over four years elapsed between Enron’s bankruptcy and Skilling’s trial. Although reporters covered Enron-related news through- out this period, the decibel level of media attention dimin- ished somewhat in the years following Enron’s collapse. . . . Finally, and of prime significance, Skilling’s jury acquitted him of nine insider-trading counts. Similarly, earlier insti- tuted Enron-related prosecutions yielded no overwhelming victory for the Government. . . . Skilling’s trial, in short, shares little in common with those in which we approved a presumption of juror prejudice. . . . Persuaded that no presumption arose, we conclude that the District Court, in declining to order a venue change, did not exceed constitu- tional limitations. . . .
We next consider whether Skilling’s conspiracy con- viction was premised on an improper theory of honest- services wire fraud. The honest-services statute, §1346, Skilling maintains, is unconstitutionally vague. Alterna- tively, he contends that his conduct does not fall within the statute’s compass. . . . A prohibition on fraudulently depriving another of one’s honest services by accept- ing bribes or kickbacks presents neither a fair-notice nor an arbitrary- prosecution problem. Skilling did not violate §1346, as the Court interprets the statute. The Government charged Skilling with conspiring to defraud Enron’s share- holders by misrepresenting the company’s fiscal health to his own profit, but the Government never alleged that he solicited or accepted side payments from a third party in exchange for making these misrepresentations. Because the indictment alleged three objects of the conspiracy— honest-services wire fraud, money-or-property wire fraud, and securities fraud—Skilling’s conviction is flawed.
KEY POINTS • The Supreme Court rejected Skilling’s claim that he did not receive a fair trial because he
did not establish that a presumption of juror prejudice against him arose or that any actual bias infected the jury in the case.
• The Court did, however, find in Skilling’s favor on the issue of honest services. The Court concluded that 18 US.C. § 1346 covers only bribery and kickback schemes and does not extend to honest services. As such, it vacated that aspect of Skilling’s conviction.
Update: Skilling was released from federal prison in 2019 after serving 12 years in prison.
[continued]
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The burden of proof is not on the defendant to prove good faith or honesty because he or she has no burden to prove anything. The government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with specific intent to defraud. The govern- ment does not have to prove actual reliance upon the defendant’s misrepresentations. Proof of damage has no application to criminal liability for mail and wire fraud. By prohibiting the “scheme to defraud” rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.
An example of wire fraud involves former Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Vice Chairman Thomas M. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin pled guilty to wire fraud and tax evasion charges for using fraudulent expense reports. Wal-Mart alleged that he stole cash, gift cards, and equipment worth about $500,000. Coughlin is serving a home-confinement sen- tence of 27 months, plus 1,500 hours of community service. He also had to pay $400,000 in restitution. Coughlin was a company icon who worked closely with com- pany founder Sam Walton.
Securities Fraud One of the most important federal laws defining criminal con- duct is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This act and Rule 10(b)5 of the Securi- ties and Exchange Commission cover fraud in the purchase or sale of a security. The details of this law are discussed in Chapter 17.
Many of the prosecutions stem from accounting fraud based on false financial statements. The defendants are typically corporate officers responsible for the finan- cial statements furnished to the investing public. Sidebar 13.8 provides examples of identity theft, a common form of fraud.
Don’t be pressured to “change the numbers” to meet unrealistic corporate goals.
According to the Federal Trade Commission, 9 million Americans are victims of identity theft annually. Approxi- mately, 25 percent of the cases are credit card fraud.
WHAT ARE THE MOST COMMON FORMS OF IDENTITY THEFT?
1. Dumpster diving. Rummaging through trash looking for personal information.
2. Skimming. Stealing credit/debit card numbers using a special storage device when processing a card.
3. Phishing. Pretending to be financial institutions or companies to get individuals to reveal their personal information.
4. Changing your address. Diverting billing statements to other locations.
5. “Old-fashioned” stealing. Stealing wallets, purses, mail, credit cards, checks, tax information, and so forth.
WHAT CAN I DO TO DETER IDENTITY THIEVES?
1. Shred financial documents and paperwork before you discard them.
2. Monitor bank and credit card statements for unusual charges.
3. Set up fraud alerts (text and/or e-mail messages) with your bank and credit card companies to help monitor potential unauthorized activity.
4. Protect your Social Security number. 5. Don’t give out personal information over the phone,
through the mail or Internet, unless you know the person.
6. Clear logins and passwords from electronic devices. 7. Never click on links sent in unsolicited e-mails, and
protect your computer with firewalls, anti-spyware, and anti-virus software.
8. Monitor your credit report. 9. Keep all personal information in a secure location, away
from roommates and others who may be in your home. See Sidebar 5.7 for information about arbitration in
connection with identity fraud cases. Sources: “Identity Theft,” usa.gov/identity-theft, 2020; “Identity Theft & Credit Card Fraud - How to Protect Yourself,” Wall Street Journal Guides, 2017. http:// guides.wsj.com; Federal Trade Commission, 2017. www.ftc.gov/idtheft.
sidebar 13.8
Preventing Identity Theft
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Health Care Fraud Another important area of criminal law enforcement against businesses is the health care industry. The Department of Justice has special- ized investigative units concentrating on health care fraud. The prosecution usually involves false claims under the False Claims Act. Prosecuting false claims results in the recoupment of millions of dollars for the federal government.
Examples of health care fraud include:
• Billing for services not actually performed. • Falsifying a patient’s diagnosis to justify tests, surgery, or other procedures that
are not medically necessary. • “Uncoding” or billing for a more costly procedure than the one actually performed. • “Unbundling” or billing each stage of a procedure as if it were a separate procedure. • Accepting kickbacks for patient referrals. • Billing a patient more than the copay amount for services that were paid in full
by a benefit plan under the terms of a managed care contract.
Health care fraud investigations are aided by information revealed by “whistleblower” suits brought under the False Claims Act. This act allows a citizen “relator” who success- fully brings a lawsuit that recovers fraudulently obtained federal funds to keep a portion of the recovery as a bounty. See Sidebar 13.9 for more examples of False Claim Act cases.
Counterfeiting Federal law outlaws the use of counterfeit access devices, includ- ing bank cards, plates, codes, account numbers, or other means of account to initiate a transfer of funds. The use of an unauthorized access device, such as a lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or fraudulently obtained bank card, is also prohibited. The counterfeit or unauthorized access device used must result in at least $1,000 being fraudulently obtained within a one-year period.
Health care fraud costs an estimated $68 to $230 billion annually in the United States.
Always review your medical bills. One expert estimates that “eight out of every 10” bills she reviews contain multiple errors.
The Department of Justice announced that its civil enforcement priorities for 2020 include pursuing False Claims Act cases involving nursing homes, Medicare Advantage plans, and electronic health records. In recent years, there has been a substantial escalation in False Claims Act (FCA) enforcement by the Department of Jus- tice (DOJ), as well as qui tam lawsuits brought by whistle- blowers on behalf of the United States.
Here are a few key cases: • A New Jersey doctor, Kenneth D. Nahum, and his wife
(who managed the oncology practice) agreed to pay $17 million to resolve FCA allegations that they “illegally imported and used unapproved chemotherapy drugs from foreign distributors and illegally billed Medicare.”
• TeamHealth agreed to pay $60 million to resolve allegations related to billing for higher and more expensive levels of medical service than were actu- ally performed, which is known as “upcoding.”
• Tenet Healthcare Corporation agreed to pay $513 million to resolve criminal and civil FCA claims. Allegations included taking steps to conceal a fraud scheme that included “circumventing internal accounting controls.” The U.S. Chamber of Commerce claims that the
federal government is critical of the prosecutions and is pushing to reform the FCA. The Chamber of Commerce is pushing for concrete “incentives,” including assurances that lower damages will be imposed to encourage com- panies to implement rigorous compliance programs and to report potential misconduct.
Sources: “DOJ Civil Division HIghlights False Claims Act Priorities for 2020,” The National Law Review, March 30, 2020; Manatt & Phillips LLP, “Spotlight on the False Claims Act,” Lexicology, March 24, 2017; Selden, Jack W., et al., “False Claims Act: 2013 Year in Review,” Lexicology, January 14, 2014; “Fixing the False Claims Act: The Case for Compliance-Focused Reforms,” U.S. Cham- ber Institute for Legal Reform, October 2013.
sidebar 13.9
False Claims Act and Whistleblower Lawsuits
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Bankruptcy Fraud Bankruptcy proceedings are conducted in federal courts. To protect the interests of all parties to the proceedings, the U.S. Code makes certain conduct by the debtor and certain conduct by creditors and others a federal crime. These are bankruptcy crimes. First, it is a crime for the bankrupt debtor to falsify the information filed in the bankruptcy proceedings. Similarly, it is a crime for any- one to present a false claim in any bankruptcy proceeding.
Any person, including the debtor, in possession of property belonging to the estate of a debtor in bankruptcy is guilty of a felony if he or she conceals the prop- erty from the person charged with control of the property in the bankruptcy pro- ceeding. The law requires that the act of concealment be fraudulent. An act is done fraudulently if done with intent to deceive or cheat any creditor, trustee, or bank- ruptcy judge. In this context, conceal means to secrete, falsify, mutilate, fraudulently transfer, withhold information or knowledge required by law to be made known, or take any action preventing discovery. Since the offense of concealment is a continu- ing one, the acts of concealment may have begun before as well as be committed after the bankruptcy proceeding began.
It is no defense that the concealment may have proved unsuccessful. Even though the property in question is recovered for the debtor’s estate, the defendant may still be guilty of concealment. Similarly, it is no defense that there was no demand by any officer of the court or creditor for the property alleged to have been concealed.
CONSPIRACY It is a separate criminal offense for anyone to conspire or agree with someone else to do something that, if carried out, would be a criminal offense. A conspiracy is an agree- ment or a “kind of partnership” for criminal purposes in which each member becomes the agent or partner of every other member. A formal agreement is not required, and all members of the conspiracy need not plan all of the details of the scheme.
To convict a person of a conspiracy, it is not necessary for the government to prove the conspirators actually succeeded in accomplishing their intended crime. The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that:
• Two or more persons, in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan.
• The defendant willfully became a member of such conspiracy. • During the existence of the conspiracy, one of the conspirators knowingly com-
mitted at least one of the overt acts described in the indictment. • Such overt act was knowingly committed in an effort to carry out or accomplish
some object of the conspiracy.
A person may be convicted of conspiracy even if he or she did not know all the details of the unlawful scheme. If a defendant has an understanding of the unlawful nature of a plan and knowingly and willfully joins in that plan on one occasion, that is sufficient evidence for conviction.
The essence of a conspiracy offense is the making of the agreement itself fol- lowed by the commission of any overt act. An overt act is any transaction or event knowingly committed by a conspirator in an effort to accomplish some object of the conspiracy. Standing alone, the act may be entirely innocent; the context of the conspiracy makes it criminal. For example, driving a car to a bank to pick up a bank robber would constitute an overt act by the driver. See Sidebar 13.10 for examples of many crimes committed in connection with Enron.
The Criminal Investigation Unit of the IRS is actively involved in uncovering bankruptcy fraud. For examples of successful actions, see www.irs. gov/compliance/.
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The fall of Enron Corp. continues to be one of this coun- try’s largest corporate scandals. According to the pros- ecution, Enron’s founder, Kenneth Lay, and former CEO, Jeffrey Skilling, instigated a massive fraud before the company collapsed. The prosecution alleged that Lay and Skilling committed crimes “through accounting tricks, fiction, hocus-pocus, trickery, misleading statements, half- truths, omissions and outright lies.”
QUICK FACTS:
• Enron’s shares were worth $90.75 in August 2000 and dropped to $0.67 in January 2002.
• Although top Enron executives sold their stock before the downfall, lower-paid employees were prevented from selling their stock due to 401(k) restrictions, and many lost their life savings.
THE PROSECUTION SCORECARD INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING: CONVICTIONS: Kenneth Lay—Found guilty on all six counts relating to fraud, includ- ing conspiracy to commit wire fraud, perpetrating wire and bank fraud,
making false and misleading statements to employees, banks, securities analysts and corporate credit-rating
Kenneth Lay. Bureau of Prisons/Getty Images
agencies. Lay died unexpectedly before sentencing, and his conviction was vacated under legal precedent. Received $67.4 million in compensation in 2001.
Jeffrey Skilling—Found guilty of 19 of the 28 counts accusing him of insider trading, securities fraud and con-
spiracy. Sentenced to prison for 24 years and 4 months. Skilling served 12 years of the term and was released to a half-way house in 2019. Received $41.8 million in compensation in 2001.
See Case 13.2 regarding Skilling’s appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
EIGHTEEN GUILTY PLEAS, INCLUDING ENRON CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER ANDREW FASTOW: Facing 98 counts, Fastow pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and con- spiracy to commit wire and securities fraud. Fastow’s “cooperation” with prosecutors significantly contributed to the successful criminal case against Lay and Skilling. Sen-
tence: six years in prison. He was released from prison in 2011 and is currently speaks on business ethics issues. Sources: “Enron Fast Facts,” CNN, April 24, 2019; www.chron.com. For addi- tional information, see Swartz, Mimi, with Enron whistleblower Sherron Wat- kins, Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron.
sidebar 13.10
Anatomy of a Prosecution: The Demise of Enron
Jeffrey Skilling. Pat Sullivan/AP Photo
Andrew Fastow. Dave Einsel/ Getty Images News/Getty Images
The law on conspiracies is often used to “drag in” defendants who did not actu- ally participate in the commission of an offense. A person may become a coconspir- ator through participation in routine business meetings if the meetings are followed by illegal conduct. If illegal plans or conduct are in the planning process, it is impera- tive that persons not wishing to participate in the conspiracy disassociate themselves from the process immediately upon discovery of the illegal scheme.
Circumstantial evidence may prove a conspiracy. A person can be charged with conspiracy even if the individual becomes involved after the conspiracy is stopped and the criminal conduct does not occur. The fact that law enforcement discovers a plot to commit a crime and thwarts it does not prevent prosecution for a conspiracy. The threat of a conspiracy is a public danger beyond the commission of the crime because it is likely that the conspirators will commit more crimes.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE Obstruction of justice occurs when an individual commits an act with the intent to obstruct the legislative process or a judicial process. Obstruction of justice laws
Do be fully forthcoming with any investigation. Never be tempted into altering or destroying documents when an investigation or litigation is pending.
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are designed to protect the integrity of legislative proceedings, judicial proceedings, and the proceedings before federal departments or agencies. The term obstruction of justice is interpreted broadly to encompass all steps and stages from the inception of an investigation to the conclusion of a trial.
Section 1505 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance, in whole or in part, with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Pro- cess Act, willfully withholds, misrepresents, removes from any place, conceals, covers up, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testimony, which is the subject of such demand; or attempts to do so or solicits another to do so; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
As you can see, this law is worded very broadly and can encompass a range of acts. The law was drafted with the recognition that there is an unlimited vari- ety of methods by which the proper administration of justice might be impeded or thwarted by those who are criminally inclined. Any act made with the intent to obstruct the legislative process or judicial process may be a crime. Sidebar 13.11 contains examples of obstruction of justice.
• E-mailing a message to “clean up the files.” • Changing records of phone conversations. • Shredding documents when an investigation or litiga-
tion is pending. • Exploiting a special relationship with a judge to
obtain a favorable decision. • Testifying falsely before Congress.
EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTIONS
investigators, five months in prison, five months home confinement, two years probation.
• Kenneth Branch, former Boeing Co. manager, pleaded guilty to obstruc- tion of justice stemming from an investigation into the theft of sen- sitive documents from competitor Lockheed Martin Corp. (during a battle for $1.99 billion in U.S. gov- ernment contracts), six months home detention and a fine.
• Barry Bonds, baseball’s home-run king, was found guilty of obstruction of justice for lying to a federal grand jury investigation into illegal steroid distribution.
sidebar 13.11
Think Before You Act: Examples of Obstruction of Justice
I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby. MANDEL NGAN/ AFP via Getty Images
Martha Stewart. Stephen Lovekin/ Getty Images
Barry Bonds. Justin Sullivan/Getty Images
• I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Vice Presi- dent Dick Cheney’s former Chief of Staff, convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice, 2½ years in prison.
• Martha Stewart convicted for obstruction of justice and lying to
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FALSE STATEMENT TO A BANK Borrowers from banks are routinely required to furnish financial statements. These statements intend to supply information to the bank so it can make its decision on the loan request. Financial statements are relied upon by banks even though many of them are not certified as correct by a certified public accountant. It is a federal crime for anyone willfully to make a false statement to a federally insured financial institution. The purpose behind making such falsehoods a crime is to protect banks and attempt to ensure the accuracy of financial information. To prove the crime of a false statement to a bank, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statement or report was made with the intent to influence the action of the insured financial institution upon an application, advance, commitment, loan, or any change or extension thereof. An insured bank is one whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. An insured credit union is one whose deposits are insured by the National Credit Union Administration.
A statement or report is false when made if it relates to a material fact and is untrue and is then known to be untrue by the person making it. A fact is material if it is important to the decision to be made by the officers or employees of the institu- tion involved and has the capacity of influencing them in making that decision. It is not necessary, however, to prove that the institution involved was, in fact, influenced or misled. The gist of the offense is an attempt to influence such an institution by willfully making the false statement or report concerning the matter. The maximum penalty for a violation is two years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.
FALSE STATEMENT TO A FEDERAL AGENCY The U.S. Code makes it a federal crime for anyone willfully and knowingly to make a false or fraudulent statement to a department or agency of the United States. The false statement must be related to a material matter, and the defendant must have acted willfully and with knowledge of the falsity. It is not necessary to show that the govern- ment agency was in fact deceived or misled. The issue of materiality is one of law for the courts. The maximum penalty is five years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
A person may be guilty of a violation without proof that he or she had knowl- edge that the matter was within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. A business- person may violate this law by making a false statement to another firm or person with knowledge that the information will be submitted to a government agency. Busi- nesses must take care to avoid puffery or exaggerations in the context of any matter that may come within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.
Due to the sweeping nature of this statute, seven federal appellate courts recog- nized an exculpatory no exception for simple denials made in response to govern- ment questioning as part of a criminal investigation. This narrow exception protected an individual from prosecution for making a false statement when the person’s state- ment simply denies criminal wrongdoing. The exculpatory no was permitted when a person, in response to governmental questioning, had to choose among three unde- sirable options: self-incrimination by telling the truth, remaining silent and raising greater suspicions, or denying guilt by making a false statement to the governmental official. Courts permitting this exception believed it balanced the need for protect- ing the basic functions of government agencies conducting investigations against the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
See Sidebar 13.12 for an example of a case involving lying to federal investiga- tors and other crimes.
There is no requirement that the institution was influenced or misled.
“I truly hope people will learn from my mistakes.”
—Olympic track star Marion Jones, sen-
tenced to six months in prison for lying to
investigators
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In early 1998, the Supreme Court rejected the exculpatory no exception in the case of Brogan v. United States, 118 U.S. 805 (1998). The Court found the excep- tion was not supported by the plain language of the statute and held that the Fifth Amendment does not confer a privilege to lie.
LARCENY Larceny is the unlawful taking of personal property with the intent to deprive the rightful owner of it permanently. Larceny is commonly referred to as theft or steal- ing. Shoplifting by customers is a common form of larceny. Larceny by violence or threat such as with a gun is robbery. Breaking into a building with the intent to commit a felony is burglary. The most common felony in burglary cases is larceny.
Larceny by employees of a business is a common white-collar crime. If an employee appropriates funds of his employer to his or her own use, the employee is guilty of embezzlement. Embezzlement is often committed by highly trusted employ- ees with access to cash or to the check-writing process. It is a crime easily committed when there is a lack of internal control over funds. Simple policies such as using
Embezzlement occurs when a person entrusted with another’s money or property fraudulently appropriates it.
Multiple charges followed a coal mine explosion that killed 29 Massey Energy Co. workers at its Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia. A grand jury indicted Hughie Elbert Stover for: • Lying to investigators for the federal Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) during their investiga- tion of the explosion.
• Lying to criminal investigators. • Destroying evidence related to the blast.
According to the indictment, Stover told MSHA offi- cials that there was a policy at the mine against provid- ing advance notice of a safety inspection. To the contrary. Stover trained guards to alert employees by radio when an inspector was on the property. A 13-month indepen- dent investigation into the explosion concluded that the accident “could have been prevented” and “was the result of failures of basic safety systems identified and codified to protect the lives of minors.” Additionally, fed- eral and state regulators failed to correct the safety vio- lations. Stover was ultimately convicted and sentenced to serve 36 months in prison. The prosecution sought a 25-year sentence.
Additionally, David Hughart, a former Massey Energy official, was sentenced to 42 months in jail after pleading guilty to conspiracy to impede the MSHA and conspiracy
to violate mine health and safety laws. Gary May, the former superintendent of the Upper Branch Mine, pled guilty to a federal fraud charge and was sentenced to 21 months in prison.
Former Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship was charged with conspiring to violate safety and health stan- dards. His management methods which were “notori- ously focused on profitability,” came under investigation after the disaster. After the explosion, he retired with a $12 million golden parachute. The judge who tried the case stated that Blankenship “created a culture of non- compliance . . . to reach profitability and production tar- gets.” He was convicted and sentenced to the maximum: a one-year sentence.
In 2018, Blankenship made an unsuccessful bid in West Virginia for the U.S. Senate. Thereafter, he launched a campaign as a third-party candidate for president in the 2020 election.
Sources: For more information and the report, see “The Undoing of a Coal Baron,” New York Times, April 7, 2016; “Report on the Upper Big Branch Mine Explosion,” The New York Times, May 19, 2011, www.nytimes.com; Smith, Sandy, “Another Massey Energy Official Sentenced on Federal Criminal Charges,” EHS Today, September 13, 2013; Raby, John, “Gary May, Former Upper Branch Mine Superintendent, Pleads Guilty to Federal Conspiracy Charges,” Huffington Post, March 29, 2012; Pavlo, Walter, “Former Massey Energy Security Chief Sentenced to 36 Months in Prison,” Forbes, February 29, 2012. See also, don- blankenship.com for information about his 2020 presidential bid.
sidebar 13.12
Massey Energy Co. Explosion: Multiple Charges
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cosigned checks, dividing check-writing duties from bank reconciliation duties, and requiring all employees to take vacations can often prevent embezzlement.
Larceny by employees takes many forms. Use of company property such as vehi- cles or computers without permission is a form of larceny. Padding expense accounts and falsifying time records are also a taking of property and they are a sophisticated form of theft.
Although larceny by rank-and-file employees is important, it pales to insignifi- cance when compared to the larcenies committed by some corporate officers and directors. Larceny at the top-management level of some corporations in recent years has involved millions of dollars. In some cases, the stealing can only be described as looting the business just as if a mob broke into a store and stole its inventory.
Larceny by directors and officers usually has the appearance of being legal. The business may loan large sums to an officer at little or no interest. If there is no intent to repay the loan and no expectation of repayment, larceny as well as conspiracy to commit larceny has occurred. A company may purchase an airplane or yacht osten- sibly for the business. If these are used only by the president for his personal enjoy- ment, larceny may have been committed. Likewise, if a company buys season tickets for the games of a local professional sports team and the tickets are used only by the officers, a form of larceny occurs. Technically, these examples could be stealing as well as tax fraud because the executive may not report receiving these benefits on his or her tax returns.
Company lawyers are not immune from prosecution for white-collar crimes. The general counsel for a company who helped cover up $600 million in looting of the corporation by company executives was given a $12 million bonus. He was indicted for grand larceny.
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO) The most controversial of the federal criminal laws relating to business is the Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, commonly known as RICO. This law imposes criminal and civil liability upon those businesspersons who engage in certain prohibited activities and who engage in interstate commerce. Specifically, lia- bility extends to any person who:
• Uses or invests income from prohibited activities to acquire an interest in or to operate an enterprise.
• Acquires or maintains an interest in or control of an enterprise. • Conducts or participates in the conduct of an enterprise while being employed
by or associated with it.
Each prohibited activity is defined to include, as one necessary element, proof either of a pattern of racketeering activity or of the collection of an unlawful debt. Racketeering is defined in RICO to mean “any act or threat involving” speci- fied state law crimes, any “act” indictable under various specified federal statutes, and certain federal “offenses.” As to the term pattern, the statute says only that it “requires at least two acts of racketeering activity” within a ten-year period. It is not otherwise defined. See Table 13.2 for examples of racketeering activity.
The requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity is not the only issue cre- ated by the wording of the RICO statute. The law makes it unlawful for any per- son employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in a
Money laundering is falsely reporting income that is obtained through criminal “dirty” activity as income obtained through a legitimate “clean” business enterprise.
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violation. Thus, the law foresees two separate entities, a person and a distinct enter- prise. An issue arises when a person incorporates and that person is the president and sole shareholder of the corporation. Courts have held in such cases that there are two separate entities and both may have RICO liability.
RICO allegations of fraud must be pled with particularity. A RICO plaintiff must describe the predicate acts of fraud with some specificity and state the time, place, and content of the alleged communications perpetrating the fraud. If there are multiple defendants, the allegations must put each defendant on notice of his alleged participation. Sidebar 13.13 provides examples of major RICO prosecutions.
Remember, RICO provides for both civil remedies and criminal penalties.
Racketeering activity encompasses a range of criminal acts. Examples of crimes that may form the basis of a RICO prosecution: • Acts or threats involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery (including sports bribery), extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or controlled substances.
• Counterfeiting. • Mail and wire fraud. • Financial institution fraud. • Obstruction of justice. • Tampering with a witness, victim, or informant. • Trafficking in counterfeit goods.
table 13.2 RICO: What Is “Racketeering Activity”?
• The former head of the New England Compounding Center, a compounding pharmacy, was convicted of racketeering, conspiracy, and fraud following a menin- gitis outbreak caused by fungus-contaminated drugs that killed 64 people. (He was acquitted of murder.)
• In January 2011, the FBI charged 127 individuals with RICO crimes, including murder, drug trafficking, extor- tion, gambling, loan-sharking, and prostitution. More than 800 federal and local law enforcement officials arrested the individuals in New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Prosecutors targeted New York’s five larg- est Mafia families: the Gambinos, Genoveses, Bonan- nos, Luccheses, and Colombos. In February 2012, 10 of those charged pled guilty to various crimes.
• In May 2011, RICO indictments were unsealed against 13 alleged leaders of the Philadelphia mafia, charging them with racketeering, extortion, loan- sharking, and illegal gambling.
• Well-known plaintiff’s class action lawyer, Melvyn I. Weiss, faced a multi-count indictment, including
RICO and money laundering charges. Prosecutors alleged that Weiss and other law partners at the firm obtained $251 million in attorney pay fees by paying $11 million in illegal kickbacks to lead plain- tiffs. His sentence: 30 months in prison, forfeiture of $9.7 million in “ill-gotten gains,” and a $250,000 fine. In Weiss’s own words: “I deeply regret my conduct and apologize to all those who have been affected, including all of the wonderful and extremely talented lawyers and other employees of the firm, none of whom had any involvement in my wrongdoing.”
Sources: Denise Lavoie, “Ex-Pharmacy Exec Convicted in Deadly Meningi- tis Outbreak,” USNews (March 22, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/ news/articles/2017-03-22/verdict-reached-in-trial-over-deadly-us-meningitis- outbreak; FBI, “Four Gambino Crime Family Members and Associates Plead Guilty in Federal Court,” February 17, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press- releases/2012/four-gambino-crime-family-members-and-associates-plead-guilty- in-manhattan-federal-court; Patrick Walters, “Reputed Mob Boss, 12 Others Arrested,” ABC Action News (May 23, 2011), http://6abc.com/archive/8146349/; New York Times feature on Melvyn Weiss, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/refer- ence/timestopics/people/w/melvyn_i_weiss/index.html.
sidebar 13.13
Major RICO Prosecutions
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A plaintiff in a civil action is, in effect, a private attorney general. In filing a complaint, the plaintiff must also allege that the defendant participated in the opera- tion or management of the enterprise and played a part in directing the affairs of the enterprise. Mere employment in an organization is not sufficient to hold someone liable under RICO.
RICO provides drastic remedies. Conviction for a violation of RICO carries severe criminal penalties and forfeitures of illegal proceeds. Upon filing a RICO indictment, the government may seek a temporary restraining order to preserve all forfeitable assets until the trial is completed and judgment entered. A person in a pri- vate civil action found to have violated RICO is liable for treble, or triple, damages as well as for costs and attorneys’ fees.
CYBER CRIME One of the most significant trends in criminal law is a product of the rapid increase of the Internet. The Internet is a part of everyday business and, along with that fact, is the opportunity to use the Internet in connection with criminal activity. With bil- lions of dollars flowing through cyberspace, it is not surprising that criminals are taking advantage of the system. Hackers commit crimes throughout the world that are very costly to business. Identity theft—when someone uses stolen information to create a new form of identity—is also a high-tech threat.
Federal law provides that a person who intentionally accesses a computer with- out authorization or exceeds authorized access to obtain classified, restricted, or pro- tected data, or attempts to do so, is subject to criminal prosecution. Protected data include financial and credit records, information from any department or agency of the United States, and information from any protected computer if the conduct involves an interstate or foreign communication.
Electronic theft is not limited to money. Employees have been caught issu- ing corporate stock to themselves. Trade secrets, personnel records, and customer lists have been stolen by hackers. Company plans are sometimes stolen and sold to competitors.
Most experts agree that cyber crime is more difficult to detect than crimes that preceded the Internet. Proof based on digital evidence about anonymous persons seldom leads to convictions. There has been an increase in law enforcement agents assigned to combat cyberspace thieves, and the training and their education in this area have improved. There are several companies in the security intelligence business that are attempting to help the business community install systems to prevent hacking.
Certain aspects of cyberspace crime should be recognized by managers and shareholders. Electronic crimes are most often committed by employees. Access to confidential information should be limited and carefully controlled. Losses from such crimes are easily hidden in cost of goods sold or in bad debt write-offs. They are usually kept secret for fear of encouraging other criminal acts. Investors typically have little or no knowledge of losses resulting from cyber crime. For examples of cyber crimes, see Sidebar 13.14.
ENDANGERING WORKERS Most of the crimes committed by business are white-collar crimes. It is possible for corporate officials to be charged with crimes, such as assault and battery, reckless endangerment of workers if a worker is injured, or even accidental homicide if
Are you the victim of an Internet crime? Complaints may be filed with the Internet Crime Complaint Center, www .ic3.gov/. The center operates in partnership with the FBI.
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According to the FBI, billions in dollars are lost every year when companies need to repair systems that are the vic- tim of cyber attacks. It is estimated that cyber crime cost the global economy $450 billion in 2016 and more than half of 3,000 companies surveyed were not prepared to deal with an attack.
Ransomware is a growing problem. It is an insidious kind of malware that encrypts or locks digital files; the perpetrators then attempt to extract ransom from their victims. Oftentimes, the ransomware is unleashed when a victim clicks on an e-mail that looks legitimate. In May 2017, a massive global ransomware attack involving more than 45,000 attacks was launched that affected more than 70 countries. Experts estimated that the perpe- trators could collect more than $1 billion. FedEx was one of the major companies affected.
During 2013 alone, the FBI notified more than 3,000 U.S. companies that their computer systems had been hacked. The cyber attacks included major retailers such as Target. During 2014, major high-profile security breaches involved JPMorgan Chase, Home Depot, and Sony Pictures. Other examples of cyber crimes include the following: • A former Bank of America computer programmer was sentenced to 27 months in federal prison plus two years of supervised release and $419,310 in
restitution for unauthorized access to the bank’s pro- tected computers.
• A college student was indicted for creating and dis- seminating counterfeit online coupons for consumer and electronic goods over the Internet. The alleged crimes cost retailers and manufacturers hundreds of thousands of dollars.
• A 20-year-old computer hacker from North Caro- lina was sentenced to 37 months without parole in federal prison for planning to hack into ATMs in the Houston area.
• A Georgia man pleaded guilty to trafficking in coun- terfeit credit cards and aggravated identity theft. According to court documents, special agents found more than 675,000 stolen credit card numbers and related information in his computers and e-mail accounts. The defendant admitted to obtaining the information either by hacking into business networks and downloading credit card databases or purchas- ing the information from others on the Internet in “carding forums.”
Source: Graham, Luke, “Cybercrime costs the global economy $450 billion: CEO,” CNBC, February, 7, 2017. For more examples and information, see, The U.S. Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, www .cybercrime.gov/ and Cyber Crime - FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber.
sidebar 13.14
HACKED! The Increasing Problem of Cyber Crime
a worker is killed on the job. In most cases, when a worker is injured on the job, the appropriate remedy is through the workers’ compensation system, which is dis- cussed in Chapter 21. If a company is involved in an extremely dangerous process, such as handling dangerous chemicals, or does not have adequate safety precautions, criminal liability may be imposed if a worker is injured or killed.
Some states have specific statutes requiring employers to warn employees of life- threatening hazards in the workplace. In California, any corporation or person who is a manager is required to report any serious concealed danger in the workplace. Serious concealed danger encompasses products and practices that create a sub- stantial probability of death, great bodily harm, or serious exposure to an employee. Failure to do so is a crime.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) can also bring actions against businesses for violation of health and safety standards. If a business exposes workers to dangerous situations, such as exposing workers to dangerous falls and hazardous chemicals, OSHA has the power to impose money penalties for each violation.
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AIDING AND ABETTING The law recognizes that businesspeople accused of criminal behavior likely did not act alone. Such persons can be assisted by co-workers, subordinates, or individuals outside the business organization. If a person acts under the direction of someone accused of criminal activities, this person might be held responsible for aiding and abetting in the commission of the crime. The charge of aiding and abetting is simi- lar to the allegation of participating in a conspiracy. This individual accused of aid- ing and abetting did not necessarily commit the same criminal acts as others. For example, the accountant who assists the chief financial officer in embezzling funds likely is guilty of aiding and abetting in the actual theft. This accountant also may be guilty of conspiring to steal money.
Indictments often charge persons both with a conspiracy to commit a crime and with aiding and abetting others to do so. These allegations are used to indict persons only minimally involved with the actual substantive crime. To avoid going to trial, many will agree to testify against those more directly involved in return for lesser punishment or even immunity from prosecution. The value to the government of the conspiracy theory and the charge of aiding and abetting should not be under- estimated. Corporate officials may be potentially liable for criminal acts committed without their direct involvement.
At the state level, a charge similar to the federal charge of aiding and abetting is that a person is an accessory to a crime. A person may be an accessory before the crime is committed. If the person is accused of being involved after the crime is committed, the charge is as an accessory after the fact. A person who assists a perpetrator of a crime in eluding the police would be such an accessory. Accessories before the crime assist in preparation for the crime, and they may be punished the same as the person who committed the crime. Accessories after the fact are usually subject to specific penalties for their actions as determined by the laws of the vari- ous states.
BRIBERY AND KICKBACKS Bribery, or the offering, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of influencing the action of an official in the discharge of his or her public or legal duties, is illegal in both the domestic and international contexts. Bribery of a public official is illegal under federal law, 18 U.S.C. Section 201. After accepting a bribe, a public official has a conflict of interest, which compromises his or her ability to act without undue influence.
It is also illegal for a sporting official to accept a bribe in exchange to “fix” a sporting event. Under 18 U.S.C. Section 224, the person accepting the bribe could be fined and/or imprisoned for up to five years. The FBI has a Sports Bribery Pro- gram to help college and professional sporting associations ensure the integrity of sporting events. They also investigate violations of federal statutes related to gam- bling and corruption in sports. See Sidebar 13.15 for examples of bribery.
Kickbacks are payments made to a person who has facilitated a transaction. An example of a kickback is a building contractor giving money back to a government official in exchange for a building contract.
For an extended discussion of illegal bribery in the global context, see the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Chapter 12.
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SENTENCING GUIDELINES Historically, the fate of a person convicted of a crime depended heavily on the judge doing the sentencing. Because some judges were lenient and others were tough, the sentencing of criminals was sometimes referred to as “judicial roulette.” To make the criminal system more just and to help ensure that similar crimes receive similar sentences, in the late 1980s a federal sentencing commission developed sentencing guidelines for federal crimes.
These guidelines were the subject of much study, debate, and controversy. Many federal judges resented the loss of control during the sentencing phase of a case. Judges also criticized the complexity of the guidelines, which are hard to follow. Initially, the guidelines were mandatory. In accordance with a U.S. Supreme Court decision, the guidelines are now advisory, requiring a court to consider the guideline ranges, but permitting it to tailor the sentence in light of other concerns. Federal judges are now free to decide for themselves if the defendants deserve sentences longer or shorter than the ranges in the guidelines. If, however, an appeals court finds the sentence to be “unreasonable” under the facts of the case, the sentencing decision can be reversed. The Supreme Court, however, ruled in 2007 that sentences falling within the guidelines may be presumed “reasonable” by courts reviewing sen- tences on appeal.
Because corporations cannot be jailed, the sentencing commission has devel- oped special guidelines for sentencing organizations convicted of federal crimes. The emphasis is on monetary penalties. It must be kept in mind, however, that in most criminal cases involving organizations, corporate officers can also be charged. As a result, the guidelines are designed so that the sanctions imposed upon orga- nizations and their agents, taken together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct. Punishment and deterrence are goals of the guidelines.
“No punishment has ever possessed enough power of deterrence to prevent the commission of crimes.” —Hannah Arendt, polit-
ical theorist
Examples of bribery include the following: • New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin was convicted on 20 of 21 corruption charges, including bribery for accepting bribes, free trips, and other gratuities from contractors in exchange for city contracts. He was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison for his partici- pation in the $500,000 scheme.
• Former Louisiana congressman William Jefferson was sentenced to 13 years in prison after being con- victed of 11 criminal counts, including bribery and racketeering. The scheme involved trying to enrich himself and relatives with bribes and payoffs involv- ing business ventures in Africa.
• Two American businessmen were charged with brib- ery in connection with obtaining multi-million-dollar contracts to supply the American military and their efforts to rebuild Iraq. The alleged bribes given to Army officers were in the form of airline tickets, spa vacations, and more than $1 million.
Sources: McWhirter, Cameron, “New Orleans Ex-Mayor Ray Nagin Sentenced to Ten Years,” Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2014; Markon, Jerry, “Ex-Rep. Jefferson (D-La.) Gets 13 Years in Freezer Cash Case,” Washington Post, November, 14, 2009; Healy, Jack, “2 Americans Indicted in Iraq Contract Bribery,” New York Times, May 30, 2011.
sidebar 13.15
Bribery Prosecutions
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To illustrate how these guidelines would work, assume that a large corporation committed fraud in selling its product to the federal government. Perhaps the test results on the product were falsely reported. If a high official in the company and some middle managers knew that the test results were falsified and the company had a previous conviction of fraud within ten years, the fine would be $20 to $40 million. However, if the company received good points for cooperation with investigators and had an aggressive internal audit program to detect and prevent fraud, the fine would be only $4 to $8 million. In either case, the court would also order restitution. The court may also put the business on probation, preventing it from selling stock and paying dividends, or the court may otherwise be involved in major corporate decisions. This probation provision serves to get and keep the attention of senior management. Management in a company on probation must prevent violations of federal laws by its employees.
TRENDS One of the more significant trends following major fraud prosecutions over the last decade is an increase in prosecution of white-collar criminals and legislative efforts to protect the public from fraud. To this end, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (discussed in detail in Chapter 17) requires companies to employ rigorous accounting and compli- ance mechanisms. The goal is to renew investor confidence in the markets.
Another important trend is the government’s effort to obtain proof of illegal activity by top corporate officials. Initiating an investigation that focuses on lower- mid-level managers, the government will obtain evidence that assists it in implicat- ing higher-level executives. If wrongful conduct is found in the lower ranks, these employees are charged with conspiracy to violate a federal law. Prosecutors will then plea bargain with these defendants in exchange for testimony against persons higher on the organizational chart. This enables prosecutors to go after the real high-value target: top management. Although plea bargains typically require that prosecutors agree to drop or reduce charges, it is becoming increasingly more likely for prosecu- tors to insist on some jail time.
Prosecutors are also capitalizing on high-profile prosecutions. Where the stakes are high, prosecutors use the media to characterize white-collar criminals as “common street thugs.” After an arrest, prosecutors may also seek millions of dollars in bail money and may object to the source of the funds if the money is the product of illegal activity. For example, a $5 million bond was required of Enron’s chief financial officer. The size of the bond made it necessary for his parents to offer their home as security. Likewise, prosecutors may seek criminal penalties that include forfeiture of illegally obtained assets such as luxury homes, bank accounts, yachts, and automobiles. All of this is designed to deter similar conduct by other would be corporate felons.
LO 13-4
Key Terms Accessory 408 Aiding and abetting 408 Bankruptcy crimes 399 Burglary 403
Concealment 399 Conspiracy 399 Double jeopardy 390 Endangerment of workers 406
Exculpatory no 402 Expectation of privacy 387 Felonies 384
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Review Questions and Problems Terms and Procedures
1. Classifications of Criminal Conduct (a) Why is it important for businesspersons to have an understanding of the basic principles of criminal
law and white-collar crime? (b) What is the difference between felonies and misdemeanors?
2. Basic Concepts Who are the parties to a criminal case?
3. The Grand Jury James was indicted by a federal grand jury. During the trial jury’s deliberation, one juror said, “I think James is guilty or else the grand jury would not have sent us the case.” Another juror objected to this statement and said, “The action of the grand jury is irrelevant in our determination of guilt or inno- cence.” Which juror is more accurate about the role of grand juries in our criminal justice system?
Constitutional Issues
4. The Fourth Amendment: Illegal Search and Seizure Burger’s junkyard business consists of dismantling automobiles and selling their parts. A New York statute authorized warrantless inspections of automobile junkyards. Police officers entered his junkyard, conducted an inspection, and discovered stolen vehicles and parts. Burger, who was charged with pos- session of stolen property, moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the inspection. He contends that the administrative inspection statute is unconstitutional when it authorizes warrantless searches. Is he correct? Why or why not?
5. The Fifth Amendment: Protection against Self-Incrimination Roberts was the president and sole shareholder of a corporation. A federal grand jury issued a subpoena to him in his capacity as president. The subpoena required Roberts to produce corporate records. Rob- erts moves to quash the subpoena on Fifth Amendment grounds. (a) Must Roberts deliver the records? Why or why not? (b) Could Roberts be required to testify about the documents? Why or why not? (c) If Roberts takes steps to dissolve the corporation, can he then avoid the subpoena? Why or why not?
6. The Fifth Amendment: Double Jeopardy Does the double jeopardy clause apply to civil penalties? Why or why not?
7. The Sixth Amendment: Rights in a Criminal Case What are the six constitutional rights provided in the Sixth Amendment?
8. The Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment What are the four basic principles to consider to determine if punishment is cruel and unusual?
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 408
Fraud 392 Good faith 395 Indictment 384 Information 384 Intent 384 Intent to defraud 395 Kickbacks 408 Knowingly 384
Larceny 403 Mail fraud 394 Misdemeanors 384 Nolo contendere 384 Obstruction of justice 400 Overt act 399 Pattern of racketeering 404 Presumption of innocence 385 Probable cause 384 Racketeering 404
RICO 404 Robbery 403 Scheme to defraud 393 Search warrant 386 Sentencing guidelines 409 Unreasonable search and
seizure 386 White-collar crime 382 Willfully 384 Wire fraud 394
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Specific Crimes
8. Fraud Mary lost her billfold, which contained credit cards and an ATM access card. She had written her PIN on a piece of paper, which was also in the billfold. Al found the billfold. He used the credit cards and ATM card to obtain more than $2,500 in goods, services, and cash. Is Al guilty of a federal offense?
9. Conspiracy Allen, Mary, and Jon agreed to participate in a program to manipulate the values of securities. Allen made several telephone calls to securities brokers in which he delivered false information about a num- ber of companies. Before any further actions were taken, Mary and Jon decided to withdraw as active participants in the program. Did Mary and Jon commit any crime? Why?
10. Obstruction of Justice Quincy was a successful investment banker specializing in underwriting and merger advice. A federal grand jury was investigating the sales of initial public offerings, and Quincy knew that the grand jury had issued subpoenas seeking information about Quincy’s deals. Quincy sent an e-mail to colleagues and encouraged them to “clean up” their files. What crimes, if any, did Quincy commit? If a colleague shred- ded files, what crimes may have been committed?
11. False Statement to a Bank Your business is in need of additional working capital. You contact your bank about a loan. A line of credit of $500,000 is tentatively approved pending you furnish audited financial statements. You meet with your auditor who is also a personal friend. Suppose you ask your auditor to add $250,000 as an account receivable. In fact, this asset does not exist. The auditor certifies the financial statements with this phantom asset. You mail the audited financial statements to the bank. What crimes have you commit- ted? What crimes did the auditor commit? What should have been the auditor’s response to your request?
12. False Statement to a Federal Agency Adam was hired by a defense contractor for a position that required a clearance for classified material. He failed to disclose a criminal conviction on a Department of Defense personnel security question- naire, but admitted that he knew there was false information on the form which he signed. (a) Did Adam willfully violate any federal law? (b) If Adam didn’t actually realize that the form would be submitted to a federal agency, is that a defense?
13. Larceny Joe, a purchasing agent of ABC Company, entered into a contract to purchase software on behalf of ABC from a software company represented by Harry. The contract stated a price of $10,000, but the actual cost was $8,000. Joe and Harry split the $2,000. What crimes were committed?
14. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) Don, a promoter of prize fights, formed a corporation. Don was the sole shareholder, sole director, and president of the corporation. Don was charged with a violation of RICO. Is the requirement of both a person and an enterprise met?
15. Cyber Crime Why is cyber crime difficult to detect and to prosecute successfully?
16. Endangering Workers Beth was killed when a trench collapsed. An investigation revealed that the trench was 27 feet deep and without adequate shoring, in violation of safety standards. Bob, the president of the firm, is charged with negligent homicide. Is a finding of guilt possible? Why or why not?
17. Aiding and Abetting Susan, a partner in a CPA firm, prepares a federal income tax return knowing that it contains false information. Because the client wants the return prepared in this manner, Susan obtains the taxpayer’s signature on the return and files it with the IRS. Has Susan aided and abetted in the commission of a crime? Why?
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A drug company applied for the approval of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a miracle drug that the company believed could cure some cancers. During the period that the application was under consideration, the company’s stock rose to $65 per share. The president of the company learned that the FDA application was about to be denied. You are a personal friend of the president, and he told you that he believed that the stock will start trading downward. You sell 4,000 shares of stock, which you purchased for $10 per share. Your decision appears to be a good one because you made a profit of about $200,000. When questioned about the sale by an investigator from the Securities and Exchange Commission, you state that the sale was because of a preexisting arrange- ment to sell the shares when the price fell below $60 per share. Following the announce- ment that the FDA application was denied, the stock went to $7 per share. • Did you commit a crime when you sold the stock? • Did you commit a crime in your answer to the federal agent? • Were you part of an illegal conspiracy?
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18. Bribery and Kickbacks A pharmaceutical company tried to boost its sales by encouraging doctors to use its new drug, LDL Control, to treat high cholesterol. An important part of their sales pitch included paying for lavish dinners and weekend trips for the doctors and their families. The company also gave doctors expensive gifts if they prescribed a certain number of prescriptions of LDL Control each month. Is this an acceptable form of marketing or criminal behavior?
19. Sentencing Guidelines The U.S. sentencing guidelines apply a mathematical formula to sentencing. How do the guidelines operate?
20. Trends Describe three trends in criminal law that affect business organizations and businesspeople.
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
14-1 To describe the factors to consider when deciding on the form of organization.
14-2 To contrast the basic organizational forms that businesses select to conduct business.
14-3 To compare the hybrid organizational forms businesses may utilize to take advantage of attributes of various basic structures.
14-4 To describe the authority of agents to act on behalf of a principal in con- tracts and beyond.
14-5 To recognize trends in managing organizations.
Business Organizations14 XiXinXing/iStock/Getty Images
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H ow are businesses organized? Why is one
business a partnership and another a cor-
poration? How do these businesses get
transactions completed through someone other than
the owner? There must be some legal principles at
work because you know you do not have to deal with
the owner of the clothing store when you make a pur-
chase. A multinational company transacts business
all over the world and its shareholders (owners) are
not parties to its contracts.
Previous chapters discuss legal issues related to vari-
ous business transactions. In this chapter, we focus on
how these transactions are accomplished and the selec-
tion of which organizational form is best to complete such
transactions. You will examine the factors that should be
considered when deciding the most appropriate organi-
zational form. You also will review the various choices of
organizations used to conduct business. Following that is
a consideration of the power of a business to act through
agents in order to form contracts and accept liability.
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FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS People conduct business using a number of different organizational forms. The law recognizes three basic forms and several hybrid forms that contain attributes of two or more basic forms. These various forms are listed in Sidebar 14.1.
LO 14-1
The three basic forms include: • Sole proprietorships • General partnerships • Corporations
The hybrid forms include: • Limited partnerships • S corporations • Limited liability companies • Limited liability partnerships
sidebar 14.1
Possible Forms of Business Organizations
Two terms are important as they relate to the number of owners of a business organization. Some organizations are owned by only a few persons. Such organiza- tions are said to be closely held. Family-owned and family-operated businesses are common examples of closely held organizations. Other businesses may be owned by hundreds, if not thousands, of persons. These organizations are publicly held ones. Examples of publicly held businesses include those whose stock is traded on a public exchange.
You should understand that the decision of selecting an appropriate organiza- tional form usually is limited to those situations involving the few owners of a closely held business. When a business is publicly held by a large number of owners, the form of organization usually is a corporation. The reason for this corporate form being used is that shareholders can transfer their ownership without interfering with the organization’s management.
Factors to Consider When Selecting a Business’s Organizational Form
Significant factors to consider in selecting the best organizational form for a particu- lar business activity include:
• The cost of creating the organization. • The continuity or stability of the organization. • The control of decisions. • The personal liability of the owners. • The taxation of the organization’s earnings and its distribution of profits to the
owners.
The issue of which organizational form is best usually involves closely held busi- nesses; publicly held businesses typically are corporations.
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In the following sections, each of these factors is defined so that you can more easily apply their meaning in the detailed sections on business structures.
CREATION The word creation means the legal steps necessary to form a particular business orga- nization. At times, a businessperson may be concerned with how much it will cost to have each form established. Usually, the cost of creation is not a major factor in considering which form of business organization a person will choose to operate a business. The most significant creation-related issues are how long it will take to cre- ate a particular organization and how much paperwork is involved.
CONTINUITY Another factor to consider when selecting the best organizational form for a business activity is the continuity of the organization. How does an organization’s existence relate to its owners? By this question, the meaning of the word continuity becomes associated with the stability or durability of the organization.
The crucial issue with this continuity factor is the method by which a business organization can be dissolved. A dissolution is any change in the ownership of an organization that changes the legal existence of the organization. In essence, the questions become: Is the organization easily dissolved? What impact does a dissolution of the organizational form have on the business activity of that organization?
MANAGERIAL CONTROL The factor of control concerns who is managing the business organization. Often, this issue is of vital importance to the owners. The egos of businesspeople can cause them to insist on equal voices in management. As you study this factor under each organizational form, keep in mind the difficulties that can arise when a few strong-willed business owners disagree with one another. Usually when people are excited about getting started in a business opportunity, no one takes time to discuss methods of resolving potential deadlocks. The failure to consider how to overcome disputes involving managerial control can cause business activities to suffer and the organization to fail. Therefore, consideration of potential conflict and mechanisms to resolve disputes are essential to consider when selecting a form for a business venture.
LIABILITY When considering the liability factor, you should ask yourself: To what degree is the owner of a business personally liable for the debts of the business organization? Additionally, you may ask: When is the owner liable under the law for harm caused by the business organization? Generally, businesspeople want to limit their personal liability. Although there are organizations that appear to accomplish this goal, you will see that such appearances might be misleading when actually conducting business transactions. For this reason, this liability factor is very important and deserves significant consideration as it relates to each of the organizational forms presented below.
The issues when considering methods of creating business organizations usually are time and money.
The death, retirement, or withdrawal of an owner creates issues of whether an organization and its business will continue.
Don’t assume you and your co-owners have to be equal in all aspects; voice in management can be decided among you.
Do always examine how liability passes from the organization to the owner.
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TAXATION This factor often is viewed as the most critical when selecting the form of business organization. At issue is: How is the income earned by the business taxed? How is the money distributed to the business owners taxed? Is it possible that owners may have to pay taxes on money that is attributed to them as income but which they have not actually received? The answers to these questions provide much needed guidance when deciding which form of organization is best suited for a business’s operation.
People have stated that the double taxation of corporate income should be avoided by selecting a different form of organization. As you will see, there are indeed specific advantages to creating the organizational forms that are “single taxed.” However, advantages also exist when an organization is subject to the so- called “double tax.”
A 2017 change to U.S. law may be particularly important when considering the tax implications of certain business forms. That year, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which significantly lowered the top corporate tax rate and changed the tax base for corporations, affecting the way deductions are claimed. The law also introduced deductions than can change the taxation rate for single-taxed orga- nizations (i.e., those with pass through income), depending on a number of factors. Sidebar 14.2 highlights some of the most important aspects of the law.
Remember a single tax is not always better than a double tax.
For many years, businesses and investors complained that the United States had the highest corporate tax rate of major economies. As of 2017, the top statutory rate in the United States was 35%. With state taxes added in, the combined rate was, on average, approximately 39%. Analysis by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) indicates that this was indeed higher than other nations. Some combined rates, such as Ireland’s 12.5%, were only a third to a half as much. Even though the effective rate that companies actually paid was significantly lower than the statutory rate, a 2012 analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) still placed the United States among the four highest tax rates in G20 countries.
That changed under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA). The law, which took effect in 2018, lowered the top U.S. corporate tax rate from 35% to a flat 21% and eliminated the alternative minimum tax. That brought the U.S. tax scheme for standard corporations (C corpora- tions) to a level under the average for OECD countries. The tax base of corporations was also revised, particu- larly in allowing businesses to deduct the full cost of new investment in the year made (“full expensing). Additionally,
the law changed the tax base for pass-through entities (such as partnerships, S corporations and LLCs) by includ- ing a 20% deduction for qualifying business income up to $415,000. This means the top individual rate on busi- ness income was effectively lowered from 37% to 29.6%. The idea of the latter was to provide some benefit for organizations besides corporations, which contribute an increasingly large portion of federal income tax revenue. Of course, the law is substantially more complex that these simple rules may suggest; there are many other benefits as well as new limits in the TCJA that can impact a business. It is important to consult IRS and third-party resources to fully understand how the tax code is likely to impact one’s chosen organizational form.
Notably, there were some early indications that the TCJA had a positive effect on gross domestic product (GDP). However, longer-term analysis is compounded by the significant disruption resulting from COVID-19 pan- demic in 2020. Source: IRS, The Highlights of Tax Reform for Business (Oct. 2018), https://www. irs.gov/newsroom/the-highlights-of-tax-reform-for-businesses; Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, Briefing Book (2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ briefing-book.
sidebar 14.2
U.S. Corporate Taxes are No Longer the Highest in the World
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Selecting the Best Organizational Form
The next six sections apply the preceding factors to major organizational forms. Figure 14.1 provides a summary of the factors for each form for comparison. Following the basic description of the organizational forms is a brief discussion on how to select the best form for a particular business activity.
LO 14-2
Figure 14.1 Corporate form selection factors.
Form Creation Continuity Control Liability Taxation
Sole Proprietorship
No formal documentation– business licenses only
So long as proprietor desires, but no transfer to others
Total control by proprietor
Personal obligation for all debts and liabilities
All business income subject to personal taxation
General Partnership
Automatic based on business conduct; modified by agreement
Dissolved whenever one partner withdraws
Each partner has equal voice; modified by agreement
Personal obligation for all debts and liabilities; joint and several liability
Pro rata share of business income subject to personal taxation
Corporation Incorporators apply for state charter with articles of incorporation
Perpetual, so long as it can conduct business
Managed by officers, appointed by directors, who are elected by shareholders
Shareholder obligations limited to investment, absent other commitments
Corporate income taxed; shareholders taxed only on income distributed
Limited Partnership
Partnership agreement and certificate filed in public office where business is conducted
Dissolved when general partner withdraws
General partners have total control
Personal obligation for general partners; limited partners liable for investment
Pro rata share of business income subject to personal taxation
S Corporation Incorporators apply for state charter with articles of incorporation
Perpetual, so long as number of shareholder limited
Managed by officers, appointed by directors, who are elected by shareholders
Shareholder obligations limited to investment, absent other commitments
All business income subject to personal taxation
Limited Liability Company or Partnership
Organizers file articles of organization with state official
Dissolved when member withdraws, but may be continued by those remaining
Equal management by members unless manager designated
Members are agents, but liable only for investment
May elect (in advance) either corporate or personal taxation for business income
Non-Profit Corporation
Incorporators apply for state charter with articles of incorporation
Perpetual, so long as it can conduct business
Managed by officers, appointed by directors, who are elected by shareholders
Shareholder obligations limited to investment, absent other commitments
Tax exempt if approved by state and IRS under IRC § 501(c)(3)
Source: Delaware Division of Corporations, Legal Business Structure Table, https://revenuefiles.delaware.gov/docs/business_structures_table.pdf.
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SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS When considering the relevant factors, the sole proprietorship has many virtues. However, the use of this business organization is very limited because multiple own- ers cannot create a proprietorship. Depending on the factual situation presented, greater continuity, less liability, and more flexible tax planning may be required than those afforded by the law of the sole proprietorship.
Creation A sole proprietorship is the easiest and least expensive business organiza- tion to create. In essence, the proprietor obtains whatever business licenses are neces- sary and begins operations. Legally, no formal documentation is needed. The ease of the steps necessary to create a proprietorship makes it an attractive alternative when beginning a new business venture. However, as the other factors might dictate, a busi- ness may shift away from the proprietorship form as it becomes more successful.
Continuity A proprietorship’s continuity is tied directly to the will of the pro- prietor. In essence, the proprietor may dissolve his or her organization at any time by simply changing the organization or terminating the business activity. The fact that the proprietorship’s business activity may be more stable than the proprietor’s willingness to remain actively involved in the business indicates that the sole propri- etorship is a less desirable organizational form. Ownership of a sole proprietorship cannot be transferred.
Managerial Control The sole proprietor is in total control of his or her business’s goals and operations. While the proprietor has complete responsibility for the business’s success or failure, the owners of all other organizational forms usually share control to some degree. As long as this control issue is carefully thought out, there can be real value in having more than one voice in control of managing a business enterprise.
Liability A sole proprietor is personally obligated for the debt of the proprietor- ship. Legally speaking, this owner has unlimited liability for the obligations of this type of business organization. The business organization’s creditors can seek to hold the proprietor personally liable for 100 percent of the debts and legal obligations that the proprietorship cannot satisfy. The desire to avoid the potentially high risk of personal liability is an important reason other organizational forms might be viewed as preferable to the proprietorship.
Taxation A sole proprietorship is not taxed as an organization. All the proprietor- ship’s income subject to taxation is attributed to the proprietor. The initial appearance of this tax treatment may appear favorable because the business organization is not taxed. However, the individual proprietor must pay the applicable personal tax rate on the income earned by the proprietorship whether the proprietor actually receives any of the income from the organization or not. If the organization retains its profits for business expansion purposes instead of distributing this money to the proprietor, that owner still must pay taxes on the income made by the proprietorship.
PARTNERSHIPS Whenever two or more people wish to own a business together, a partnership is a possible organizational form. In general, a partnership is an agreement between two or more persons to share a common interest in a commercial endeavor and to share
A sole proprietorship may appear to have many advantages; shar- ing responsibility and liability with others are not among them.
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profits and losses. The word persons in the previous sentence should be interpreted broadly enough to allow business organizations, as well as individuals, to form a partnership. For example, two or more individuals, an individual and a corporation, a partnership and a corporation, or any combination of these entities may agree to create a business organization called a partnership.
Creation When compared to other forms of business organizations (other than the sole proprietorship), a partnership is easily formed. The cost of forming a part- nership is relatively minimal. In addition, the creation of a partnership is made eas- ier since it does not need to get permission from each state in which it does business.
The key to a partnership’s existence is satisfying the elements of its definition:
1. Two or more persons. 2. A common interest in business. 3. Sharing profits and losses.
If the parties conduct their affairs in such a way as to meet these definitional elements, a partnership exists regardless of whether the persons involved call them- selves partners or not. Sidebar 14.3 presents issues related to the existence and nam- ing of a partnership.
Don’t operate a business with one or more co-owners without a carefully drafted partnership agreement; unresolved issues lead to major legal problems.
Because the existence of a partnership is based on the partners’ agreement, it is possible that this agreement is implied from the conduct or actions of the parties. Part- ners should never rely on implied agreements. Rather, their agreement should be explicitly stated among the parties and drafted into a formal document. The formal agreement is called the articles of partnership.
Because a partnership is created by agreement, the partners select the name of the partnership. This right of selection is subject to two limitations in many states. First, a partnership may not use any word in the name, such as “company,” that would imply the existence of a corpora- tion. Second, if the name is other than that of the partners,
the partners must give notice as to their actual identity under the state’s assumed-name statute. Failure to comply with this disclosure requirement may result in the partnership being denied access to courts, or it may result in criminal actions being brought against those operating under the assumed name.
An example of these naming concepts could arise in the creation of a partnership to conduct business as a consulting firm. If the firm’s name is a listing of your surname and those of your partners, your identities are clear via your firm’s name. However, if you called your partnership “We are the Best Consulting,” you and your partners would need to comply with any applicable assumed-name statute.
sidebar 14.3
Formation and Naming of a Partnership
Continuity A general partnership is dissolved any time there is a change in the partners. For example, if a partner dies, retires, or otherwise withdraws from the organization, the partnership is dissolved. Likewise, if a person is added as a new partner, there is a technical dissolution of the organization. Therefore, it generally is said that the partnership organization is easily dissolved. Even if the partnership agreement provides that the partnership will continue for a stated number of years, any partner still retains the power to dissolve the organization. Although liability may be imposed on the former partner for wrongful dissolution in violation of the agreement, the partnership nevertheless is dissolved.
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A dissolution does not necessarily destroy the business of a partnership. Dis- solution is not the same thing as terminating an organization’s business activity. Termination involves the winding up or liquidating of a business; dissolution simply means the legal form of organization no longer exists. Sidebar 14.4 addresses how parties might prevent dissolution from destroying a partnership’s business success.
To prevent problems that may arise when a partner dies or withdraws from a partnership, the articles of partner- ship should include a buy and sell agreement. This agreement, which should be entered into when the busi- ness entity is created, provides for the amount and man- ner of compensation for the interest of the deceased or withdrawing owner.
Buy and sell agreements frequently use formulas to compute the value of the withdrawing partner’s interest
and provide for the time and method of payment. In the case of death, the liquidity needed is often provided by the cash proceeds from life insurance taken out on the life of the deceased and made payable to the business or to the surviving partners. Upon payment of the amount required by the buy and sell agreement to the estate of the deceased, the interest of the deceased ends, and all the surviving partners can continue the business, as mem- bers of a new partnership.
sidebar 14.4
Anticipating a Partnership’s Dissolution—Buy and Sell Agreements
Managerial Control In a general partnership, unless the agreement provides to the contrary, each partner has an equal voice in the firm’s affairs. Partners may agree to divide control in such a way as to make controlling partners and minority partners. The decision of who has what voice in management is of crucial impor- tance to the chances of the business’s success and to the welfare of the partners’ relationship with each other. The possibility of a deadlock among partners is very real, especially when there are only a few partners and there are an even number of them. Care should be taken to design mechanisms to avoid or at least handle the dis- putes that will arise when partners share managerial control. A written partnership agreement should provide specific language governing issues of managerial control.
Liability All partners in a general partnership have unlimited liability for their organization’s debts. These partners’ personal assets, which are not associated with the partnership, may be claimed by the partnership’s creditors. From a creditor’s perspective, this personal liability of each partner extends to the organization’s entire debt, not just to a pro rata share. These partners are jointly and severally liable for the partnership’s obligations. For example, assume that a general partner- ship has three partners and that it owes a creditor $300,000. If it is necessary to collect the debt, this creditor can sue all three partners jointly for the $300,000. As an alternative, the creditor can sue any one partner or any combination of two for the entire $300,000. Among the partners, anyone who has to pay the creditor more than her or his pro rata share of the liability usually can seek contribution from the remaining partners.
Taxation Like proprietorships, partnerships are not a taxable entity. The fact that this type of organization pays no income tax does not mean that the profits of the
Don’t rely on partners having an equal voice in managing the organization; negotiate how to share this managerial responsibility.
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partnership are free from income tax. A partnership files an information return that allocates to each partner his or her proportionate share of profits or losses from operations, dividend income, capital gains or losses, and other items that would affect the income tax owed by a partner. Partners then report their share of such items on their individual income tax returns, irrespective of whether they have actu- ally received the items.
This aspect of a partnership is an advantage to the partners if the organiza- tion suffers a net loss. The pro rata share of this loss is allocated to each partner, and it can be used to reduce these partners’ personal taxable income. However, by this same reasoning, a partnership is a disadvantage if the organization retains any profits made by the organization for the purpose of expansion. Suppose a partner- ship with three equal partners has $30,000 in net income. If the partnership keeps this money, there still is a constructive distribution of $10,000 to each partner for tax purposes. Assuming that these partners are in a 32 percent personal income tax bracket, they each would have to pay $3,200 in taxes, even though they actually received nothing from the partnership.
A partnership does not pay taxes; this may be a benefit or detriment to the partners depending on whether the organi- zation makes or loses money and whether it distributes or retains any profits made.
The basic law relating to partnerships is found in the Uni- form Partnership Act, a state law that can exist in slightly different forms in different states. As articulated in the act, the partnership form of organization generally has the fol- lowing advantages:
1. A partnership is easily formed because it is based on a contract among persons.
2. Costs of formation are not significant. 3. Partnerships are not a tax-paying entity. 4. Each partner has an equal voice in management,
unless there is a contrary agreement. 5. A partnership may operate in more than one state
without obtaining a license to do business. 6. Partnerships generally are subject to less regula-
tion and less governmental supervision than are corporations.
Offsetting these advantages, the following aspects of partnerships have been called disadvantages:
1. For practical reasons, only a limited number of peo- ple can be partners.
2. A partnership is dissolved any time a partner ceases to be a partner, regardless of whether the reason is withdrawal or death.
3. Each partner’s liability is unlimited, contrasted with the limited liability of a corporate shareholder.
4. Partners are taxed on their share of the partnership’s profits, whether the profits are distributed or not. In other words, partners often are required to pay income tax on money they do not receive.
concept summary
Advantages and Disadvantages of Partnerships
CORPORATIONS The third basic organizational form that might be used to operate a business is the corporation. A corporation is an artificial, intangible entity created under the authority of a state’s law. A corporation is known as a domestic corporation in the state in which it is incorporated. In all other states, this corporation is called a foreign corporation. A corporation created under the authority of a foreign coun- try may be called an alien corporation, though it is generally treated the same as
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a foreign corporation under the law. As a creature of state legislative bodies, the corporation is much more complex to create and to operate than other forms of busi- nesses. These legal complexities associated with the corporation are presented in a way that parallels the preceding section so that comparisons with partnerships can be easily made.
Creation A corporation is created by a state issuing a charter upon the application of individuals known as incorporators. In comparison with partnerships, corpora- tions are more costly to form. Among the costs of incorporation are filing fees, license fees, franchise taxes, attorneys’ fees, and the cost of supplies, such as minute books, corporate seals, and stock certificates. In addition to these costs of creation, there also are annual costs in continuing a corporation’s operation. These recurring expenses include annual reporting fees and taxes, the cost of annual shareholders’ meetings, and ongoing legal-related expenses. Sidebar 14.5 describes the process of incorporation.
Do check the website of your state’s authority responsible for issuing corporate charters. In most states, this authority is under the secretary of state.
The formal application for a corporate charter is called the articles of incorporation. These articles must contain the proposed name of the corporation. So that persons dealing with a business will know that it is a corporation, the law requires that the corporate name include one of the following words or end with an abbreviation of them: “corporation,” “company,” “incorporated,” or “limited.” In addition, a corporate name must not be the same as, or deceptively similar to, the name of any domestic corpora- tion or that of a foreign corporation authorized to do busi- ness in the state to which the application is made. The corporate name is an asset and an aspect of goodwill. As such, it is legally protected.
In addition to the proposed corporate name, the articles of incorporation usually will include the proposed corporation’s period of duration, the purpose for which it is formed, the number of authorized shares, and informa- tion about the initial corporate officials.
Once drafted, these papers are sent to the appro- priate state official (usually the secretary of state), who approves them and issues a corporate charter. Notice of this incorporation usually has to be advertised in the local newspaper in order to inform the public that a new corpo- ration has been created. The initial board of directors then meets, adopts the corporate bylaws, and approves the sale of stock. At this point, the corporation becomes operational.
sidebar 14.5
Steps in Creation of a Corporation
If a corporation wishes to conduct business in states other than the state of incorporation, that corporation must be licensed in these foreign states. The process of qualification usually requires payment of license fees and franchise taxes above and beyond those paid during the initial incorporation process. If a corporation fails to qualify in states where it is conducting business, the corporation may be denied access to the courts as a means of enforcing its contracts. Although an organiza- tion may choose to incorporate in its principle place of business, as Sidebar 14.6 explains, many incorporate in the state with the most favorable legal environment.
Continuity In contrast to a partnership, a corporation usually is formed to have perpetual existence. The law treats a corporation’s existence as distinct from its own- ers’ status as shareholders. Thus, a shareholder’s death or sale of her or his stock does not affect the organizational structure of a corporation. This ability to separate management from ownership is an often cited advantage of the corporation.
The separation of the corporate organiza- tion’s existence from its owners’ willingness to remain associated with it is viewed as a major advantage to the corpo- ration’s stability.
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Although the sale of stock by a major shareholder or the shareholder’s death has no legal impact on the organization’s existence, this event may have a very real adverse impact on that corporation’s ability to do business. The shareholder may have been the driving force behind the corporation’s success. Without this share- holder, the corporation’s business may fail.
Managerial Control In the corporate form of organization, the issue of con- trol is complicated by three groups. First, the shareholders elect the members of the board of directors. These directors set the objectives or goals of the corporation, and they appoint the officers. These officers, such as the president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer, are charged with managing the daily operations of the cor- poration in an attempt to achieve the stated organizational objectives or goals. Thus, which one of these three groups really controls the corporation?
To answer this question effectively, you must realize that the issue of who con- trols a corporation varies depending on the size of the ownership base of the organi- zation. In essence, matters of managerial control require us to examine the publicly held corporation as distinct from the closely held corporation.
If you look for the state of incorporation for a large com- pany, there is a good chance that you will discover it is Delaware. In fact, by the state’s own estimate, more than 1 million business entities and more than 60% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware. You may find this surprising considering the state’s relatively small population and geographic size. There must be a reason that so many companies choose Delaware.
Several factors have been suggested to explain Del- aware’s success as an incorporating forum. One of the most frequently cited is the state’s stable legal environ- ment. This includes Delaware’s respected judiciary and,
in particular, the Court of Chancery, which is highly expe- rienced in deciding issues related to the state General Corporation Law. Additionally, the legislature is generally believed to be supportive of business interests. There is no income tax for businesses that do not operate in Delaware (though there is a franchise tax). And the state Division of Corporations makes the process of incorporation simple and efficient. Sources: Delaware Division of Corporations, “Why Businesses Choose Delaware,” https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-businesses-choose-delaware/; Eisenberg, Theodore, and Miller, Geoffrey, “Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements,” 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 1975 (2006).
sidebar 14.6
Why Are So Many Companies Incorporated in Delaware?
Publicly Held Corporations In very large corporations, control by management (a combination of the directors and officers) is maintained with a very small percentage of stock ownership through the use of corporate records and funds to solicit proxies. Technically, a proxy is an agent appointed by a shareholder for the purpose of voting the shares. Management can, at corporate expense, solicit the right to vote the stock of shareholders unable to attend the meetings at which the directors of the company are elected. An outsider must either own sufficient stock to elect the directors or must solicit proxies at his or her own expense. The management of a large corporation usu- ally can maintain control with only a small minority of actual stock ownership.
During the first years of this century, we have seen evidence of the negative aspects arising from a few shareholders, who also serve as officers and directors, con- trolling large, publicly held corporations. The lack of sufficient review and influence
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from those called “outside directors” contributed to corporate scandals that shocked the public confidence in business and the economy. You should appreciate that lim- iting the role of corporate governance to only a few people can lead to massive fraud. Despite legal requirements designed to increase the influence of corporate directors, all accounting records are not perfect.
Closely Held Corporations Unlike the situation with a large, publicly held corpora- tion, one shareholder (or at least a small group of shareholders) may be able to control a closely held corporation. This can result because this individual (or the group) can own an actual majority of the issued shares. This majority can control the election of a board of directors. In fact, the shareholders with the largest amount of stock are often elected to this board of directors. The directors, in turn, elect officers, who again may be the shareholders with the largest interests. In a very real sense, those who own a majority of a closely held corporation can rule with near-absolute authority.
What are the rights of those who do not possess control in a closely held corpo- ration—the so-called minority interest? To a large degree, the owners of the minority interest are subject to the decisions of the majority. The majority may pay them- selves salaries that use up profits and may never declare a dividend. However, the minority interest is not without some rights because the directors and officers stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and to the minority shareholders if the cor- poration is closely held. This relation imposes a duty on directors to act for the best interests of the corporation rather than for themselves individually.
If the majority is acting illegally or oppresses the rights of the minority share- holders, a lawsuit known as a derivative suit may be brought by a minority share- holder on behalf of the corporation. Such suits may seek to enjoin the unlawful activity or to collect damages for the corporation. For example, contracts made between the corporation and an interested director or officer may be challenged. If a suit is brought, the burden is on the director or officer (who may be the majority shareholder) to prove good faith and inherent fairness in such transactions.
The basic difficulty of owning a minority interest in a closely held corporation arises from the fact that there is no ready market for the stock should the share- holder desire to dispose of it. Of course, if there is a valid buy and sell agreement, then there is a market for the stock. Thus, as with partnerships, buy and sell agree- ments are absolutely essential in closely held corporations.
Liability The legal ability to separate a corporation’s shareholders from its man- agers means that the owners are liable for the debts of the corporation only to the extent of those shareholders’ investment in the cost of the stock. Thus, corporate shareholders are said to have limited personal liability.
The generalization that the investors in a corporation have limited liability but those in a partnership have unlimited liability is too broad and needs qualification. To be sure, someone investing in a company listed on the New York Stock Exchange will incur no risk greater than the investment, and the concept of limited liability certainly applies. However, if the company is a small, closely held corporation with limited assets and capital, it will be difficult for it to obtain credit on the strength of its own net worth. As a practical matter, shareholders will usually be required to add their own individual liability as security for borrowing. For example, if the XYZ Company seeks a loan at a local bank, the bank often will require the owners, X, Y, and Z, to personally guarantee repayment of the loan.
This is not to say that shareholders in closely held corporations do not have some degree of limited liability. Shareholders have limited liability for contract-like
Do realize that any minority ownership interest in a corporation provides you with very little influence.
Your status as a shareholder in a closely held corporation probably limits your liability for torts; you likely forgo your limited liability for contracts by cosigning your corporation’s contracts.
The phrases limited liability and unlimited liability are overly sim- plistic; an understanding of a business owner’s liability goes beyond these simple terms.
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obligations that are imposed as a matter of law (such as taxes). Liability also is limited when the corporate obligation results from torts committed by company employees while doing company business.
Even in these situations, the mere fact of corporate existence does not guarantee the shareholders will have liability limited to their investment. When courts find that the corporate organization is being misused, the corporate entity can be disregarded. This has been called piercing the corporate veil. When this veil of protection has been pierced, the shareholders are treated like partners who have unlimited liability for their organization’s debts.
The alter-ego theory, by which the corporate veil can be pierced, may also be used to impose personal liability upon corporate officers, directors, and stockholders. If the corporate entity is disregarded by these officials themselves, so that there is such a unity of ownership and interest that separateness of the corporation has ceased to exist, the alter-ego theory will be followed and the corporate veil will be pierced.
Simply alleging that a person is the sole owner of a corporation engaged in wrongful activity will not result in a piercing of the corporate veil. This conclusion is appropriate when the owner has respect for the existence of the organization. In Case 14.1, note the number of factors that must be considered before the corporate veil is pierced.
case 14.1
ALLI V. U.S. 83 Fed. Cl. 250 (2008)
This case involves Dr. Alli and his spouse, property owners who sued the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for failure to pay housing assistance for residents of three apartment complexes. The owners held the apartment complexes through a business organization called BSA Corpo- ration. HUD counterclaimed that the Allis breached the agree- ment for housing assistance due to multiple health and safety violations. Moreover, HUD argued that the Allis were person- ally liable for the violations, which compelled HUD to pay for relocation of the affected residents.
Among other issues, the court was required to determine whether to strip away the liability protection of the Allis’ cor- poration and “pierce the corporate veil.” The court investigated the extent to which the corporate form was merely used as a shield for illegal activity.
ALLEGRA, JUDGE: In its counterclaims, defendant [HUD] has asserted three breach of contract claims—one each for Pingree, Riverside, and Collingwood—attributable to plaintiffs’ failure to maintain the property in good repair and condition so as to provide decent, safe and sanitary housing. . . . For Collingwood, defendant seeks $90,646.40 for the cost of moving families to safe housing,
$18,128.80 for foreclosures costs, and $1,112,173.45 for the cost to HUD of providing basic services, security, and repairs while acting as mortgagee-in-possession of Collingwood.
Defendant must carry the burden of proof on its counterclaims. . . . Based on the record, the court finds that defendant has done so, demonstrating that plaintiffs breached the HAP contracts in failing to maintain the prop- erties in a safe, decent and sanitary state. . . .
The next question is who is liable for the damages caused by these breaches. Defendant asserts that the Allis should be “jointly and severally” liable for these damages. As to Collingwood, that means that the court must decide whether the corporate veil of BSA Corp. should be disregarded and liability imposed directly upon Dr. Alli and his wife. “The concept of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ is equitable in nature,” the Federal Circuit has stated, and “courts will pierce the corporate veil ‘to achieve justice, equity, to remedy or avoid fraud or wrongdoing, or to impose a just liability.’ . . .” Because BSA Corp. was incorporated under the laws of Michigan, the court applies that law in deciding whether the corporate veil should be pierced.
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. . . Michigan courts often have employed the following tripartite formula:
First, the corporate entity must be a mere instrumental- ity of another entity or individual. Second, the corpo- rate entity must be used to commit a fraud or wrong. Third, there must have been an unjust loss or injury to the [party seeking to pierce the veil].
. . . In considering the first of these prongs—whether the corporation is a mere instrumentality—courts have exam- ined, inter alia, the adequacy of the corporation’s capitaliza- tion, the commingling of funds, the diversion of corporate assets for personal use, a failure to comply with the formali- ties of corporate organization, and domination and control over the corporation by another person or entity. . . .
In general, then, under Michigan law, when the notion of a corporation as a legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify a wrong, protect fraud or defend a crime, that notion may be set aside and the corporation treated as being one with its shareholders. . . . As the Sixth Circuit once commented:
Michigan appears to follow the general rule that requires demonstration of patent abuse of the corpo- rate form in order to pierce the corporate veil. There must be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and its owner cease to exist, and the circumstances must be such that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote an injustice.
United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, sub nom., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 141 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998) . . . Other cases emphasize that while there must be some misuse of the corporate form to trigger pierc- ing, that misuse need not necessarily constitute fraud. . . .
In the case sub judice, the Allis were the sole owners of BSA Corp., which they purportedly hired to manage their properties and which purportedly owned Colling- wood. Every indication is that this corporation was a mere
instrumentality that the Allis relied upon when it served their purposes and ignored when it did not. They com- mingled their funds with those of the corporation—indeed, at trial and in his earlier deposition, Dr. Alli admitted that he and his wife provided interest-free loans to BSA Corp. and, at other times, deposited their personal funds into accounts supposedly controlled by the corporation. The Allis certainly treated the assets of the corporation as if their own—on June 30, 1992, for example, they entered into a deed of trust, as individuals, that encumbered the Collin- gwood property in exchange for two loans of $250,000 and $75,000, respectively. They provided no evidence to indicate that the proceeds from these loans were used to maintain or improve Collingwood—in fact, BSA Corp. never requested HUD’s approval of the loans, as would have been required under the Collingwood regulatory agreement. Periodically, thereafter, the Allis took funds from the Collingwood proj- ect account to make payment on these loans and to pay for personal expenses. Accordingly, there is clear proof that BSA Corp. was a merely instrumentality here, disregarded when it served the Allis’ purposes, thereby satisfying one of the requirements for piercing the corporate veil. . . .
The other requirements under Michigan law for piercing the corporate veil are satisfied here, as well. First, BSA Corp. certainly was wielded by the Allis to commit a wrong—the fail- ure to maintain the buildings in question in safe, decent, and sanitary condition, consistent with BSA Corp.’s contractual obligations. And this entire opinion is a testament to magni- tude and seriousness of this wrong. Second, every indication is that the failure to pierce the veil of this thinly-capitalized cor- poration would lead the United States to suffer an unjust loss. Defendant is seeking well in excess of $1 million in its counter- claims, insofar as it relates to Collingwood, with the majority of those costs associated with HUD’s taking over as mortgagee- in-possession. The record suggests that BSA Corp. lacks the funds to pay a judgment of even a fraction of that magnitude. Accordingly, the court concludes that the circumstances here are appropriate for allowing defendant to pierce the corporate veil and hold Dr. Alli and his wife personally liable for any damages arising under the Collingwood counterclaim. . . .
[continued]
KEY POINTS • Dr. Alli and his wife claimed that the corporate structure shielded them from decisions
made in the name of the corporation. • The court concluded that Dr. Alli and his wife did not act as though the corporation was
independent from their personal assets. • The court also found that the corporate form had been used to commit a wrong by failing to
adhere to obligations to keep BSA’s properties in a decent and safe condition for tenants.
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Taxation Corporations must pay income taxes on their earnings. The fact that there is a separate corporate income tax may work as an advantage. For example, if the corporation makes a profit that is to be retained by the corporation to support growth, no income is allocated to the shareholders. These shareholders will not have their personal taxable income increased, as would a partner in a similar situation. In addition, the corporate rate may be lower than the individual rates.
But corporations also have tax disadvantages. Suppose a corporation suffers a loss during a given tax year. The existence of the corporate tax works as a disadvan- tage because this loss cannot be distributed to the shareholders in order to reduce their personal tax liability. Indeed, as a result of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, a net operating loss (NOL) to a corporation can be used only to offset 80 percent of corporate income earned in other years. And the allocation of such a loss can only be carried forward. (Note: The 2017 law creates many new rules concerning carry- over situations. The Internal Revenue Code should be examined prior to relying on the general rule just stated.)
Perhaps a greater disadvantage of the corporate tax occurs when a profit is made and the corporation wishes to pay a dividend to its shareholders. The money used to pay this dividend will have been taxed at the corporate level. It is then taxed again because the shareholder must take the amount of the dividend into his or her own personal income. The existence of the second tax is potentially significant in selecting the best organizational form for a business. This situation has been called the double tax on corporate income. A similar situation of double taxation occurs when a corporation is dissolved and its assets are distributed to shareholders as capital gains. Yet, as the discussion next indicates, the double tax may not be as big a disadvantage as it appears at first.
Avoiding Double Taxation Corporations have employed a variety of techniques for avoiding the double taxation of corporate income. First, reasonable salaries paid to corporate officials may be deducted in computing the taxable income of the busi- ness. Thus, in a closely held corporation in which all or most shareholders are offi- cers or employees, this technique may avoid double taxation of substantial portions of income. As might be expected, the Internal Revenue Code disallows a deduction for excessive or unreasonable compensation and treats such payments as dividends. Therefore, the determination of the reasonableness of corporate salaries is often a tax problem in that form of organization.
Second, corporations provide expense accounts for many employees, including shareholder employees. These are used to purchase travel and food (entertainment was eliminated as a category in 2017). When so used, the employee, to some extent, has compensation that is not taxed. In an attempt to close this tax loophole, the law limits deductions for business meals to 50 people of the cost. Meal expenses are deductible only if the expenses are directly related to or associated with the active conduct of a trade or business. For a deduction, business must be discussed directly before, during, or directly after the meal. Additionally, meal expenses are not deduct- ible to the extent the meal is lavish or extravagant. Thus, the use of the expense account to avoid taxation of corporate income is subject to numerous technical rules and limitations.
Third, the capital structure of the corporation may include both common stock and interest-bearing loans from shareholders. For example, assume that a company needs $100,000 cash to go into business. If $100,000 of stock is issued, no expense will be deducted. However, assume that $50,000 worth of stock is purchased by
Ways corporate share- holders might avoid paying two taxes on the business’s income and dividend payments: • Reasonable
salaries. • Reasonable
expense accounts. • Reasonable loans
from shareholders. • Reasonable
accumulation of earnings.
• Subchapter S election.
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the owners and $50,000 is lent to the company by them at 10 percent interest. In this case, $5,000 interest each year is deductible as an expense of the company and thus subject to only one tax as interest income to the owners. Just as in the case of salaries, the Internal Revenue Code has a counteracting rule relating to corporations that are undercapitalized. If the corporation is undercapitalized, interest payments will be treated as dividends and disallowed as deductible expenses.
The fourth technique for avoiding double taxation, at least in part, is simply not to pay dividends and to accumulate the earnings. The Internal Revenue Service seeks to compel corporations to distribute those profits not needed for a business purpose, such as growth. When a corporation retains earnings in excess of $250,000, there is a presumption that these earnings are being accumulated to avoid a second tax on divi- dends. If the corporations cannot rebut this presumption, an additional tax is imposed.
Fifth, a corporation may elect to file under Subchapter S of the Internal Rev- enue Code. This election eliminates the corporate tax; this subject is discussed fur- ther later in the chapter.
The usual advantages of the corporate form of organiza- tion include the following:
1. This form is the best practical means of bringing together a large number of investors.
2. Control may be held by those with a minority of the investment.
3. Ownership may be divided into many unequal shares.
4. Shareholders’ liabilities are limited to their investments.
5. The organization can have perpetual existence. 6. In addition to being owners, shareholders may be
employees entitled to benefits such as workers’ compensation.
Among the frequently cited disadvantages of the cor- porate organization are the following:
1. The cost of forming and maintaining a corporation, with its formal procedural requirements, is significant.
2. License fees and franchise taxes often are assessed against corporations but not partnerships.
3. A corporation must be qualified in all states where it is conducting local or intrastate business.
4. Generally, corporations are subject to more govern- mental regulation at all levels than are other forms of business.
5. Corporate income may be subject to double taxation.
concept summary
Advantages and Disadvantages of Corporations
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS A limited partnership basically has all the attributes of a partnership except that one or more of the partners are designated as limited partners. This type of partner is not personally responsible for the debts of the business organization. However, these limited partners are not permitted to be involved in the control or operations of the limited partnership. The management is left in the hands of one or more general partners who remain personally liable for the organization’s debts.
The attributes of a general partnership and a corporation that combine to make the limited partnership an attractive alternative form of business organization are discussed under the subheadings that follow.
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Creation Like a general partnership, a limited partnership is created by agree- ment. However, as in the case of a corporation, state law requires that the contents of a certificate must be recorded in a public office so that everyone may be fully advised as to the details of the organization. This certificate contains, among other matters, the following information: the name of the partnership, the character of the business, its location, the name and place of residence of each member, those who are to be the general partners and those who are to be the limited partners, the length of time the partnership is to exist, the amount of cash or the agreed value of property to be contributed by each partner, and the share of profit or compensation each limited partner shall receive.
The limited partnership certificate is required to be recorded in the county where the partnership has its principal place of business. An additional copy has to be filed in every community where the partnership conducts business or has an office. Whenever there is a change in the information contained in the filed certifi- cate, a new certificate must be prepared and recorded. If an accurate certificate is not on record and the limited partnership continues its operation, the limited part- ners become liable as general partners. Substantial compliance with all the technical requirements of the limited partnership law is essential if the limited partners are to be assured of their limited liability.
The terms of the limited partnership agreement control the governance of the organization. These terms should be read carefully and understood by all general and limited partners before the agreement is signed. Failure of the parties to state their agreement clearly may result in a court’s interpreting the limited partnership agreement.
Continuity The principles guiding partnerships also apply to limited partner- ships if there is a change in the general partners. A limited partner may assign his or her interest to another without dissolving the limited partnership.
Managerial Control In a limited partnership, the general partners are in con- trol. Limited partners have no right to participate in management. The impact of this relationship on the operations of a limited partnership is discussed in detail in the next subsection.
Liability The true nature of the limited partnership being a hybrid is in the area of owners’ liability. Traditionally, the general partners in a limited partnership have unlimited liability. However, the limited partners are not personally liable for the partnership’s debts. These limited partners’ liability typically will not exceed the amount of their investments.
Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA), a limited part- ner’s surname may not be used in the partnership’s name unless there is a general partner with the same name. If a limited partner’s name is used in the firm’s name, that partner will become personally liable to unsuspecting creditors.
Limited partners also may not participate in the management of the limited partnership. Under the RULPA, a limited partner who participates in the organiza- tion’s management becomes liable as a general partner if a third party had knowl- edge of the limited partner’s activities. Sidebar 14.7 lists actions by a limited partner that are not considered participation in management.
Limited partnerships are complex organiza- tions that have been used to raise money for real estate investments and management of complex entities, such as professional sports teams.
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S CORPORATIONS Beginning in 1958, the federal government permitted shareholders of certain cor- porations to unanimously elect to have their organization treated like a partnership for income tax purposes. This election is made possible through the language of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. Today, organizations that are subject to this election often are referred to simply as S corporations.
The S corporation has all the legal characteristics of the corporation previ- ously discussed in this chapter. The one exception to this similar treatment is that shareholders in the S corporation are responsible for accounting on their individual income tax returns for their respective shares of their organization’s profits or losses. In essence, these shareholders can elect to have their business organization treated, for tax purposes, as if it were a partnership. Through this election, the shareholders avoid having a tax assessed on the corporate income itself. Even though the S corpo- ration does not pay any taxes, like a partnership, it must file an information return with the Internal Revenue Service.
S corporations cannot have more than 100 shareholders, each of whom must elect to have the corporate income allocated to the shareholders annually in comput- ing their income for tax purposes, whether actually paid out or not. Only individuals are eligible to elect under Subchapter S. Therefore, other forms of business organiza- tion, such as partnerships, limited partnerships, or corporations, cannot be share- holders in an S corporation.
In addition to the limitations just stated, there are many technical rules of tax law involved in S corporations. However, as a rule of thumb, this method of orga- nization has distinct advantages for a business operating at a loss because the loss is shared and immediately deductible on the returns of the shareholders. It is also advantageous for businesses capable of paying out net profits as earned. In the lat- ter case, the corporate tax is avoided. If net profits must be retained in the business, Subchapter S tax treatment is disadvantageous because income tax is paid on earn- ings not received, and there is a danger of double taxation to the individual because undistributed earnings that have been taxed once are taxed again in the event of the death of a shareholder. Thus, the theoretical advantage of using an S corporation to avoid double taxation of corporate income must be carefully qualified.
Do remember the limitation on the number of shareholders in an S corporation reduces it as an option for many business ventures.
Limited partners do not lose the benefit of limited per- sonal liability when performing the following: • Acting as an agent or employee of the partnership. • Consulting with or advising a general partner. • Acting as a guarantor of the partnership’s obligations. • Inspecting and copying any of the partnership’s
financial records. • Demanding true and full information about the part-
nership whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable.
• Receiving a share of the profits or other compensa- tion by way of income.
• Approving or disapproving an amendment to the partnership’s certificate.
• Voting on matters of fundamental importance such as dissolution, sale of assets, or change of the partner- ship’s name.
• Having contribution returned upon dissolution.
sidebar 14.7
Actions by Limited Partner
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LIMITED LIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS The limited liability company is an increasingly popular organizational alternative. In 1977, Wyoming was the first state to pass a law permitting the creation of this type of business organization.
In 1988, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that limited liability companies (LLCs) would be treated as nontaxable entities, much like partnerships, for federal income tax purposes. Following this ruling, states rushed to pass legislation autho- rizing businesspeople to operate their businesses as LLCs. In essence, its owners have more flexibility than with the S corporation while not having to struggle with the complexities of the limited partnership.
A variation of the LLC is known as the limited liability partnership. This orga- nization often is used by professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants. In the true sense of a hybrid, an LLC and an LLP have characteristics of both a partnership and a corporation.
The growing popularity of these forms of business organizations requires a careful examination of various factors. The focus of the following subheadings is on the LLC.
Creation An LLC is created through filings much like those used when creat- ing a corporation. Articles of organization are filed with a state official, usually the secretary of state. Instead of “incorporators,” the term organizers is used. The name of any LLC must acknowledge the special nature of this organizational form by including the phrase “limited liability company,” or “limited company,” or some abbreviation, such as “LLC” or “LC.” An LLC created in a state other than the one in which it is conducting business is called a foreign LLC. Like a foreign corpora- tion, this LLC must apply to the state to be authorized to transact business legally. An LLC also must file annual reports with the states in which it operates.
Continuity The owners of LLCs are called members rather than shareholders or partners. Membership in LLCs is not limited to individuals. Unlike in the S cor- poration, a business organization can be an owner in any LLC. The transferability of a member’s interest is restricted in the fashion of a partner as opposed to the free transferability of a corporate shareholder. Anytime a member dies or withdraws from the LLC, there is a dissolution of the business organization. However, the business of a dissolved LLC is not necessarily adversely impacted if the remaining members decide to continue business. Either as provided in the articles of organization or by agreement of the remaining members within 90 days of the withdrawing member’s disassociation, the business of the LLC may be continued rather than wound up.
Managerial Control The managerial control of an LLC is vested in its members, unless the articles of organization provide for one or more managers. Regardless of whether members or managers control the LLC, a majority of these decision makers decide the direction of the organization (the fiduciary duties of LLC managers are addressed in Sidebar 14.8). In a few situations enumerated in the state law authorizing LLCs, unanimous consent of the members is required for the organization to make a binding decision. Similarly to partners in a partnership, members of LLCs make contri- butions of capital. They have equal rights to share in the LLC’s profits and losses, unless these members have agreed otherwise. When a member is in the minority with respect to decisions being made on behalf of the LLC, that dissenting member may have rights very much like a dissenting shareholder in a corporation. These rights include bringing a derivative lawsuit against the controlling members of the LLC. Ultimately, a dissenting member has the right to sell the membership interest to the other members of the LLC.
Over the past two decades, the growth of LLPs and LLCs has made these organizational forms very popular for closely held businesses.
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Liability For liability purposes, members do act as agents of their LLC. However, they are not personally liable to third parties. Thus, these members have attributes of both partners and shareholders with respect to liability.
Taxation Finally, state laws and the IRS recognize LLCs as nontaxable entities. Therefore, members’ income is taxed at the personal rate (pass-through). However, members can also elect to have income taxed at the corporate rate. This may be an advantage, given the 2017 changes to the tax law, but the impact of double taxation must also be considered. Although the LLC appears to have many advantages, do not forget that careful analysis is needed in every situation to determine whether this type of tax treatment is in the members’ best interests.
NON-PROFITS Depending on the purpose of your organization, you may find that creating a non- profit instead of one of the above profit-oriented forms is a better choice. Gener- ally speaking, non-profit organizations are created for a public purpose and not to personally benefit owners or members. A non-profit must return any profits made to the organization to be used for future operations. Importantly, a non-profit can have paid employees, the payment to whom is considered an expense. In addition, a non-profit may provide the liability limitation to directors and officers that make the corporate form so important. Many different types of businesses are run as non- profits, including charities, religious organizations, museums, and even universities.
Non-profit organizations can take a variety of forms, including trusts, corpora- tions, and associations. State law dictates what organizations are permissible, the necessary filings, and the governance structure. For example, a non-profit corpora- tion must file articles of incorporation with the state, it is run by a board of directors, and it has limited liability, just like a traditional corporation. An important part of any non-profit administration is the avoidance of conflicts of interest between the non-profit and board members. Some states require a non-profit to adopt an explicit conflict of interest policy (and having one is a good idea even if not required).
It is a standard proposition that corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to share- holders. Do managers of limited liability companies owe similar duties to members? Surprisingly, this is an area of law that is still being developed. Some states treat LLC fiduciary duties similar to those owed in corporations, while others apply the rules for partnership. Fiduciary duties are clearly spelled out in some state statutes, while others are silent. In some cases, different duties are trig- gered in a “manager managed” LLC versus one that is “member managed.” Delaware provides an especially
strong mechanism for limiting fiduciary duties by permit- ting their contractual elimination in the LLC agreement. Courts are still working out what the above statutory lan- guage means in the context of this relatively new form of business organization. It is an important issue. In deciding what state is best for LLC organization and what language to include in the agreement, the desired nature of fidu- ciary duties should be considered. Source: Miller, Sandra K., “What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More Than a Decade of Experimentation?” 32 Journal of Corpo- ration Law 565 (2007).
sidebar 14.8
Fiduciary Duties in LLCs
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One critical attribute for most non-profits is tax-exempt status. In addition to eliminating tax liability, such status permits donors to deduct contributions from their taxes. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must approve tax exempt status, and many charitable non-profits file under section 501(c)(3) of the IRS code (other sec- tions apply to specific types of non-profits such as social clubs or professional asso- ciations). An IRS approval is contingent on an organization’s intent to operate for a specific tax-exempt purpose that is allowed under the law. Similar filings for tax exemp- tion must be made with the relevant state. Yearly filings to the IRS are required, and organizations that do not comply or meet the exemption requirements may have their status revoked. In 2011, the IRS announced that it was revoking the tax-exempt status of 275,000 non-profits, shrinking the sector by 17 percent. This action demonstrates the diligence that is required if an organization is to effectively operate as a non-profit.
MAKING THE DECISION There usually is no absolutely right answer to the question, Which organizational form is best for a particular business’s operation? Hopefully, the preceding sections have presented you with some helpful background material to consider when this important decision is made.
The criteria used to select a form of organization needs to be reviewed periodi- cally. This review should be done in consultation with close advisers such as attor- neys, accountants, bankers, and insurers. These people weigh the factors and costs involved and then select the most suitable organizational form for the business’s needs at that time. Because this selection process balances advantages against disad- vantages, the decision often is to choose the least objectionable form of organization.
Today, the growth in limited liability partnerships and limited liability compa- nies could lead you to think these are the best options for your business activities. While one of these forms may be best, a careful analysis will consider the various factors discussed in this chapter.
It is not unusual for the growth in a business to be reflected in changes in orga- nizational forms as a part of a life cycle. For example, business activity could begin through the efforts of a sole proprietor. As the business grows and investors join the business, the organizational form could shift to a partnership or limited partnership (depending on the active or passive nature of the investor). An alternative to the partnership or limited partnership could be a limited liability organization. As the business matures and prepares to conduct a public offering of its stock, the corpo- rate form becomes the most feasible organization.
Operating the Organization through Agents
Business organizations cannot accomplish anything without the assistance of individu- als. An accounting firm does nothing as an organization. The work of the firm is done through the accountants and other employees. Likewise, a local restaurant provides food through the work of servers, cooks, managers, and other employees. In both cases, those employees undertake acts that implicate contract, tort, or criminal law.
The people who get the work done are called agents, and the concepts presented below are referred to as agency law. The actions of agents can have significant conse- quences to business organizations. The concepts presented in the next four sections form the fundamentals of agency relationships in the transaction of everyday business.
Don’t assume there is an easy answer to which organizational form is best; careful analysis and consultation with experts help businesspeople make wise decisions in the selection process.
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TERMINOLOGY The application of agency law involves the interaction among three parties. Although individuals usually are these parties, agency relationships can involve business orga- nizations. Figure 14.2 illustrates a three-step approach to understanding how the law views the purpose of agency relationship.
First, a principal interacts with someone (or some organization) for the purpose of obtaining that second party’s assistance. This second party is the agent. Principals hire agents to do tasks and represent them in transactions. All employees are agents of the employer/principal, but not all agents are employees. For example, a principal may hire an independent contractor to perform a task. Principals do not directly control inde- pendent contractors and independent contractors generally work for more than one principal. Examples of independent contractors include attorneys (other than in-house counsel), outside accountants, and subcontractors hired to perform construction proj- ects. The nature of their relationship with the principal determines whether employees or independent contractors have authority to contractually bind the principal.
Next, the agent (on behalf of the principal) interacts with a third party. Third, the usual legal purpose of the agent is to create a binding relationship between the principal and third party. Typically, the agent wants Step 3 to involve the understand- ing that any liability created by Steps 1 and 2 is replaced by the new principal–third party relationship. To accomplish this substitution, the agent must remember to comply with the following duties owed to the principal:
• A duty of loyalty to act for the principal’s advantage and not to act to benefit the agent at the principal’s expense.
• A duty to keep the principal fully informed. • A duty to obey instructions. • A duty to account to the principal for monies handled.
In studying the law of agency, keep in mind that the employer/business organiza- tion is the principal and the employee is the agent. Whether employee conduct cre- ates liability for the employer is the usual agency issue facing businesses. Such issues may involve either contracts or torts.
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY FROM AN AGENT’S ACTS How is an organization bound in a contract? For an employee to bind the employer to a contract negotiated with a third party, the employer must have authorized the employee’s actions. Contractual authority can take the following forms:
• Actual authority. • Implied authority. • Apparent authority.
Organizations deal with third parties through the actions of agents.
Principal Agent Step 1
Principal Agent
Step 2
Third Party
Principal Agent
Third Party
Step 3
Figure 14.2 Illustration of the agency relationship.
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Only when one of these types of authority is present will the principal and the third party become contractually bound.
Actual Authority A simple example helps illustrate the concept of actual author- ity. Suppose, as an owner of a restaurant, you hire Alex to be an evening manager. You discover that the restaurant is running low on coffee. You write a note to your friend, Terry, the manager of the local grocery store. In this note, you ask Terry to allow Alex to charge $100 worth of coffee to your restaurant’s account at the grocery store. You give this note to Alex with instructions to purchase the coffee and deliver the note to Terry. If Terry allows Alex to charge $100 worth of coffee, is your res- taurant liable to pay $100 to the grocery store? The answer is yes, because Alex had actual authority, which was expressed in writing.
Now suppose a week later, you send Alex to the same grocery store to buy pound cake and yogurt. This time you call Terry on the phone and ask that Alex be allowed to charge the cost of the cake and yogurt. Once again, your restaurant is contractu- ally liable to pay for this purchase because Alex was actually authorized to contract through your expressed oral statement to Terry.
Implied Authority What if, sometime later, you and your co-owner are out of town and Alex is in charge of the restaurant for the evening. Alex, realizing that the tuna salad is in short supply, goes to Terry’s grocery store and charges to the res- taurant $60 worth of tuna fish. Upon your return, you find a bill from Terry for this purchase. Legally, do you have to pay it? Yes. This time Alex’s actions contractually bind the restaurant to Terry because Alex had implied authority to do what was necessary for the restaurant’s benefit. This implied authority arises from the position Alex holds as evening manager and by the history of the express authority situations.
Apparent Authority Finally, suppose that you terminate Alex’s employment. In retaliation, Alex goes to Terry’s grocery store and charges a variety of groceries that are consistent with the food your restaurant serves. When you get the bill from Terry, is the restaurant liable? Answer—yes. Even though Alex lacks any actual (expressed or implied) authority, your failure to notify Terry of Alex’s termination left Alex with apparent authority. Due to the history of Alex’s representing your restaurant, it is reasonable for Terry to assume that this incident is one more in the series of Alex’s properly charging items to the restaurant’s account. To prevent this unwanted liabil- ity from occurring, you should have let Terry know that Alex is no longer employed. This notice destroys the existence of apparent authority.
It should be noted that in this last scenario, involving the existence of apparent authority, you would have a claim against Alex for the monies you had to pay Terry. Alex’s liability to you arises because Alex breached the duty of loyalty owed to the restaurant.
The basic concepts of agency law apply to the operation of business organiza- tions. Sometimes, the law provides technical rules, such as those applicable to how partners can bind their partnership. One such special rule is worthy of mention. A partner in a trading partnership, that is, one engaged in the business of buying and selling commodities, has the implied authority to borrow money in the usual course of business and to pledge the credit of the firm. A partner in a nontrading partnership, such as an accounting or other service firm, has no implied power to borrow money. In the latter case, such authority must be actual before the firm will be bound.
Specific instructions, whether spoken or written, given by an employer to an employee create actual authority.
Implied authority can be inferred from the acts of an agent who holds a position of authority or who had actual authority in previous situations.
Remember to notify third parties if an agent no longer works for you; this notice is essential to cut off apparent authority.
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Ratification What happens when an agent enters into a contract without proper authority? Although the agent does not have the power to bind the principal, the contract may become binding if ratified. Ratification occurs when a principal vol- untarily decides to honor an agreement, which otherwise would not be binding due to an agent’s lack of authority. Returning to the example of the restaurant’s evening manager Alex, suppose Alex enters into a contract on behalf of the restaurant to purchase $100,000 worth of kitchen equipment. If Alex had no authority to bind the restaurant, yet you realize that this is a great deal, you could ratify the contract, and follow through with the transaction.
TORT LIABILITY FROM AN AGENT’S ACTS The legal elements of a tort are discussed in Chapter 10. For the purpose of this discus- sion, remember that a tort is a breach of a duty that causes injury to a person or their property. If you drive your car onto the sidewalk and hit a pedestrian, you are person- ally liable for the tort of negligence due to your poor driving. Now, suppose the driver was your employee delivering items from your business. Can the injured victim collect damage from you and your business? The answer is found in agency law.
An agent who causes harm to a third party may create legal liability owed by the principal to the third party. The legal test for imposing this “vicarious liability” depends on whether the agent was acting within the scope of employment when the tort occurred. Any time an employee is liable for tortious acts in the scope of employ- ment, the employer is also liable. This is because of the tort doctrine of respondeat superior (“let the master reply”).
The reason for respondeat superior is that the employee is advancing the interests of the employer when the tortious act occurs. If the employee is not doing the work, the employer would have to do it. Therefore, the employer is just as liable as the employee when the employee acts tortiously in carrying out the work. In a sense, the employer has set the employee in motion and is responsible for the employee’s acts.
Most respondeat superior cases involve employee negligence. Note, however, that the employer is strictly liable once the employee’s fault is established. And it does not matter that the employer warned the employee against the tortious behavior.
Some respondeat superior cases involve an employee’s intentional tort. If a store’s service representative strikes a customer during an argument over the return of mer- chandise, the store will be liable under respondeat superior. But if the argument con- cerns football instead of the return of merchandise, the store will not be liable. The difference is that the argument over football is not within the scope of employment.
Usually, the only defense the employer has to the strict liability of respondeat superior is that the employee was outside the scope of employment. Sometimes, this defense is made using the language frolic and detour. An employee who is on a frolic or detour is no longer acting for the employer. If, for example, an employee is driving to see a friend when an accident occurs, the employer is not liable.
An employer who must pay for an employee’s tort under respondeat superior may legally sue the employee for reimbursement. In practice, this seldom happens because the employer carries insurance. Occasionally, an insurer who has paid a respondeat superior claim will sue the employee who caused the claim.
The type of business organization in existence determines the extent of respon- sibility for agents’ torts. In essence, partners are liable for all transactions entered into by any partner in the scope of the partnership business and are similarly liable for any partner’s torts committed while she or he is acting in the course of the firm’s
Do know when agents are and are not acting within the scope of employment.
An agent on a frolic and detour leaves the scope of employment, and the principal is not liable for the agent’s actions.
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business. Each partner is in effect both an agent of the partnership and a principal, being capable of creating both contract and tort liability for the firm and for copart- ners and likewise being responsible for acts of copartners. Generally, shareholders of corporations and members of LLCs are protected from tort liability that exceeds the amount of their investment.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY As with torts and contracts, agents can impose criminal liability on business organizations. There are a variety of ways businesspeople and their organizations can be found criminally responsible. The issue of holding businesses criminally liable has been emphasized by the scandals in the beginning of this century. The repercussions of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and others are still being felt. And recent cases like the one involving Volkswagen’s diesel emissions scandal demonstrate that the emphasis continues.
Trends in Managing the Organization
In the next chapters, you will address legal issues important to governance, such as competition laws and securities and financial regulations. You will study the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), which includes corporate governance reform among its many provisions. Because control of business organizations is a major topic in this chapter, three important trends merit consideration here.
A first significant trend is the increasing emphasis on sustainability in business. Also known as environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations, sus- tainability is more frequently cited as a goal for individual firms as well as inves- tors across industries. The growing concern about the impacts of climate change as well as worker rights in a world with greater income inequality has motivated some company leaders to take action. The results might be increased use of renewable energy, reduction of single-use plastics in product packaging or the use of contracts to ensure fair treatment of workers in the supply chain.
However, one might argue that a corporate board’s ESG goals conflict with their fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the shareholders; perhaps the paths of sustainability and profit diverge. Generally, the business judgment rule provides a significant degree of protection for the decisions of directors by presuming they are in the interests of the firm. Still, a shareholder challenge is always possible.
To avoid concerns of diverging shareholder and director interests, some rec- ommend organizing the firm from the outset as a benefit corporation. This spe- cial business form combines aspects of non-profit and profit organizations in a way intended to permit the business to make a profit while pursuing explicit, socially oriented goals. First approved as a corporate form in Maryland in 2010, it has spread to about two-thirds of the states, including Delaware, California, Illinois, Massachu- setts, New Jersey, and New York. Variations with similar goals include California’s flexible-purpose corporation and Washington’s social-purpose corporation. Remem- ber to distinguish a benefit corporation from a “B-Corp,” which is a private certifica- tion rather than a legal business structure.
The impetus for creating the benefit corporation structure comes from the perception that traditional corporate forms place too much emphasis on profit maximization. This may conflict with business decisions that would yield less
LO 14-5
“While each of our indi- vidual companies serves its own corporate pur- pose, we share a funda- mental commitment to all of our stakeholders. We commit to: . . . Sup- porting the communities in which we work. We respect the people in our communities and protect the environment by embracing sustain- able practices across businesses.” —Business Roundtable,
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation,
August 19, 2019
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profit but achieve a social goal such as preserving the environment or enhanc- ing employment opportunities in the community. In most states with the benefit corporation structure, firms identify the targeted public benefit in the articles of incorporation and subsequently provide reports to shareholders on progress in achieving the benefit. It may be possible to change an existing corporate structure to a benefit corporation.
Benefit corporations are not without criticism. Some note that traditional cor- porations are not legally or functionally precluded from offering essentially the same social benefits due to the flexibility in corporate governance.1 Justice Alito made this point explicitly in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014). Moreover, there may be less accountability to shareholders in a benefit corporation. To date, a few thousand of these corporations have been formed in the various states, and it remains to be seen whether the movement will grow significantly in the future.
Interestingly, as the effect of climate change and other sustainability issues become more impactful on a firm’s bottom line, one could argue that not addressing them is actually a breach of fiduciary duty. Courts have held directors liable for fail- ing to properly consider the risks of certain business decisions. One such example can be found in a recent decision of the influential Delaware Supreme Court related to a firm’s safety choices as detailed in Case 14.2. Perhaps courts and shareholders will view the failure to incorporate sustainable business practices (or even plan for future pandemics or sufficient cybersecurity) as a similar breach.
1Angus Loten, “With New Law, Profits Take a Back Seat,” The Wall Street Journal online, January 19, 2012.
case 14.2
MARCHAND V. BARNHILL, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019)
Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. (“Blue Bell”) is a Delaware corporation that was founded in Texas in 1907. Its headquar- ters remain in Texas. It is very well known for its ice cream, which is a product that is heavily regulated by the federal Food and Drug Administration as well as various state agencies. In 2015, the company suffered a major listeria outbreak, forcing it to recall all of its products, shut down production and lay off over a third of its workforce. The impact on shareholders was huge. One aggrieved shareholder brought a derivative suit accusing two key executives of breaching their fiduciary duties by disregarding the contamination risks.
STRINE, CHIEF JUSTICE: . . . The complaint starts by observing that, as a single-product food company, food safety is of obvious importance to Blue Bell. But despite the critical nature of food safety for Blue Bell’s continued success, the complaint alleges that management turned a
blind eye to red and yellow flags that were waved in front of it by regulators and its own tests, and the board—by failing to implement any system to monitor the company’s food safety compliance programs—was unaware of any problems until it was too late.
* * *
According to the complaint, Blue Bell’s issues began to emerge in 2009. At that time, Paul Kruse, Blue Bell’s President and CEO, and his cousin, Paul Bridges, were responsible for the three plants Blue Bell operated in Texas, Oklahoma, and Alabama. The complaint alleges that, despite being responsible for overseeing plant operations, Paul Kruse and Bridges failed to respond to signs of trouble in the run up to the listeria outbreak. From 2009 to 2013 several regulators found troubling compliance failures at Blue Bell’s facilities . . . .
Source: Delaware Courts/State of Delaware
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Although management had received reports about lis- teria’s growing presence in Blue Bell’s plants, the complaint alleges that the board never received any information about listeria or more generally about food safety issues. Minutes from the board’s January 29, 2014 meeting “reflect no report or discussion of the increasingly frequent positive tests that had been occurring since 2013 or the third party lab reports received in the preceding two weeks.” Board meeting minutes from February and March likewise reflect no board-level discussion of listeria. . . . .
Despite management’s knowledge of the growing prob- lem, the complaint alleges that this information never made its way to the board, and the board continued to be unin- formed about (and thus unaware of) the problem. . . . In short, the complaint pleads that the Blue Bell board had made no effort at all to implement a board-level system of mandatory reporting of any kind. . . .
Blue Bell’s listeria problem spread in 2015. Starting in January 2015, one of Blue Bell’s product tests had positive coliform levels above legal limits. The same result appeared in February 2015. And by this point, the problem spread to Blue Bell’s products and spiraled out of control. . . .
After the fact, various news outlets interviewed former Blue Bell employees who “claimed that Company management ignored complaints about factory conditions in [the Texas facil- ity].” One former employee “reported [that] spilled ice cream was left to pool on the floor, ‘creating an environment where bacteria could flourish.’ ” Another former employee described being “instructed to pour ice cream and fruit that dripped off his machine into mix to be used later.” . . .
B. The Caremark Claim
. . . Under Caremark [698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)] . . . a director must make a good faith effort to oversee the com- pany’s operations. Failing to make that good faith effort breaches the duty of loyalty and can expose a director to liability. In other words, for a plaintiff to prevail on a Care- mark claim, the plaintiff must show that a fiduciary acted in bad faith—“the state of mind traditionally used to define the mindset of a disloyal director.”
Bad faith is established, under Caremark, when “the directors [completely] fail[ ] to implement any reporting or information system or controls[,] or . . . having imple- mented such a system or controls, consciously fail[ ] to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.” In short, to satisfy their duty of loyalty, directors must make a good faith effort to implement an oversight system and then monitor it.
As with any other disinterested business judgment, directors have great discretion to design context- and indus- try-specific approaches tailored to their companies’ busi- nesses and resources. But Caremark does have a bottom-line requirement that is important: the board must make a good
faith effort—i.e., try—to put in place a reasonable board-level system of monitoring and reporting. Thus, our case law gives deference to boards and has dismissed Caremark cases even when illegal or harmful company activities escaped detec- tion, when the plaintiffs have been unable to plead that the board failed to make the required good faith effort to put a reasonable compliance and reporting system in place.
For that reason, our focus here is on the key issue of whether the plaintiff has pled facts from which we can infer that Blue Bell’s board made no effort to put in place a board- level compliance system. That is, we are not examining the effectiveness of a board-level compliance and reporting sys- tem after the fact. Rather, we are focusing on whether the complaint pleads facts supporting a reasonable inference that the board did not undertake good faith efforts to put a board-level system of monitoring and reporting in place.
Under Caremark, a director may be held liable if she acts in bad faith in the sense that she made no good faith effort to ensure that the company had in place any “system of controls.” . . .
Using [company] books and records, the complaint fairly alleges that before the listeria outbreak engulfed the company:
• no board committee that addressed food safety existed; • no regular process or protocols that required manage-
ment to keep the board apprised of food safety compli- ance practices, risks, or reports existed;
• no schedule for the board to consider on a regular basis, such as quarterly or biannually, any key food safety risks existed;
• during a key period leading up to the deaths of three customers, management received reports that contained what could be considered red, or at least yellow, flags, and the board minutes of the relevant period revealed no evidence that these were disclosed to the board;
• the board was given certain favorable information about food safety by management, but was not given important reports that presented a much different pic- ture; and
• the board meetings are devoid of any suggestion that there was any regular discussion of food safety issues.
. . . At every board meeting of any company, it is likely that management will touch on some operational issue. Although Caremark may not require as much as some com- mentators wish, it does require that a board make a good faith effort to put in place a reasonable system of monitor- ing and reporting about the corporation’s central compli- ance risks. In Blue Bell’s case, food safety was essential and mission critical. The complaint pled facts supporting a fair inference that no board-level system of monitoring or reporting on food safety existed.
If Caremark means anything, it is that a corporate board must make a good faith effort to exercise its duty of
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care. A failure to make that effort constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty. Where, as here, a plaintiff has followed our admonishment to seek out relevant books and records and then uses those books and records to plead facts sup- porting a fair inference that no reasonable compliance system and protocols were established as to the obviously most central consumer safety and legal compliance issue
facing the company, that the board’s lack of efforts resulted in it not receiving official notices of food safety deficien- cies for several years, and that, as a failure to take remedial action, the company exposed consumers to listeria-infected ice cream, resulting in the death and injury of company cus- tomers, the plaintiff has met his onerous pleading burden and is entitled to discovery to prove out his claim.
KEY POINTS • Although the corporate directors are given significant deference in their decision making,
when confronted with risks that can impact “essential and mission critical” operations, a court may apply more scrutiny.
• The court determined that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to make the case that the Blue Bell Directors did not take food safety risks seriously enough.
A second trend is the continued definition of the nature of corporate personhood. As described above, corporations are considered legal persons under the law. They undertake activities like individuals, such as buying and selling property. In addition, corporations incur liability for their actions, such as manufacturing defective products. The U.S. Code even explicitly states that, in interpreting U.S. law, “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, soci- eties, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals” (1 U.S.C. §1). Thus, corpora- tions and individuals reasonably have a largely equal claim to rights and protections under the law. For example, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the Supreme Court affirmed a corporation’s speech protections under the Constitution’s First Amendment by striking down a federal law that limited spending on political advertising. And in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014), the Supreme Court was compelled to determine whether for-profit corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Court found that closely-held corporations (non-publicly traded) are indeed persons that have a right to the free exercise of religion (see Chapter 6 for an excerpt of this case).
A third trend is the evolving role of flexible workspaces (e.g., telecommuting) and online customer interactions in business operations and governance. To a great extent, the business world has been on the path toward substituting remote inter- actions for in-person activities for many years. For example, most state corpora- tion laws authorize board meetings using electronic communication of some type (though the permissible technology may differ from state to state). And some busi- nesses have shifted much of their work force to some form of telecommuting. How- ever, this trend greatly accelerated in the wake of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. Suddenly, every business was compelled to consider how much of its workforce could be shifted online. Additionally, in some parts of the United States, pickup or home delivery became the only option for maintaining a retail presence. The extent to which the shift to more online interactions becomes a permanent reality may not be fully determined for years, and it may differ by industrial sector.
We encourage you to use what you learn in this chapter to stay current in this area of operating and managing business organizations.
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Key Terms Actual authority 437 Agent 436 Alien corporation 423 Alter-ego theory 427 Apparent authority 437 Articles of incorporation 424 Articles of organization 433 Articles of partnership 421 Assumed-name statute 421 Benefit corporation 439 Business judgment rule 439 Buy and sell agreement 422 Charter 424 Closely held 416 Corporation 423 Derivative suit 426
Directors 425 Dissolution 417 Domestic corporation 423 Double tax 429 Foreign corporation 423 Frolic and detour 438 General partner 430 Implied authority 437 Incorporator 424 Independent contractor 436 Jointly and severally liable 422 Limited liability company 433 Limited liability partnership 433 Limited partner 430 Limited personal liability 426 Managers 433
Members 433 Nontrading partnership 437 Officer 425 Organizer 433 Partnership 420 Piercing the corporate veil 427 Principal 436 Proxy 425 Publicly held 416 Ratification 438 Respondeat superior 438 S corporation 432 Shareholder 425 Sole proprietorship 420 Third party 436 Trading partnership 437
Review Questions and Problems 1. Forms of Business Organizations
(a) What are the three traditional business organizations and the four hybrid forms?
Factors to Consider when Selecting a Business’s Organizational Form
2. Creation Relative to other factors discussed in this chapter, how important is the factor of creation?
3. Continuity Why does dissolution of a business organization not necessarily impact that organization’s business activities?
4. Managerial Control Why should business owners take time to discuss the control each will exert over the organization’s activities?
5. Liability What is meant by the phrase liability of a business organization as compared to the liability of the owners?
6. Taxation Why is taxation an important element to consider when selecting the appropriate organization for your business activities?
Selecting the Best Organizational Form
7. Sole Proprietorships What are the limitations of the sole proprietorship?
8. Partnerships Terry is the senior partner in an accounting firm. One of Terry’s partners performs an audit. The audited firm sues Terry, as the senior partner, for alleged errors in the audit. If Terry is found liable, can Terry sue to collect a pro rata share of this liability from the other partners? Why or why not?
9. Corporations (a) Who controls the closely held corporation? Explain. (b) Describe five techniques that a corporation might use to avoid the double taxation of corporate profits.
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10. Limited Partnerships Laura and Gary have formed a limited partnership, with Gary agreeing to be the general partner. This partnership has purchased supplies from Sam. Sam has received a promissory note signed on behalf of the partnership as payment. If the partnership is unable to pay this note, can Sam hold Gary personally liable? Explain.
11. S Corporations (a) Although it is technically a corporation, the S corporation has the attributes of
which business organization when considering the taxation factor? (b) What is the implication of this treatment if the S corporation has a profitable
year but does not distribute dividends to its shareholders? 12. Limited Liability Organizations
What is the advantage of this organizational form compared to the S corporation? 13. Non-Profits
Your neighbor has an idea for a faster food delivery service in your town. She is considering organizing her prospective business as a non-profit to avoid taxes. Briefly explain to your neighbor the restrictions on non-profits that might affect her decision, as well as her necessary interaction with the IRS.
14. Making the Decision Albert and Barbara wish to enter into the business of manufacturing fine furniture. Which form of business organization would you recommend in each of the follow- ing situations? Explain each of your answers. (a) Barbara is a furniture expert, but she has no funds. Albert knows nothing about
such production, but he is willing to contribute all the money needed to start the business.
(b) The furniture-manufacturing process requires more capital than Albert or Barbara can raise together. However, they wish to maintain control of the business.
(c) The production process can be very dangerous, and a large tort judgment against the business is foreseeable.
(d) Sales will be nationwide. (e) A loss is expected for the first several years.
Operating the Organization through Agents
14. Terminology (a) What are the names given to the three parties typically involved in an agency
relationship? (b) Describe the general purpose of the agency relationship.
15. Contractual Liability from an Agent’s Acts For several years, Albert acted as a collection agent for Paulette. Recently, Paulette revoked Albert’s authority to collect payments from customers. However, neither Paulette nor Albert told any customers of Albert’s termination. Yesterday, Theresa, one of Paulette’s customers, paid Albert the money owed to Paulette. Albert never gave this money to Paulette. Is Theresa liable to pay Paulette? Why or why not?
16. Tort Liability from an Agent’s Acts Tammy was shopping in Save-a-Lot Grocery Store when Stewart, an employee, brushed Tammy’s ankle with a grocery cart. A short time later, while still shopping, Tammy told Stewart that he should say “Excuse me,” and then people would get out of his way. Stewart then punched Tammy in the face, knocking her to the floor. If Tammy sues Save-a-Lot, what legal issue must be addressed to determine whether Save-a-Lot is liable?
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17. Criminal Liability (a) Describe how business organizations can be found criminally responsible for
their actions. (b) What is the way such organizations are punished?
Trends in Managing the Organization 18. Detail three trends in the law related to corporate governance. Discuss whether you
believe these trends, taken together, reflect an increase or decrease in legal risk associ- ated with managing the organization.
1. You and two of your college roommates have discussed plans to open a restaurant. You intend to attract college-age students who are health- and fitness-minded to your restaurant. You and your co-owners agree that each will invest equally in terms of time and money. However, in addition to contributions made by each of you, another $700,000 is essential for the restaurant to succeed.
• What type of organization is best suited for this business activity? • Who will manage the restaurant during times that you and your co-owners are not
present? • What liabilities do you and your co-owners face?
2. Three years following your graduation with a business degree, you and three class- mates began operating a consulting business. Your firm specializes in offering support related to payroll- and account-management computer applications. So far, your firm has relied on the four of you as its only consultants. A potential major client requests that your firm make a proposal for a year-long project. This project would result in your firm hiring several additional consultants and support staff. Because of the length of time and financial commitment this project may take, you and your co-owners take time to address the following questions:
• How would your firm conduct business on such a large scale? • How could you limit potential liability for and by various consultants? • Which form of business organization is best suited to meet the needs of your
growing firm?
business discussions
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Part THREE
The Regulatory Landscape for Business
P art Three of this text focuses on some of the most important questions discussed in our society today. Can the government’s
regulatory powers protect and improve the lives of individuals and level the playing field for business competition yet still encourage businesses to thrive and innovate? It is a difficult balance of interests that requires an understanding of the complex regulatory environment. The next five chapters describe and discuss critical elements of business regulation.
Chapter 15 focuses on the regulatory process, highlighting the role of administrative agencies in the development of rules and promulgation of reg- ulations to carry out the laws passed by Congress. Courts oversee the work of the administrative agen- cies as a check on the executive branch. The chapter also explores this important dynamic.
Chapter 16 illustrates why the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws remain important in the early years of the 21st century. The regulation of business activities to ensure a competitive environment is now over 100 years old—the Sherman Antitrust Act became law in 1890—yet it continues to be of critical significance. From the market dominance of Apple to Google, the regulatory environment attempts to find the right balance of restrictive and free market principles to ensure workable competition in interna- tional marketplaces.
We know the regulation of the securities indus- try began as an attempt to help the United States
emerge from the Great Depression in the 1930s. One of the commonplace responses to economic troubles caused by business excesses has been further regula- tion of financial institutions and securities firms and exchanges. The accounting scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and many other major companies pro- duced the congressional response called Sarbanes- Oxley. The more recent economic crises resulted in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Chapter 17 provides details on the history that led to securities regulations and financial reforms.
Another critically important area of regulations concerns how individuals are protected from various business activities that might cause harm. Chapter 18 specifically examines privacy and various important consumer protection laws. It first considers the broad reach and power of one of the most important con- sumer-protection regulators, the Federal Trade Commis- sion. Additionally, the impact on privacy is discussed in view of the fact that mobile technology and information security are becoming ever more integral parts of our lives. False advertising prohibitions are addressed, as well as various laws protecting consumers in the exten- sion of credit, limitations on debt collection, and the financial discharge of consumers in bankruptcy.
Finally, in this part of the text, we look at the laws designed to protect our physical environment. Chapter 19 examines the efforts of federal, state, and local governments to enact laws limiting pollution
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of air, water, and land. This chapter also provides examples of environmental laws that protect human health, endangered species, and other aspects of the environment. At this moment in time, some argue that our environmental laws have been so successful in creating a cleaner environment that there is little
to gain from increased regulation. Others argue that business people will sacrifice the environment’s well- being for all in return for increased profits for a few. Chapter 19 provides information so you can make your own judgment as to how business people should act to ensure a safe future. •
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Learning Objectives In this chapter, you will learn:
15-1 To analyze the essential reasons for and requirements of administrative agencies.
15-2 To evaluate the role of courts in reviewing the actions of administrative agencies.
15-3 To understand the trade-offs involved in the regulatory processes.
The Regulatory Process15 Bloomberg/Getty Images
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F rom a historical perspective, there are many
eras during which significant laws were
passed. However, three periods stand out
as involving major expansion of government regula-
tion of business activities. First, the New Deal of the
1930s and 1940s included the creation of securities
regulations, social security, minimum wages, and
several labor laws. During the period of the Great
Society in the 1960s and 1970s, the Civil Rights Act,
Medicare, other employment laws, and environmental
regulations were enacted. Since the turn to the 21st
century, a third period of expansion has included the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, economic recovery legislation,
health care, and financial reforms.
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While it is beyond the scope of this text to explain whether a 30-year pattern exists and whether one of these eras is more significant than the others, it is clear we need to address several questions related to government regulation of business.
This chapter focuses on the regulatory process and the role of regulation in the legal system. You will be introduced to the regulatory process through administrative agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. In addition to learning about the rea- sons for and functions of agencies, the role of the courts in reviewing and enforcing administrative rules and regulations is examined.
Regulatory Process—Administrative Agencies
Recall from the Constitution discussion in Chapter 6 that authority of the fed- eral, state, and local governments to regulate our professional and personal lives is founded in the constitutional principles of the commerce clause and police powers. Typically, the actual regulatory activity is performed by administrative agencies. The term administrative agencies describes the boards, bureaus, commissions, and organizations that make up the governmental bureaucracy. Sidebar 15.1 lists several federal agencies and briefly describes their functions.
These agencies have either one or both types of regulatory authority. The first type is called quasi-legislative in that an agency can issue rules (regulations) that have the impact of laws. The second type is quasi-judicial in that agencies can make decisions like a court.
The direct day-to-day legal impact on business of the rules and regulations adopted and enforced by these agencies is probably greater than the impact of the courts or other branches of government. Administrative agencies create and enforce the majority of all laws constituting the legal environment of business. The admin- istrative process at either the state or federal level regulates almost every business activity.
Although we focus on federal agencies in this chapter, keep in mind that state and local governments also have many agencies. For example, state workers’ com- pensation boards hear cases involving industrial accidents and injuries to employees, and most local governments have zoning boards that make recommendations that impact business activities. State governments usually license and regulate intrastate transportation, and state boards usually set rates for local utilities supplying gas and electricity.
In the rest of this chapter, you will study the following:
• The reasons our governments have come to rely on administrative agencies. • The basic functions of administrative agencies. • The organization and workings of these agencies. • The limits of courts’ review of agencies’ actions.
REASONS FOR AGENCIES There are many reasons administrative agencies are necessary. Almost every govern- mental agency exists because of a recognized problem in society and the expectation that the agency may be able to help solve the problem.
This section contains a discussion of the reasons why agencies are the essential part of the regulatory process.
LO 15-1
The regulatory process involves agencies at all levels of government.
Administrative agencies are needed to provide specificity, expertise, protection, regulation, and services.
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Providing Specificity Legislative branches often cannot legislate in sufficient detail to cover all aspects of many problems. Congress cannot possibly legislate in minute detail, and, as a consequence, it uses more and more general language in stat- ing its regulatory aims and purposes. For example, Congress cannot enact a securi- ties law that covers every possible issue that might arise. Therefore, it delegates to the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to make rules and regulations to fill in the gaps and create the necessary details to make securities laws workable. In many areas, an agency develops detailed rules and regulations to carry out a legisla- tive policy.
Also courts cannot handle all disputes and controversies that may arise. For example, each year tens of thousands of industrial accidents cause injury or death
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) implements federal tax policy.
sidebar 15.1
Major Federal Agencies
NAME FUNCTIONS
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) Protects the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administers all laws relating to the environment, including laws on water pollution, air pollution, solid wastes, pesticides, toxic substances, etc.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (part of the Department of Transportation)
Regulates civil aviation to provide safe and efficient use of airspace.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Regulates interstate and foreign communications by means of radio, television, wire, cable, and satellite.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Promotes dependable, affordable energy through sustained competitive markets.
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) Regulates the availability and cost of money and credit; the nation’s central bank.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Protects the public from anticompetitive behavior and unfair and deceptive business practices.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Administers laws to prohibit distribution of adulterated, misbranded, or unsafe food and drugs.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Seeks to prevent discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and other unlawful employment practices.
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Conducts union certification elections and holds hearings on unfair labor practice complaints.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Ensures all workers a safe and healthy work environment. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Enforces the federal securities laws that regulate sale of
securities to the investing public.
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to workers. If each of these industrial accidents results in traditional litigation, the courts simply will not have the time or the personnel to handle the multitude of cases. Therefore, workers’ compensation boards decide such claims. Likewise, most cases involving alleged discrimination in employment are turned over to agencies for investigation and resolution.
Providing Expertise A reason many agencies are created is to refer a problem or area to experts for solution and management. The Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Food and Drug Administra- tion (FDA) are examples of agencies with expertise beyond that of Congress or the executive branch. The development of sound policies and proper decisions in many areas requires expertise, and thus we tend to resort to administrative agencies for this expertise. Similarly, administrative agencies often provide needed continuity and consistency in the formulation, application, and enforcement of rules and regula- tions governing business.
Providing Protection Many governmental agencies exist to protect the public, especially from the business community. Business often fails to regulate itself, and the lack of self-regulation is contrary to the public interest. For example, the failure of business to voluntarily refrain from polluting many streams and rivers as well as the air led to the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The sale of worthless securities to the investing public was a major reason for the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The manufacture and sale of dangerous products led to the creation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Americans tend to turn to a governmental agency for assistance whenever a business or business practice may injure significant numbers of the general public. A prevailing attitude exists that the government’s duty is to protect the public from harm.
Providing Regulation Agencies often replace competition with regulation. When a firm is given monopoly power, it loses its freedom of contract, and a gov- ernmental body is given the power to determine the provisions of its contracts. For example, electric utility companies are usually given a monopoly in the geographic area which they serve. A state agency such as a public service commission then has the power to set the rate structure for the utility. Similar agencies regulate transporta- tion and banking because of the difference in bargaining power between the business and the public. Regulation is often a substitute for competition.
Providing Services Many agencies arise simply out of necessity. If we are to have a mail service, a post office is necessary. Welfare programs require government personnel to administer them. Social Security programs necessitate that there be a federal agency to determine eligibility and pay benefits. The mere existence of most government programs automatically creates a new agency or expands the functions of an existing one.
The Affordable Care Act created and authorized dozens of new entities to implement the legislation, providing a recent example of how Congress relies on reg- ulatory bodies to fulfill legislative mandates. A complex undertaking such as coordi- nating aspects of the health care law affects numerous existing agencies as well.
Zoning and planning boards are local agen- cies that provide speci- ficity, expertise, and protection.
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FUNCTIONS OF AGENCIES Administrative agencies tend to possess functions of the other three branches of government, including:
• Rule making • Adjudicating • Advising • Investigating
These functions do not concern all administrative agencies to the same degree. Some agencies are primarily adjudicating bodies, such as industrial commissions that rule on workers’ compensation claims. Others are primarily supervisory, such as the SEC, which oversees the issue and sale of investment securities. To be sure, most agencies perform all these functions to some degree in carrying out their respon- sibilities. Figure 15.1 illustrates how these functions have been delegated to these agencies.
Rule Making Agencies exercise their quasi-legislative power by issuing rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law. Because of the vast volume of rules and regulations, many business organizations struggle to know all the legal require- ments. By allowing time periods for public comments on proposed regulations, inter- ested parties have an opportunity to be heard on the desirability and legality of the proposals.
Rules and regulations may apply to a business practice irrespective of the industry involved, or they may apply only to an industry. For example, Occupational Safety and Health Administrative (OSHA) rules may cover anyone’s workplace, or a rule may be drafted so that its coverage is limited to an industry such as drug manufacturing.
The Federal Trade Com- mission and the Justice Department have guide- lines to help determine which mergers are legal and which ones are likely to be challenged as illegal.
Figure 15.1 The powers of administrative agencies.
Power to create rules
& regulations
Power to investigate, prosecute,
advise, supervise
Power to decide
controversies
Legislative Executive Judicial
Administrative Agencies
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Guidelines are also issued by agencies to supplement rules. Guidelines are administrative interpretations of the statutes that an agency is responsible for enforc- ing. Often, guidelines help businesses determine whether certain practices may or may not be viewed as legal. While guidelines can be helpful in understanding an agency’s policy, these guidelines do not have the same force of law as rules and regulations do.
Adjudicating The quasi-judicial function involves both fact-finding and apply- ing law to the facts. If violations of the law are found, sanctions, such as a fine or other penalty, may be imposed. In addition, an agency may order that a violator stop (cease) the objectionable activity and refrain (desist) from any further similar violations. This type of agency action is called a cease and desist order. Viola- tions of a cease and desist order are punishable by fines, which can be as much as $10,000 per day.
Many cases before agencies are settled by agreement before a final decision, just as most lawsuits are settled. Such a settlement results in the issuance of a con- sent order, which requires that the organization or individual accused admit to the jurisdiction of the agency and waive all rights to seek a judicial review. There is no admission that the business has been guilty of a violation of the law, but there is an agreement not to engage in the business activities that were the subject of the com- plaint. A consent order saves considerable expense and has the same legal force and effect as a final cease and desist order issued after a full hearing.
Advising The advisory function of an administrative agency may be accom- plished by making reports to the president or to Congress. For example, an agency may propose new legislation to Congress, or it may inform the attorney general of the need for judicial action due to violations of the law. Agencies also report information to the general public that should be known in the public interest, and they publish advisory opinions. For example, a commission may give advice as to whether a firm’s proposed course of action might violate any of the laws that com- mission administers. Advisory opinions are not as binding as formal rulings, but they do give a business an indication of the view an agency would take if the prac- tice in question were challenged formally. The advisory opinion is a unique device generally not available in the judicial system, as courts deal only with actual cases and controversies.
Investigating One of the major functions of all agencies is to investigate activi- ties and practices that may be illegal. Because of this investigative power, agencies can gather and compile information concerning the organization and business prac- tices of any corporation or industry engaged in commerce to determine whether there has been a violation of any law. In exercising their investigative functions, agencies may use the subpoena power and require reports, examine witnesses under oath, and examine and copy documents, or they may obtain information from other governmental offices. This power of investigation complements the exercise of the agency’s other powers, especially the power to adjudicate.
As discussed in Chapter 13, it is a crime to make any false or fraudulent state- ment in any matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. A person may be guilty of a violation without proof that he or she had knowledge that the matter was within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. As a result, information furnished to an agency must be truthful.
“Concerned that big tech companies are unfairly engaging in potential anti- competitive behavior, the Federal Trade Commission . . . ordered Alphabet Inc’s Google unit, Amazon.com Inc, Apple Inc, Facebook Inc and Microsoft Corp to provide information on mergers that were too small to report to anti- trust regulators.”
—Diane Bartz and Nandita Bose, “FTC
Demands Data on Small Buys by Google,
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft,” Reuters, February 11,
2020
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ORGANIZATION OF AGENCIES Administrative agencies, boards, or commissions usually consist of five to seven members, one of whom is appointed as chair. Laws creating the regulatory body usu- ally specify that no more than a simple majority of the members (three of the five or four of the seven) may belong to the same political party. Appointments at the fed- eral level require Senate confirmation, and appointees are not permitted to engage in any other business or employment during their terms. They may be removed from office by the president only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
Sidebar 15.2 highlights the constitutionality of a novel agency structure and executive oversight of the agency director.
Regulatory agencies require staffs to carry out their duties. While each agency has its own distinctive organizational structure to meet its responsibilities, most agen- cies have persons performing certain functions common to all agencies. Because agencies have quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions as well as the usual execu- tive ones, the organizational chart of an agency usually embraces the full range of governmental duties. Figure 15.2 shows an organizational chart outlining the general functions and duties of administrative agencies.
In General The chairperson is designated as such at the time of nomination by the president and is the presiding officer at agency meetings. The chairperson usu- ally belongs to the same political party as the president and, while an equal in voting, is somewhat more important than the other agency members because of visibility and the power to appoint staff. For example, the chair of the Federal Reserve Board is often in the news, while the other board members are relatively unknown.
In 2010, legislation aimed at Wall Street reform, com- monly known as the Dodd-Frank Act, created the Con- sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and granted it wide-ranging authority to regulate financial service prod- ucts. In addition, Congress established the CFPB as an independent agency headed by a single director rather than a multi-member commission. This structure shielded the agency director from public oversight.
In 2015, CFPB Director Richard Cordray increased an initial $6 million fine against PHH Corp., a mort- gage lender, by an additional $103 million. The CFPB alleged that PHH illegally received kickbacks for referring consumers to mortgage insurers. PHH filed a lawsuit asking for the court to vacate the order. It claimed the CFPB did not have authority to issue the fine because its structure as an independent agency headed by a single director violated Article II of the Constitution.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit initially held that the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional. Direc- tor Cordray appealed that decision and the court granted a rehearing en banc on the issue.
In 2018, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a 250 page decision holding the single director structure constitutional and stating that its director can only be fired by the president for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The court, however, held partially for PHH, vacating the $103 million fine.
A Supreme Court ruling in 2020 in another case, Seila Law v. CFPB, however, found a restriction on the removal of the CFPB director unconstitutional because it violated separation of powers. Nevertheless, the remain- ing structure of the agency was constitutional and could operate absent the leadership removal provision. Source: PHH Corp. v. CFPB, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. 2016) and PHH Corp. v. CFPB, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S.Ct 2183 (2020).
sidebar 15.2
Is the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Constitutional?
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The secretary is responsible for the minutes of agency meetings and is legal custodian of its records. The secretary usually signs orders and official correspon- dence and is responsible for publication of all actions in the Federal Register. The secretary also coordinates the activities of the agency with others involved in the regulatory process.
The office of general counsel is so important in many agencies that the appointment usually requires Senate approval. The general counsel is the chief law officer and legal adviser. He or she represents the agency in court and often makes the decision to file suit or pursue other remedies. The general counsel has significant impact on policy and is often as powerful as a commissioner or board member.
Advisory councils are persons not employed by the agency but interested in its mission. Persons serving on councils are usually selected because of their expertise. For example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has an advisory council on poison prevention packaging and another on flammable fabrics. These councils provide for interaction between regulators and those being regulated.
The executive director for administration is the chief operating official of an agency and supervises usual administrative functions such as accounting, bud- geting, and personnel. Research and planning are usually also supervised by the executive director. Because agencies spend a great deal of time lobbying with Con- gress, most of them have a legislative liaison, reporting to the executive director for administration.
All the staff of an administrative agency are employees of the appointed commission- ers or board members.
Figure 15.2 Organizational chart of typical agency, board, or commission.
Northeast
General Counsel
Director of Operations
Bureaus Investigations
Advisory Opinions Litigation
Executive Director for
Administration
Accounting Budgeting
Congressional Liaison EEO
Personnel Planning
Public Information Research
Administrative Law Judges
Southeast
Regional Offices
Northwest
Secretary
Members (5–7)
Chairperson
Advisory Councils
Midwest Rocky
Mountain Southwest
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The duties and suborganization of the director of operations vary greatly from agency to agency. These operating bureaus are assigned specific areas of activity. For example, at the EPA, one group will be concerned with clean air and another with water problems.
Regional offices investigate alleged violations of the law. In addition, they usu- ally have an educational function. Many regional offices have their own administra- tive law judges and special legal counsel.
Quasi-Judicial Staff Administrative law judges perform the adjudicative fact-finding functions. Like other types of judges, administrative law judges are pro- tected from liability for damages based on their decisions. This protection is called immunity. Because these administrative law judges must exercise independent judg- ment on the evidence presented, they must be free from pressures possibly asserted by the parties.
These administrative law judges hear cases of alleged law violations and apply the law to the facts. The members of the agency board or commission hear only appeals from the decisions of the administrative law judges. The judges are orga- nizationally separate from the rest of the agency so that the quasi-judicial function will be performed impartially. Administrative law judges use prior decisions or prec- edent. In addition, they must follow the procedural rules of the agency as well as its policy directives.
Historically, administrative law judges and all other personnel involved in a quasi-judicial hearing have been employees of the administrative agency bringing the complaint. Despite their best efforts to serve as neutral adjudicators, administrative law judges have been accused of being biased in favor of their employer (the agency). To reduce the likelihood of this accusation, several states have created an Office of Administrative Hearings. Such an office provides impartial administrative law judges for hearings involving all agencies in the state government.
The case below highlights the authority of administrative law judges in federal agencies. Sidebar 15.3 that follows presents an overview of the procedures typically followed in quasi-judicial matters.
Because even the administrative law judges work for the appointed agency lead- ers who hear appeals of the decision made, there is a clear appear- ance of bias that must be overcome to main- tain the confidence of the parties regulated.
case 15.1
FREE LUCIA v. SEC 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018)
Raymond Lucia and his investment company marketed a retirement savings strategy called “Buckets of Money.” The SEC claimed that Lucia used misleading slideshow presenta- tions to deceive prospective clients. The SEC charged Lucia under the Investment Advisers Act and assigned the case to administrative law judge (ALJ) Cameron Elliot to adjudicate
the case. Judge Elliot concluded that Lucia had violated the Act and imposed civil penalties of $300,000 and a lifetime bar from the investment industry.
Lucia appealed the decision, arguing that the adminis- trative proceeding was invalid because Judge Elliot had not been constitutionally appointed. According to Lucia, the SEC’s
Supreme Court of the United States
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ALJs are “Officers of the United States” and thus subject to the Appointments Clause. Under that Clause, only the President, “Courts of Law,” or “Heads of Departments” can appoint “Offi- cers.” See Art. II, §2, cl. 2. SEC staff members appointed ALJs, including Judge Elliot. As a result, Lucia claimed that Judge Elliot lacked constitutional authority to do his job.
The SEC rejected that claim. It held that ALJs are not “Officers of the United States.” Instead, they are “mere employees”—officials with lesser responsibilities who fall out- side the Appointments Clause’s ambit. The Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit agreed that SEC’s ALJs were employees.
Certiorari was granted to review the constitutional issue.
KAGAN, JUSTICE: . . . The sole question here is whether the Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States” or sim- ply employees of the Federal Government. . . .
Two decisions set out this Court’s basic framework for distinguishing between officers and employees. Germaine held that “civil surgeons” (doctors hired to perform various physical exams) were mere employees because their duties were “occasional or temporary” rather than “continuing and permanent.”. . . Buckley then set out another require- ment, central to this case. It determined that members of a federal commission were officers only after finding that they “exercis[ed] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” . . .
[I]n Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991), we applied the unadorned “significant authority” test to adjudicative officials who are near-carbon copies of the [SEC’s] ALJs. . . .
The officials at issue in Freytag were the “special trial judges” (STJs) of the United States Tax Court. . . .
Freytag says everything necessary to decide this case. To begin, the Commission’s ALJs, like the Tax Court’s STJs, hold a continuing office established by law. . . . Still more, the Commission’s ALJs exercise
the same “significant discretion” when carrying out the same “important functions” as STJs do. . . . Both sets of officials have all the authority needed to ensure fair and orderly adversarial hearings—indeed, nearly all the tools of federal trial judges.
Consider in order the four specific (if overlapping) pow- ers Freytag mentioned. First, the Commission’s ALJs (like the Tax Court’s STJs) “take testimony.” . . . Second, the ALJs (like STJs) “conduct trials.” . . . Third, the ALJs (like STJs) “rule on the admissibility of evidence.” . . . And fourth, the ALJs (like STJs) “have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.” . . . So point for point—straight from Frey- tag’s list—the Commission’s ALJs have equivalent duties and powers as STJs in conducting adversarial inquiries.
And at the close of those proceedings, ALJs issue decisions much like that in Freytag—except with potentially more independent effect. . . . [T]he SEC can decide against reviewing an ALJ decision at all. And when the SEC declines review (and issues an order saying so), the ALJ’s decision itself “becomes final” and is “deemed the action of the Commission.” . . . That last-word capacity makes this an a fortiori case: If the Tax Court’s STJs are officers, as Frey- tag held, then the Commission’s ALJs must be too.
For all the reasons we have given, and all those Freytag gave before, the Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States,” subject to the Appointments Clause. And as noted earlier, Judge Elliot heard and decided Lucia’s case without the kind of appointment the Clause requires. . . . To cure the constitutional error, another ALJ (or the Com- mission itself) must hold the new hearing to which Lucia is entitled.
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings con- sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
KEY POINTS • SEC’s ALJs have significant authority to ensure fair and orderly hearings, including taking
testimony, conducting trials and deciding issues about the evidence presented. • This significant authority means that, under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause,
ALJs are “Officers of the United States” and not “employees” of the SEC. • Only the President, courts, or heads of departments, like the SEC Commissioner, can
appoint officers, changing the hiring process for ALJs at the SEC.
[continued]
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INFLUENCING AGENCY DECISIONS As discussed previously, agencies adopt rules and regulations. Due process of law requires that before a rule or regulation may be adopted by an agency, interested parties must be given notice of the proposed rules and an opportunity to express their views on them. Agencies give public notice of proposed rules and hold public hearings on them.
At public hearings, interested parties are allowed to present evidence in support of, or in opposition to, a proposed rule or regulation. As a result, the best means of influencing a quasi-legislative decision of an administrative agency is to participate in the adoption process.
Agencies are not politically responsible, in the sense that they are elected by the people. However, it is clear that they react, sometimes dramatically, to the force of public opinion. For example, the SEC consistently garners media attention as it strives to investigate, adopt rules, and assess fines covering corporate scandals.
Citizens writing letters to agencies to obtain action or a change in policy may be effective. These are probably even more effective if directed to a member of Congress, who in turn asks the agency for an official response or explanation. At various times, an agency may find itself bombarded with official congressional inquiries into its activities. Investigations may result in either budget cutbacks or increases. Just the threat of such a proceeding is often sufficient to cause a review of administrative policy.
Furthermore, each branch of government has some control over the administra- tive process. The executive branch normally appoints the top officials of an agency with the advice and consent of the legislative branch. In addition, the executive branch makes budget recommendations to the legislature and has veto power over its statutes. The legislature can review and control administrative activity by abolish- ing the agency, enacting specific legislation contrary to rules adopted by the agency,
Stay involved with the regulatory process by commenting on proposed rules. Go to https://www.regulations. gov/ to learn about proposed regulations and leave comments on those that affect your interests.
Checks and balances are supposed to keep agencies from becom- ing too political.
Quasi-judicial proceedings usually begin with a com- plaint filed by the agency. The complaint is often the result of an investigation of information received from a consumer or other person affected by business conduct that may be illegal. The complaint contains allegations of fact concerning the alleged illegal conduct. The busi- ness or individual accused of some illegality is called the respondent. After the formal complaint is served, the respondent files an answer to the charges and alle- gations. The case is then assigned to an administrative law judge. At the hearing, counsels for the agency and the respondent produce evidence to prove or disprove
the allegations of fact in the complaint and answer. The judge rules on the admissibility of evidence; rules on motions made by counsel; and renders an initial deci- sion that includes a statement of findings and conclu- sions, along with reasons for them, as to all material issues of fact and law. The ruling also includes an order the judge deems appropriate in view of the evidence in the record. This order becomes final if not challenged within 30 days after it is filed. On the appeal, the agency, board, or commission reviews the record of the initial decision and has all the powers it could have exercised if it had rendered that decision itself.
sidebar 15.3
Procedures Followed in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings
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more explicitly defining limitations on the agency’s activities, providing additional procedural requirements for the agency’s adjudications, or limiting appropriations of funds to the agency.
Judicial Review of Agency Decisions
What alternatives are available to a person, business, or industry unhappy with either rules and regulations that have been adopted or with the quasi-judicial decisions? What are the powers of courts in reviewing decisions of administrative agencies? What chance does a party upset with an agency’s decision have in obtaining a rever- sal of the decision? How much deference is given to an agency’s decisions? Answers to these questions must be clearly understood to appreciate the role of administra- tive agencies in our system.
The following section discusses a requirement that must be satisfied by the par- ties challenging an agency’s rule-making or adjudicating function. Then, you will see that the issues before a court reviewing an agency’s decision vary depending on whether a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial decision is being reviewed.
STANDING TO SUE Any party seeking the judicial review of any administrative agency’s decision must be able to prove standing to sue. To establish standing, the challenging party must address two issues.
Reviewability First, is the action or decision of the agency subject to judicial review? Not all administrative decisions are reviewable. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review except where “(1) statutes preclude judi- cial review or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Few stat- utes actually preclude judicial review, and preclusion of judicial review by inference is rare. It is most likely to occur when an agency decides not to undertake action to enforce a statute. For example, prison inmates asked the Food and Drug Adminis- tration (FDA) to ban the use of lethal injections to carry out the death penalty. It refused to do so. The Supreme Court held that this decision of the FDA was not subject to judicial review.
Aggrieved Party Second, is the plaintiff “an aggrieved party”? Generally the plaintiff must have been harmed by an administrative action or decision to have standing. This aspect of standing was discussed in Chapter 4. It is clear that persons who may suffer economic loss due to an agency’s action have standing to sue. Court decisions have expanded the group of persons with standing to sue to include those who have noneconomic interests, such as First Amendment rights.
Sidebar 15.4 summarizes the U.S. Supreme Court’s explanation of why broad meaning should be given to the concept of standing to sue.
REVIEW OF RULE MAKING The rule-making function in the administrative process is essentially legislative in character. Legislatures usually create administrative agencies or quasi-legislative power to the agency. An administrative agency must propose rules and regulations
LO 15-2
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within the confines of its grant of power from the legislature, or a court will find the proposal void.
However, once courts decide that an act of the legislature is constitutional or a rule of an agency is authorized, the courts will not inquire into its wisdom or effec- tiveness. An unwise or ineffectual law may be corrected by political action at the polls; an unwise rule or regulation adopted by an agency may be corrected by the legislature that gave the agency power to make the rule in the first place.
There are two basic issues in litigation challenging the validity of a rule made by an administrative agency. First, is the delegation valid? Second, has the agency exceeded its authority?
Is Delegation Valid? Delegation of quasi-legislative authority to administra- tive agencies is subject to two constitutional limitations:
• It must be definite. • It must be limited.
First, delegation of authority must be definite or it will violate due process. Defi- niteness means that the delegation must be set forth with sufficient clarity so that all concerned, and especially reviewing courts, will be able to determine the extent of the agency’s authority. Broad language has been held sufficiently definite to meet this test. For example, the term unfair methods of competition is sufficiently definite to meet the requirements of due process and validate the delegation of this authority to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
Second, the delegation of authority to an agency from the legislative or execu- tive branch must have limitations. This delegation of authority must provide that the agency’s power to act is limited to areas that are certain, even if these areas are not specifically defined. For example, the FTC regulates unfair methods of competi- tion in or affecting commerce. Regulations or enforcement activities by the FTC that focus solely on intrastate business are void as being beyond the “limited” authority delegated to that agency. Also, procedural safeguards must exist to control arbitrary administrative action and any administrative abuse of discretionary power.
Do remember to ask two critical questions: Is the delegation valid? Has authority been exceeded?
State and local agen- cies may regulate areas of business that are not subject to federal regulation.
The Administrative Procedures Act states:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
Through U.S. Supreme Court cases, we know that a plain- tiff must show a claim within the “zone of interest” pro- tected by the statute under consideration. The plaintiff
does not need to prove that the legislative body envi- sioned protecting this particular plaintiff.
An example of this broad nature of standing to sue is found in the decision of the Supreme Court allowing banks to challenge whether credit unions must limit mem- bership to persons who have a common bond, such as employment with the same company. Source: National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998).
sidebar 15.4
Standing to Sue or Who May Challenge an Administrative Policy
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Just as broad language has been approved as being sufficiently definite for a delegation to be valid under the due process clause since the 1930s, broad standards meet the limited-power test. Today, it is generally agreed that delegations of author- ity to make rules may involve very broad language. For example, the delegation of authority to make such rules as the “public interest, convenience and necessity may require” is a valid standard.
The general language used in delegating quasi-legislative authority usually involves grants of substantial discretion to an agency. It must be kept in mind that this delegation of discretion is to the agency and not to the judiciary. Therefore, courts cannot interfere with the discretion given to the agency and cannot substitute their judgment for that of the agency. In essence, there is a policy of deference by the judges to the decision of the administrators. This practice of deference further emphasizes why a businessperson’s influence on the rule-making process is greater in the administrative process than through appellate procedures.
Sidebar 15.5 illustrates the Supreme Court’s use of this philosophy of deference. It demonstrates the expansive discretion given to administrative agencies and how courts are not to substitute their judgment for that of the administrative process.
Authority Exceeded? Although it is highly unlikely that a court would hold a delegation invalid because of indefiniteness or lack of standards, from time to time courts do find that agencies exceed their authority. Courts will hold that an agency exceeds its authority if an analysis of legislative intent confirms the view that the agency has gone beyond that intent, however noble its purpose may be.
Case 15.2 presents a case that impacts all of us. Regardless of your personal views on smoking, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the agency’s authority to regu- late cigarettes is quite interesting. Notice how the Court struggles with the dilemma present in this case and how the rules of administrative law assist in reaching a decision.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is charged with regulatory broadcasters. One of the contro- versial areas of FCC regulation concerns the censorship of indecent language in broadcasts. In a series of actions since 2003, the FCC has narrowed the permissible use of certain words. Even a one-time use of a word that inher- ently has a sexual connotation or a word that refers to excrement can be considered vulgar and censored as indecent.
Broadcasters challenged the FCC’s penalty for broadcasting these words during the presentation por- tion of an awards show. The Second Circuit reversed the FCC finding the agency had not adequately reasoned its conclusion. While the Second Circuit did not reach a
final conclusion on the constitutional protection of the one-time use of certain words, it did question the FCC’s conclusion.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and reinstates the FCC’s ruling and penalty. The Court relies on the long-held principle that judges should defer to the administrator’s ruling unless the court finds the admin- istrator’s action was arbitrary or capricious. The Court concludes that the Second Circuit failed to apply this stan- dard. Furthermore, the Court did not find the FCC acted in an improper manner, even though the FCC’s ruling was controversial. Source: Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
sidebar 15.5
Standard of Review of Agency Actions
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case 15.2
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000)
O’CONNOR, Justice: This case involves one of the most troubling public health problems facing our Nation today: the thousands of premature deaths that occur each year because of tobacco use. In 1996, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), after having expressly disavowed any such authority since its inception, asserted jurisdic- tion to regulate tobacco products. The FDA concluded that nicotine is a “drug” within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or Act), and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are “combination products” that deliver nicotine to the body. Pursuant to this authority, it promul- gated regulations intended to reduce tobacco consumption among children and adolescents. The agency believed that, because most tobacco consumers begin their use before reaching the age of 18, curbing tobacco use by minors could substantially reduce the prevalence of addiction in future generations and thus the incidence of tobacco-related death and disease.
Regardless of how serious the problem an adminis- trative agency seeks to address, however, it may not exer- cise its authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law. And although agencies are generally entitled to deference in the interpretation of statutes that they administer, a reviewing court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. In this case, we believe that Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. Such authority is inconsistent with the intent that Congress has expressed in the FDCA’s overall reg- ulatory scheme and in the tobacco specific legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA. In light of this clear intent, the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction is impermissible.
The FDCA grants the FDA . . . the authority to regulate, among other items, “drugs” and “devices.” The Act defines “drug” to include “articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” It defines “device,” in part, as “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, . . . or other similar or related arti- cle, including any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” The Act also grants the FDA the authority to regu- late so-called “combination products,” which “constitute a combination of a drug, device, or biologic product.” The
FDA has construed this provision as giving it the discretion to regulate combination products as drugs, as devices, or as both.
On August 11, 1995, the FDA published a proposed rule concerning the sale of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to children and adolescents. . . . A public com- ment period followed, during which the FDA received over 700,000 submissions, more than “at any other time in its history on any other subject.”
On August 28, 1996, the FDA issued a final rule entitled “Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents.” The FDA determined that nicotine is a “drug” and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are “drug delivery devices,” and therefore it had jurisdiction under the FDCA to regulate tobacco products. . . .
Based on these findings, the FDA promulgated regu- lations concerning tobacco products’ promotion, label- ing, and accessibility to children and adolescents. The access regulations prohibit the sale of cigarettes or smoke- less tobacco to persons younger than 18; require retailers to verify through photo identification the age of all pur- chasers younger than 27; prohibit the sale of cigarettes in quantities smaller than 20; prohibit the distribution of free samples; and prohibit sales through self-service displays and vending machines except in adult-only loca- tions. The promotion regulations require that any print advertising appear in a black-and-white, text-only for- mat unless the publication in which it appears is read almost exclusively by adults; prohibit outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of any public playground or school; pro- hibit the distribution of any promotional items, such as T-shirts or hats, bearing the manufacturer’s brand name; and prohibit a manufacturer from sponsoring any ath- letic, musical, artistic, or other social or cultural event using its brand name. . . .
Respondents, a group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers, filed suit . . . challenging the regulations. . . .
We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to determine whether the FDA has authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco products. . . .
A threshold issue is the appropriate framework for analyzing the FDA’s assertion of authority to regu- late tobacco products. Because this case involves an
Dane Penland, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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administrative agency’s construction of a statute that it administers, our analysis is governed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Under Chevron, a reviewing court must first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If Congress has done so, the inquiry is at an end; the court “must give effect to the unambigu- ously expressed intent of Congress.” But if Congress has not specifically addressed the question, a reviewing court must respect the agency’s construction of the statute so long as it is permissible. Such deference is justified because the responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones, and because of the agency’s greater familiarity with the ever-changing facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects regulated. . . .
Viewing the FDCA as a whole, it is evident that one of the Act’s core objectives is to ensure that any product regu- lated by the FDA is “safe” and “effective” for its intended use. This essential purpose pervades the FDCA. . . .
In its rulemaking proceeding, the FDA quite exhaus- tively documented that “tobacco products are unsafe,” “dangerous,” and “cause great pain and suffering from ill- ness.” It found that the consumption of tobacco products “presents extraordinary health risks,” and that “tobacco use is the single leading cause of preventable death in the United States.” . . .
These findings logically imply that, if tobacco prod- ucts were “devices” under the FDCA, the FDA would be required to remove them from the market. . . .
Congress, however, has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products from the market. A provision of the United States Code currently in force states that “the marketing of tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic industries of the United States with ramifying activities which directly affect interstate and foreign commerce at every point, and stable conditions therein are necessary to the general welfare:” 7 U.S.C. §1311(a). More impor- tantly, Congress has directly addressed the problem of tobacco and health through legislation on six occasions since 1965. . . . Congress stopped well short of order- ing a ban. Instead, it has generally regulated the labeling and advertisement of tobacco products, expressly pro- viding that it is the policy of Congress that “commerce and the national economy may be . . . protected to the maximum extent consistent with” consumers “being adequately informed about any adverse health effects.” 15 U.S.C. §1331. Congress’ decisions to regulate labeling
and advertising and to adopt the express policy of pro- tecting “commerce and the national economy . . . to the maximum extent” reveal its intent that tobacco products remain on the market. Indeed the collective premise of these statutes is that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco will continue to be sold in the United States. A ban of tobacco products by the FDA would therefore plainly contradict congressional policy. . . .
[O]ur inquiry into whether Congress has directly spo- ken to the precise question at issue is shaped, at least in some measure, by the nature of the question presented. Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesi- tate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.
This is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its rep- resentations to Congress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy. In fact, the FDA contends that, were it to determine that tobacco products provide no “reasonable assurance of safety,” it would have the authority to ban cigarettes and smokeless tobacco entirely. Owing to its unique place in American history and society, tobacco has its own unique politi- cal history. Congress, for better or for worse, has cre- ated a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products, squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdic- tion over tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency from exercising significant policymaking author- ity in the area. Given this history and the breadth of the authority that the FDA has asserted, we are obliged to defer not to the agency’s expansive construction of the statute, but to Congress’ consistent judgment to deny the FDA this power. . . .
Nonetheless, no matter how important, conspicuous, and controversial the issue, and regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch politically account- able, an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress. . . . Reading the FDCA as a whole, as well as in conjunction with Congress’ subsequent tobacco-specific legislation, it is plain that Congress has not given the FDA the authority that it seeks to exercise here. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is
Affirmed.
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In 2009, Congress passed and President Obama signed the Family Smoking Preven- tion and Tobacco Control Act. This legislation increased the FDA’s authority beyond that discussed in the preceding case. However, the FDA still cannot totally ban nicotine.
REVIEW OF ADJUDICATIONS: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS Judicial review of agencies’ adjudications by its very nature is quite limited. Legisla- tures have delegated authority to agencies because of their expertise and knowledge, and courts usually exercise restraint and resolve doubtful issues in favor of an agency. For example, courts reviewing administrative interpretations of law do not always decide questions of law for themselves. It is not unusual for a court to accept an administrative interpretation of law as final if it is warranted in the record and has a rational basis in law. Administrative agencies are frequently called upon to interpret the statute governing an agency, and an agency’s construction is persuasive to courts.
Administrative agencies develop their own rules of procedure unless mandated oth- erwise by an act of the legislature. These procedures are far less formal than judicial pro- cedures, because one of the functions of the administrative process is to decide issues expeditiously. To proceed expeditiously usually means, for example, that administrative agencies are not restricted by the strict rules of evidence used by courts. Such agencies cannot ignore all rules, but they can use some leeway. They cannot, for example, refuse to permit any cross-examination or unduly limit it. Because an agency “is frequently the accuser, the prosecutor, the judge and the jury,” it must remain alert to observe accepted standards of fairness. Reviewing courts are, therefore, alert to ensure that the true sub- stance of a fair hearing is not denied to a party to an administrative hearing.
The principle that federal administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and pursue methods of inquiry permitting them to discharge their duties grows out of the view that administrative agencies and administrators will be familiar with the industries they regulate. Thus, they will be in a better posi- tion than courts or legislative bodies to design procedural rules adapted to the pecu- liarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency involved.
In reviewing the procedures of administrative agencies, courts lack the authority to substitute their judgment or their own procedures for those of the agency. Judicial responsibility is limited to ensuring consistency with statutes and compliance with the demands of the Constitution for a fair hearing. The latter responsibility arises
KEY POINTS • Although a core objective of the FDCA is to ensure that products regulated by the FDA are
safe for their intended use, Congress has established policies for balancing the economic and health implications of tobacco products with more specific legislative enactments.
• This is a relatively rare case in which the Court cannot give deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of the law it is responsible for administering. The Court noted that tobacco has a “unique political history.”
• An administrative agency’s ability to enforce laws through the executive branch must derive its authority from Congress. In this case, Congress has chosen to control tobacco products separately from other similar products within the FDA’s purview.
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from the due process clause. Due process usually requires a hearing by an agency, but on occasion sanctions may be imposed prior to the hearing.
Two doctrines guide courts in the judicial review of agency adjudications:
• Exhaustion of remedies • Primary jurisdiction
Exhaustion of Remedies The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is a court- created rule that limits when courts can review administrative decisions. Courts refuse to review administrative actions until a complaining party has exhausted all of the administrative remedies and procedures available to him or her for redress. Judi- cial review is available only for final actions by an agency. Preliminary orders such as a decision to file a complaint are not reviewable. Otherwise, the administrative sys- tem would be denied important opportunities to make a factual record, to exercise its discretion, or to apply its expertise in its decision making. Also, exhaustion allows an agency to discover and correct its own errors, and thus it helps to dispense with any reason for judicial review. Exhaustion clearly should be required in those cases involving an area of the agency’s expertise or specialization; it should require no unusual expense. It should also be required when the administrative remedy is just as likely as the judicial one to provide appropriate relief. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies avoids the premature interruption of the administrative process.
This doctrine is not an absolute principle. Courts do allow parties to litigate prior to exhausting administrative remedies. Sidebar 15.6 provides explanation for exceptions to this administrative requirement.
Primary Jurisdiction A doctrine similar to exhaustion of remedies is known as primary jurisdiction. Exhaustion applies when a claim must go in the first instance to an administrative agency alone. Primary jurisdiction applies when a claim is originally filed in the courts. It comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues that, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the spe- cial competence of an administrative body. In such a case, the judicial process is sus- pended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views. Primary jurisdiction ensures uniformity and consistency in dealing with matters entrusted to an administrative body. The doctrine is invoked when referral to the agency is preferable
Don’t ignore what may appear to be a biased administrative hearing. Relying on courts to reverse the agency’s decision is a bad plan.
Colleges and universi- ties have an admin- istrative process for handling students’ grade appeals. You must fol- low this administrative procedure.
When there is nothing to be gained from the exhaus- tion of administrative remedies and when the harm from the continued existence of the administrative ruling is great, the courts have not been reluctant to discard this doctrine. This is especially true when very fundamental constitutional guarantees such as freedom of speech or press are involved or when the administrative remedy is likely to be inadequate.
Also, probably no court would insist upon exhaus- tion when the agency is clearly acting beyond its jurisdic- tion (because its action is not authorized by statute or the statute authorizing it is unconstitutional) or where it would result in irreparable injury (such as great expense) to the petitioner. Finally, an exception to the doctrine is fraud. If an agency is acting fraudulently, immediate access to the court is appropriate.
sidebar 15.6
Exceptions to Requirement of Exhaustion
A judge hearing a case involving a dispute over licensing requirements for a nuclear power plant likely would refer this case to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
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because of its specialized knowledge or expertise in dealing with the matter in con- troversy. Statutes such as those guaranteeing equal employment opportunity that cre- ate a private remedy for dollar damages sometimes require the parties to resort to an administrative agency as a condition precedent to filing suit. Some of these are federal statutes that require referral to state agencies. In these cases, referral must occur, but the right to sue is not limited by the results of the administrative decision.
REVIEW OF FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS When it reviews the findings of fact made by an administrative body, a court pre- sumes them to be correct. A court of review examines the evidence by analyzing the record of the agency’s proceedings. It upholds the agency’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. In other words, the record must contain material evidence from which a reasonable person might reach the same conclusion as did the agency. If substantial evidence in support of the decision is present, the court will not disturb the agency’s findings, even though the court itself might have reached a different conclusion on the basis of other conflicting evidence also in the record. For example, the determination of credibility of the witnesses who testify in quasi-judicial proceedings is for the agency to determine and not the courts.
Courts do not (1) reweigh the evidence, (2) make independent determinations of fact, or (3) substitute their view of the evidence for that of the agency. However, courts do determine if there is substantial evidence to support the action taken. But in their examination of the evidence, all that is required is evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable mind to a fair degree of certainty. Thus, substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.
For the courts to exercise their function of limited review, an agency must pro- vide a record that sets forth the reasons and basis for its decision. If this record
1. Regardless of whether a party is challenging an agency’s rule making or adjudication, that party must have standing to sue.
2. To establish standing to sue, the challenger must show the reviewing court that the agency’s decision is subject to review and that the challenger is person- ally affected by the agency’s decision.
3. When the decision challenged involves the agency’s rule-making function, the court must determine if the agency’s authority was validly delegated.
4. If the delegation of authority is definite and limited, the court will decide if the agency has exceeded its author- ity. If the answer is no, the agency’s rule will be upheld.
5. When the decision challenged involves the agency’s adjudicatory function, the law requires the challenger to exhaust the available administrative remedies and the court to determine whether an agency should have primary jurisdiction.
6. The factual findings of an agency are presumed to be correct.
7. Courts are not permitted to substitute their personal views for the agency’s findings and conclusions if a reasonable person could reach the same result as the agency.
8. An agency’s expertise is entitled to great deference and will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous.
concept summary
Judicial Review of Agency Decisions
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shows that the agency did not examine all relevant data and that it ignored issues before it, a court may set aside the agency’s decision because such a decision is arbi- trary and capricious. Agencies cannot assume their decisions. They must be based on evidence, and the record must support the decision.
After reading this section and the preceding ones, do you understand why it is impor- tant for businesses to take seriously the procedures within the administrative agency?
Criticism of Administrative Agencies
Administrative agencies and the regulatory process face many problems and much criticism. Sidebar 15.7 summarizes issues relating to the people involved, to the pro- cess followed, and to the substantive outcomes of agencies’ rule-making and adjudi- cating authority.
LO 15-3
RELATING TO PERSONNEL
1. Government has difficulty in hiring and retaining the best-qualified people. Salaries are often not competi- tive, and advancement is often slower than in the pri- vate sector. Also, some people are overqualified for their positions.
2. The reward system usually does not make a signifi- cant distinction between excellent, mediocre, and poor performances. There are few incentives to improve productivity and job performance.
3. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to discharge unsatisfactory employees. Transfers of employees are easier to accomplish than discharges.
4. Personnel in many top positions are selected for political reasons. They often lack the necessary expertise to run an effective organization.
RELATING TO PROCEDURES
1. Delay in the decision-making process is quite com- mon. There often is no reason to expedite decisions, and a huge backlog of cases is common in agencies such as EEOC.
2. The administrative process is overwhelmed with paperwork and with meetings.
3. Rules and regulations are often written in complex legal language—“legalese”—which laypeople cannot understand.
4. There is often a lack of enforcement procedures to follow up on actions taken to ensure compliance.
5. The administrative process can be dictatorial; there may be too much discretionary power, often unstruc- tured and unchecked, placed in many bureaucratic hands. Formal as well as informal administrative action can amount to an abuse of power.
RELATING TO SUBSTANCE
1. There are so many agencies making rules and reg- ulations directed at the business community that the rules and regulations often overlap and are in conflict.
2. Some agencies are accused of “sweetheart regu- lations,” or favoring the industry or industries they regulate over the public interest. This may arise as a result of the “revolving door” relationship. Regula- tors are often persons who had former high execu- tive positions in the industries they regulate. The reverse is also true: People in high-paying jobs in certain industries often were regulators of those very industries.
3. Many actions for illegal conduct end only with con- sent orders. A business accused of a violation agrees not to violate the law in the future without admitting any past violation. Such actions have little deter- rent effect on others, and little or no punishment is imposed for illegal conduct.
4. The volume of rules adopted by agencies is beyond the ability of the business community to keep up with and comply with.
5. Enforcement of some laws varies over time.
sidebar 15.7
Criticisms of Administrative Process
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At the heart of many of these problems and criticisms is the cost associated with the regulatory process.
THE COSTS TO BUSINESS Regulation is a form of taxation. It directly increases the cost of government. But these direct costs of regulation are only a small fraction of the indirect costs. Regula- tion significantly adds to the cost of doing business, and these costs are passed on to the tax-paying, consuming public. The consumer, for whose protection many regula- tions are adopted, pays both the direct cost of regulation (in taxes) and the indirect cost (when purchasing products and services).
The existence of a governmental agency usually forces a business subject to the agency’s jurisdiction to create some way to monitor compliance with regulations and rules. Large corporations now typically employ a chief compliance officer (CCO) to navigate the ever-changing landscape of complex business regulations and to detect any noncompliance within the organization. Additionally, businesses often must consider the laws of multiple countries where they conduct business.
Other costs the public must absorb result from agency regulations that inhibit competition and innovation. Regulation may protect existing companies by creating a barrier to entry into a market. Regulation tends to protect “cozy competition” to the extent that, quite often, the parties that object the most to deregulation are the businesses being regulated.
Perhaps the most tiresome additional cost to the business community is the cost of filings. The burden of the documentation involved in filing applications, returns, reports, and forms is significant and a major cost of doing business.
Federal administrative agencies are required to work with the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy as it attempts to lessen the burdens of regula- tion on small businesses. These requirements are spelled out in the Regulatory Flex- ibility Act and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act.
THE COSTS TO SOCIETY Historically, there was little or no cost-benefit analysis when new rules and regula- tions were proposed. Government has tended only to assess the benefits accruing from a cleaner environment, safer products, healthier working conditions, and so on, in deciding to embark upon vast new regulatory programs. The primary focus of policymaking by way of such social regulation has not been on balancing the costs of the programs with their potential benefits. The public, and especially consumers, has frequently been forced to pay for many things it did not want or need in the sense that the cost far exceeded the benefits.
At first glance, the application of cost-benefit analysis to the administrative pro- cess would seem to make sense. However, on closer examination, it is obvious that in many cases it is not possible to weigh the costs against the benefits of regulation.
How do you apply cost-benefit analysis to a rule dealing with human life? How much dollar benefit is to be assigned to a life in measuring it against the cost? Assume that a Department of Transportation rule requiring front- and side-impact air bags in all new automobiles sold adds a cost of $800 to each car. Assume also that it saves 50,000 lives per year. Is the cost worth the benefit? Your answer may depend on whether you are one of the 50,000. Cost-benefit analysis becomes ethically awkward
Attempts to comply with administrative agencies can cause businesses to become more and more bureaucratic.
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when there is an attempt to place a dollar value on things not usually bought and sold, such as life, health, or mobility.
A greater cost to each of us occurs when the regulatory process causes ineffi- ciencies. The regulatory process can be so cumbersome that even the administrative agency involved becomes less effective. However, you must ask, “What should you do to stay current and in compliance?” As much as you may want to say, “Let’s not worry about all the details,” it is essential that your company know the rules and guidelines of relevant agencies. As this chapter describes, it is much easier to influ- ence an agency’s action than it is to convince a court you have been wronged by such action.
At the federal level, all agencies are required to publish guidelines and rules in their proposed and final versions. The place for such publications is the Fed- eral Register, which appears daily. Reading the Federal Register is more than a full-time job. The volume of pages printed is beyond what anyone can manage day-after-day. Although it may take a staff, actions by federal administrative agen- cies can be followed. Unfortunately the same cannot be said for each state and all local administrative proposals and decisions. There simply is nothing like a state or local version of the Federal Register. To keep track of regulations of all levels requires personnel beyond that which businesses can afford. Reliance on local attorneys or trade organizations becomes an incomplete means of staying current. The cost of “keeping up” is balanced against the cost of being out of com- pliance. As with the issue of how to enhance efficiency in the regulatory process, there is no easy answer to staying fully informed of administrative actions at all governmental levels.
CONCLUSION Perhaps from the time the U.S. Constitution was debated and adopted, people have complained “There is too much government.” This feeling probably exists today any time a governmental action interferes with a property interest we have.
How did we get to this situation? you might ask. The answer is rather compli- cated and subject to some controversy. What is clear is all levels of governments are larger and more complex in this decade 21st than even 25 years ago. Indeed, each generation of Americans has seen an increase in the government’s influence.
Sidebar 15.8 presents a historical overview of the growth of the regulatory pro- cess and some corresponding administrative agencies.
The topics presented in Sidebar 15.8 are not exhaustive of important administra- tive agencies. In fact, a complete list of agencies would take up too much space. One federal government website lists 136 federal agencies. And there are countless state and local administrative agencies.
Some additional data provide further insight as to the growth of government. In colonial times, more than 90 percent of the people were engaged in some agri- cultural activity. The westward expansion continued this trend. In 1840, four out of every five adults were self-employed. Ask yourself: How much government protec- tion/influence/interference did this society need? Today, more than 90 percent of adults are employees. This shift in our economy has resulted in a larger role for government regulation.
Do review the agencies found at https://www.usa.gov/ federal-agencies/
“The total number of Federal Register pages per decade has increased from 170,325 in the 1960s, to 450,821 in the 1970s, to 529,233 in the 1980s, to 622,368 in the 1990s, to 713,920 in the 2000s (based on a four-year average).”
—“Reviving Regula- tory Reform: Options for the President and
Congress” by Marlo Lewis, Jr.
“Most regulations reviled by some are cherished by others, meaning that any effort to reduce regulation is a political process, not a question of housekeeping.” —Binyamin Appelbaum
and Edward Wyatt, “Obama May Find Use-
less Regulations Are Scarcer Than Thought,” New York Times, Janu-
ary 21, 2011
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As the 1800s ended and the 1900s began, a major concern of the federal government was the concen- tration of economic power into the hands of America’s wealthiest. This concern led to the creation of antitrust laws. Although it was not the first federal administra- tive agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), cre- ated in 1914 to prevent unfair methods of competition, started the growth of administrative agencies in the 20th century. (Note: This topic is the subject matter of Chapter 16.)
The financial crash of the country’s capital mar- kets and the ensuing depression caused Congress to pass several laws attempting to restore economic order. Among some of the most important laws were the securities acts. These laws, passed in the 1930s, and subsequent laws intended to address the business scandals of the 1980s, 1990s, and early 21st century, make up the subject matter of Chapter 17. This chap- ter emphasizes the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Con- gress attempted to balance the bargaining power of busi- ness management and organized labor. These various laws and others affecting the employment relationship are the topics of Chapter 22. A key administrative agency studied in that chapter is the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
The second half of the 20th century saw a focus on discriminatory practices and their negative impact on society and business. At the heart of regulating and pre- venting discrimination is the Equal Employment Oppor- tunity Commission (EEOC). This agency and the related laws are described in Chapter 20.
Also, in the latter portion of the last century we saw a growing concern for protecting the environment. In the 1970s, Congress passed clean air and clean water legislation. To ensure businesses and individuals remain aware of their environmental impact, Congress created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Chapter 19 discusses this area of the law.
sidebar 15.8
Trends in Regulations: Growth of Government in the 20th Century
Key Terms Administrative agency 452 Administrative law 464 Administrative law judges 459 Cease and desist order 456
Consent order 456 Exhaustion of remedies 468 General counsel 458 Immunity 459
Primary jurisdiction 468 Quasi-judicial 452 Quasi-legislative 452
Review Questions and Problems Regulatory Process—Administrative Agencies
1. Reasons for Agencies This chapter discusses five reasons for having administrative agencies. Give an example for each reason.
2. Functions of Agencies Describe the four possible functions of an administrative agency.
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3. Organization of Agencies (a) Why is the position of general counsel of an administrative agency so important? (b) What is the purpose of the administrative law judges within administrative agencies?
4. Influencing Agency Decisions Suppose that a company is interested in a newly proposed regulation on clean air by the Environmental Protection Agency. What should this company do to provide its input on this EPA regulation?
Judicial Review of Agency Decisions
5. Standing to Sue What are the two issues that must be considered by courts to determine whether a person has standing to challenge an agency’s decision?
6. Review of Rule Making (a) Again there are two issues that must be addressed by courts when they review the rule-making
(quasi-legislative) functions of agencies. What are these two issues? Explain each. (b) A national bank sought permission from the comptroller of the currency to sell annuities. This per-
mission was granted as “incidental to the business of banking.” The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company filed suit claiming the comptroller should not have granted this permission. What stan- dard of review of this administrative decision should courts apply?
7. Review of Adjudications: Procedural Aspects Plaintiffs purchased state lottery tickets and were winners along with 76 others. The state had advertised that $1,750,000 would be the prize, but it distributed only $744,471. Plaintiff sued the lottery director, alleging fraud in the conduct of the lottery. The state lottery law provides for administrative hearings upon complaints charging violations of the lottery law or of regulations thereunder. It also allows any party adversely affected by a final order of the administrative agency to seek judicial review. Must the plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies? Why or why not?
8. Review of Factual Determinations What standard of review do courts use to decide whether to uphold the factual determinations made by an administrative agency?
Criticism of Administrative Agencies
9. The Costs to Business Describe four types of costs that businesses must absorb due to the regulatory process.
10. The Costs to Society Why has there been so little use of cost-benefit analysis when judging the merits of an agency’s propos- als and actions?
11. Conclusion Why has the complaint against excessive government been consistent throughout the years?
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1. Suppose it has been two years since your graduation. During the time you have worked for a large energy company. In your work, you have been exposed to the numerous ways your employer is investing in energy. These sources include oil, coal, natural gas, solar, wind, nuclear, and electrical plants.
Just last month, you were told you were being transferred to the CEO’s office. Your first assignment is to work with the general counsel’s staff to determine how your company is regulated and how all divisions are complying with the various, relevant laws and regula- tions. As you ponder this assignment, you ask yourself the following questions: • Is this company regulated only by the federal government, or are state and local
regulations relevant? • How does the company and its divisions keep track of laws and regulations? • If an administrative agency begins an investigation of your company, should your
company cooperate with or fight the agency’s action? 2. You are chief executive officer of a toy manufacturing firm. Your firm has been inspected by officials at OSHA, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for alleged violations of workplace safety regulations. The evidence presented to the agency was confusing and conflicting. You feel strongly that the company should not be penalized. Nevertheless, your firm has been ordered to pay a substantial fine, and an administrative law judge ordered you to make some very expensive modifications in its manufacturing processes. • Should you continue to seek review of your case before the agency’s officials? • Should you appeal by filing a lawsuit to reverse the agency’s decision? • If you are successful in court, under what circumstances can you recover your
attorney’s fees? 3. As a manager employed by Want-It-Now Rapid Delivery Service, you are responsible for pricing the services involving same-day deliveries. Among your primary concerns is the competitive aspects of your business. You have proposed contractual language that states “any package picked up after 10:00 a.m. will be considered as if it is picked up the next business day. Any package delivered before 10:00 p.m. on the day of pick up will be considered to have arrived on that business day. Under the language, a package received at 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday and delivered by 10:00 p.m. on Wednesday is considered, by you, to involve a “same-day delivery.” The impact of this language is that a business day lasts for as long as 36 hours, thereby giving a customer the wrong impression of the phrase “same-day delivery.”
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), under its authority to protect the public from unfair or deceptive trade practices, has contacted your company asking questions about the plain meaning of “same-day delivery.” In anticipation of a face-to-face meeting with an FTC investigator, you strive to answer these questions. • To what degree does the FTC have authority to question your business practices? • Are your clearly stated contractual provisions unfair or deceptive? • Should you cooperate with this investigator or seek a court order enjoining this
investigation? • How do you challenge the FTC’s action if a formal complaint is filed against your
company?
business discussion
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
16-1 To understand the rationale for promoting a competitive business environ- ment and the role of federal and state antitrust law in preserving competition.
16-2 To evaluate how the Sherman Act scrutinizes agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.
16-3 To analyze how the Sherman Act regulates monopolization in business markets.
16-4 To understand the penalties for violating the Sherman Act and important exceptions to liability.
16-5 To analyze how the Clayton Act expands the national policy to preserve competition in the marketplace.
16-6 To evaluate the powers of the Federal Trade Commission in conjunction with and independent from the Justice Department.
Regulating Competition— Antitrust Laws16 NAWROCKI/ClassicStock/Alamy Stock Photo
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W hy is it important to study antitrust laws?
First, the application of antitrust policy
can have significant implications for you
and your company. Major fines and a prison sentence
are not beyond the realm of possibilities. You need to
know that antitrust laws apply equally to small, local
businesses and to large, multinational corporations.
During the Obama administration, the U.S.
Department of Justice imposed more than $8 billion
in fines related to antitrust violations. It also charged
425 individuals and 144 companies with breaking
antitrust laws.1 Notably, the United States is not the
only country actively engaged in antitrust enforce-
ment. In 2016 alone, the European Union imposed a
record 3.7 billion euros (approximately $4.1 billion)
in antitrust penalties.
These figures are intended to catch your attention
and to emphasize the significant impact of the antitrust
laws presented in this chapter. It is wise to take into
account the consequences of anticompetitive behavior.
1 U.S. Department of Justice, Division Update, Spring 2016, https://www .justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-2016.
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT The term antitrust is somewhat misleading. Trusts are a legal arrangement in which a fiduciary holds legal title to property for benefit of another. In the last part of the 19th century, businesspeople used the trust device extensively to gain monopolistic control of several industries. Through it, a group of corporations in the same type of business could unite to eliminate competition among themselves. The trust device allowed all, or at least a majority, of the stock of several companies to be transferred to a trustee. The trustee then was in a position to control the operations and policy making of all the companies. The trust not only controlled production, but also dominated and divided the market and established price levels. The effect of these concentrations was to destroy the free market—“to restrain trade,” as the Sherman Act would put it.
Because the purpose of the laws discussed in this chapter was to “bust” the trusts, these laws became known as the antitrust laws. Today the term is used to describe all laws that intend to promote and regulate competition and make our competitive economic system work. The goal is workable competition and all the benefits that are intended to flow from it.
During its first hundred years, the federal government’s role in relation to com- merce was that of promoter. The U.S. Constitution itself eliminates trade barriers among the states. In the early and mid-19th century, through its sponsorship of inter- nal improvements such as canals and roads and its support for railroads, the federal government facilitated trade and commerce. However, by the end of the 19th cen- tury, business and industrial combinations were so powerful that reformers called on government to break these monopolies and restore healthy competition. The govern- ment responded by enacting the Sherman Act in 1890.
The goal of the Sherman Act is competition. Competition, these reformers pointed out, tends to keep private markets working in ways that are socially desir- able. It encourages an efficient allocation of resources and stimulates efficiency and product innovation. A competitive system that allows easy entry to and withdrawal from the marketplace is consistent with individual freedom and economic opportu- nity. In 1958, Justice Hugo Black, in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States (356 U.S. 1), reflected on the purpose of the Sherman Act when he stated in part:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material prog- ress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions.
The Sherman Act still provides the basic framework for the regulation of busi- ness and industry. It seeks to preserve competition by prohibiting two types of anti- competitive business behavior:
• Sherman Act, Section 1—contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unrea- sonably restrain trade or commerce.
• Sherman Act, Section 2—monopolization or attempts to monopolize a market.
The Sherman Act is general in its terms and does not specifically set forth every act that would constitute a violation of the law. It does not define trust, monopoly, or restraint of trade. It also does not make clear whether it applies to combinations of labor as well as capital.
LO 16-1
John Rockefeller gained control of the petroleum industry, Cornelius Vanderbilt controlled railroads, and Andrew Carnegie controlled the steel industry.
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In 1914, the Congress, recognizing that the Sherman Act needed to be more specific, enacted the Clayton Act as an amendment to the Sherman Act and later amended the Clayton Act (1936, 1950, and 1980) to clarify its provisions. The Clayton Act declares that certain enumerated practices in interstate commerce are illegal. These are practices that might adversely affect competition but were not clear violations under the Sherman Act.
In 1914, Congress also passed the Federal Trade Commission Act. This act cre- ated the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an independent administrative agency charged with keeping competition free and fair. The FTC enforces the Clayton Act. In addition, it enforces Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
The antitrust laws are enforced by the federal and state governments and by private parties. The federal government enforces the law through two agencies, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Department of Justice alone has the power to bring criminal proceedings, but it shares its civil enforcement powers with the FTC.
State government also plays an important role in the enforcement of antitrust laws. A state attorney general may bring civil suits for damages under the Sherman Act as well as suits for an injunction. In addition, state legislators have enacted anti- trust laws that cover both products and services. These laws cover intrastate activi- ties and are designed to prevent loss of competition in local communities.
In addition to these governmental enforcers, private parties may bring civil suits seeking monetary damages or injunction as a means of enforcing the antitrust laws. The penalties that help protect the competitive nature of the marketplace are dis- cussed later in the chapter.
The Sherman Act, Section 1—Agreements in Restraint of Trade
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce. Contracts in restraint of trade usually result from verbal or written agreements; combinations usually result from conduct; conspiracies are usually established by agreement and followed up by some act carrying out the plan of the conspiracy.
Joint activities by two or more persons may constitute a violation of Section 1. The most common contract in restraint of trade is an agreement among competitors to charge the same price for their products (price fixing). Such agreements among producers to set prices in advance rather than allow prices to be set by the free market are obviously anticompetitive and in restraint of trade. Agreements relating to territories of operation also violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. So does an attempt to extend the economic power of a patent or copyright to unrelated products or services.
As the courts deal with potential violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, they employ different analyses depending on the relationship of the parties. The most important division is in agreements between horizontal competitors versus agreements between parties in vertical relationships. Horizontal competitors are firms that could compete for the same customers in the same market. For example, imagine three supermarket chains in a town, each of which have different corporate
LO 16-2
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states: “Every contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”
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owners (see Figure 16.1). They sell goods to the same population of consumers and are in direct competition. Agreements they make with each other to offer certain products or price goods at a certain level are horizontal restraints. Horizontal restraints face significantly more scrutiny under the Sherman Act and are much more likely to be deemed illegal.
Parties in vertical relationships include manufacturers, distributors, and retailers that may enter into agreements concerning pricing, supply, or territory. For example, imagine a milk producer makes an agreement with a dairy distributor related to territory, or a diary distributor makes agreements with supermarkets on maximum price for goods (see Figure 16.2). These agreements are termed vertical restraints. Although such restraints may violate the Sherman Act, as discussed later, they may be permitted if the net impact is to benefit consumers.
Retailer A Agreement
Retailer CRetailer B Agreement
Horizontal Restraints Agreements between direct
competitors
Illegal agreement may include restraints on
• Price • Supply • Other behavior related to consumers
Figure 16.1 Horizontal restraints.
Retailer A Retailer CRetailer B
Vertical Restraints Agreements between firms in production
or distribution chain
Manufacturer
Distributor
Agreements between non-competitors
Figure 16.2 Vertical restraints.
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ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST LAW To analyze potential violations of the Sherman Act, two categories of analysis are used:
• The rule of reason. • Per se illegality.
The first category consists of agreements and practices that are illegal only if they impose an unreasonable restraint upon competitors. The per se category con- sists of agreements or practices that are so plainly anticompetitive and so lacking in any redeeming values that they are conclusively presumed to be illegal without further examination under the rule of reason.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal.” However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress did not really mean it when it used the word every. For example, if you and I enter into a contract whereby I agree to buy your car, this contract restrains trade. You cannot sell your car to another person without becoming liable to me for a breach of our contract. The Court felt that Congress did not intend our contract to be a violation of the Sherman Act.
Rule of Reason The rule of reason was announced in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Supreme Court in that case held that contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade were illegal only if they constituted undue or unreasonable restraints of trade and that only unreasonable attempts to monopolize were covered by the Sherman Act. As a result, acts that the statute prohibits may be removed from the coverage of the law by a finding that they are reasonable.
The test of reasonableness asks whether challenged contracts or acts are unrea- sonably restrictive of competitive conditions. Unreasonableness can be based on:
• The nature or character of the contracts. • Surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that the
contracts were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices.
Under either branch of the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions. If an agreement promotes competition, it may be legal. If it suppresses or destroys competition, it is unreasonable and illegal.
Per Se Illegality Agreements falling within the per se category have such a pernicious effect on competition that elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they may cause or a business excuse for them is unnecessary. They are per se illegal. The concept simplifies proof in these cases of clearly wrongful conduct. If the activity is deemed is illegal per se, proof of the activity is proof of a violation and proof that it is in restraint of trade. It is unreasonable as a matter of law.
Courts develop the distinction between rule of reason and per se illegality on a case-by-case basis. However, history tells us the horizontal restraints or agreements defined earlier are much more likely to satisfy the per se illegality standards. Courts hold that the sharing among competitors of product information, pricing policies, and territorial allocations is not going to increase competition. Indeed, the anticom- petitive results of this sharing results in such arrangements being viewed as illegal per se. On the other hand, analysis of vertical agreements usually requires consider- ation of the rule of reason as opposed to being judged as per se illegal.
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Sherman Act cases must satisfy an interstate commerce element. The facts must show that an allegedly illegal activity was either in interstate commerce or had a sub- stantial effect on interstate commerce. One need not prove a change in the volume of interstate commerce but only that the activity had a substantial and adverse or not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce. As discussed in Chapter 15, the impact on interstate commerce often is readily apparent.
As a result of courts’ and regulators’ experience with anticompetitive conduct, it is possible to identify particularly problematic activities. The following sections highlight some of the most important categories.
HORIZONTAL PRICE FIXING Horizontal price fixing is an agreement between competitors to fix prices. The term price fixing means more than setting a price. For example, if partners in a firm set the price of their goods or service, they have engaged in a form of price fixing but not the type envisioned by the Sherman Act. The price fixing covered by the Sherman Act is that which threatens free competition.
It is no defense to a charge of price fixing that the prices fixed are fair or reason- able. It also is no defense that price fixing is engaged in by small competitors to allow them to compete with larger competitors. A common point that courts make in anti- trust cases is the fact that antitrust law protects consumers, not competitors. The per se rule makes price fixing illegal whether the parties to it have control of the market or not, and whether or not they are trying to raise or lower the market price. It is just as illegal to fix a low price as it is to fix a high price. Maximum-price agreements are just as illegal as minimum-price agreements.
One of the greatest hurdles in establishing that illegal price fixing took place is identifying an actual agreement between competitors. If competitors simply act in parallel or even seem to tacitly (impliedly) agree on the same goals, a court is unlikely to determine that the law was violated. In Case 16.1, the court had to deter- mine whether airlines adopting the same pricing restrictions were explicitly coordi- nating or independently responding to industry pressures in the same way.
case 16.1
PROSTERMAN v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. 747 Fed. Appx. 458 (9th Cir. 2018) For years, travel agents and independent consumers were able to book cheaper flights by breaking up a long trip into several shorter, multi-ticket bookings. Of course, this practice reduced revenue and the airlines eventually took action to eliminate it. United Airlines was the first to act in 2016 by changing its one way fare rules to remove the advantages of the short- flight combination. Within two days, American Airlines made the same change to its fare rules. And Delta Airlines followed American on the same day.
Believing that such significant change by multiple com- petitors within days of each other was unlikely to be a coin- cidence, a group of passengers and travel agents sued. The plaintiffs claimed that airlines coordinated their price-change through a third-party service that distributes pricing called the Airline Tariff Publishing Company (“ATPCO”). The defendant airlines petitioned the district court to dismiss the case based on a lack of evidence of an agreement. In this appeal, the 9th Circuit reviewed the case and considered whether new evidence of alleged collusion was enough to require the case to proceed.
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SCHROEDER, EBEL and OWENS, Circuit Judges: Every commuter knows the gas station effect. The prices on two gas stations on opposing corners of a busy intersection often move in near unison.
This phenomenon also occurs in the airline industry. With a market comprised of a few dominant players and publicly available pricing information, it is no surprise that consumer fares remain relatively uniform across the indus- try. That is not to say that unlawful agreements among air carriers never occur, nor that all claims based on Section 1 of the Sherman Act must fail. But in an interdependent oligopoly such as the U.S. airline industry, a plaintiff whose claim lies under Section 1 of the Sherman Act must plead more than conscious parallelism to survive a motion to dismiss. * * *
We review dismissal of the complaint de novo using the now-familiar plausibility rubric established by Twombly [550 U.S. 544 (2007)] and its progeny. Under this frame- work, “when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a con- text that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be indepen- dent action.” “Even ‘conscious parallelism,’ a common reac- tion of ‘firms in a concentrated market [that] recogniz[e] their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions’ is ‘not in itself unlawful.’ If a plaintiff fails to provide something more—to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claim[ ] across the line from con- ceivable to plausible”—a complaint which alleges conscious parallelism “must be dismissed.”
In the Ninth Circuit we have described the allegations required for this “nudge” as “plus factors,” or “‘some fur- ther factual enhancement,’ a ‘further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds’ of the alleged conspirators.” These “plus factors” are often “economic actions and out- comes that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action.”
In re Musical Instruments [798 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2015)] is instructive. There, we rejected the proposed “plus factors” as insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss because the stated factors were simply activities one would expect in an interdependent market, where “firms may engage in consciously parallel conduct through observation of their competitors’ decisions even absent an agreement.”
So too here. Each of Plaintiffs’ proposed plus factors is a restatement of the conscious parallelism endemic to an oligopoly. Under In re Musical Instruments, allegations of a “common motive” are insufficient to state a claim because “alleging ‘common motive to conspire’ simply restates that a market is interdependent.” The same analysis applies to allegations the airlines acted against self-interest. While a company acting against self-interest can sometimes be a plus-factor, in an interdependent oligopoly it may be in
a company’s interest to raise prices in the hope that its competitors play “follow the leader.” In this way, conscious parallelism also explains the Airline Defendants’ decision to change their rules in such a way as to increase prices notwithstanding “steeply falling costs.”
As for the mechanics of the change itself, Plaintiffs argue the simultaneity of the decisions is evidence of an agreement. But again, In re Musical Instruments holds that simultaneity “does not reveal anything more than similar reaction to similar pressures within an interdependent mar- ket, or conscious parallelism.” Similarly, while “complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by multiple competitors” might suggest collusion . . . . such complexity is absent here. Per- haps hardcoding the airlines’ new rule changes into ATP- CO’s reservation and information systems may have been complex, but that is a question of implementation not deter- mination. The airlines’ decisions to eliminate sum-of-sector pricing are not so complex as to suggest an agreement.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Airline Defendants used ATPCO as a “coordination facilitating device.” ATPCO—while not technically a trade association—plays a similar role in the marketplace. As the [complaint] describes, ATPCO provides a “clearinghouse” for pricing information, much like a trade organization. After that information has been made available to the public, ATPCO then publishes each airline’s fares and rules to the other airline members of ATPCO, and those airlines use this information “for internal management purposes, including [deciding] whether or not to respond to the competitive actions of other airlines.”
We have long been skeptical that participation in a trade organization is suggestive of collusion, and that skepticism has only hardened since Twombly and its prog- eny. And while it may be possible for participation in an ATPCO-like organization to suggest collusion, the [First Amended Complaint] here contains no factual allegations sufficient under Twombly to suggest that ATPCO coordi- nated collusive behavior.
Plaintiffs’ final volley is that all of these potential plus factors, viewed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test, are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. But even viewed collectively, Plaintiffs’ plus factors suggest only con- scious parallelism in an interdependent oligopoly. Accord- ingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss. * * *
After filing a notice of appeal, Plaintiffs discovered “new” evidence that ATPCO hosted an online meeting on March 30, 2016 that Plaintiffs claim addressed the issues raised in this lawsuit. . . .
In any event, the online meeting . . . occurred in response to a business request submitted in 2015 by non- Defendant ATPCO member Aegean Airlines. That agenda
[continued]
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further outlines that the online meeting’s goal was in part to “[r]evise ATPCO’s User Interface . . . to make it easier for airlines to quickly and accurately specify and maintain Combination restrictions for their carrier fares.”
In this light the online meeting does nothing to make a conspiracy more plausible. Instead, it suggests that the airlines independently decided to disallow sum-of-sector
[continued]
pricing—which was clearly an issue in the industry as early as 2015—and thereafter worked with ATPCO to apply and implement the airlines’ decisions while still leaving discre- tion to the individual airlines to develop or revise their rules for sum-of-sector pricing.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to deny the . . . motion for an indicative ruling.
KEY POINTS • An agreement that unreasonably restrains trade must be explicit, and generally cannot be
inferred by independent actions that seem coordinated. • Although trade associations and similar groups can face liability for assisting the collusion
of competitors, if such associations merely publish policies or set standards, the law may not be violated.
• The court determined that, although airlines adopted restrictive pricing policies at nearly the same time, more was necessary to prove an actual agreement.
It is a defense to a charge of price fixing if two competitors enter into a joint venture and agree what the combined company will charge for its product. In Texaco v. Dagher,2 the Court found that Texaco and Shell Oil were not fixing prices when they operated a joint venture to refine and sell gasoline.
Historically, the Sherman Act was thought to apply only to the sale of goods. Price fixing in the service sector was commonly engaged in by professional persons such as architects, lawyers, and physicians. Persons performing services argued they were not engaged in trade or commerce and thus they were not covered by the Sherman Act. They also contended there was a “learned profession” exception to the Sherman Act.
In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments and held that the Sherman Act covers services, including those performed by the learned professions such as attorneys-at-law. Today, it is just as illegal to fix the price of services as it is to fix the price of goods.
Some professional groups have attempted to avoid restrictions on price fixing through the use of ethical standards. Although such ethical standards are not illegal per se, they are nevertheless anticompetitive and a violation of the Sherman Act. Others have attempted to determine the price of services indirectly by using formu- las and relative-value scales. For example, some medical organizations have deter- mined that a given medical procedure would be allocated a relative value on a scale of 1 to 10. Open-heart surgery might be labeled a 9 and an appendectomy a 3. All members of the profession would then use these values in determining professional fees. Such attempts have been uniformly held to be illegal.
Table 16.1 lists examples of horizontal price-fixing cases. The companies and industries listed illustrate the far-reaching nature of the Sherman Act.
Courts have held lawyers, doctors, real estate agents, engineers, and dentists subject to antitrust laws.
2 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
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Business Type of Case Sherman Act Violation Case Result
21 airline companies and 19 executives
Criminal Fixed prices to passengers and for cargo
$1.7 billion
Archer Daniels Midland Company and others
Criminal and civil Fixed prices on citric acid $70 million fine and $35 million civil settlement
President of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.
Criminal Agreed with Coca-Cola bottler to stop discounts to retailers
4 months in jail, $45,000 fine, 3 years’ probation, community service
Southland Corp. and Borden Inc.
Criminal and civil Rigged bids for dairy products sold to Florida school-milk programs
$8 million combined fine and $2.5 million in civil claims
American Institute of Architects
Civil, injunction Discouraged competitive bidding, discount fees, and free services
Consent decree that practices would cease plus $50,000 in costs
Fireman’s Fund Home Insurance Co., Liberty Mutual Insurance, and Travelers Corp.
Civil, class action, triple damages
Boycotted Minnesota law requiring workers’ compensation rates to be established by competition
$34 million settlement
Citicorp, Barclays PLC, Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, UBS, AG, and JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Criminal Manipulating the price of dollars and euros in foreign currency exchange market
$2.5 billion
table 16.1 Examples of Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases
VERTICAL PRICE FIXING Attempts by manufacturers to control the ultimate retail price for their products is known as vertical price fixing or resale price maintenance. Such efforts result in part from the desire to maintain a high-quality product image, the assumption being that a relatively high price suggests a relatively high quality. These efforts are also based on a desire to maintain adequate channels of distribution. If one retailer is sell- ing a product at prices significantly below those of other retailers, there is a strong likelihood that the other retailers will not continue to carry the product.
Although resale price-maintenance schemes can run afoul of the Sherman Act, it is possible for a manufacturer to control the resale price of its products. The pri- mary method of legally controlling the retail price is for a manufacturer simply to announce its prices and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply. Under what is commonly referred to as the Colgate doctrine, the Supreme Court recognizes that such independent action by a manufacturer is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Resale price maintenance is legal only if there is no coercion or pressure other than the announced policy and its implementation.
Whether or not vertical price fixing harms competition or consumers has been a matter of debate among economists and politicians. There is a possibility that a vertical restraint imposed by a single manufacturer or wholesaler may stimulate interbrand competition as it reduces intrabrand competition. This debate led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which held that a luxury leather products firm’s efforts to force retailers to main- tain minimum prices in its products was not per se illegal. Overruling prior case
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law, the Court recognized many of the arguments in favor vertical price fixing and determined that a firm should be permitted to justify such conduct under the rule of reason.
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion when a manufacturer attempts to fix a maximum price that its distributors can charge.3 It now appears the Court is comfortable limiting the per se illegality analysis to horizontal agreements among competitors. Vertical agreements involving pricing (high and low) and territorial arrangements within channels of distribution are analyzed under the rule of reason.
INDIRECT PRICE FIXING The ingenuity of businesspersons produces numerous attempts to fix prices by indi- rect means. Such attempts to control prices take a variety of forms and appear in diverse circumstances. Some arise out of a desire to protect a channel of distribution or a marketing system. Others result from attempts to keep marginal competitors in business to avoid becoming a monopoly.
In one case, indirect price fixing took the form of an exchange of price infor- mation. Economic theory was used to support the assumption that prices would be more unstable and lower if the information had not been exchanged. This case established that conduct directed at price stabilization is per se anticompetitive. The warning to business and industry is clear: Cooperation and cozy relationships between competitors may be illegal.
3State Oil Company v. Khan, 118 S.Ct. 275 (1997).
1. Horizontal price fixing in the sales of goods or services is illegal per se.
2. It is just as illegal for competitors to fix a low price as it is a high price.
3. Professionals and service providers cannot legally conspire to fix prices.
4. Ethical standards cannot be used to fix prices.
5. Attempts by manufacturers to control the ultimate sale of their product (vertical price fixing) is analyzed under the rule of reason.
6. The mere exchange of price information among competitors may constitute a Sherman Act violation.
concept summary
Price Fixing
TERRITORIAL AGREEMENTS Territorial agreements restrain trade by allocating geographical areas among com- petitors. They may be either horizontal or vertical. Competing businesses may enter into a horizontal territorial agreement for the purpose of giving each an exclusive territory. For example, if all lawn care and landscaping companies in a county agree to allocate to each an exclusive territory, a horizontal arrangement would exist. This agreement is illegal per se under the Sherman Act. This is true even if the arrange- ment is made with a third party. For example, an agreement among competing cable television operators to divide the market in Houston, Texas, was found to be a per se violation even though the agreement required city council approval.
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A vertical territorial agreement is one between a manufacturer and a dealer or distributor. It assigns the dealer or distributor an exclusive territory, and the manu- facturer agrees not to sell to other dealers or distributors in that territory in exchange for an agreement by the dealer that it will not operate outside the area assigned. Such agreements are usually part of a franchise or license agreement. These vertical arrangements are not per se violations; they are subject to the rule of reason.
CONCERTED ACTIVITIES Many antitrust cases involve agreements or conduct by competitors that have anti- competitive effects. Competitors sometimes attempt to share some activities or join together in the performance of a function. These are known as concerted activities. Case 16.2 discusses aspects of concerted activities in the context of whether profes- sional sports teams should be considered as separate entities, subject to antitrust laws, or as one body organized as a league. A league, acting on behalf of all teams, would be free from antitrust laws since it would not be acting in concert with others.
case 16.2
AMERICAN NEEDLE, INC. v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 560 U.S. 183 (2010)
The National Football League (NFL) consists of 32 indepen- dently owned teams. In 1963, the existing NFL teams formed the National Football League Properties (NFLP) to develop, license, and market the intellectual property of each team and the league. Prior to 2000, the NFLP granted nonexclu- sive licenses to several vendors, including American Needle Inc. American Needle manufactured and sold apparel with the various teams’ logos. Beginning in 2000, NFLP entered into a 10-year exclusive arrangement with Reebok International Ltd., allowing Reebok to be the only licensee to manufacture and sell headwear associated with NFL teams. Due to this exclusive agreement with Reebok, the nonexclusive license pre- viously awarded to American Needle was not renewed.
American Needle filed a lawsuit alleging the NFL, its 32 teams, the NFLP, and Reebok violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court granted American Needle’s petition for a writ of certiorari to address whether the NFL respondents are capable of engaging in a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” as defined in section 1 of the Sherman Act.
STEVENS, Justice: . . . We have long held that concerted action under §1 does not turn simply on whether the parties involved are legally distinct entities. Instead, we have eschewed such formal- istic distinctions in favor of a functional consideration of
how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually operate. As a result, we have repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single entity violated §1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.
Conversely, there is not necessarily concerted action sim- ply because more than one legally distinct entity is involved. Although, under a now-defunct doctrine known as the “intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine,” we once treated coop- eration between legally separate entities as necessarily cov- ered by §1, we now embark on a more functional analysis. . . .
Because the inquiry is one of competitive reality, it is not determinative that two parties to an alleged §1 violation are legally distinct entities. Nor, however, is it determinative that two legally distinct entities have organized themselves under a single umbrella or into a structured joint venture. The question is whether the agreement joins together “inde- pendent centers of decisionmaking.” If it does, the entities are capable of conspiring under §1, and the court must decide whether the restraint of trade is an unreasonable and therefore illegal one.
The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decision making quality or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic of independent action. Each of the teams is a
Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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substantial, independently owned, and independently managed business. . . . The teams compete with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel.
Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market for intellectual property. To a firm making hats, the Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of valuable trademarks. When each NFL team licenses its intel- lectual property, it is not pursuing the common interests of the whole league but is instead pursuing interests of each corpora- tion itself; teams are acting as separate economic actors pursu- ing separate economic interests, and each team therefore is a potential independent center of decision making. Decisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned trademarks col- lectively and to only one vendor are decisions that deprive the marketplace of independent centers of decision making, and therefore of actual or potential competition.
In defense, respondents argue that by forming NFLP, they have formed a single entity, akin to a merger, and market their NFL brands through a single outlet. But it is not dispos- itive that the teams have organized and own a legally separate entity that centralizes the management of their intellectual property. An ongoing §1 violation cannot evade §1 scrutiny simply by giving the ongoing violation a name and label. . . .
The NFL respondents may be similar in some sense to a single enterprise that owns several pieces of intellectual property and licenses them jointly, but they are not similar in the relevant functional sense. Although NFL teams have common interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their inter- ests in licensing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned.
Common interests in the NFL brand partially unite the economic interests of the parent firms, but the teams still have distinct, potentially competing interests.
It may be, as respondents argue, that NFLP has served as the single driver of the teams’ promotional vehicle, pursuing the common interests of the whole. But illegal restraints often are in the common interests of the parties to the restraint, at the expense of those who are not par- ties. It is true, as respondents describe, that they have for some time marketed their trademarks jointly. But a history of concerted activity does not immunize conduct from §1 scrutiny. Absence of actual competition may simply be a manifestation of the anticompetitive agreement itself. . . .
The question whether NFLP decisions can constitute concerted activity covered by §1 is closer than whether deci- sions made directly by the 32 teams are covered by §1. This is so both because NFLP is a separate corporation with its own management and because the record indicates that most of the revenues generated by NFLP are shared by the teams on an equal basis. Nevertheless we think it clear that for the same reasons the 32 teams’ conduct is covered by §1, NFLP’s actions also are subject to §1, at least with regards to its marketing of property owned by the separate
teams. NFLP’s licensing decisions are made by the 32 poten- tial competitors, and each of them actually owns its share of the jointly managed assets. Apart from their agreement to cooperate in exploiting those assets, including their deci- sions as the NFLP, there would be nothing to prevent each of the teams from making its own market decisions relating to purchases of apparel and headwear, to the sale of such items, and to the granting of licenses to use its trademarks.
We generally treat agreements within a single firm as independent action on the presumption that the components of the firm will act to maximize the firm’s profits. But in rare cases, that presumption does not hold. Agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted action covered by §1 when the parties to the agreement act on interests separate from those of the firm itself, and the intrafirm agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action.
For that reason, decisions by the NFLP regarding the teams’ separately owned intellectual property constitute concerted action. Thirty-two teams operating independently through the vehicle of the NFLP are not like the compo- nents of a single firm that act to maximize the firm’s profits. The teams remain separately controlled, potential competi- tors with economic interests that are distinct from NFLP’s financial well-being. Unlike typical decisions by corporate shareholders, NFLP licensing decisions effectively require the assent of more than a mere majority of shareholders. And each team’s decision reflects not only an interest in NFLP’s profits but also an interest in the team’s individual profits. The 32 teams capture individual economic benefits separate and apart from NFLP profits as a result of the deci- sions they make for the NFLP. NFLP’s decisions thus affect each team’s profits from licensing its own intellectual prop- erty. . . . In making the relevant licensing decisions, NFLP is therefore an instrumentality of the teams. . . .
Football teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law. . . . The fact that NFL teams share an inter- est in making the entire league successful and profitable, and that they must cooperate in the production and sched- uling of games, provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of collective decisions. But the conduct at issue in this case is still concerted activity under the Sher- man Act that is subject to §1 analysis.
When restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all, per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason. In such instances, the agreement is likely to survive the Rule of Reason. . . .
Other features of the NFL may also save agreements amongst the teams. We have recognized, for example, that the interest in maintaining a competitive balance among athletic teams is legitimate and important. While that same interest applies to the teams in the NFL, it does not jus- tify treating them as a single entity for §1 purposes when it comes to the marketing of the teams’ individually owned
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Concerted activities are often beneficial to society even though they reduce competition. For example, joint research efforts to find a cure for cancer or to find substitutes for gasoline would seem to provide significant benefits to society. A shar- ing of technology may be beneficial also. Joint efforts in other areas may reduce costs and improve efficiency, with direct benefit to the public.
Congress has recognized the need to encourage cooperation among competi- tors. For example, in 1984, the National Cooperative Research Act was enacted. In 1990, Congress created an exception to the Sherman Act so that television indus- try officials could discuss the development of joint guidelines to limit the depiction of violence on television.
Again, in 1993, Congress made it easier for U.S. companies to engage in joint production ventures. The National Cooperative Research and Production Act does not protect joint production ventures from all possibilities of antitrust violations. Rather, this law provides protection to activities described in Sidebar 16.1. Despite these exceptions to the Sherman Act that permit specific joint activities, you should always remain aware that concerted activities among competitors can lead to the severe sanctions discussed later in this chapter.
intellectual property. It is, however, unquestionably an interest that may well justify a variety of collective decisions made by the teams. What role it properly plays in applying the Rule of Reason to the allegations in this case is a matter to be considered on remand.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
KEY POINTS • The Court initially discusses the issue of whether National Football League Properties
(NFLP) is an entity distinct from the individual teams. If the case involved coordination between the individual teams, the antitrust violation would be more clear.
• If the members of an association like the NFPL make decisions based on interests separate from the association, concerted action occurs.
• The court finds that the NFL and the NFLP are simply representations of the 32 teams. But agreements they make may, in some cases, be legal.
[continued]
• Joint production ventures will be subject to the rule of reason analysis rather than the per se illegality standard.
• A joint production venture must notify the Justice Department and the FTC of its plans to engage in joint activities.
• In a private civil antitrust action brought against the joint production venture, the plaintiff can be awarded only actual damages plus costs. The joint production venture will not be subject to triple damages.
sidebar 16.1
Basic Provisions of National Cooperative Research and Production Act
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The Sherman Act, Section 2—Monopolization
Section 2 of the Sherman Act regulates monopoly and the attempts to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign commerce. The law establishes the means to break up existing monopolies and to prevent others from developing. It is directed at single firms and does not purport to cover shared monopolies or oligopolies.
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is a violation for a firm to monopo- lize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign commerce. To establish a violation of the law, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) had monopoly power and (2) willfully acquired or maintained that power. Attempts to monopolize cases require proof of intent to destroy competi- tion or achieve monopoly power along with a dangerous probability that monopo- lization will occur. This is difficult to prove, and as a result, there have been few cases concerning attempts to monopolize. A conspiracy to monopolize requires proof of specific intent to monopolize and at least one overt act to accomplish it. Proof of monopoly power or even that it was attainable is not required. This conspiracy theory is usually joined with the allegation of actual monopoly in most cases. Sidebar 16.2 provides an example of a monopolization case.
LO 16-3
For much of the last two decades, technology companies like Amazon, Google, Facebook, and Apple were consid- ered market success stories that overwhelmingly bene- fited consumers. They provided products and services for reasonable prices (even free in many cases) that solved important societal needs. Thanks to the tech industry, we can quickly search the world for answers, connect with old friends, know how quickly we can get a ride to the airport, or simply get socks delivered to our doorstops in a matter of hours.
However, in recent years, the regulators and the pub- lic have begun to more closely scrutinize the conduct of tech firms. They seem to possess outsized power in certain industries such as shopping and media, and many worry that competition is increasingly restricted. Interestingly, these firms do not have control over traditional scarce resources such as oil or steel. Rather, they control infor- mation, much of it generated by their own users, as well as essential ways to access that information. The particu- lar concern is different for each company under scrutiny.
For example, Amazon and Google are accused of favoring their own products in searches. On the other hand, Face- book allegedly uses its wealth to acquire new firms that could threaten its dominance in social media. And Apple maintains near total control over the marketplace for apps on its mobile devices (see case 16.3).
As concerning as tech company influence may be, the legal case for an antitrust case is less clear. Tradition- ally, courts view antitrust law as a protection for consumers rather than competitors. The fact that a competitor’s goods, services or social networking portals are disadvantaged is not a problem under this view unless consumers suffer. Moreover, finding an appropriate remedy is a challenge in the context of Big Tech. A large fine may be insufficient to induce change, but the alternative of breaking up a firm to increase competition is difficult in field that is in constant flux. For now, regulators seem poised to begin inquiries and consider stronger enforcement. Source: Jack Nicas, Karen Weise and Mike Isaac, “How Each Big Tech Company May be Targeted by regulators,” New York Times, Sept. 8, 2019.
sidebar 16.2
Are Big Tech Companies Monopolists?
Importantly, simply having monopoly power is not illegal. Some monopolies are lawful. If monopoly power is “thrust upon” a firm or if it exists because of a patent or franchise, there is no violation of Section 2 if the firm does not engage in conduct that has the effect or purpose of protecting, enforcing, or extending the monopoly power.
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The power must have been either acquired or used in ways that go beyond normal, honest industrial business conduct for a violation to exist. To be illegal, the monopoly must have been deliberatively acquired or used. A firm is guilty of monopolization when it acquires or maintains monopoly power by a course of deliberate conduct that keeps other firms from entering the market or from expanding their share of it. Deliberativeness is not difficult to prove in most cases.
Conduct that proves deliberativeness may be anything in restraint of trade. For example, predatory conduct would prove deliberativeness. Predatory conduct is seeking to advance market share by injuring actual or potential competitors by means other than improved performance. It may be for the purpose of driving out competitors, for keeping them out, or for making them less effective. Pricing policies are frequently examined for proof of predatory conduct. Predatory pricing takes place when a firm sells at below cost in order to drive out competition. One must also prove that the low-price scheme is likely to eventually produce a rise in prices sufficient to recoup the initial income loss. Profit-maximizing pricing; limit pricing, whereby the price is limited to levels that tend to discourage entry; and the practice of price discrimination all may tend to prove monopoly power and predatory con- duct. There must be proof the prices were intended to drive competitors out of busi- ness followed by the wrongdoer recouping these initial losses.
Generally speaking, the parties most injured by the illegal use of monopoly power are consumers; they pay higher prices or deal with more limited choices. Federal antitrust law provides consumers the right to sue illegal monopolists to address this harm (15 U.S.C. §15, otherwise known as Section 4 of the Clayton Act). An important limitation of this right is that only a party directly injured by the antitrust violator can sue. One cannot simply that an alleged monopolist has had a negative impact on the marketplace, but rather there must be a direct connection to a consum- er’s harm. In fact, this standard applies to injury under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but the difficulty in proving Section 2 cases (see Sidebar 16.3) makes it even more challenging to connect the illegal act with an impacted party. Additionally, the modern use of electronic marketplaces and supply chains with many levels of third party actors can mean that the consumer is several steps removed from the party acting as a monopolist. If the monopolist’s actions are suf- ficiently upstream or downstream of the consumer’s purchase, the consumer may not be able to show direct injury. In Case 16.3, the Supreme Court confronts just this issue in evaluating whether consumers have a right to sue Apple over its allegedly monopolistic App Store policies. A case like this has implications for other market- places, such as Amazon and Alibaba.
A utility, such as a power company, usually submits to regulatory requirements by a pub- lic service commission in return for its near- monopoly status.
case 16.3
APPLE, INC. v. PEPPER, 139 S.Ct. 1514 (2019) This case is based on plaintiff iPhone owners’ assertion that Apple monopolizes the iPhone app market, increasing the prices that consumers pay. Apple has been selling iPhones since 2007. Within a year, the company launched its “App Store,” a marketplace for purchasing Apple and third-party apps for
use on iPhones. The App Store is the only place where iPhone users can legally obtain apps. Apple requires third-party app producers to give Apple 30 percent of the price of each sale as well as pay a membership fee. According to the iPhone owners, if not for Apple’s total control of the app market, apps would
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cost less. Apple argued that consumers have no right to sue because the App Store is merely a marketplace and app pro- ducers set the price. The Supreme Court took the appeal to determine whether Apple’s consumers can pursue this claim under antitrust law.
KAVANAUGH, Justice: . . . The plaintiffs’ allegations boil down to one straightforward claim: that Apple exer- cises monopoly power in the retail market for the sale of apps and has unlawfully used its monopoly power to force iPhone owners to pay Apple higher-than-competitive prices for apps. According to the plaintiffs, when iPhone owners want to purchase an app, they have only two options: (1) buy the app from Apple’s App Store at a higher-than-com- petitive price or (2) do not buy the app at all. Any iPhone owners who are dissatisfied with the selection of apps avail- able in the App Store or with the price of the apps available in the App Store are out of luck, or so the plaintiffs allege.
The sole question presented at this early stage of the case is whether these consumers are proper plaintiffs for this kind of antitrust suit—in particular, our precedents ask, whether the consumers were “direct purchasers” from Apple. It is undisputed that the iPhone owners bought the apps directly from Apple. Therefore, under Illinois Brick the iPhone owners were direct purchasers who may sue Apple for alleged monopolization.
That straightforward conclusion follows from the text of the antitrust laws and from our precedents.
First is text: Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for any person to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com- merce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” Section 4 of the Clayton Act in turn provides that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . . the defendant . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” The broad text of § 4—“any person” who has been “injured” by an antitrust violator may sue—readily covers consumers who purchase goods or services at higher-than-competitive prices from an allegedly monopolistic retailer.
Second is precedent: Applying § 4, we have consis- tently stated that “the immediate buyers from the alleged antitrust violators” may maintain a suit against the anti- trust violators. At the same time, incorporating principles of proximate cause into § 4, we have ruled that indirect purchasers who are two or more steps removed from the violator in a distribution chain may not sue. Our decision in Illinois Brick established a bright-line rule that autho- rizes suits by direct purchasers but bars suits by indirect purchasers.
* * *
The bright-line rule of Illinois Brick, as articulated in that case . . . means that indirect purchasers who are two or more steps removed from the antitrust violator in a distribu- tion chain may not sue. By contrast, direct purchasers—that is, those who are “the immediate buyers from the alleged antitrust violators”—may sue.
For example, if manufacturer A sells to retailer B, and retailer B sells to consumer C, then C may not sue A. But B may sue A if A is an antitrust violator. And C may sue B if B is an antitrust violator. That is the straightforward rule of Illinois Brick.
In this case, unlike in Illinois Brick the iPhone owners are not consumers at the bottom of a vertical distribution chain who are attempting to sue manufacturers at the top of the chain. There is no intermediary in the distribution chain between Apple and the consumer. The iPhone own- ers purchase apps directly from the retailer Apple, who is the alleged antitrust violator. The iPhone owners pay the alleged overcharge directly to Apple. The absence of an intermediary is dispositive. Under Illinois Brick, the iPhone owners are direct purchasers from Apple and are proper plaintiffs to maintain this antitrust suit.
* * * All of that seems simple enough. But Apple argues
strenuously against that seemingly simple conclusion, and we address its arguments carefully. For this kind of retailer case, Apple’s theory is that Illinois Brick allows consumers to sue only the party who sets the retail price, whether or not that party sells the good or service directly to the com- plaining party. Apple says that its theory accords with the economics of the transaction. Here, Apple argues that the app developers, not Apple, set the retail price charged to consumers, which according to Apple means that the con- sumers may not sue Apple . . . .
Apple’s theory would disregard statutory text and precedent, create an unprincipled and economically sense- less distinction among monopolistic retailers, and furnish monopolistic retailers with a how-to guide for evasion of the antitrust laws.
* * * It is true that Apple’s alleged anticompetitive con-
duct may leave Apple subject to multiple suits by different plaintiffs. But Illinois Brick did not purport to bar multiple liability that is unrelated to passing an overcharge down a chain of distribution. Basic antitrust law tells us that the “mere fact that an antitrust violation produces two different classes of victims hardly entails that their injuries are dupli- cative of one another.” Multiple suits are not atypical when the intermediary in a distribution chain is a bottleneck monopolist or monopsonist (or both) between the manu- facturer on the one end and the consumer on the other end. A retailer who is both a monopolist and a monopso- nist may be liable to different classes of plaintiffs—both to downstream consumers and to upstream suppliers—when
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the retailer’s unlawful conduct affects both the downstream and upstream markets.
Here, some downstream iPhone consumers have sued Apple on a monopoly theory. And it could be that some upstream app developers will also sue Apple on a monop- sony theory. In this instance, the two suits would rely on fundamentally different theories of harm and would not assert dueling claims to a “common fund,” as that term was used in Illinois Brick. The consumers seek damages based on the difference between the price they paid and the com- petitive price. The app developers would seek lost profits that they could have earned in a competitive retail market. Illinois Brick does not bar either category of suit.
In short, the . . . Illinois Brick rationales do not persuade us to remake Illinois Brick and to bar direct-purchaser suits against monopolistic retailers who employ commissions
rather than markups. The plaintiffs seek to hold retailers to account if the retailers engage in unlawful anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers who purchase from those retailers. That is why we have antitrust law.
* * * Ever since Congress overwhelmingly passed and Presi-
dent Benjamin Harrison signed the Sherman Act in 1890, “protecting consumers from monopoly prices” has been “the central concern of antitrust.” . . . The consumers here purchased apps directly from Apple, and they allege that Apple used its monopoly power over the retail apps market to charge higher-than-competitive prices. Our decision in Illinois Brick does not bar the consumers from suing Apple for Apple’s allegedly monopolistic conduct. We affirm the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
KEY POINTS • Customers of Apple’s App Store believed that the company’s monopoly resulted in
increased prices. • Because consumers can enforce antitrust law only if they are direct purchasers, the
Court had to determine the relationship between Apple, third-party developers, and app purchases.
• A firm that controls a marketplace may be more likely to be viewed as the direct seller to a consumer harmed by allegedly monopolistic conduct.
[continued]
It is critically important to understand when, under the law, a monopoly exists. Sidebar 16.3 describes the proof needed to document the existence of an illegal monopoly.
A firm violates Section 2 if it follows a course of conduct through which it obtained the power to control price or exclude competition. The mere possession of monopoly power is not a violation. There must be proof that the power resulted from a deliberate course of conduct or proof of intent to maintain the power by conduct. Proof of deliberateness is just as essential as is proof of the power to control price to exclude competition.
Section 2 cases require proof of market power—the power to affect the price of the firm’s products in the mar- ket. Whether such power exists is usually determined by an analysis of the reaction of buyers to price changes by the alleged monopolist seller. Such cases require a defi- nition of the relevant market and a study of the degree of concentration within the market. Barriers to entry are analyzed, and the greater the barriers, the greater the
sidebar 16.3
Proving That an Illegal Monopoly Exists is Not Easy
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significance of market share. The legal issues in such cases require structural analysis.
In defining the relevant market, the courts examine both product market and geographic market. A relevant market is the smallest one wide enough so that products from outside the geographic area or from other produc- ers in the same area cannot compete with those included in the defined relevant market. In other words, if prices are raised or supply is curtailed within a given area while demand remains constant, will products from other areas or other products from within the area enter the market in enough quantity to force a lower price or increased supply?
Some monopoly cases involve products for which there are few or no substitutes. Other cases involve products for which there are numerous substitutes. For example, aluminum may be considered a product that is generally homogeneous. If a firm has 90 percent of the virgin aluminum market, a violation would be established. However, if a firm had 90 percent of the Danish coffee
cake market, the decision is less clear, because numer- ous products compete with Danish coffee cakes as a breakfast product. The relevant product is often difficult to define because of differences in products, substi- tute products, product diversification, and even product clusters.
Section 2 cases may involve a variety of proofs and many different forms of economic analysis. The degree of market concentration, barriers to entry, structural fea- tures such as market shares of other firms, profit levels, the extent to which prices respond to changes in supply and demand, whether or not a firm discriminates in price between its customers, and the absolute size of the firm are all factors usually considered by courts in monopoly cases. In addition, courts examine the conduct of the firm. How did it achieve its market share? Was it by inter- nal growth or acquisition? Does the firm’s current con- duct tend to injure competition? These and other issues are important aspects in any finding of the existence of monopoly power.
Sherman Act Sanctions and Exceptions
SANCTIONS The Sherman Act as amended by the Clayton Act recognizes four separate legal sanctions:
1. Violations may be subject to criminal fines and imprisonment. 2. Violations may be enjoined by the courts. 3. Injured parties may collect triple damages. 4. Any property owned in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act that is being
transported from one state to another is subject to a seizure by and forfeiture to the United States.
The first sanction is criminal punishment. Crimes under the Sherman Act are felonies. An individual found guilty may be fined up to $1 million and imprisoned up to 10 years. A corporation found guilty may be fined up to $100 million for each offense. These sanctions show congressional intent to keep the antitrust laws cur- rent. Figure 16.3 lists the fines the U.S. Justice Department imposed since 2008. The significant dollar amounts involved illustrates the serious nature of antitrust violations.
The second sanction of the Sherman Act empowers courts to grant injunctions, at the request of the government or a private party, that will prevent and restrain violations or continued violations of its provisions. An injunction may prevent anti- competitive behavior, or it may even force a breakup of a corporation.
LO 16-4
These financial penalties were updated in the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004.
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The injunction is frequently used when the success of a criminal prosecution is doubtful. It takes less proof to enjoin an activity (preponderance of the evidence) than it does to convict of a crime (beyond a reasonable doubt). There have been cases involving this remedy even after an acquittal in a criminal case. In effect, the court ordered the defendant not to do something it had been found innocent of doing.
The third sanction affords relief to persons, including governments, injured by another’s violations of the Sherman Act. Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes such victims in a civil action to collect three times the damages they have suffered plus court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Normally, the objective of award- ing money damages to individuals in a private lawsuit is to place them in the posi- tion they would have enjoyed, as nearly as this can be done with money, had their rights not been invaded. The triple-damage provisions of the antitrust laws, however, employ the remedy of damages to punish a defendant for a wrongful act in addition to compensating the plaintiff for actual injury. Today it is perhaps the most impor- tant sanction for an antitrust violation, because it allows one’s competitors as well as injured members of the general public to enforce the law. Legislation also allows both federal and state governments to file a suit for triple damages.
Successful triple-damage suits may impose financial burdens on violators far in excess of any fine that could be imposed as a result of a criminal prosecution. This significant liability may be far in excess of the damages caused by any one defen- dant, because the liability of defendants is based on tort law and is said to be joint and several. For example, assume that 10 companies in an industry conspire to fix prices and that the total damages caused by the conspiracy equal $100 million. Also,
Do realize that individuals or businesses harmed by an antitrust violation have the incentive of triple damages to act as an enforcer of the law.
Source: Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail-charts
Figure 16.3 Criminal antitrust fines (2008–2019).
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
$701 Million
$1 Billion
$555 Million
$524 Million
$1.1 Billion $1
Billion
$1.3 Billion
$3.6 Billion
$399 Million
$67 Million
$172 Million
$365 MIllion
Total Criminal Antitrust Fines and Penalties
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assume that nine of the defendants settle out of court for $25 million. The remaining defendant, if the case is lost, would owe $275 million (3 × 100 – 25). The Supreme Court has held that there is no right of contribution by the losing party against those that settled prior to the final judgment.
There is a significant relationship between the criminal antitrust prosecution and the civil suit for triple damages. If the defendant in a criminal antitrust suit is convicted or pleads guilty, the plaintiff in the related triple damages suit is greatly aided. This result arises from the criminal case’s prima facie evidence that an anti- trust violation occurred. The cost of the investigation and preparation needed to prove the existence of an antitrust violation is usually substantial. Using the defen- dant’s criminal conviction or guilty plea as proof of the wrong allows the civil plain- tiff to concentrate on proving damages, which are then tripled by the court. This automatic proof deriving from the criminal case can be avoided if the defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere (no contest) in the criminal case. Because this plea technically is interpreted as avoiding a conviction, the civil plaintiff is left with the burden of proving the antitrust violation.
EXEMPTIONS Certain businesses may be exempt from the Sherman Act because of a statute or as the result of a judicial decision. Among activities and businesses for which there are statutory exemptions are insurance companies; farmers’ cooperatives; shipping, milk marketing, and investment companies. Activities required by state law are exempt. In addition, normal activities of labor unions are exempt.
These exemptions are narrowly construed and do not mean that every activity of a firm is necessarily exempted simply because most activities are exempted. For example, an agreement between an insurance company and a pharmaceutical organization that regulates the price of prescription drugs given to policyholders of the insurance company is not exempt—it was not the business of insurance involved
A firm that is indicted for violating the Sherman Act often will face civil actions as well. The firm may resolve the criminal case through a nolo plea so the civil plaintiffs do not benefit from a criminal conviction.
1. Four sanctions are recognized by the antitrust laws: a. Federal criminal penalties. b. Injunctions ordered by the courts. c. Triple damages payable to an injured party. d. Seizure and forfeiture of property owned in
restraint of trade if such property is transported between states.
2. The federal criminal penalties are, for an individual, up to a $1,000,000 fine plus up to 10 years in prison, and for a corporation, up to $100 million in fines.
3. An injunction may prevent anticompetitive behavior. 4. Under the triple-damage sanctions, a defendant can-
not seek contribution from other wrongdoers. 5. To avoid the impact of a guilty plea or a conviction on
a pending civil antitrust suit, the criminally accused defendant often pleads nolo contendere (no contest).
concept summary
Antitrust Sanctions
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in this transaction. It is the business of insurance that is exempt and not the business of insurance companies. Likewise, a labor union would forfeit its exemption when it agrees with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other employers’ bargaining units. It is only the usual and legitimate union activity that is exempt. In Chapter 22, we discuss how a union must deal directly with the company involved in the labor dispute. Therefore, the arrangement in the example above is beyond the normal and proper activities of a union and not protected from antitrust claims.
In a 1943 case known as Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court created a state action exemption to the Sherman Act. This state action exemption, referred to as the Parker v. Brown doctrine, is based on the reasoning that the Sherman Act does not apply to state government. When a state acts in its sovereign capacity, it is immune from federal antitrust scrutiny. For example, an unsuccessful candidate for admittance to the Arizona bar alleged a conspiracy by the bar examiners in violation of the Sherman Act. He contended that the grading scale was dictated by the num- ber of new attorneys desired rather than by the level of competition and answers on the exam. The courts held that this activity was exempt from the Sherman Act. The grading of bar examinations is, in reality, conduct of the Arizona Supreme Court and thus exempt. Action by the courts is just as immune as actions by the legislature.
Another exemption from the Sherman Act extends to concerted efforts to lobby government officials, regardless of the anticompetitive purposes of the lob- bying effort. The doctrine, known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, is based on the First Amendment. For example, Budget Rent-A-Car filed suit against Hertz and National Rent-A-Car because the defendants lobbied officials at three state-owned airports to limit the number of car-rental operations.
This lobbying was ruled exempt from the Sherman Act under the First Amend- ment right to petition government for a redress of grievances and recognition of the value of the free flow of information.
Sidebar 16.4 describes a Supreme Court case involving the issue of whether securities laws take priority over antitrust laws in practices related to the sale of securities in public offerings.
Don’t rely on an exemption from antitrust laws to justify anticompetitive behavior.
Buyers of newly issued securities filed an antitrust law- suit against underwriting firms for allegedly engaging in anticompetitive activities in marketing of the shares. The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a series of cases that try to balance the role of securities laws and antitrust laws. The implied repeal of antitrust laws should be found only where there is a “plain repugnancy” between the antitrust and securities regulations.
The Court ruled as follows: “We believe” it fair to conclude that, where conduct at the core of the marketing of new securities is at issue; where securities
regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encour- aged and permissible from the forbidden; where the threat of antitrust lawsuits, through error or disincentive, could seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways, to allow an anti- trust lawsuit would threaten serious harm to the efficient func- tioning of the securities markets.
Thus, the Supreme Court emphasizes that antitrust laws are not to be used to replace other regulations.
Source: Credit Suisse Securities LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
sidebar 16.4
Antitrust vs. Securities Regulation
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The Clayton Act
By 1914, it was obvious that the Sherman Act of 1890 had not accomplished its intended purpose. Practices that reduced competition were commonplace. In order to improve the antitrust laws, Congress in 1914 enacted the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Clayton Act is more specific than the Sher- man Act in declaring certain enumerated practices in commerce illegal. These were practices that might adversely affect competition but were not themselves contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade; such practices did not go far enough to constitute actual monopolization or attempts to monopolize. Further, the enumerated practices did not have to actually injure competition to be wrongful; they were outlawed if their effect may substantially lessen competition or tends to create a monopoly. Thus, the burden of proving a violation was eased. The Clayton Act made it possible to attack in their incipiency many practices which, if continued, eventually could destroy competition or create a monopoly. The idea was to remedy these matters before full harm was done.
Violations of the original Clayton Act were not crimes, and the act contained no sanction for forfeiture of property. However, it did provide that the Justice Depart- ment might obtain injunctions to prevent violations. Individuals or organizations injured by a violation could obtain injunctive relief on their own behalf. In addition, they were given the right to collect three times the damages suffered plus court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.
The following three sections of this chapter focus on three important provisions of the Clayton Act. As you study this material, ask yourself what business practices occur today that may violate the Clayton Act.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION Section 2 of the Clayton Act as originally adopted in 1914 made it unlawful for a seller to discriminate in the price that is charged to different purchasers of commodi- ties when the effect may be to lessen competition substantially or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Discrimination in price on account of differ- ences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for differences in the cost of selling or transportation was not illegal.
In the 1920s and early 1930s, various techniques such as large-volume purchases with quantity discounts were used by big retailers, especially chain stores, to obtain more favorable prices than those available to smaller competitors. In addition to obtaining quantity discounts, some large businesses created subsidiary corporations that received brokerage allowances as wholesalers. Another method used by big buyers to obtain price advantages was to demand and obtain larger promotional allowances than were given to smaller buyers. The prevalence of these practices led to the enact- ment in 1936 of the Robinson-Patman amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act. This statute attempted to eliminate the advantage that a large buyer could secure over a small buyer solely because of the larger buyer’s quantity-purchasing ability.
The Robinson-Patman amendment attempts to ensure equality of price to all customers of a seller of commodities for resale. The law protects a single competitor who is victimized by price discrimination. It is a violation both to knowingly give and to receive the benefits of such discrimination. Therefore, the law applies to both sellers and buyers. It is just as illegal to receive the benefit of price discrimination as it is to give a lower price to one of two buyers.
LO 16-5
Note the lesser burden of the Clayton Act test.
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The Robinson-Patman amendment extends only to transactions in interstate commerce; it does not extend to transactions that affect only intrastate commerce. In addition, the law is applicable only to the sale of goods; it does not cover contracts that involve the sale of services or the sale of advertising such as television time.
The Robinson-Patman amendment gives the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jurisdiction and authority to regulate quantity discounts. It also prohibits certain hidden or indirect discriminations by sellers in favor of certain buyers. Section 2(c) prohibits an unearned brokerage commission related to a sale of goods. For exam- ple, it is unlawful to pay or to receive a commission or discount on sales or purchases except for actual services rendered. Section 2(d) outlaws granting promotional allow- ances or payments on goods bought for resale unless such allowances are available to all competing customers. For example, a manufacturer who gives a retailer a right to purchase three items for the price of two as part of a special promotion must give the same right to all competitors in the market. Section 2(e) prohibits giving promo- tional facilities or services on goods bought for resale unless they are made available to all competing customers.
The Robinson-Patman amendment makes it a crime for a seller to sell either at lower prices in one geographic area than elsewhere in the United States to eliminate competition or a competitor, or at unreasonably low prices to drive out a competitor. This conduct may also be termed predatory pricing, which is also a violation of Sec- tion 2 of the Sherman Act, as described earlier.
Importantly, the law recognizes certain exceptions or defenses:
• Sellers may select their own customers in good-faith transactions and not in restraint of trade.
• Price changes may be made in response to changing conditions, such as actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned (changing conditions defense).
• Price differentials based on differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or deliv- ery of commodities are permitted (cost justification defense).
• A seller in good faith may meet the equally low price of a competitor (good- faith meeting-of-competition defense).
As you can see from the foregoing sections on the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, different antitrust analyses are applied to pricing in different contexts. Figure 16.4 summarizes the analysis for the most important categories.
SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS Section 3 of the Clayton Act limits the use of certain types of contractual arrange- ments involving goods when the impact of these contracts may substantially lessen competition or tends to create a monopoly. These special arrangements include sales contracts that tie one product with another, contracts that contain reciprocal arrangements in which each party is a buyer and a seller, and provisions foreclosing buying or selling with others.
A tying contract is one in which a product is sold or leased only on the condition that the buyer or lessee purchase a different product or service from the seller or lessor. In order to face liability, the seller requiring the tying arrangement must have market power in one product or service that it seeks to extend through the tied product or ser- vice. A common form of tying arrangement is known as full-line forcing. In full-line
Price discrimination originally focused on the seller offering various prices to its customers. The Robinson-Patman amendment addresses the power of large buy- ers to demand favorable prices.
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forcing, the seller compels the buyer or lessee to take a complete product line from the seller. Under these arrangements, the buyer cannot purchase only one product of the line. A typical illegal agreement is one in which a clothing manufacturer requires a retailer to carry the manufacturer’s full line of articles in order to sell a popular line of shirts. Another common factual situation relates to how a holder of a potential product uses the patent protection to market that product and related, but unpatented, products. In addition to being addressed by the Clayton Act, courts have found tying arrangements to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The agreement in restraint of trade in the tying arrangement is between the buyer and the seller, though the buyer faces no liability. Sidebar 16.5 summarizes a recent Supreme Court decision discussing tying arrangements involving a patented and unpatented, but related, product.
Two (or more) firms agreeing on price
Single firm offering high or
low price
Single firm price discrimination involving goods
Horizontal agreement on maximum,
minimum, or exact price
Per se illegal
Vertical agreement on
maximum price
Rule of reason
Vertical agreement
maximum price
Rule of reason
Vertical agreement on minimum price
Rule of reason
Excessively high price (price
gouging)
No violation of federal law (but may violate state
law)
Excessively low price (predatory
pricing)
Selling below cost problematic
if likely recouped
Primary line— harms
competitors
Similar to predatory pricing
Secondary and tertiary line—
harms buyers (or their consumers)
that compete
No substantial impairment of
competition
Summary of Antitrust Analysis of Pricing
Figure 16.4 Analysis of pricing.
Two (or more) firms agreeing on price
Single firm offering high or
low price
Single firm price discrimination involving goods
Horizontal agreement on maximum,
minimum, or exact price
Per se illegal
Vertical agreement on
maximum price
Rule of reason
Vertical agreement
maximum price
Rule of reason
Vertical agreement on minimum price
Rule of reason
Excessively high price (price
gouging)
No violation of federal law (but may violate state
law)
Excessively low price (predatory
pricing)
Selling below cost problematic
if likely recouped
Primary line— harms
competitors
Similar to predatory pricing
Secondary and tertiary line—
harms buyers (or their consumers)
that compete
No substantial impairment of
competition
Summary of Antitrust Analysis of Pricing
Trident Inc. is owned by Illinois Tool Works Inc. Trident manufactures and markets printing systems that consist of patented equipment and unpatented ink. In marketing its printing systems, Trident insists its buyers agree to pur- chase only Trident ink for use in its equipment.
Independent Ink Inc. produces an ink that is chemi- cally similar to Trident’s ink. Independent files an antitrust lawsuit against Trident claiming its tying contracts are per se illegal under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
sidebar 16.5
Tying Contracts, Patents, and Standard of Review
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The Supreme Court reviews the history of the pat- ent misuse doctrine and its holdings that tying a patented product to an unpatented one creates a per se antitrust violation. The Court explains that Congress’s changes to the patent law remove the patent misuse doctrine and that commentators have been critical of the Court’s prior decisions allowing antitrust claims to limit the benefits of patents. The Court concludes:
Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most econo- mists have all reached the conclusion that a patent does not
necessarily confer market power upon the patentee. Today, we reach the same conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying product.
In essence, the Court now requires the plaintiff in antitrust claims to prove the defendant acted unreason- ably in tying the patented and unpatented product. The anticompetitive nature of the tying arrangement will no longer be presumed. Source: Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
A reciprocal dealing arrangement exists when two parties face each other as both buyer and seller. One party offers to buy the other’s goods but only if the second party buys other goods from the first party. For example, suppose that company A is a manufacturer of microprocessor chips for personal computers. Further assume that company B manufactures personal computers. A reciprocal dealing occurs if B agrees to buy processor chips only if A agrees to buy a specified number of B’s com- puters for use in A’s offices.
An exclusive dealing contract contains a provision that one party or the other (buyer or seller) will deal only with the other party. For example a seller of tomatoes agrees to sell only to Campbell Soup. A buyer of coal may agree to purchase only from a certain coal company. Such agreements tend to fore-close a portion of the market from competitors.
A similar arrangement is known as a requirements contract. In a requirements contract, a buyer agrees to purchase all of its needs of a given contract from the seller during a certain period of time. The buyer may be a manufacturer who needs the raw materials or parts agreed to be supplied, or it may be a retailer who needs goods for resale. In effect, the buyer is agreeing not to purchase any of the products from competitors of the seller.
Franchise contracts often require that the franchisee purchase all of its equipment and inventory from the franchiser as a condition of the agreement. These provisions are commonly inserted because of the value of the franchiser’s trademark and the desire for quality control to protect it. For example, Baskin-Robbins ice cream may require its franchisees to purchase all of their ice cream from Baskin- Robbins. The legitimate purpose is to maintain the image of the franchise and the product. Customers expect the same ice cream from every retail operation. Such agreements, while anticompetitive, are legal because the legitimate purpose out- weighs the anticompetitive aspects.
However, a franchiser is not able to license its trademark in such a manner that it can coerce franchisees to give up all alternate supply sources, because such agree- ments are unreasonable restraints of trade. The quality-control aspect is not present for items such as packaging materials and food items in which special ingredients or secret formulas are not involved; thus, the purpose of the “exclusive source of sup- ply” proviso is only to limit competition. Franchise agreements are not per se viola- tions; they are subject to the rule of reason.
Do be wary of the restrictive nature of franchise contracts.
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Exclusive contracts and requirements contracts are less likely to harm compe- tition than are tying contracts. Such contracts may add competition by eliminat- ing uncertainties and the expense of repeated contracts. However, the courts tend to give per se violation treatment to exclusive contracts if they substantially affect commerce.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS Section 7 of the Clayton Act makes certain mergers and acquisitions illegal. Specifi- cally, a merger that will substantially lessen competition violates the law. Because issues of agreements and alleged monopolization can be involved, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act may be relevant to merger analysis as well.
Mergers are usually classified as horizontal, market extension, vertical, or con- glomerate. A horizontal merger usually combines two businesses in the same field or industry. The acquired and acquiring companies have competed with each other, and the merger reduces the number of competitors and leads to greater concentra- tion in the industry. A market extension merger describes an acquisition in which the acquiring company extends its markets. This market extension may be either in new products (product extension) or in new areas (geographic extension). For example, if a brewery that did not operate in New England acquired a New England brewery, it would have accomplished a geographic market extension merger.
A vertical merger brings together one company that is the customer of the other in one of the lines of commerce in which the other is a supplier. Such a combi- nation ordinarily removes or has the potential to remove the merged customer from the market as far as other suppliers are concerned. It also may remove a source of supply if the acquiring company is a customer of the acquired one. A conglomerate merger is one in which the businesses involved neither compete nor are related as customer and supplier in any given line of commerce. Some analysts consider prod- uct extension and geographic extension mergers to be conglomerate ones with many characteristics of horizontal ones. In any event, there is a great deal of similarity in the legal principles applied to market extension and to conglomerate mergers.
Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (through its Section 5 powers) have the authority to challenge mergers. In general, one agency takes the lead in investigating. To determine the impact of a proposed merger, the investigating agency considers the change in market concentration before and after. Market concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which squares the market share of each firm in the market and adds them together for a final number. For example, if there are five firms in the market, each with a 20 percent share, the final HHI is 2,000 points. If two of those firms merge, the HHI would rise to 2,800 points. According to the DOJ’s and FTC’s joint guidelines, an HHI in excess of 2,500 points is highly concentrated, and an increase by more than 200 points that results in highly concentrated markets is presumed to enhance mar- ket power.4 In addition to market power, other factors are taken into account such as evidence from existing mergers, whether the merging firms substantially competed and whether a merging firm was disruptive in a positive way for consumers but will now be quieted.
To review Horizontal Merger Guidelines, see www.justice.gov/atr/ public/guidelines/hmg- 2010.html.
4 DOJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (August 19, 2010), www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg- 2010.html#5c.
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The determination that a merger is illegal can have a devastating impact after the parties have already combined assets. Therefore, in 1976, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act was passed to facilitate early government evaluation by requiring premerger notification. Under the program, parties to a merger must notify the DOJ and FTC before consummating and wait 30 days for the agencies to conduct their review. The outcome of the review (which may take significantly longer than the 30-day waiting period) could be to permit the merger without oppo- sition. However, if the merger is found to violate the Clayton Act, the DOJ or FTC may seek an injunction to prevent it. State antitrust enforcers may also join in the suit. Firms commonly find that they can sell off assets in a process called divestment to address the agencies’ concerns and permit the merger to go forward. Sidebar 16.6 provides a good example of the power of regulators to impact competition through the merger approval process.
In February 2015, Staples announced its intent to acquire Office Depot for $6.3 billion. The proposed merger would have combined two of the largest competitors in the busi- ness-to-business (B2B) market for office supplies. Accord- ing to the companies, the deal would help cut costs and stem years of declining sales. The FTC immediately began investigating the likely impact of the merger. After seven months of market analysis, the FTC filed an admin- istrative complaint and requested a preliminary injunction from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the merger. But Staples and Office Depot were determined to fight, and the stage was set for a battle between regulators and business.
The FTC’s concern with the proposed merger was that Staples and Office Depot controlled so much of the B2B office supply market that their combination would substantially reduce competition. Such a reduction could
increase prices and harm consumers. According to the FTC, the HHI score for the market was 3,270 before the merger and would be 6,265 afterward. This is termed highly concentrated. Staples and Office Depot argued that the FTC’s analysis of the market was too narrow and did not take into account the likelihood that Amazon and other players would expand to restore competition.
In May 2016, the District Court issued a 75-page opinion granting the FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction. Shortly thereafter, Staples and Office Depot agreed to abandon their effort to merge and settle with the FTC. The companies’ respective stock prices fell in the immediate aftermath, and they were forced to figure out how to be stronger as independent firms. Sources: Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, Inc., 190 F.Supp.3d 100 (D.D.C. 2016); Kendall, Brent, and Drew Fitzgerald, “Federal Judge Blocks Staples- Office Depot Merger,” The Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2016.
sidebar 16.6
Preserving Competition in Pens, Post-Its, and Paper Clips
The Federal Trade Commission Act—Unfair Competition
As previously noted, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces the Clayton Act. The FTC also enforces Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which made “unfair methods of competition” in commerce unlawful. The Wheeler-Lea amendment in 1938 added that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce” are also unlawful under Section 5.
The FTC has broad, sweeping powers and a mandate to determine what methods, acts, or practices in commerce constitute unfair competition. The original Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act outlawed unfair methods of compe- tition in commerce and directed the FTC to prevent the use of such, but it offered no
LO 16-6
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definition of the specific practices that were unfair. The term unfair methods of com- petition was designed by Congress as a flexible concept, the exact meaning of which could evolve on a case-by-case basis. It can apply to a variety of unrelated activities. It is generally up to the FTC to determine what business conduct is “unfair.” Great deference is given to the FTC’s opinion as to what constitutes a violation and to the remedies it proposes to correct anticompetitive behavior.
To decide whether challenged business conduct is “unfair” as a method of com- petition or as a commercial practice, the FTC asks three major questions if there is no deception or antitrust violation involved:
1. Does the conduct injure consumers significantly? 2. Does the conduct offend an established public policy? (Conduct may offend
public policy even though not previously unlawful.) 3. Is the conduct oppressive, unscrupulous, immoral, or unethical?
Answering any one of these questions affirmatively could lead to a finding of unfairness. The Supreme Court has declared that the FTC can operate “like a court of equity” in considering “public values” to establish what is unfair under Section 5.
Business conduct in violation of any provision of the antitrust laws may also be ruled illegal under Section 5. However, the purpose of Section 5 was to establish that anticom- petitive acts or practices that fall short of transgressing the Sherman or Clayton Act may be restrained by the FTC as being “unfair methods of competition.” If a business practice is such that it is doubtful that the evidence is sufficient to prove a Sherman or Clayton Act violation, the FTC may nevertheless proceed and find the business practice is unfair.
The primary function of the FTC is to prevent illegal business practices rather than punish violations. It prevents wrongful actions by the use of cease and desist orders. To prevent unfair competition, the FTC issues trade regulation rules that deal with business practices in an industry plus FTC guidelines on particular practices.
The FTC also periodically issues trade practice rules and guides, sometimes referred to as industry guides. These rules are the FTC’s informal opinion of legal requirements applicable to a particular industry’s practices. Although compliance with the rules is voluntary, they provide the basis for the informal and simultaneous abandonment by industry members of practices thought to be unlawful. FTC guide- lines are administrative interpretations of the statutes the commission enforces, and they provide guidance to both FTC staff and businesspeople evaluating the legal- ity of certain practices. Guidelines deal with specific practices and may cut across industry lines. Sidebar 16.7 lists examples of some of the most important guidelines.
Section 5 of the FTC Act arguably gives the FTC power beyond the sections of other antitrust laws.
To assist businesses in complying with U.S. antitrust law, the FTC and DOJ provide guidelines. The core documents include: • Horizontal Merger Guidelines. • Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations
Among Competitors.
• Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care.
• Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.
• Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations.
sidebar 16.7
Read It!—The FTC and DOJ Guidelines
grzegorz knec/ Alamy Stock Photo
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Other guidance documents address topics like agree- ments between firms not to compete for employees. Any business would be wise to review these resources. The documents are available on the FTC and DOJ webpages.
Source: FTC, Competition Policy Guidance, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/ competition-guidance.
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT The U.S. antitrust laws described earlier also apply to companies outside the United States. So long as their activities have a substantial impact on U.S. commerce, foreign companies must comply with U.S. antitrust law. In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice has concentrated much of its antitrust enforcement effort on international cartels. In recent years, a large portion of the criminal fines imposed by the U.S. Antitrust Division relate to activities of foreign companies or international cartels.
Similarly, U.S. companies doing business in other countries must comply with those countries’ antitrust laws. Perhaps the most important antitrust enforcement agency outside the United States is the European Commission, part of the Euro- pean Union. The commission has authority under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to investigate and regulate anticompetitive activity. Its enabling treaty is similar in many respects to U.S. law. The EU treaty specifically prevents price fixing, market divisions, and production controls. It also holds companies lia- ble for monopolization, which is termed “abuse of a dominant position” in the EU. The commission also has the power to challenge mergers.
Fines for violating EU antitrust law can be as large as those in the United States. For example, in 2016, the European Commission fined five truck producers a total of 2.93 billion euros (more than $3 billion) for fixing prices and passing on the costs of emissions compliance to consumers. And Intel was fined 1 billion euros (about $1.3 billion) in 2009 for abusing its dominant position in the CPU market. An additional controversial aspect of EU antitrust power is the fact that its deci- sions need not mirror those of the U.S. government. The EU may impose fines or require changes in business practices related to activities that do not violate U.S. law. In 2014, the European Commission and Google announced a settlement requir- ing Google to provide promotion space for rival advertisers when delivering results from a Google specialized search. This system appears only in Europe. Moreover, the scale of scrutiny can be quite different. Since 2017, the EU has imposed fines of approximately 8.2 billion euros on Google, but the penalties in the United States are only in the tens of millions.
Other countries have antitrust enforcement agencies as well. Global businesses must be aware of the extent to which various antitrust regimes complement or conflict.
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Key Terms Clayton Act 479 Concerted activities 487 Conglomerate merger 502 Cost justification defense 499 Exclusive dealing 501 Federal Trade Commission
Act 479 Full-line forcing 499 Geographic extension
merger 502 Good-faith meeting-of-competition
defense 499 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) 502 Horizontal merger 502
Horizontal price fixing 482 Horizontal restraints 480 Horizontal territorial
agreement 486 Market extension merger 502 Merger 502 Monopoly 490 Noerr-Pennington doctrine 497 Per se illegality 481 Predatory pricing 491 Premerger notification 502 Price fixing 479 Product extension merger 502 Reciprocal dealing 501 Requirements contract 501
Resale price maintenance 485 Restraint of trade 479 Robinson-Patman
amendment 498 Rule of reason 481 Sherman Act 478 State action exemption 497 Triple damages 494 Tying contract 499 Vertical merger 502 Vertical price fixing 485 Vertical restraints 480 Vertical territorial agreement 487
Review Questions and Problems 1. Historical Development
(a) The Sherman Act, as amended by the Clayton Act, seeks to preserve competition by declaring two types of anticompetitive behavior to be illegal. Describe these two behaviors.
(b) Through what agencies does the federal government enforce the antitrust laws? (c) What role do state attorneys general play in antitrust enforcement? (d) Can individuals or business organizations enforce antitrust laws?
The Sherman Act
2. Restraint of Trade All of the orthodontists in your community at their annual holiday party agreed to charge the parents of each child patient a nonrefundable fee of $200 prior to beginning any treatment. They also agreed that the charge for an orthodontia procedure would not be less than $2,000. Are these agreements in viola- tion of the Sherman Act? Explain.
3. Analysis in Antitrust Law (a) Why is it important for courts to use the rule of reason analysis when considering actions allegedly
in violation of the Sherman Act? (b) What is the significance of the per se analysis for potential antitrust violations?
Types of Cases
4. Horizontal Price Fixing The members of a real estate brokers’ multiple listing service voted to raise their commission rate from 6 percent to 7 percent. The bylaws of the association provided for expulsion of any member charg- ing less than the agreed-upon commission. If broker Hillary continues to charge 6 percent, can she be expelled legally? Why or why not?
5. Vertical Price Fixing (a) Describe the situations when a supplier can legally fix the minimum price that a customer must
charge to its buyers. (b) What analysis do courts use when judging the legality of a vertical price-fixing plan? Why is this
legal analysis the appropriate one to use?
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6. Indirect Price Fixing Assume that all manufacturers of computer chips entered into an agreement whereby each agreed to exchange information as to the most recent price charged or quoted to a consumer. Is this agreement a violation of the Sherman Act? Why or why not?
7. Territorial Agreements (a) Are franchise agreements which allocate an exclusive territory to the franchisee
always illegal? Explain. (b) Give an example of a product where intrabrand competition is as important as
interbrand competition. 8. Concerted Activities
In response to public pressure, all of the manufacturers of chewing tobacco agree not to advertise on radio or television. The resulting savings are used to reduce the price of the product to consumers. Furthermore, the use of chewing tobacco by teenagers is reduced dramatically. Is the agreement legal? Explain.
9. Monopoly The Justice Department filed a civil suit claiming Grinnell Corporation had a monopoly in the operation of central station hazard-detecting devices. These security devices are used to prevent burglary and to detect fires. They involve electronic notification of the police and fire departments at a central location. Grinnell, through three separate subsidiaries, controlled 87 percent of that business. It argues that it faces competition from other modes of protection from burglary, and therefore it does not have monopoly power. What argument does the Justice Department have to make to prove its claim that Grinnell is operating an illegal monopoly?
10. Sanctions (a) Name the four sanctions used to enforce the Sherman Act. (b) What is the relationship between the criminal sanction and suits for triple
damages? (c) What is the impact of the nolo contendere plea?
11. Exemptions The operators of adult bookstores got together and each agreed to contribute $1,000 to a fund for use in lobbying the city council to repeal an ordinance which made the sale of sexually explicit publications a crime. If the operators are charged with violating the antitrust laws, what will be the likely defense? Explain.
The Clayton Act
12. Introduction (a) Name the sanctions that can be imposed against a violator of the Clayton Act. (b) What is the significance of the word incipiency in Clayton Act enforcement?
13. Price Discrimination You are the sales representative for a manufacturer of insulation. A customer that accounts for approximately one-third of your sales suddenly asks for a discount because of the volume of its purchases. You are politely told that a refusal will cause the customer to take its business to another manufacturer. Your income is solely from commissions on sales, which are calculated on gross profit margins. (a) If you agree to a discount, have you broken any law? (b) If you have violated a law, what are the potential consequences? (c) If you give the same discount to all customers, would your actions be illegal?
Explain.
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14. Special Arrangements (a) An ice-cream franchiser requires its franchisees to purchase all ice cream,
cones, and syrups from the franchiser. Does this contract violate the antitrust laws? Why or why not?
(b) Would your answer be the same if the contract also required the franchisees to purchase all of its paper products and cleaning supplies, such as napkins, from the franchiser? Explain.
15. Mergers and Acquisitions The government challenged the acquisition by Procter & Gamble (P&G) of Clo- rox. Clorox was the leading manufacturer of liquid bleach at the time of the acquisi- tion, accounting for 48 percent of the national sales. It was the only firm selling nationally, and the top two firms accounted for 65 percent of national sales. P&G is a large, diversified manufacturer of household products, with its primary activity being in the area of soaps, detergents, and cleaners. P&G accounted for 54 percent of all packaged detergent sales, and the top three firms accounted for 50 percent of the market. P&G is among the nation’s leading advertisers. What is the basis for the government’s challenge to this acquisition? Explain.
The Federal Trade Commission Act—Unfair Competition
16. Enforcement A group of lawyers in private practices who regularly acted as court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants in District of Columbia criminal cases agreed at a meeting of the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA) to stop provid- ing such representation until the District increased group members’ compensation. The boycott had a severe impact on the District’s criminal justice system, and the District government capitulated to the lawyers’ demands. After the lawyers returned to work, the FTC filed a complaint against SCTLA and four of its offi- cers, alleging that they had entered into a conspiracy to fix prices and to conduct a boycott that constituted unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Does the FTC have the authority to bring a Section 5 case against these lawyers? Explain.
17. Prevention (a) The FTC has responsibility for preventing unfair methods of competition and
unfair and deceptive business practices. Describe three examples of business activities that could be declared unlawful by the FTC pursuant to these powers.
(b) Does the FTC have to prove that these examples involve violations of the Sher- man or Clayton Acts to be successful in establishing an unfair method of com- petition or an unfair or deceptive business practice? Explain.
International Antitrust Enforcement 18. In some cases, U.S. antitrust authorities have approved mergers that were rejected
by European antitrust authorities. How might such inconsistencies create problems for multinational corporations and what are some possible solutions?
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You are feeling very good about your life. This positive feeling is due in large part to your recent promotion to national sales manager of Ever-Present Technologies Inc. Your com- pany offers full-service consulting and computer sales to manufacturers, especially those in the consumer products areas.
Two weeks into your new responsibilities, you are beginning to lose your good feel- ings. This change of spirit results from hearing about various activities among your sales personnel. First, you learn one of your new sales representatives has been visiting with a competitor’s salesperson about each focusing on particular customers while agreeing not to call on the other’s customers. Second, a district manager reports that a large, extremely valuable customer is asking for a pricing structure that is more favorable than prices offered to any other customer. The district manager expressed concern that your company may lose this customer’s business. • What legal worries do you have about each of these situations? • What type of information should a training/education program for your sales force
include? • What are the ramifications if you decide to ignore these situations as you try to return
to your “happy” state of mind?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn: 17-1 To understand the meaning of the term securities and to apply the broad
scope of the securities laws and regulations. 17-2 To analyze the differences between a public offering and subsequent secu-
rities transactions. 17-3 To apply ways in which the laws cover these differences. 17-4 To evaluate when and why private individuals and organizations make
claims to enforce securities laws. 17-5 To evaluate how state regulations add to the requirements of proper secu-
rities transactions. 17-6 To understand why the Sarbanes—Oxley Act was passed and evaluate its
effectiveness. 17-7 To remember the complexity of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act.
Financial and Securities Regulations
vichie81/Getty Images17
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C hapter 14 examined how business activity
can be organized. That chapter relates to
the creation and management of business
organizations. One way to view this chapter is as a
continuation of those topics. The phrase corporate
governance as used in this chapter relates to govern-
ment regulation of the ownership of business organi-
zations. Indeed, of all the topics covered in this text,
enforcement and revisions of securities regulations
are the principal means used by the federal and state
government to create and restore investor confidence
following scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Adelphia, HealthSouth, and other major corporations
in 2000 and 2001. Financial reforms also followed
the economic collapse in 2008, which was caused by
the failure or near-failure of Lehman Brothers, Mer-
rill Lynch, AIG, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America,
Wachovia, and other financial institutions. The mar-
kets’ fluctuations in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic
impacted supply chains and businesses of all kinds
likely will lead to regulatory changes in the future.
Your reading and study of this chapter will expose
you to numerous examples as to how businesspeople
are required to manage their organizations. This chap-
ter also acquaints you, as a potential investor, with the
laws protecting you and your fellow investors.
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As you study this chapter, remember that the regulation of securities began as part of the program to help the United States overcome the great depression of the early 1930s. You should also realize that these securities laws are designed to give potential investors sufficient information so that they can make intelligent invest- ment decisions based on factual information rather than on other less certain cri- teria. Although federal securities laws are more than 80 years old, their application is at the heart of corporate governance during the first years of the 21st century. Table 17.1 provides a chronological summary of various securities laws covered in this chapter.
Statute Summary of Major Provisions
Securities Act of 1933 • Disclosure law governing initial sale of securities to public • Defines the term security • Creates liability for false or misleading registration statement
(Section 11) • Creates liability for failure to file a registration statement
(Section 12[1]) • Creates liability for false or misleading prospectus (Section 12[2]) • Creates liability for fraudulent communications used in the offer of
sales of securities (Section 17[a]) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 • Created Securities and Exchange Commission
• Governs exchanges of securities beyond the initial sale • Creates liability for fraudulent manipulation of securities’ value (Section 10[b])
• Creates liability for short-swing profits made by insiders (Section 16) • Creates liability for false or misleading filings with the SEC
(Section 18) • Creates liability for fraudulent transactions related to tender offers
(Section 14[e]) Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
• Provides for recovery of triple damages in civil actions against user of nonpublic information
• Increases criminal sanctions for use of nonpublic information Securities Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990
• Increases civil fines for violations of securities laws • Prohibits an individual’s service as an officer or director
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
• Clarifies that individuals and organizations can sue primary parties, but not secondary parties, for securities violations
• Requires pleading of specific allegations of wrongdoing State blue sky laws • Impose another level of securities regulations beyond federal laws
• Govern intrastate securities transactions not regulated by federal laws
table 17.1 Laws Regulating Securities Transactions
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Before we examine any of the laws in depth, the next two sections present intro- ductory materials on the meaning of the term security and the role of the federal Securities and Exchange Commission.
WHAT IS A SECURITY? Because the objective of securities laws is to protect uninformed people from invest- ing their money without sufficient information, the term security has a very broad definition. Indeed, the federal securities laws provide the following definition:
“Security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted- ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or in general, any interest or instrument com- monly known as a “security,” or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.1
As this definition indicates, the word security includes much more than corpora- tion stock. Historically, the Supreme Court has held that a security exists when one
LO 17-1
Statute Summary of Major Provisions
Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002 • Increases budgetary support to Securities and Exchange Commission
• Creates Public Company Accounting Oversight Board • Changes membership requirements of corporate audit committees • Requires CEOs to certify financial statements • Protects whistleblowers who reveal fraud
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
• Enhances consumer protection • Ends “Too Big to Fail” bailouts • Reforms Federal Reserve • Creates mortgage reforms • Regulates various financial instruments and organizations • Reforms SEC and investor protection • Creates several new administrative oversight agencies
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012
• Relaxes some of the regulatory burden for investments in smaller businesses or start-ups
• Permits small businesses to advertise for investment • Companies can raise a maximum $1 million through online crowdfunding in a 12-month period
table 17.1 Laws Regulating Securities Transactions—(Continued)
115 U.S.C.A. §77b(1). This definition is a part of the 1933 Securities Act. It is virtually identical to the definition of security found in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
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person invests money and looks to others to manage the money for profit. On the basis of this statement, courts seek positive answers to the following three questions when determining whether a person has purchased a security:
1. Is the investment in a common business activity? 2. Is the investment based on a reasonable expectation of profits? 3. Will these profits be earned through the efforts of someone other than the
investor?
This three-prong analysis permits courts to find the sale of oil-well interests, the syndication of racehorses, and shares of limited partnerships are securities. The Howey case involved the sale of orange trees in a Florida orchard. The Howey-in- the-Hills Services Company offered buyers of trees a management service contract whereby Howey provided care for the trees and harvesting of the fruit. When the investors did not receive the return they expected, Howey was held liable for failing to comply with securities laws.2
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an administrative agency cre- ated in 1934 that is responsible for administering the federal securities laws. The SEC consists of five commissioners appointed by the president for five-year terms. In addition to these commissioners, the SEC employs staff personnel such as law- yers, accountants, security analysts, security examiners, and others.
The SEC has both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Under its quasi- legislative power, it has adopted rules and regulations relating to financial and other information that must be furnished to the Commission. Other rules prescribe infor- mation that must be given to potential investors. The SEC also regulates the vari- ous stock exchanges, utility holding companies, investment trusts, and investment advisers. Under its quasi-judicial power, the SEC also is involved in a variety of investigations.
The Securities Act of 1933: Going Public
The Securities Act of 1933 is a disclosure law with respect to the initial sale of securities to the public. This law makes it illegal to use the mails or any other means of interstate communication or transportation to sell securities without disclosing certain financial information to potential investors. The following sections discuss several aspects of the act in detail, including who is regulated, what documents are required, when criminal and civil liability exist, and what defenses are available. As you read, remember that this law applies only to the initial sale of the security. Sub- sequent transfers of securities are governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, discussed later in this chapter.
In essence, the 1933 Securities Act requires the disclosure of information to the potential investor or other interested party. The information given must not be untrue or even misleading. If this information is not accurate, liability is imposed upon those responsible.
LO 17-2
2SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 66 S. Ct. 1100 (1946).
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The act recognizes three sanctions for violations:
• Criminal punishment. • Civil liability, which may be imposed in favor of injured parties in certain cases. • Equitable remedy of an injunction.
Proof of an intentional violation usually is required before criminal or civil sanc- tions are imposed. Proof of negligence will, however, support an injunction.
PARTIES REGULATED The Securities Act of 1933 regulates anyone who is involved with or who promotes the initial sale of securities. Typically, these parties who must comply with the disclo- sure requirements of the 1933 Act fall into one or more of four roles.
An issuer is the individual or business organization offering a security for sale to the public. An underwriter is anyone who participates in the original distribu- tion of securities by selling such securities for the issuer or by guaranteeing their sale. Often securities brokerage firms or investment bankers act as underwriters with respect to a particular transaction. A controlling person is one who controls or is controlled by the issuer, such as a major stockholder of a corporation. Finally, a seller is anyone who contracts with a purchaser or who is a motivating influence that causes the purchase transaction to occur.
Whenever you operate a business, you and your co-owners must understand the requirements of the 1933 Securities Act. Your organization clearly is an issuer. You and your co-owner clearly are controlling persons. Whether you also are an under- writer or seller or both will depend on the factual situation and relationships you create with other individuals or firms to promote and sell stock in your organization. Regardless of whether you occupy one or more of these roles, you must comply with the 1993 Act or face significant liability.
DOCUMENTS INVOLVED In regulating the initial sales of securities, the Securities Act of 1933 is viewed as a disclosure law. In essence, this law requires that securities subject to its provisions be registered prior to any sale and that a prospectus be furnished to any potential inves- tor prior to any sale being consummated. Thus, an issuer of securities who complies with the federal law must prepare:
• A registration statement • A prospectus
Registration Statement In an attempt to accomplish its purpose of disclo- sure, the Securities Act of 1933 contains detailed provisions relating to the registra- tion of securities. These provisions require that a registration statement be filed with the SEC. The statement includes a detailed disclosure of financial information about the issuer and the controlling individuals involved in the offering of securities for sale to the public.
With respect to the filing of the registration statement, the law describes selling activities permitted at the various stages of the registration process. This procedure and its time frame are a primary reason why you and your co-owner described in the Business Discussions cannot begin business immediately.
Three time periods involved in the registra- tion process are the pre- filing period, the waiting period, and the postef- fective period.
Parties subject to the 1933 act include issu- ers, underwriters, con- trolling persons, and sellers.
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During the prefiling period, it is legal for the issuer of a security to engage in preliminary negotiations and agreements with underwriters. It is illegal to sell a cov- ered security during this period. Offers to sell and offers to buy securities also are prohibited during this prefiling period.
After the registration statement is filed, a waiting period commences. This period typically lasts 20 days. During this time, the SEC staff investigates the accuracy of the registration statement to determine whether the sale of the securities should be permitted. During the waiting period, it is still illegal to sell a security subject to the act. However, it is not illegal to solicit a buyer or receive offers to buy. Because contracts to sell are still illegal, offers cannot be accepted during the waiting period. However, during these waiting periods, sellers may solicit offers for later acceptance.
Many solicitations during the waiting period are made in advertisements called tombstone ads. These ads are brief announcements identifying the security and stating its price, by whom orders will be executed, and from whom a prospectus may be obtained. Solicitations may also be made during the waiting period by use of a statistical summary, a summary prospectus, or a preliminary prospectus. These techniques allow dissemination of the facts that are to be ultimately disclosed in the formal prospectus.
A registration becomes effective at the expiration of the waiting period, 20 days after it is filed, unless the SEC gives notice that it is not in proper form or unless the SEC accelerates the effective date. Any amendment filed without the commission’s consent starts the 20-day period running again. The end of the waiting period is the beginning of the posteffective period. During this period, contracts to buy and sell securities are finalized.
Prospectus During the posteffective period, securities may be sold. A prospectus must be furnished to any interested investor, and it must conform to the statutory requirements. Like the registration statement, the prospectus contains financial information related to the issuer and controlling persons. Indeed, the prospectus contains the same essential information contained in the registration statement. The prospectus supplies the investor with sufficient facts (including financial informa- tion) so that he or she can make an intelligent investment decision. The SEC has adopted rules relating to the detailed requirements of the prospectus. The major requirements are detailed facts about the issuer and financial statements, including balance sheets and statements of operations of the issuer.
Theoretically, any security may be sold under the act, provided the issuer and others follow the law and the rules and regulations enacted under it are followed. The law does not prohibit the sale of worthless securities. An investor may “fool- ishly” invest his or her money, and a person may legally sell the blue sky if the statutory requirements are met. In fact, the prospectus must contain the following in capital letters and boldface type:
THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COMMISSION PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS. ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.
The SEC has alternative processes to this formal registration process for compa- nies that sell securities to institutional investors. Rule 144A is an example of an SEC- approved regulation allowing sale of securities to investors such as pension funds. Under this Rule, the securities are labeled as restricted. All other provisions of the
Don’t rely on the prospectus as assurance the investment will make money.
“According to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Economic Analysis, registered offerings since 2012 accounted for approximately $1.4 trillion of capital raised whereas exempt offerings, including Rule 144A and Regulation D offerings, accounted for approximately $2.9 trillion of capital raised.”
–Anna T. Pinedo and Carlos Juarez, “Capital Formation
Marketing Trends: IPOs and Follow-On Offer- ings,” Mayer Brown,
March 3, 2020
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securities law, such as those related to any fraudulent transactions, remain appli- cable to transactions involving these restricted securities.
LIABILITY Under the federal Securities Act of 1933, both criminal and civil liability may be imposed for violations. Criminal liability results from a willful violation of the act or fraud in any offer or sale of securities. Fraud occurs when any material fact is omit- ted, causing a statement to be misleading. The penalty is a substantial fine or five years in prison or both.
Civil liability under the 1933 Act usually involves a buyer of securities suing for a refund of the investment. This liability on the issuer, controlling person, under- writer, and seller is significant because the investors’ money typically is lost at the time of these civil claims.
Three sections of the Securities Act of 1933 directly apply to civil liability of parties involved in issuing securities:
• Section 11 deals with registration statements. • Section 12 relates to prospectuses and oral and written communication. • Section 17 concerns fraudulent interstate transactions.
Section 11: Registration Statement The civil liability provision dealing with registration statements imposes liability on the following persons in favor of purchasers of securities:
1. Every person who signed the registration statement. 2. Every director of the corporation or partner in the partnership issuing the
security. 3. Every person who, with his or her consent, is named in the registration state-
ment as about to become a director or partner. 4. Every accountant, engineer, or appraiser who assists in the preparation of the
registration statement or its certification. 5. Every underwriter.
These persons are liable if the registration statement:
• Contains untrue statements of material facts. • Omits material facts required by statute or regulation. • Omits information that if not given makes the facts stated misleading.
This last situation describes the factual situation of a statement containing a half-truth, which has the net effect of being misleading. The test of accuracy and materiality is as of the date the registration statement becomes effective.
A plaintiff-purchaser need not prove reliance on the registration statement in order to recover the amount of an investment. All the plaintiff has to show is omit- ted or misleading information in the registration statement. A defendant can defend the suit by proving actual knowledge of the falsity by the purchaser. Knowledge of the falsity by a defendant need not be proved. However, a defendant’s reliance on an expert such as an accountant is a defense. For example, a director may defend a suit on the basis of a false financial statement by showing reliance on a certified public accountant. This reliance exception logically does not apply to the issuer. Because
The issuer and experts assisting must make sure the registration materials are truthful and not misleading.
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the issuer provides information to the expert, the issuer should not be allowed to rely on the expert’s use of the inaccurate information.
Section 12: Prospectus and Other Communications This section of the 1933 Act is divided into two parts. The first subsection of Section 12 imposes lia- bility on those who offer or sell securities that are not registered with the SEC. This liability exists regardless of the intent or conduct of those who fail to comply with the registration requirements. Thus, liability traditionally has been imposed against violators even though they lacked any wrongful intent. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant is free from liability if the plaintiff is equally responsible for the failure to file the registration statement.
The second subsection of Section 12 imposes liability on sellers who use a prospec- tus or make communications (by mail, telephone, or other instrumentalities of inter- state commerce) that contain an untrue statement of material facts required to be stated or necessary to make statements not misleading. As under Section 11, the plaintiff does not have to prove reliance on the false or misleading prospectus or communication. Nor does the plaintiff have to establish that the defendant intended the deception.
Purchasers of such securities may sue for their actual damages. If the purchaser still owns the securities and he or she can prove a direct contractual relationship with the seller, the remedy of rescission and a refund of the purchase price is also available.
Section 17: Fraudulent Transactions This provision concerning fraudu- lent interstate transactions prohibits the use of any instrument of interstate commu- nication in the offer or sale of any securities when the result is:
1. To defraud. 2. To obtain money or property by means of an untrue or misleading statement. 3. To engage in a business transaction or practice that may operate to defraud or
deceive a purchaser.
The requirement that a defendant-seller must act with the intent (scienter) to deceive or mislead in order to prove a Section 17 violation has caused much con- troversy over the years. The Supreme Court has resolved this issue by holding that a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s intent to violate 1. However, no proof of the defendant’s intent is required to find a violation of 2 or 3. The Court’s decision is limited to when the plaintiff is seeking an injunction, because Section 17 does not explicitly provide for the private remedy of monetary damages.
DEFENSES The Securities Act of 1933 recognized several defenses that may be used to avoid civil liability. Among the most important defenses are:
• Materiality • The statute of limitations • Due diligence
Materiality A defendant in a case involving the 1933 Act might argue that the false or misleading information is not material and thus should not have had an impact on the purchaser’s decision-making process. Determining whether or not a particular fact is material depends on the facts and the parties involved.
Plaintiffs can recover for harm done by false or misleading information in a prospectus even if the prospectus is not read or reviewed.
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The SEC and the courts have attempted to define materiality. The term mate- rial describes the kinds of information that an average prudent investor would want to have so that he or she can make an intelligent, informed decision whether or not to buy the security. A material fact is one that if correctly stated or disclosed would have deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities in question. The term does not cover minor inaccuracies or errors in mat- ters of no interest to investors. Facts that tend to deter a person from purchasing a security are those that have an important bearing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corporation or its business.
Statute of Limitations The statute of limitations is a defense for both civil and criminal liability. The basic period is one year. The one year does not start to run until the discovery of the untrue statement or omission. Or it does not start to run until the time such discovery would have been made with reasonable diligence. In no event may a suit be brought more than three years after the sale.
A defense similar to the statute of limitations is also provided. The 1933 Act provides that if the person acquiring the security does so after the issuer has made generally available an earnings statement covering at least 12 months after the effec- tive date of the registration statement, then this person must prove actual reliance on the registration statement.
Due Diligence A very important defense for experts such as accountants is the due diligence defense.
Sarbanes-Oxley does not increase the statute of limitations under the 1933 Act.
SECTION 11 Purpose: Creates liability for false or misleading reg- istration statements. Plaintiff’s case: Not required to prove defendant’s intent to deceive or plaintiff’s reliance on documents. Defendant’s defenses: Proof of no false or misleading information; proof that plaintiff knew of false or mis- leading nature of information; except for issuers, proof of reliance on an expert (attorney or accountant).
SECTION 12 Purpose: (1) Creates liability for failing to file a required registration statement; (2) creates liability for false or misleading prospectus. Plaintiff’s case: Not required to prove defendant’s intent to deceive or plaintiff’s reliance on documents. Defendant’s defenses: For (1), plaintiff equally at fault for failing to file a registration statement; for (2), same as Section 11 defenses.
SECTION 17 Purpose: In an interstate transaction, it is unlawful to (1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice of fraud; (2) obtain money or property by untrue statement or omission of material fact; (3) engage in events that operate or would operate as fraud or deceit. Plaintiff’s case: For (1), required to prove defendant’s intent to deceive; for (2) and (3), not required to prove intent to deceive. Defendant’s defenses: For (1), proof of no intent to deceive and proof of good faith; for (2), proof of no material misstatement or omission; for (3), proof of no involvement in unlawful activities.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY Substantial fine or five years in prison or both.
concept summary
Liability under the Securities Act of 1933
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To establish this defense, the expert must prove that a reasonable investigation of the financial statements of the issuer and controlling persons was conducted. As the result of this investigation, an expert exercising due diligence must prove that there was no reason to believe any of the information in the registration statement or prospectus was false or misleading.
In determining whether or not an expert, such as an accountant, has made a reasonable investigation, the law provides that the standard of reasonableness is that required of a prudent person in the management of his or her own property. The burden of proof of this defense is on the expert, and the test is as of the time the registration statement became effective. The due diligence defense, in effect, requires proof that a party was not guilty of fraud or negligence.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Being Public
Whereas the Securities Act of 1933 deals with original offerings of securities, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates transfers of securities after the initial sale. The 1934 Act, which created the Securities and Exchange Commission, also deals with regulation of securities exchanges, brokers, and dealers in securities.
The Securities Exchange Act makes it illegal to sell a security on a national exchange unless a registration is effective for the security. Registration under the 1934 Act differs from registration under the 1933 Act. Registration under the 1934 Act requires filing prescribed forms with the applicable stock exchange and the SEC.
Provisions relating to stockbrokers and dealers prohibit the use of the mails or any other instrumentality of interstate commerce to sell securities unless the broker or the dealer is registered. The language is sufficiently broad to cover attempted sales as well as actual sales. Brokers and dealers must keep detailed records of their activi- ties and file annual reports with the SEC.
The SEC requires that issuers of registered securities file periodic reports as well as report significant developments that would affect the value of the security. For example, the SEC requires companies to disclose foreign payoffs or bribes to obtain or retain foreign business operations. Businesses must disclose their minor- ity hiring practices and other social data that may be of public concern. Business has been forced by the SEC to submit certain shareholder proposals to all share- holders as a part of proxy solicitation. When a new pension law was enacted, the SEC required that financial reports disclose the law’s impact on the reporting business. The SEC requires more complete disclosure of executive compensation packages.
The SEC’s activity concerning information corporations must furnish to the investing public is almost limitless. With the actions of the Public Company Account- ing Oversight Board (PCAOB), SEC regulations are of paramount significance to all persons concerned with the financial aspects of business. This area of regulation directly affects the accounting profession. Because the SEC regulates financial state- ments, it frequently decides issues of proper accounting and auditing theory and practices.
The following sections examine how the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 affects the businessperson, the accountant, the lawyer, the broker, and the investor. These sections cover some fundamental concepts of this law, such as civil liability in gen- eral and insider transactions in particular, as well as criminal violations and penal- ties under the 1934 Act.
LO 17-3
Sarbanes-Oxley, through the PCAOB and SEC regulations, affects the accounting and audit practices.
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SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5 Most of the litigation under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is brought under Section 10(b) of the act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the act. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 declare that it is unlawful to use the mails or any instru- mentality of interstate commerce or any national securities exchange to defraud any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Sidebar 17.1 contains the actual language of this section and rule.
Common issues regarding litigation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 include the following:
• Who is liable? • What can be recovered by the plaintiff, and does the defendant have the right to
seek contribution from third parties? • When is information material to the transaction? • Where does the law apply?
Liability Parties directly connected to a fraudulent scheme in the sale of securi- ties are liable, but does that liability extend to third parties? The Supreme Court historically has not permitted 10b-5 actions against parties that were not “makers” of material misstatements, even if they knowingly or recklessly provided substantial assistance in the fraudulent scheme. However, in Case 17.1, the Court refines its answer to the question who is liable.
Damages A plaintiff in a suit under Rule 10b-5 must prove damages. The damages of a defrauded purchaser are actual out-of-pocket losses or the excess of what was paid over the value of what was received. Courts in a few cases have used the benefit
LO 17-4
Section 10(b) states: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of inter- state commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula- tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.
Rule 10b-5, adopted by the SEC in 1942, states: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 1. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 2. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum- stances under which they were made, not mislead- ing, or
3. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
sidebar 17.1
Language of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC’s Rule 10b-5
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case 17.1
FRANCIS V. LORENZO v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019)
BREYER, Justice: . . . In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), . . . . [w]e held that the “maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.”. . .
In this case, we consider whether those who do not “make” statements (as Janus defined “make”), but who disseminate false or misleading statements to potential investors with the intent to defraud, can be found to have violated . . . Rule 10b–5. . . We believe that they can.
Francis Lorenzo, the petitioner, was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer in Staten Island, New York. Lorenzo’s only investment banking client at the time was Waste2Energy Holdings, Inc., a company developing technology to con- vert “solid waste” into “clean renewable energy.” In a June 2009 public filing, Waste2Energy stated that its total assets were worth about $14 million. This figure included intan- gible assets, namely, intellectual property, valued at more than $10 million. Lorenzo was skeptical of this valuation, later testifying that the intangibles were a “dead asset” because the technology “didn’t really work.”
During the summer and early fall of 2009, Waste2En- ergy hired Lorenzo’s firm, Charles Vista, to sell to investors $15 million worth of debentures, a form of “debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, not by a lien on any specific asset,”. . . . In early October 2009, Waste2Energy publicly disclosed, and Lorenzo was told, that its intellec- tual property was worthless, that it had “[w]rit[ten] off . . . all [of its] intangible assets,” and that its total assets (as of March 31, 2009) amounted to $370,552.
Shortly thereafter, on October 14, 2009, Lorenzo sent two e-mails to prospective investors describing the debenture offering. According to later testimony by Lorenzo, he sent the e-mails at the direction of his boss, who supplied the content and “approved” the messages. The e-mails described the investment in Waste2Energy as having “3 layers of pro- tection,” including $10 million in “confirmed assets.” The e-mails nowhere revealed the fact that Waste2Energy had publicly stated that its assets were in fact worth less than $400,000. Lorenzo signed the e-mails with his own name, he identified himself as “Vice President—Investment Banking,” and he invited the recipients to “call with any questions.”
The Commission charged that Lorenzo had violated Rule 10b–5, §10(b) of the Exchange Act, and §17(a)(1) of the Securities Act. Ultimately, the Commission found that
Lorenzo had run afoul of these provisions by sending false and misleading statements to investors with intent to defraud. As a sanction, it fined Lorenzo $15,000, ordered him to cease and desist from violating the securities laws, and barred him from working in the securities industry for life.
Lorenzo appealed, arguing primarily that in sending the e-mails he lacked the intent required to establish a violation . . . .
We granted review to resolve disagreement about whether someone who is not a “maker” of a misstatement under Janus can nevertheless be found to have violated the other subsections of Rule 10b–5 and related provisions of the securities laws, when the only conduct involved con- cerns a misstatement.
As we have said, subsection (a) of the Rule makes it unlawful to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” Subsection (b) makes it unlawful to “make any untrue statement of a material fact.” And subsection (c) makes it unlawful to “engage in any act, practice, or course of business” that “operates . . . as a fraud or deceit.”. . .
After examining the relevant language, precedent, and purpose, we conclude that (assuming other here-irrelevant legal requirements are met) dissemination of false or mis- leading statements with intent to defraud can fall within the scope of subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b–5, as well as the relevant statutory provisions. In our view, that is so even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements and con- sequently falls outside subsection (b) of the Rule.
Lorenzo’s view that subsection (b), the making-false- statements provision, exclusively regulates conduct involv- ing false or misleading statements would mean those who disseminate false statements with the intent to cheat inves- tors might escape liability under the Rule altogether. But using false representations to induce the purchase of securi- ties would seem a paradigmatic example of securities fraud. We do not know why Congress or the Commission would have wanted to disarm enforcement in this way. And we cannot easily reconcile Lorenzo’s approach with the basic purpose behind these laws: “to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securi- ties industry.” Capital Gains, 375 U.S., at 186. . . .
In Janus, we considered the language in subsection (b), which prohibits the “mak[ing]” of “any untrue state- ment of a material fact.” We held that the “maker” of a “statement” is the “person or entity with ultimate authority
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of the bargain measure of damages and awarded the buyer the difference between what he or she paid and what the security was represented to be worth. A buyer’s damages are measured at the time of purchase.
As Sidebar 17.2 illustrates, a buyer must allege specific damages due to the seller’s fraud. An allegation of fraud and a drop in stock price is not enough to prove the case.
over the statement.” And we found that subsection (b) did not (under the circumstances) cover an investment adviser who helped draft misstatements issued by a different entity that controlled the statements’ content. We said nothing about the Rule’s application to the dissemination of false or misleading information. And we can assume that Janus would remain relevant (and preclude liability) where an
individual neither makes nor disseminates false information— provided, of course, that the individual is not involved in some other form of fraud.
. . . . Congress intended to root out all manner of fraud in the securities industry. And it gave to the Commission the tools to accomplish that job.
Affirmed.
KEY POINTS • Lorenzo sent emails to potential investors containing information about the value of
Waste2Energy that he knew was inaccurate. The intellectual property of the company did not work and, therefore, was not worth $10 million as the email stated. Also, the emails did not include Waste2Energy’s public disclosure of less than $400,000 in assets.
• The Supreme Court held in Janus that 10b-5 subsection (b) applied to “makers” of mis- statements; meaning those who had ultimate control over the content and how it was distributed. Lorenzo did not create the content of the emails, his boss did. Lorenzo sent the emails as instructed by his boss.
• The Court found that other parts of 10b-5, subsections (a) and (c), apply to these facts. Lorenzo is liable by knowingly disseminating false information to potential investors.
• This ruling means that anyone who knowingly or recklessly disseminates material mis- statements to potential investors are primarily liable under 10b-5. This ruling expands the SEC’s enforcement powers.
[continued]
Shareholders of Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. sued the company and its directors and officers for violations of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. These plaintiffs claim they paid an artificially high price for the stock because Dura executives misrepresented that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would approve Dura’s application to sell a new asthmatic spray. During the time in question, Dura’s stock declined in price rapidly when it announced its sales projection would not be met. Later, when Dura announced that the FDA would not approve its new
asthmatic spray, the stock declined again. However, within a week, Dura stock had regained much of that lost value.
The shareholder plaintiffs simply alleged they had lost money due to the inflated price of the stock and the misrepresentation by the Dura executives. The Supreme Court held that these simple allegations were not enough to establish the loss of value due to the fraud. More spe- cific proof of the loss caused by the fraud is required. Source: Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
sidebar 17.2
Proof of Loss Due to Fraud
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Computation of a defrauded seller’s damages is more difficult. A defrauding purchaser usually benefits from an increase in the value of the securities, while the plaintiff seller loses this increase. Courts do not allow defrauding buyers to keep these increases in value. Therefore, the measure of the seller’s damages is the differ- ence between the fair value of all that the seller received and the fair value of what he or she would have received had there been no fraud. A fraudulent buyer loses all profits flowing from the wrongful conduct.
Plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 are also entitled to consequential damages. These include lost dividends, brokerage fees, and taxes. In addition, courts may order pay- ment of interest on the funds. Punitive damages are not permitted as they are in cases of common law fraud based on state laws. This distinction results from the language of the 1934 Act, which limits recoveries to actual damages.
The issue of whether a defendant who is liable under Section 10(b) can seek contribution from third parties was not resolved until 1993. In Sidebar 17.3, the Supreme Court concludes that a right of contribution does exist in Section 10(b) private actions.
Materiality Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are usually referred to as the antifraud provisions of the act. A plaintiff seeking damages under the provisions must establish the existence of a material misrepresentation or omission made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security and the culpable state of mind of the defendant. Materiality under the 1934 Act is the same as materiality under the 1933 Act. How- ever, liability under Rule 10b-5 requires proof of the defendant’s intent to deceive. Proof of the defendant’s simple negligence is not enough to establish liability. The plaintiff also must establish that the defendant’s practice is manipulative and not merely corporate mismanagement.
The concept of fraud under Section 10(b) encompasses not only untrue state- ments of material facts but also the failure to state material facts necessary to pre- vent statements actually made from being misleading. In other words, a half-truth that misleads is fraudulent. Finally, failure to correct a misleading impression left by statements already made, or silence where there is a duty to speak, gives rise to a violation of Rule 10b-5 because it is a form of aiding and abetting the deception.
Another issue impacting materiality relates to when the plaintiff brings the com- plaint. The Supreme Court looks at when the potentially misleading statements are
To settle a securities lawsuit by its shareholders, Wausau Insurance agreed to pay $13.5 million. Following this set- tlement, Wausau filed a lawsuit against the attorneys and accountants involved in the public offering. These defen- dants sought dismissal of this complaint on the grounds that there is no right of contribution under §10(b). The
Supreme Court concludes that there is a private right of contribution in §10(b) of the 1934 Act and in Rule 10b-5. Those charged with liability in a §10b-5 action have a right of contribution against other parties who have joint responsibility for the violation. Source: Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Wausau Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
sidebar 17.3
Right to Contribution from Others
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made and whether the plaintiff did know or should have known the statements were misleading. This examination is further described in Sidebar 17.4.
One of the most difficult issues concerning materiality arises in preliminary merger negotiations. How should management respond when asked about merger possibilities? Should management reveal information about merger possibilities even when the likelihood of an actual merger is very slight? The Supreme Court uses an objective-person case-by-case analysis to determine whether information about potential mergers is material and thus required to be disclosed. The Court said, “materiality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information.”
International Application The application of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to international securities transactions appears to depend on the nationality of the purchaser and seller of the securities as well as the location of the actual sales trans- action. Case 17.2 discusses the factual situation involving international sellers and buyers on foreign exchanges.
Merck & Co. manufactured and marketed the drug Vioxx, a painkiller used to reduce arthritis pain. In 1999, the Food and Drug Administration approved Vioxx as a pre- scription drug. Shortly after Vioxx was introduced, reports arose questioning whether taking Vioxx increased the risk of heart attack. Merck officials issued many statements and reports that promoted the virtues of Vioxx and down- played any negative side effects. On October 9, 2001, The New York Times reported that Merck “had reex- amined its own data and found no evidence that Vioxx increased the risks of heart attacks.”
Despite these reassurances, Merck stock price rose and fell depending on the nature (good or bad) of news reported about Vioxx. Finally, on September 30, 2004, Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market.
Based on the uncertainty surrounding Vioxx, many lawsuits were filed against Merck. Included in these cases was one filed on November 6, 2003. A group of share- holders sued Merck, alleging that company officials had engaged in securities fraud under §10(b) by falsely and deceptively denying the risks associated with Vioxx. The defendants sought to have this case dismissed as being filed too late under the applicable statute of limitations.
Upon its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the applicable statute of limitations, in this case, was two years. The Court also found that the limitations period
“begins to run once the plaintiff did discover or a reason- able diligent plaintiff would have discovered the facts constituting the violation—whichever comes first.” The Court also concluded the element of scienter (intention to defraud) by the defendant may be considered when determining whether the plaintiff knew or should known the fraud occurred. The element of scienter typically will delay the beginning of the statute of limitations running because the defendant is attempting to hide the fraud.
Based on the facts presented, the Court decided that the statute of limitations had not run out because the plaintiffs could not have reasonably known before November 6, 2001 (two years prior to the lawsuit being filed), that Merck officials engaged in the alleged fraud.
Note that a unanimous Supreme Court rejected the SEC’s claim that this “discovery rule” applied to govern- ment actions for penalties. In Gabelli v. SEC, Chief Jus- tice Roberts emphasized that the five-year statute of limitations clock for the SEC started when the allegedly fraudulent conduct happened, adding, “we have never applied the discovery rule . . . where the plaintiff is not a defrauded victim seeking recompense, but is instead the Government bringing an enforcement action for civil penalties.” Sources: Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010); Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013).
sidebar 17.4
Statute of Limitations for Fraud Claims
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case 17.2
MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010)
The National Australia Bank Limited (National or Bank) is the largest bank in Australia. Its common shares are traded on the Australian Stock Exchange and other foreign securities exchanges, but this stock is not listed for sale on any exchange in the United States. What is listed on the New York Stock Exchange is National’s American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). An ADR represents the right to receive specified shares of a for- eign stock.
In February 1998, National purchased a Florida corpora- tion known as HomeSide Lending Inc. In essence, HomeSide earned profits by collecting mortgage payments. Any early pay- ment of mortgages reduced HomeSide’s profits as it reduced its income stream.
National announced it was writing down the value of HomeSide’s assets by $450 million in July 2001 and by another $1.75 billion in September 2001. The reason for these adjustments was low interest rates causing many borrowers to refinance existing mortgages. The early payoff due to the refi- nanced mortgages hurt HomeSide’s income.
A group of Australian investors filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the officers of National and HomeSide violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The basis of this complaint is that the officers misrepresented the cal- culation of HomeSide’s value by not considering the reduced income from early payoff.
The District Court found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The plaintiffs argued that HomeSide was a Florida corporation and investors had purchased National ADRs via the New York Stock Exchange. The District Judge found there was no jurisdiction because the acts in the United States were “at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad.” On appeal, the Sec- ond Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Certio- rari was granted.
SCALIA, Justice: We decide whether §10(b) of the Securi- ties Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to for- eign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges. . . .
Rule 10b–5, the regulation under which petitioners have brought suit, was promulgated under §10(b), and does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by §10(b)’s prohi- bition. Therefore, if §10(b) is not extraterritorial, neither is Rule 10b–5. . . .
Petitioners and the Solicitor General contend, how- ever, that three things indicate that §10(b) or the Exchange Act in general has at least some extraterritorial applica- tion. First, they point to the definition of “interstate com- merce,” a term used in §10(b), which includes “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any foreign country and any State.” But we have repeat- edly held that even statutes that contain broad language in their definitions of “commerce” that expressly refer to “foreign commerce” do not apply abroad. The general reference to foreign commerce in the definition of “inter- state commerce” does not defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Petitioners and the Solicitor General next point out that Congress, in describing the purposes of the Exchange Act, observed that the prices established and offered in such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign countries. The antecedent of such transactions, however, is found in the first sentence of the section, which declares that “transac- tions in securities as commonly conducted upon securi- ties exchanges and over-the counter markets are affected with a national public interest.” Nothing suggests that this national public interest pertains to transactions con- ducted upon foreign exchanges and markets. The fleet- ing reference to the dissemination and quotation abroad of the prices of securities traded in domestic exchanges and markets cannot overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Finally, there is §30(b) of the Exchange Act, which does mention the Act’s extraterritorial application: “The provisions of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regula- tion thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States,” unless he does so in violation of regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission “to prevent . . . evasion of [the Act].” (The parties have pointed us to no regulation promulgated pursuant to §30(b).) The Solicitor General argues that this exemption would have no function if the Act did not apply in the first instance to securities transactions that occur abroad.
We are not convinced. In the first place, it would be odd for Congress to indicate the extraterritorial application of the whole Exchange Act by means of a provision impos- ing a condition precedent to its application abroad. And
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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if the whole Act applied abroad, why would the Commis- sion’s enabling regulations be limited to those preventing “evasion” of the Act, rather than all those preventing “viola- tion”? The provision seems to us directed at actions abroad that might conceal a domestic violation, or might cause what would otherwise be a domestic violation to escape on a technicality. At most, the Solicitor General’s pro- posed inference is possible; but possible interpretations of statutory language do not override the presumption against extraterritoriality. . . .
In short, there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that §10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.
Petitioners argue that the conclusion that §10(b) does not apply extraterritorially does not resolve this case. They contend that they seek no more than domestic application anyway, since Florida is where HomeSide and its senior executives engaged in the deceptive conduct of manipulating HomeSide’s financial models. . . . This is less an answer to the presumption against extraterritorial application than it is an assertion—a quite valid assertion— that that presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive, but its application requires further analysis. For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial applica- tion that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption against extraterritorial appli- cation would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case. . . .
We think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States. Sec- tion 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only
deceptive conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.” Those purchase-and-sale transactions are the objects of the statute’s solicitude. It is those transactions that the statute seeks to regulate; it is parties or prospective parties to those transactions that the statute seeks to protect. And it is in our view only trans- actions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which §10(b) applies. . . .
Finally, we reject the notion that the Exchange Act reaches conduct in this country affecting exchanges or transactions abroad. . . . Like the United States, foreign countries regulate their domestic securities exchanges and securities transactions occurring within their territorial jurisdiction. And the regulation of other countries often dif- fers from ours as to what constitutes fraud, what disclosures must be made, what damages are recoverable, what discov- ery is available in litigation, what individual actions may be joined in a single suit, what attorney’s fees are recoverable, and many other matters. . . .
Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States. This case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all aspects of the purchases com- plained of by those petitioners who still have live claims occurred outside the United States. Petitioners have there- fore failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. We affirm the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint on this ground.
Affirmed.
KEY POINTS • The Court addresses whether Australian investors can utilize Section 10(b) to sue an Aus-
tralian bank that owns a Florida corporation. • The Court concludes that Section 10(b) does not include extraterritorial application in
light of the limited provision for such jurisdiction in the Exchange Act. • The investors’ contention that they were misled by financial models HomeSlide’s officers
created in their Florida offices is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction for a cause of action under Section 10(b).
• Section 10(b) seeks to regulate deceptive securities transactions, and not all conduct relates closely to these transactions.
[continued]
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Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s request to permit for- eign securities claims with limited connections to the United States to be litigated in U.S. courts in Morrison, filings of securities claims against foreign companies increased in 2019 to its highest number ever.3 Many of the lawsuits were filed against foreign companies listed on U.S. exchanges. At least two court decisions found that jurisdiction for U.S. courts, however, is not present when foreign companies listed on foreign exchanges are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges.4
Another reason for the increase in securities claims filed against foreign coun- tries is passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, just three weeks after the Court issued its decision in Morrison. Dodd-Frank expanded the extraterritorial reach of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 so that courts now have jurisdiction over claims brought by regulators regarding “(1) con- duct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”5 Later in this chapter the reforms targeted by Dodd-Frank are addressed.
INSIDER TRANSACTIONS Section 16, one of the most important provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, concerns insider transactions. An insider is any person who:
• Owns more than 10 percent of any security. • Is a director or an officer of the issuer of the security.
The SEC defines an officer for insider trading purposes as the executive offi- cers, accounting officers, chief financial officers, and controllers. The SEC also examines the individual investor’s function within the company rather than the title of the position held.
Section 16 and SEC regulations require that insiders file, at the time of the reg- istration or within 10 days after becoming an insider, a statement of the amount of such issues of which they are the owners. The regulations also require filing within 10 days after the close of each calendar month thereafter if there has been any change in such ownership during such month (indicating the change). Sarbanes-Oxley short- ens the time period for filing information about insider transactions. Now, these filings with the SEC must be made electronically within two business days of the insider’s transaction.
The reason for prohibiting insiders from trading for profit is to prevent the use of information that is available to an insider but not to the general public. Because the SEC cannot determine for certain when nonpublic information is improperly used, Section 16 creates a presumption that any profit made within a six-month time period is illegal. These profits are referred to as short-swing profits. Thus, if a direc- tor, officer, or principal owner realizes profits on the purchase and sale of a security
3Securities Class Action Filings, Cornerstone Research, https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/ Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2019-Year-in-Review. 4In re Alstom SA Sec Litig, 741 F. Supp 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 515 U.S.C. § 78aa(b).
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within a six-month period, the profits legally belong to the company or to the inves- tor who purchased it from or sold it to an insider, resulting in the insider’s profit and the investor’s loss. The order of the purchase and sale is immaterial. The profit is calculated on the lowest price in and highest price out during any six-month period. Unlike the required proof of intent to deceive under Section 10(b), the short-swing profits rule of Section 16 does not depend on any misuse of information. In other words, short-swing profits by insiders, regardless of the insiders’ states of mind, are absolutely prohibited.
While the SEC enforces the requirements of Section 16 that insiders file certain documents, the SEC does not enforce the provision that prohibits insiders from engag- ing in short-swing profits. This provision of Section 16 is enforced by civil actions filed by the issuer of the security or by a person who owns a security of the issuer.
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION The SEC’s concern for trading based on nonpublic information goes beyond the Sec- tion 16 ban on short-swing profits. Indeed, a person who is not technically an insider but who trades securities without disclosing nonpublic information may violate Sec- tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The SEC takes the position that the profit obtained as the result of a trader’s silence concerning information that is not freely available to everyone is a manipulation or deception prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In essence, the users of nonpublic information are treated like insiders if they can be classified as tippees.
A tippee is a person who learns of nonpublic information from an insider. In essence, a tippee is viewed as a temporary insider. A tippee is liable for the use of nonpublic information because an insider should not be allowed to do indirectly what he or she cannot do directly. In other words, a tippee is liable for trading or passing on information that is nonpublic.
The use of nonpublic information for financial gain has not been prohibited entirely. For example, in one case, a financial printer had been hired to print corpo- rate takeover bids. An employee of the printer was able to deduce the identities of both the acquiring companies and the companies targeted for takeover. Without dis- closing the knowledge about the prospective takeover bids, the employee purchased stock in the target companies and then sold it for a profit immediately after the take- over attempts were made public. He was indicted and convicted for having violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defen- dant had no duty to reveal the nonpublic information, since he was not in a fiduciary position with respect to either the acquiring or the acquired company.
In another case, the U.S. Supreme Court further narrowed a tippee’s liability. The Court ruled that a tippee becomes liable under Section 10(b) only if the tipper breaches a fiduciary duty to the business organization or fellow shareholders. There- fore, if the tipper communicated nonpublic information for reasons other than per- sonal gain, neither the tipper nor the tippee could be liable for a securities violation.
These two Supreme Court cases have made it more difficult for the SEC to control the use of nonpublic information. However, the SEC has successfully argued that a person should be considered to be a temporary insider if that person con- veys nonpublic information that was to have been kept confidential. This philosophy has become known as the misappropriation theory of insider trading. Case 17.3 approves the misappropriation theory.
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case 17.3
UNITED STATES v. O’HAGAN 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997)
GINSBURG, Justice: . . . Respondent James Herman O’Hagan was a partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In July 1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met), a company based in Lon- don, England, retained Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel to represent Grand Met regarding a potential tender offer for the common stock of the Pillsbury Company, head- quartered in Minneapolis. Both Grand Met and Dorsey & Whitney took precautions to protect the confidentiality of Grand Met’s tender offer plans. O’Hagan did no work on the Grand Met representation. Dorsey & Whitney with- drew from representing Grand Met on September 9, 1988. Less than a month later, on October 4, 1988, Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock.
On August 18, 1988, while Dorsey & Whitney was still representing Grand Met, O’Hagan began purchasing call options for Pillsbury stock. Each option gave him the right to purchase 100 shares of Pillsbury stock by a specified date in September 1988. Later in August and in September, O’Hagan made additional purchases of Pillsbury call options. By the end of September, he owned 2,500 unexpired Pillsbury options. . . . O’Hagan also purchased, in September 1988, some 5,000 shares of Pillsbury common stock, at a price just under $39 per share. When Grand Met announced its tender offer in October, the price of Pillsbury stock rose to nearly $60 per share. O’Hagan then sold his Pillsbury call options and common stock, making a profit of more than $4.3 million.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) initiated an investigation into O’Hagan’s transactions, culminating in a 57-count indictment. The indictment alleged that O’Hagan defrauded his law firm and its client, Grand Met, by using for his own trading purposes material, nonpublic information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer. . . .
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed all of O’Hagan’s convictions. Liability under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Eighth Circuit held, may not be grounded on the “misappropriation theory” of secu- rities fraud on which the prosecution relied. . . .
Decisions of the Courts of Appeals are in conflict on the propriety of the misappropriation theory under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5. . . . We granted certiorari and now reverse the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. . . .
Under the “traditional” or “classical theory” of insider trading liability, §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information. . . .
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connection with” a securities transac- tion, and thereby violates §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trad- ing purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. Under this theory, a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confiden- tiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary rela- tionship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of securities. The classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of non-public information by a corporate “outsider” in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information. The mis- appropriation theory is thus designed to protect the integ- rity of the securities markets against abuses by outsiders to a corporation who have access to confidential informa- tion that will affect the corporation’s security price when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation’s shareholders.
In this case, the indictment alleged that O’Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met, traded on the basis of nonpublic information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer for Pillsbury common stock. This conduct, the Government charged, constituted a fraudulent device in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.
We agree with the Government that misappropriation, as just defined, satisfies §10(b)’s requirement that charge- able conduct involve a “deceptive device or contrivance” used “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. We observe, first, that misappropriators, as the Govern- ment describes them, deal in deception. A fiduciary who “[pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly convert- ing the principal’s information for personal gain,” “dupes” or defrauds the principal. . . .
Deception through nondisclosure is central to the the- ory of liability for which the Government seeks recognition.
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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As counsel for the Government stated in explanation of the theory at oral argument: “To satisfy the common law rule that a trustee may not use the property that [has] been entrusted [to] him, there would have to be consent. To sat- isfy the requirement of the Securities Act that there be no deception, there would only have to be disclosure.” . . .
[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the mis- appropriation theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic infor- mation, there is no “deceptive device” and thus no §10(b) violation—although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.
We turn next to the §10(b) requirement that the misap- propriator’s deceptive use of information be “in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security.” This element is satis- fied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the per- son or entity defrauded is not the other party to the trade; but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information. A mis- appropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public.
The misappropriation theory targets information of a sort that misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities. . . .
The misappropriation theory comports with §10(b)’s language, which requires deception “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” not deception of an iden- tifiable purchaser or seller. The theory is also well-turned to
an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure hon- est securities markets and thereby promote investor confi- dence. Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misap- propriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law. An investor’s informational disadvantage vis-à-vis a misappro- priator with material, nonpublic information stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.
In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on market participation of trading on misappropriated information, and the congressional purposes underlying §10(b), it makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like O’Hagan a §10(b) viola- tor if he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder. The text of the statute requires no such result. The misappropriation at issue here was properly made the subject of a §10(b) charge because it meets the statutory requirement that there be “deceptive” conduct “in connec- tion with” securities transactions. . . .
. . . [T]he misappropriation theory, as we have exam- ined and explained it in this opinion, is both consistent with the statute and with our precedent. Vital to our decision that criminal liability may be sustained under the misappropria- tion theory, we emphasize, are two sturdy safeguards Con- gress has provided regarding scienter. To establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b-5, the Government must prove that a person “willfully” violated the provision. Furthermore, a defendant may not be imprisoned for violating Rule 10b-5 if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule. . . .
The Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the misap- propriation theory is inconsistent with §10(b). The Court of Appeals may address on remand O’Hagan’s other chal- lenges to his convictions under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5. . . .
Reversed and remanded.
KEY POINTS • The “traditional” or “classical theory” of insider trading is complemented by the “misap-
propriation theory” because each targets different sources that undermine the integrity of the purchase or sale of securities.
• The misappropriation theory is focused on the deception of a person with nonpublic infor- mation obtained from others using that information to his or her own benefit.
• Liability is based on secretly using the information. The trader must offer full disclosure of his or her intention to no longer keep the information confidential.
• Those who misappropriate nonpublic information to gain an advantage in trading over other traders undermine participation in securities markets.
[continued]
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The SEC continues to focus its enforcement efforts on the misuse of nonpublic information at all levels of transactions. The SEC’s efforts are aided by the fact that the civil penalty for gaining illegal profits with nonpublic information is three times the profits gained. In addition, controlling persons who fail to prevent these violations by employees may be civilly liable for the greater amount of triple damages or $1,000,000.
The penalties were increased to their current levels by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. This law also provides that suits alleging the illegal use of nonpublic information may be filed within a five-year period after the wrongful transaction. This period, being substantially longer than the one year/ three years limitation periods for other federal securities violations, illustrates the emphasis Congress has placed on preventing trading on nonpublic information.
ADDITIONAL CIVIL LIABILITY In 1990, Congress expressed its concern for enforcement of the securities laws. In that year, the Securities Enforcement Remedies Act became law. This legislation pro- vides that civil fines of up to $500,000 per organization and $100,000 per individual may be imposed and collected by the courts. In addition, an individual found to have violated the securities laws may be prohibited by the court from serving as an officer or director of a business organization. These fines and this prohibition from service can be utilized, at the judge’s discretion, when a party in a civil case is found to have violated the securities laws. There does not have to be any proof of a criminal viola- tion for these fines to be imposed.
Furthermore, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes liabil- ity on a theory of fraud on any person who shall make or cause to be made any false and misleading statements of material fact in any application, report, or document filed under the act. This liability favors both purchasers and sellers. A plaintiff must prove that the defendant knowingly made a false statement, that plaintiff relied on the false or misleading statement, and that plaintiff suffered damage.
Two distinctions between this section of the 1934 Act and Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act are noteworthy. First, the requirement that an intent to deceive be proven under Section 18 means that the defendant’s good faith is a defense. Good faith exists when a person acts without knowledge that the statement is false and misleading. In other words, freedom from fraud is a defense under an action based on Section 18. There is no liability under this section for simple negligence. Second, the plaintiff in a Section 18 case must prove reliance on the false or misleading filing. The simple fact that the filing is inaccurate is not sufficient. In a Section 11 or 12 case under the 1933 Act, the plaintiff does not have to establish reliance.
The Sarbanes—Oxley Act extends the statute of limitations for civil actions under the 1934 Act. Lawsuits must be filed within two years of the time the wrong was discovered (or should have been) and at least within five years of the wrongful act. The expansion of civil liability under the 1934 Act encourages settlement in many cases. Although the number of class-action securities cases increased due to the 2008 market decline, the largest settlements come from the accounting scandals uncovered in 2000 and 2001. However, 2016 was the first year since 2006 when there were multiple settlements of more than $1 billion.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY The 1934 Act provides for criminal sanctions for willful violations of its provisions or the rules adopted under it. Liability is imposed for false material statements in
Don’t be tempted to take advantage of nonpublic information if you are an insider within your company.
“Securities fraud class- actions settlements in the U.S. rose 39 percent to more than $3.8 billion in 2009.” –Margaret Cronin Fisk, Bloomberg.com, March
24, 2010
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applications, reports, documents, and registration statements. In response to the corporate scandals occurring during the beginning of the 21st century, Congress in 2002 increased the criminal penalties for violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. An individual found guilty of filing false or misleading documents with the SEC may be fined up to $5,000,000 and imprisoned for up to 20 years. A business organization found guilty of filing with the SEC false or misleading docu- ments may be subject to a fine up to $25,000,000. An individual guilty of securi- ties fraud may face a prison sentence of up to 25 years. These increased sanctions emphasize the seriousness with which all business people must treat compliance with securities regulations.
The penalties are not theoretical. Sixteen officials from Enron have pled guilty and face a variety of prison terms. The CEO of WorldCom has been convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison. The names of other former executives became commonly known because serious prison sentences get the public’s attention. Whether these examples serve as deterrents for future fraudulent behavior remains to be seen.
Criminal liability is an important consideration for officers and directors as well as for accountants. Accountants have been found guilty of a crime for fail- ure to disclose important facts to shareholder-investors. Compliance with generally
SECTION 10(B) Purpose: Creates liability for use of mail or any instru- mentality of interstate commerce to defraud any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Plaintiff’s case: Proof of defendant’s intent to deceive through use of false information or nondisclosure of truthful information; plaintiff’s reliance on fraudulent documents; and damages. Defendant’s defenses: No actual fraud was involved; only aided or abetted fraud; information was not material. Civil liability: Person in violation of §10(b) is liable for actual damages, court costs, and reasonable attor- ney fees.
SECTION 16(B) Purpose: Creates strict liability for any insider making a profit on issuer’s securities during any six-month period. Plaintiff’s case: Proof of the short-swing nature of the profitable transaction. Defendant’s defenses: Proof of no short-swing trans- action; good faith (lack of intent) is no defense.
Civil fines: Up to three times the illegal profits; ban from service as director or officer.
SECTION 18 Purpose: Imposes liability for fraudulently filing false or misleading documents with the SEC or any exchange. Plaintiff’s case: Proof of defendant’s intent to make false or misleading documents filed; plaintiff’s reli- ance on documents filed; and damages. Defendant’s defenses: Freedom from fraud; good faith—no intent to defraud; no reliance by plaintiff on documents filed.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY For securities fraud: Up to 25 years in prison. For false or misleading documents filed: $5,000,000 fine or 20 years in prison or both per individual; $25,000,000 fine per organization. For trading on nonpublic information: $1 million fine or 10 years in prison or both per individual; $10 mil- lion fine per organization.
concept summary
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
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accepted accounting principles is not an absolute defense. The critical issue in such cases is whether the financial statements as a whole fairly present the financial condition of the company and whether they accurately report operations for the covered periods. If they do not, the second issue is whether the accountant acted in good faith. Compliance with generally accepted accounting principles is evidence of good faith, but such evidence is not necessarily conclusive. Lack of criminal intent is the defense usually asserted by accountants charged with a crime. They usually admit mistakes or even negligence but deny any criminal wrongdoing. Proof of motive is not required.
As with issues of civil liability, most cases involving potential criminal liability are litigated under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Other Considerations
In addition to understanding the historical nature of securities laws, every business- person and investor should be familiar with two additional topics. First, in the next section, we present materials related to private parties suing to enforce the federal securities laws. Second, in the last section of this chapter, you should gain an under- standing of how states also regulate the issuance and sale of securities.
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 In 1994, the Supreme Court held that liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 did not extend to parties aiding and abetting the primary violator.6 The following year, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Private Securities Litiga- tion Reform Act (PSLRA). The law made it clear the Court’s decision would not be expanded and set up other hurdles to limit the number of class-action claims under federal securities law. Indeed, the PSLRA clarified that only the SEC can pursue claims against third parties not directly responsible for the securities law violation. This part of the law helps form the basis for the decision in Case 17.1.
The PSLRA requires any private plaintiff to allege with specificity the scienter, or intent, of a company or its executives when filing a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. A plaintiff “must plead facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference.”7
Congress fortified the PSLRA by passing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). SLUSA supported the aims of curbing abusive securities fraud litigation by not allowing plaintiffs to file claims in state courts that PSLRA prevented in federal courts. However, Congress did not choose to eliminate the fraud-on-the-market presumption when it enacted PSLRA. Fraud- on-the-market theory, described by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,8 substitutes for proof of direct reliance by each member of a class so that class cer- tification is easier. The Supreme Court further elaborated on fraud-on-the-market theory in Case 17.4.
“Congress amended the securities laws in 1995 to allow the Securities and Exchange Com- mission to bring actions against secondary viola- tors that aid and abet securities fraud. Con- gress wisely declined to extend that right to private parties, out of concern of abusive securities litigation.”
–Paul S. Atkins, “Stoneridge and the
Rule of Law,” The Wall Street Journal, January
25, 2008
6Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). 7Tellabs, Inc. v. Mabor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). 8Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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case 17.4
HALLIBURTON CO. v. ERICA P. JOHN FUND, INC. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)
ROBERTS, Chief Justice: Investors can recover damages in a private securities fraud action only if they prove that they relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation in deciding to buy or sell a company’s stock. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), we held that investors could satisfy this reliance requirement by invoking a presumption that the price of stock traded in an efficient market reflects all public, material information—including material misstate- ments. In such a case, we concluded, anyone who buys or sells the stock at the market price may be considered to have relied on those misstatements.
We also held, however, that a defendant could rebut this presumption in a number of ways, including by show- ing that the alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the stock’s price—that is, that the misrepresentation had no “price impact.” The questions presented are whether we should overrule or modify Basic’s presumption of reli- ance and, if not, whether defendants should nonetheless be afforded an opportunity in securities class action cases to rebut the presumption at the class certification stage, by showing a lack of price impact.
Respondent Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (EPJ Fund), is the lead plaintiff in a putative class action against Hal- liburton and one of its executives (collectively Hallibur- ton) alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities and Exchange Com- mission Rule 10b-5. According to EPJ Fund, between June 3, 1999 and December 7, 2001, Halliburton made a series of misrepresentations regarding its potential liabil- ity in asbestos litigation, its expected revenue from certain construction contracts, and the anticipated benefits of its merger with another company—all in an attempt to inflate the price of its stock. Halliburton subsequently made a number of corrective disclosures, which, EPJ Fund con- tends, caused the company’s stock price to drop and inves- tors to lose money. . . .
Halliburton urges us to overrule Basic’s presumption of reliance and to instead require every securities fraud plaintiff to prove that he actually relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation in deciding to buy or sell a company’s stock. Before overturning a long-settled precedent, however, we require “special justification,” not just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided. . . . Halliburton has failed to make that showing.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5 prohibit making any material misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Although Section 10(b) does not create an express private cause of action, we have long recognized an implied private cause of action to enforce the provision and its implementing regulation. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). To recover dam- ages for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the pur- chase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrep- resentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
The reliance element “ensures that there is a proper connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.” “The traditional (and most direct) way a plaintiff can demonstrate reliance is by showing that he was aware of a company’s statement and engaged in a relevant transaction—e.g., purchasing common stock—based on that specific misrepresentation.”
In Basic, however, we recognized that requiring such direct proof of reliance “would place an unnecessarily unre- alistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.” That is because, even assuming an investor could prove that he was aware of the misrepresentation, he would still have to “show a specula- tive state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted . . . if the misrepresentation had not been made.”
We also noted that “[r]equiring proof of individualized reliance” from every securities fraud plaintiff “effectively would . . . prevent[ ] [plaintiffs] from proceeding with a class action” in Rule 10b-5 suits. If every plaintiff had to prove direct reliance on the defendant’s misrepresenta- tion, “individual issues then would . . . overwhelm[ ] the common ones,” making certification under Rule 23(b)(3) inappropriate.
To address these concerns, Basic held that securities fraud plaintiffs can in certain circumstances satisfy the reli- ance element of a Rule 10b-5 action by invoking a rebuttable presumption of reliance, rather than proving direct reliance
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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on a misrepresentation. The Court based that presumption on what is known as the “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which holds that “the market price of shares traded on well-devel- oped markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.” The Court also noted that, rather than scrutinize every piece of public infor- mation about a company for himself, the typical “investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price”—the belief that it reflects all public, material information. As a result, when- ever the investor buys or sells stock at the market price, his “reliance on any public material misrepresentations . . . may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”
Based on this theory, a plaintiff must make the fol- lowing showings to demonstrate that the presumption of reliance applies in a given case: (1) that the alleged mis- representations were publicly known, (2) that they were material, (3) that the stock traded in an efficient market, and (4) that the plaintiff traded the stock between the time the misrepresentations were made and when the truth was revealed.
At the same time, Basic emphasized that the pre- sumption of reliance was rebuttable rather than conclu- sive. Specifically, “[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.” So for example, if a defendant could show that the alleged misrepresentation did not, for whatever reason, actually affect the market price, or that a plaintiff would have bought or sold the stock even had he been aware that the stock’s price was tainted by fraud, then the presumption of reliance would not apply. In either of those cases, a plaintiff would have to prove that he directly relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation in buying or selling the stock. . . .
Even if plaintiffs need not directly prove price impact to invoke the Basic presumption, Halliburton contends that defendants should at least be allowed to defeat the pre- sumption at the class certification stage through evidence that the misrepresentation did not in fact affect the stock price. We agree.
There is no dispute that defendants may introduce such evidence at the merits stage to rebut the Basic pre- sumption. Basic itself “made clear that the presumption was just that, and could be rebutted by appropriate evidence,” including evidence that the asserted misrepresentation (or
its correction) did not affect the market price of the defen- dant’s stock.
Nor is there any dispute that defendants may introduce price impact evidence at the class certification stage, so long as it is for the purpose of countering a plaintiff ’s showing of market efficiency, rather than directly rebutting the pre- sumption. As EPJ Fund acknowledges, “[o]f course . . . defen- dants can introduce evidence at class certification of lack of price impact as some evidence that the market is not efficient. . . .”
. . . As we explained in Basic, [a]ny showing that sev- ers the link between the alleged misrepresentation and . . . the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff . . . will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance” because “the basis for finding that the fraud had been transmitted through market price would be gone.” And without the pre- sumption of reliance, a Rule 10b-5 suit cannot proceed as a class action: Each plaintiff would have to prove reliance individually, so common issues would not “predominate” over individual ones, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). Price impact is thus an essential precondition for any Rule 10b-5 class action. While Basic allows plaintiffs to establish that precondition indirectly, it does not require courts to ignore a defendant’s direct, more salient evidence showing that the alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the stock’s market price and, consequently, that the Basic pre- sumption does not apply. . . .
More than 25 years ago, we held that plaintiffs could satisfy the reliance element of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action by invoking a presumption that a public, material misrepresentation will distort the price of stock traded in an efficient market, and that anyone who purchases the stock at the market price may be considered to have done so in reliance on the misrepresentation. We adhere to that decision and decline to modify the prerequisites for invoking the presumption of reliance. But to maintain the consistency of the presumption with the class certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, defen- dants must be afforded an opportunity before class certifi- cation to defeat the presumption through evidence that an alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the market price of the stock.
Because the courts below denied Halliburton that opportunity, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for fur- ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[continued]
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Congress, through the PSLRA, limits the amount of damages private plain- tiffs can recover and restricts attorney fees. This law also provides requirements for the appointment of lead plaintiffs in securities class-action cases. Even with these restrictions, there are many securities class-actions filed each year. Table 17.2 details the number of these cases during this decade. Notice the sharp increase in filings beginning in 2017 after several years of relatively stable number of securities litigation.
KEY POINTS • The “fraud-on-the-market” theory holds that the price of shares that are traded on devel-
oped markets reflect all publicly available information about the corporation, including any material misrepresentations made by the corporation.
• The Basic Inc. v. Levinson decision permitted plaintiffs to utilize the “fraud-on-the-market” theory to show a link between a misrepresentation by a corporation and the required reli- ance on that misrepresentation to bring a Rule 10b-5 action.
• The Basic presumption makes it easier for plaintiffs to address a potential Rule 10b-5 viola- tion as a class action.
• The Halliburton decision maintains the use of the Basic presumption of reliance on mate- rial misrepresentations. However, it clarifies that defendants should have an opportunity to present evidence that the misrepresentation did not affect the market price of the stock. Defeating the presumption, if successful, would make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain class-action certification.
[continued]
Year Number of Cases
2010 175 2011 188 2012 151 2013 165 2014 168 2015 208 2016 271 2017 412 2018 402 2019 404
table 17.2 Number of Federal Securities Fraud Class Actions (filed each year)
Source: Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in cooperation with Cornerstone Research. http://securities.stanford.edu/
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STATE BLUE SKY LAWS Throughout their history, state regulations regarding securities laws commonly have been referred to as blue sky laws—probably because they were intended to protect the potential investor from buying “a piece of the attractive blue sky” (worthless or risky securities) without financial and other information about what was being purchased. The blue sky laws can apply to securities subject to federal laws as well as to those securities exempt from the federal statutes. It is clearly established that the federal laws do not preempt the existence of state blue sky laws. Due to their broad application, any person associated with issuing or thereafter transferring securities should survey the blue sky laws passed by the various states.
Although the existence of federal securities laws has influenced state legisla- tures, enactment of blue sky laws has not been uniform. Indeed, states typically have enacted laws that contain provisions similar to the antifraud provisions, the registration of securities provisions, the registration of securities brokers and dealers provisions, or a combination of these provisions of the federal laws. To bring some similarity to the various blue sky laws, the Uniform Securities Act was proposed for adoption by all states beginning in 1956. Since that time, the Uniform Securities Act has been the model for blue sky laws. A majority of states have used the uniform proposal as a guideline when enacting or amending their blue sky laws.
Registration Requirements Despite the trend toward uniformity, state laws still vary a great deal in their methods of regulating both the distribution of securities and the practices of the securities industry within each state. For example, state regu- lations concerning the requirements of registering securities vary widely. Some states require registration by notification, other states require registration by qualification. Reg- istration by notification allows issuers to offer securities for sale automatically after a stated time period expires unless the administrative agency takes action to prevent the offering. This is very similar to the registration process under the Securities Act of 1933. Registration by qualification usually requires a more detailed disclosure by the issuer. Under this type of regulation, a security cannot be offered for sale until the administrative agency grants the issuer a license or certificate to sell securities.
In an attempt to resolve some of this conflict over the registration procedure, the drafters of the Uniform Securities Act may have compounded the problem. This act adopts the registration by notification process for an issuer who has demon- strated stability and performance. Registration by qualification is required by those issuers who do not have a proven record and who are not subject to the Securities Act of 1933. In addition, the Uniform Securities Act created a third procedure— registration by coordination. For those issuers of securities who must register with the SEC, duplicate documents are filed with the state’s administrative agency. Unless a state official objects, the state registration becomes effective automatically when the federal registration statement is deemed effective.
Exemptions To further compound the confusion about blue sky laws, various exemptions of the securities or transactions have been adopted by the states. Four basic exemptions from blue sky laws have been identified. Every state likely has enacted at least one and perhaps a combination of these exemptions. Among these common four are the exemptions:
1. For an isolated transaction. 2. For an offer or sale to a limited number of offerees or purchasers within a stated
time period.
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3. For a private offering. 4. For a sale if the number of holders after the sale does not exceed a specified
number.
The second type of exemption probably is the most common exemption, because it is part of the Uniform Securities Act. Nevertheless, states vary on whether the exemption applies to offerees or to purchasers. There also is great variation on the maximum number of such offerees or purchasers involved. That number likely ranges between 5 and 35, depending on the applicable blue sky law. The time period for the offers or purchases, as the case may be, also may vary; however, 12 months seems to be the most common period.
Usually the applicable time limitation is worded to read, for example, “any 12-month time period.” In essence, this language means that each day starts a new time period running. For example, assume a security is exempt from blue sky regis- tration requirements if the issuer sells (or offers to sell) securities to no more than 35 investors during any 12-month period. Furthermore, assume the following transac- tions occur, with each investor being a different person or entity:
• On February 1, 2013, issuer sells to five investors. • On June 1, 2013, issuer sells to ten investors. • On September 1, 2013, issuer sells to ten investors. • On December 1, 2013, issuer sells to five investors. • On March 1, 2014, issuer sells to five investors. • On May 1, 2014, issuer sells to ten investors.
Only 30 investors are involved during the 12-month period following February 1, 2013. However, 40 investors are purchasers during the 12 months following June 1, 2013. Therefore, this security and the transactions involved are not exempt from the blue sky law. Civil as well as criminal liability may result for failure to comply with applicable legal regulations.
Although blue sky laws may cause confusion because of their variation, igno- rance of the state legal requirements is no defense. This confusion is aggravated when the businessperson considers the further applicability of federal securities laws. To diminish this confusion, any person involved in the issuance or subsequent transfer of securities should consult with lawyers and accountants as well as other experts who have a working knowledge of securities regulations.
Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002
When the collapse of Enron was followed by the even larger accounting fraud and bankruptcy of WorldCom, congressional response was passage of the Sarbanes— Oxley Act of 2002. This law is named for its sponsors—Senator Paul Sarbanes, a Democrat from Maryland, and Representative Michael Oxley, an Ohio Republican. The Sarbanes—Oxley Act receives mixed reviews; however, most businesspeople agree it has overwhelming positive impacts on the way business is conducted and audited. The act applies to all public companies in the United States and can apply to international companies if they are registered with the SEC. All accounting firms that have auditing work with these companies also are affected by the Sarbanes— Oxley Act rules.
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Sarbanes-Oxley is “the most significant change to securities law since they were put into effect in the mid-1930s”
–Dennis M. Nalley, Chairman of Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers
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REVITALIZATION OF SEC Through the Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002 and in response to the corporate scandals of the first few years of this century, Congress increased the authority it delegated to the SEC. A primary way of accomplishing this reinvigoration of a 70-year-old agency was to increase its budget. Because the budget is not controlled solely by Congress, there initially was some controversy with the Bush Administration as to the amount of the increase. The proposed increase of more than 75 percent of the SEC budget was not accomplished in one year; however, the SEC’s increased budget has led to a more active SEC.
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) increases the SEC’s power over many of the governance issues discussed in this chapter. In addition, Congress empowered the SEC to increase corporate accountability. The SEC instituted rules for internal checks and balances and various levels of sign-off to encourage financial disclosure.
ACCOUNTING REFORMS Sarbanes-Oxley creates the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). This Board consists of five members appointed by the SEC commissioners. The PCAOB reports to the commissioners. Congress viewed accounting firms as a major contributor to the corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, Tyco, and others. This view is based, in part, on the role that the Arthur Andersen accounting firm played with Enron and WorldCom.
The PCAOB is given oversight of accounting firms that audit public compa- nies. One of the first steps required of accounting firms was the separation of the auditing and consulting functions. The belief is that firms tainted their indepen- dence in the auditing function because they made so much more money consulting with these same corporate clients. This separation of the auditing and consulting functions is the reason why Arthur Andersen consultants formed a separate orga- nization, which is now called Accenture. The management consulting services of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) were sold to IBM so that PWC can concentrate on its tax and audit practices.
The PCAOB requires that auditing firms refrain from conducting a variety of nonauditing services. These services include bookkeeping, system designs and implementation, appraisals and valuations, actuarial services, human resources func- tions, and investment banking.
The effectiveness of the role of PCAOB is still being determined. Some critics question the Sarbanes—Oxley Act for not making this Board truly an independent agency. Others believe that having the Board report within the SEC strengthens the new and existing administrative structure. The PCAOB continues to evolve as it exer- cises its role in governing the effectiveness of public accounting firms.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Over time, this area of regulation may be the major contribution of the Sarbanes— Oxley Act. Although other parts of the law get more attention because of the finan- cial impact, restructuring how corporations govern themselves and the governance requirements required by the SEC and the PCAOB are of critical importance. Under this heading, several items relate to the audit of public companies.
In November 2019, the PCAOB approved a five- year strategic plan found at pcaobus.org.
These legal require- ments allow the audit firm to do what it his- torically did—review the company’s finances and ensure accuracy.
“Our goal is to effec- tively balance the goal of providing sharehold- ers with timely disclo- sure of accurate and complete compensation information with the need to prevent strate- gic company information from being revealed to competitors and damag- ing a company.”
New York Times, January 18, 2006.
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Sarbanes-Oxley focuses on increasing the independence of the auditors. Con- gress seeks to ensure that auditors maintain the trust of the public and the cor- porate shareholders and not the loyalty of the corporate officers and directors. This effort principally is oriented to the public company’s audit committee. Each member of this committee must be independent from the control of the company. No longer may a public company place its finance officer or other employee on the audit committee.
Further, at least one member of the audit committee has to be a financial expert. To qualify as a financial expert, it must be shown that through experience or educa- tion this person has an understanding of generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP), financial statements, audits of public companies, internal audit controls, and the functions of an audit committee.
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the auditor report to this independent audit com- mittee. The auditor should not have a close working relationship with the company’s CFO, accounting staff, and other company officials. In addition, the audit partner of the auditing firm must rotate off the engagement every five years. Auditors also must preserve audit records for seven years.
Similar to the audit-related changes, many of which seek to reduce conflicts of interest or personal connections that could interfere with objective evaluation, board qualifications focus on independent directors. Except for controlled compa- nies, the majority of directors on a public company board must be independent, and the definition for who qualifies as an independent director is stricter under new rules. Public companies must have audit, compensation, and nominating com- mittees that include only independent directors. These changes in board composi- tion encourage unbiased reviews for the long-term benefit of the companies and their investors.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND CONTROLS These requirements of the Sarbanes—Oxley Act have been the most controversial. One of the major reasons for the controversy is the cost associated with complying with these provisions. Section 302 of the law requires CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy of the quarterly and annual financial statements filed with the SEC. These officials also must certify the existence of internal financial controls. These controls are subject to an independent auditor’s review, in the same manner that the financial statements must be audited. The certification of internal financial controls is man- dated by Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Because the compliance costs issue creates political debate, the SEC extended the beginning date of compliance for smaller companies to 2008. The SEC also offered guidelines to reduce the burden on larger companies in certifying internal reporting controls. These actions and the repetitive nature of complying with Sec- tion 404 seem to bring down the compliance costs. Larger companies have found efficiencies related to Section 404 certification.
Other evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley is having a positive impact is found in the number of restatements of financial reports. During 2007, there were fewer restate- ments than in 2006. This was the first year to show a decline since Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted. Other good news was that the amount or severity of the average restate- ment also declined. In 2017 the number of financial restatements hit a 17-year low. These trends indicate that the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley is positive.
The requirements of Section 404 “offered us an opportunity to look at our processes and in many cases improve them. We found our people really benefited from understanding the processes. It has made Staples a better company.”
–John J. Mahoney, CFO of Staples
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An additional provision of Sarbanes-Oxley emphasizes the importance of accu- rate financial records. Despite the fact that corporate scandals caused sharehold- ers to lose billions of dollars, corporate executives received millions in bonuses and incentive payments. Sarbanes-Oxley provides that whenever there is a restatement of the company’s financial condition, executives must return any bonuses paid as a result of the incorrect financial statements. The law also prohibits personal loans from the company to its executives.
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley provides protections for whistleblowers so that individuals are more willing to report the corruption that can lead to major scandals. Audit committees are required to adopt procedures ensuring that whistleblowers’ reports are taken seriously. Whistleblowers that suffer retaliation are able to recover civil damages and can be reinstated if terminated improperly. In 2014, the Supreme Court ruled that Sarbanes-Oxley’s provision for whistleblower protection includes not just employees but also outside lawyers and accountants who work as contractors for public companies and reveal fraud to their supervisors. Sidebar 17.5 discusses the decision. Whistleblower protection also is an important feature of the Dodd-Frank Act, described in the following section.
On March 4, 2014, in Lawson v. FMR, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014), the U.S. Supreme Court extended whistleblower protections of the Sarbanes—Oxley Act to private con- tractors of public companies. In reaching this decision, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the majority, noted one of the financial scandals that led to Congress enacting Sarbanes-Oxley: Enron and its close relationship with accounting firm Arthur Andersen.
In Lawson, both plaintiffs were employees of pri- vately held companies that provide advisory and man- agement services to mutual funds. It is typical for mutual funds to have no employees but to rely on contractors for day-to-day operations. Each plaintiff raised concerns with supervisors about inaccurate financial documents and alleged retaliation based on raising such concerns. The mutual fund parent company maintained the plain- tiffs were not covered by Sarbanes-Oxley because
the law provides that companies may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in any other man- ner discriminate against an employee” who reports wrongdoing.
Denying whistleblower protection to contractors of public companies would leave a “huge hole” in the law, the Court noted, and it is not reasonable to believe this was what Congress intended. Congress learned during hearings following the Enron scandal that led to Arthur Andersen’s demise that both employees of Enron and contractors from Arthur Andersen attempted to report fraud and suffered retaliation as a result. Congress included whistleblower protection in the Sarbanes— Oxley Act because, in complex securities transactions, “employees are often the only firsthand witnesses to the fraud.” Now, whistleblower protection includes contrac- tors of public companies as well as employees.
sidebar 17.5
Extending Whistleblower Protection
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
Following the near collapse of the United States economy in the autumn of 2008 and the lingering adverse impact throughout 2009, Congress passed financial reforms in 2010. President Obama signed what has been called the most extensive reforms since the New Deal, and this massive bill became law on July 21, 2010. The changes in this law are summarized in Table 17.3. In the decade since its passage, many refinements to the original law, both through legislation and litigation, have continued to shape the Dodd-Frank Act. This list demonstrates the extensive nature of these reforms.
There are numerous examples, in our history, when Congress created an admin- istrative agency to ensure that the details contained in the legislation would be car- ried out. Chapter 15 discusses the principles of this form of government regulation, and we see the specifics of this policy in Chapter 16 (FTC and antitrust laws), this
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INCREASED AUTHORITY TO SEC
• Mandates budgetary increases for SEC. • Increases power of SEC over many of governance
matters. • Since 2002, SEC enforcement much more active.
ACCOUNTING REFORMS
• Creates Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
• Oversight of auditing of public companies. • Requires separation of auditing and consulting func- tions within accounting firms.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
• Increases independence of auditors. • Requires audit committees to be independent with at least one member being a financial expert.
• Audit partner must rotate off engagement after five years.
• Auditors must preserve audit records for seven years.
• Majority of directors must meet the definition of independent.
• Audit, compensation, and nominating committees are comprised of independent directors only.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND CONTROLS
• CEO and CFO must certify accuracy of financial statements.
• Also must certify existence of internal financial controls. • Internal financial controls are subject to audit, just like
financial statements. • When restatement is made, executives must return any bonuses paid on incorrect financial statements.
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
• Audit committees must adopt procedures for whistleblowing.
• Whistleblowers can recover damages for retaliation and request reinstatement.
• Whistleblowers include contractors as well as employees.
concept summary
Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002
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chapter (SEC and securities regulations), Chapter 18 (various agencies and con- sumer protection), Chapter 20 (EEOC and employment discrimination), Chapter 21 (various agencies and employment laws), and Chapter 22 (NLRB and labor laws).
What is striking about the Dodd-Frank Act is the way it addresses so many issues of reform. To accomplish its broad goals, Congress authorizes the creation of many new administrative organizations. Many of these new entities are housed within existing organizations. The following list highlights some of the new agencies:
• Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—CFPB (independent within Federal Reserve).
• Financial Stability Oversight Council—FSOC (independent). • Federal Insurance Office—FIO (Treasury). • Office of Financial Research—OFR (FSOC). • Offices of Minority and Women Inclusion (within Bank and Securities
Regulators). • Office of Housing Counseling (HUD). • Office of Credit Ratings (SEC). • Investment Advisory Committee (SEC). • Office of Investor Advocate (SEC).
Source: U.S Securities And Exchange Commission. http://banking.senate.gov.
• Enhances consumer protection • Ends policy on “Too Big to Fail” bailouts • Reforms Federal Reserve • Creates mortgage reforms • Regulates trading of derivatives • Regulates hedge funds • Regulates credit rating agencies • Controls executive compensation and corporate governance • Reforms regulations of banks and thrifts • Regulates insurance industry • Limits credit card interchange fees • Reforms SEC and investor protections • Regulates securitizations • Regulates municipal securities • Provides financial assistance to overcome mortgage crisis • Disclosures to SEC of payments to United States or foreign governments related to commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals (in February 2017 Congress eliminated this provision under the Congressional Review Act)
• Disclosures to SEC concerning manufacturing of products derived from minerals from the Congo
• Limits U.S. loans to foreign governments unlikely to repay
table 17.3 Major Provisions of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
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Sidebar 17.6 describes the role of one of those new agencies, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
What is most important to remember about these financial reforms is that Con- gress feels responsibility to react or respond to crises when they arise. The effec- tiveness of these reforms remains unknown since the full implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act has progressed slowly. However, changes implemented by Congress in 2017 did not result in the anticipated overhaul of Dodd-Frank, so full implementa- tion of the law may now proceed.
One example of how this complex law is being implemented in stages concerns the whistleblower provisions. In 2011, the SEC approved final regulations allowing whistleblowers to report violations directly to the SEC. Businesses argued that the SEC should require employees to use a company’s internal reporting systems to have protection under the Dodd-Frank Act. The SEC did not adopt this approach, and courts were divided about whether employees who do not report wrongdoing directly to the SEC qualify as whistleblowers under the act.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S.___ (2018) resolved the circuit court split. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that a person is protected by Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision only if the person has reported a suspected securities violation to the SEC. This means that a person who reports violations internally within an organization but does not report to the SEC is not protected by Dodd-Frank whistleblower anti-retaliation provision. The whistle- blower may be protected by other state or federal laws, such as Sarbanes-Oxley.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012
On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed into law a provision meant to help smaller businesses find the necessary capital to grow. The stated goals of the JOBS Act are to ease burdensome federal regulations and allow individuals to invest in start-ups through relaxed rules for some initial public offerings.
“The Financial Stability Oversight Council . . . proposed rules as to which large financial companies that were not banks would be regulated by the Federal Reserve because they constituted a potential threat to the nation’s financial system’s stabil- ity based on their size.”
–Edward Wyatt, The New York Times,
January 18, 2011
In Spokeo v. Robins the plaintiff alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Under the Dodd-Frank Act, responsibilities for authority to publish FCRA rules, regulations, and guidelines transferred from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to a new agency created by the Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
When Spokeo filed a petition for the Supreme Court to review the lower court’s holding, the U.S. Solicitor Gen- eral and CFPB filed an amicus brief recommending that the Court deny certiorari. The argument proffered in the
amicus brief was that the FCRA clearly required report- ing agencies to take steps to ensure information accu- racy. The CFPB supported a broad reading of the FCRA to allow for economic recovery even without actual injury. The Supreme Court rejected the CFPB recommendations both in granting certiorari and in adopting a more narrow interpretation requiring evidence of a concrete and par- ticularized injury. Source: “Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,” CFPB, July 11, 2016. https://www.consumer- finance.gov.
sidebar 17.6
CFPB Files Brief Addressing Spokeo v. Robins Petition
“The Dodd-Frank bill requires the SEC to do more than 100 new rules, create 5 new offices, and conduct more than 20 stud- ies and reports, which require significant use of staff resources and money.”
–Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant for
the SEC
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One closely watched provision encourages new businesses to raise small amounts of investment dollars from many people, using the Internet to spread the investment opportunity, also known as crowdfunding. Of course, crowdfunding is not a new concept as charitable organizations and even some celebrities encouraging support for new movies have used small investments promoted through social media to generate a large pool of capital. It is unique, however, to see Congress and the SEC encourage such investment activity.
Title II of the JOBS Act allows companies to advertise or share publicly that they are seeking investments and raise money from accredited investors—those with $1 million in assets or annual income of more than $200,000.
Title III allows a company to raise up to $1 million from anyone, not just accred- ited investors, by selling securities through crowdfunding intermediaries in a 12-month period. Similar crowdfunding mechanisms are permitted under some state laws.
The SEC issued final regulations in 2015 to implement Title III of the JOBS Act, known as Regulation Crowdfunding. In June 2019, the SEC released a report of findings after studying crowdfunding from May 2016 through December 2018. The reports findings included:
• “[T]here were 1,351 offerings, excluding withdrawn filings, seeking in the aggre- gate a target, or minimum, amount of $94.3 million and a maximum amount of $775.9 million.”
• “The market exhibited growth over time: 292 offerings initiated during the first year, 557 during the second year, and approximately 502 during the first part of the third year (from May 16, 2018 through December 31, 2018) since the rules went into effect. While most issuers undertook one offering during this period, some issuers (105) returned to the crowdfunding market for follow-on offerings.”
• “The typical offering was small and raised less than the 12-month offering limit. The median target amount sought was $25,000 and the median maximum amount sought was $500,000.”
• “The majority of issuers that sought financing under Regulation Crowdfunding during the considered period were relatively small and early in their life cycle. Based on information in offering statement filings, the median offering was by an issuer that was incorporated approximately two years prior to the offering and employed about three people.”
Figure 17.1 The report found that crowdfunding offerings were concentrated geographically, with California (32%), New York (11%) and Texas (7%) representing almost a third of all offerings. The geographic distribution is found in Figure 17.1 below.
Source: “Report to the Commission: Regulation Crowdfunding,” SEC staff, https://www.sec.gov/files/regulation- crowdfunding-2019_0.pdf.
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Key Terms Blue sky laws 538 Controlling person 515 Due diligence defense 519 Insider 528 Issuer 515 JOBS Act 545 Misappropriation theory 529 Posteffective period 516 Prefiling period 516
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 534
Prospectus 516 Registration statement 515 Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002 539 Scienter 518 Securities Act of 1933 514 Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) 514
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 520
Security 513 Seller 515 Short-swing profits 528 Tippee 529 Tombstone ad 516 Underwriter 515 Waiting period 516
Review Questions and Problems 1. What Is a Security?
W.J. Howey Company and Howey-in-the-Hills Service Inc. are Florida corporations under common control and management. Howey Company offers to sell to the public its orange grove, tree by tree. Howey-in-the-Hills Service offers these buyers a contract wherein the appropriate care, harvesting, and marketing of the oranges would be provided. Most of the buyers who sign the service contracts are non- residents of Florida who have very little knowledge or skill needed to care for and harvest the oranges. These buyers are attracted by the expectation of profits. Is a sale of orange trees by the Howey Company and a sale of services by Howey-in-the-Hills Service a sale of a security? Why or why not?
2. Securities and Exchange Commission (a) When was this administrative agency created? (b) What types of regulatory authorities does the SEC have at its disposal?
The Securities Act of 1933: Going Public
3. Parties Regulated Who are the four types of parties governed by the 1933 Securities Act?
4. Documents Involved (a) What are the two important documents required by the Securities Act of 1933? (b) Under the provisions of the federal Securities Act of 1933, there are three important time periods
concerning when securities may be sold or offered for sale. Name and describe these three time periods.
5. Liability To secure a loan, Rubin pledges stock that he represents as being marketable and worth approximately $1.7 million. In fact, the stock is nonmarketable and practically worthless. He is charged with violating the Securities Act of 1933. He claims that because no sale occurred, he is not guilty. Is he correct? Why or why not?
6. Defenses What are three defenses that might be used by a party charged with violating the Securities Act of 1933?
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Being Public
7. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (a) Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 are of fundamental importance
in the law of securities regulations. What is the main purpose of this section and rule? (b) Do you suppose that an oral promise made and not performed can be the basis of arguing a party is
guilty of defrauding another under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5?
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8. Insider Transactions Donna, a corporate director, sold 100 shares of stock in her corporation on June 1, 2007. The selling price was $10.50 a share. Two months later, after the corpora- tion had announced substantial losses for the second quarter of the year, Donna purchased 100 shares of the corporation’s stock for $7.25 a share. Are there any problems with Donna’s sale and purchase? Explain.
9. Nonpublic Information Eric Ethan, president of Inside-Outside Sports Equipment Company, has access to information that is not available to the general investor. What standard should Eric Ethan apply in deciding whether this information is so material as to prevent him from investing in his company prior to the information’s public release?
10. Additional Civil Liability What is the purpose of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?
11. Criminal Liability What are the dollar amounts related to fines, and what are the number of years related to prison terms for those that violate the Securities Act of 1934?
Other Considerations
12. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (a) What is the purpose of the PSLRA? (b) List four ways Congress accomplishes this purpose.
13. State Blue Sky Laws Why is it important for businesspeople to understand the role of state blue sky laws in addition to federal securities regulations?
Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002
14. Revitalization of SEC What was the primary way the Sarbanes—Oxley Act increased the authority and capabilities of the SEC?
15. Accounting Reforms List and describe two major developments designed to allow auditors to focus on their review of, and not service to, public companies.
16. Corporate Governance Some commentators state that the concept of independence is the most important aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley. How is independence required and why is it critical to corporate governance?
17. Financial Statements and Controls Describe the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions that require certification of financial state- ments and internal financial controls.
18. Whistleblower Protections In what three ways did the Sarbanes—Oxley Act strengthen the enforcement of securities fraud?
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 19. What event led to Congress creating new financial regulations? 20. What are the major changes made by this statute? Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 21. What new way can small businesses raise money under the JOBS Act?
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1. Two former roommates from college contact you about an opportunity to make big money. Their idea is to start a business to market a new video game system (the computer science major developed the software; the engineer created the hardware). They estimate it will take $5 million to $10 million to begin production, and they want to raise money by selling shares in the company to investors. They think their product is superior, and they are aware of the time factor. They want to get started as soon as possible. Your field of expertise is securities marketing. • Can the three of you just begin advertising for investors? • What steps must be followed to comply with the law? • How much time is needed before potential investors can be approached legally? 2. You and a former classmate started a computer software company five years ago. Originally, the two of you were the owners and only employees. The foundation of your company was your combined expertise in creating custom-designed applications addressing the human resource needs of your clients. As your company grew, you added programmers, which now allows your business to provide a greater array of computer applications. You and your co-owner decide to raise capital by making a public offering of stock. In preparation for going public, you visit with several of your most valuable clients about investing in your company. • What concerns should you have regarding these conversations? • Is there anything about your expectations of the company’s future performance
you must or must not share? 3. You and two partners operate a graphics design and printing company. The success of this business relates to the high-quality service and products you provide to your clients. To move to the next level requires a considerable financial investment in computer software and hardware. You and your partners are considering forming a corporation and offering to sell stock to the public. You anticipate raising at least $40 million in new capital. As you ponder these moves, you seek answers to the following questions: • What requirements of the Sarbanes—Oxley Act will you have to meet? • What is involved in offering a new company’s stock for sale to the public? • Are there aspects of doing business as a publicly traded company that are different
from operating as a partnership?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
18-1 To analyze the Federal Trade Commission’s consumer protection mission and why politics influence it.
18-2 To understand the general framework of consumer privacy protection in the United States and evaluate how the law protects consumers in particu- lar contexts.
18-3 To understand the power of federal and state governments to enforce laws against false and deceptive advertising.
18-4 To evaluate the provisions of various consumer and financial protection laws concerning lending, credit reporting protection, debt collection, and bankruptcy.
Privacy and Consumer Protection 18 TARIK KIZILKAYA/Getty Images
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C onsumer protection laws ensure the opera-
tion of an efficient marketplace. They are
a type of regulation on business. Most
consumer protection laws give consumers a type of
private property regarding how goods and services
are transferred by sellers through contract law. This
private property produces greater safety and security
for consumers in their purchases and their “privacy,”
ensuring that sellers do not defraud or take undue
advantage. But at the same time, because it limits
what is privately proper to sellers, consumer protec-
tion laws may result in higher prices and fewer goods
and services being easily available.
The exclusive legal fence (or boundary) of prop-
erty protects us in various ways, principally in the
possession, use, and transfer of what we own. Yet we
cannot use or transfer what we own without limits.
We must respect the equal property right of others
and not interfere with the exclusive legal fence that
protects what belongs to them. For example, the
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doctrine of nuisance (Chapter 7) prevents us from using our land in a way that inter- feres unreasonably with the use and enjoyment (really, possession) of another’s land. We cannot injure what others own. Likewise, in transferring ownership of something we own, we cannot sell it through fraud, sometimes called intentional misrepresenta- tion or deception (see Chapter 10).
It is a mistake, however, to think that the placement of this fence of law is always clearly understood. In the property system, owners often just assume they can do whatever they want with what they own. Property seems open-ended that way. But what one owner does affects other owners, and property also protects the right of other owners not to have what belongs to them injured or to be defrauded out of what they own by what another owner does. The exact definition of what constitutes “injury” and “fraud” is often uncertain, and this means that it may not always be obvi- ous to owners where the limits are regarding what they can do with what they own and how they can affect other owners. For that reason, we have agencies and regula- tions to help enforce societal expectations on the appropriate use of business prop- erty, particularly in interactions with consumers, as well as reasonable risk sharing.
In this chapter, we will detail a selection of consumer protection laws in impor- tant areas such as privacy, false advertising, and consumer finance. These laws offer protection not only for respective physical property resources but also intangible resources like personally identifiable information. This chapter also highlights the role of the key federal agency charged with protecting these resources, the Federal Trade Commission. By drawing the boundaries more clearly through such regula- tions and regulators, commerce operates more efficiently and equitably.
The Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the primary federal agency that protects consumers. Although the Federal Trade Commission Act protects businesses as well as consumers, the consumer protection mission of the FTC is promoted by a special bureau called the Bureau of Consumer Protection. This body within the FTC is the regulatory center for federal consumer protection. The next sections examine activi- ties of the FTC and the Bureau of Consumer Protection.
THE FTC AND TRADE PRACTICE REGULATION Created in 1914, the FTC is an “independent” regulatory agency charged with keeping competition free and fair, and with protecting consumers. Independent agencies are less directly controlled by the executive branch, with controlling members (commis- sioners or board members) representing more than one political party and appointed for staggered terms. The FTC obeys its mandate to promote competition through enforcement of the antitrust laws. It achieves its consumer protection goal by trade practice regulation under that section of the FTC Act which prohibits using “unfair methods of competition” or “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.” It also administers more than 70 other consumer protection acts, some of which are cov- ered in this chapter (see Table 18.1). In the final analysis, promoting competition and protecting consumers overlap considerably. A highly competitive economy produces better goods and services at lower prices, while trade practice regulation ensures fair competition by preventing those who would deceive consumers from diverting trade from those who compete honestly.
LO 18-1
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The FTC furthers consumer protection through trade practice regulation in sev- eral ways. For instance, it advises firms as to whether a proposed practice is unfair or deceptive. Although not legally binding, an advisory opinion furnishes a good idea about how the FTC views the legality of a given trade practice. The FTC also issues industry guides, which specify the agency’s view of the legality of a particu- lar industry’s trade practices. Like advisory opinions, industry guides are informal and not legally binding, but they can be very helpful in understanding the agency’s perspective on an issue. For example, the FTC’s “Green Guides” are essential read- ing for any firm that intends to make environmental claims in its advertising. The Bureau of Consumer Protection plays the major role in issuing advisory opinions and industry guides on trade regulation issues.
In its function of protecting consumers, however, the FTC goes far beyond merely advising businesses about the legality of trade practices. It also prosecutes them for committing unfair or deceptive trade practices. Such prosecutions arise in one of two related ways. First, the Bureau of Consumer Protection may allege that an individual or company, called a respondent, has violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Over the years, the FTC’s administrative law judges and the commissioners who review decisions of the judges have derived a body of quasi-judicial interpretations as to what constitutes unfair and deceptive acts. FTC inquiries may begin as a result of consumer complaints. Con- sumers may even file complaints electronically.
Enforcement actions may also arise from allegations under Section 5 that a respondent’s actions violate a trade regulation rule of the FTC. At the recommenda- tion of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, the five-member Commission adopts trade regulation rules in exercising its quasi-legislative power. These rules are formal interpretations of what the FTC regards as unfair or deceptive, and they have the force and effect of law. The rules usually deal with a single practice in a single indus- try, and they cover all firms in the affected industry. Examples of trade regulation rules include required disclosures of the “R” value for siding and installation and the familiar telemarketing sales rule that established the national “Do Not Call” list.
The FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network (CSN) received 3.2 million consumer complaints in 2019 (including 1.7 million fraud complaints and 650,572 identity theft complaints).
–FTC, Consumer Sen- tinel Network Data
Book, January 2020.
A deceptive act, or deception, usually involves a misrepresen- tation or omission similar to common law fraud.
Laws Duties
FTC Act To regulate unfair or deceptive acts or practices Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
To prohibit online collection of information from children under the age of 13 without parental consent; requires disclosures and protection when consent is given
Equal Credit Opportunity Act To prevent discrimination in credit extension based on sex, age, race, religion, national origin, marital status, and receipt of welfare payments
Truth-in-Lending Act To require that suppliers of consumer credit fully disclose all credit terms before an account is opened or a loan made
Fair Credit Reporting Act To regulate the consumer credit reporting industry Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
To prevent debt-collection agencies from using abusive or deceptive collection practices
table 18.1 Selected Laws Administered by the FTC
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Alleged trade practice violations may come to the attention of the Bureau of Consumer Protection in a variety of ways. A business executive may complain about another’s acts that injure competition, or a consumer may direct the attention of the Bureau to unfair or deceptive acts of a business. Such complaints are filed informally, and the identity of the complainant is not disclosed. A letter signed by a complaining party provides a basis for proceedings if it identifies the offending party, contains all the evidence which is the basis for the complaint, and states the relief desired. Of course, other government agencies, Congress, or the FTC itself may discover busi- ness conduct alleged to be illegal.
The chief legal tools of the Bureau are the consent order and the cease and desist order. Under the consent-order procedure, a party “consents” to sign an order which restrains the promotional activity deemed offensive and agrees to whatever remedy, if any, the Bureau imposes. Most cases brought by the Bureau are settled by this procedure.
If a party will not accept a consent order, it will be prosecuted before an admin- istrative law judge. If the party is found guilty, the judge issues a cease and desist order prohibiting future violations. Parties may appeal cease and desist orders to the full five-member commission and from there to the court of appeals if legal basis for further appeal is present.
FTC PENALTIES AND REMEDIES Civil Fines The basic remedy for trade practice violations under the FTC Act is a civil fine. The maximum penalty was raised to $40,000 per violation in 2016. It is now inflation adjusted and was $42,530 in 2019. The punishment function of fining violators is only an incidental one, as the FTC’s main purpose is to prevent and deter trade practice violations.
To obtain fines, either the FTC or the Justice Department must ask the federal court to assess them. The exception is when companies agree to fines as part of a consent order. Fines may be assessed in three distinct situations: (1) for a violation of a consent or cease and desist order, (2) for a violation of a trade regulation rule, and (3) for a knowing violation of prior FTC orders against others.
The FTC Act provides that “each separate violation of . . . an order [or rule] shall be a separate offense.” It also states that in the case of a violation through continuing failure to obey an order, each day the violation continues is a separate offense. Because of these provisions, the total fine against a violator may be considerably more than $40,000. See Sidebar 18.1 for an extreme example of the FTC’s power to seek monetary remedies.
Other Remedies In addition to assessing penalty fines, the FTC has broad powers to fashion appropriate remedies to protect consumers in trade regulation cases. One remedy the FTC has used in the past to accompany some of its orders is corrective advertising.
When a company has advertised deceptively, the FTC can require it to run ads that admit the prior errors and correct the erroneous information. The correction applies to a specific dollar volume of future advertising. The theory is that the future advertising, however truthful itself, will continue to be deceptive unless the correc- tion is made because it will remind consumers of the prior deceptive ads. Corrective ads have forced admissions that a mouthwash does not reduce cold symptoms or prevent sore throats, that an oil-treatment product cannot decrease gasoline con- sumption, and that an aspirin-based drug cannot relieve tension.
Don’t forget that a cease and desist order from an administrative law judge is very similar to an injunction from a trial court.
Note that the FTC has not used corrective advertising much when a majority of the five commissioners is politi- cally conservative.
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Other remedies the FTC may use in its orders, or may seek to impose by court action under certain circumstances, include (1) rescission of contracts (each party must return what has been obtained from the other), (2) refund of money or return of property, (3) payment of damages to consumers, and (4) public notification of trade practice violations. When it is in the public interest, and when harm from an illegal practice is substantial and likely to continue, the FTC may ask the federal court to grant temporary or even permanent injunctions to restrain violators.
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: THE FTC TODAY The FTC’s consumer protection mission and enforcement of Section 5 varies accord- ing to the economic orientation of the president and of Congress. The president appoints the FTC commissioners for four-year terms and Congress annually must approve a budget for the FTC. Although the FTC is an independent regulatory agency, it is understandable that the FTC commissioners often reflect the views of the presi- dent who appointed them. However, no more than three of the five commissioners can be members of the same political party. Additionally, Congress can always cut the FTC’s budget if it disapproves of the rules made and the cases brought by the FTC.
According to the majority views of the five commissioners who absolutely run the FTC, in some years the FTC is very laissez-faire, meaning that it leaves alone or does not regulate most advertising. The FTC allows the market to regulate adver- tising under the theory that consumers will not buy again from a seller if they are
From 2008 to 2015, Volkswagen Group of America sold cars with diesel engines that were supposedly engineered to mini- mize pollution, maximize performance, and comply with U.S. government regula-
tions. The vehicles were promoted as “clean diesel” cars, and they sold well. However, unbeknownst to consumers and regulators, Volkswagen had installed illegal “cheat” software in its cars to fool emissions testers. The software could sense when a car was being tested, and it would turn on emissions reduction technology to comply with pollution standards. When driving under normal condi- tions, however, the emissions controls would be signifi- cantly reduced, increasing performance and gas mileage but producing up to 40 times as much pollution.
Volkswagen’s deception was discovered, not by reg- ulators, but by graduate students from West Virginia Uni- versity working at its Center for Alternative Fuels, Engines and Emissions. Eventually, regulators responded to the
students’ evidence and publicly exposed VW’s actions. Consumers who purchased the illegally equipped vehi- cles discovered they were deceived by the promise that the cars were “clean.” Moreover, the resale value of the cars plummeted.
Volkswagen was sued in the United States by the Federal Trade Commission, the U.S. Environmental Protec- tion Agency, the California Attorney General, the California Air Resources Board, and current and former VW owners. Settlements reached through 2017 provided consumers with $11.5 billion in compensation, repair, and buy-back options. The FTC also obtained an injunction to prevent Volkswagen from using cheat devices or making decep- tive statements about environmental benefits in the future.
Sources: Ewing, Jack, “Inside VW’s Campaign of Trickery,” New York Times, May 6, 2017; In Re: Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation, 2016 WL 6824450, N.D. Cal., October 25, 2016; Volkswagen/Audi/Porsche Diesel Emissions Settlement Program, https://www. vwcourtsettlement.com/en/.
sidebar 18.1
When Clean Diesel Isn’t so Clean
AR Pictures/ Shutterstock
Appreciate that tra- ditional frauds that substantially impact interstate commerce not only violate the FTC Act but also may violate federal and state crimi- nal laws, as well as give consumers injured by the fraud a common law right to sue for actual and punitive damages.
Do note that the Bureau of Consumer Protection may urge that a case be brought, but a majority of the five commissioners is necessary officially to authorize FTC action by the Bureau of Consumer Protection.
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unhappy with what they bought the first time. In such times, only traditional frauds tend to be regulated. In other years, when politics and the FTC commissioners are more consumer-oriented, the FTC will increase the number of deceptive cases filed and the number of new rules regulating trade practices that are not only deceptive but also “unfair” in the minds of the commissioners. They may allow the Bureau of Consumer Protection to impose new legal remedies like corrective advertising.
The FTC has great discretion in deciding what is deceptive or unfair and whether or not to make new rules and bring new cases. Politics, economics, and discretion combine to determine the consumer protection mission of the FTC.
Privacy
Consumer privacy has become a much-discussed topic in recent years, rising to the top of the enforcement and legislative agenda. It is clear that consumers expect to have some basic control over their private information. On the other hand, consum- ers enjoy the benefits that open information provides. Firms can make advertising more relevant, personalize web searches, and help connect social and work groups by using personal information. The fact that there is conflict in satisfying both pri- vacy and convenience goals is perhaps inevitable. Consumers look to the law to provide clear rules.
Privacy protection in the United States is, in most cases, less robust than many believe. Some essential protections exist against government intrusions. However, protections against intrusions by private actors are often limited to particular busi- ness contexts or certain forms of communications. As you will see from the follow- ing discussion, in many cases, consumers are left to rely on industry self-regulation or hope for future legislative initiatives.
LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENT INTRUSIONS Many consider privacy to be a fundamental right. The natural place to look for such rights protection is the U.S. Constitution. However, the Constitution does not explic- itly mention privacy. Courts have, instead, found aspects of privacy to be protected by various amendments, particularly in the Bill of Rights. These protections are impor- tant, but note that they generally limit only the government; limitations on private actors must be found elsewhere. For example, the Fourth Amendment right against “unreasonable searches and seizures” prevents the government from collecting much private information without a search warrant. In Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014), the Supreme Court ruled that the police must generally first obtain a warrant in order to search a cell phone seized from a person who has been arrested. The First Amendment protecting freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion may also prevent intrusions on privacy. Additionally, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right to liberty that has been extended to marital privacy.
In the modern world, much of our private information is held by third parties such as internet and telecommunications companies. How does that impact the government’s ability to obtain information? The Supreme Court addressed that question in the context of location tracking that naturally occurs when we use cell phones. In Case 18.1, the Court determines whether the legislative protections in the Stored Communications Act (discussed in detail below the case) appropriately take into account constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
LO 18-2
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case 18.1
CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018)
ROBERTS, CHIEF JUSTICE: There are 396 million cell phone service accounts in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million people. Cell phones perform their wide and growing variety of functions by connecting to a set of radio antennas called “cell sites.” Although cell sites are usually mounted on a tower, they can also be found on light posts, flagpoles, church steeples, or the sides of buildings. Cell sites typically have several directional antennas that divide the covered area into sectors.
Cell phones continuously scan their environment look- ing for the best signal, which generally comes from the clos- est cell site. Most modern devices, such as smartphones, tap into the wireless network several times a minute when- ever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of the phone’s features. Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location information (CSLI). The precision of this information depends on the size of the geographic area cov- ered by the cell site. The greater the concentration of cell sites, the smaller the coverage area. As data usage from cell phones has increased, wireless carriers have installed more cell sites to handle the traffic. That has led to increasingly compact coverage areas, especially in urban areas.
* * * In 2011, police officers arrested four men suspected
of robbing a series of Radio Shack and (ironically enough) T–Mobile stores in Detroit. One of the men confessed that, over the previous four months, the group (along with a rotat- ing cast of getaway drivers and lookouts) had robbed nine different stores in Michigan and Ohio. The suspect identi- fied 15 accomplices who had participated in the heists and gave the FBI some of their cell phone numbers; the FBI then reviewed his call records to identify additional num- bers that he had called around the time of the robberies.
Based on that information, the prosecutors applied for court orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone records for petitioner Timothy Carpenter and several other suspects. That statute, as amended in 1994, permits the Government to compel the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when it “offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought “are relevant and mate- rial to an ongoing criminal investigation.” . . . Altogether the Government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging Car- penter’s movements—an average of 101 data points per day.
Carpenter was charged with six counts of robbery and an additional six counts of carrying a firearm during
a federal crime of violence. . . . Carpenter was convicted on all but one of the firearm counts and sentenced to more than 100 years in prison.
* * * The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The “basic purpose of this Amendment,” our cases have recog- nized, “is to safeguard the privacy and security of individu- als against arbitrary invasions by governmental official. . . .
* * * The question we confront today is how to apply the
Fourth Amendment to a new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals. . . . Much like GPS tracking of a vehicle, cell phone location information is detailed, ency- clopedic, and effortlessly compiled. . . .
Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI. The location information obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search.
* * * A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment
protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the con- trary, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” . . . A majority of this Court has already recognized that indi- viduals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. . . . Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, but doing so “for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” For that reason, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”
Allowing government access to cell-site records con- travenes that expectation. Although such records are gen- erated for commercial purposes, that distinction does not negate Carpenter’s anticipation of privacy in his physical location. Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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In addition to the limited areas of privacy protection in the Constitution, more substantial privacy rights against the government are provided by statute. The Pri- vacy Act of 1974 places constraints on the collection of certain kinds of information by the federal government and limits the release of such information. It also provides a tort cause of action against those who violate the act. A second statute, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, requires all government agencies seeking depositor records from banks and other financial institutions to notify depositors of this fact. The individual depositor then has 14 days to challenge an agency’s legal basis for
of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts. As with GPS information, the time- stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” These location records “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life.’” And like GPS mon- itoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of a button, the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location information at practically no expense. . . .
Moreover, the retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a category of information other- wise unknowable. In the past, attempts to reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of recollection. With access to CSLI, the Government can now travel back in time to retrace a per- son’s whereabouts, subject only to the retention policies of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain records for up to five years. Critically, because location informa- tion is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to persons who might happen to come under investigation—this new- found tracking capacity runs against everyone. Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police need not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular indi- vidual, or when.
Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police may—in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance. . . .
Accordingly, when the Government accessed CSLI from the wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reason- able expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.
* * * Having found that the acquisition of Carpenter’s CSLI
was a search, we also conclude that the Government must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records. . . . We decline to grant the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier’s database of physical location information. In light of the deeply reveal- ing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its col- lection, the fact that such information is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amend- ment protection. The Government’s acquisition of the cell- site records here was a search under that Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
KEY POINTS • Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures extend beyond houses
and cars to the electronic world. • The Court recognized that we have no choice about providing location data to third parties when
using a cell phone. • Although the SCA permitted the government’s collection of cell phone location data, the Court
determined that the Constitution prevented it without a warrant.
[continued]
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seeking the records. Depositors are allowed to sue the government agencies or finan- cial institutions that fail to comply with the statute for actual and punitive damages, plus attorney’s fees.
TRADITIONAL BUSINESS PRIVACY Because limitations on government intrusions generally do not affect private actors, a consumer wishing to assert a right of privacy against a business must base it on another source of law. Many of the basic tenets of our concept of privacy come from the common law. As detailed in Chapter 10, they can be quite effective in prevent- ing the most egregious intrusions into one’s personal life. However, in the consumer context, common law privacy protections provide only limited success in protecting information.
Two basic common law privacy torts arise in consumer transactions. The tort of intrusion on seclusion prevents one from invading another’s private affairs if it would be highly offensive to the reasonable person. To be actionable, one must have a reasonable expectation of privacy that was infringed. In general, the expectation of privacy is difficult to establish in a business context, where communications with another in a public setting are the norm. Another potentially useful common law tort is public disclosure of private facts. The disclosure must be highly offensive to the reasonable person, which implies that the disclosed fact must concern a very sensi- tive issue. This tort could be used to prevent a business from disclosing embarrassing facts about a customer. However, a business that simply collects sensitive, private information is unlikely to be liable.
In a narrower context, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 provides for privacy of medical records. Enacted to standard- ize health care privacy, HIPAA protects individually identifiable health information by limiting how it can be used and disclosed by health plans, health care providers, and health care clearinghouses. Patients ultimately have control over their personal health care information and can authorize disclosures. HIPAA applies to both elec- tronic and physical records.
Another specific instance of legislated privacy related to a specific consumer transaction is the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) of 1988. The act prevents the disclosure of personally identifiable information concerning video rentals and includes a right of civil action with a minimum $2,500 liquidated damages provision. Enacted during a time of videocassette rentals, the law’s application to streaming services like Netflix was unclear. In particular, the requirement that consumers pro- vide “written consent” before information is disclosed appeared to preclude shar- ing viewing preferences over social networking services like Facebook. Therefore, Congress amended the law in 2012 to permit consumers to convey electronic consent.
Several of the consumer financial protection laws discussed later in this chap- ter contain privacy protection provisions. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, for example, a potential employer, insurer, or creditor must inform the consumer that an investigative report is being obtained on him or her. This notice allows the consumer to terminate the contemplated transaction, thus ending the legitimate business rea- son for the report and preventing the report from being obtained legally. Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a debt collector may not call a consumer at the workplace in most instances or after 9:00 p.m. or before 8:00 a.m. Both the FDCPA and the Fair Credit Reporting Act recognize the privacy of a consumer in certain circumstances.
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ELECTRONIC AND ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION Although some laws like HIPAA apply in both the physical and electronic worlds, we understand that electronic communication and the Internet present special chal- lenges. Laws exist to prevent some kinds of intrusions. But the protections are never- theless limited, and many believe that additional protections are required.
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) as an update to the Wiretap Act. The law limited government action by extending protections against telephone wiretaps without a search warrant to computer com- munications. But it also extended the protections against private intrusions on electronic communications, and this has become an important law for modern busi- nesses to understand. The ECPA prevents the interception of electronic or wire com- munications, including e-mail, by another without authorization. Another provision, called the Stored Communications Act (SCA) was enacted as part of the ECPA in 1986 and protects the privacy of communications stored on a server. The SCA pre- vents unauthorized access or disclosure of stored communications. Of course, not everything transmitted electronically is a communication.
Both the ECPA and SCA have significant limitations. For example, the ECPA allows for interception of business communications on an employer’s equipment. More importantly, for both the ECPA and SCA, one can obtain a standing authori- zation. Therefore, many employers avoid issues with the ECPA and SCA by estab- lishing the right to incept and access employee communications.
Another limitation permits the interception of broadcast radio communica- tions. A case considering whether unsecured wi-fi, which is broadcast using radio waves, falls within this exception. In Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013), the court determined that the meaning of “radio communication” in 1986 could not be extended to include data transmission over radio through wi-fi today. This case demonstrates how the arcane language of the ECPA and SCA can make it dif- ficult to apply the rules to modern technology. The statutes have been referred to as “dial-up law in a broadband world.” Figure 18.1 is a flow chart that may assist you in determining when a violation has occurred. Its complexity is evidence of the awkward structure of the law.
Children require special protection in the online world. For that reason, in 1998, Congress passed the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). The law is enforced by the FTC and prohibits the online collection of information on children under the age of 13 without a parent’s consent. It also requires firms that collect such information to provide a privacy policy and to secure the information and avoid third-party disclosures. COPPA applies to any company that knowingly collects information from children under the age of 13, even if that is not the pri- mary purpose of the Internet site. That scope means that common Internet sites may inadvertently violate COPPA. For example, in 2019, Google and its subsidiary YouTube agreed to pay a civil penalty of $136 million for violating COPPA by using identifiers embedded in videos to track children across the Internet without parental permission. In 2012, the FTC updated its rules related to COPPA to include social networks and apps in its scope and ensure that protected information included pic- tures, geographic location, and online behavior.
Due to the limited nature of general privacy rights, the FTC has stepped into the void to provide additional protection. The FTC’s main tactic is to scrutinize companies that make affirmative promises about privacy. For example, promises about protect- ing information may be explicitly communicated in an advertisement, on a webpage,
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Figure 18.1 Legal analysis of private- party capture of electronic communications.
No ECPA or
SCA case
Communication captured
without authorization or exemption
In transit?
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
In remote storage?
SCA applies
ECPA applies
Downloaded by recipient?
No ECPA or
SCA case
Archived in remote storage?
or in a privacy policy. If a company fails to keep a promise, it has engaged in false or deceptive advertising in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act (see Sidebar 18.1). In addition to enforcing promises, the FTC releases recommendations about best privacy practices to permit firms to self-regulate in an effective manner.
STATE AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION In view of limited statutory protection for privacy rights at the federal level in the United States, many advocates have called for state action. California has taken the lead on this front with the passage of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in 2018. The law, which took effect in January 2020, grants California consumers the right to know what personal information is collected about them as well as the right to delete it and opt out of its sale to third parties. It applies to most businesses that conduct business in California (even if located elsewhere). Violation of the CCPA can result in civil penalties from regulators and damages to individuals in private actions. Other states are considering similar legislation, but there is the potential for pushback based on a dormant commerce clause concern (states improperly regulating interstate commerce as discussed in Sidebar 6.3).
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Many other countries beside the United States have a deep concern about pri- vacy, particularly on the Internet. One of the strongest forces on the global stage is the European Union. In 1995, the European Parliament passed the Data Protection Directive, which mandates that companies may collect personal information only with consent, keep it only as long as necessary, and transfer to third parties only with permission. Such directives must be enacted into law in all of the EU member states. Companies in the United States quickly realized that the Data Protection Directive could prove a significant hurdle to operating in Europe (particularly if information was to be transferred back to the United States). To make things easier and streamline compliance, the EU and United States agreed to a “safe harbor” framework in which companies self-certify that they comply with seven privacy principles, including notice about data collection, the option to opt-out, security of data, and transfer only to other companies that also comply with the safe harbor framework. However, in 2015, the European Court of Justice determined that the safe harbor framework was inad- equate. It was quickly replaced in 2016 with the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework, which is more stringent. Companies provide their certifications of compliance to the U.S. Department of Commerce. Any deception about the facts in the certification is subject to FTC penalties for false and deceptive trade practices as discussed earlier.
To provide greater harmony and increased protections, the European Parliament voted in 2016 to replace Data Protection Directive with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This new regulation has already taken effect (see Sidebar 18.3).
A robust debate continues about which kinds of information about online behavior should be protected as private and which kinds of information should be freely available to businesses wishing to use it for marketing purposes. Issues raised by these questions are related to the legal fence of private property (see Chapter 7) and are similar to the information issues raised by trade secrets (see Chapter 11).
Most people value their privacy and are particularly skep- tical of being tracked by the government or private actors (see Case 18.1). When stories about surreptitious location tracking or online profile aggregation are reported, the reaction is usually overwhelmingly negative. For example, in early 2020 a company called Clearview AI rocked the privacy world when several sources reported on its facial recognition technology, created in part by scraping the public postings of thousands of Facebook, Venmo and YouTube images. The fact that law enforcement could use the technology to identify most people simply from a picture was particularly concerning. In recent years, most people have agreed with the proposition that we want our movements and history to be as private as possible.
And then the COVID-19 pandemic hit. Suddenly, phrases like “social distancing,” “contact tracing,” and
“flatten the curve” became a common part of every-day speech. Public health officials realized that an important tool for slowing the spread of the virus was to identify people who were infected (or at risk) and work to iso- late them. A number of firms jumped into the game with phone apps using technology created by Apple and Google to engage in Bluetooth and location tracking of at-risk individuals. But would the public use them? That specific question is part of a broader debate about when the desire for privacy should give way to the protection of public health. The line is not clear, but there is little doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic shifted it significantly in the direction of public health.
Sources: Kashmir Hill, “The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as we Know it,” New York Times, January 18, 2020; Joanna Stern, “Curbing Coronavirus With a Contact-Tracing App? It’s Not so Simple,” Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2020.
sidebar 18.2
Exchanging Privacy for Protection eDuring A Crisis
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Although the European Union’s Data Protection Direc- tive was groundbreaking when it was adopted in 1995, two decades later, the regime was starting to show signs of strain. Certainly, the ways in which information is used in today’s world of smartphones and data aggregation is dramatically different than the period when the Direc- tive was passed. Also, decisions by the European Court of Justice weakened established agreements such as the EU-US Safe Harbor framework and one-location data reg- ulation. Moreover, the fact that the rules were embodied in a “directive” meant that variation existed between EU nations. Improvement was clearly necessary.
In 2016, the European Parliament took steps to improve data privacy and protection by passing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Among the regulation’s provisions are requirements that firms notify customers of data breaches within three days, provide individuals “the right to be forgotten” by facilitating erasure of outdated or
irrelevant information, and adhere to strengthened rules regarding customer consent before collecting data. The new rules took effect on May 25 of 2018. As a “regulation,” the GDPR is binding on EU members as written without the possibility for country-to-country interpretation.
Importantly, the GDPR impacts all U.S. companies that do business in Europe. The regulation specifically covers the collection and processing of data from individuals in the EU, even if a firm is located outside of the Union. Not all firms appreciate the GDPR’s reach. And some com- mentators have noted that, so far, the GDPR has been enforced as strongly as it could be. But the potential for high fines means that firms must do what is necessary to comply, even if the actual threat of penalty is somewhat uncertain. Sources: European Union GDPR Portal, https://gdpr.eu; Adam Satriano, “Europe’s Privacy Law Hasn’t Shown Its Teeth, Frustrating Advocates,” New York Times, April 27, 2020.
sidebar 18.3
The Long Reach of the GDPR
False Advertising
False or deceptive advertising is one of the most important areas of consumer pro- tection. The government’s power to address the claims of multiple consumers at once is one important reason. For example, if a firm makes a false claim about an inexpensive home good, it may not be worthwhile for a customer to sue for fraud. A consumer protection agency, on the other hand, can bring a claim on behalf of all of those defrauded. In addition, false and deceptive advertising statutes may provide more flexibility in bringing a claim than one would have under common law. The necessary elements are commonly reduced (see Table 18.2).
LO 18-3
Common Law Fraud
State or Federal False Advertising
Misrepresentation of fact Required Required Scienter Required Generally not required Justified reliance Required Misrepresentation must be material Injury Required Generally not required
table 18.2 Comparison of Common Law Fraud and False Advertising Elements
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Because the Federal Trade Commission has a national focus, it is the most sig- nificant enforcer of false and deceptive advertising laws. The agency’s power to regu- late advertising is derived from Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibiting deceptive trade practices. To determine deception, the FTC looks at the ad from the point of view of the “reasonable consumer,” the typical person looking at the ad. Rather than focusing on certain words, the agency considers the ad in context—words, phrases, and pictures—to determine what it conveys to consumers. The FTC looks at both “express” and “implied” claims. An express claim is a statement that literally appears in the ad. For example, “ABC Mouthwash prevents colds” is an express claim that the product will prevent colds. An implied claim is one made indirectly or by infer- ence. “ABC Mouthwash kills the germs that cause colds” contains an implied claim that the product will prevent colds. Although the ad doesn’t literally say that the product prevents colds, it would be reasonable for a consumer to conclude from the statement “kills the germs that cause colds” that the product will prevent colds. Under the law, advertisers must have proof to back up express and implied claims that consumers take from an ad.
Additionally, the FTC looks at what the ad does not say—that is, if the failure to include information leaves consumers with a misimpression about the product. For example, if a company advertised a collection of books, the ad would be deceptive if it did not disclose that consumers actually would receive abridged versions of the books (see Table 18.3).
An important issue in a Section 5 deceptive advertising case is whether the claim would be “material”—that is, important to a consumer’s decision to buy or use the product. Examples of material claims are representations about a product’s performance, features, safety, price, or effectiveness.
The FTC Act is not the only statute governing false and deceptive advertising. States have enacted false advertising laws as well. Often referred to as “little FTC Acts,” these state laws cover similar harms and may look to federal law for guidance. Significantly, state law may allow for private lawsuits in addition to government enforcement, which is an option not available under the FTC Act.
Company Order
Sensa, L’Occitane, HCG Diet Direct, and LeanSpa
Barred from making weight-loss claims about dietary supplements, foods, or drugs unless adequate and well-controlled human clinical studies exist; pay $34 million in consumer redress.
Snapchat Refrain from misrepresenting privacy, security, or confidentiality of user information, including false promises of disappearing messages; submit independent privacy monitoring for next 20 years.
AJM Packaging Corporation Barred from making unsubstantiated claims that a product or package is biodegradable, compostable, recyclable, or offers an environmental benefit; disclose information needed to qualify certain green claims to avoid deception; pay $450,000 civil penalty for violating previous FTC order.
table 18.3 Typical FTC Deception Cases
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In addition to government agencies and consumers, competitors can serve as an important means of false advertising regulation. One of the most important mecha- nisms for such action is the federal Lanham Act of 1946. This law, which is typically thought of as a trademark statute (see Chapter 11), also prohibits false or misleading advertising. However, the Lanham Act is somewhat more limited than traditional consumer protection statutes in that it only allows those with a commercial interest to sue. This still has the effect of protecting consumers. Exactly what level of com- mercial interest is required to sue was the subject of Case 18.2, which articulated a new standard for Lanham Act cases.
case 18.2
LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC. 572 U.S. 118 (2014)
Lexmark makes toner cartridges for laser printers that can be “remanufactured” and refilled. There are competitors who pur- chase used Lexmark cartridges to remanufacture and refill them, cutting into Lexmark’s profits. To limit competition, Lexmark uses a microchip that must be replaced in order for a remanu- factured cartridge to function. When Static Control began mak- ing an alternative microchip that could be used by competitors in remanufactured Lexmark cartridges, Lexmark stated that the microchips were illegal and that anyone using them violated the law. Static Control sued for false advertising under the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court took the case to determine whether Static Control was a proper plaintiff under the Act.
SCALIA, JUSTICE: [T]his case presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: Does the cause of action in §1125(a) extend to plaintiffs like Static Control? The stat- ute authorizes suit by “any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged” by a defendant’s false advertising. §1125(a)(1). Read literally, that broad language might suggest that an action is available to anyone who can satisfy the mini- mum requirements of Article III. No party makes that argu- ment, however, and the “unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover persuades us that [§1125(a)] should not get such an expansive reading.” . . .
A. Zone of Interests First, we presume that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” . . . The modern “zone of inter- ests” formulation originated in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), as a limitation on the cause of action for judicial review con- ferred by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). We have since made clear, however, that it applies to all statutorily
created causes of action; that it is a “requirement of general application”; and that Congress is presumed to “legislat[e] against the background of” the zone-of-interests limitation, “which applies unless it is expressly negated.” . . . The zone-of- interests test is therefore an appropriate tool for determining who may invoke the cause of action in §1125(a).
* * * Identifying the interests protected by the Lanham Act . . . requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an “unusual, and extraordinarily helpful,” detailed statement of the stat- ute’s purposes. . . . Section 45 of the Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §1127, provides:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the decep- tive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair com- petition; to prevent fraud and deception in such com- merce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
Most of the enumerated purposes are relevant to false- association cases; a typical false-advertising case will implicate only the Act’s goal of “protect[ing] persons engaged in [com- merce within the of Congress] against unfair competition.” Although “unfair competition” was a “plastic” concept at common law . . . it was understood to be concerned with inju- ries to business reputation and present and future sales. . . .
We thus hold that to come within the zone of inter- ests in a suit for false advertising under §1125(a), a plaintiff
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales. A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cogni- zable under Article III, but he cannot invoke the protection of the Lanham Act—a conclusion reached by every Circuit to consider the question. . . . Even a business misled by a supplier into purchasing an inferior product is, like consum- ers generally, not under the Act’s aegis.
B. Proximate Cause Second, we generally presume that a statutory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute. For centuries, it has been “a well established principle of [the common] law, that in all cases of loss, we are to attribute it to the proxi- mate cause, and not to any remote cause.” . . .
Put differently, the proximate-cause requirement gener- ally bars suits for alleged harm that is “too remote” from the defendant’s unlawful conduct. . . .
We thus hold that a plaintiff suing under §1125(a) ordinarily must show economic or reputational injury flow- ing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising; and that that occurs when deception of consum- ers causes them to withhold trade from the plaintiff. That showing is generally not made when the deception produces injuries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the plaintiff. For example, while a competitor who is forced out of business by a defendant’s false advertising generally will be able to sue for its losses, the same is not true of the com- petitor’s landlord, its electric company, and other commer- cial parties who suffer merely as a result of the competitor’s “inability to meet [its] financial obligations.” . . .
* * *
IV. Application Applying those principles to Static Control’s false-advertising claim, we conclude that Static Control comes within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress authorized to sue under §1125(a).
To begin, Static Control’s alleged injuries—lost sales and damage to its business reputation—are injuries to pre- cisely the sorts of commercial interests the Act protects. Static Control is suing not as a deceived consumer, but as a “perso[n] engaged in” “commerce within the control of Con- gress” whose position in the marketplace has been damaged by Lexmark’s false advertising. §1127. There is no doubt that it is within the zone of interests protected by the statute. . . .
For at least two reasons, Static Control’s allegations [also] satisfy the requirement of proximate causation.
First, Static Control alleged that Lexmark disparaged its business and products by asserting that Static Control’s business was illegal. . . . When a defendant harms a plain- tiff’s reputation by casting aspersions on its business, the plaintiff’s injury flows directly from the audience’s belief in the disparaging statements. Courts have therefore afforded relief under §1125(a) not only where a defendant denigrates a plaintiff’s product by name, . . . but also where the defen- dant damages the product’s reputation by, for example, equating it with an inferior product . . . .
In addition, Static Control adequately alleged proximate causation by alleging that it designed, manufactured, and sold microchips that both (1) were necessary for, and (2) had no other use than, refurbishing Lexmark toner cartridges. . . . It follows from that allegation that any false advertising that reduced the remanufacturers’ business necessarily injured Static Control as well. Taking Static Control’s assertions at face value, there is likely to be something very close to a 1:1 relationship between the number of refurbished Prebate cartridges sold (or not sold) by the remanufacturers and the number of Prebate microchips sold (or not sold) by Static Control. . . . Although we conclude that Static Control has alleged an adequate basis to proceed under §1125(a), it can- not obtain relief without evidence of injury proximately caused by Lexmark’s alleged misrepresentations. We hold only that Static Control is entitled to a chance to prove its case.
It is so ordered.
KEY POINTS • The Lanham Act allows those businesses Congress meant to protect (in the “zone of inter-
ests”) to sue for false advertising. They do not have to be direct competitors of the firm accused of the falsehood.
• Static Control was essentially accused of selling a microchip that could only be used ille- gally. The firm believed this was not true, and it believed that the false accusation dis- suaded customers from purchasing its chips.
• Even though Static Control did not compete with Lexmark, it could sue for Lexmark’s alleged false statements.
[continued]
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Federal Credit Regulations
In addition to the FTC Act, the FTC administers several other consumer protection statutes. This means that the FTC can bring enforcement actions against those who violate the statutes. Several of these statutes concern credit regulation because the extension of credit is such an important economic reality of our consumer society. Enforcement of these statutes by other government agencies such as the Department of Justice and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau may be possible depend- ing on the circumstances.
Considering the importance of credit buying to the consumer and business, you should not be surprised that a number of laws regulating credit extension have been passed. The laws discussed in the following sections cover nondiscrimination in credit extension, the collection of information for credit reports, and the standard- ized disclosure of credit charges.
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT In 1975, Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The ECOA’s purpose is to prevent discrimination in credit extension. In an economy in which credit availability is so important, the ECOA is a logical extension in a vital con- sumer area of the anti-discrimination laws found in the employment field.
ECOA Prohibitions This act prohibits discrimination based on sex, marital status, race, color, age, religion, national origin, or receipt of welfare in any aspect of a consumer credit transaction. Although the ECOA forbids discrimination on the basis of all these different categories, it is aimed especially at preventing sex discrimination.
The law prohibits one to whom the act applies from discouraging a consumer from seeking credit based on sex, marital status, or any other of the enumerated cat- egories. A married woman, for example, cannot be denied the right to open a credit account separate from her husband’s or in her maiden name. Unless the husband will be using the account or the consumer is relying on her husband’s credit, it is ille- gal even to ask if the consumer is married. It is also illegal to ask about birth-control practices or childbearing plans or to assign negative values on a credit checklist to the fact that a woman is of childbearing age.
The ECOA applies to all businesses which regularly extend credit, including financial institutions, retail stores, and credit-card issuers. It also affects automobile dealers, real estate brokers, and others who steer consumers to lenders. Many courts are also ruling that ECOA covers consumer leasing situations, which may substitute in place of credit-based sales.
Responsibilities of the Credit Extender In basing a credit decision on the applicant’s income, the credit extender must consider alimony, child support, and maintenance payments as income, although the likelihood of these payments being actually made may be considered as well. The credit extender must also tell an appli- cant that she need not disclose income from these sources unless she will be relying on that income to obtain credit. In calculating total income, those subject to the law must include income from regular part-time jobs and public assistance programs.
Information on accounts used by both spouses must be reported to third parties, such as credit reporting agencies, in the names of both spouses. This provision of the
LO 18-4
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law helps women establish a credit history and enables a woman who separates from her husband to obtain credit in her own right.
To date, much of the litigation surrounding the ECOA concerns the require- ment that specific reasons be given a consumer who is denied credit. Several cases have imposed liability upon credit extenders who have failed to provide any reasons for credit denial or who merely informed the consumer that she had failed to achieve a minimum score on a credit rating system. Other cases have dealt with age and race discrimination. It has also been established that the practice of redlining, that is, refusing to make loans at all in certain areas where property values are low, can discriminate on the basis of race in granting mortgage credit.
ECOA Remedies and Penalties Private remedies for violation of the ECOA are recovery of actual damages, punitive damages up to $10,000, and attorney’s fees and legal costs. Actual damages can include recovery for embarrassment and mental distress. Punitive damages can be recovered even in the absence of actual damages. In addition to private remedies, the government may bring suit to enjoin violations of the ECOA and to assess civil penalties. In one case, the FTC assessed a $200,000 civil pen- alty against a major national oil company. The FTC charged that the company practiced race and sex discrimination by using zip codes as a factor in deciding whether to extend credit and by failing to consider women’s alimony and child support income.
Note that the ECOA has both private remedies that consumers can pursue as well as public enforcement by such agencies as the Federal Trade Commission the Department of Justice, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. For this reason, consumers do not need to depend on the government to ensure they have equal opportunities for credit. If there are violations of the ECOA, affected consumers can sue. On the other hand, the activity of multiple regulators and significant remedies can present a challenge to businesses. Sidebar 18.4 considers the difficulties faced by new business models in the financial sector.
A business that denies a consumer credit must give specific reasons for the denial to the consumer.
The FTC determined that using zip codes as a factor in denying credit amounted to racial discrimination under the circumstances. The company should have decided each credit application on its own merits.
New technologies that span traditional industry segments present special regulatory hurdles. Such is the case with the burgeoning financial technology (FinTech) field. Fin- Tech firms may be involved in such diverse products or services as banking, mobile payments, peer-to-peer lend- ing, budgeting software, digital wallets, and insurance bro- kering. They may be well-established firms or start-ups. And the offerings may be consumer based or B2B. Clearly, it is impossible for a single regulator to evaluate it all.
Two agencies have taken a leadership role at the fed- eral level. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), an independent bureau of the U.S. Treasury, regu- lates FinTech to the extent it is involved in national bank- ing and savings associations. When FinTech firms provide products to consumers, the Consumer Financial Protec- tion Bureau (CFPB) will consider issues such as required disclosures and data privacy. Depending on the nature of
the FinTech product, other agencies at the state or federal level may be involved. Any firm desiring to offer financial products or services would be wise to investigate potential regulators to find guidance on how to comply with the law.
Of course, regulators do not want to squelch innova- tion in FinTech with the unthinking application of arcane rules and procedures. They may pilot new regulatory structures to encourage experimentation. For example, the CFPB oversees Project Catalyst, which evaluates con- sumer-friendly FinTech improvements and can provide relief from standard disclosure rules. To be sure, FinTech is a fast-moving environment and all stakeholders have an interest in ensuring a balance between consumer protec- tion and innovation. Sources: Yagiz, Bora, “Fintech Challenge for Regulators: Evolution or Revolution?” Reuters, April 21, 2017; CFPB, “Project Catalyst,” Consumer Finance, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/project-catalyst.
sidebar 18.4
Who Regulates FinTech?
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THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT Every year in the United States, the consumer reporting industry issues many times as many reports as there are people in the country. Examples of the entities that compile such reports include credit Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union. However, many other companies provide consumer reports related to employment history, ten- ant screening, and medical conditions. Therefore, these reports cover not only con- sumers seeking credit but also persons seeking jobs, shelter, or insurance. Although most of the information contained in such reports is accurate, the harm caused by occasionally inaccurate information and the potential for undue invasion of privacy led Congress to pass the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). FCRA applies to any- one who prepares or uses a consumer report in connection with (1) extending credit, (2) selling insurance, or (3) hiring or firing an employee. The law regulates reports on consumers but not those on businesses.
Consumer Rights under FCRA The law gives individual consumers certain rights whenever they are rejected for credit, insurance, or employment because of an adverse credit report. These rights include (1) the right to be told the name of the agency making the report, (2) the right to require the agency to reveal the informa- tion given in the report, and (3) the right to correct the information or at least give the consumer’s version of the facts in dispute.
This law does have one important limitation. It provides that a report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report is not a “consumer report” covered by the act. To illustrate this limitation, assume that a bank is asked for information about its credit experi- ence with one of its customers. If it reports only as to its own experiences, the report is not covered by the act. The act is designed to cover consumer reporting agencies that obtain information from several sources, compile it, and furnish it to third par- ties. If the bank passed along any information it had received from an outside source, then its credit report would be subject to the provision of the act. Also, if the bank gave its opinion as to the creditworthiness of the customer in question, it would come under the act. The limitation is restricted to information relating to transac- tions or experiences, and the information furnished must be of a factual nature if the exception in the law is to be applicable.
Many businesses can avoid the pitfalls of being a consumer reporting agency, but most businesses will be subject to the “user” provisions of this law. The “user” provision requires that consumers who are seeking credit for personal, family, or household purposes be informed if their application is denied because of an adverse credit report. They must also be informed of the source of the report and the fact that they are entitled to make a written request as to the nature of the information received. If they request the information in the report, they are entitled to receive it so that they may challenge the accuracy of the negative aspects of its contents.
Investigative Consumer Reports The act also contains a provision on investigative consumer reports. These are reports on a consumer’s character, general reputation, mode of living, and so on, obtained by personal interviews in the consumer’s community. No one may obtain such a report unless at least three days’ advance notice is given to the consumer that such a report will be sought. The consumer has the right to be informed of the nature and scope of any such personal investigation. Reports that are intended to be covered by this act are those usually conducted for insurance companies and employment agencies.
A 2012 FTC study of 1,001 consumer credit reports found that “one in 20 of the study par- ticipants had an error on his or her credit report that lowered the credit score to a degree that the error likely made getting credit more expensive.”
–Senate testimony of Maneesha Mithal,
Associate Director for the Division of Privacy
and Identity Protec- tion at the FTC, May 7,
2013
Don’t ignore the difference between a “consumer report” and an “investigative consumer report.”
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Observing Reasonable Procedures In making investigations and collecting information, credit reporting agencies must observe reasonable procedures, or they will be liable to consumers. For example, when a consumer investigative report con- tained false information about a consumer’s character—including rumored drug use, participation in demonstrations, and eviction from prior residences—a court found liability against the credit reporting agency. The agency’s investigator had obtained the information from a single source, a person with a strong bias against the con- sumer, and he failed to double-check it. However, if an agency follows reasonable procedures, it is not liable to a consumer, even if it reports false information. Fur- thermore, several courts have ruled that the FCRA preempts state law. This prevents consumers from filing libel actions against agencies which report false information.
FCRA Penalties and Remedies The Federal Trade Commission can enforce the FCRA. In addition, anyone who violates the provisions of the act is civilly liable to an injured consumer. The consumer may recover actual damages, attorney’s fees, and in some instances punitive damages. Consider in Case 18.3 what the court says about punitive damages under the FCRA.
case 18.3
SAFECO INSURANCE CO. v. BURR 551 U.S. 47 (2007)
Safeco Insurance Company and GEICO General Insurance Company issued automobile insurance policies to three appli- cants without telling them that the companies had obtained credit reports on the applicants. One applicant filed a lawsuit against Safeco and two applicants sued GEICO under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The cases reached the Supreme Court and were consolidated for decision.
SOUTER, JUSTICE: . . . The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires notice to any consumer subjected to “adverse action . . . based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer credit report.” Anyone who “will- fully fails” to provide notice is civilly liable to the consumer. The questions in these consolidated cases are whether will- ful failure covers a violation committed in reckless disre- gard of the notice violation, and, if so, whether petitioners Safeco and GEICO committed reckless violations. We hold that reckless action is covered, that GEICO did not violate the statute, and that while Safeco might have, it did not act recklessly.
Congress enacted the Act in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the bank- ing system, and protect consumer privacy. The Act requires
among other things, that “any person who takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report” must notify the affected consumer. The notice must point out the adverse action, explain how to reach the agency that reported on the consumer’s credit, and tell the consumer that he can get a free copy of the report and dis- pute its accuracy with the agency. As it applies to an insur- ance company, “adverse action” is “a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied for.”
In GEICO’s case, the initial rate offered to Edo [one of the applicants] was the one he would have received if his credit score had not been taken into account, and GEICO owed him no adverse action notice under the Act.
Safeco did not give Burr and Massey (the other appli- cants) any notice because it thought the Act did not apply to an initial application, a mistake that left the company in violation of the statute if Burr and Massey received higher rates “based in whole or in part” on their credit reports; if they did, Safeco would be liable to them on a showing of reckless conduct (or worse). The first issue we can forget,
Hulton Archive/Getty Images
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Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act Amendments The FCRA was amended in 2003 by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACT). The FACT Act provides for the right to dispute information on credit reports with the information furnisher and permits consumers to place fraud alerts on the report to notify creditors of identity theft. In addition, the FACT Act allows consumers to obtain a free credit report each year from the national consumer reporting agencies (Experian, Trans Union, Equifax). Notably, the free credit report is not required to contain a credit score, which is a proprietary number calculated by the reporting agency. But consumers must be allowed to purchase the score under the FACT Act.
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act In 2018, in response to widespread reports of data breaches, Congress passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. The law requires nationwide consumer reporting agencies to provide “security freezes” to consumers free of charge. The freeze restricts lender access to a consumer credit report unless the consumer lifts the restriction (either temporarily or permanently). Additionally, the legislation extended the amount of time a fraud alert must be included in a consumer’s file to one year.
[continued]
however, for although the record does not reliably indicate what rights they would have obtained if their credit reports had not been considered, it is clear enough that if Safeco did violate the statute, the company was not reckless in fall- ing down in its duty.
While “the term recklessness is not self-defining,” the common law has generally understood it in this sphere of civil liability as conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing “an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.”
There being no indication that Congress had some- thing different in mind, we have no reason to deviate from the common law understanding in applying the statute. Thus, a company subject to the Act does not act in reckless disregard of it unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that
the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless. Here, there is no need to pinpoint the neg- ligence/recklessness line, for Safeco’s reading of the statute, albeit erroneous, was not objectively unreasonable.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that reckless disre- gard of a requirement of the Act would qualify as a willful vio- lation within the meaning of the Act. But there was no need for that court to remand the cases for factual development. Geico’s decision to issue no adverse action notice to Edo was not a violation of the Act, and Safeco’s misreading of the stat- ute was not reckless. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore reversed in both cases, which are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
KEY POINTS • The Court expands the interpretation of “willfulness” to include reckless disregard of the
notice requirements. This ensures that one cannot avoid the law’s penalties by acting out of complete ignorance.
• There must be a “but for” relationship between the use of the credit report and the adverse action. The failure to demonstrate GEICO changed its rate based on the report is why the company escaped liability.
• In assessing Safeco’s liability, the Court indicates that misunderstanding the law is differ- ent from reckless disregard.
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THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT The Truth-in-Lending Act authorized the Federal Reserve Board to adopt regulations “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to com- pare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.” That rule-making authority has now been assumed by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. As previously mentioned, the FTC enforces these regulations.
Truth-in-Lending Coverage The Truth-in-Lending Act covers all transactions in which (1) the lender is in the business of extending credit in connection with a loan of money, a sale of property, or the furnishing of services; (2) the debtor is a natural person, as distinguished from a corporation or business entity; (3) a finance charge may be imposed; and (4) the credit is obtained primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes. It covers loans secured by real estate, such as mortgages, as well as unsecured loans and loans secured by personal property. Dis- closure is necessary whenever a buyer pays in four installments or more.
Truth-in-Lending imposes a duty on all persons regularly extending credit to private individuals to inform them fully of the cost of the credit. It does not regulate the charges which are imposed.
Finance Charge and Annual Percentage Rate The Truth-in-Lending philosophy of full disclosure is accomplished through two concepts, namely, the finance charge and the annual percentage rate (APR). The borrower uses these two concepts to determine the amount he or she must pay for credit and what the annual cost of borrowing will be in relation to the amount of credit received. Theo- retically, a debtor armed with this information will be better able to bargain for credit and choose one creditor over the other.
The finance charge is the sum of all charges payable directly or indirectly by the debtor or someone else to the creditor as a condition of the extension of credit. Included in the finance charge are interest, service charges, loan fees, points, finder’s fees, fees for appraisals, credit reports or investigations, and life and health insurance required as a condition of the loan.
Among the costs frequently paid by debtors that are not included in the finance charge are recording fees and taxes, such as a sales tax, which are not usually included in the listed selling price. These are items of a fixed nature, the proceeds of which do not go to the creditor. Other items of cost not included are title insurance or abstract fees, notary fees, and attorney’s fees for preparing deeds.
The law requires that the lender disclose the finance charge, expressing it as an annual percentage rate, and specifies the methods for making this computation. The purpose is to ensure that all credit extenders calculate their charges in a uniform fashion. This enables consumers to make informed decisions about the cost of credit.
Financing Statement The finance charge and annual percentage rate are made known to borrowers by use of a financing statement. This statement must be given to the borrower before credit is extended and must contain, in addition to the finance charge and the annual percentage rate, the following information:
1. Any default or delinquency charges that may result from a late payment. 2. Description of any property used as security. 3. The total amount to be financed, including a separation of the original debt
from finance charges.
The finance charge is the total cost of the money to the consumer or farmer.
The financing statement is a disclosure docu- ment only. It does not regulate the interest charged.
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Penalties and Remedies under Truth-in-Lending There are both civil and criminal penalties for violation of Truth-in-Lending. The civil liability provisions make creditors liable to debtors for actual damages and an amount equal to twice the finance charge, within a statutorily defined range. Creditors may avoid liability in the event they make an error, provided they notify the debtor within 60 days after discovering the error and also correct the error. In this connection, the law allows for corrections in favor of the debtor only. Creditors cannot collect finance charges in excess of those actually disclosed.
The Truth-in-Lending Act gives debtors the right to rescind or cancel certain transactions for a period of three business days from the date of the transactions or from the date they are given the notice of their right to rescind, whichever is later. For example, consumers may generally cancel transactions in which they give a secu- rity interest on their principal residence if they do so within the three-day period. If the transaction is rescinded, the borrower has no liability for any finance charge, and the security which he or she has given is void. The act also allows consumer- borrowers to rescind their mortgage agreements altogether if lenders have failed to comply with important disclosure provisions. For an interesting application of this, see Sidebar 18.4.
Subprime mortgages refer to mortgages secur- ing loans for consumers who do not qualify for ordinary market rates of interest because of lack of credit worthi- ness. Generally, this means that their income is not high enough or certain enough to qualify under ordinary cir- cumstances. But during the 1990s and early 2000s, house prices nationally kept going up and up, and many banks and other financial institutions—encouraged by the government—became willing to loan money to con- sumers who ordinarily would not qualify for particular loans because rising house prices made the mortgage securities quite sound. If consumers became unable to pay monthly loan rates, they found it easy to renegotiate lower rates because of the soundness of the mortgages and the equity provided by rising house values.
When the housing bubble burst and, in many parts of the country, house values stopped rising, disaster struck the subprime market, which by 2007 was esti- mated to be at least $1.3 trillion. Many consumers became unable to pay back their loans, and lenders were unwilling to lower monthly repayments because house prices were no longer rising. Foreclosure filings zoomed. Consumers with adjustable rate mortgages
were hardest hit as interest rates began to rise and their monthly house payments did also. The economic effects began to ripple through the economy, which went into recession. Financial institutions collapsed, credit dried up, joblessness rose, and the government passed emergency legislation to bail out financial institutions to help them extend credit required by businesses. Some homeowners were also assisted to help them repay their mortgages.
Lawyers representing consumers with mortgages in foreclosure sometimes turned to the Truth-in-Lending Act and sued lenders who had not complied with all of the complicated provisions of the act, especially with provi- sions relating to how prominently various disclosures of key terms had to be made. In some instances, class-action lawsuits were filed. In other instances, consumers used the threat of lawsuits to pressure banks into renegotiating loan rates downward. Failure to comply with truth-in-lending requirements could even allow consumers to rescind (take back) their mortgage agreements, and cause lend- ers to lose their security altogether, making them only general creditors unlikely to be able to recover the debt for the large loans.
sidebar 18.4
Truth-in-Lending and the Subprime Mortgage Mess
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Truth-in-Lending Trends In 1980, Congress passed the Truth-in-Lending Sim- plification Act. Two changes from the original act stand out. First, the law elimi- nates statutory penalties based on purely technical violations of the act. It restricts such penalties to failures to disclose credit terms that are of material importance in credit comparisons. Second, the Simplification Act requires the government to issue model disclosure forms. These are now issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The disclosure forms are particularly important to small businesses that can- not afford legal counsel to help prepare such forms. Proper use of the forms proves compliance with the Simplification Act.
Studies conducted by the FTC show that many of those involved in credit exten- sion, such as home builders and realtors, fail to make required Truth-in-Lending disclosures in their advertising. In several instances, the FTC has successfully under- taken programs to educate these businesses about their disclosure obligations under Truth-in-Lending.
Debt Collection and Consumer Protection
In a consumer-credit-oriented economy, the collection of bad debts is very impor- tant. At present, there are thousands of collection agencies in the United States engaged in collecting unpaid accounts, judgments, and other bad debts. Thousands of attorneys also collect debts. Annually, creditors turn over bills totaling many bil- lions of dollars for collection. The following sections examine the federal laws of debt collection and consumer protection, which the FTC enforces.
THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT Due to complaints that some debt-collection agencies used techniques of harass- ment, deception, and personal abuse to collect debts, Congress in 1978 passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The act covers only consumer debt collections. It applies to agencies and individuals whose primary business is the col- lection of consumer debts for others. It also applies to the Internal Revenue Service and attorneys who collect consumer debts on behalf of their clients. Creditor collec- tion efforts are exempt from the act.
One of the first actions of a debt collector will usually be to locate the debtor. This action, known as “skip-tracing,” may require that the collector contact third parties who know of the debtor’s whereabouts. The FDCPA permits the collector to contact third parties, such as neighbors or employers, but it limits the way in which this contact may be carried out. The collector may not state that the consumer owes a debt nor contact any given third party more than once, except in very limited cir- cumstances. When the collector knows that an attorney represents the debtor, the collector may not contact any third parties, except the attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond to the collector’s communication.
Having located the debtor, the collector will next seek to get payment on the overdue account. However, the FDCPA restricts methods that can be used in the collection process. Table 18.4 outlines these restrictions.
FDCPA Remedies and Enforcement If the consumer debtor desires to stop the debt collector from repeatedly contacting him or her about payment, the debtor need only notify the collector in writing of this wish. Any further contact by
Small businesses may rely on model forms to avoid violating the Truth- in-Lending Act.
Federal regulators received 75,200 debt collection complaints in 2019, approximately 45% of which concerned attempts to collect debts not owed.
–CFBP, Fair Debt Col- lection Practices Act
Annual Report, March 2020.
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the collector following such notification violates the act. The collector’s sole remedy now is to sue the debtor. Violations of the FDCPA entitle the debtor to sue the debt collector for actual damages, including damages for invasion of privacy and inflic- tion of mental distress, plus court costs and attorney’s fees. In the absence of actual damages, the court may still order the collector to pay the debtor up to $1,000 for violations. Class-action suits, as well as individual ones, are permitted under the act. Note, however, that the debt collector can also recover costs if it prevails in the lawsuit. In Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013), the Supreme Court ruled that a district court may award the debt collector costs even if the debtor did not bring the case in bad faith.
State Laws Regulating Debt Collection Congress specified that the FDCPA does not preempt state laws regulating debt collections so long as they are more strict than FDCPA standards. Some of these laws apply to debt collections by creditors as well as by collection agencies.
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION ACT As part of the Dodd-Frank reforms, Congress passed the Consumer Financial Pro- tection Act. The act created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The CFPB has broad authority over federal financial consumer law. Its authority overlaps that of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in administering consumer laws such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Truth-in-Lending Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, along with several others. The CFPB can also make and enforce rules regulating unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices toward consumers.
The CFPB’s authority applies to any “covered person” offering or providing a consumer financial product or service and to any business associated with that per- son. It applies to banks and other financial businesses that extend credit or service loans, provide real estate settlement or appraisal services, take deposits, transmit funds, cash or guarantees checks, provide financial data processing services, provide consumer report information such as credit bureaus, and collect debts. The CFPB
Don’t forget that state debt collection laws may be stricter than the FDCPA and may apply to the creditor as well as to the debt collection agency.
The collector cannot: 1. Physically threaten the debtor. 2. Use obscene language. 3. Represent himself or herself as an attorney unless it is true. 4. Threaten debtor with arrest or garnishment unless the collector can legally take such
action and intends to do so. 5. Fail to disclose his or her identity as a collector. 6. Telephone before 8:00 a.m. or after 9:00 p.m. in most instances. 7. Telephone repeatedly with intent to annoy. 8. Place collect calls to the debtor. 9. Use any “unfair or unconscionable means” to collect the debt.
table 18.4 FDCPA’S Restrictions on Collection Methods of Collection Agencies
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does not apply to insurance companies, Internet service providers, real estate agents and brokers, lawyers, car dealers, or persons and businesses regulated by the Securi- ties and Exchange Commission.
BANKRUPTCY Federal agencies do not administer all consumer protection laws. For instance, the bankruptcy laws are not subject to regulatory enforcement at all. These laws estab- lish a procedure by which the “honest debtor” can get rid of debts by having them “discharged.” The bankruptcy laws are not subject to regulatory interpretation and depend upon assertion by private debtors, both in their capacity as consumers and in business. However, as discussed here, the bankruptcy laws help explain one important consumer protection outcome of our consumer credit society: inability to repay debts.
Bankruptcy Proceedings Bankruptcy proceedings begin upon the filing of either a voluntary or involuntary petition to the court. A voluntary petition is one filed by the debtor; an involuntary petition is filed by one or more creditors of the debtor. The creditors who sign the involuntary petition must be owed at least $16,750 (adjusted periodically). If the court finds in an involuntary proceeding that the debtor is on the table to pay his or her debts as they mature, the court will order relief against the debtor. Relief may be also ordered if someone has been appointed to control the debtor’s property for the purpose of satisfying a judgment or other lien.
Two alternatives are possible in a bankruptcy proceeding against an individual. The individual’s property either will be liquidated under Chapter 7 of the bank- ruptcy law and the debts discharged, or the debts will be adjusted under Chapter 13. Under Chapter 13, individuals who have secured debts (mortgages, security interests against personal property, and so on) of less than $1,257,850 and unsecured debts of less than $419,275 (these amounts change periodically) can have their debts adjusted by the court for repayment. Time periods for repayment are also adjusted, and the debtor repays the creditors the adjusted debts over a three- to five-year period.
Congress amended the bankruptcy law in 2005 to force above median income earners to repay their adjusted debts under Chapter 13 rather than have them liqui- dated under Chapter 7. When this happened, bankruptcy filings, which had risen to more than 2 million in 2005, dropped to 827,000 in 2006 but were back to more than 1 million in 2007.
Trustee in Bankruptcy The trustee in bankruptcy is an important person in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trustee is someone elected by the creditors to represent the debtor’s estate in taking possession of and liquidating (selling off) the debtor’s property. Broad powers are granted to the trustee. The trustee can (1) affirm or disaf- firm contracts with the debtor which are yet to be performed; (2) set aside fraudulent conveyances, that is, transfers of the debtor’s property for inadequate consideration or for the purpose of defrauding creditors; (3) void certain transfers of property by the debtor to creditors which prefer some creditors over others; (4) sue those who owe the debtor some obligation; and (5) set aside statutory liens against the debtor’s property which take effect upon the beginning of bankruptcy proceedings.
Creditor Priority Under bankruptcy laws, certain creditors receive priority over others in the distribution of a debtor’s assets. The law divides creditors into priority classes, as set forth in Table 18.5. The amounts owing to each creditor class
Consumers sometimes get credit that they cannot repay, and con- sequently, they end up going bankrupt.
Do make sure you know the difference between liquidation under Chapter 7 and adjustment of debts under Chapter 13.
The trustee may void gifts and other transfers of assets made for inad- equate consideration by a bankruptcy that diminishes the assets the creditors can claim against.
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must be satisfied fully before the next lower class of priority can receive anything. Note that secured creditors who hold mortgages or Article 9 security interests in the debtor’s property usually have priority over the bankruptcy creditor classes.
Discharge From the debtor’s point of view, the purpose of bankruptcy is to secure a discharge of further obligation to the creditor. Certain debts, however, cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. They include those arising from taxes, alimony and child support, intentional torts (including fraud), breach of fiduciary duty, liabilities arising from drunken driving, government fines, and debts not submitted to the trustee because the creditor has lacked knowledge of the proceedings. Education loans which become due within five years of the filing of the bankruptcy petition are also nondischargeable.
In addition to having certain debts denied discharge, the debtor may fail to receive a discharge from any of his or her debts if the courts find that the debtor has concealed property, falsified or concealed books of record, refused to obey court orders, failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets, or been discharged in bankruptcy within the prior six years. Courts may deny this discharge of debts alto- gether when relief would amount to a “substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy process, meaning usually that the consumer will have the income in the next several years to repay the debts owed.
ADDITIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION Additional statutes protect consumers. This section mentions some of the key laws not otherwise covered by this chapter. They are enforced by the Federal Trade Com- mission or other regulatory agencies, and many give consumers private remedies and rights of enforcement. What follows are just brief summaries of key consumer protection provisions.
Courts may deny bank- ruptcy discharge when they believe the debtor will be able to pay off the debt in the next few years, often because the debtor has a good job.
1. Spouse, former spouse, child, or guardian with claims for domestic support 2. Creditors with claims that arise from the costs of preserving and administering the
debtor’s estate (such as the fee of an accountant who performs as audit of the debtor’s books for the trustee)
3. Creditors with claims that occur in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business after a bankruptcy petition has been filed
4. Employees who are owed wages earned within 180 days of the bankruptcy petition (limited to a particular statutory amount per employee)
5. Employee benefit plans that require contributions based on services rendered within 180 days of the bankruptcy petition (limited to a particular statutory amount per employee)
6. Grain producers or fishermen who have supplied goods 7. Consumers who have paid deposits or prepayments for undelivered goods or
services (limited to a particular statutory amount per consumer) 8. Government (for tax claims) 9. Federal depository institution regulatory agency (such as the FDIC) for
commitments to maintain capital 10. One who is injured from a motor vehicle operated by the debtor while intoxicated
table 18.5 Priority of Bankruptcy Creditors
Source: 11 U.S.C. 507.
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• Fair Credit Billing Act—administered by the Federal Trade Commission, this act limits liability on lost, stolen, or misused credit cards to $50. Establishes rules for resolving billing disputes with the credit card issuer. Enables consumers who follow certain procedures to assert any defense against the credit card issuer that could have been asserted against a merchant who has sold shoddy merchandise, given bad service, or failed to perform as promised. Basically, the act allows consumers to require credit card issuers to recredit accounts in such a situation. Applies only to amounts over $50 within the consumer’s home state or within 100 mile radius of the consumer’s home.
• Electronic Fund Transfer Act—administered by the Consumer Financial Protec- tion Bureau, this act limits liability on lost, stolen, or misused automatic teller and check cards (debit cards) to $50 if reported within two business days of consumers’ learning of a misuse. After two business days, consumers responsi- bility is up to $500, except that after 60 days without reporting, responsibility becomes unlimited. The act also establishes procedures that banks and other financial institutions must follow when consumers dispute amounts billed by the bank.
• Consumer Product Safety Act—administered by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. The act requires the commission to protect consumers against “unreasonable risk” of harm and applies to thousands of consumer products. The commission protects consumers against unreasonable risk of injury by developing mandatory and voluntary standards, banning harmful consumer products, issu- ing recalls of products, and researching potential product hazards. The law was amended in 2008 by the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act and updated again in 2011 to provide the CPSC with new regulatory and enforcement tools.
• Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act—administered by the Federal Trade Commission. Applies to all product warranties on consumer products costing more than $15. These warranties must be identified as “full” or “limited.” Under full warran- ties a warrantor must repair or replace a defective product within a reasonable time and at no charge, including no shipping costs. Implied warranties may not be limited in full warranties, and other limitations must be disclosed fully and conspicuously in readily understood language. All other warranties must be described as “limited warranties,” and their limitations must also be described conspicuously and in plain English. Failure to comply with the act enables con- sumers to sue for damages and reasonable attorney fees.
• Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act—administered by the Food and Drug Administration, this act and the rules established under it by the FDA establish that prescription drugs must be proven effective and safe by extensive testing before they can be sold. Medical devices are likewise regulated. The act also empowers the FDA to protect consumers against unsafe and adulterated foods.
• Various labeling laws—administered by various federal and state agencies, these laws require informative labels and warnings to be given on various products. Some labels identify the country of clothing manufacture. Other labels specify nutritional amounts for packaged foods. Still other labels, like the surgeon gen- eral’s warning on cigarette packages, disclose potential dangers of products.
• State consumer protection—administered by the states, consumer protection agen- cies similar to the Federal Trade Commission exist in many states. The states also have other consumer protection laws ranging from the application of war- ranties under state commercial codes to various antifraud statutes.
The Fair Credit Billing Act applies to credit cards. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act applies to automatic teller machine transac- tions and point-of-pur- chase debit transactions. Note the greater amount that the consumer can be responsible for under the latter act.
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Key Terms Adjusted 576 Advisory opinion 553 Annual percentage rate
(APR) 572 Bankruptcy 576 California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) 561 Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA) 560 Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) 575 Corrective advertising 554
Data Protection Directive 562 Discharge 577 Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) 560 Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) 575 Finance charge 572 General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) 562 Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 559
Industry guide 553 Investigative consumer report 569 Lanham Act of 1946 565 Liquidated 576 Redlining 568 Respondent 553 Section 5 553 Stored Communications Act
(SCA) 560 Subprime mortgage 573 Trade practice regulation 552 Trustee 576
Review Questions and Problems The Federal Trade Commission 1. The FTC and Trade Practice Regulation
(a) Explain the difference between a cease and desist order and a consent order. Which type of order is used most frequently at the FTC for consumer protection? Why do you suppose this type of order is most often used?
(b) What is a trade regulation rule? 2. FTC Penalties and Remedies
A certain company sells dietary supplements made from “green coffee bean extract” with claims that consumers could lose 17 pounds and 16 percent of their body fat in only 12 weeks. There is no evidence to back up these claims. What potential penalty could the company face?
3. Politics, Economics, and the Law Discuss the current political climate for consumer protection regulation in the United States. Do you believe that regulators will be more or less aggressive in enforcement in the near future?
Privacy 4. Limitations on Government Intrusions
Explain how the U.S. Constitution limits government privacy intrusions. Why is this not an effective limitation on private businesses?
5. Traditional Business Privacy If a grocery store records video of a customer as he shops for cereal, will that customer have a case based on intrusion on seclusion?
6. Electronic and Online Privacy (a) BigCo records all of the phone calls its employees make on BigCo’s land-line phones. Is BigCo liable
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act? (b) An online backpack store sells many products that are popular with elementary school children. The
store knows some children under 10 subscribe to the store’s coupon service. Is the store subject to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act?
(c) Should what people say and do on their smartphones be protected by a legal fence, or should these activities be freely available to businesses wishing to use the information they provide for marketing purposes?
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7. International Privacy Protection Imagine a firm sells products to a consumer in the European Union. The firm col- lects and retains personal information about the purchase, as well as the identify of the purchaser. What restrictions does the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) impose?
False Advertising 8. The Mosquito No Company claims that its electronic mosquito device will “eliminate
all mosquito problems within a one-half acre area.” Actually, the device will only work if there is no standing water on the half acre. Explain how the FTC will evaluate this advertising for deception.
9. Pom Wonderful claims that Coca-Cola engages in false advertising by selling a “pomegranate-blueberry juice blend” that in fact contains only 0.3% pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice. Discuss Coca-Cola’s liability under the Lanham Act.
Federal Credit Regulations 10. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Jane Thomas applies for automobile financing at Kenwood Cars Inc., a used- car dealership. The dealership obtains a credit report on her. On the basis of this report, the dealership denies her credit. The manager informs her that she will have to get her husband to cosign her application if she wants dealership financing. She refuses, and sues Kenwood under the ECOA. What was the result and why?
11. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (a) The ABC department store refuses credit to Mary Jane. Mary Jane has a good
job and no debts. She cannot understand the refusal. What would you suggest Mary Jane do? Explain.
(b) What is a credit freeze under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act?
12. The Truth-in-Lending Act Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, what is a finance charge? What charges are and are not included as finance charges?
Debt Collection and Consumer Protection 13. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The Zenith Credit Bureau telephones Dan and his family almost daily about pay- ment of a $3,500 debt. The phone calls are causing stress for Dan’s family. Dan cannot afford to pay the debt at present, and he needs a listed telephone num- ber for his business. Is there anything Dan can do legally to stop the calls from Zenith?
14. Consumer Financial Protection Act Why do you think Congress passed the Consumer Financial Protection Act when the FTC already had authority to regulate many acts over which the CFPB also has authority?
15. Bankruptcy Discuss the concept of “discharge” as used in bankruptcy law. What types of debts are not dischargeable? Explain.
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The regulation of deceptive trade practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the dis- closures required by the Truth-in-Lending Act, and the provisions of many other con- sumer protection laws are aimed at helping consumers. They do so by preventing business activities that might also violate what common law and statutory tort found in Chapter 10? Explain.
business discussions
16. Additional Consumer Protection Janet buys a year’s membership in a new spa and exercise gym that has just opened. She pays $500 with her credit card. Less than one month later the busi- ness closes its doors, leaving 450 members without a place to work out. The owner, who has vanished, also failed to pay his employees, rent on the build- ing, and payments on his leased equipment. Everyone suspects fraud. Accord- ing to consumer protection laws, what recourse might Janet have under the circumstances?
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Learning Objectives In this chapter, you will learn:
19-1 To analyze how the government itself regulates its own impact on the environment at both the federal and state levels.
19-2 To understand the laws regulating business uses that have an impact on our shared resources of air and water.
19-3 To explain how public and private laws are used to address harmful sub- stances and the damage to the environment caused by them
19-4 To evaluate why environmental sustainability will be one of the most impor- tant challenges and opportunities for business during the 21st century.
Environmental Regulation and Resource Sustainability19
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M uch economic activity causes pollu-
tion. This chapter introduces you to the
boundaries that the law creates to regu-
late the environmental pollution created in modern
business life.
Private property is the most productive system
known for producing the goods and services people
want and need. When people have the exclusive use
of their resources for productive purposes, it maxi-
mizes the wealth of nations, but it can also cause
harmful pollution. It can harm public resources like
the nation’s air and water and the private resources of
individual health and well-being. It’s difficult to have
environmental laws that balance commercial produc-
tion of goods and services with harmful effects to air,
water, and human health.
Common law litigation works well in resolv-
ing disputes and awarding compensation in cases
involving individuals and their problems with each
other. Judges and courts, however, do not work as
Environmental Regulation and Resource Sustainability
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584 PART 3 The Regulatory Landscape for Business
effectively when problems involve immensely complex technical issues of environ- mental pollution that may affect others over great distances and long periods of time and arise both from business activity and government action. The rules that set the boundaries for what and how much it is proper to pollute do not come from the com- mon law. They come from legislated public policy and the legal authority of large federal and state regulatory agencies. The implementation of environmental law is highly political, and as unemployment and economic woes complicate the expense of pollution regulation, the politics become more heated. For example, as of July 15, 2020, President Trump had “reversed, revoked or otherwise rolled back” 100 envi- ronmental regulations. Source: “The Trump Administration is Reversing 100 Envi- ronmental Rules. Here is the Full List,” New York Times, July 15, 2020.
As you read this chapter, keep in mind the wide discretion that regulators have to act or not to act in regulating environmental pollution. It is inevitable that politics become involved in environmental law.
Environmental and pollution-control laws govern regulation on three levels:
• Government’s regulation of itself • Government’s regulation of business • Suits by private individuals
Sidebar 19.1 illustrates this breakdown.
GOVERNMENT’S REGULATION OF ITSELF National Environmental Policy Act State environmental policy acts
GOVERNMENT’S REGULATION OF BUSINESS Clean Air Act Clean Water Act Pesticide Control Acts Solid Waste Disposal Act
Toxic Substances Control Act Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Other federal, state, and local statutes
SUITS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS Citizen enforcement provisions of various statutes Public and private nuisance Trespass Negligence Strict liability for ultrahazardous activity
sidebar 19.1
Categories of Environmental and Pollution-Control Laws
This chapter examines environmental and pollution-control laws by looking first at federal environmental policy and then at specific laws aimed at reducing specific kinds of pollution. The emphasis is on the compliance these laws force on business and industry. The final sections of this chapter look at the rights and liabilities of private individuals under environmental law and the challenge of environmental sustainability.
Administering environmental laws at the federal level is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Because many of the laws provide for joint federal–state enforcement, the states also have strong environmental agencies. Policies are set at the federal level, and the states devise plans to implement them. States, and even local governments, also enforce their own laws that affect the environment and con- trol pollution.
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Government’s Regulation of Itself
The modern environmental movement began in the 1960s. As it gained momentum, it generated political pressure that forced government to reassess its role in environ- mental issues.
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT The way the government considers the environmental impact of its decision making greatly interests the business community. For instance, the federal government pays private enterprise almost $100 billion annually to conduct studies, prepare reports, and carry out projects. In addition, the federal government is by far the nation’s largest landholder, controlling one-third of the entire area of the United States. Pri- vate enterprise must rely on governmental agencies to issue permits and licenses to explore and mine for minerals, graze cattle, cut timber, or conduct other business activities on government property. Thus, any congressional legislation that influ- ences the decision making concerning federal funding or license granting also affects business. Such legislation is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
NEPA Basics NEPA took effect in 1970. It establishes a “national policy [to] encourage productive and enjoyable harmony” with nature and promotes “the under- standing of the ecological systems and natural resources” important to the United States. It imposes specific “action forcing” requirements on federal agencies. The most important requirement demands that all federal agencies prepare an environ- mental impact statement (EIS) prior to taking certain actions. An EIS must be included “in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” This EIS is a “detailed statement” that estimates the environmental impact of the proposed action. Any discussion of such action and its impact must contain informa- tion on adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided, any irreversible use of resources necessary, and available alternatives to the action (see Figure 19.1).
Several regulatory guidelines have made the EIS more useful. One guideline directs federal agencies to engage in scoping. Scoping requires that even before preparing an EIS, agencies must designate which environmental issues of a con- templated action are most significant. It encourages impact statements to focus on
LO 19-1
Figure 19.1 Components of the environmental impact statement.
Major action Federal action
Human environment Detailed statement
Requirements Examines Adverse environmental effects
Irreversible commitment of resources
Alternatives to proposed action
Environmental Impact Statement
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586 PART 3 The Regulatory Landscape for Business
more substantial environmental concerns and reduce the attention devoted to trivial issues. It also allows other agencies and interested parties to participate in the scop- ing process. Scoping helps ensure that formal impact statements will address matters regarded as most important.
Another guideline directs that EISs be “clear, to the point, and written in plain English.” This requirement deters the use of technical jargon and helps those read- ing impact statements to understand them. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has also limited the length of impact statements, which once ran to more than 1,000 pages, to 150 pages, except in unusual circumstances.
EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS Importantly, NEPA does not require that federal agencies follow the conclusions of an EIS. However, as a practical political matter, agencies are not likely to proceed with a project when an EIS concludes that the environmental costs outweigh the benefits. EISs have been responsible for the abandonment or delay of many federal projects.
Some critics point out that the present process fails to consider the economic injury caused by abandoning or delaying projects. They also contend that those pre- paring EISs are forced to consider far too many alternatives to proposed federal action without regard to their economic reasonableness. Other critics maintain that most impact statements are too descriptive and not sufficiently analytical. They fear that the EIS is “a document of compliance rather than a decision-making tool.” A final general criticism of the EIS process notes the limits of its usefulness. As follow- ups on some EISs have shown, environmental factors are often so complex that projections concerning environmental effects amount to little more than guesswork.
In Case 19.1, note the complexity of the scientific issues and consider whether it would have been possible for the judge to come to the opposite conclusion than he did and to require additional information in the EIS. Such is often the situation in NEPA cases.
In Department of Trans- portation v. Public Citi- zen, the Supreme Court upheld a CEQ regulation permitting agencies to prepare an environmen- tal assessment (EA) that is less detailed than an EIS when it is not clear that the law requires an EIS. 124 S. Ct. 2204 (2004)
case 19.1
SIERRA FOREST LEGACY v. SHERMAN 646 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)*
The Sierra Forest Legacy and other plaintiffs challenged the National Forest Service’s plan for allowing additional timber- ing activities in the Sierra Nevada Forest, claiming that the environmental impact statement under NEPA was inadequate. The federal district court upheld the Forest Service’s plan, and the plaintiffs appealed to the federal court of appeals.
FISHER, Circuit Judge: . . . The National Environmental Policy Act is “our basic national charter for protection of
the environment.” NEPA requires that all agencies of the Federal Government shall include in every recommenda- tion or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the respon- sible official on (1) the environmental impact of the pro- posed action, (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (3) alternatives to the proposed action, (4) the relationship
Joe Marquette/AP Images
*SIERRA FOREST LEGACY v. SHERMAN 646 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2011).
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between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productiv- ity, and (5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Agencies must also “study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts con- cerning alternative uses of available resources.” When an agency produces an environmental impact statement (EIS), it must “provide full and fair discussion of significant envi- ronmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.”
“NEPA . . . does not impose any substantive require- ments on federal agencies—it ‘exists to ensure a process.’” So long as “the adverse environmental effects of the pro- posed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.”*
The Sierra Forest Legacy and other plaintiffs argue that the Forest Service violated NEPA when approving the 2004 Plan by failing to disclose and to respond to the views of experts opposed to intensified management. “In prepar- ing the final EIS, the agency must discuss at appropriate points . . . any responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the draft statement and [must] indicate the agency’s response to the issue raised.” . . . The mere presence of expert disagreement does not violate NEPA because “experts in every scientific field routinely disagree.” NEPA also does not require an agency to publish “every comment . . . in the final EIS. Nor must an agency set forth at full length the views with which it disagrees.”
Sierra Forest and others presented an array of experts who submitted comments to the 2004 draft EIS. As a gen- eral matter, the final SEIS incorporates a science consis- tency review that raises conflicting perspectives. It also acknowledges and responds to general critiques concerning the use of science. Plaintiffs’ experts’ more specific criti- cisms can be broken down into five categories.
Most critiques concerned the California spotted owl. The final EIS, however, expressed uncertainty concerning California spotted owl analysis, noted submission of con- cerns “about the reliability of habitat projections” for the California spotted owl and disclosed “conflicting science about the effects of canopy cover reductions from fuel treatments.” Most importantly, the EIS dedicates nearly 12 pages to airing concerns about California spotted owl man- agement and providing agency responses.
Second, the experts expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty inherent in long-term modeling. The final EIS acknowledges that “concerns have been expressed about
the reliability of habitat projections used in this analysis and the deterministic nature of the models underlying those projections” but explains the importance and inher- ent flaws of modeling. The SEIS also includes modeling appendices, which describe modeling assumptions and “sensitivity analysis to address questions about uncertainty in modeling outcomes.” Moreover, the Regional Forester acknowledged the validity of some critiques and chose not to rely on 120-year projections when deciding to adopt the 2004 Framework.
Third, the experts argued that the 2004 Framework will lead to further decline of fisher and marten popula- tions. The final EIS acknowledges uncertainty concerning marten and fisher habitat use and the effect of manage- ment on persistence in the Sierra Nevada. It also recog- nizes that concerns have been expressed “that treatments . . . may increase fragmentation and create barriers to fisher movement,” that reductions to canopy that will harm fisher habitat and about “effects . . . on marten in eastside pine habitats.” The EIS also airs and responds to three pages of additional concerns regarding fisher and marten management.
Fourth, the experts raised concerns regarding meadow species, such as the willow flycatcher and Yosemite toad. The final EIS acknowledges uncertainty concerning the effects of grazing on these species and accepts one of the willow flycatcher working group’s suggestions concerning development of a conservation strategy. More importantly, the SEIS raises and addresses a host of public concerns regarding both meadow species in the volume dedicated to responding to public comments.
Fifth, the experts critique the fire ecology under-pin- ning the core management analysis. The final EIS notes uncertainty “whether unaltered wildfires would have a greater or lesser impact . . . on ecosystem integrity and habitat” compared to fires in treated areas. Again, the EIS acknowledges and responds to a substantial number of crit- ics addressing fire and fuels management, including cri- tiques of the scope and methods of treatment.
The plaintiffs specifically argue that “the agency did not bring attention to . . . critical expert comments but rather mixed them into the stack of all public comments . . . .” Similarly, they contend that the “SEIS does not dis- close that these ‘other’ viewpoints were expressed by the country’s leading spotted owl experts, including the retired Forest Service owl expert . . . and the agency’s own wildlife office.” However, NEPA does not require that a final EIS prioritize the concern of scientific experts or disclose their identities among public critiques. The practical concerns of individual landholders or hikers may be just as important— and just as trenchant—as the formal submissions of aca- demic experts. So long as an EIS addresses the substance of public comments, it need not single out the authors.
[continued]
*42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370h (NEPA).
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In sum, the EIS dedicates over 120 pages to raising and meaningfully responding to public critiques. That is all NEPA requires. The plaintiffs do not argue that the Forest Service’s decision not to adopt critiques was arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. Therefore, the Forest Service
did not violate NEPA by failing to disclose conflicting sci- entific opinion.
Affirmed.
KEY POINTS • NEPA requires agencies to carefully consider environmental impact and, in that way,
requires a process but does not determine the decisions. • NEPA does not require agencies to prioritize scientific experts or give special consider-
ation to particular experts. • The EIS included a thorough review of project critiques and responded to them adequately.
It met the standard imposed by NEPA.
[continued]
Although the NEPA applies only to federal actions, many states have enacted similar legislation to assist their decision making. Many interpretive problems found on the national level are also encountered at the state level. In addition, because the states frequently lack the resources and expertise of the federal government, state EISs are often even less helpful in evaluating complex environmental factors than are those prepared by federal agencies.
NEPA Trends Currently, NEPA is being applied to some of the most significant issues of the day. For instance, those who object to the building of a fence between the United States and Mexico have called for environmental impact statements because of the effect of the fence on wildlife and other environmental aspects. The director of Homeland Security has exercised authority to create exceptions to the NEPA requirement for the fence building.
In January 2020, President Trump announced a proposed rule that significantly scales back NEPA. The proposal creates deadlines for completing EISs for projects and expands the number of projects excluded from NEPA reviews altogether. Signifi- cantly, the new proposal would eliminate “cumulative” environmental effects from the factors agencies must consider. Agencies have used the cumulative analysis to incorporate considerations of climate change into their project reviews. Under the new proposal environmental effects must be “reasonably foreseeable” and have a direct, causal relationship to the project.
NEPA has been a powerful tool for administrative agency action concerning environmental concerns. Whether it remains as effective in the future is uncertain.
Government’s Regulation of Business
In the past 25 years, the federal government has enacted a series of laws regulating the impact of private enterprise on the environment. More and more companies are hir- ing environmental managers to deal with environmental compliance issues. This trend reflects the continuing importance of government regulation in this area. Sustainability
Don’t forget that many states have laws similar to NEPA that require environmental impact statements.
LO 19-2
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is a focus for many companies because customers demand environmental responsibility. As the CEO of a large chemical company observed about environmental concern, “Sometimes you find that the public has spoken, and you get on with it.”
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY One of the first steps taken at the federal level in response to concerns about the environment was the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. At the federal level, the EPA coordinates public control of private action as it affects the environment.
Today, the EPA is a large agency with a number of major responsibilities (see Sidebar 19.2). Most important, it administers federal laws that concern pollution of the air and water, solid waste and toxic substance disposal, pesticide regulation, and radiation. The following sections examine these laws.
• Conducts research on the harmful impact of pollution. • Gathers information about present pollution problems. • Assists states and local governments in controlling pollu-
tion through grants, technical advice, and other means.
• Advises the CEQ about new policies needed for protection of the environment.
• Administers federal pollution laws.
sidebar 19.2
Responsibilities of the EPA
AIR POLLUTION In 1257, Queen Eleanor of England was driven from Nottingham Castle because of harsh smoke from the numerous coal fires in London. Coal had come into widespread use in England during this time, following the cutting of forests for fuel and agricul- tural purposes. By 1307, a royal order prohibited coal burning in London’s kilns under punishment of “grievous ransoms.” This early attempt at controlling air pollution does not appear, however, to have been very effective. As recently as the London smog of 1952, 4,000 people died of air pollution-related causes, including coal smoke.
In the United States, the key federal legislation for controlling air pollution is the Clean Air Act.
Clean Air Act and Amendments The Clean Air Act directs the EPA admin- istrator to establish air quality standards and to see that these standards are achieved according to a definite timetable. The administrator has set primary and secondary air quality standards for particulates, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen diox- ide, hydrocarbons, and lead. Primary air quality standards are those necessary to protect public health. Secondary air quality standards guard the public from other adverse air pollution effects such as injury to property, vegetation, and climate and damage to aesthetic values. In most instances, primary and secondary air quality standards are identical.
Government regulation of private action under the Clean Air Act is a joint fed- eral and state effort. The EPA sets national ambient (outside) air quality standards,
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590 PART 3 The Regulatory Landscape for Business
and the states devise implementation plans, which the EPA must approve, to carry them out. The states thus bear principal responsibility for enforcing the Clean Air Act, with the EPA providing standard setting, coordinating, and supervisory func- tions. However, the EPA may also participate in enforcement. The administrator can require the operator of any air pollution source to keep such records and perform such monitoring or sampling as the EPA thinks appropriate. In addition, the EPA has the right to inspect these records and data. Various criminal and civil penalties and fines back up the Clean Air Act. In addition, industries that do not obey cleanup orders face payment to the EPA; payment amounts to the economic savings they realize from their failure to install and operate proper antipollution equipment.
In setting air quality standards, does the EPA have to consider the costs to busi- ness? In Whitman v. American Trucking, the Supreme Court ruled that the Clean Air Act “unambiguously bars cost considerations” from the air quality standards-setting process.
In 1990, Congress passed significant amendments to the Clean Air Act. These amendments have added billions of dollars annually to the cost of complying with environmental regulations. In cities that did not meet clean air standards, businesses were required to install new pollution control equipment, and tail-pipe emissions for cars and trucks were reduced. A pilot program in California has introduced alterna- tive fuel cars, and cleaner gasoline blends are now sold in specific cities with the worst pollution problems.
Because many cities currently do not meet existing Clean Air Act standards, the amendments force businesses in these areas to install new pollution-control equipment to cut emissions. Tailpipe emissions for cars and trucks must be reduced, and compa- nies must phase in alternative fuel vehicles for their fleets of vehicles. A pilot program for California will introduce up to 300,000 alternative fuel cars. The amendments also required sale of cleaner gasoline blends in cities with the worst pollution problems. The goal of all these requirements is to cut pollution by three percent per year until air quality standards are met. The states have prepared blueprints for meeting these goals.
Expressing concern about airborne toxic chemicals, the 1990 amendments require industry to use the “best available technology” on plants to reduce emissions of 189 toxics by 90 percent. Significantly, the plants covered include bakeries and dry cleaning businesses as well as chemical companies. The EPA must also study how to reduce toxic emissions from vehicles and fuels.
Clean Air Act Enforcement Civil and criminal penalties enforce the Clean Air Act. Criminal sanctions include fines of individuals up to $250,000 and up to 15 years’ imprisonment. Corporations can be fined up to $1 million for knowingly endangering people with emissions and up to $500,000 per incident of negligent emissions. Civil settlements between the EPA and businesses are very common.
Air Pollution Sources For control purposes, the Clean Air Act amendments divide air pollution sources into two categories: stationary source and mobile source (transportation). Under the state implementation plans, major stationary polluters, such as steel mills and utilities, must reduce their emissions to a level sufficient to bring down air pollution to meet primary and secondary standards. Polluters must fol- low timetables and schedules in complying with these requirements. To achieve desig- nated standards, they must install a variety of control devices, including wet collectors (scrubbers), filter collectors, tall stacks, electrostatic precipitators, and afterburners. New stationary pollution sources, or modified ones, must install the best system of emission reduction that has been adequately demonstrated. Under the act’s provision, citizens are granted standing to enforce compliance with these standards.
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set air quality standards without regard to their costs to business.
“Acid rain” is seldom front-page news anymore because of the Clean Air Act’s success in controlling sulfur dioxide emissions.
In 2016, Volkswagen agreed to spend up to $14.7 billion to settle claims for cheating emis- sions tests and deceiv- ing customers.
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The act requires both stationary and mobile sources to meet a timetable of air pollution standards for which control technology may not exist at the time. This technology-forcing aspect of the act is unique to the history of governmental regula- tion of business, yet it has been upheld by the Supreme Court. In large part due to technology forcing, new automobiles today emit less than one percent as much pol- lution per mile as cars of 25 years ago.
Technology forcing does not always succeed. It is neither always possible nor always feasible to force new technological developments. In recognizing this fact, the Clean Air Act allows the EPA in many instances to grant compliance waivers and variances from its standards.
CLEAN AIR ACT TODAY As originally implemented, the Clean Air Act did not try to promote efficient pollu- tion. For instance, if an area’s air could tolerate a million tons of pollution per year, the authorities made no attempt to identify those who could make the best produc- tive use of air pollution. Likewise, when a business was permitted to pollute a certain annual amount, the act specified the allowable pollution from each smokestack or other polluting source within the business instead of letting the business arrange its total allowable pollution in the most efficient way.
In the past few years, the EPA has moved to make its regulatory practices more economically efficient. All new pollution-control rules are now subjected to cost- benefit analysis. The EPA has also developed specific policies to achieve air pollu- tion control in an economically efficient manner.
Traditionally, the EPA has regulated each individual pollution emission point source (such as a smokestack) within an industrial plant or complex. Increasingly, how- ever, the EPA is encouraging the states, through their implementation plans, to adopt an approach called the bubble concept. Under the bubble concept, each plant complex is treated as if it were encased in a bubble. Instead of each pollution point source being licensed for a limited amount of pollution emission, the pollution of the plant com- plex as a whole is the focus of regulation. Businesses may suggest their own plans for cleaning up multiple sources of pollution within the entire complex as long as the total pollution emitted does not exceed certain limits. This approach permits flexibility in curtailing pollution and provides businesses with economic incentives to discover new methods of control. The Supreme Court has upheld the EPA’s authority to approve the bubble concept even in states where pollution exceeds air quality standards.
Emissions Reduction Banking A number of states have developed EPA- approved plans for emissions reduction banking. Under such plans, businesses can cut pollution beyond what the law requires and “bank” these reductions for their own future use or to sell to other companies as emission offsets. Eventually, we may be headed for a marketable rights approach to pollution control, under which the right to discharge a certain pollutant would be auctioned off to the highest bidder. This approach would promote efficiency by offering to those who have the great- est need for pollution rights the opportunity to obtain them by bidding highest for them. Under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, Congress specifically allows util- ity companies to engage in emissions reduction banking and trading. Since 1992, the Chicago Board of Trade has run an auction in pollution credits given by the EPA to the nation’s 110 most polluting utility plants.
According to the EPA, emissions trading accounts significantly for the fact that electric utilities today emit a quarter fewer tons of sulfur dioxide than they did in
The bubble concept, emissions reduction, banking, and cap and trade all give incentives to businesses to limit emissions, rather than relying on “command and control,” that is, on rules simply requiring attainment of air quality standards.
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1980 while producing 41 percent more electricity. The General Accounting Office figures that emissions trading saves the utility industry $3 billion a year over previ- ous pollution-enforcement approaches. The EPA estimates that for every $1 billion of sulfur dioxide reduction there is a $50 billion saving in health costs.
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Another important policy of the Clean Air Act is the prevention of significant deterioration. Under this policy, pollution emission is controlled, even in areas where the air is cleaner than prevail- ing primary and secondary air quality standards require. In some of these areas, the EPA permits construction of new pollution emission sources according to a strictly limited scheme. In other areas, it allows no new pollution emission at all. Critics of this policy argue that it prevents industry from moving into southern and western states, where air quality is cleaner than standards require.
The Permitting Process One of the most controversial issues involving the Clean Air Act concerns the delay and red tape caused by the permitting process. Before a business can construct new pollution emission sources, it must obtain the necessary environmental permits from the appropriate state agency. Today, the esti- mated time needed to acquire the necessary permits to build a coal-fired electric- generating plant is five to ten years. This is nearly twice the length of time it took in the early 1970s. The formalities of the permitting process, the lack of flexibility in state implementation plans, and the requirement that even minor variations in state imple- mentation plans be approved by the EPA—all these factors contribute to delay. Both the EPA and Congress are considering ways to streamline the permitting process.
The EPA is experimenting with allowing states to issue “smart permits” to air polluters. Under these permits, polluters can engage in “a family of alternative operating scenarios” (i.e., engage in new operations) without the expensive delay of obtaining new permits as the EPA previously required. Some environmental groups oppose smart permitting as failing to allow communities a time period to determine if new operations really meet clean air standards.
Indoor Pollution The EPA has also grown increasingly concerned about indoor air pollution. Paints, cleaning products, furniture polishes, gas furnaces, and stoves all emit pollutants that can be harmful to human health. Radioactive radon seep- ing into homes and buildings from the ground has now been recognized as a major health hazard. Some studies have found that indoor levels of certain pollutants far exceed outdoor levels, whether at work or at home. Although the Clean Air Act does not currently apply to indoor pollution, its application may be extended in the future.
Significantly, the EPA does not regulate indoor air pollution under the Clean Air Act, although OSHA could regulate it as to the workplace. Numerous major businesses already ban workplace smoking. Many local governments also regulate or prohibit indoor smoking in public buildings.
Conclusion In spite of the controversy generated by the Clean Air Act, evidence indicates that the overall air quality in the United States is steadily improving. The 16,000 quarts of air we each breathe daily are cleaner and healthier in most places than they were a decade ago. Yet an estimated 111 million persons in the United States still breathe air that violates one or more primary air quality standards. Case 19.2 considers the EPA’s efforts to protect air quality generated by upwind sources that affect downwind states.
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case 19.2
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. EME HOMER CITY GENERATION L.P. 134 S.Ct. 1584 (2014)*
A group of state and local governments, joined by industry and labor groups, sought a review of EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (known as the Transport Rule). The D.C. Cir- cuit Court vacated the rule in its entirety. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
GINSBURG, Justice: Air pollution is transient, heedless of state boundaries. Pollutants generated by upwind sources are often transported by air currents, sometimes over hun- dreds of miles, to downwind States. As the pollution travels out of state, upwind States are relieved of the associated costs. Those costs are borne instead by the downwind States, whose ability to achieve and maintain satisfactory air quality is hampered by the steady stream of infiltrating pollution.
For several reasons, curtailing interstate air pollution poses a complex challenge for environmental regulators. First, identifying the upwind origin of downwind air pol- lution is no easy endeavor. Most upwind States propel pol- lutants to more than one downwind State, many downwind States receive pollution from multiple upwind States, and some States qualify as both upwind and downwind. The overlapping and interwoven linkages between upwind and downwind States with which EPA had to contend number in the thousands. . . .
Over the past 50 years, Congress has addressed inter- state air pollution several times and with increasing rigor. In 1963, Congress directed federal authorities to “encour- age cooperative activities by the States and local govern- ments for the prevention and control of air pollution.” In 1970, Congress made this instruction more concrete, intro- ducing features still key to the Act. For the first time, Con- gress directed EPA to establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for pollutants at levels that will protect public health. Once EPA settles on an NAAQS, the Act requires the Agency to designate “nonattainment” areas, i.e., locations where the concentration of a regulated pollut- ant exceeds the NAAQS.
The Act then shifts the burden to States to propose plans adequate for compliance with the NAAQS. Each State must submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to EPA within three years of any new or revised NAAQS. If EPA determines that a State has failed to submit an ade- quate SIP . . . the Act requires the Agency to promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).
[SIP] has come to be called the Good Neighbor Pro- vision. . . . The statute requires States to eliminate those “amounts” of pollution that “contribute significantly to nonattainment”* in downwind States. Thus, EPA’s task is to reduce upwind pollution, but only in “amounts” that push a downwind State’s pollution concentrations above the relevant NAAQS. As noted earlier, however, the non- attainment of downwind States results from the collective and interwoven contributions of multiple upwind States. The statute therefore calls upon the Agency to address a thorny causation problem: How should EPA allocate among multiple contributing upwind States responsibility for a downwind State’s excess pollution?
As EPA interprets the statute, upwind emissions rank as “amounts [that] . . . contribute significantly to nonat- tainment” if they (1) constitute 1% or more of a relevant NAAQS in a nonattaining downwind State and (2) can be eliminated under the cost threshold set by the Agency. In other words, to identify which emissions were to be elimi- nated, EPA considered both the magnitude of upwind States’ contributions and the cost associated with eliminat- ing them.
The Industry respondents argue that, however EPA ultimately divides responsibility among upwind States, the final calculation cannot rely on costs. . . . Because the Transport Rule considers costs, respondents argue, “States that contribute identical ‘amounts’ . . . may be deemed [by EPA] to have [made] substantially different” contributions. But, as just explained, the Agency cannot avoid the task of choosing which among equal “amounts” to eliminate. The Agency has chosen, sensibly in our view, to reduce the amount easier, i.e., less costly, to eradicate, and nothing in the text of the Good Neighbor Provision precludes that choice.
Using costs in the Transport Rule calculus, we agree with EPA, also makes good sense. Eliminating those amounts that can cost-effectively be reduced is an efficient and equitable solution to the allocation problem the Good Neighbor Provision requires the Agency to address. Effi- cient because EPA can achieve the levels of attainment, i.e., of emission reductions, the proportional approach aims to achieve, but at a much lower overall cost. Equitable because, by imposing uniform cost thresholds on regulated States, EPA’s rule subjects to stricter regulation those States that
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
*ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. EME HOMER CITY GENERATION L.P. 134 S.Ct. 1584 (2014).
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*1963 (42 U.S.C. § 7401) Clean Air Act.
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have done relatively less in the past to control their pollu- tion. Upwind States that have not yet implemented pollu- tion controls of the same stringency as their neighbors will be stopped from free riding on their neighbors’ efforts to reduce pollution. They will have to bring down their emis- sions by installing devices of the kind in which neighboring States have already invested.
Suppose, for example, that the industries of upwind State A have expended considerable resources installing modern pollution-control devices on their plants. Facto- ries in upwind State B, by contrast, continue to run old, dirty plants. Yet, perhaps because State A is more populous and therefore generates a larger sum of pollution overall, the two States’ emissions have equal effects on downwind attainment. If State A and State B are required to eliminate emissions proportionally (i.e., equally), sources in State A will be compelled to spend far more per ton of reductions
because they have already utilized lower cost pollution controls. State A’s sources will also have to achieve greater reductions than would have been required had they not made the cost-effective reductions in the first place. State A, in other words, will be tolled for having done more to reduce pollution in the past. EPA’s cost-based allocation avoids these anomalies. . . .
We further conclude that the Good Neighbor Provi- sion does not require EPA to disregard costs and consider exclusively each upwind State’s physically proportionate responsibility for each downwind air quality problem. EPA’s cost-effective allocation of emission reductions among upwind States, we hold, is a permissible, workable, and equitable interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision.
It is so ordered.
KEY POINTS • Under the Clean Air Act, EPA must determine what upwind states contribute to air pollu-
tion to downwind states and work to reduce it. • The determination is a complex task that establishes air quality standards (NAAQS), iden-
tifies states that have not complied with the standards, and implements a plan for reaching the standards (the Good Neighbor Provision).
• The state and local governments and industry groups objected to the EPA prioritizing the pollution that was least costly to eliminate instead of the proportional amounts of pollu- tion contributed by upwind states to the pollution downwind.
• Using costs in the calculation of preventing cross-state pollution makes sense and is both efficient and effective, the Court held.
[continued]
Note, also, that air pollution is an international problem and that not all coun- tries of the world have, or can afford, our air quality standards. The Environmental Performance Index ranks 180 countries around the world. It places the United States in 10th place when it comes to overall air quality. Australia and New Zealand receive top rankings. For examples of air pollution concerns around the world, see Table 19.1.
Air pollution reaches across international borders. President Obama proposed regulation to reduce greenhouse gases by 30 percent from their 2005 level by 2030. Many viewed this as a necessary demonstration of the United States’ leadership to press for a reduction in air pollution on a global scale. President Trump, however, withdrew the United States from the global Paris Agreement in 2017.
WATER POLLUTION Business enterprise is a major source of water pollution in the United States. Almost one-half of all water used in this country is for cooling and condensing purposes in connection with industrial activities. The resulting discharge into our rivers and lakes sometimes takes the form of heated water, called thermal effluents. In addition
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Comment
1. Beijing, China World’s highest levels of sulfur dioxide concentration 2. New Delhi, India 40% of residents suffer from respiratory illness 3. Santiago, Chile Some days reach eight times the danger level for particulate matter 4. Mexico City, Mexico World’s highest levels of ozone 5. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia At times, daytime visibility requires cars to use headlights 6. Cairo, Egypt A WHO report says living there equals smoking a pack a day of cigarettes 7. Chongqing, China Nearly five percent of children suffer from asthma 8. Guangzhou, China Sulfur dioxide levels second to Beijing 9. Hong Kong Government has warned people against outdoor activities 10. Kabul, Afghanistan Infrastructure designed for 500,000 residents now supports five million
table 19.1 Examples of World Air Pollution Concerns
Source: Wall Street Journal, 24/7, 2010.
to thermal effluents, industry also discharges chemical and other effluents into the nation’s waterways.
The principal federal law regulating water pollution is the Clean Water Act, passed by Congress in 1972. As with the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act is administered primarily by the states in accordance with EPA standards. If the states do not fulfill their responsibilities, however, the federal government, through the EPA, can step in and enforce the law. The Clean Water Act applies to all naviga- ble waterways, intrastate as well as interstate. Although the term navigable is much broader than merely meaning being able to get a boat down, in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), the Supreme Court ruled that mere small ponds that do not empty into streams or rivers are not “ navigable” under the Clean Water Act.
Goals and Enforcement The Clean Water Act sets goals to eliminate water pollution. Principally, these goals are to make the nation’s waterways safe for swimming and other recreational use and clean enough for the protection of fish, shellfish, and wildlife. The law sets strict deadlines and strong enforcement provisions, which must be followed by industry, municipalities, and other water polluters. Enforcement of the Clean Water Act revolves around its permit dis- charge system. Without being subject to criminal penalties, no polluter can dis- charge pollutants from any point source (such as a pipe) without a permit, and municipal as well as industrial dischargers must obtain permits. The EPA has issued guidelines for state permit programs and has approved those programs that meet the guidelines.
Because the Clean Water Act applies to “navigable waterways,” the criminal penalties of the act cover only the unpermitted point-source pollution of navigable waterways. However, the penalties under the Clean Water Act can still be substan- tial. Koch Industries agreed to pay a $30 million fine to settle lawsuits involving oil spills from its pipelines and oil facilities in six states. Sidebar 19.3 addresses the recent Dakota Access Pipeline environmental controversy.
In April 2020, the Supreme Court held in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund that the Clean Water Act applies to pollution sources such as pipes or wells when their discharges mix with groundwater before moving directly into rivers, lakes, or oceans because this is the “functional equivalent of a direct discharge.” 590 U.S. _____ (2020)
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Thousands of protesters, including representatives from more than 100 Native American tribes, camped out at the Standing Rock Sioux reservation in the fall and win- ter of 2016 attempting to stop construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, a project that would transport oil from North Dakota to Illinois refining markets—a distance of 1,172 miles. The protest received national attention.
The protesters feared that the pipeline would leak and endanger the water supply of the Standing Rock Sioux and cause other significant damage to their land. Pipeline accidents resulting in leaks happen on a regular basis. Between 2013 and 2015, an average of 121 pipeline accidents occurred each year. Although the con- struction project was halted temporarily when President
Obama’s administration blocked construction across federal lands, the pipeline was completed in 2017. The first leak occurred in March 2017.
In a lawsuit filed by the Standing Rock Sioux and other interested parties, it is alleged that the review process required by NEPA was not conducted correctly and that the pipeline construction violates the Clean Water Act. Although the pipeline is now completed, Standing Rock Sioux and others bringing the lawsuit hope to stop the use of the pipeline. Source: Erin Brodwin, “People at the Front Lines of the Battle over the Dakota Access Pipeline Are Calling It a ‘Death Sentence,’” Business Insider, November 1, 2016; Zak Cheney Rice, “The Dakota Access Pipeline Sprung 2 New Leaks,” Business Insider, May 23, 2017.
sidebar 19.3
The Dakota Access Pipeline Controversy
Under the Clean Water Act, industries adopt a two-step sequence for cleanup of industrial wastes discharged into rivers and streams. The first step requires polluters to install best practicable technology (BPT). The second demands installation of best available technology (BAT). Various timetables apply in achieving these steps, accord- ing to the type of pollutant being discharged. In 1984, the EPA announced applica- tion of the bubble concept to water pollution in the steel industry.
In addition to the Clean Water Act, the EPA administers two other acts related to water pollution control. One, the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, requires a permit system for the discharge or dumping of various mate- rial into the seas. The other is the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, which has forced the EPA to set maximum drinking water contaminant levels for certain organic and inorganic chemicals, pesticides, and microbiological pollutants.
The Clean Water Act and other current statutes do not reach one important type of water pollution: non-point source pollution, which comes from runoffs into streams and rivers. These runoffs often contain agricultural fertilizers and pesti- cides as well as oil and lead compounds from streets and highways. Congress has authorized $400 million for the National Non-Point Source Pollution Program to study the problem. Addressing non-point source pollution, the EPA has issued a rule requiring the states to impose antipollution standards for about 20,000 bodies of water. The rule requires states to set standards for the total “maximum daily load” of pollutants in a body of water. This standard, which went into effect in 2014, would apply to pollutants from non-point sources as well as point sources.
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT Every day, entire species of animals and plants die off. As with the dinosaurs, sometimes great catastrophes like comet impacts cause species to become extinct. Gradual climate changes and competition from other species also can kill off animals and plants. However, in modern times, human activity has caused the vast majority of species extinctions. Air and water pollution, the clearing of land for agriculture,
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the development of water resources, hunting and fishing, and a growing human population all potentially threaten other species.
In 1973, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the world’s toughest law protecting animals and plants, and, perhaps, the country’s most controversial environmental standard. Under the act, the Secretary of the Interior can list any species as “endangered”—that is, “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range”—except for certain insect pests. (“Threatened” species are also protected.) In determining the factors of endangerment, the secretary must consider the destruction of habitat, disease or predation, commercial and rec- reational activity, and “other natural or manmade factors.” Within a year of listing an endangered species, the secretary is required to define the “critical habitat” of the species, which is the area with the biological or physical features necessary to species survival. The Fish and Wildlife Services and the National Marine Fisheries Services administer the ESA for the Department of Interior.
Approximately 2,500 species of animals and plants are listed as endangered or threatened. The act also requires that recovery plans be drawn up for the listed spe- cies. Recovery plans may involve breeding of the species.
Application of the ESA Although no federal agency can authorize, fund, or carry out any action that is likely to jeopardize an endangered species, the ESA’s application to private business activity has caused the greater debate in recent years. Section 9 of the act prohibits any person from transporting or trading in any endan- gered species of fish or wildlife (a separate section applies to plants) or from “taking any such species within the United States” or “upon the high seas.” Taking a species is defined as “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or attempt to engage in any such conduct.”
The Secretary of the Interior has further defined the “harm” of taking to mean any act that actually kills or injures wildlife, including harming habitat or essential behavior pat- terns. Thus, neither private businesses nor individuals can harm the habitats of endangered species. In Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that “the Sec- retary reasonably constructed the intent of Congress when he defined ‘harm’ to include ‘significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife.’”*
Note that the ESA does not permit courts or regulators to take economic factors into consideration in applying its provisions. There has been much criticism of the act, and amendments to it have been proposed to Congress. Congress has estab- lished a review board that can grant exemptions to the ESA for certain important federal projects. However, the exemptions do not apply to private activities.
The ESA requires recovery plans for the species it protects. Question: If pollu- tion causes or contributes to global warming, and global warming endangers species like polar bears by changing their habitat, does the law require that automobile or plant emissions be regulated to diminish global warming? For now, no courts have addressed this issue.
PESTICIDE CONTROL Pests, especially insects and mice, destroy more than 10 percent of all crops grown in the United States, causing several billion dollars of damage annually. In many under- developed countries, however, a much greater percentage of total crop production
An endangered species is one determined by the Secretary of the Inte- rior to be “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”
LO 19-3
*Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter (1995).
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598 PART 3 The Regulatory Landscape for Business
is lost to pests, as high as 40–50 percent in countries such as India. Perhaps the principal reason for our lower rate of crop loss is that the United States uses more pesticides per acre than any other country.
The widespread, continual application of pesticides creates environmental prob- lems, however. Not only is it dangerous to wildlife, particularly birds and fish, but it is also harmful to humans and may eventually threaten our agricultural capacity itself. Rapidly breeding pests gradually become immune to the application of pes- ticides, and researchers may not always be able to invent new poisons to kill them.
Nationwide, nearly half of the farmers responding to one poll expressed increas- ing concern about their own safety when using pesticides. A National Cancer Insti- tute report concluded that farm families suffer from elevated rates of seven types of cancer, including leukemia, with pesticides suspected as a leading cause.
The Federal Pesticide Acts Federal regulation of pesticides is accomplished primarily through two statutes: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, as amended, and the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 (FEPCA). Both statutes require the registration and labeling of agricultural pesticides, although FEPCA coverage extends to the application of pesticides as well.
Under the acts, the administrator of the EPA is directed to register those pesticides that are properly labeled, meet the claims made as to their effectiveness, and will not have unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, which is defined as “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.”* In addition to its authority to request registration of pesticides, the EPA classifies pesticides for either general use or restricted use. In the latter category, the EPA may impose further restrictions that require application only by a trained applicator or with the approval of a trained consultant. Today, the EPA requires that employ- ers train agricultural workers in pesticide safety, post safety information, and place warning signs to keep workers out of freshly sprayed fields.
Enforcement The EPA has a variety of enforcement powers to ensure that pes- ticide goals are met, including the power to deny or suspend registration. In the 1980s, the EPA used this power and banned several pesticides suspected of causing cancer. In 2000, the EPA used its authority to halt the manufacture of household products containing the pesticide chlorpyrifos sold under the trade names Dursban and Lorsban. The EPA determined that the pesticide was more harmful to humans, particularly children, than had been thought previously.
The EPA also defines what a pesticide can and cannot be used for and may seek penalties against violators. For example, the EPA sought criminal charges against several quail-hunting clubs in Florida and Georgia that improperly used the pesticide Furadan to kill predators that ate quail eggs.
Pesticide control has been attacked by both affected businesses and the environ- mental movement itself. Pesticide manufacturers complain that the lengthy, expensive testing procedures required by the FEPCA registration process delay useful pesticides from reaching the market and inhibit new research. On the other hand, many in the environmental movement contend that our country’s pesticide control policy is hypo- critical in that the FEPCA does not apply to pesticides U.S. manufacturers ship to foreign countries. Companies can sell overseas what they cannot sell in this country.
The EPA must register pesticides for use unless they have unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.
*7 U.S.C. §136 et seq. (1996) (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
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SOLID WASTE Pollution problems cannot always be neatly categorized. For instance, solid waste disposal processes often create pollution in several environmentally related forms. When solid waste is burned, it can cause air pollution and violate the Clean Air Act. When dumped into rivers, streams, and lakes, solid waste can pollute the water beyond amounts permitted under the Clean Water Act. Machinery used in solid waste disposal can also be subject to the regulation of the Noise Control Act.
By all accounts, solid waste pollution problems during the last 25 years have grown as pollution has risen and the country has become more affluent and pro- ductive. Currently, total solid wastes produced yearly in the United States exceed 5 billion tons, or almost 25 tons for every individual. Half this amount is agricultural waste, another third is mineral waste, and the remainder is industrial, institutional, and residential waste. Some wastes are toxic and hazardous, while others stink or attract pests. All present disposal problems of significant proportion.
Landfills represent the primary disposal sites for most household and much business solid wastes. Figure 19.2 illustrates the composition of solid wastes in the typical landfill. According to Bill Rathje, professor of anthropology at the University of Arizona, paper is the biggest solid waste category in landfills. And paper, which in 1970 constituted 35 percent of landfill volume, today constitutes 50 percent. By contrast, disposable diapers take up less than one percent of landfill volume. Poly- styrene foam, such as thermal cups, also takes up less than one percent of landfill volume. For additional figures on composition of landfill waste, see Figure 19.2.
The Solid Waste Disposal Act The Solid Waste Disposal Act passed in 1965 represents the primary federal effort in solid waste control. Congress recognized in this act that the main responsibility for nontoxic waste manage- ment rests with regional, state, and local management and limited the federal role in this area. Under this act, the federal role in nontoxic waste management
Don’t forget that total solid waste created in the United States divided by the U.S. population yields some 25 tons of waste for every person.
The federal government sets no standards for and enforces no rules about general solid waste disposal.
Paper (includes newspapers, telephone books, magazines, catalogs, and packaging)
Miscellaneous (includes construction and demolition debris, tires, rubber, and disposable diapers)
Organic (includes wood, yard waste, and food scraps)
Plastic (includes milk jugs, soda bottles, garbage and food bags, and polystyrene foam)
Metal (includes iron, aluminum, and steel)
Glass (includes bottles, food containers, and cosmetics jars)
20% 13% 10% 6%
1%
50%
Figure 19.2 Composition of a typical landfill by volume.
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600 PART 3 The Regulatory Landscape for Business
is limited mainly to promoting research and providing technical and financial assistance to the states.
In responding to solid waste disposal problems, state and local governments have taken a variety of approaches. These include developing sanitary landfills, requiring that solid waste be separated into categories that facilitate disposal and recycling, and granting tax breaks for industries using recycled materials. A report by the Council of State Governments noted that thousands of cities and towns recycle solid wastes, usually in the form of household trash-separation requirements.
One recycling success story involves tires. The Scrap Tire Management Coun- cil estimates that two-thirds of the nearly 300 million tires discarded annually end up in dozens of retail and industrial products. Companies use recycled tires in indoor flooring, fuel alternatives, playground surfaces, and automobile parts. General Motors, for example, uses recycled rubber in 35 parts along the produc- tion line.
TOXIC AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES According to the opinion research organization Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, the control of toxic and hazardous chemicals “ranks first” on the public’s list of where the government’s regulation of industry is needed. In the last several years, regula- tion of such chemicals has been expanding rapidly. We can divide public control of private action in this area into three categories:
• Regulation of the use of toxic chemicals. • Regulation of toxic and hazardous waste disposal. • Regulation of toxic and hazardous waste cleanup.
The Problem Even as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts are slowly beginning to diminish many types of air and water pollution, attention is being drawn to another environmental problem that is potentially the most serious of all: toxic substances. Hardly a day passes without the news media reporting some new instance of alleged threat to human health and well-being from one or another of the chemical substances so important to manufacturing, farming, mining, and other aspects of modern life.
Threats to human welfare from toxic substances are not new to history. Some scholars have suggested that poisoning from lead water pipes and drinking vessels may have depleted the ranks of the ruling class of ancient Rome and thus contrib- uted to the downfall of the Roman Empire. More recently, some think that the “mad hatters” of the 19th century fur and felt trades likely suffered brain disorders from inhaling the vapors of mercury used in their crafts. Today, however, the problem of toxic substances in the environment is more widespread. More than 70,000 industrial and agricultural chemical compounds are in commercial use, and new chemicals, a significant percentage of which are toxic, are being introduced into the marketplace at the rate of more than 1,000 substances annually.
Toxic Substances Control Act To meet the special environmental problems posed by the use of toxic chemicals, Congress in 1976 enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Prior to passage of the TSCA, there was no coordinated effort to evaluate effects of these chemical compounds. Some of these compounds are
Legislation divides the regulation of toxic and hazardous substances into their (1) use, (2) disposal, and (3) cleanup.
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beneficial to society and present no threat to the environment. Some, however, are both toxic and nondegradable, a fact that in the past has been uncovered only after these compounds were introduced into wide use and became important to manufac- turing and farming. The primary purpose of the TSCA is to force an early evaluation of suspect chemicals before they become economically important.
The EPA collects information under TSCA sections that require manufacturers and distributors to report to the EPA any information they possess that indicates a chemical substance presents a substantial risk of injury to health or to the environ- ment. The TSCA further demands that the EPA be given advance notice before the manufacture of new chemical substances or the processing of any substance for a significant new use. Based on the results of its review, the EPA can take action to stop or limit introduction of new chemicals if they threaten human health or the environment with unreasonable risks.
The law also authorizes the EPA to require manufacturers to test their chemicals for possible harmful effects. Because not all the 70,000 chemicals in commerce can be tested all at once, the EPA has developed a priority scheme for selecting sub- stances for testing based on whether or not the chemicals cause cancer, birth defects, or gene mutations. Today, only a small fraction of the total chemicals in production use have been safety tested.
In view of the beneficial role that many chemical substances play in all aspects of production and consumption, Congress directed the EPA through the TSCA to consider the economic and social impact, as well as the environmental one, of its decisions. In this respect, the TSCA is unlike the Clean Air Act, which requires that certain pollution standards be met without regard for economic factors.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act The congressional Office of Technology Assessment reports that more than a ton of hazardous waste per citizen is dumped annually into the nation’s environment. A major environmental problem has been how to ensure that the generators of toxic wastes dispose of them safely. In the past, there have been instances where even some otherwise responsible com- panies have placed highly toxic wastes in the hands of less-than-reputable disposal contractors.
To help ensure proper handling and disposal of hazardous and toxic wastes, Congress in 1976 amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Under the RCRA, a generator of wastes has two primary obligations:
• To determine whether its wastes qualify as hazardous under RCRA. • To see that such wastes are properly transported to a disposal facility that has an
EPA permit or license.
The EPA lists a number of hazardous wastes, and a generator can determine if a nonlisted waste is hazardous in terms of several chemical characteristics specified by the EPA. The RCRA accomplishes proper disposal of hazardous wastes through the manifest system. This system requires a generator to prepare a manifest document that designates a licensed facility for disposal purposes. The generator then gives copies of the manifest to the transporter of the waste. After receiving hazardous wastes, the disposal facility must return a copy of the manifest to the generator. In this fashion, the generator knows the waste has received proper disposal.
Don’t forget that the TSCA requires that businesses report to the EPA any information they possess indicating that a chemical presents a substantial risk of injury to human health or the environment.
Do remember how the RCRA regulates the disposal of hazardous and toxic wastes by the manifest system.
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Failure to receive this manifest copy from the disposal facility within certain time limits requires the generator to notify the EPA. Under RCRA, the EPA has various investigatory powers. The act also prescribes various record-keeping require- ments and assesses penalties for failure to comply with its provisions. The penalties include criminal fines and imprisonment.
As amended, the RCRA is moving the handling of toxic wastes away from burial on land to treatments that destroy or permanently detoxify wastes. Today, RCRA requirements cost business an estimated $20 billion annually.
The Superfund After passage of the TSCA and RCRA in 1976, regulation of toxic and hazardous substances was still incomplete. These acts did not deal with problems of the cleanup costs of unsafe hazardous waste dumps or spills, which are often substantial. Many abandoned dump sites date back as far as the 19th century. Even current owners of unsafe dump sites are frequently financially incapable of cleaning up hazardous wastes. Nor are transporters and others who cause spills or unauthorized discharges of hazardous wastes.
In 1980, Congress created the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to address these problems. Known as the Superfund, this act has allotted billions of dollars for environmental cleanup of dangerous hazardous wastes.
The act requires anyone who releases unauthorized amounts of hazardous substances into the environment to notify the government. Whether it is noti- fied or not, the government has the power to order those responsible to clean up such releases. Refusal to obey can lead to a suit for reimbursement for any cleanup monies spent from the Superfund plus punitive damages of up to triple the cleanup costs. The government can also recover damages for injury done to natural resources. To date, the biggest Superfund case involved Shell Oil and the U.S. Army. These parties agreed to clean up a site outside Denver. Total costs may exceed $1 billion. In 2007, the EPA received private business commitments of $698 million for superfund site cleanups.
Liability under Superfund The Superfund imposes strict liability on those responsible for unauthorized discharges of hazardous wastes. No negligence need be proved. Responsible parties have liability when there is a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance that causes response costs. Responsible parties include (1) those who currently or formerly operate or own waste disposal sites, (2) those who arrange for disposal of wastes, and (3) those who transport wastes. Liability includes the costs of remediation, which are basically the costs of restoring land to its previous condition.
Many times, more than one business may have liability for a toxic cleanup. In such an instance, each business may have liability to repay the government for the entire cost of the cleanup unless responsibility can be clearly separated. In Case 19.3 that follows, the Supreme Court determines who is an “arranger” under CERCLA and whether or not each business is liable for the entire amount. Remember from the torts chapter (Chapter 10) that when more than one defendant is responsible for the entire liability, it is called “joint and several liability.”
Superfund provisions also allow a purchaser of land forced by a state or federal agency to clean up hazardous substances to recover contribution from former owners, that is, to make them pay some of the cleanup costs.
In a recent seven-year period, the Department of Justice at the request of the EPA brought crimi- nal charges against 253 individuals and corpora- tions under the RCRA.
Under the Superfund, those responsible for unauthorized discharges of hazardous and toxic wastes are strictly liable to the government for cleanup costs and dam- ages. Negligence need not be proved.
Before buying land, purchasers may wish to hire consultants to evaluate the land for hazardous and toxic substances in order to show due diligence.
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case 19.3
BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. v. UNITED STATES 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009)*
In 1960, Brown & Bryant Inc. (B&B) began operating an agricultural chemical distribution business, purchasing pesti- cides and other chemical products from suppliers such as Shell Oil Company (Shell). B&B opened its business on a 3.8-acre parcel of former farmland in Arvin, California, and in 1975, expanded operations onto an adjacent 0.9-acre parcel of land owned jointly by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, and . . . the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Rail- way Company (Railroads). . . . During its years of operation, B&B stored and distributed various hazardous chemicals on its property. Among these were the herbicide dinoseb, sold by Dow Chemicals, and the pesticides D-D and Nemagon, both sold by Shell. The toxic chemicals leaked, and the government was forced to clean it up and sued all potentially liable par- ties (PLPs), including Shell and the Railroads. The issues that reached the Supreme Court concluded whether Shell was an “arranger” under CERCLA and whether the railroads were jointly and severally liable.
STEVENS, Justice: . . . In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in response to the serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollu- tion. The Act was designed to promote the “timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites” and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination. . . . CERCLA imposes strict liability for environmental contamination upon four broad classes of PRPs:
1. the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 2. any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
3. any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub- stances, and
4. any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance. . . .
Once an entity is identified as a PRP, it may be com- pelled to clean up a contaminated area or reimburse the Government for its past and future response costs.
In these cases, it is undisputed that the Railroads qual- ify as PRPs under CERCLA because they owned the land leased by B&B at the time of the contamination and con- tinue to own it now. The more difficult question is whether Shell also qualifies as a PRP by virtue of the circumstances surrounding its sales to B&B.
To determine whether Shell may be held liable as an arranger, we begin with the language of the statute. As rel- evant here CERCLA applies to an entity that “arrange[s] for disposal . . . of hazardous substances.” It is plain from the language of the statute that CERCLA liability would attach if an entity were to enter into a transaction for the sole purpose of discarding a used and no longer useful haz- ardous substance. It is similarly clear that an entity could not be held liable as an arranger merely for selling a new and useful product if the purchaser of that product later, and unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product in a way that led to contamination. Less clear is the liability attaching to the many permutations of “arrangements” that fall between these two extremes—cases in which the seller has some knowledge of the buyers’ planned disposal or whose motives for the “sale” of a hazardous substance are less than clear. In such cases, courts have concluded that the determination whether an entity is an arranger requires a fact-intensive inquiry that looks beyond the parties’ char- acterization of the transaction as a “disposal” or a “sale” and seeks to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA’s strict-liability provisions.
Although we agree that the question whether liabil- ity attaches is fact intensive and case specific, such liabil- ity may not extend beyond the limits of the statute itself. Because CERCLA does not specifically define what it means to “arrange for” disposal of a hazardous substance. In common language, the word “arrange” implies action directed to a specific purpose. Consequently, under the plain language of the statute, an entity may qualify as a PRP when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance.
Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
*BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. v. UNITED STATES 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
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[continued]
The Government does not deny that the statute requires an entity to “arrange for” disposal; however, they interpret that phrase by reference to the statutory term “disposal,” which the Act broadly defines as “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water.”* The Governments assert that by including unintentional acts such as “spilling” and “leaking” in the definition of disposal, Congress intended to impose liability on entities not only when they directly dispose of waste products but also when they engage in legitimate sales of hazardous sub- stances knowing that some disposal may occur as a collateral consequence of the sale itself. Applying that reading of the statute, the Governments contend that Shell arranged for the disposal of D-D by shipping D-D to B&B under conditions it knew would result in the spilling of a portion of the hazard- ous substance by the purchaser or common carrier. Because these spills resulted in wasted D-D, a result Shell anticipated, the Governments insist that Shell was properly found to have arranged for the disposal of D-D. . . .
Although the evidence at trial showed that Shell was aware that minor, accidental spills occurred during the transfer of D-D from the common carrier to B&B’s bulk storage tanks after the product had arrived at the Arvin facility and had come under B&B’s stewardship, the evi- dence does not support that Shell intended such spills to occur. To the contrary, the evidence revealed that Shell took numerous steps to encourage its distributors to reduce the likelihood of such spills, providing them with detailed safety manuals, requiring them to maintain adequate stor- age facilities, and providing discounts for those that took safety precautions. Although Shell’s efforts were less than wholly successful, given these facts, Shell’s mere knowl- edge that spills and leaks continued to occur is insufficient grounds for concluding that Shell “arranged for” the dis- posal of D-D. Accordingly, we conclude that Shell was not liable as an arranger for the contamination that occurred at B&B’s Arvin facility. . . .
We must now determine whether the Railroads were properly held jointly and severally liable for the full cost of the Governments’ response efforts.
The seminal opinion on the subject of apportionment in CERCLA actions was written in 1983 by Chief Judge Carl Rubin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. After reviewing CERCLA’s history, Chief Judge Rubin concluded although the Act imposed a “strict liability standard,” it did not mandate “joint and several” liability in every case. Rather, Congress intended the scope of liability to “be determined from traditional and evolving principles of common law.”
Following Chem-Dyne, the courts of appeals have acknowledged that “the universal starting point for
divisibility of harm analyses in CERCLA cases” is Section 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “When two or more persons acting independently cause a distinct or single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for divi- sion according to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of the total harm that he has himself caused . . . . But where two or more persons cause a single and indivisible harm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm.” In other words, apportionment is proper when “there is a reasonable basis for determining the con- tribution of each cause to a single harm.”* . . .
The District Court calculated the Railroads’ liabil- ity based on three figures. First, the court noted that the Railroad parcel constituted only 19% of the surface area of the Arvin site. Second, the court observed that the Rail- roads had leased their parcel to B&B for 13 years, which was only 45% of the time B&B operated the Arvin facil- ity. Finally, the court found that the volume of hazardous- substance-releasing activities on the B&B property was at least ten times greater than the releases that occurred on the Railroad parcel . . . . “Allowing for calculation errors up to 50%,” the court concluded that the Railroads could be held responsible for 9% of the total CERCLA response cost for the Arvin site.
We conclude that the facts contained in the record rea- sonably supported the apportionment of liability. The Dis- trict Court’s detailed findings make it abundantly clear that the primary pollution at the Arvin facility was contained in the southeastern portion of the facility most distant from the Railroads’ parcel and that the spills of hazardous chem- icals that occurred on the Railroad parcel contributed to no more than 10% of the total site contamination, some of which did not require remediation. With those background facts in mind, we are persuaded that it was reasonable for the court to use the size of the leased parcel and the dura- tion of the lease as the starting point for its analysis.
Because the District Court’s ultimate allocation of liability is supported by the evidence and comports with the apportionment principles outlined above, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Railroads are subject to joint and several liability for all response costs arising out of the contamination of the Arvin facility.
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by holding Shell liable as an arranger under CERCLA for the costs of remediating environmental contamination at the Arvin, California facility. Furthermore, we conclude that the District Court reasonably apportioned the Railroads’ share of the site remediation costs at 9%. The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceed- ings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
*42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 1980). *United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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KEY POINTS • CERCLA imposes strict liability for contamination, but not all actors involved in contami-
nation are “joint and severally” liable. Liability is based on the facts of each case. • Shell engaged in specific and reasonable efforts to limit minor, accidental spills at the
facility. Despite continued spills, these facts do not support that Shell is an “arranger” for disposal of its product that resulted in contamination.
• The contamination was such that the district court could apportion responsibility based on the actions of the railroads. Although the railroads have a portion of responsibility, CERCLA does not demand holding the railroads liable for the entire harm at the toxic site.
For this reason, Superfund law has caused land purchasers to be very careful in buying land that may contain hazardous wastes. The law makes current as well as former landowners liable for hazardous wastes. The purchaser may escape liability by proving that it is innocent of knowledge of the wastes and has used due diligence in checking the land for toxic hazards. But exercising due diligence can be both costly and difficult to prove. Fortunately, the Superfund permits a land purchaser to sue a land seller if the purchaser incurs response costs due to hazardous wastes left by the seller.
Banks and other lenders who take out a security interest (such as a mortgage) in land that turns out to be contaminated and subject to the Superfund are not liable responsible parties. However, if a lender exerts control over a borrower’s contami- nated land, or assumes ownership of it, the lender will become a responsible party. Many lenders have become very wary about loaning money to borrowers who wish to put up as security land that may be contaminated.
As responsible parties engage in Superfund-required cleanup, they try to pass on the costs to others, often their insurers. In the future, insurers may specifically refuse to cover pollution risks in their policies. Some courts, however, have interpreted existing policies to cover waste-cleanup costs as insured-against damages arising from an occurrence, which includes an accidental discharge of pollutants.
Reforms to Superfund The business community has proposed various reforms to the Superfund law. Possible reforms include:
• Prorating liability for companies in Superfund litigation that agree to pay their share of cleanup costs.
• Exempting companies from liability when they have contributed very small amounts of waste at a dump site.
• Permitting dump site cleanups that meet health and safety standards, rather than requiring that the land be returned to a pristine state.
Finally, take note that both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act also con- tain provisions related to government suits to recover costs for the cleanup of toxic chemicals. Suits under the Superfund and other acts may be a major area of litiga- tion in coming years. In 2020, the Supreme Court, in Atlantic Richfield v. Christian, held that Montana landowners could pursue state law claims for damages within an EPA-managed Superfund site.
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The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment estimates that it will require as much as $500 billion during the next 50 years to clean up the nation’s hazardous waste sites. However, since 2000, the pace of cleanups has begun to decline while the number of sites identified to be cleaned has more than doubled. By 2011, one in four Americans lived within three miles of a cleanup site.
Radiation In 1979, the nuclear power plant accident at the Three Mile Island installation in Pennsylvania and subsequent evacuation of thousands of nearby resi- dents focused the nation’s attention on the potential hazards of radiation pollution. Although no single piece of legislation comprehensively controls radiation pollution and no one agency is responsible for administering legislation in this technologically complex area, overall responsibility for such control rests with the Nuclear Regula- tory Commission. The EPA, however, does have general authority to conduct testing and provide technical assistance in the area of radiation pollution control. In addi- tion, the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act also contain sections applicable to radiation discharges into the air and water.
Overall control of radioactive materials, their use, disposal, and cleanup, rests with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
concept summary
An Environmental Alphabet
Environmental and pollution control legislation seems especially given to acronyms. Here’s a key.
BAT: best available technology BPT: best practicable technology CEQ: Council on Environmental Quality CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
EIS: environmental impact statement EPA: Environmental Protection Agency FEPCA: Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act TSCA: Toxic Substances Control Act
Suits by Private Individuals
Achieving environmental goals requires coordinated strategy and implementation. As private citizens, individuals and groups of individuals lack both the power and foresight necessary to control pollution on a broad scale. There is a role, however, for the private control of private action in two principal areas:
• Citizen enforcement provisions. • Tort law.
The following sections examine suits by private individuals that relate to environmental concerns.
CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT Most of the environmental laws, such as the Clean Air and Water Acts, contain citi- zen enforcement provisions, which grant private citizens and groups the standing to sue to challenge failures to comply with the environmental laws. In many instances, private citizens can sue polluters directly to force them to cease violating the law.
Private citizens have standing to sue the government or businesses to enforce rules under environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.
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Private citizens also have standing to sue public agencies (for example, the EPA) to require them to adopt regulations or implement enforcement against private pollut- ers that the environmental laws require.
TORT THEORIES A second area of private control of private action lies in tort law and its state codi- fications. When pollution directly injures private citizens, they may sue offending polluters under various theories of tort law. Thus, the traditional deterrence of tort law contributes to private control of private action. This section further develops tort law’s role in pollution control.
Examination of tort law and pollution control reveals little understanding of the interdependence between ourselves and our environment. Instead, tort theories, as they have been applied to environmental problems, focus on the action of one person (or business) as it injures what legally belongs to another. In other words, tort law attacks the pollution problem by using the established theories of nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability.
Nuisance The principal tort theory used in pollution control has been that of nuisance. The law relating to nuisance is somewhat vague, but in most jurisdictions, the common law has been put into statutory form. Several common elements exist in the law of nuisance in most states. To begin with, there are two types of nuisances: public and private. (See Chapter 7.)
A public nuisance arises from an act that causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to everyone. In the environmental area, air, water, and noise pollution can all constitute a public nuisance if they affect common rights. More specifically, industrial waste discharge that kills the fish in a stream may be held a public nuisance because fishing rights are commonly possessed by the public. Public nuisance actions may be brought only by a public official, not private individuals, unless the latter have suffered some special damage to their persons or property as a result of the public nuisance.
Any use of one’s land that unreasonably interferes with the use or enjoyment of another’s land establishes a common law private nuisance. Courts measure the unreasonableness of the interference by balancing the character, extent, and dura- tion of harm to the plaintiff against the social utility of the defendant’s activity and its appropriateness to its location. Because society needs industrial activity as well as natural tranquility, people must put up with a certain amount of smoke, dust, noise, and polluted water if they live in concentrated areas of industry. But what may be an appropriate industrial use of land in a congested urban area may be a private nuisance if it occurs in a rural or residential location.
Note that the proving of nuisance does not demand that a property owner be found negligent. An unreasonable use of one’s land does not mean that one’s conduct is unreasonable.
Other Tort Doctrines Private plaintiffs in pollution cases frequently allege the applicability of tort doctrines other than that of nuisance. These doctrines, however, do overlap that of nuisance, which is really a field of tort liability rather than a type of conduct.
One such doctrine is that of trespass. A defendant is liable for trespass if, with- out right, he or she intentionally enters land in possession of another or causes
A public nuisance arises from an act that causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to everyone.
Any use of one’s land that unreasonably interferes with the use of enjoyment of another’s land constitutes a private nuisance.
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608 PART 3 The Regulatory Landscape for Business
something to do so. The entrance is considered intentional if the defendant knew that it was substantially certain to result from his or her conduct. Thus, airborne particles that fall on a plaintiff’s property can constitute a trespass. In recent years, many courts have merged the theories of nuisance and trespass to such an extent that before plaintiffs can recover for a particle trespass, they must prove that the harm done to them exceeds the social utility of the defendant’s enterprise.
Negligence doctrine is sometimes used by private plaintiffs in environmental pollution cases. The basis for the negligence tort lies in the defendant’s breach of his or her duty to use ordinary and reasonable care toward the plaintiff, which proxi- mately (foreseeably) causes the plaintiff injury. A factory’s failure to use available pollution-control equipment may be evidence of its failure to employ reasonable care.
Finally, some courts recognize the applicability in pollution cases of strict liabil- ity tort doctrine. This tort liability arises when the defendant injures the plaintiff’s person or property by voluntarily engaging in ultrahazardous activity that necessarily involves a risk of serious harm that cannot be eliminated through the exercise of the utmost care. No finding of fault, or failure of reasonable care, on the defendant’s part is necessary. This doctrine has been employed in situations involving the use of poisons, such as in crop dusting and certain industrial work, the storage and use of explosives, and the storage of water in large quantities in a dangerous place.
Increasing numbers of private plaintiffs are suing companies for pollution-related harm. In one case, residents in northeast Denver, Colorado, sued Asarco Inc. for environmental property damage caused by its smelter. Asarco settled the suit for $35 million. Not all pollution, however, comes from smokestacks. In agricultural states like Iowa and North Carolina, tort suits arise because of pollution from agricultural production. For example, plaintiffs have sued because of brain damage alleged to be caused by hydrogen sulfide, a by-product of waste from pork production.
Sustainability Approaches
Sustainability encompasses many concerns but a key concept involves maintain- ing the environment so that it will adequately meet the needs of future generations. Public and business awareness of environmental sustainability has increased signifi- cantly. At the World Economic Forum, 650 business and government leaders ranked the environment as the greatest challenge facing business.
Government leaders have taken steps to address environmental sustainability. In 1997, delegates from 150 nations reached a treaty to reduce emission of various greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. Under the Kyoto Protocol industrialized nations, including the United States, would lower greenhouse gas emission below 1990 levels. Although the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, drop- ping out of the agreement in 2001, it was an important first step in international cooperation to advance environmental sustainability. The Paris Agreement built on this earlier attempt to develop international cooperation in addressing world envi- ronmental impact.
The Paris Agreement, which went into effect in 2016 and currently is ratified by 187 of the 197 countries, was the first time the world produced a global response to climate change by aiming to limit temperature increases. The United States ratified the agreement, but on June 1, 2017, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the agreement, joining only Syria and Nicaragua as nations rejecting the agreement.
In suing for damages, private plaintiffs (as opposed to the government) often base their lawsuits on tort doctrines of (1) trespass, (2) negligence, or (3) strict liability for ultrahazardous activity.
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The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement received criticism given the fact that it is one of the world’s largest polluters. However, most other countries in the world, including all other major polluters, remain committed to global action to reduce overall temperature increase in this century below 2 degrees Celsius. Given the scientific impact of any major polluter on the global climate, other countries have a reason for concern.
Fifteen percent of the world’s population uses more than half of its polluting energy. If all nations in the world consume polluting energy at the same rate as high- income nations, what will be the impact on global warning? One thing seems likely. In the words of Nobel laureate economist Thomas Schelling: “In the 21st century, greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and climate change is going to be the big- gest diplomatic issue there is.”
AREAS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN Researchers almost daily report new instances of how industry and technology affect life on our planet. For every allegation of pollution-caused environmental harm, however, counter theories maintain that the harm is not as significant as alleged or argue that the harm arises from causes unrelated to industrial pollution. Lack of unanimous scientific opinion on many environmental issues underscores their great complexity. It also reveals a key controversy at the heart of environmental regulation: How much certainty of harm is required to justify regulatory intervention?
Loss of Natural Ecosystems A report signed by 1,575 scientists, including 100 Nobel Prize winners, warned of the effects of worldwide destruction to natural ecosystems, the cutting of rainforests being the most widely publicized destruction. The report concluded: “If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know.”* At risk in the next 30 years are up to 20 percent of the planet’s species of animals and plants.
Some government leaders of countries with fragile ecosystems are actively engaged in programs to preserve these areas. These programs include efforts to pro- mote education of local people and businesses about the value of biodiversity, eco- tourism to produce jobs for local people while using the money produced to protect environmentally significant areas, and international debt-for-nature swaps in which a country that is owed money by another country cancels part of the debt if the debtor country agrees to ensure the conservation of its environment. Malaysia, for example, instituted several measures to protect its tropical rainforest including education, eco- tourism, and a selective logging program.
Ozone In 1990, 59 countries agreed to stop producing certain chemicals that destroy the Earth’s protective ozone layer of the atmosphere. The agreement required participating countries to stop production of certain chlorofluorocarbons and halons by the year 2000. Destruction of the ozone layer could lead to hundreds of thousands of cases of cataracts and skin cancer in humans plus unknown serious damage to animals and plants.
Don’t forget that the environment is extremely complex and our understanding of the impacts of pollution on the environment is only partial.
To learn more about the United Nations Frame- work Convention on Climate Change, includ- ing the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement visit the website: http:// unfccc.int/paris_agree- ment/items/9485.php
*Henry Kendall, “The World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity” Union of Concerned Scientists, November 1992.
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These forms of ozone-destroying chemicals are no longer in production. How- ever, a new threat to the ozone has emerged. Air conditioning that uses chemicals that reduce ozone is increasing rapidly in the developing world, especially in India and China, which together have a third of the world’s population. New air condi- tioning installations in India and China are growing at the rate of 25–30 percent annually.
Greenhouse Effect Overshadowing even ozone destruction as a future pol- lution concern are increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. The National Academy of Sciences notes that global carbon dioxide levels have increased six percent since 1960. The increase is due largely to the burning of fossil fuels such as oil and coal.
Higher carbon dioxide levels has led to warmer global temperatures, the so-called greenhouse effect. The last decade has had many of the warmest years on record, and atmospheric scientists believe that the rise in global carbon dioxide levels was the cause. Changing climatic patterns and rising sea levels are the result. The Arctic sea ice has lost two-thirds of its volume in the past four decades. Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has reached its highest concentration in the atmosphere in the last 650,000 years. Sidebar 19.4 notes the implications of people clearing vital rainforests.
“The first, most basic thing to realize about cli- mate change is its incred- ible unfairness. Those who contributed the least to it suffer first and are the hardest hit by it. That’s now widely understood — enough so that the cli- mate movement is really morphing into the climate justice movement. The people who are most at risk are also the people doing most of the leading on these questions.”
—Bill McKibben, in an interview with Elmira
Bayrasli for Project Syndicate (2020).
Human alterations of the environment are causing the sixth mass extinction of species in the planet’s history, with unique varieties of plants and animals disappearing at roughly 1,000 to 10,000 times the background rate—in other words, between 10,000 to 100,000 unique spe- cies are killed off every year. In the past, large extinction events have occurred after cataclysms like asteroids col- liding with the Earth, but the present extinction arises from our own making, mostly from destroying habitats.
For example, every week humanity clears an area of tropical rain forest the size of Rhode Island for lumber, cattle raising, and agricultural uses, including large-scale operations that involve companies from the developed economies of Asia, Europe, and United States.
Tropical rain forests are an important part of the life support systems of the planet, removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and generating a large portion of the oxygen that we breathe. In addition, when species
are lost, we lose the genetic information in their DNA for producing compounds that are useful to people. At least 25 percent of all medicines contain ingredients from rain forest species, and roughly 70 percent of plants known to have anti-cancer properties (over 1,400 species) are found in the rain forests. There are likely many more such species. Because cataloging of species of all kinds is not complete, we do not even know the full amount of pat- entable genetic information that we are destroying. Aside from moral questions and related concerns about the bio- sphere’s ability to continue providing living conditions to which we have become accustomed, the current mass extinction represents a loss of an irreplaceable library of information that could benefit human life and health. Source: Contributed by Adam J. Sulkowski, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth. Copyright © by Adam J. Sulkowski. All rights reserved. Used with permission.
sidebar 19.4
Mass Extinction and Its Consequences
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE ENVIRONMENT Concerned about the environment, some investors are turning to corporate gover- nance as a way to make polluting industries more environmentally sensitive. Boards of directors legally control the activities of corporations, but shareholders who own
LO 19-4
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these businesses elect the boards of directors. Increasingly, shareholders are present- ing resolutions at the annual meetings of corporations to encourage or require the directors and managers of major polluting industries to analyze and report on cer- tain environmental issues.
In 2011, shareholders filed 66 global warming shareholder resolutions. Pension funds, labor organizations, various foundations, and religious and environmental groups were behind most of the resolutions. Many of the investors belong to the Institutional Network on Climate Risk that controls more than $5 trillion in assets. Each year, a substantial number of these shareholder resolutions are withdrawn when businesses agree to make environmentally friendly changes in their operations.
Corporate governance concerns have also led to increasing awareness of busi- nesses on the environmental impacts they have; for instance, in annual summaries frequently referred to as sustainability reporting. In Sidebar 19.5, the pledge from Hershey to reduce its environmental impact is excerpted and shows the range of opportunities for businesses to adopt sustainability efforts.
“Without substantial participation by develop- ing economies, green- house gas emissions will continue to rise rapidly over the next 50 years even if the U.S. and other developed economies cut emissions to zero.”
–James L. Connaughton, Chair, White House Council
on Environmental Quality, 2008
Hershey details on its website the specific goals for reduc- ing its impact on the environment. These efforts include: • Reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2025,
compared to a 2009 baseline, augmenting the 23% reduction we have already achieved
• Trace 100 percent of our full year 2015 palm oil purchases to the mill level (confirmation by mid- year 2016) and 100 percent of our full year 2016 purchases to the plantation level (confirmation by mid-year 2017), ensuring the palm we purchase is deforestation-free and grown and processed sus- tainably, in alignment with the 2014 New York Decla- ration on Forests
• Expand the utilization of electric vehicles in our cor- porate fleet, and continue to purchase carbon cred- its to offset unavoidable emissions in our sales and
corporate fleet of vehicles while concurrently reduc- ing these emissions
• Achieve zero-waste-to-landfill status at all Hershey facilities by 2025, building on our existing roster of 11 zero-waste-to-landfill facilities
• Save an additional 25 million pounds of packaging material by 2025, augmenting the 16 million pounds we have already saved since 2009
• Improve our company-wide recycling rate to 95% by 2025, up from our 2009 baseline of 72%
• Reduce absolute water use by an additional 25% by 2025, building on our existing progress of reducing water use by 70% since 2009
“Our Heritage of Environmental Stewardship,” The Hershey Company. https:// www.thehersheycompany.com.
sidebar 19.5
Hershey Commits to Environmental Sustainability
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT Considering the human impact on the natural world, does the existence of exclu- sive private ownership of resources help or hurt the environment? Theory and prac- tice suggest that improper use of common resources causes more environmental problems than does improper use of private resources. Garrett Hardin called this the “tragedy of the commons.” People tend to misuse and waste resources that are common to all, like air, water, and public land. They are more careful with their own private resources. Destruction of the world’s rain forests is occurring mainly on
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612 PART 3 The Regulatory Landscape for Business
public or unowned lands. Overall, then, private ownership contributes to a wiser, less wasteful use of resources than do other ways of using resources.
However, exceptions to the general rule do occur. For instance, species of plants and animals that have little immediate market value suffer even on private land. And some companies dump toxic substances that will be hazardous for generations even on their own land. Some landowners have challenged environmental regulation and zoning as a governmental “taking” of private property without “just compensation,” which the Fifth Amendment expressly prohibits. The Supreme Court has ruled that land regulation is not a taking that must be compensated as long as an owner is allowed a “reasonable” use of the land. If a law like the Endangered Species Act is applied to prohibit any building on a piece of land, has there been a “taking”? What do you think?
Remember that “property” includes the concept of the equal right of others. In a strong property system, owners cannot use their land or other resources in ways that harm the resources of others, including the resource that others have in their health. The problem is how does the law define “the equal right of others”? Traditional tort law simply does not deal well with pollution harms that occur over long distances or across many years. It is too difficult to prove that the pollution caused the harm. So the government steps in and sets pollution limits that are themselves controversial.
Note that the emissions trading approach to pollution management is a property approach. Granting private owners an exclusive right to sell a quantity of pollution emission to a buyer is the essence of the exclusionary right of property. The world is heading toward increased emissions trading. Imagine in the future that an inter- national treaty sets acceptable emission levels for greenhouse gases and companies worldwide bid for permits to engage in such pollution. What if everyone on earth were considered to own an equal right to engage in greenhouse pollution and pro- ceeds from the emissions auction were distributed to the countries of the world on a population proportional basis?
Key Terms Bubble concept 591 Clean Air Act 589 Clean Water Act 595 Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 602
Emissions reduction banking 591 Environmental impact statement
(EIS) 585 Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) 589 Federal Environmental Pesticide
Control Act of 1972 (FEPCA) 598
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 598
Manifest system 601 National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) 585 Nuisance 607 Point source 591 Prevention of significant
deterioration 592 Primary air quality standards 589 Remediation 602 Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) 601
Scoping 585 Secondary air quality
standards 589 Solid Waste Disposal Act 599 Superfund 602 Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) 600
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Review Questions and Problems Government’s Regulations of Itself
1. The National Environmental Policy Act (a) Your firm has been hired to build a large government facility near a residential neighborhood. A
committee of residents has been formed to oppose the building. You have been asked to assist in writing the EIS. What factors must your EIS take into consideration?
(b) The Avila Timber Company has asked for and been granted permission by the Department of the Interior to cut 40 acres of timber from the 10,000-acre Oconee National Forest. Prior to the actual logging, a local environmental group files suit in federal district court, contending that the Depart- ment of the Interior has not filed an EIS. Can the group challenge the department’s action? Analyze whether an EIS should be filed in light of the facts given.
2. Evaluation of Environmental Impact Statements Outline criticisms of the EIS process. Why are state EISs often less helpful in evaluating complex envi- ronmental factors than are those prepared by federal agencies?
Government’s Regulation of Business
3. The Environmental Protection Agency Explain the function of the EPA.
4. Air Pollution The Akins Corporation wishes to build a new smelting facility in Owens County, an area where air pollu- tion exceeds primary air quality standards. (a) What legal difficulties may Akins face? (b) What solutions might you suggest for these difficulties?
5. Clean Air Act Today (a) What is the difference between an individual point-source approach and a bubble-policy approach to
dealing with factory pollution? (b) For the factory owner, what are the advantages of employing the bubble concept?
6. Water Pollution Explain the concept of “navigable waterway” and how it is related to the Clean Water Act.
7. Endangered Species Act How does the ESA apply to private businesses? Explain.
8. Pesticide Control Before beginning the manufacture of a new pesticide, what process must a company follow under the pesticide-control acts?
9. Solid Waste (a) Who has the primary responsibility for nontoxic solid waste disposal? (b) Describe the role of the Solid Waste Disposal Act in waste disposal.
10. Toxic and Hazardous Substances (a) As a manufacturer of paints, you need to dispose of certain production by-products that are highly
toxic. Discuss the process the law requires you to follow in disposing of these products. (b) An abandoned radioactive waste site is discovered by local authorities. The waste came from a com-
pany that manufactured radium watch faces and is now out of business. Who will pay to clean up these radioactive wastes? Discuss.
Suits by Private Individuals
11. Citizen Enforcement Explain the standing to sue doctrine as it applies to the citizen enforcement of federal pollution laws.
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12. Tort Theories Several years ago, the Spul Chemical Corporation built a new plant near your neighborhood. About once a month, clouds of odorous mist have passed across your property, your children have complained of skin rashes, and you have heard that the water table has been contaminated with toxic chemicals. You and your neighbors are fearful of health hazards from the plant, and the neighborhood property values have dropped significantly. Explain possible tort causes of action you may have against the chemical company.
Sustainability Approaches
13. Areas of Environmental Concern Give examples of why a key controversy at the heart of environmental regulation concerns how much certainty of harm is required to justify regulatory intervention.
14. Corporate Governance and the Environment How have shareholder groups tried to make environmental concerns relevant to corporate governance?
15. Private Property and the Environment Explain what it means to say that “emissions trading has propertitized pollution.”
1. You are senior project manager for Superior Paper Inc., a paper processing company with plants in several states. Recently, you have been given responsibility for oversee- ing the construction of a new plant in High Top, Tennessee, on the edge of the Tal- ladega National Forest. You must also secure a lease from the U.S. Department of the Interior to harvest timber on federal land. Although many residents welcome the new jobs your company will create, others have moved into the area for its natural beauty and are mounting a campaign to keep out new development.
• What environmental laws will apply to the new plant construction? • What environmental law will have to be followed as you seek to get the national
forest lease? • What steps should you take to maintain good community relations?
2. International Paint Company wants to sell a large tract of land with several facilities on it to U.S. Parts Inc. As acquisitions manager for U.S. Parts, what do you need to know before buying this land, other than that International Paint has good ownership, that your company needs the site, and that the price is right?
• Why might you need to know the environmental condition of the land? • What steps might you want to take before buying the land?
business discussions
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Part FOUR
The Employer–Employee Relationship
E mployment and labor laws reflect the con- stant need for balance between the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees
and the drive toward production of a company’s bot- tom line. This final section discusses the complexity of those relationships. As you study these chapters, consider the historical development of the law, including how it must continually evolve to address technology developments, changing social values, and economic issues affecting the workplace.
The United States enjoys a diverse population, which makes it important to ensure that workers are not discriminated against in hiring, promoting, and firing, as well as in the terms and conditions of employment. Chapter 20 details federal laws prohib- iting workplace discrimination, specifically discuss- ing the prohibitions on employment discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, color, pregnancy, age, religion, and disabilities. This chapter focuses on what constitutes illegal discrimination in the work- place, including employment practices—even those that may seem well intentioned on their face—that may be challenged as discriminatory. In addition to federal protections, this chapter notes that state laws may offer additional protection against workplace discrimination. Taken together, these laws provide the framework for fair competition in a workplace free of unlawful discrimination.
Chapter 21 describes other major employment laws, including rules regarding minimum wage and overtime, mass layoffs, family and medical leave,
workplace safety and workers’ compensation, as well as the limits of employee privacy at work. All of these laws provide important protections for workers and further define the employer–employee relationship. The scope of the employment-at-will doctrine is also presented, along with ways an employer can protect itself from an unjustified lawsuit.
The final chapter in the text, Chapter 22, focuses on labor laws that permit employees to organize their labor through unions. Although they have been met with challenges in the twenty-first century, unions continue to play an important role in the U.S. labor market. The development of labor law in the United States illustrates a long history of organized labor and the effort to protect work- ers. This chapter presents the major labor laws and helps students identify unfair labor practices by management and unions. This chapter also incor- porates current issues important to unions. Many unions maintain active political agendas on behalf of their members, including high-profile advocacy during political elections and on labor-related top- ics such as international trade. Labor advocates are vocal about the kinds of provisions that could be incorporated into trade agreements to allow U.S. workers to compete on a level playing field. For example, a number of free trade agreements dis- cussed in Chapter 12 faced vocal opposition from some labor unions. It is possible that the United States may renegotiate existing trade agreements, including labor provisions. •
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
20-1 To discuss the general provisions of Title VII, enforcement procedures, and the differences between disparate treatment and disparate impact.
20-2 To understand the specific kinds of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
20-3 To discuss employment practices that may be challenged.
20-4 To apply other federal statutes protecting against employment discrimination.
20-5 To realize that state laws may offer additional protection against work- place discrimination.
Employment Discrimination Laws
Tom Merton/Getty Images20
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L aws prohibiting discrimination exist at
both the federal and state levels. The open-
ing sections of the chapter focus on anti-
discrimination laws at the federal level. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (including its amend-
ments) is the principal such law. It prohibits certain
discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion,
and national origin. Next, employment practices
that may be challenged as discriminatory are
considered. Other antidiscrimination laws covered
are the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1981), the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of trends in
employment discrimination litigation and a discus-
sion about ensuring against employment discrimi-
nation claims.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964
“That all men are created equal” was one of the “self-evident” truths recognized by the Founding Fathers in the Declaration of Independence. However, equality among all our citizens clearly has been an ideal rather than a fact. The Constitution itself recognizes slavery by saying that slaves should count as “three-fifths of all other Persons” for determining population in House of Representatives elections. And of course, that all men are created equal says nothing about women, who did not even get a constitutionally guaranteed right to vote until 1920.
Nowhere have effects of inequality and discrimination been felt more acutely than in the area of job opportunity. Historically, common law permitted employers to hire and fire virtually at will, unless restrained by contract or statute. Under this system, white males came to dominate the job market in their ability to gain employ- ment and their salaries and wages.
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1866 originally protected against race discrimi- nation in the making and enforcement of contracts, its early effectiveness was lim- ited. Passage of labor law in the 1920s and 1930s marks the first significant federal constraint on a relatively unrestricted right of employers to hire and fire. Then, in connection with the war effort, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued executive orders in 1941 and 1943 requiring a clause prohibiting racial discrimination in all federal contracts with private contractors. Subsequent executive orders in the 1950s established committees to investigate complaints of racial discrimination against such contractors. Affirmative action requirements on federal contracts followed from executive orders of the 1960s.
The most important statute eliminating discriminatory employment practices, however, is the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employ- ment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
GENERAL PROVISIONS The provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply to employers with 15 or more employees, labor unions, and certain other employers. The major purpose of these laws is to eliminate job discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Discrimination for any of these reasons is a violation of the law, except that employers, employment agencies, and labor unions can discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin where these are bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) reasonably necessary to normal business operations. Title VII also does not sanction discrimination if it results unintentionally from a senior- ity or merit system.
The types of employer action in which discrimination is prohibited include:
• Discharge. • Refusal to hire. • Compensation. • Promotion. • Terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
Employment agencies are prohibited from either failing to refer or from actually referring an individual for employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This prohibition differs from the law binding employers, where it is
LO 20-1
Historically, common law permitted employers to hire and fire at will. At-will employment still applies today unless modified by legislation or contract.
Don’t forget that a defense to intentional discrimination is that such discrimination is a BFOQ.
According to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, denial of overtime can constitute an adverse employment action sufficient to trigger Title VII.
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unlawful only to fail or refuse to hire on discriminatory grounds—the affirmative act of hiring for a discriminatory reason is apparently not illegal. For example, assume that a contractor with a government contract seeks a qualified African American engineer and requests an employment agency to refer one. The agency complies with the request. Unless a white applicant was discriminated against, the employer likely did not break the law; but the employment agency, by referring on the basis of color, unquestionably did violate Title VII. Presumably, however, all non–African Ameri- can job applicants would have a discrimination claim.
Employers, unions, and employment agencies are also prohibited from discrimi- nating against an employee, applicant, or union member because he or she has made a charge, testified, or participated in an investigation or hearing under the act or otherwise opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII. These are the statute’s antiretaliation provisions.
Note that regarding general hiring, referrals, advertising, and admissions to train- ing or apprenticeship programs, Title VII allows discrimination only on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin and only where these considerations are bona fide occupational qualifications. For example, it is legal for a Baptist church to refuse to engage a Lutheran minister. EEOC guidelines on sex discrimination consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, for example, where it is necessary for authenticity or genuineness in hiring an actor or actress. The omission of race and color from this exception means that Congress was unwilling to make either of these two factors a bona fide occupational qualification.
Additional exemptions exist with respect to laws creating preferential treatment for veterans and hiring based on professionally developed ability tests that are not designed or intended to be used to discriminate. Such tests must bear a relationship to the job for which they are administered, however.
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- sion (EEOC). This agency has the primary responsibility of enforcing the provisions of the act. The EEOC is composed of five members, not more than three of whom may be members of the same political party. They are appointed by the president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and serve a five-year term. In the course of its investigations, the EEOC has broad authority to hold hearings, obtain evi- dence, and subpoena and examine witnesses under oath.
Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the EEOC can file a civil suit in federal district court and represent a person or class of persons charging a violation of the act. However, it must first exhaust efforts to settle the claim. Rem- edies that may be obtained in such an action include reinstatement with back pay or other actions that will make the victim of illegal discrimination whole, including injunctions against future violations of the act by the defendant. See Figure 20.1 for a breakdown of charges received by the EEOC.
The 1991 Amendments In 1991 Congress amended the Civil Rights Act to allow the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages of up to $300,000 per person depending on the size of the employer. These damages are in addition to other remedies such as job reinstatement and back pay or front pay. Compensatory damages include damages for the pain and suffering of discrimination. Punitive dam- ages are appropriate whenever discrimination occurs with “malice or with reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”
Discriminating in employment on the basis of race or color can almost never be a BFOQ.
“[M]ajor American busi- nesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”
–Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)
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Source: EEOC Charge Statistics FY1997–2019, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm.
20
15
10
5
0
25
30
35
40
45
50
Percentage of Charges Received by the EEOC
P er
ce n
ta ge
In 1997, the EEOC received 72,675 total charges, in 2006, it received 75,768 charges, and in 2019, it received 91,503 charges.
Race Sex National Origin
Religion Retaliation (all statutes)
Retaliation (Title VII
only)
Age Disability Equal Pay Act
GINA
1997
2006
2019
Figure 20.1 What kinds of claims are being filed with the EEOC?
In enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made it clear that it did not intend to preempt states’ fair employment laws. Where state agencies begin discrimination proceedings, the EEOC must wait 60 days before it starts action. Furthermore, if a state law provides relief to a discrimination charge, the EEOC must notify the appropriate state officials and wait 60 days before continuing action.
An employee must file charges of illegal discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days after notice of the unlawful practice. If the employee first filed in a timely fashion with a state fair employment practices commission, the law extends the time for filing with the EEOC to 300 days.
Winning a Title VII Civil Action To win a Title VII civil action, a plain- tiff must initially show that steps taken by the employer likely had an illegally dis- criminatory basis, such as race. Generally, the plaintiff must prove either disparate (unequal) treatment or disparate impact. In proving disparate treatment, the plain- tiff must convince the court that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff and that any alleged legitimate reasons for such treatment are a mere pretext for discrimination. If discrimination is a substantial or motivating factor, an employ- er’s practice is illegal even though other factors (such as customer preference) also contributed. Even if the plaintiff proves disparate treatment, the defendant can still win by showing that all or substantially all members of the plaintiff’s class cannot perform the duties of the job. This defense is the BFOQ defense mentioned earlier in this chapter.
In a disparate-impact case, the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s prac- tices or policies had a discriminatory effect on a group protected by Title VII. The employer can defeat the plaintiff’s claim by proving the business necessity defense.
Under Title VII, a plaintiff can recover up to $300,000 in punitive and compensatory damages for intentional discrimination. Back pay or front pay damages can further add to that amount.
Do remember that the three types of cases permitted under Title VII are for (1) disparate treatment, (2) disparate impact, and (3) retaliation.
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This defense requires that the employer prove that the practices or policies used are job related and consistent with a business necessity. However, the plaintiff can still establish a violation by showing that other policies would serve the legitimate interests of business necessity without having undesirable discriminatory effects.
A third type of discrimination case concerns retaliation. It is illegal for employ- ers to retaliate against employees for opposing discrimination, filing a charge of dis- crimination, giving testimony in a discrimination case, or in any way participating in a discrimination investigation. Such retaliation discrimination involves employers taking employment actions against employees that would dissuade a reasonable per- son from engaging in such an act of protest.
What are ways a company can avoid retaliation claims? As illustrated in Figure 20.1, retaliation claims are on the rise. There are a number of steps an employer can take to address allegations of discrimination without triggering a retaliation claim:
• Comply with all posting requirements. • Have a written policy prohibiting discrimination and specifying reporting procedures. • Treat complaints seriously as soon as they are made. • Investigate the complaint. • Be sure managers and other employees know and follow the company’s policies
on discrimination, including harassment. • Follow up with the complainant, including explaining how the company will
address the problem. • Create an atmosphere in which the complainant and others with information
feel comfortable coming forward with information or other complaints. • Never retaliate against a complainant or witnesses, based on information
obtained in the investigation.
These straightforward steps go a long way to create an atmosphere of fairness and head off additional claims based on retaliation.
Before the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments, employees or the EEOC some- times claimed that proving racial or gender statistical imbalances in a workforce established illegal discrimination. They claimed that such imbalances showed illegal discrimination, much like disparate impact discrimination, even in the absence of proof of an employer’s discriminatory intent. However, the 1991 amendments state that the showing of a statistically imbalanced workforce is not enough in itself to establish a violation of Title VII.
If an employee who complains about discrimination is transferred to the night shift, even without a loss of pay, he may have a claim for retali- ation under Title VII. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2007).
case 20.1
THOMPSON v. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS, LP 562 U.S. __ (2011)
After petitioner Eric Thompson’s fiancée Miriam Regalado filed a sex discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Oppor- tunity Commission (EEOC) against their employer respondent
North American Stainless (NAS), NAS fired Thompson. He filed his own charge and a subsequent suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that NAS fired him to retaliate against
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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Regalado for filing her charge. The District Court granted NAS summary judgment on the ground that third-party retaliation claims were not permitted by Title VII, which prohibits discrimi- nation against an employee “because he has made a [Title VII] charge.” The en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Thompson was not entitled to sue NAS for retaliation because he had not engaged in any activity protected by the statute. By a vote of 8–0, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals. (Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.)
SCALIA, JUSTICE: Until 2003, both petitioner Eric Thomp- son and his fiancée, Miriam Regalado, were employees of respondent North American Stainless (NAS). In February 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notified NAS that Regalado had filed a charge alleging sex discrimination. Three weeks later, NAS fired Thompson.
Thompson then filed a charge with the EEOC. After conciliation efforts proved unsuccessful, he sued NAS in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., claiming that NAS had fired him in order to retaliate against Regalado for filing her charge with the EEOC. The District Court granted sum- mary judgment to NAS, concluding that Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation claims.” 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (ED Ky. 2006). After a panel of the Sixth Cir- cuit reversed the District Court, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and affirmed by a 10-to-6 vote. 567 F. 3d 804 (2009). The court reasoned that because Thomp- son did not “engag[e] in any statutorily protected activity, either on his own behalf or on behalf of Miriam Regalado,” he “is not included in the class of persons for whom Con- gress created a retaliation cause of action.” . . .
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employ- ment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has made a charge” under Title VII. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–3(a). The statute permits “a person claiming to be aggrieved” to file a charge with the EEOC alleging that the employer committed an unlawful employment practice, and, if the EEOC declines to sue the employer, it permits a civil action to “be brought . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved . . . by the alleged unlaw- ful employment practice.” §2000e–5(b), (f)(1). It is undis- puted that Regalado’s filing of a charge with the EEOC was protected conduct under Title VII. In the procedural pos- ture of this case, we are also required to assume that NAS fired Thompson in order to retaliate against Regalado for filing a charge of discrimination. This case therefore pres- ents two questions: First, did NAS’s firing of Thompson constitute unlawful retaliation? And second, if it did, does Title VII grant Thompson a cause of action?
With regard to the first question, we have little difficulty concluding that if the facts alleged by Thompson are true, then NAS’s firing of Thompson violated Title VII. In Burl- ington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006), we held
that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct. We reached that conclusion by contrasting the text of Title VII’s antire- taliation provision with its substantive antidiscrimination provision. . . . Title VII’s antiretaliation provision prohibits any employer action that “well might have dissuaded a rea- sonable worker from making or supporting a charge of dis- crimination.” Id., at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). We think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dis- suaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiancé would be fired. Indeed, NAS does not dispute that Thompson’s firing meets the standard set forth in Burlington. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. NAS raises the concern, however, that prohibiting reprisals against third parties will lead to diffi- cult line-drawing problems concerning the types of relation- ships entitled to protection. Perhaps retaliating against an employee by firing his fiancée would dissuade the employee from engaging in protected activity, but what about firing an employee’s girlfriend, close friend, or trusted co-worker? . . .
Although we acknowledge the force of this point, we do not think it justifies a categorical rule that third-party reprisals do not violate Title VII. . . .
The more difficult question in this case is whether Thompson may sue NAS for its alleged violation of Title VII. The statute provides that “a civil action may be brought . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.” “. . . to be aggrieved” to bring “a civil action.” It is arguable that the aggrievement referred to is nothing more than the minimal Article III standing, which consists of injury in fact caused by the defen- dant and remediable by the court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992). But Thompson’s claim undoubtedly meets those requirements, so if that is indeed all that aggrievement consists of, he may sue. . . .
We hold that the term “aggrieved” in Title VII incorpo- rates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the statutes,” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), while excluding plaintiffs who might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibitions in Title VII. Applying that test here, we conclude that Thompson falls within the zone of inter- ests protected by Title VII. Thompson was an employee of NAS, and the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers’ unlawful actions. Moreover, accept- ing the facts as alleged, Thompson is not an accidental vic- tim of the retaliation—collateral damage, so to speak, of the employer’s unlawful act. To the contrary, injuring him was the employer’s intended means of harming Regalado. Hurt- ing him was the unlawful act by which the employer pun- ished her. In those circumstances, we think Thompson well within the zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII. He is a person aggrieved with standing to sue.
Reversed and remanded.
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DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE OR COLOR The integration of African Americans into the mainstream of American society is the primary objective of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII, which deals with employment practices, is the key legal regulation for achieving this goal. Without equal employment opportunities, African Americans can hardly enjoy other guaran- teed rights, such as access to public accommodations.
Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices based on race or color that involve recruiting, hiring, promotion, discharge, or application of the terms and conditions of employment. Of course, intentional discrimination in these matters is illegal, but, as previously stated, policies with disparate impact are also forbid- den. Such discrimination arises from an employer’s policies or practices that apply equally to everyone but that discriminate in greater proportion against minorities and have no relation to job qualification.
Examples of disparate impact on race include:
• Using personnel tests that have no substantial relation to job qualification, which have the effect of screening out minorities.
• Denying employment to unwed mothers, when minorities have a higher rate of illegitimate births than whites.
• Refusing to hire people because of a poor credit rating, when minorities are disproportionately affected.
• Giving hiring priority to relatives of present employees, when minorities are underrepresented in the workforce.
• Excluding applicants for employment based on conviction records when irrel- evant to the job and statistics show racial imbalance in conviction rates.
Often at issue in disparate impact cases is whether a discriminatory policy or practice relates to job qualification. Courts require proof, not mere assertion, of job relatedness before upholding an employer’s discriminatory personnel test or other practice.
The law also prohibits discrimination in employment conditions and benefits. EEOC decisions have found such practices as the following to be violations:
• Permitting racial insults in the work situation. • Maintaining all-white or all-black crews for no demonstrable reasons.
LO 20-2
Lockheed Martin settled a race discrimination and retaliation lawsuit for $2.5 million. The case alleged a racially hostile work environ- ment at several job sites, including threats of lynching and the use of the “N-word.”
KEY POINTS • Eric Thompson and his fiancée Miriam Regalado worked for the same employer, NAS.
After Regalado filed a Title VII claim with the EEOC, NAS fired Thompson. • The Supreme Court was asked to determine if firing Thompson constituted unlawful retal-
iation and, if so, whether he had a cause of action under Title VII. • The Court held that as an employee of NAS, Thompson was within the zone of interests
of Title VII and, as such, the statute’s antiretaliation provisions protected him. As such, he has standing to bring a claim against NAS.
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• Providing better housing for whites than blacks. • Granting higher average Christmas bonuses to whites than blacks for reasons
that are not persuasive.
Researchers at the University of Chicago and MIT revealed racial bias in hiring based on an applicant’s name. The study tracked response rates to resumes sent to 1,300 help-wanted ads. The authors found that white-sounding names (such as Anne, Emily, Allison, Neil, Todd, and Matthew) are 50 percent more likely to get called for an initial interview than applicants with African American–sounding names (such as Tamika, Latoya, Latonya, Tyrone, Tremayne, and Rasheed). Additionally, race affects the degree to which applicants benefit from having more experience and credentials. The study showed that white applicants with higher-quality résumés received 30 percent more callbacks than whites with lower-quality résumés. By con- trast, African American applicants experienced only 9 percent more callbacks for the same improvement in credentials.1
It is important to appreciate that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against members of all races. In one case, a federal court jury awarded a white senior air traffic official $500,000 in damages against the Federal Aviation Administration. The official charged the FAA had demoted him and replaced him with an African American following complaints that black workers were underrepresented in senior management levels. Note that this case did not involve affirmative action.
See Sidebar 20.1 for an example involving race discrimination.
The State of New York has outlawed the display of a noose as a threat, punishable by up to four years in prison.
John Hithon and Anthony Ash, African American men, worked at a Tyson Foods plant in Alabama. When two supervisor positions opened up, they were passed over for promotion and two white men from other plants were hired. Believing that the failure to be promoted resulted from racial prejudice, Hithon and Ash filed an employment discrimination claim against their employer.
As part of their case, the plaintiffs produced evidence that their white boss used the term “boy” when referring to them. Is the use of the term boy racially discriminatory?
In 2002, an Alabama jury awarded Hithon and Ash $250,000 each in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. After a magistrate overruled the jury’s verdict, Hilton and Ash appealed. On appeal, the 11th Circuit determined that an adult African American man being called “boy” alone was not discriminatory unless it was preceded by “black” or “white.”
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 11th Circuit’s decision, stating:
Although it is true that the disputed word will not always be evi- dence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is always benign . . . The speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice,
local custom and historical usage. Ash v. Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454 (2006)
Thereafter, in 2007, another Alabama jury found in favor of Hithon, awarding him $35,000 in back pay, $300,000 in compensatory damages for his mental anguish, and $1 million in punitive damages. The District Court vacated the punitive damage award. Both sides appealed. On appeal, the 11th Circuit voted 2–1 entering a judgment in favor of Tyson Foods. The majority said that the evidence did not support Hithon’s argument. A number of civil rights leaders and other interested groups then filed amicus briefs in support of Hithon’s petition for en banc rehearing. In 2011, the 11th Circuit panel reversed its prior ruling and reinstated the 2007 verdict.
EEOC and Code Words: A temporary agency in Cleveland agreed to pay $650,000 following a discrimi- nation lawsuit following allegations that the agency used code words to describe clients and applicants: “chocolate cupcake” for young African American women, “hockey player” for a young white male, “figure skater” for white females, “basketball player” for black males, and “small hands” for females in general. EECO v. Area Temps, Inc.
sidebar 20.1
Hithon v. Tyson Foods, Inc.: The Use of the Word “Boy”
1Bill Leonard, “Study Suggests Bias Against ‘Black’ Names on Resumes,” HR Magazine (2003).
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case 20.2
RICCI v. DESTEFANO 557 U.S. 557 (2009)
New Haven, Conn. (City), uses objective examinations to iden- tify those firefighters best qualified for promotion. When the results of such an exam to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions showed that white candidates had outperformed minority candidates, a rancorous public debate ensued. Con- fronted with arguments both for and against certifying the test results—and threats of a lawsuit either way—the City threw out the results based on the statistical racial disparity. Petition- ers, white and Hispanic firefighters who passed the exams but were denied a chance at promotions by the City’s refusal to certify the test results, sued the City and respondent officials, alleging that discarding the test results discriminated against them based on their race in violation of, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendants responded that had they certified the test results, they could have faced Title VII liability for adopting a practice having a disparate impact on minority firefighters. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Justice Sotomayor was on the Second Circuit at the time of that decision. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined.
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Jus- tices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined. In her dissent, Jus- tice Ginsburg notes that firefighting is “a profession in which the legacy of racial discrimination casts an especially long shadow” and that the facts of this case should be assessed “against this backdrop of entrenched inequality.”
KENNEDY, JUSTICE: In the fire department of New Haven, Connecticut—as in emergency-service agencies through-out the Nation—firefighters prize their promotion to and within the officer ranks. An agency’s officers com- mand respect within the department and in the whole com- munity; and, of course, added responsibilities command increased salary and benefits. Aware of the intense compe- tition for promotions, New Haven, like many cities, relies on objective examinations to identify the best-qualified can- didates. In 2003, 118 New Haven firefighters took examina- tions to qualify for promotion to the rank of lieutenant or captain. Promotion examinations in New Haven (or City) were infrequent, so the stakes were high. The results would determine which firefighters would be considered for pro- motions during the next two years, and the order in which they would be considered. Many firefighters studied for months, at considerable personal and financial cost.
When the examination results showed that white can- didates had outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local politicians opened a public debate that turned rancorous. Some firefighters argued the tests should be discarded because the results showed the tests to be dis- criminatory. They threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City made promotions based on the tests. Other firefight- ers said the exams were neutral and fair. And they, in turn, threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City, relying on the statistical racial disparity, ignored the test results and denied promotions to the candidates who had performed well. In the end the City took the side of those who pro- tested the test results. It threw out the examinations.
Certain white and Hispanic firefighters who likely would have been promoted based on their good test per- formance sued the City and some of its officials. Theirs is the suit now before us. The suit alleges that, by discarding the test results, the City and the named officials discrim- inated against the plaintiffs based on their race, in viola- tion of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The City and the officials defended their actions, arguing that if they had certified the results, they could have faced liability under Title VII for adopting a practice that had a disparate impact on the minority firefighters. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
We conclude that race-based action like the City’s in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute. The respondents, we further determine, cannot meet that threshold standard. As a result, the City’s action in discarding the tests was a viola- tion of Title VII. . . .
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., as amended, prohibits employment discrimi- nation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination (known as “disparate treatment”) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as “disparate impact”). . . . The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include an express prohibition on policies or practices that produce a disparate impact. But in Griggs
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v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court inter- preted the Act to prohibit, in some cases, employers’ facially neutral practices that, in fact, are “discriminatory in opera- tion.” Id., at 431. . . . Twenty years after Griggs, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, was enacted. The Act included a provision codifying the prohibition on disparate- impact discrimination. That provision is now in force along with the disparate-treatment section already noted. Under the disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing that an employer uses “a particu- lar employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i). An employer may defend against liability by demonstrating that the practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Ibid. Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a plaintiff may still succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs. . . . Petitioners allege that when the CSB refused to certify the captain and lieu- tenant exam results based on the race of the successful can- didates, it discriminated against them in violation of Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision. The City counters that its decision was permissible because the tests “appear[ed] to violate Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions.” . . .
The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability. On the captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates. On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates
was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent. The pass rates of minori- ties, which were approximately one half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provi- sion of Title VII. . . .
There is no genuine dispute that the examinations were job-related and consistent with business necessity. . . . On the record before us, there is no genuine dispute that the City lacked a strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified the examination results. In other words, there is no evidence—let alone the required strong basis in evidence—that the tests were flawed because they were not job-related or because other, equally valid and less discriminatory tests were available to the City. Fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer’s reli- ance on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations and qualified for promotions. The City’s dis- carding the test results was impermissible under Title VII, and summary judgment is appropriate for petitioners on their disparate-treatment claim. . . . Many of the candidates had studied for months, at considerable personal and finan- cial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City’s reli- ance on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the more severe. Confronted with arguments both for and against certifying the test results—and threats of a lawsuit either way—the City was required to make a difficult inquiry. But its hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparate- impact violation, and the City was not entitled to disregard the tests based solely on the racial disparity in the results.
Reversed.
KEY POINTS • New Haven, Connecticut (City), administered a test to firefighters to determine who qual-
ified for promotion. The results showed that white and Hispanic candidates outperformed minority candidates.
• Some minority firefighters argued that the test should be disregarded as discriminatory and that it had a disparate impact on minority firefighters.
• Firefighters who passed the test argued that the City’s failure to certify the test resulted in disparate-treatment discrimination.
• As a practical matter, the City of New Haven believed that, based on the arguments from both sides, it would be sued if it did or if it did not certify the test results.
• The Supreme Court held that because the examinations were job related and consistent with business necessity, and there was no strong evidence of a disparate-impact violation, the City should have certified the test results.
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DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination protects various ethnic groups in the workplace. In a recent case, the court ruled that Title VII had been violated when a bakery employee of Iranian descent was called “Ayatollah” in the workplace by the assistant manager and other employees. After he complained, he was fired.
Discrimination concerning the speaking of a native language frequently causes national-origin lawsuits under Title VII. For instance, courts have ruled illegal an employer’s rule against speaking Spanish during work hours when the employer could not show a business need to understand all conversations between Hispanic employ- ees. On the other hand, some courts have held that, if jobs require contact with the public, a requirement that employees speak some English may be a business necessity.
Direct foreign investment in the United States has doubled and redoubled in recent years. This increasing investment has presented some unusual issues of employment discrimination law. For instance, many commercial treaties with foreign countries give foreign companies operating in the United States the right to hire executive-level employ- ees “of their choice.” Does this mean that foreign companies in the United States can discriminate as to their managerial employees on a basis forbidden under Title VII? The Supreme Court has partially resolved this issue by ruling that the civil rights law applied to a Japanese company that did business through a subsidiary incorporated in this country. See Sidebar 20.2 for problematic examples related to national origin.
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION Note that religious corporations, associations, or societies can discriminate in all their employment practices on the basis of religion, but not on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin. Other employers cannot discriminate on the basis of
Don’t forget that a policy requiring employees to speak English will violate Title VII as disparate impact unless it is justified by business necessity.
Not long after the COVID-19 pandemic started, the EEOC sig- naled that it would start tracking charges of discrimination related to the virus. This was in response
to reports of discrimination against people of Asian descent. Chinese-Americans reported instances of abuse and targeting, including asking them not to return to work.
Other forms of national origin discrimination were evidenced in connection with a lawsuit by the EEOC brought a lawsuit on behalf of Mexican immigrant workers at Sam’s Club. The workers claimed they were harassed about their national origin by a co-worker who is Mexican American. Among the allegations: • At least nine female workers of Mexican descent and
one woman married to a Mexican were subjected to ethnic slurs and derogatory remarks.
• The insults were made on a “near daily” basis, includ- ing being called “f—n’ wetbacks” and references to Mexicans only being good to clean the harasser’s home.
• The harasser also threatened to report three of the victims to immigration authorities, despite their legal status.
• The victims complained about the hostile work envi- ronment, but this “only intensified the harassment and led to intimidation.” Wal-Mart Stores agreed to pay $440,000 to settle
this case. Source: EEOC Press Release, “Wal-Mart to Pay $440,000 to Settle EEOC Suit for Harassment of Latinos,” April 14, 2011. www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/.
sidebar 20.2
National Origin: Problematic Discrimination and Slurs
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religion in employment practices, and they must make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of their employees if it does not result in undue hardship to them.
In one case, the Supreme Court let stand a lower court ruling that employees cannot be required to pay union dues if they have religious objections to unions. The case determined that a union violated Title VII by forcing a company to fire a Seventh Day Adventist who did not comply with a collective bargaining agreement term that all employees must pay union dues. The union argued unsuccessfully that it had made reasonable accommodation to the worker’s religious beliefs by offering to give any dues paid by him to charity. However, in another case the Supreme Court ruled that a company rightfully fired an employee who refused to work on Saturdays due to religious belief. The Court said that the company did not have to burden other employees by making them work Saturdays.
A growing source of religious discrimination lawsuits concerns employees who for religious reasons refuse to perform some task required by the employer. For example, in one case a vegetarian bus driver refused to distribute hamburger coupons on his bus, asserting religious beliefs. When his employer fired him, he sued. The parties settled the case for $50,000. Note that even if an employer wins such a lawsuit, it can be extremely expensive to defend.
Over the last decade, there has been a rise in religious discrimination against Muslims. In 2003, the EEOC settled a complaint by four Muslim machine operators against Stockton Steel of California for $1.1 million. The four operators claimed they were given the worst jobs, ridiculed during their prayers, and called names like “camel jockey” and “raghead.” See Sidebar 20.3 and 20.4 for additional examples of religious discrimination.
In the case of employ- ees of Arab descent, note the close connec- tion between national origin discrimination and religious discrimination.
Abercrombie & Fitch (A&F) has a significant history involving employment discrimination. In 2015, the Supreme Court heard the EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. case involving allega- tions that it refused to hire Saman-
tha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because she was wearing a headscarf. Elauf wore it pursuant to her religious obliga- tions, but it conflicted with A&F’s dress policy. The Court held in favor of Elauf (8–1 majority decision written by Jus- tice Scalia; Justice Thomas dissented). The bottom line: To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, the employee needs to show only that the need for an accommoda- tion was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer had knowledge of the need for an accommodation.
In 2005, A&F settled a discrimination lawsuit with more than 10,000 class members. The suit alleged hiring discrimination against Latino, African American, and Asian American applicants. The checks ranged from several hundred to several thousand dollars each, totaling $40 million. The settlement agreement also requires A&F to:
• Set “benchmarks” (not quotas) for hiring and promo- tion of women, Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Americans.
• Stop targeting fraternities, sororities, or specific col- leges for recruitment.
• Hire 25 recruiters who would focus on seeking women and minority employees.
• Implement a new internal complaint procedure. • Create marketing materials reflecting diversity.
Following the lawsuit, Mike Jeffries, A&F’s then chairman and CEO said, “Diversity and inclusion are key to our organization’s success.”
A&F, however, later litigated a case in which Saman- tha Elauf, a Muslim teen, claimed that she was not hired because her hajib was inconsistent with A&F’s dress code policy. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed ruling 8-1 in favor of Ms. Elauf (575 U.S. __ (2015)). For more information about the case, see EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/equal- employment-opportunity-commission-v-abercrombie- fitch-stores-inc/.
sidebar 20.3
Abercrombie & Fitch’s $40 Million Diversity Lesson
360b/Shutterstock
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A Carnegie Mellon study found that Muslim job candi- dates experience a 13 percent callback rate compared to Christian applicants. The EEOC continues to receive com- plaints involving religious discrimination against Muslims and national origin discrimination against Muslims. Com- plaints include: • Somali immigrants working at a meatpacking com-
pany who were cursed for being Muslim; had blood, meat, and bones thrown at them; and were inter- rupted during prayer breaks.
• Dress policies forbidding headwear, prohibiting Mus- lim women from wearing headscarves, also called hijabs.
• Name-calling, including “terrorist,” “Osama,” “camel jockey,” “camel eater,” and “towel head.”
• No beard rules. • Failure to give prayer breaks and accommodations
related to Ramadan.
What steps should employers take to accommodate Muslims in the workplace? If it will not cause undue hard- ship, employers should consider allowing the following kinds of accommodations: • Prayer breaks with the understanding that Muslims
pray five times a day for approximately 5 to 15 minutes. • Headscarves for women if they do not create a safety
issue. • Facial hair for men. • Vacation days for religious holidays such as Eid al-
Fitr and Eid al-Adha. Overall, as is the case with any form of illegal dis-
crimination, employers should be vigilant and take action to ensure that the workplace is free from discriminatory animus.
For further reading, see, Janice Gassam, “How to Overcome Islamophobia in Your Workplace,” Forbes, May 4, 2019.
sidebar 20.4
Workplace Discrimination against Muslims
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX Historically, states have enacted many laws designed supposedly to protect women. For example, many states by statute have prohibited the employment of women in certain occupations such as those that require lifting heavy objects. Others have barred women from working during the night or more than a given number of hours per week or day. A federal district court held that a California state law that required rest periods for women only was in violation of Title VII. Some statutes prohibit employing women for a specified time after childbirth. Under EEOC guidelines, such statutes are not a defense to a charge of illegal sex discrimination and do not provide an employer with a bona fide occupational qualification in hiring standards. Other EEOC guidelines forbid employers:
• To classify jobs as male or female. • To advertise in help-wanted columns that are designated male or female, unless
sex is a bona fide job qualification.
Similarly, employers may not have separate male and female seniority lists. Whether sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (and discrimination is
thus legal) has been raised in several cases. The courts have tended to consider this exception narrowly. In the following instances involving hiring policy, no bona fide occupational qualification was found to exist:
• A rule requiring airline stewardesses, but not stewards, to be single. • A policy of hiring only females as flight cabin attendants.
Query: Could Victoria’s Secret stores legally hire only women for certain positions?
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• A rule against hiring females with preschool-age children, but not against hiring males with such children.
• A telephone company policy against hiring females as switchers because of the alleged heavy lifting involved on the job.
In the telephone company case, the court held that for a bona fide occupational qualification to exist, there must be “reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to per- form safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.” The Supreme Court has indicated that for such a qualification to exist, sex must be provably relevant to job performance.
Other examples of illegal sex discrimination include:
• Refusing to hire a female newscaster because “news coming from a woman sounds like gossip.”
• Allowing women to retire at age 50, but requiring men to wait until age 55. • Failing to promote women to overseas positions because foreign clients were
reluctant to do business with women.
The much-talked-about Hooters restaurant case involved a lawsuit filed by men in Illinois and Maryland who were denied jobs. Hooters paid $3.75 million to settle the lawsuit. The settlement allows Hooters to continue employing voluptuous and scantily clad female “Hooters Girls,” but they must create and fill a few other sup- port jobs, like bartenders and hosts, without regard to gender.
The largest gender discrimination case was brought as a class action against Walmart and Sam’s Club. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to certify the class. For more information about this case, see Case 4.2 in Chapter 4. In early 2020, workers filed a $500 million class action lawsuit against McDonald’s alleging the firm fosters “systemic sexual harassment.”
See Sidebar 20.5 for discussion material related to women in business.
A study by Strategy& (formerly Booz & Co.) of the 2,500 largest public companies by market value revealed that over the past ten years, fewer than three in ten male chief executives were fired, yet almost two in five female bosses were pressured to leave. The study cited two main reasons: (1) “benefit of the doubt factor” (the strong desire to appoint a female candidate can lead to making a bolder choice with a higher chance of going wrong) and (2) boardroom culture remains overwhelmingly male, which can create a difficult working environment.
About 42 percent of working women in the United States report that they have faced job discrimination because of their gender. The allegations range from earn- ing less than male counterparts to being passed over for important assignments.
Does so-called bro talk affect women in the work- place? In an op-ed piece in The New York Times, a former bond trader contends that “‘Bro talk’ produces a force field of disrespect and exclusion that makes it incred- ibly difficult for women to ascend the Wall Street ladder.”
sidebar 20.5
Women in Business: A Tough Go for Many
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The author calls on hedge fund founders, managing directors and desk heads to institute a zero-tolerance policy for this behavior to help foster a culture of respect for women on Wall Street.
Here are some examples of gender bias cases brought by women against major U.S. firms: • Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.—After finding dis-
crimination against women employees in pay, pro- motion, and pregnancy policies, a New York jury awarded the plaintiffs $3,367,250 in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages. In his closing argument, the plaintiffs’ lawyer told the jury that the evidence proved that Novartis “tolerated a culture of sexism, a boys’ club atmosphere.” Novar- tis subsequently settled the remaining gender bias claims, agreeing to a settlement of approximately $152.5 million to current and former female sales representatives.
• Morgan Stanley—In 2004, the firm agreed to pay $54 million to settle a gender discrimination suit brought by a former bond saleswoman.
• Goldman Sachs Group Inc.—Three former female employees sued Goldman Sachs in 2010, alleging “systemic” violations of female employees’ rights, including allegations of excluding women from golf outings and other work-related social events, push- up contests, and retaliation after complaining about being groped by a male colleague after an outing at a topless bar. The suit alleges that the decentralized structure gives managers “unchecked discretion” in assigning pay and responsibilities.
Sources: Kim Parker and Cary Funk, “Gender Discrimination Comes in Many Forms for Today’s Working Women,” Pew Research Center, December 14, 2017; Polk, Sam, “How Wall Street Bro Talk Keeps Women Down,” New York Times, July 7, 2016; and “The 2013 Chief Executive Study: Women CEOs of the Last 10 Years,” Strategy, & April 29, 2014.
Sexual Harassment A common type of illegal sex discrimination in the work- place is sexual harassment. The typical sexual harassment case involves a plaintiff who has been promised benefits or threatened with loss if she or he does not give sexual favors to an employment supervisor. Such a case is also called a quid pro quo (this for that) case. Under Title VII and agency law, an employer is liable for this sex discrimination.
Another type of sexual harassment is the hostile work environment, one in which co-workers make offensive sexual comments or propositions, engage in suggestive touching, show nude pictures, or draw sexual graffiti. The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson ruled that Title VII prohibits “an offensive or hos- tile working environment,” even when no economic loss occurs. By so ruling, the Court acknowledged that the work environment itself is a condition of employment covered by Title VII.
The Supreme Court also addressed the hostile work environment issue in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. Specifically, the Court was asked to determine whether, before a person could sue under Title VII, a hostile work environment had “to seri- ously affect [his or her] psychological well-being” or “cause injury.” The Court ruled that illegal sexual harassment goes beyond that which causes “injury.” It includes any harassment reasonably perceived as “hostile or abusive.”
Is all sexually offensive conduct between employees illegal? The answer is no, although an employee’s company may choose to forbid and punish all such conduct. In 2005, the Supreme Court in Clarke County School District v. Breeden summarized when offensive sexual conduct becomes illegal:
[S]exual harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.
It may be helpful to think of sexual harassment discrimination in terms of (1) quid pro quo cases and (2) hostile work environment cases.
#MeToo is a social movement against sexual harassment and sexual assault of women, which spread virally in 2017.
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The Court continued:
Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation; instead, whether an environment is suffi- ciently hostile or abusive must be judged by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.
It is not uncommon for a discrimination lawsuit to involve multiple kinds of claims. A good example of this is a recent case against Cracker Barrel, in which the restaurant agreed to pay $2 million to settle a lawsuit alleging sexual harassment, racial harassment, and retaliation by 51 current or former employees. On behalf of the workers, the EEOC alleged that male co-workers and managers subjected female workers to unwelcome and offensive sexual comments and touching. According to the EEOC, “Black employees said that they experienced racially charged language in the workplace, including ‘spear chucking porch monkey,’ ‘you people,’ and the ‘n-word.’” In addition to the monetary settlement, Cracker Barrel must train all employees in its stores about harassment.
Employer’s Defense to Hostile Environment Is an employer always liable when fellow employees create a hostile environment based on gender? The answer is that the employer is not always legally responsible for a hostile environment. The employer may have a defense. Courts have ruled that an employer is liable to a plain- tiff employee for a hostile working environment created by fellow employees only when the employer knows of the problem and fails to take prompt and reasonable steps to correct it, such as by moving the harassers away from the plaintiff employee. The employer can defend itself by proving that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.
Remember Title VII requires an employee to file a complaint concerning a discriminatory practice with the EEOC within 180 days of its happening (within 300 days if the employee has first filed with a state fair employment practices commis- sion). Employers are liable for acts that occurred before 180 days of the EEOC filing if they are part of a single hostile environment that continued within the 180-day period.
See Sidebar 20.6 for a range of examples involving sexual harassment and gen- der discrimination in the workplace.
Nearly 1 in 5 sexual harassment claims were filed by men with the EEOC in 2018.
Don’t forget that employers are liable if plaintiffs prove quid pro quo harassment. But employers may have a defense to hostile environment harassment.
Here is a sample of sexual harassment claims in the workplace:
21st Century Fox: In 2017, 21st Century Fox dis- closed in an SEC filing that, in the nine months prior, it had incurred $45 million in costs related to sexual harassment litigation. Sexual harassment allegations at Fox News formed much of the basis of the costs. Fallout at Fox News related to sexual harassment included the departures of
chairman Roger Ailes and news personality Bill O’Reilly. The O’Reilly Factor went from at least 30 nightly nation- ally broadcast commercials to 10. Fearing a consumer backlash, sponsors, including Mercedes Benz and Aleve, pulled their advertising amid the scandal.
Vulgar Language: Can vulgar language, even if it is not specifically directed at an individual, be actionable as sex- ual harassment under Title VII? Yes—according to the 11th
sidebar 20.6
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
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Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiff, Ingrid Reeves, worked at a sales company, C.H. Robinson. Reeves alleged that she was subjected to hearing her male co-workers call other women names such as “b***h,” “wh**e,” and “c**t” on a daily basis. She also claimed that there were repeated vulgar discussions about female body parts and a pornographic image of a woman in the office. Reeves complained to her co-workers, her supervisor, and top company executives, but the offensive conduct was “accepted and tolerated.”
According to the 11th Circuit, “if Reeves’s account is to be believed, C.H. Robinson’s workplace was more than a rough environment—indiscriminately vulgar, pro- fane, and sexual. Instead, a jury reasonably could find that it was a workplace that exposed Reeves to disad- vantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex were not exposed.” Moreover, the court stated that it was no defense to assert “that the workplace may have been vulgar and sexually degrading before Reeves arrived.”
Query: Were there unintended consequences of the #MeToo movement?
According to one study, 74 percent of women said they thought that they would be more willing to speak
out about sexual harassment and 77 percent of men anticipated being more careful about potentially appro- priate behavior. Although this is very positive news, more than 10 percent of both men and women said that they thought that they would be less willing than previously to hire attractive women. Additionally, 22 percent of men and 44 percent of women predicted that men would be more apt to exclude women from social interactions.
In a follow-up survey in 2019, the same researchers revealed that the backlash was more significant than was anticipated. In fact, 19 percent of men said that they were reluctant to hire attractive women and 21 percent said that they were reluctant to hire women for jobs involv- ing close interpersonal interaction with men (e.g. those involving travel), and 21 percent said that they avoided one-on-one meetings with female colleagues. Sources: Tim Bower, “The #MeToo Backlash,” Harvard Business Review, October 2019; Barnes, Brooks, “Fox Reveals Cost of Sexual Harassment Allegations,” New York Times, May 10, 2017; Grynbaum, Michael M., and Maheshwari, Sapna, “Fears of Revolt by Consumers Felled O’Reilly,” New York Times, April 20, 2017; Reeves v.C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 07-10270 (11th Cir. Jan. 20, 2010), available at www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ ops/200710270op2.pdf.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended the Civil Rights Act in 1978. Under it, employers can no longer discrimi- nate against women workers who become pregnant or give birth. Thus, employers with health or disability plans must cover pregnancy, childbirth, and related medi- cal conditions in the same manner as other conditions are covered. The law covers unmarried as well as married pregnant women. It also states that an employer can- not force a pregnant woman to stop working until her baby is born, provided she is still capable of performing her duties properly. An employer is also prohibited from specifying how long a leave of absence must be taken after childbirth. Coverage for abortion is not required by the statute unless an employee carries to term and her life is endangered or she develops medical complications because of an abortion. If a woman undergoes an abortion, though, all other benefits provided for employees, such as sick leave, must be provided to her.
Note that sex discrimination applies to discrimination against men as well as women. For example, under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act the Supreme Court ruled unlawful an employer’s health insurance plan that covered the pregnancies of female employees but did not cover the pregnancies of male employees’ wives.
See Sidebar 20.7 for a discussion of a Supreme Court case on pregnancy discrimination.
Men as well as women may be subject to illegal sex discrimination.
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Pregnancy discrimination remains an issue in the workplace.
What does a woman need to bring a successful claim? She must prove that her pregnancy or her status as a mother motivated the employer’s adverse action.
In the U.S. Supreme Court case, Young v. United Par- cel Service 575 U.S. __ (2015), the plaintiff alleged that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Peggy Young claimed that she had to take unpaid leave after her doctor recommended that she not lift heavy items. She claimed that UPS did not offer her alternative work.
The question before the court: Whether, and under what circumstances, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires an employer that provides work accommoda- tions to non-pregnant employees with work limitations to provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who are “similar in their ability or inability to work.”
Holding: A plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate impact under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which requires employers to treat “women affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”
A plaintiff can make a prima facie case by showing that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others simi- lar in their ability or inability to work. The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying accommodation.
Decision: In a 6–3 opinion, the court held in favor of Ms. Young. Ms. Young’s daughter was seven years old when the decision was reached.
For more information, see https://www.eeoc.gov/ eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm. Note that the EEOC has changed the way it report currents data, and it only includes charges filed with the EEOC. See https://www .eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy_new.cfm.
sidebar 20.7
Pregnancy Discrimination: Claims on the Rise
Equal Pay Act Historically, employers have paid female employees less than males, even when they held the same jobs. In 1964, women earned only 59 cents for every dollar earned by males. By 2008, female employees earned just 77 cents for every dollar earned by males.
Federal legislation prohibits sex discrimination in employment compensation under both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Administered by the EEOC, the Equal Pay Act prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of sex in the payment of wages for performing substantially the same work under similar working conditions and in the same establishment. For jobs to be equal, they must require “equal skill, effort, and responsibility.” Discrimination is allowed if it arises from a seniority system, a merit system, or any factor other than sex.
The focus of Equal Pay Act cases is whether the male and female jobs being compared involve “equal” work. Courts have recognized that equal does not mean identical; it means substantially equal. Thus, courts have ruled “equal” the work of male barbers and female beauticians and of male tailors and female seamstresses. Differences in male and female job descriptions will not totally protect employers against charges of equal-pay infractions. The courts have held that “substantially equal” work done on different machines would require the employer to compensate male and female employees equally. The question of what is “equal pay” is also a common focus. Equal pay includes all payments, including fringe benefits such as stock options, incentive bonuses, and other benefits such as vacation or holiday pay, reimbursement for travel, and retirement benefits.
According to the census statistics, women earned 81.6 cents on the male dollar in 2018. April 20th is now Equal Pay Day in the United States to highlight aware- ness of this ongoing discrepancy.
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The Supreme Court has ruled that discriminatory male and female pay differ- ences can also be illegal under Title VII. In County of Washington v. Gunther, the Court decided that plaintiffs can use evidence of such pay differences to help prove intentional sex discrimination, even when the work performed is not substantially equal. Relying on the Gunther case, at least one lower court has held that women must be paid equally with men who perform comparable work. A federal district court ruled that the state of Washington discriminated against secretaries (mostly women) by paying them less than maintenance and other personnel (mostly men). However, the comparable worth theory is highly controversial, and other courts have not agreed with the theory. Equal Pay Act cases tend to rely heavily on statisti- cal analysis of disparities.
In a landmark Title VII decision, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. (2007), a sharply divided Supreme Court rejected the pro-employee paycheck- accrual theory of pay discrimination previously accepted by many courts. This deci- sion was negated by Congress with the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Equal Pay Act. Simply stated, each paycheck is not a separate violation and employees have a claim with each violation; however, employees must still file an EEOC charge within 180 or 300 days (depending on their state) after each discriminatory pay decision or forever lose their claim. For more details about the controversial Ledbetter case, see Sidebar 20.8.
One court ruled that an employer could pay male physician assistants more than female nurses because the physician assistants had administrative duties that nurses did not have to perform.
Lilly Ledbetter worked for Goodyear for nearly 20 years. During that time, Ledbetter and other salaried employees received or were denied raises based on their supervi- sors’ evaluation of their performance. Near the end of her tenure at Goodyear, Ledbetter discovered that her pay was significantly less—as much as 40 percent less—than her male counterparts. Ledbetter then filed a charge with the EEOC.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY The district court allowed Ledbetter to present evi-
dence of her entire 19-year career at Goodyear. A jury found in her favor, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court (5–4) affirmed the decision that a Title VII pay discrimination claim cannot be based on any pay decision that occurred outside of the EEOC charging period.
DISSENTING VIEWS Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote a spirited dissent
(joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) arguing that “[p]ay disparities often occur . . . in small increments” and “cause to suspect that discrimination is at work devel- ops only over time.” She continued, asserting that discrim- inatory disparities in pay, like hostile work environment claims, rest not on “one particular paycheck, but on ‘the cumulative effect of individual acts.’” Incensed about the majority opinion, Justice Ginsberg read her dissent aloud from the bench.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE The first piece of legislation President Obama signed
into law was the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. The Ledbetter Act extends the time for employees to bring gender discrimination claims challenging pay or promo- tion decisions.
sidebar 20.8
Did the Supreme Court Get It Wrong? Legislative Action Post-Ledbetter
Examples of successful Equal Pay Act cases include one against Walmart and another against the New York Corrections Department. In the first case, a pharmacist who claimed Walmart fired her after asking to be paid the same as her male colleagues won nearly a $2 million award against Walmart. Walmart argued that it fired the pharmacist for leaving the pharmacy unattended and allowing a
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technician to use her computer security code to issue prescriptions, including a fraudulent prescription for a painkiller. Countering this argument, the pharmacist argued that the prescription incident took place 18 months before her termination and more severe infractions by her male counterparts were unpunished. In the sec- ond case, the EEOC settled an Equal Pay Act suit against the New York Department of Corrections for nearly $1 million. The EEOC alleged that female employees were receiving less benefits than their male counterparts.
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Title VII does not prohibit discrimi- nation against employees based on their sexual orientation or whether they are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or heterosexual. The word sex in Title VII refers only to gender, whether someone is female or male. That said, because the focus is on gender, discrimination cases are brought based on illegal gender stereotypes. For instance, discrimination on account of a person’s gender identity that offends tradi- tional notions can be a violation of Title VII. A quarter of the states, however, and numerous cities do forbid discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Congress could amend Title VII to protect employees from such discrimination. Already, thou- sands of companies—ranging from American Express, Coca-Cola, and JPMorgan Chase to Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler—offer domestic partner benefits to all employees without regard to sexual orientation.
Although there have been efforts to pass federal legislation, such as the Employ- ment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), banning employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it has not yet become federal law. See Sidebar 20.9 for a landmark decision on Title VII involving workplace discrimination against workers on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
In June 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against work- ers based on sexual orientation or gender identity. This landmark 6-3 decision in Bostock v. Clayton Co., Georgia protects LGBT workers from discrimination. The decision involved three cases in which the employer allegedly fired a long-time employee for being homosexual or transgender.
In the majority opinion written by Justice Neil Gor- such, the language is unequivocal:
“In Title VII, Congress adopted broad language mak- ing it illegal for an employer to rely on an employee’s sex when deciding to fire that employee. We do not hesitate to recognize today a necessary consequence of that leg- islative choice: An employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.” In reaching
this conclusion, Justice Gorsuch said, “An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it wouldn’t have ques- tioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a neces- sary and undisguisable role in that decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh dissented. In his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh stated, “Millions of gay and lesbian Americans have worked hard for many decades to achieve equal treatment in fact and in the law. . . They have advanced powerful policy arguments. . .Under the Constitution’s separation of powers, however, I believe that it was Congress’s role, not this Court’s to amend Title VII.”
For full details, see Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. __ (2020).
sidebar 20.9
Federal Protection for LGBT Workers from Discrimination
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Employment Practices That May Be Challenged
In studying the Civil Rights Act, we can usefully consider several specific employ- ment practices that employees or job applicants may challenge as discriminatory. These practices include:
• Setting testing and educational requirements. • Having height and weight requirements for physical labor. • Maintaining appearance requirements. • Practicing affirmative action. • Using seniority systems.
The following sections take a close look at these practices.
QUESTIONNAIRES, INTERVIEWS, TESTING, AND EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Employers have used a number of tools to help them find the right person for the right job. Among these tools are questionnaires, interviews, references, minimum educational requirements (such as a high school diploma), and personnel tests. However, employers must be extremely careful not to use tools that illegally discrimi- nate. For example, Rent-A-Center, a Dallas-based appliance-rental company, agreed to pay more than $2 million in damages to more than 1,200 job applicants and employees who were asked questions about their sex lives and religious views in a 500-item true/false questionnaire. Plaintiffs claimed the questionnaire discriminated illegally on the basis of gender and religion and that it violated their privacy.
Interviews can also discriminate illegally, and personnel interviewers must be well trained. One study indicated that interviewers can be biased even if they are not aware of it. The study showed that the interviewers tended to select males over females for sales positions because the interviewers subconsciously related sales suc- cess with height, and males are on the average taller than females. References may not be so reliable, either. A previous employer’s letter may reflect personal biases against an applicant that were not related to job performance.
At the other extreme, an employer may give a poor employee a top recommenda- tion because of sympathy or fear of a lawsuit in case the letter is somehow obtained by the employee. Advocates of personnel tests in the selection process feel they are very valuable in weeding out the wrong persons for a job and picking the right ones. They believe reliance on test results eliminates biases that interviewers or former employers who give references may have.
Tests, however, can have a disparate impact on job applicants, discriminating on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin. Setting educational standards such as requiring a high school diploma for employment can also have a disparate impact. To avoid discrimination challenges, employers must make sure that all testing and educational requirements are job related and necessary for the business.
In the past, some employers have “race normed” employment tests. Race norm- ing is the practice of setting two different cutoff test scores for employment based on race or one of the other Title VII categories. For example, on a race-normed test, the minimum score for employment of white job applicants might be set at 75 out of 100. For minority applicants, the minimum score might be set at 65. The Civil Rights Act amendments of 1991 specifically prohibit the race norming of employment tests.
LO 20-3
Most employment prac- tices that discriminate illegally do so because of their disparate impact.
Don’t forget that for employers to race- norm employment tests violates Title VII.
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HEIGHT AND WEIGHT REQUIREMENTS Minimum or maximum height or weight job requirements apply equally to all job applicants, but if they have the effect of screening out applicants on the basis of race, national origin, or sex, the employer must demonstrate that such requirements are validly related to the ability to perform the work in question. For example, maxi- mum size standards would be permissible, even if they favored women over men, if the available work space were too small to permit large persons to perform the duties of the job properly. Most size requirements have dictated minimum heights or weights, often based on a stereotyped assumption that a certain amount of strength that smaller persons might not have probably was necessary for the work. In one case, a 5-foot, 5-inch, 130-pound Hispanic won a suit against a police department on the basis that the department’s 5-foot, 8-inch minimum height requirement dis- criminated against Hispanics, who often are shorter than that standard. He was later hired when he passed the department’s physical agility examination, which included dragging a 150-pound body 75 feet and scaling a 6-foot wall.
APPEARANCE REQUIREMENTS Employers often have set grooming standards for their employees. Those regulat- ing hair length of males or prohibiting beards or mustaches have been among the most common. Undoubtedly, motivation for these rules stems from the feeling of the employer that the image it projects to the public through its employees will be adversely affected if their appearance is not “proper.” It is unclear whether appear- ance requirements are legal or illegal because there have been rulings both ways. However, in 2000 the EEOC filed a lawsuit in Atlanta against FedEx Corporation for firing a bearded delivery driver who refused to shave in violation of a company policy that permitted beards only when medically necessary. The driver’s Islamic beliefs required males to wear beards, and the lawsuit alleged that FedEx’s policy constituted religious discrimination. FedEx entered into a consent decree to modify its appearance policy to allow beards or particular hairstyles if an employee’s sin- cerely held religious belief is at issue. FedEx also agreed to pay back pay and com- pensatory damages.
In another case, a black employee argued that he was wrongfully fired for break- ing a company rule prohibiting beards. Dermatologists testified that the plaintiff had a condition called “razor bumps” (which occurs when the tightly curled facial hairs of black men become ingrown from shaving) and that the only known cure was for him not to shave. Although the federal appeals court found that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the employer’s regulation, it held in favor of the company, ruling that its slight racial impact was justified by the business necessity it served. A conflicting opinion in still another case upheld an employee’s right to wear a beard because of razor bumps.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION Since the 1940s, a series of presidential executive orders have promoted nondiscrim- ination and affirmative action by employers who contract with the federal govern- ment. The authority for these orders rests with the president’s executive power to control the granting of federal contracts. As a condition to obtaining such contracts,
Walt Disney World has detailed instructions for employees on “The Disney Look,” including eyewear, body piercing, earlobe expansion, facial hair, fingernails, hair length, and sideburns. The goal is to look “friendly, approachable, and knowledgeable.”
The burden of proof in a disparate-impact case requires the employer to prove that appearance is a business necessity.
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employers must agree contractually to take affirmative action to avoid unlawful dis- crimination in recruitment, employment, promotion, training, rate of compensation, and layoff of workers.
The affirmative action requirement means that federally contracting employers must actively recruit members of minority groups being underused in the workforce. That is, employers must hire members of these groups when there are fewer minority workers in a given job category than one could reasonably expect, considering their availability. In many instances, employers must develop written affirmative action plans and set goals and timetables for bringing minority (or female) workforces up to their percentages in the available labor pool.
The Labor Department administers executive orders through its Office of Fed- eral Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). The OFCCP can terminate federal contracts with employers who do not comply with its guidelines and can make them ineligible for any future federal business. For instance, it required Uniroyal Inc. to give its female employees an estimated $18 million in back pay to compensate for past employment discrimination. The alternative was elimination of $36 million of existing federal contracts and ineligibility for future federal business.
Private Employer Affirmative Action Not all affirmative action programs arise under federal contracting rules. Courts also impose affirmative action on pri- vate employers to overcome a history of prior discrimination. Sometimes private employers voluntarily adopt affirmative action or agree to it with unions. These affir- mative action programs can give rise to claims of reverse discrimination when minorities or women with lower qualifications or less seniority than white males are given preference in employment or training. Even though such programs are intended to remedy the effects of present or past discrimination or other barriers to equal employment opportunity, white males have argued that the law does not per- mit employers to discriminate against them on the basis of race or sex any more than it allows discrimination against minorities or women.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, the Supreme Court ruled legal under Title VII a voluntary affirmative action plan between an employer and a union. The plan required that at least 50 percent of certain new work trainees be black. The Court noted that the plan did not require that white employees be fired or excluded altogether from advancement. It was only a temporary measure to elimi- nate actual racial imbalance in the workforce.
Note the difference between taking affirmative action and setting a “quota.” Affirmative action is taken to help correct historic workforce imbalances and usu- ally has target goals that are pursued for a limited time. On the other hand, quotas set rigid standards for various groups, such as that 50 percent of the workforce must be female. The 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments prohibit the setting of quotas in employment.
The EEOC has issued guidelines intended to protect employers who set up affir- mative action plans. These guidelines indicate that Title VII is not violated if an employer determines that there is a reasonable basis for concluding that such a plan is appropriate and the employer takes reasonable affirmative action. For example, if an employer discovers that it has a job category where one might expect to find more women and minorities employed than are actually in its workforce, the employer has a reasonable basis for affirmative action.
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Supreme Court emphasized that government-imposed affirmative action plans are subject to strict judicial
It is not unusual for an employment ad to state that the company is an “affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.” Some ads also state: “Women and underrep- resented minorities are encouraged to apply.”
Do remember that the justification for affirmative action is the historic discrimination against protected groups.
In 2005, a federal jury found that the New Orleans district attorney discriminated against 43 white employees by firing them and replac- ing them with African Americans.
Voluntary affirmative action plans by private employers may violate Title VII but do not vio- late constitutional equal protection because they are not “state action.”
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scrutiny under equal protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To be constitutional, such plans must now be supported by a compelling interest. The Adarand decision will make it constitutionally difficult to justify some government-imposed affirmative action plans. Much litigation has followed that tests the constitutionality of various plans.
In California, voters approved the controversial Proposition 209. In relevant part, it says that “the state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treat- ment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contract- ing.” The Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from a lower court decision that upheld Proposition 209 against constitutional challenge and the assertion it violated federal civil rights law. Although Proposition 209 does not affect private employer affirmative action plans required by federal law, it does illustrate the cur- rent opposition that many Americans have to affirmative action. Polls show that almost three-fourths of the general population disapproves of affirmative action. Nearly 50 percent of African Americans also oppose it.
SENIORITY SYSTEMS Seniority systems give priority to those employees who have worked longer for a particular employer or in a particular line of employment of the employer. Employ- ers may institute seniority systems on their own, but in a union shop they are usu- ally the result of collective bargaining. Their terms are spelled out in the agreement between the company and the union. Seniority systems often determine the calcula- tion of vacation, pension, and other fringe benefits. They also control many employ- ment decisions such as the order in which employees may choose shifts or qualify for promotions or transfers to different jobs. They also are used to select the persons to be laid off when an employer is reducing its labor force. As a result of seniority, the last hired are usually the first fired. Decisions based on seniority have been chal- lenged in recent years as violating the laws relating to equal employment opportu- nity. Challenges often arose when recently hired members of minority groups were laid off during periods of economic downturn. Firms with successful affirmative action programs often lost most of their minority employees.
Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that, in spite of other provisions in the act, it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different employment standards under a bona fide (good-faith) seniority system if the differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate. In Mem- phis Fire Dept. v. Stotts, the Supreme Court ruled that discrimination resulting from application of a seniority system was lawful even when it affected minorities hired or promoted by affirmative action.
Other Statutes and Discrimination in Employment
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the most widely used antidiscrimination statute, there are other important antidiscrimination laws. They include the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and various state and local laws. The following sections examine these laws.
Title VII specifically allows employers to adopt seniority systems even when they may operate to discrimi- nate against protected groups.
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CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 An important federal law that complements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is the Civil Rights Act of 1866. One provision of that act, known as Section 1981 (referring to its U.S. Code designation, 42 U.S.C. §1981), provides that “all per- sons . . . shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts . . . as enjoyed by white citizens.” Since union memberships and employment relationships involve contracts, Section 1981 bans racial discrimination in these areas.
The courts have interpreted Section 1981 as giving a private plaintiff most of the same protections against racial discrimination that the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides. In addition, there are at least two advantages to the plaintiff who files a suit based on Section 1981. First, there are no procedural requirements for bringing such a suit, whereas there are a number of fairly complex requirements plaintiffs must fol- low before bringing a private suit under Title VII. For instance, before a plaintiff can file a lawsuit against an employer, the plaintiff must file charges of discrimination with the EEOC and obtain a notice of right to sue from the agency. By using Section 1981, a plaintiff alleging race discrimination can immediately sue an employer in federal court without first going through the EEOC.
Unlimited Damages A second advantage to Section 1981 is that under it the courts can award unlimited compensatory and punitive damages. There are no capped limits as there are under Title VII. As a practical matter, parties alleging racial discrimination usually sue under both Section 1981 and Title VII.
Note that Section 1981 does not cover discrimination based on sex, religion, national origin, age, or handicap. As interpreted by the courts, this section applies only to racial discrimination. However, what is race? The Supreme Court has held that being of Arabic or Jewish ancestry constitutes “race” as protected by Section 1981. The Court stated that when the law was passed in the 19th century, the concept of race was much broader than it is today. Race then included the descendants of a particular “family, tribe, people, or nation.” Today, Section 1981 protects persons of all races from discrimination.
In Patterson v. McLean, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 1981 to apply only to the actual hiring or firing of employees based on race. Under this interpreta- tion, Section 1981 did not offer protection against discrimination such as a hostile working environment. But the Civil Rights Act amendments of 1991 redefined Sec- tion 1981 to include protection against discrimination in “enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.” Thus, Section 1981 now also protects against hostile environment discrimination. In 2008, the Supreme Court also extended Section 1981 to claims of retaliation for complaining about race discrimination.
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF AGE The American workforce is “graying.” According to a 2015 Gallup poll, 37 percent of non-retired Americans said that they do not plan to stop working until after age 65. This number is significantly higher than that 20 years ago when the number was 14 percent. According to a report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are record numbers of workers among 55- to 64-year-olds, and the numbers are expected to increase. In fact, workers 65 and older are expected to continue to be a fast-growing
Denny’s restaurants have been repeatedly sued by black customers claiming Denny’s violated their civil rights. Denny’s has paid more than $54 million to settle the lawsuits.
Don’t forget that Section 1981 is why racial discrimination is subject to damages far in excess of the $300,000 limit imposed on individuals under Title VII.
Under Section 1981, “race” includes ethnic or national groups.
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segment of the U.S. labor force. As percentages of older workers rise in coming years, so will the increase in complaints about age discrimination.
The Civil Rights Act does not protect against discrimination based on age. However, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does. It prohibits employment discrimination against employees ages 40 and older, and it prohibits the mandatory retirement of these employees. Only certain executives and high policy- makers of private companies can be forced into early retirement. Specifically, “bona fide” executives and high-level policymakers age 65 and older who are entitled to receive annual retirement benefits of at least $44,000 a year are subject to mandatory retirement policies. The ADEA applies to employers with 20 or more employees. The ADEA also invalidates retirement plans and labor contracts that violate the law.
Types of Age Discrimination The ADEA recognizes both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact discrimination for employers with 20 or more employees. The Supreme Court has upheld a jury’s finding of disparate treatment in an age dis- crimination case. The employer had said the employee “was so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower” and that he “was too damn old to do his job.” When the employer later fired the employee, the jury found for the employee in spite of the employer’s assertion that it had fired the employee for reasons other than age.
The Supreme Court has also stated that the ADEA recognizes disparate impact in age discrimination cases. The city of Jackson, Mississippi, had awarded pay raises to junior ranks of police officers that were substantially higher than the pay raises given to more senior ranks. These raises had the impact of discriminating on the basis of age. Older officers received lower pay raises because they were mostly in senior ranks.
However, the Supreme Court stated that disparate impact alone did not prove illegality under the ADEA. The city of Jackson was merely attempting to match the salaries offered to junior officers in nearby cities, which was a “reasonable factor other than age.” See Sidebar 20.10 for an example of illegal mandatory retirement policy.
“Age bias is still a persistent problem in the 21st century workplace.”
–Spencer H. Lewis, EEOC district director
The EEOC filed a lawsuit against Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (Sidley Austin), a major Chicago-based interna- tional law firm, alleging that it violated the ADEA when it selected 32 “partners” for expulsion from the firm on account of their age or forced them to retire.
After more than two years of litigation, Sidley Austin agreed to pay $27.5 million to the former partners. The firm also agreed to refrain from “terminating, expel- ling, retiring, reducing the compensation of, or otherwise adversely changing the partnership status of any partner because of age” or “maintaining any formal or informal policy or practice requiring retirement as a partner or requiring permission to continue as a partner once the partner has reached a certain age.”
ADEA Case Involving PricewaterhouseCoopers: Two accountants brought a lawsuit against PWC claim- ing that its hiring policies discriminated against appli- cants over 40. PWC agreed to pay $11.625 million to settle the case. The settlement included commitment to a hiring program for at least two years that would allow candidates over 40 to apply for entry-level positions. Additionally, PWC agreed to hire a consultant to advise on inclusivity and age bias in the hiring and training process and to avoid asking graduation date information of appli- cants before making a job offer. Source: EEOC Press Releases.
sidebar 20.10
Did You Read the Law? A Law Firm Runs Afoul of the ADEA
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Employer Defenses in ADEA Cases The employer defenses to age discrim- ination, disparate treatment, and disparate impact differ slightly from the defense in Title VII cases.
For instance, under the ADEA, age is seldom recognized as the basis for a bona fide occupational qualification. It is recognized that as people grow older, their physical strength, agility, reflexes, hearing, and vision tend to diminish in quality. However, this generally provides no legal reason for discriminating against older persons as a class. Although courts will uphold job-related physical requirements if they apply on a case- by- case basis, they frequently find as illegal those policies that prohibit the hiring of persons beyond a maximum age or that establish a maximum age beyond which employees are forced to retire for physical reasons. Thus, one court ruled that a mandatory retire- ment age of 65 was illegally discriminatory as applied to the job of district fire chief. In an exception to the general rule, one court has ruled that age can be a BFOQ in a case where the airlines imposed a maximum age for hiring new pilots. The court observed that the Federal Aviation Administration mandated a retirement age for pilots.
The ADEA also does not require the employer to prove a “business necessity” in order to successfully defend an age discrimination case of disparate impact. All the employer need do is establish that a “reasonable factor other than age” accounted for the discriminatory impact. Further, unlike under Title VII, the employer’s defense of a reasonable factor other than age cannot be defeated by the employee’s showing of a less discriminatory way of achieving the employer’s purpose.
Remedies under the ADEA The ADEA provides for back pay and recovery of attorney fees. Note that willful violations of the act permit discrimination victims to be awarded double damages.
Note an important exception to this general rule about remedies against state actors under the ADEA. In accordance with the Supreme Court case Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents (2000), a plaintiff cannot recover money damages against a state entity. State law and state courts, however, may offer remedies for age discrimination perpetrated by a state. This Eleventh Amendment immunity for states in federal court has been extended to other employment laws, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act.
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITIES According to a Harris poll, two-thirds of all disabled Americans between the ages of 16 and 64 are not working, even though most of them want to work. To help those with disabilities obtain work, Congress in 1990 passed the Americans with Disabili- ties Act (ADA). Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a number of employer- friendly decisions restricting the scope of the ADA’s protection. Responding to criticism that the U.S. Supreme Court unreasonably restricted the ADA’s scope, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, effective January 1, 2009, and, in 2011, the EEOC released its final regulations. The ADA is now expanded to protect a broader group of individuals.
To prevent disability discrimination, the ADA prohibits employers from requir- ing a pre-employment medical examination or asking questions about the job appli- cant’s medical history. Only after a job offer has been extended can the employer condition employment on the employee’s responses to job-related medical questions.
The ADA prohibits employer discrimination against job applicants or employ- ees based on (1) their having a disability, (2) their having a disability in the past,
Willful violations of the ADEA allow courts to impose double damage awards against employers.
It is now easier to establish a “disability” within the definition of the ADA and employers need to be prepared to make reasonable accommodations.
The concept of “dis- ability” includes mental disabilities and diseases as well as physical impairment.
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or (3) their being regarded as having a disability. The ADA defines disability as “any physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an indi- vidual’s major life activities.” “Substantially limits” now requires a lower degree of limitation than was previously applied by the courts.
“Physical and mental impairment” includes physical disorders and conditions, disease, disfigurement, amputation affecting a vital body system, psychological dis- orders, mental retardation, mental illness, and learning disabilities. An individual can demonstrate that he or she is “regarded as” having a disability by establishing that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited by the ADA “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”
“Major life activities” include such activities as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” The definition also includes the operation of any major body function, including functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, and digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions. The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity must be made without regard to the “ameliorative effects of mitigating measures”—that is, individuals who use medications, artificial limbs, or hearing aids qualify for protection under the ADA, even though those measures may overcome the limiting effects of an impairment. (Ordinary eyeglasses and contact lenses are specifically excluded from this list by the amendments to the ADA.) The ADA also states that an individual with an impairment that is “transitory and minor,” defined as having an actual or expected duration of six months or less, does not fall under the ADA. However, individuals with impairments that are episodic or in remission, such as epilepsy, diabetes, or cancer are not barred from coverage under the ADA.
Not included by the ADA as protected disabilities are homosexuality, sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, and disorders resulting from current drug or alcohol use. The emphasis on current drug or alcohol use means that employees who have successfully recovered or are successfully recovering from drug or alcohol disabilities are protected from employment discrimination.
The ADA prohibits employers of 15 or more employees (also unions with 15 or more members and employment agencies) from discriminating against the quali- fied disabled with respect to hiring, advancement, termination, compensation, train- ing, or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Qualified disabled are defined as those with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of a particular job position. Employers must make reasonable accommodation only for the qualified disabled.
Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA The ADA does not require employers to hire the unqualified disabled, but they must make reasonable accom- modation so qualified disabled employees can succeed in the workplace. Reason- able accommodation is the process of adjusting a job or work environment to fit the needs of disabled employees. It may include:
• Making the work facilities accessible and usable to disabled employees. • Restructuring jobs or modifying work schedules. • Purchasing or modifying necessary equipment for use by the disabled. • Providing appropriate training materials or assistance modified to fit the needs
of disabled employees.
Impairments, such as cancer, that are substantially limiting when active remain so despite being in remission.
Individuals with HIV or AIDS are protected by the ADA. Persons who are discriminated against because they are regarded as being HIV-positive are also protected.
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Note that an employer need make only reasonable accommodation for disabled employees. The employer can plead undue hardship, defined as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,” as a reason for not accommodating the needs of disabled employees. The ADA specifies that in evaluating undue hardship, the cost of the accommodation, the resources of the employer, the size of the employer, and the nature of the employer’s business be considered.
Businesses must reasonably accommodate not only employees for their disabilities under the ADA, but also customers and others who use public facilities such as hotels, restaurants, theaters, schools (even private ones), most places of entertainment, offices providing services, and other establishments doing business with the public. The Supreme Court ruled that the Professional Golf Association had to accommodate golfer Casey Martin, who suffered a walking disability because of a circulatory disor- der, by allowing him to use a golf cart in PGA tournaments. The Court held (1) that PGA tournaments were open to any member of the public who paid a qualifying fee and participated successfully in a qualifying tournament and (2) that accommodating Casey Martin by allowing him to use a golf cart while other golfers walked a tourna- ment course did not “fundamentally alter the nature” of PGA tournament events.
See Sidebar 20.11 for additional examples involving the ADA.
The ADA prohibits discrimination in employ- ment and in public accommodations. Maurizio Antoninetti, a patron of the Chipotle Mexican Grill, complained that a 45-inch barrier at Chipotle restaurants blocked his
view of the counter, preventing him from inspecting each dish, choosing his order, and watching it be prepared.
Chipotle argued that it accommodated the needs of customers in wheelchairs by bringing them spoonfuls of their preferred dish for inspection before ordering.
This fell short of being adequate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the barrier “subjects disabled customers to a disadvantage that non-disabled customers do not suffer.” The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Chipotle is retrofitting restaurants affected by the ruling and incorporating new designs into newly built restaurants and remodeled restaurants in the United States.
In a similar suit in 2017, it was held that McDon- ald’s drive-through window only hours violate the ADA
because they exclude blind individuals who cannot oper- ate a vehicle.
Websites & Mobile Apps and the ADA: Lawsuits have been filed against Domino’s and Taco Bell alleg- ing violations of the ADA, because they impede access to goods and services, particularly for blind customers. Dominos reports that in 2018 over 2,250 lawsuits were filed regarding its website.
Drive-by Lawsuits and the ADA: Thousands of law- suits have been filed in the United States against busi- nesses that allegedly do not provide equal access for disabled customers. So-called drive-by lawsuits are filed by individuals who apparently are just driving around looking for ADA violations. One controversial lawyer has filed more than 2,000 lawsuits and made a substantial amount of money bringing such lawsuits. Is he champion- ing the rights of the disabled or just out to make money? See, “What’s a ‘Drive-By Lawsuit,’” CBS News, December 4, 2016.
sidebar 20.11
Chipotle Mexican Grill: Must Accommodate Disabled Patrons
Lucy Nicholson/ REUTERS
Remedies under the ADA Remedies under the ADA are basically the same remedies available under the Civil Rights Act, including hiring, reinstatement, back pay, front pay, injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. As with the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must first seek administration remedies with the EEOC. Compensatory and punitive damages are not available for policies that merely have disparate impact. They are available for intentional discrimination and for other
The remedies under the ADA are basically the same remedies avail- able under Title VII.
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employer actions such as failing to make reasonable accommodation for known job applicant or employee disabilities.
The ADA replaces the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as the primary federal law protecting the disabled in private sector employment. The Rehabilitation Act, which applies only to employers doing business with the government under a federal con- tract for $2,500 or more, still requires that such employers have a qualified affirma- tive action program for hiring and promoting the disabled.
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), effective November 2009, prohibits covered employers from firing, refusing to hire, or otherwise discriminating against individuals on the basis of their genetic information and from discriminating against employees and applicants on the basis of a family member’s genetic informa- tion. Genetic information includes information about an individual’s genetic tests, genetic information about genetic tests of an individual’s family members, information about the manifestation of a disease or disorder in an individual’s family history, request for or receipt of genetic services, and genetic information of a fetus and the genetic information of any embryo held by the individual or a family member.
“Covered employers” is defined as all employers subject to Title VII. The act further prohibits the limitation, segregation, or classification of employees in such a way “that would deprive or tend to deprive any employee of employment opportuni- ties or otherwise adversely affect the status of the employee as an employee, because of genetic information with respect to the employee.”
Under GINA, it is unlawful for an employer to “request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or the family member of an employee,” with limited exceptions.
GINA also has ramifications for group health plans and health insurance com- panies. Although many states have already enacted similar legislation, GINA estab- lishes a federal baseline for protection against employment discrimination based on genetic information.
In November 2010, the EEOC published final regulations implementing Title II of GINA, which protects applicants for employment, current employees, former employees, apprentices, trainees, and labor organization members against discrimi- nation based on their genetic information. The EEOC regulations, which became effective on January 11, 2011, are intended to:
• Prohibit the use of genetic information in employment decisions. • Restrict employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information. • Require that genetic information be maintained as a confidential medical
records and place strict limits on the disclosure of genetic information. • Provide remedies for individuals whose genetic information is acquired, used, or
disclosed in violation of GINA.
Tests that are considered to be “genetic tests” under GINA include:
• Tests that might determine if a person is genetically disposed to breast cancer, colon cancer, or Huntington’s disease.
• Amniocentesis and newborn screening. • Carrier screening for cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, spinal muscular dystro-
phy, and fragile X syndrome. • DNA testing to detect genetic markers associated with ancestry information.
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Employers should consider incorporating the following language into FMLA and other forms to help establish a defense to any claim that it wrongfully obtained genetic information in response to an otherwise lawful request for medical information:
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) prohibits employers and other entities covered by GINA Title II from requesting or requiring genetic information of an indi- vidual or family member of the individual, except as specifically
allowed by this law. To comply with this law, we are asking that you not provide any genetic information when responding to this request for medical information. “Genetic information” as defined by GINA, includes an individual’s family medical his- tory, the results of an individual’s or family member’s genetic tests, the fact that an individual or an individual’s family member sought or received genetic services, and genetic information of a fetus carried by an individual or an individual’s family member or an embryo lawfully held by an individual or family member receiving assistive reproductive services.
sidebar 20.12
Protecting against Inadvertent Acquisition of Medical Information in Violation of GINA
See Sidebar 20.12 for information on how to protect against inadvertent acquisi- tion of medical information in violation of GINA.
DISCRIMINATION IN GETTING AND KEEPING HEALTH INSURANCE Group health plans and health insurance issuers are prohibited from discriminat- ing against employees based on certain factors. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) forbids group plans and issuers from excluding an employee from insurance coverage or requiring different premiums based on the employee’s health status, medical condition or history, genetic information, or disability.
The act primarily prevents discrimination against individual employees in small businesses. Before the act, individual employees with an illness like cancer or a genetic condition like sickle cell anemia were sometimes denied coverage in a new health plan. The small size of the plan deterred insurers from covering individual employees whose medical condition might produce large claims. The act denies insurers the right to discriminate on this basis. It also guarantees that insured employees who leave their old employer and join a new employer are not denied health insurance.
In addition to HIPAA, the Affordable Care Act prohibits insurance companies from refusing to sell coverage to renew policies because of an individual’s preexisting conditions.
OTHER FEDERAL LEGISLATION Other federal legislation dealing with employment discrimination includes the National Labor Relations Act of 1936. The National Labor Relations Board has ruled that appeals to racial prejudice in a collective bargaining representation elec- tion constitute an unfair labor practice. The NLRB has also revoked the certification of unions that practice discriminatory admission or representation policies. Addi- tionally, employers have an obligation to bargain with certified unions over matters of employment discrimination. Such matters are considered “terms and conditions of employment” and are thus mandatory bargaining issues.
Finally, various other federal agencies may prohibit discriminatory employ- ment practices under their authorizing statutes. The Federal Communications
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Commission, for example, has prohibited employment discrimination by its licens- ees (radio and TV stations) and has required the submission of affirmative action plans as a condition of license renewal.
STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS Federal laws concerning equal employment opportunity specifically permit state laws imposing additional duties and liabilities. In recent years, fair employment prac- tices legislation has been introduced and passed by many state legislatures. When the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Act became effective, 40 states had such laws, but their provisions varied considerably. A typical state act makes it an unfair employment practice for any employer to refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of his or her race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry. If employment agencies or labor organizations discriminate against an individual in any way because of one of these reasons, they are also guilty of an unfair employment practice. State acts usually set up administrative bodies with the power to make rules and regulations and hear and decide charges of violations filed by complainants.
State antidiscrimination laws sometimes protect categories of persons not pro- tected by federal law. As discussed earlier, state and local laws may prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace (see Sidebar 20.9). Other state and local laws prohibit employment discrimination based on weight (e.g., Michigan; Santa Cruz and San Francisco, California; and Washington, DC). Michigan’s antidiscrimi- nation law also includes height.
State law may also supplement Title VII, offering remedies to victims of sex- ual harassment. In New York, for example, former Knicks team executive Anucha Browne Sanders sued the owner of the New York Knicks and Madison Square Gar- den for discrimination using Title VII, as well as New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law §296, and the Administrative Code of the City of New York §8-107, which prohibit unlawful discriminatory practices. After hearing testimony about crude racial and sexual insults and unwanted advances from coach Isaiah Thomas, a jury awarded Sanders $11.6 million.
As indicated in Chapter 10 on torts, discrimination plaintiffs can also sue employ- ers under various state common law causes of action, like negligence, assault, battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, invasion of privacy, and defamation. Under common law, plaintiffs may be able to receive unlimited compensatory and punitive damages, and greater numbers of plaintiffs seem to be suing under common law.
TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND LITIGATION Several current trends in employment discrimination and litigation will require close attention from managers in the coming years. These trends highlight the fact that the workforce is increasingly diverse and that new managers must be alert to the full impact of antidiscrimination laws. They also show the effects of new technology.
Surge in Private Lawsuits Private lawsuits alleging discrimination in employ- ment surged in recent years. Several factors account for the rapid increase. The 1991 revision of the Civil Rights Act to support punitive and compensatory damages has encouraged employees to sue their employers. The passage of and amendments to the
LO 20-5
State antidiscrimination laws may permit discrim- ination lawsuits against employers of fewer than 15 employees, the minimum number for a lawsuit under federal Title VII.
According to a study by the Rudd Center at Yale University, discrimination against overweight people, particularly women, is as common as racial discrimination.
Do remember that discrimination lawsuits can be based on multiple causes of action, including common law ones.
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Americans with Disabilities Act has led to a new area of discrimination lawsuits, and some 50 million Americans, according to a conservative estimate, may legally qualify as disabled. Finally, as the large generation of baby boomers ages in the workforce, more lawsuits arise under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In the new century, these trends continue, making it ever more important for business managers to understand the law prohibiting discrimination in employment. See Sidebar 20.13 for an interesting study about female CEOs.
The clear answer is, unfortunately, “Yes” according to a study by Lyda Bigelow and Judi McLean Parks at the Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis.
Bigelow and McLean Parks created a prospectus for a fictitious company about to go public, along with a set of qualifications for the company’s CEO. To determine if gender played a role in the decision, they gave half of the potential investors information with a female CEO and the other half a male CEO—the qualifications, however, were the same. Only the name and gender were different. They then asked individuals with a background in finance to consider investing in the company.
The researchers found that the CEO’s gender clearly affected potential investors. For example, the study showed that the participants were inclined to invest up to three times more with the company with the male CEO. Executive compensation was also an issue. The par- ticipants in the study indicated that they would pay the female CEO 14 percent less than her male counterpart.
Perhaps even more disturbing, female CEOs were evaluated more harshly in other very subjective catego- ries. Although the only difference given in the study was gender, participants deemed female CEOs as less com- petent leaders in a variety of realms, including handling a crisis and dealing with the company’s board of directors.
Overall, the study showed that participants viewed male CEOs as more favorable representatives of the com- pany in the public eye.
Not-So-Fun Fact: There are more large compa- nies run by men named John than are run by women. In fact, among chief executives of S&P 1500 firms, for each woman there are four men who are named John, Robert, William, or James. Sources: Wolfers, Justin, “Fewer Women Run Big Companies Than Men Named John,” New York Times, March 2, 2015; U.S. News and World Report, www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060508/8investment_bias.htm.
sidebar 20.13
Is It Important to Investors If the CEO Is a Man or a Woman?
Arbitration in Employment Discrimination Disputes Arbitration is usually cheaper, quicker, and less public than litigation. Accustomed to using arbitra- tion clauses in contracts with customers and suppliers, many employers also have begun placing arbitration clauses in employment contracts and personnel hand- books. These clauses require arbitration in employment discrimination disputes and with other employment controversies.
The Federal Arbitration Act (see Chapter 5) prefers arbitration over litigation, but that act may not apply to certain employment contracts. The EEOC has issued a policy statement concluding that “agreements that mandate binding arbitration of discrimination claims as a condition of employment are contrary to the fundamental principles” of antidiscrimination laws.
However, without specifically discussing the EEOC’s policy statement, the Supreme Court has upheld arbitration clauses in certain employment discrimina- tion cases. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Supreme
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Court decided that the Federal Arbitration Act did not prohibit enforceabil- ity of the following arbitration provision, which an employee had signed in his job application:
I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for
employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator. By way of
example only, such claims include claims under federal, state, and local statutory or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and the law of tort.
Congress may ultimately decide whether binding arbitration as a condition of working for an employer is an acceptable part of the employment contract. In the meantime, employers who wish to have employment disputes, including discrimina- tion disputes, arbitrated should consider the following:
• Ensuring that arbitration agreements allow for the same range of remedies con- tained in the antidiscrimination laws.
• Allowing limited discovery in arbitration, which traditionally has no discovery process.
• Permitting employees to participate in selecting neutral, knowledgeable profes- sional arbitrators instead of using an industry arbitration panel.
• Not requiring the employee to pay arbitration fees and costs.
These steps should go far toward eliminating many of the objections to the arbi- tration of employment discrimination disputes.
Proper arbitration agreements should continue to be considered as a business response to litigation of employment disputes.
Insuring against Employment Discrimination Claims Employers commonly insure against many potential liabilities. However, the general liability policies carried by many businesses, which cover bodily injury and property damage, often do not insure against intentional torts. Intent is a key element in many employ- ment discrimination claims. In addition, general policies may not cover the back pay or damages for mental anguish that many discrimination plaintiffs seek. As a result, employers are beginning to ask for and get employment practices liability insurance, a type of insurance aimed specifically at discrimination claims.
Even with the availability of the new insurance, not all types of employment discrimination can be insured against in every state. States like New York and California do not permit companies to insure against “intentional acts.” Disparate- treatment discrimination is an example of such an act. Similarly, some states do not permit companies to insure against punitive damages that can arise in intentional violations of Title VII. Managers should also be aware that what the new policies cover and what they exclude vary widely.
Insurance policies are more likely to insure against disparate-impact claims rather than dis- parate-treatment claims. Do you understand why?
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Unless bona fide occupational qualifications or business necessity can be proved, federal law prohibits recruiting, hiring, promoting, and other employment practices that involve disparate treatment or produce a disparate impact on the basis of: • Race or color • National origin
• Religion • Sex • Age • Disabilities • Pregnancy • Genetic discrimination
concept summary
Illegal Employment Practices
Key Terms Affirmative action 638 Bona fide occupational
qualifications (BFOQs) 618 Business necessity defense 620 Comparable worth 635 Disability 644 Disparate impact 620
Disparate treatment 620 Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) 646
Hostile work environment 631 Qualified disabled 644 Reasonable accommodation 644
Retaliation 621 Reverse discrimination 639 Section 1981 641 Seniority system 640 Sexual harassment 631
Review Questions and Problems The Civil Rights Act of 1964
1. General Provisions Martel, a competent male secretary to the president of ICU, was fired because the new president of the company believed it is more appropriate to have a female secretary. (a) Has a violation of the law occurred? (b) Assume that a violation of the law has occurred and Martel decided to take an extended vacation
after he was fired. Upon his return seven months later, Martel filed suit in federal district court against ICU, charging illegal discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. What remedies will be available to him under the act?
2. Enforcement Procedures Muscles-Are-You Inc., a bodybuilding spa targeted primarily toward male bodybuilders, refused to hire a woman for the position of executive director. The spa’s management stated that the executive director must have a “macho” image to relate well with the spa’s customers. Discuss whether it is likely that the spa has violated Title VII.
3. Discrimination on the Basis of Race or Color Does Title VII prohibit employment discrimination against members of all races? Explain.
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4. Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin Ace Tennis Co. hires only employees who speak English. Does this policy illegally discriminate against Hispanic job applicants who speak only Spanish? Discuss.
5. Discrimination on the Basis of Religion Ortega, an employee of ABC Inc., recently joined a church that forbids working on Saturdays, Sundays, and Mondays. Ortega requested that his employer change his work schedule from eight-hour days, Monday through Friday, to ten-hour days, Tuesday through Friday. Ortega’s request was refused because the employer is in operation only eight hours per day, five days a week. After a month during which Ortega failed to work on Mondays, he was fired. The employer stated that “only a full-time employee would be acceptable” for Ortega’s position. What are Ortega’s legal rights, if any?
6. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex A male supervisor at Star Company made repeated offensive sexual remarks to female employees. The employees complained to higher management, which ignored the complaints. If the company does not discharge or otherwise penalize the employee, has it violated Title VII? Discuss.
Employment Practices That May Be Challenged
7. Questionnaires, Interviews, Testing, and Educational Requirements Jennings Company, which manufactures sophisticated electronic equipment, hires its assembly employ- ees on the basis of applicants’ scores on a standardized mathematics aptitude test. It has been shown that those who score higher on the test almost always perform better on the job. However, it has also been demonstrated that the use of the test in hiring employees has the effect of excluding African Amer- icans and other minority groups. Is this practice of the Jennings Company prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
8. Height and Weight Requirements (a) An employer hires job applicants to wait tables in the Executive Heights Restaurant only if they are
over six feet tall. Does this policy likely violate Title VII? Explain. (b) If a class of job applicants under six feet sues the employer, will it likely get compensatory and puni-
tive damages? Explain. 9. Appearance Requirements
Silicon Products requires all male employees to wear their hair “off the collar.” Does this policy violate Title VII? Discuss.
10. Affirmative Action Programs and Reverse Discrimination Kartel Inc. found that historically African Americans had been significantly underrepresented in its workforce. It decided to remedy the situation and place African Americans in 50 percent of all new job openings. Discuss the legality of Kartel’s action.
11. Seniority Systems Are seniority systems in the workplace legal under Title VII if in fact they discriminate on the basis of gender or race? Explain.
Other Statutes and Discrimination in Employment 12. Civil Rights Act of 1866
When is it an advantage for a plaintiff to use Section 1981 as the basis for discrimination litigation as contrasted with using Title VII?
13. Discrimination on the Basis of Age Cantrell, the controller of Xylec’s Inc., was forced to retire at age 58 due to a general company policy. Although Cantrell has a company pension of $50,000 per year, she believes that her lifestyle will soon be hampered due to inflation because the pension provides for no cost-of-living increases. What are Cantrell’s rights, if any?
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1. When Maria Suarez got her new job, she was happy. As an oil rigger, she would make enough money to support herself and her two children. But after a week of working with a primarily male crew, her happiness was gone. Her co-workers were the reason. At first, the men made unwelcome comments about her body. Then sexual graffiti mentioning her name appeared. When she came to work one morning, a nude female picture was pinned to one of the rigs. Her name had been scrawled across the bot- tom. Maria complained to the crew foreman, who referred her to the site manager. “Let’s ignore it for a while,” he told Maria. “It’s just good fun. The men are testing you. You’ve got to fit in.”
• What are Maria’s legal rights in this situation? • What would you do if you were the site manager? • Do you think Maria should just try to “fit in”?
2. Delivery Quik Inc. delivers packages to small retail stores from a central distribution point in a major metropolitan area. Drivers both load and unload their packages, some of which weigh close to 100 pounds. Although equipment helps the drivers in their tasks, there is still considerable lifting necessary. Delivery Quik has a policy that driv- ers must stand at least six feet tall and weigh no less than 180 pounds. All drivers must retire at age 45 and have at least a high school education.
• Does the height, weight, age, and education policy discriminate illegally? • How would you change the policy? • If your customers prefer male drivers, does their preference mean that the com-
pany can hire only males as drivers?
business discussions
14. Discrimination on the Basis of Disabilities Ralph is a systems analyst for the Silicon Corporation, a major defense contractor. When Ralph’s co- workers learn that he has AIDS, six of them quit work immediately. Fearing that additional resignations will delay production, the company discharges Ralph. Discuss whether or not the company acted legally.
15. Genetic Discrimination Amy learns that she has the “breast cancer gene.” Devastated, she shares the news with her supervisor. A few days later, Amy receives a harsh employment evaluation—the first of her career—criticizing her handling of a client matter. Two weeks later, Amy is fired. Amy cannot understand how she went from being a model employee with strong performance reviews to unemployed in such a short time. Does she have any claim against her employer?
16. Discrimination in Getting and Keeping Health Insurance Why does Title VII not apply to preventing discrimination in the getting and keeping of health insurance?
17. Other Federal Legislation Do employers have an obligation to negotiate with groups of employees over issues of discrimination? Explain.
18. State Antidiscrimination Laws Explain how state antidiscrimination laws protect workers in situations where federal laws do not.
19. Trends in Employment Discrimination and Litigation Can arbitration agreements be used to keep employees from litigating discrimination issues? Discuss.
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
21-1 To identify major employment laws and their significance for employers and employees.
21-2 To explain the scope and limits of the employment-at-will doctrine.
21-3 To understand the limits of privacy in the workplace and the role of work- ers’ compensation laws.
21-4 To discuss ways an employer should document employee performance in anticipation of potential employee litigation.
Employer Responsibilities and Employee Rights - Employment Laws
21 create jobs 51/Shutterstock
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I n addition to the employment discrimina-
tion laws detailed in Chapter 20, there are
many other employment laws pertaining to
the employer–employee relationship. This chapter
surveys a number of important employment laws.
As you read, consider how these laws contribute to
the employment law framework in the United States.
Most of the laws discussed are federal laws. However,
it is important to understand that state and local
governments may also have employment laws. One
major example of this is workers’ compensation laws.
Each state has its own laws addressing accidental
workplace injuries. Lastly, in light of the practical
reality of defending against employee lawsuits, this
chapter suggests ways that employers should docu-
ment employee performance so that they are pre-
pared for potential litigation by current and former
employees.
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The number of FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act) cases is on the rise. Here are points to consider regarding over- time pay to be in compliance with the law: • Hourly or Salaried? It is not uncommon for an
employer to pay a salary to an employee who should be paid hourly. “White collar workers” may be paid a salary of at least $684 per week (equivalent to $35,568 per year) if (1) the employee’s primary duty is managing the enterprise, or managing a custom- arily recognized department or subdivision of the enterprise; (2) the employee customarily and regu- larly directs the work of at least two or more other full- time employees or their equivalent; (3) the employee has the authority to hire or fire other employees, or the employee’s suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other change of status of other employees is given particular weight. This rule became effective
January 1, 2020, making approximately 1.3 million workers newly eligible for overtime pay.
• Employee or Independent Contractor? Because the FLSA requires employers to pay nonexempt employ- ees overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, employers are some- times tempted to classify these workers as “indepen- dent contractors” to avoid overtime pay. Although each individual’s damages may not be sub-
stantial, an employer may face an FLSA collective action involving many workers who are misclassified. Workers are increasingly aware of their rights under wage and hour laws, especially when it comes to overtime pay.
This is a hot issue, involving many companies, includ- ing Uber, Lyft, and Domino’s.
For more information see the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, available at www.dol.gov/ whd/.
sidebar 21.1
Fair Labor Standards Act: To Pay or Not to Pay Overtime?
Employment Laws
A complete review of all laws and regulations that impact how employers and employ- ees interact is beyond our scope. The following sections address some of these laws and examine some current issues arising in many companies. Table 21.1 provides a list of some of the major employment laws and the purpose of each. Chapter 20 focused on the first category of laws, those addressing discrimination. This chapter discusses a range of employment laws from the Fair Labor Standards Act to retirement and pension laws. Chapter 22 then details labor laws, the last category in the table.
Employment laws are among the most emotionally and politically charged top- ics. The reason tempers flare and even violence happens is that these laws go to the heart of how business makes a profit and how people make a living.
MINIMUM WAGES AND MAXIMUM HOURS The federal government regulates wages and hours through the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Originally enacted in 1938, the FLSA establishes a minimum wage, over- time pay, record-keeping requirements, and child labor standards. The FLSA has been repeatedly amended to keep it up to date. For example, effective May 25, 2007, the FLSA was amended to increase the federal minimum wage in three steps:
• To $5.85 per hour effective July 24, 2007. • To $6.55 per hour effective July 24, 2008. • To $7.25 per hour effective July 24, 2009 (currently the federal minimum wage).
LO 21-1
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Law Purpose Civil Rights Acts, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Genetic Nondiscrimination Act
• Provide national policy governing employment discrimination.
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) • Provides hourly minimum wage and maximum number of hours before overtime is owed.
• Provides restrictions on child labor. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act)
• Provides restrictions on plant closings and mass layoffs.
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) • Provides unpaid leave to care for a newborn child, an adopted child, to care for a family member, or for serious health conditions.
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)
• Provides reemployment rights after performing uniformed service.
• Provides those serving in the military the right to be free from discrimination and retaliation based on uniformed service.
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
• Provides standards for a safe and healthy working environment.
Social Security Act • Provides unemployment compensation. • Provides disability benefits.
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
• Provides requirements for private pension plans.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act • Provides standards to protect privacy. Railway Labor Act, Norris-LaGuardia Act, Wagner Act, Taft-Hartley Act, and Landrum-Griffin Act
• Provide national policy for governing the union–management relationship.
table 21.1 Summary of Major Federal Employment Laws
Additionally, overtime pay at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay is required after 40 hours of work in a workweek. For example, if an employee earns $8 an hour, the overtime pay must be at least $12 per hour. Employers of “tipped employees” must pay a cash wage of at least $2.13 per hour if they claim a tip credit against their minimum wage obligation. If the employee’s tips combined with the cash wage do not meet the minimum hourly wage, the employer must make up the difference (with certain conditions). Many states provide for mini- mum wages higher than the federal rate. Employers are legally required to pay which- ever minimum wage is higher. The FLSA does not require breaks or meal periods to be given to workers. Some states, however, may require breaks or meal periods.
Although a minimum wage and a maximum workweek of 40 hours before over- time is owed seems straightforward, there are many exceptions and factual situations complicating the general rules. Some of the general exceptions include pay for work- ers in executive administrative or professional job positions. These exceptions are commonly referred to as the “white-collar” exemptions to overtime. See Sidebar 21.1 for points to consider related to the payment of overtime and Sidebar 21.2 for an important test related to whether interns need to be paid. In Case 21.1, the Supreme Court addresses the legal issue of how an employer is to count work hours.
Employers should use care to properly classify workers as either “employees” or “ independent contractors.”
The highest state minimum wages: Washington $13.50; California $13.50; Massachusetts $12.75; New York $12.50; Arizona $12; Connecticut $10.10. In 2020, 24 states started the new year with higher minimum wages. A number of cities have even higher minimum wages than the rest of the state: Seattle $16.39 (for some employers); San Francisco $15; Chicago $13; New York City $15 (with limitations).
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case 21.1
SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. 571 U.S. ___ (2014)
Petitioner Sandifer and others filed a putative collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, seeking back pay for time spent donning and doffing pieces of protective gear that they assert respondent United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel) required workers to wear because of hazards at steel plants. U.S. Steel contended that this donning-and-doffing time, which would otherwise be compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, is noncompensable under a provision of its collective bargaining agreement with petitioners’ union.
The district court granted U.S. Steel summary judgment in pertinent part, holding that petitioners’ donning and doff- ing constituted “changing clothes.” It also assumed that any time spent donning and doffing items that were not “clothes” was “de minimis” and hence noncompensable. The Circuit affirmed.
SCALIA, JUSTICE: The question before us is the meaning of the phrase “changing clothes” as it appears in the Fair Labor Standards Act (Act). . . . [Petitioners] seek backpay for time spent donning and doffing various pieces of protec- tive gear . . . a flame-retardant jacket, a pair of pants, and hood; a hardhat; a “snood”; “wristlets”; work gloves; leg- gings’ “metatarsal” boots; safety glasses; earplugs; and a res- pirator. At bottom, petitioners want to be paid for the time they have spent putting on and taking off these objects. In the aggregate, the amount of time—and money—involved is likely to be quite large. Because the donning-and-doffing time would otherwise be compensable under the Act, U.S. Steel’s contention of non-compensability stands or falls upon the validity of a provision of its collective bargaining agreement with petitioners’ union, which says that this time is noncompensable. The validity of that provision depends, in turn, upon the applicability of 29 U.S.C. §203(o) to the time at issue. That subsection allows parties to decide, as part of a collective bargaining agreement, that “time spent in changing clothes . . . at the beginning or end of each workday” is noncompensable. . . .
We begin by examining the meaning of “clothes.” . . . The Oxford English Dictionary defines “clothes” as a “[c]overing for the person; wearing apparel; dress; railment,
vesture.” That is what we hold to be the meaning of the word as used in §203(o). . . . Petitioners argue that the word “clothes” is too indeterminate to be ascribed any gen- eral meaning but that, whatever it includes, it necessarily excludes items designed to be used to protect against work- place hazards. . . . We see no basis for the proposition that the unmodified term “clothes” somehow omits protective clothing. . . .
Having settled upon the meaning of “clothes,” we must now consider the meaning of “changing.” . . . Petitioners conclude that items of protective gear that are put on over the employee’s street clothes are not covered by §203(o). We disagree . . . We think that despite the usual meaning of “changing clothes,” the broader statutory context makes it plain that “time spent in changing clothes” includes time spent altering dress. . . .
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, we hold that petitioners’ donning and doffing of the protective gear at issue qualifies as “changing clothes” within the meaning of §203(o). Petitioners have pointed to 12 particular items. . . . The first nine clearly fit within the interpretation of “clothes.” . . . The remaining three items [glasses, earplugs, and a respirator], by contrast, do not satisfy our standard. . . . The question is whether the time devoted to the putting on and off of these items must be deducted from the noncompensable time. If so, federal judges must be assigned the task of separating the min- utes spent clothes-changing and washing from the minutes devoted to other activities during the period in question. . . .
[I]it is most unlikely that Congress meant §203(o) to convert federal judges into time-study professionals. . . . In the present case, the District Court stated that “the time expended by each employee donning and doffing” safety glasses “is minimal,” a conclusion with which the Sev- enth Circuit agreed. As for the respirators, the District Court [determined that they were outside of the scope of §203(o)]. The Seventh Circuit did not address the respira- tors at all, and we are not inclined to disturb the District Court’s factual conclusion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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[continued]
KEY POINTS • The Supreme Court held that the time spent donning and doffing their protective gear is
not compensable by operation of 29 U.S.C. §203(o) of the FLSA. • Where employees are donning and doffing items considered to be “clothes,” employ-
ers should make their practices clear in collective bargaining agreements to avoid legal challenges.
• Although this decision addresses employers with unionized workforces, nonunionized employers should be compensating employees for donning and doffing. As such, they should review any requirements, including the time spent donning and doffing, to deter- mine if the employees are being compensated appropriately.
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) abandoned its six- part test for determining if interns should be paid under the FLSA. The DOL now uses a seven-factor “primary beneficiary test” adopted by four federal courts (effective January 2018). This test focuses on the “economic reality” of the relationship, between the intern and the employer. Ask: “Is the internship primarily for the economic benefit of the employer or primarily for the educational benefit of the intern. According to the DOL, the primary benefi- ciary test is a “flexible test” with the following seven non- exhaustive factors to be considered:
1. The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand that there is no expectation of compensation. Any promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the intern is an employee--and vice versa.
2. The extent to which the internship provides training that would be similar to that which would be given in an edu- cational environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training provided by educational institutions.
3. The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of academic credit.
4. The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s academic commitments by correspond- ing to the academic calendar.
5. The extent to which the internship’s duration is lim- ited to the period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial training.
6. The extent to which the intern’s work compliments, rather than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing significant educational benefits to the intern.
7. The extent to which the intern and the employer under- stand that the internship is conducted without entitle- ment to a paid job at the conclusion of the internship. This is a flexible test and no single factor is deter-
minative. Whether an intern or student is an “employee” under the FLSA necessarily depends on the unique cir- cumstances of each case. If an analysis of the circum- stances reveals that an intern or student is actually an employee, then he or she is entitled to both minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA.
Successful FLSA Lawsuits Involving Interns: Over the past several years, the following settlements were reached: Warner Music, $4.2 million; NBC, $6.2 million; and Viacom, $7.2 million. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs under the Fair Labor Standards Act, January 2018. Available at www.dol.gov/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs71.pdf.
sidebar 21.2
Internship Programs under the FLSA
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The FLSA also sets wage, hours worked, and safety requirements for minors (individuals under age 18). The rules vary depending upon the particular age of the minor and the particular job involved. As a general rule, the FLSA sets 14 years of age as the minimum age for employment, and limits the number of hours worked by minors under the age of 16. In 2008, the FLSA was amended to increase penalties against employers who violate child labor laws. The penalties increased from $11,000 to $50,000 for each FLSA violation leading to the serious injury or death of a child worker. The increased fines are subject to doubling for repeated or willful violations.
See Sidebar 21.3 for FLSA rules related to nursing moms.
The FLSA requires break time for nursing mothers. Employers are required to provide “reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk for her nurs- ing child for 1 year after the child’s birth each time such employee has need to express the milk.”
Employers are also required to provide a functional space for expressing breast milk that is “shielded from view and free from intrusion from co-workers and the pub- lic.” A bathroom, even a private one, is not a permissible location under the FLSA.
Employers with fewer than 50 employees are not subject to the FLSA break time requirement if compliance with the provision would impose an undue hardship.
Employers are not required to compensate nursing mothers for breaks taken for the purpose of expressing milk. However, if the employer already provides compen- sated breaks, an employee who uses that break time to express milk must be compensated in the same way that other employees are compensated for break time. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Fact Sheet #73: Break Time for Nursing Mothers under the FLSA, December 2010. Available at www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs73.htm.
sidebar 21.3
Break Time for Nursing Moms
case 21.2
KASTEN v. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS CORP. 563 U.S. 1 (2011)
Petitioner Kasten brought an antiretaliation suit against his former employer, respondent (Saint-Gobain), under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act), which provides minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime pay rules; and which for- bids employers “to discharge . . . any employee because such employee has filed any complaint” alleging a violation of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §215(a)(3). In a related suit, the District Court found that Saint-Gobain violated the Act by placing timeclocks in a location that prevented workers from receiving credit for the time they spent donning and doffing work-related protective gear.
In this suit, Kasten claims that he was discharged because he orally complained to company officials about the timeclocks. The District Court granted Saint-Gobain summary judgment, concluding that the Act’s antiretaliation provision did not cover oral complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opin- ion in which Justice Thomas joined in part. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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BREYER, JUSTICE: The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) sets forth employment rules concerning minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. The Act contains an antiretaliation provision that forbids employers
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the Act], or has tes- tified or is about to testify in such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee. §215(a)(3) (emphasis added).
We must decide whether the statutory term “filed any complaint” includes oral as well as written complaints within its scope. We conclude that it does.
I The petitioner, Kevin Kasten, brought this antire- taliation lawsuit against his former employer, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation. Kasten says that Saint- Gobain located its timeclocks between the area where Kasten and other workers put on (and take off) their work- related protective gear and the area where they carry out their assigned tasks. That location prevented workers from receiving credit for the time they spent putting on and taking off their work clothes—contrary to the Act’s requirements. In a related suit the District Court agreed with Kasten, find- ing that Saint-Gobain’s “practice of not compensating . . . for time spent donning and doffing certain required protec- tive gear and walking to work areas” violated the Act. Kas- ten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 954 (WD Wis. 2008). In this suit Kasten claims unlawful retaliation. He says that Saint-Gobain discharged him because he orally complained to Saint-Gobain officials about the timeclocks.
In particular, Kasten says that he repeatedly called the unlawful timeclock location to Saint-Gobain’s attention— in accordance with Saint-Gobain’s internal grievance resolu- tion procedure. See Brief for Petitioner 4 (quoting Saint- Gobain’s Code of Ethics and Business Conduct as imposing upon every employee “the responsibility to report . . . sus- pected violations of . . . any applicable law of which he or she becomes aware”); id., at 4–5 (quoting Saint-Gobain’s Employee Policy Handbook as instructing employees with “questions, complaints, and problems” to“[c]ontact” their “supervisor[s] immediately” and if necessary “take the issue to the next level of management,” then to the “local Human Resources Manager,” then to “Human Resources” personnel at the “Regional” or “Headquarters” level).
Kasten adds that he “raised a concern” with his shift supervisor that “it was illegal for the time clocks to be where they were” because of Saint-Gobain’s exclusion of “the time you come in and start doing stuff”; he told a human resources employee that “if they were to get chal- lenged on” the location in court, “they would lose”; he told
his lead operator that the location was illegal and that he “was thinking about starting a lawsuit about the placement of the time clocks”; and he told the human resources man- ager and the operations manager that he thought the loca- tion was illegal and that the company would “lose” in court. Record in No. 3:07–cv–00686–bbc (WD Wis.), Doc.87–3, pp. 31–34 (deposition of Kevin Kasten). This activity, Kas- ten concludes, led the company to discipline him and, in December 2006, to dismiss him.
Saint-Gobain presents a different version of events. It denies that Kasten made any significant complaint about the timeclock location. And it says that it dismissed Kas- ten simply because Kasten, after being repeatedly warned, failed to record his comings and goings on the timeclock.
For present purposes we accept Kasten’s version of these contested events as valid. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 380 (2007). That is because the District Court entered summary judgment in Saint-Gobain’s favor. . . . Kasten sought certiorari. And in light of conflict among the Circuits as to whether an oral complaint is protected, we granted Kasten’s petition. . . . The sole question pre- sented is whether “an oral complaint of a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act” is “protected conduct under the [Act’s] anti-retaliation provision.” Pet. for Cert. i. The Act protects employees who have “filed any complaint,” 29 U. S. C. §215(a)(3), and interpretation of this phrase “depends upon reading the whole statutory text, consider- ing the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis,” Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006). This analysis leads us to conclude that the language of the pro- vision, considered in isolation, may be open to competing interpretations. But considering the provision in conjunc- tion with the purpose and context leads us to conclude that only one interpretation is permissible. We begin with the text of the statute. The word “filed” has different relevant meanings in different contexts. . . . The bottom line is that the text, taken alone, cannot provide a conclusive answer to our interpretive question. The phrase “filed any complaint” might, or might not, encompass oral complaints. We must look further. . . .
Why would Congress want to limit the enforcement scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s com- plaint procedure by those who would find it difficult to reduce their complaints to writing, particularly illiterate, less educated, or overworked workers? . . . In the years prior to the passage of the Act, illiteracy rates were particularly high among the poor. . . . To limit the scope of the antire- taliation provision to the filing of written complaints would also take needed flexibility from those charged with the Act’s enforcement. It could prevent Government agencies from using hotlines, interviews, and other oral methods of receiving complaints. . . . To fall within the scope of the anti- retaliation provision, a complaint must be sufficiently clear
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THE WARN ACT The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act became law in 1989. Known as the WARN Act, this law requires employers to provide notice of plant closings and mass layoffs. This notice must be given in writing and be delivered at least 60 days prior to closing a work site or conducting mass layoffs. The WARN notice must be given to employees or their bargaining representatives (such as a union), the state’s dislocated worker unit, and the elected chief officer of the local government impacted.
The WARN notice is required of employers with 100 or more employees. Work- ers who work less than half-time are not counted to determine this threshold level of 100. Employees entitled to receive the WARN notice include those who are hourly, salaried, supervisory, and managerial. In essence, all workers, even part-time, are entitled to receive the notice.
The WARN notice covers plant closings and mass layoffs involving loss of employment. Covered plant closings are defined as the shutting of an employment site resulting in a loss of employment of 50 or more employees during any 30-day period. A mass layoff requires the WARN notice if 500 or more employees lose their jobs in a 30-day period. This notice also must be given if between 50 and 499 employees are laid off if the number terminated make up at least 33 percent of the employer’s workforce. Although they are entitled to receive any applicable WARN notice, less than half-time employees are not counted to reach the requirement of 50 for plant closings or the thresholds for mass layoffs. A loss of employment includes (1) termination of employment, (2) layoff exceeding six months, or (3) a reduction in an employee’s work time of more than 50 percent in each month for six months.
The WARN notice allows impacted employees and communities some time to prepare for the negative impact of a plant closing or mass layoff.
On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a national emergency due to COVID-19. By the end of May, 40 million Ameri- cans -- 1 in 4 -- had filed for unemployment ben- efits, undoing a decade of employment gains.
and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection. This standard can be met, however, by oral complaints, as well as by written ones. . . .
Second, given Congress’ delegation of enforcement powers to federal administrative agencies, we also give a degree of weight to their views about the meaning of this enforcement language. . . . The Secretary of Labor has con- sistently held the view that the words “filed any complaint” cover oral, as well as written, complaints. . . . The EEOC has set forth a similar view in its Compliance Manual. . . .
These agency views are reasonable. They are consistent with the Act. . . . We conclude that the Seventh Circuit erred in determining that oral complaints cannot fall within the scope of the phrase “filed any complaint” in the Act’s antiretaliation provision. We leave it to the lower courts to decide whether Kasten will be able to satisfy the Act’s notice requirement. We vacate the Circuit’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
KEY POINTS • This case involves an antiretaliation action against a former employer. This issue was
whether an oral complaint was sufficient to make a complaint under the FLSA. • After analyzing the FLSA statutory language, “filed any complaint,” as well as the statu-
tory context and relevant authorities, the Supreme Court concluded that an oral com- plaint is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement.
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The WARN notice must be provided even if the numbers in the preceding para- graph are not satisfied if there are two or more plant closings or mass layoffs in a 90-day period that when taken together satisfy the threshold numbers. The sale of a business may or may not require the WARN notice. Any required notice prior to the sale being completed is the responsibility of the seller. The buyer of the business assumes this responsibility after the closing date.
The penalty for failure to comply with the WARN notice is back pay to employees to cover the required 60-day period. Each day of the 60-day period that an employer fails to provide written notice to the local government can result in a $500 fine.
When an employer is replacing striking employees in large numbers, the WARN notice is not required. Employers may avoid the need to provide 60-day notice if it can show its business is faltering and to give notice of a plant closing would adversely impact its ability to get financing. Also, unforeseen business circumstances may jus- tify a less than 60-day WARN notice for either plant closing or layoffs. Finally, natu- ral disasters, such as storms, floods, and earthquakes, may justify a less than 60-day notice for a plant closing or mass layoff.
THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT On February 5, 1993, Bill Clinton signed his first piece of legislation as president. This was the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). While the details of this law have been called burdensome to business, it has provided eligible employees who work for covered employers to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave during any 12-month period if one or more of the following events occur:
• Birth and care of a newborn child of the employee. • Placement with employee of a son or daughter for adoption or foster care. • Care of an immediate family member with a serious health condition. • Employee is unable to work due to a serious health condition.
The provisions relating to birth, adoption, and foster care apply to both female and male employees. Increasingly, men are opting to take leave to care for chil- dren. See Sidebar 21.4 for FMLA facts and statistics. An immediate family mem- ber is a spouse, minor child, or parent of the employee. Under the FMLA, the employee’s parents in law do not qualify as an immediate family member. And the employee’s children who are over 18 years old do not qualify as an immedi- ate family member, unless that child is incapable of self-care due to a mental or physical disability that limits one or more of the major life activities as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). For a more thorough discussion of the ADA, see Chapter 20.
Covered employers are those who employ 50 or more employees for each working day of 20 or more calendar weeks during either the current or preceding year. Eligible employees have worked for their employer for at least 12 months and have worked at least 1,250 hours during the preceding 12 months. The 12-month work period does not have to be consecutive months. An employee satisfies this requirement so long as that employee has worked for the employer at least a total of 12 months. Furthermore, eligible employees must work at a location where at least 50 employees are employed.
See Sidebar 21.5 for EEOC best practices recommendations related to work/ family balance.
“With the Family Medical Leave Act, the United States at last joined more than 150 other countries in guaranteeing workers some time off when a baby is born or a family member is sick.”
—President Bill Clinton in My Life
FMLA eligible employ- ees in legal same-sex marriages are able to take FMLA leave to care for their spouse or family member, regardless of where they live.
To satisfy the require- ment that the employer have 50 employees, all persons who work for the employer within 75 miles can be counted.
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MOST EMPLOYERS GIVE FMLA HIGH MARKS • 91 percent of employers report that complying with
the FMLA has had either a positive or no notice- able effect on employee absenteeism, turnover, or morale.
• 85 percent of employers report that complying with the FMLA is very easy, somewhat easy, or has no noticeable effect. WHO TAKES FMLA LEAVE?
• Nearly 60 percent of employees meet all criteria for coverage and eligibility under the FMLA.
• Thirteen percent of all employees reported taking leave for an FMLA reason in the past 12 months. WHY DO PEOPLE TAKE FMLA LEAVE?
• To care for their own serious illness: 55 percent • Surgery is the top medical condition • To care for a seriously ill family member: 18 percent • To take care of a new child: 21 percent (29 percent
women and 23 percent men).
HOW HAS FMLA AFFECTED EMPLOYERS? • 98 percent of eligible employees return to work for
the same employer after returning from FMLA leave. • 91 percent of covered businesses report that the
FMLA has a neutral or positive effect on employee morale.
• 90 percent of covered businesses reported that the FMLA had either a neutral or positive effect on busi- ness profitability. Fewer than two percent of covered work sites reported confirmed misuse of FMLA.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, “FMLA is Work- ing,” dol.gov/whd/fmla/survey; U.S. Department of Labor, Family Medical Leave in 2012: Executive Summary, September 13, 2013; U.S. Department of Labor, “FMLA Is Working,” FMLA Fact Sheet, dol.gov, May 2014; U.S. Depart- ment of Labor’s 2000 Report Balancing the Needs of Families and Employers: Family and Medical Leave Surveys 2000 Update; Nicole Casta’s “Highlights of the 2000 U.S. Department of Labor Report: Balancing the Needs of Families and Employers: Family and Medical Leave Surveys,” and the National Partner- ship for Women & Families’ 2005 Report, “Facts about the FMLA: What Does It Do, Who Uses It, and How.”
sidebar 21.4
FMLA: Facts and Statistics
As part of an ongoing attempt to avoid discrimination against workers with care-giving responsibilities, some- times called “family responsibilities discrimination,” the EEOC issued a document on best practices. Those rec- ommendations include the following: • Be aware of and train managers about the legal obli-
gations that may affect decisions about the treatment of workers with care-giving responsibilities.
• Develop, disseminate, and enforce a strong EEO pol- icy that clearly addresses the types of conduct that might constitute unlawful discrimination.
• Ensure that managers at all levels are aware of and comply with the organization’s work/life policies.
• Respond to complaints of caregiver discrimination efficiently and effectively.
• Protect against retaliation. The document also encourages employers to
develop “flexible work policies,” which studies have dem- onstrated have a “positive impact on employee engage- ment organizational productivity and profitability.”
Make Time for What Matters: This can go a long way to overall life satisfaction. A few tips: As you are pulled in many directions, make time for yourself; have a no regrets policy; create rituals that increase your con- nection with others; outsource where you can; if you are a manager, “walk the talk,” thus setting an example to help your team make time for what is important to them and sharing the work burden.
Case to Consider: Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc. (1st Cir. 2009), in which the court held that “unlawful sex
sidebar 21.5
EEOC: Best Practices Recommendations on Work/Family Balance
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discrimination occurs when an employer takes an adverse job action on the assumption that a woman, because she is a woman, will neglect her job responsibilities in favor of her presumed childcare responsibilities.” The plaintiff in Chadwick was the mother of young triplets. She was passed over for promotion and the position was given to a woman with two older children. The First Circuit held
that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the employer and, accordingly, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Sources: Zalis, Shelley, “Forget Work-Life Balance and Make Time for What Matters Most,” Forbes, May 10, 2017; EEOC, Employer Best Practices for Work- ers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 2009, available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/ docs/caregiver-best-practices.html.
The FMLA places a number of responsibilities on the employer. These respon- sibilities include notifying the employees that they are eligible for family medical leave and designating in writing when the employee has requested such leave. The employer may request a medical certification that a qualifying event has occurred in the employee’s life, but the employer is not entitled to review the actual medical records of the employee.
Once family medical leave is granted, the employer must keep the employee’s job available for when the leave is up and the employee returns to work. In essence, the employee who qualifies for family medical leave is not supposed to be disadvan- taged by the fact that the leave was taken. For example, if the employer gives a bonus for perfect attendance, the employee on family medical leave should be awarded this bonus, assuming perfect attendance other than the leave period. If a bonus is based on the amount of sales, the FMLA does not require the employer to award sales that the employee would have made if not on family medical leave.
Employees who believe they have been denied their rights under the FMLA can sue the employer in federal district court for equitable relief and back pay damages. Such an employee may sue for reinstatement or may seek damages or both.
See Sidebar 21.6 for a key case holding states are immune from FMLA self-care claims.
Coleman v. Maryland, Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30 (2012)
Key Facts: Daniel Coleman was an employee of the Maryland Court of Appeals for six years. In August 2007, he sent a letter requesting sick leave for a documented medi- cal condition. The request was denied and Mr. Coleman was given an ultimatum: resign or be terminated. In this com- plaint, Mr. Coleman claimed that his FMLA leave was denied in retaliation for his complaints of wrongdoing in the office.
Procedural History: The District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, including plaintiffs’ FMLA claims, holding that “the FMLA’s self-care provisions did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Explanation by the Supreme Court: The Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars claims in federal court against an unconsenting state and any governmen- tal units that are arms of the state unless Congress has abrogated immunity. To do so, Congress must make clear its intent to abrogate and must act in accordance with a valid exercise of power.
Supreme Court: Affirmed, holding suits against the states under the self-care provision of the FMLA are barred by sovereign immunity. Source: Coleman v. Maryland, Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30 (2012).
sidebar 21.6
States Are Immune from FMLA Self-Care Claims
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FMLA and Military Families In 2010, the National Defense Authorization Act (FY 2010 NDAA) broadened coverage under the FMLA to expand the avail- ability of military caregiver leave and qualifying exigency leave. The FY 2010 NDAA extended military caregiver leave to eligible employees whose family members are recent veterans with serious injuries or illnesses, including conditions that do not arise until after the veteran has left the military. The FY 2010 NDAA also expanded the definition of a serious injury or illness for both current service members and vet- erans to include serious injuries or illnesses that result from a condition that existed before the service member’s active duty service and was aggravated by service in the line of duty on active duty.
Additionally, the FY 2010 NDAA expanded qualifying exigency leave to eligible employees with family members serving in the Regular Armed Forces, in addition to the National Guard and Reserves. The FY 2010 NDAA also added the require- ment that for all qualifying exigency leave, the military member (National Guard, Reserves, Regular Armed Forces) must be deployed to a foreign country.
Military caregiver leave entitles an eligible employee who is the spouse, parent, son, daughter, or next of kin of a covered service member with a serious illness or injury to take up to a total of 26 workweeks of unpaid, job-protected leave during any single 12-month period to care for the service member. Before the FY 2010 NDAA was enacted, military caregiver leave was limited to eligible employees who were the family members of current service members with a serious injury or illness incurred in the line of duty on active duty.1
UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) protects the rights of individuals who voluntarily or involuntarily leave employment positions to undertake military service or certain types of service in the National Disaster Medical System. Specifically, USERRA provides reemployment rights fol- lowing a period of service if:
• The individual held a civilian job. • The employee informed the employer that he/she was leaving the job for service
in the uniformed services. • The period of service did not exceed five years (with exceptions). • The release from service was under “honorable conditions.” • The individual reports back to the civilian employer in a timely manner or sub-
mits a timely application for reemployment.
Those eligible to be reemployed must be restored to the job and receive benefits that would have been attained had there not been an absence due to military service. USERRA protects those performing uniformed service from discrimination in:
• Initial employment • Reemployment • Retention in employment • Promotion • Any benefit of employment
An international survey of 173 countries revealed that the United States is only one of four countries that does not guarantee any paid leave for new mothers. The other countries are Liberia, Papua New Guinea, and Swaziland. Source: Project on Global Working Families’ 2007 Report “Work, Family, and Equity Index.”
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Employers may not retaliate against anyone asserting his or her rights or assisting in the enforcement of USERRA rights, even if that person has no service connection.
USERRA also contains health insurance provisions. Covered individuals who leave a job to perform military service have the right to elect to continue existing employer-based health plan coverage for up to 24 months. For those who do not elect to continue coverage, they have the right to be reinstated in the employer’s health plan when reemployed, generally without any waiting periods or exclusions (except for service-connected illnesses or injuries). Federal law requires employers to notify employees of their rights under USERRA, including by displaying government notices.
See Sidebar 21.7 for a Rand study related to PTSD in veterans.
Rand, a non-profit global think tank, conducted a study of U.S troops to determine the effects of their service. Since October 2001, approximately 1.64 million U.S. troops have been deployed for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The study assessed the post-deployment, health-related needs. Major findings: • About 19 percent of returning veterans report symp-
toms consistent with a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or depression.
• About 20 percent reported having suffered a prob- ably traumatic brain injury while deployed.
• Only about half of those who need treatment for PTSD and depression actually seek it, and slightly more than half of those who receive treatment get care that meets minimal clinical standards.
• Concerns about confidentiality and career issues were major reasons why many veterans did not seek treatment.
• Removing such barriers to care and delivering treat- ment supported by scientific evidence can improve recovery rates and reduce societal costs. Taking into consideration these issues, the U.S.
Department of Labor issued Hiring Veterans: A Step-by- Step Toolkit for Employers to help employers working with transitioning service members. The guide includes infor- mation about available resources and developing effec- tive strategies to hire veterans.
Resources for employers and others, including crisis prevention, can be found via the U.S. Department for Vet- eran’s Affairs, National Center for PTSD, https://www.ptsd. va.gov/. Source: Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their Con- sequences, and Services to Assist Recovery. Rand Corporation, 2008. www.rand. org/health/feature/forty/invisible_wounds.html.
sidebar 21.7
Rand Study: Invisible Wounds of War
case 21.3
STAUB v. PROCTOR HOSPITAL 562 U.S. 411 (2011)
This case contains a reference to the 17th century fable, “The Monkey and the Cat” by French poet Jean de La Fontine. In that fable, a monkey persuades an unsuspecting cat to extract some chestnuts from a fire. The monkey absconds with the nuts, leaving the cat with only a burnt paw. Under the cat’s paw theory of liability, an employer may be held liable when a
biased non–decision maker (the monkey) influences an unbi- ased decision maker (the cat) to take action he or she would not otherwise take.
While employed as an angiography technician by respon- dent Proctor Hospital, petitioner Staub was a member of the U.S. Army Reserve. Both his immediate supervisor (Mulally)
Source: Steven Petteway, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
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and Mulally’s supervisor (Korenchuk) were hostile to his military obligations. Mulally gave Staub disciplinary warning, which included a directive requiring Staub to report to her or Korenchuk when his cases were completed. After receiving a report from Korenchuk that Staub had violated the Corrective Action, Proctor’s vice president of human resources (Buck) reviewed Staub’s personnel file and decided to fire him. Staub filed a grievance, claiming that Mulally had fabricated the allegation underlying the warning out of hostility toward his military obligations, but Buck adhered to her decision. Staub sued Proctor under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). He contended not that Buck was motivated by hostility to his military obliga- tions, but that Mulally and Korenchuk were, and that their actions influenced Buck’s decision. A jury found Proctor liable and awarded Staub damages, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the decision maker had relied on more than Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s advice in making her decision. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Justice Kagan did not take part in the decision.
SCALIA, JUSTICE: We consider the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for employment discrimination based on the discriminatory animus of an employee who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision.
Petitioner Vincent Staub worked as an angiography technician for respondent Proctor Hospital until 2004, when he was fired. Staub and Proctor hotly dispute the facts surrounding the firing, but because a jury found for Staub in his claim of employment discrimination against Proctor, we describe the facts viewed in the light most favor- able to him. While employed by Proctor, Staub was a mem- ber of the U.S Army Reserve, which required him to attend drill one weekend per month and to train full time for two to three weeks a year. . . .
On April 2, 2004, Angie Day, Staub’s co-worker, com- plained to Linda Buck, Proctor’s vice president of human resources, and Garrett McGowan, Proctor’s chief operating officer, about Staub’s frequent unavailability and abrupt- ness. McGowan directed Korenchuk and Buck to create a plan that would solve Staub’s “availability’ problems.” But three weeks later, before they had time to do so, Korenchuk informed Buck that Staub had left his desk without inform- ing a supervisor, in violation of the January Corrective Action. Staub now contends this accusation was false: he had left Korenchuk a voice-mail notification that he was leaving his desk. Buck relied on Korenchuk’s accusation, however, and after reviewing Staub’s personnel file, she decided to fire him. The termination notice stated that Staub had ignored the directive issued in the January 2004 Corrective Action.
Staub challenged his firing through Proctor’s griev- ance process, claiming that Mulally had fabricated the allegation underlying the Corrective Action out of hostility toward his military obligations. Buck did not follow up with Mulally about this claim. After discussing the matter with another personnel officer, Buck adhered to her decision.
Staub sued Proctor under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U. S. C. §4301 et seq., claiming that his discharge was moti- vated by hostility to his obligations as a military reservist. His contention was not that Buck had any such hostility but that Mulally and Korenchuk did, and that their actions influenced Buck’s ultimate employment decision. A jury found that Staub’s “military status was a motivating factor in [Proctor’s] decision to discharge him,” App. 68a, and awarded $57,640 in damages.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 560 F. 3d 647. The court observed that Staub had brought a “‘cat’s paw case,” meaning that he sought to hold his employer liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with mak- ing the ultimate employment decision. . . . Here, however, Staub is seeking to hold liable not Mulally and Korenchuk, but their employer. Perhaps, therefore, the discriminatory motive of one of the employer’s agents (Mulally or Kore- nchuk) can be aggregated with the act of another agent (Buck) to impose liability on Proctor. . . . The employer is at fault because one of its agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did in fact cause, an adverse employment decision. . . . moti- vated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the super- visor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA . . . Applying our analysis to the facts of this case, it is clear that the Sev- enth Circuit’s judgment must be reversed. Both Mulally and Korenchuk were acting within the scope of their employ- ment when they took the actions that allegedly caused Buck to fire Staub. . . . As the Seventh Circuit recognized, there was evidence that Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s actions were motivated by hostility toward Staub’s military obligations. There was also evidence that Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s actions were causal factors underlying Buck’s decision to fire Staub. Buck’s termination notice expressly stated that Staub was terminated because he had “ignored” the direc- tive in the Corrective Action. Finally, there was evidence that both Mulally and Korenchuk had the specific intent to cause Staub to be terminated. Mulally stated she was try- ing to “get rid of” Staub, and Korenchuk was aware that Mulally was “out to get” Staub. Moreover, Korenchuk informed Buck, Proctor’s personnel officer responsible for terminating employees, of Staub’s alleged noncompliance with Mulally’s Corrective Action, and Buck fired Staub
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OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has jurisdiction over complaints about hazardous conditions in the workplace. Employers are required to comply with OSHA standards to furnish a workplace free from recognized hazards. Employees have the right to request an OSHA inspection if they believe that there are unsafe and unhealthful conditions in the workplace. If employees who make complaints are then subjected to retaliation or discrimination by their employers they may also file a complaint with OSHA. There is no private cause of action under OSHA, which means that an employee cannot sue an employer for damages based on an OSHA violation.
OSHA investigates a wide variety of workplace hazards. For example, follow- ing the deaths of 20 workers in 2008 in construction accidents in New York City, OSHA sent inspectors there in an effort to increase safety and improve working conditions. OSHA inspectors examined cranes and high-rise construction sites. In addition to the inspections, OSHA sent notices to employers’ insurance and work- ers’ compensation carriers. Citations involving training violations at unionized sites also were sent to the unions representing workers and to their training funds. The U.S. House Education and Labor Committee reviewed the sufficiency of OSHA’s construction enforcement. OSHA also investigated The Atlanta Ballet following the fall of a 17-year-old dancer wearing a panda costume during a performance of “The Nutcracker” at the Fox Theater in Atlanta. The dancer, who fell about 12 feet into the empty orchestra pit, suffered serious injuries, requiring spinal surgery. OSHA conducted more than 38,000 inspections in 2006.
See Sidebar 21.8 and 21.9 for important information related to OSHA.
immediately thereafter; a reasonable jury could infer that Korenchuk intended that Staub be fired. The Seventh Cir- cuit therefore erred in holding that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It is less clear whether the jury’s verdict should be reinstated or whether Proctor is entitled to a new trial. The jury instruction did not hew precisely to the rule we
adopt today; it required only that the jury find that “mili- tary status was a motivating factor in [Proctor’s] decision to discharge him.” App. 68a. Whether the variance between the instruction and our rule was harmless error or should mandate a new trial is a matter the Seventh Circuit may consider in the first instance.
Reversed and remanded.
KEY POINTS • This case pertains to the situation in which an employer may be held liable when a biased,
non–decision maker influences an unbiased decision maker to take action that he or she would not otherwise take. This is referred to as the “cat’s paw theory of liability.”
• The Supreme Court held that an employer can be at fault when one of its agents commits an action based on discriminatory animus that is intended to cause and does cause an adverse employment action. Discriminatory animus is discriminatory intent, motive, or state of mind.
• This case arose in connection with a USERRA claim. The same theory, however, could be used to find liability in Title VII and other discrimination cases.
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In 2008, a temporary maintenance worker was pushed to the ground and suffocated to death after approximately 2,000 holiday shoppers broke through Walmart’s glass doors. The shoppers were racing to buy sharply dis- counted televisions, computers, and other gifts. OSHA filed a citation against Walmart, alleging that it did not furnish a workplace “free from recognizable hazard” that was likely to cause death or serious physical harm to an employee due to “crowd crush.” Walmart was fined $7,000 and was required to take steps to correct the hazard. Although the fine is de minimus for Walmart, concerned about the ramifications for future crowd-attracting events, the retailer appealed. The fine was upheld on appeal.
As a result of this incident, OSHA issued Crowd Control Guidelines in November 2010. The detailed guidelines address steps to be taken during planning,
pre-event setup, and the sales event and in emergency situations. Considerations include staffing plans; emer- gency contacts; training workers in crowd management; using barricades or ropes with adequate breaks or turns; using wristbands, tickets, or an Internet lottery for “hot items;” and ensuring adequate communication among employees, customers, and emergency personnel.
Specific measures implemented by Walmart include issuing tickets for hot items, placing employees on plat- forms to direct customers, and using steel barriers in zig- zag patters in front to the store to guide customers into the store in an orderly fashion—avoiding a shoving and crushing mass trying to enter the store. Source: For more about OSHA’s new rules, see Crowd Control Guidelines at www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/Crowd_Control.pdf.
sidebar 21.8
New OSHA Crowd Management Safety Guidelines
Under the Obama administration, OSHA increased its focus on enforcing safe workplaces. One significant step was releasing the Severe Violator Enforcement Pro- gram (SVEP) draft directive to concentrate resources on “inspecting employers who have demonstrated indiffer- ence” to their OSHA obligations “by willful, repeated, or failure-to-abate violations.“ If an employer engages in this behavior in one of the following four areas, it is at risk for being placed in the SVEP:
1. Fatality and/or catastrophic situations, such as three or more hospitalizations or the death of an employee.
2. Non-fatality and/or catastrophic situations in which the employer has exposed the employee to one of the most severe workplace hazards, including “high gravity serious violations” such as fall hazards, com- bustible dust hazards, and lead hazards.
3. Hazards due to the potential release of a highly haz- ardous chemical.
4. Any violation that is deemed “egregious” under cur- rent OSHA regulations. The SVEP casts a wide enforcement net, applying to
employers of all sizes. Example: After a worker fell 50 feet to his death at
a Missouri agricultural facility, an Oklahoma tank-building company was cited for $415,204 in OSHA penalties. The tank company allegedly violated federal fall protec- tion standards by putting employees to work at heights over 25 feet above ground without appropriate fall protection. The company faced two willful and 11 serious safety violations. It was placed on OSHA’s Severe Violator Enforcement Program in 2020. Source: Fatima Hussein, “Oklahoma Tanker Maker Cited for $415,204 for Worker Fall Death,” Bloomberg Law, April 7, 2020; OSHA, Severe Violator Enforcement Program Directive, available at www.osha.gov/dep/svep-directive.pdf.
sidebar 21.9
OSHA’s Severe Violator Enforcement Program
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PENSION PLANS In 1974, Congress passed and President Nixon signed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). This law attempts to protect employees whose employers have voluntary pension plans. These protections include disclosure of information about the management of and fiduciary relationships within the plan. Since ERISA, the federal government has enacted a number of other laws directed at protecting employees’ health care. Among these laws are Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), which was passed in 1986; it provides that employees can continue to purchase health insurance even after their employment is terminated. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) became law in 1996 and protects employees who have preexisting health conditions when they change jobs.
During the early part of this century, we have seen a new crisis arising. This involves businesses that are changing their defined-benefit retirement plans to pri- vate individual accounts, such as 401(k) plans. A number of companies have gone into bankruptcy and have sought permission to cancel retirement plans. It appears a very real competitive advantage is to be a new company that is not burdened by large pension plans obligations. For example, many of the legacy airlines, such as Delta, United, and Northwest, have gone into and come out of bankruptcy in the hope that they will be competitive with newer airlines, which do not have the large obligation of paying the pensions of thousands of retirees.
HEALTH CARE The Patient Protection Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act) was signed into law on March 23, 2010. The goals of the Affordable Care Act include increasing the quality and affordability of health insurance. The act mandates most Americans to purchase health insurance, offering subsidized coverage for qualifying individuals. Key features of the Affordable Care Act include a number of consumer protection features, including:
• Providing the Patient’s Bill of Rights. • Prohibiting denying coverage for children based on preexisting conditions. • Prohibiting insurance companies from rescinding coverage. • Eliminating lifetime limits on insurance coverage. • Providing small businesses with health insurance tax credits. • Offering seniors on Medicare better prescription drug benefits. • Expanding coverage to young adults and early retirees. • Expanding free preventive care.
By May 2014, more than 7 million Americans had signed up for health care in connection with the Affordable Care Act.
See Sidebar 21.10 for information about key provisions of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act.
For more details about these laws, visit www. dol.gov/dol/topic/health- plans/erisa.htm#content.
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The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) requires certain employers to provide their employees with paid sick leave or expanded family and medical leave for specified reasons related to COVID-19.
Key features include that covered employers provide to all employees: • Two weeks (up to 80 hours) of paid sick leave at the
employee’s regular rate of pay where the employee is unable to work because the employee is quaran- tined and/or experiencing COVID-19 symptoms and seeking a medical diagnosis;
• Two weeks (up to 80 hours) of paid sick leave at two- thirds the employee’s regular rate of pay because
the employee is unable to work because of a bona fide need to care for an individual subject to quar- antine, or care for a child (under 18 years of age) whose school or child care provider is closed or unavailable for reasons related to COVID-19, and/or the employee is experiencing a substantially similar condition as specified by relevant agencies. Unless extended, the provisions apply through
December 31, 2020. See The New York Times, Special Topics: Health
Care Reform, https://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/ health-care-reform.
sidebar 21.10
Families First Coronavirus Response Act
LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYMENT AT WILL Historically, unless employees were contracted for a definite period of employment (such as for one year), employers were able to discharge them without cause at any time. This is called the employment-at-will doctrine.
During the 1930s, employers began to lose this absolute right to discharge employees whenever they desired. The Labor–Management Relations Act prohib- ited employers from firing employees for union activities. Now, many federal laws limit employers in their right to terminate employees. Table 21.2 provides a listing of some of these laws. Some states also prohibit employers by statute from discharging employees for certain reasons, such as for refusing to take lie detector examinations.
Courts, too, have begun limiting the at-will doctrine. Under contract theory, several courts have stated that at-will employment contracts (which are not written and are little more than an agreement to pay for work performed) contain an implied promise of good faith and fair dealing by the employer.
Other courts have ruled that the employer’s publication of an employee hand- book can change the nature of at-will employment. They have held the employer liable for breach of contract for discharging an employee in violation of statements made in the handbook about discharge procedures.
Many contract and tort exceptions to employment at will have involved one of three types of employer behavior:
• Discharge of employee for performance of an important public obligation, such as jury duty.
• Discharge of employee for reporting employer’s alleged violations of law (whis- tle-blowing). The recent financial reform legislation, Dodd-Frank, includes financial incentives to blow the whistle for a broad range of wrongdoing from securities and accounting fraud to bribery allegations. (See Sidebar 21.11 for information about IRS whistleblowers.)
• Discharge of employee for exercising statutory rights.
LO 21-2
Do understand that any commitments stated in an employee handbook are viewed by courts as a contractual promise by the employer.
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Statute Limitation on Employee Discharge
Labor–Management Relations Act Prohibits discharge for union activity or for filing charges under the act.
Fair Labor Standards Act Forbids discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the act.
Occupational Safety and Health Act Prohibits discharge for exercising rights under the act. Civil Rights Act Makes discharge based on race, sex, color, religion, or national origin
illegal. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Forbids age-based discharge of employees over age 40. Employee Retirement Income Security Act Prohibits discharge to prevent employees from getting vested
pension rights. Clean Air Act Prevents discharge of employees who cooperate in proceedings
against an employer for violation of the act. Clean Water Act Prevents discharge of employees who cooperate in proceedings
against an employer for violation of the act. Consumer Credit Protection Act Prohibits discharge of employees due to garnishment of wages
for any one indebtedness. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act Forbids discharge of employees for service on federal grand or petit juries.
table 21.2 Federal Statutes Limiting Employment-at-Will Doctrine
In 2006, the IRS amended its whistleblower statute to encourage the reporting of tax fraud perpetrated by indi- viduals and corporations. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §7623, whistleblowers have an enforceable right to a reward when they report significant tax violations. A person who provides information regarding tax law violations under the IRS Whistleblower Law is known as a whistleblower. To be eligible to recover compensation from the IRS, a person must bring information to the Internal Revenue Service’s attention. The whistleblower may receive com- pensation only from monies actually collected based on the information provided.
Under the IRS Whistleblower Reform Law, a per- son can receive a reward of between 15 percent and 30 percent of the total collected proceeds (including pen- alties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts). If the IRS moves forward with an administrative or judicial action based on information brought by a whistleblower, the whistleblower is eligible to receive at least 15 percent and up to a cap of 30 percent of the recovery, depending on the whistleblower’s contribution to the prosecution of
the action. The IRS may give awards of lesser amounts under certain circumstances (i.e., when the fraud has already been publicly disclosed and the whistleblower is not an original source).
WHAT ARE THE MOST COMMON TAX FRAUD SCHEMES? • Failing to report income earned in a foreign stock
exchange. • Participating in bogus income tax shelters. • Hiding or transferring assets or income out of the
United States. • Overstating deductions. • Making false entries in books and records. • Claiming personal expenses as business expenses. • Claiming false deductions. • Under-reporting tip income. • Paying employees in cash. • Keeping two sets of books.
sidebar 21.11
IRS Whistleblowers Rewards Program
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Most of the cases that limit at-will employment state that the employer has vio- lated public policy. What does it mean to say that an employer has violated public pol- icy? Is it a court’s way of saying that most people no longer support the employer’s right to do what it did?
Limitations on discrimination and employment at will evidence a growing con- cern for the rights of employees in their jobs and may suggest a trend that could lead to some type of broad, legally guaranteed job security. In recent years, unions have also increasingly focused on job-security issues in their bargaining with employers.
Technology and social media are raising ongoing issues about privacy in the workplace. Both employers and employees are dealing with how to navigate these issues. Here are a few examples: • The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously found that
notwithstanding a city policy officer’s reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages received on a pager provided by the City, the City did not violate his privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment by reviewing transcripts of those text messages. In this case, many of the messages were not work related and were sexually explicit (City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010)).
• Employers may review an applicant’s Facebook, Instagram, or LinkedIn pages to learn more about potential employees during the recruitment and hir- ing process.
• Many employers now have documented policies pertaining to their employees’ use of social media sites while on the job. Sixty-one percent of compa- nies have policies in place that are designed to pro- tect company secrets and confidential information, as well as customer financial data.
• When using social media sites, employers must use care not to base a decision on something learned
that cannot legally be used to make an employment decision.
• At least a dozen states prohibit employers from ask- ing employees and prospective employees for pass- words to their social media accounts.
• Many employers have policies governing personal use of e-mail, cell phones, texting, and social media during the workday to avoid the distractions that can affect productivity.
• A study revealed that 36 percent of employers block access to social media sites and 70 percent of the responding employers reported disciplinary action for social media misuse in the workplace. (See Proskauer Rose LLP, 2013/14 Survey Social Media in the Workplace and World 3.0, 2014, www.pros- kauer.com/files/uploads/social-media-in-the-work- place-2014.pdf.) For additional information, see, “Electronic Business
Communication Policies and Procedures Survey,” ePolicy Institute, http://www.epolicyinstitute.com/2009-electronic- business-communication-policies-procedures-survey- article.
sidebar 21.12
Privacy, Technology and Social Media
WORKERS’ PRIVACY Individual privacy is such an important part of individual freedom that both legal and ethical questions regarding privacy are bound to multiply in the computer age. While debate continues concerning the need for further federal privacy legislation, many states have passed their own privacy-related statutes. Several states guarantee workers access to their job personnel files and restrict disclosure of personal infor- mation to third parties. See Sidebar 21.12 for many examples related to technology and privacy in the workplace.
LO 21-3
Don’t rely on an expectation of privacy in the workplace; employers may monitor e-mail systems they provide.
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Concerns for individual privacy also contributed to passage of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and the 1988 Employee Polygraph Protection Act. Under this latter federal law, private employers generally are forbidden from using lie detector tests while screening job applicants. Current employees may not be tested randomly but may be tested as a result of a specific incident or activity that causes economic injury or loss to an employer’s business. The act permits private security companies to test job applicants and allows companies that manufacture or sell controlled substances to test both job applicants and current employees. The Labor Department may seek fines of up to $10,000 against employers who violate the act. Employees are also authorized to sue employers for violating the act.
Another important privacy concern involves drug testing. At present there is no uniform law regarding the drug testing of employees. Many private companies conduct such testing. However, some states have placed some limits on a private company’s right to test for drugs.
Public employees are protected from some drug testing by the Fourth Amend- ment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches. However, exactly when drug tests are unreasonable is subject to much debate in the courts. In general, public employ- ees may be tested when there is a proper suspicion that employees are using ille- gal drugs that impair working ability or violate employment rules. Courts have also upheld drug testing as part of required annual medical exams.
See Sidebar 21.13 for a survey involving privacy in the workplace.
Unlike the United States, workers in other juris- dictions, such as the European Union, enjoy a much higher expecta- tion of privacy in the workplace.
There is very little expectation of privacy in the American workplace. For example, of the employers surveyed: • 73 percent monitored e-mail messages • 66 percent monitored web surfing • 48 percent monitored with video surveillance • 45 percent monitored keystrokes and keyboard time • 43 percent monitored computer files
Of those employers, a number reported firing employees for violating policies regarding use of the Internet (30 percent), e-mail (28 percent), or phones (six percent). Source: 2007 Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey (released February 2008) by the American Management Association and the ePolicy Institute.
sidebar 21.13
Is There Any Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Workplace?
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACTS In Chapter 10, you learned about torts. What happens, however, if a worker is injured at work? Around the turn of the century, the tort system was largely replaced in the workplace by a series of workers’ compensation acts. These statutes were enacted at both the state and federal level, and they imposed a type of strict liability on employ- ers for accidental workplace injuries suffered by their employees. The clear purpose of these statues was to remove financial losses of injury from workers and redistrib- ute them onto employers and ultimately onto society.
History Workers’ compensation laws are state statutes designed to protect employees and their families from the risks of accidental injury, death, or disease resulting from their employment. They were passed because the common law did not
Even if an employee’s contributory negligence or assumption of risk leads to an accidental injury, the employee still receives workers’ compensation.
Remember workers’ compensation is a form of insurance required by the states.
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give adequate protection to employees from the hazards of their work. At common law, anyone was liable in tort for damages resulting from injuries caused to another as a proximate result of negligence. If an employer acted unreasonably and his or her carelessness was the proximate cause of physical injury suffered by an employee, the latter could sue and recover damages from the employer. However, the common law also provided the employer with the means of escaping this tort liability in most cases through the following three defenses:
• Assumption of the risk • Contributory negligence • The fellow-servant rule
For example, assume that the employer knowingly instructed workers to operate dangerous machinery not equipped with any safety devices, even though it realized injury to them was likely. A worker had his arm mangled when it was caught in the gears of one of these machines. Even though the employer was negligent in permit- ting this hazardous condition to persist, if the worker was aware of the dangers that existed, he would be unable to recover damages because he knowingly assumed the risk of his injury. In addition, if the injury were caused by contributory negligence of the employee as well as the negligence of the employer, the action was defeated. And, if the injury occurred because of the negligence of another employee, the negli- gent employee, rather than the employer, was liable because of the fellow-servant rule.
The English Parliament passed a workers’ compensation statute in 1897. Today all states have such legislation, modeled to a greater or lesser degree on the English act. These laws vary a great deal from state to state as to the industries subject to them, the employees they cover, the nature of the injuries or diseases that are com- pensable, the rates of compensation, and the means of administration. In spite of wide variances in the laws of the states in this area, certain general observations can be made about them.
The System State workers’ compensation statutes provide a system to pay work- ers or their families if the worker is accidentally killed or injured or incurs an occupa- tional disease while employed. To be compensable, the death, illness, or injury must arise out of and in the course of the employment. Under these acts, the negligence or fault of the employer in causing an on-the-job injury is not an issue. Instead, these laws recognize the fact of life that a certain number of injuries, deaths, and diseases are bound to occur in a modern industrial society as a result of the attempts of busi- nesses and their employees to provide the goods and services demanded by the con- suming public. This view leads to the conclusion that it is fairer for the consuming public to bear the cost of such mishaps rather than to impose it on injured workers.
Workers’ compensation laws create strict liability for employers of accidentally injured workers. Liability exists regardless of lack of negligence or fault, provided the necessary association between the injuries and the business of the employer is present. The three defenses the employer had at common law are eliminated. The employers, treating the costs of these injuries as part of the costs of production, pass them on to the consumers who created the demand for the product or service being furnished.
Workers’ compensation acts give covered employees the right to certain cash payments for their loss of income due to accidental, on-the-job injuries. In the event of a married employee’s death, benefits are provided for the surviving spouse and minor children. The amount of such awards usually is subject to a stated maximum and is calculated by using a percentage of the wages of the employee. If the employee
If you are injured at work, report the accident immediately.
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suffers permanent, partial disability, most states provide compensation both for injuries that are scheduled in the statute and those that are nonscheduled. As an example of the former, a worker who loses a hand might be awarded 100 weeks of compensation at $95 per week. Besides scheduling specific compensation for certain specific injuries, most acts also provide compensation for nonscheduled ones based upon the earning power the employee lost due to his or her injury. In addition to the above payments, all statutes provide for medical benefits.
In some states, employers have a choice of covering their workers’ compensation risk with insurance or of being self-insured (i.e., paying all claims directly) if they can demonstrate their capability to do so. Approximately 20 percent of compensation benefits are paid by self-insurers. In other states, employers pay into a state fund used to compensate workers entitled to benefits. In these states, the amounts of the payments are based on the size of the payroll and the experience of the employer in having claims filed against the system by its employees. Workers’ compensation laws are usually administered exclusively by an administrative agency called the industrial commission or board, which has quasi-judicial powers. Of course, the ruling of such boards is subject to review by the courts of the jurisdiction in the same manner as the actions of other administrative agencies.
Tests for Determining Compensation The tests for determining whether an employer must pay workers’ compensation to an employee are simply:
1. Was the injury accidental? 2. Did the injury arise out of and in the course of employment?
Because workers’ compensation laws benefit workers, courts interpret them liberally to favor workers. In recent years, cases have tended to expand employers’ liability. For instance, courts have held that heart attacks (as well as other common ailments in which the employee has had either a preexisting disease or a physical condition likely to lead to the disease) are compensable as “accidental injuries.” One ruling approved an award to a purchasing agent who became mentally ill because she was exposed to unusual work, stresses, and strains.
Her “nerve-racking” job involved a business whose sales grew more than sixfold in 10 years. Factors contributing to her “accidental injury” included harsh criticism by her supervisor and long hours of work. Likewise, the courts have been liberal in upholding awards that have been challenged on the grounds that the injury did not arise “out of and in the course of employment.” Courts routinely support compensa- tion awards for almost any accidental injury that employees suffer while traveling for their employers. A Minnesota Supreme Court decision upheld a lower court award of compensation to a bus driver. On a layover during a trip, the driver had been shot accidentally in a tavern parking lot following a night on the town.
Exclusive Remedy Rule Recently, some courts have been liberal in their inter- pretations of the exclusive remedy rule. This rule, which is written into all com- pensation statutes, states that an employee’s sole remedy against an employer for workplace injury or illness shall be workers’ compensation. In the past few years, courts in several important jurisdictions have created exceptions to this rule. Note that these exceptions recognize in part that workers’ compensation laws do not ade- quately compensate badly injured workers.
Because workers’ compensation laws apply only to accidentally injured work- ers, the exclusive remedy rule does not protect employers who intentionally injure
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workers. But the issue arises as to how “intentional” such an injury has to be. What if an employer knowingly exposes employees to a chemical that may cause illness in some employees over a long term?
The Future of State Workers’ Compensation Currently, many problems confront the state workers’ compensation system. Fifty separate nonuniform acts make up the system. Many acts exclude from coverage groups such as farmworkers, government employees, and employees of small businesses. Many state legislatures have enacted changes in their compensation laws. However, states that have broad- ened coverage and increased benefits have greatly boosted the cost of doing business within their borders. This discourages new businesses from locating within these states and encourages those already there to move out.
In the last decade, workers’ compensation payments have tripled. Many workers exaggerate their injuries to get compensation. At the same time, compensation pay- ments to seriously injured workers are often inadequate, and this has led to attempts to get around the exclusive remedy rule.
As our national economy moves from a manufacturing to a service emphasis, the nature of injuries suffered under workers’ compensation programs begins to change. In particular, the number of mental stress claims rises. The National Coun- cil on Compensation Insurance states that these claims have increased fivefold in the past few years. Problems of proving (or disproving) mental stress claims bring new concerns for the workers’ compensation system.
A major problem concerns slowly developing occupational diseases. Many toxic chemicals cause cancer and other diseases only after workers have been exposed to them over many years. Often, it is difficult or impossible for workers or their survi- vors to recover workers’ compensation for such diseases. One solution to the prob- lems confronting the workers’ compensation system would be federal reform. Those advocating such reform have put forth several plans, but Congress has shown little inclination so far to adopt a uniform federal act.
EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION In accordance with the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), all U.S. employers must complete and retain Form I-9, Employment Eli- gibility Verification, forms for each individual they hire in the United States. Both citizens and noncitizens must complete the form. The employer is required to exam- ine the employment eligibility and identify document(s) an employee presents to determine whether the document(s) reasonably appear to be “genuine.” Acceptable documents that establish both identity and employment authorization include:
• U.S. Passport or U.S. Passport Card • Permanent Resident Card or Alien Registration Receipt Card • Foreign passport that contains a temporary I-551 stamp or temporary I-551
printed notation on a machine-readable visa • An Employment Authorization document that contains a photograph
If none of these documents are available, a worker may use a combination of documents specified by federal law. Employers must use care to determine that the documents appear genuine, but not to go overboard and be liable for “document abuse” or discriminatory practices related to verification. The U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services broadly categorizes document abuse into four categories:
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1. Improperly requesting that employees produce more documents than are required by Form I-9 to establish the employee’s identity and employment authorization.
2. Improperly requesting that employees present a particular document, such as a “green card,” to establish identity and/or employment authorization.
3. Improperly rejecting documents that reasonably appear to be genuine and to relate to the employee presenting them.
4. Improperly treating groups of applicants differently when completing Form I-9, such as requiring certain groups of employees who look or sound “foreign” to present particular documents to the employer.
The completed forms must be retained by the employer either for three years after the date of hire or for one year after employment is terminated, whichever is later.
See Sidebar 21.14 for a Supreme Court case involving hiring foreign workers.
By a 5–3 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Cham- ber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ___ (2011), that the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) law does not preempt the Arizona statute that penal- izes employers who knowingly hire unauthorized foreign workers. The Legal Arizona Workers Act provides that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intention- ally employ unauthorized aliens may be, and in certain circumstances must be, suspended or revoked. The law
also requires all Arizona employers to use E-Verify, an Internet-based system that provides instant verification of work authorization.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, along with various business and civil rights organizations, challenged the Arizona law. The Court reasoned that Arizona’s licensing law falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the states and therefore is not expressly preempted.
sidebar 21.14
Arizona Law on Hiring Foreign Workers Is Upheld
Employee Lawsuits
Despite the presence of many examples of the employer’s violating an employment law, most employers strive to obey the law. They still risk lawsuits, however, includ- ing many brought by unsatisfactory employees who have been disciplined, denied promotion, or discharged. How can employers protect themselves from unjustified employee lawsuits?
One important protection against unjustified employee lawsuits is an established system of adequate documentation. Sometimes called the paper fortress, this docu- mentation consists of job descriptions, personnel manuals, and employee personnel files.
Before handing anyone an employment application, the employer should insist that the potential candidate carefully study a job description. A well-written job description will help potential applicants eliminate themselves from job situations for which they lack interest or qualification, thus preventing employers from having to dismiss them later and risking lawsuits.
Once a new employee is hired, the employer should give the employee a person- nel manual. This manual should include information about employee benefits and
LO 21-4
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should also outline work rules and job requirements. The employer should go over the manual with the employee and answer any questions. Clear identification of employer expectations and policies helps provide a defense against employee law- suits if subsequent discipline or discharge of the employee becomes necessary. The employer should ask that the employee sign a form indicating receipt of the manual and an understanding of the employer’s explanation of its contents.
The employer should enter this form, with all other documentation relevant to an employee’s work history, into the employee’s personnel file. Regular written evaluations of employee performance should also be entered into the personnel file. A chronological record of unsatisfactory work performance is a very useful defense against unjustified lawsuits following discipline, denial of promotion, or discharge.
Another piece of documentation that helps justify employer decisions is the written warning. Any time an employee breaks a work rule or performs unsatisfacto- rily, the employer should issue the employee a written warning and place a duplicate in the personnel file. The warning should explain specifically what work rule the employee violated. In addition, employers should either have an employee sign that he or she has received a written warning or else note in the personnel file that the employee has received a copy of it. The employer should also give the employee the opportunity to place a letter of explanation in the personnel file.
Laws discussed in this chapter and the next one should not prevent employers from discharging unsatisfactory employees. In an actual termination conversation, however, the employer should provide the employee with specific reasons for dis- charge, taken from the personnel file. Detailed documentation is vital in successfully responding to unjustified employee lawsuits. Even better is to prevent them in the first place through the development, enforcement, and review of company policies that promote legal compliance.
See Sidebar 21.15 for practical suggestions for employers to prevent employee lawsuits.
Taking any disciplinary action without docu- mentation fails to build the record for increased sanctions in the future.
There are a number of steps that employers can take to avoid employment litigation, including: • Implementing workplace policies and procedures
and training employees to understand the rules and apply them consistently. The policies should cover how to prevent sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination and how to report the same.
• Conducting regular candid performance evaluations, with clear feedback to employees.
• Investigating all complaints thoroughly, never taking any adverse action against persons making honest complaint.
• Documenting all employee incidents, including disci- plinary issues and other problems, in each employ- ee’s personnel file.
• Being fair and objective when dealing with employ- ees. Being upfront and honest about action taken in the workplace, including termination, helps employ- ees understand the rationale for the action. Keep these practical suggestions in mind as you
study discrimination in Chapter 20, or, in light of them, review Chapter 20, and realize how many workers could potentially assert one or more discrimination claims against their employer.
sidebar 21.15
What Can Employers Do to Avoid Employment Litigation?
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Key Terms Employment Eligibility
Verification 678 Employment-at-will doctrine 672 Exclusive remedy rule 677 Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) 656
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 663
Form I-9 678 Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) 669 Paper fortress 679
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) 666
WARN Act 662 Workers’ compensation 675
Review Questions and Problems Employment Laws
1. Minimum Wages and Maximum Hours (a) What federal law establishes the minimum wage and the hours in a workweek? (b) What is the minimum wage and what is considered the maximum workweek? (c) What is required regarding overtime compensation or time off?
2. The WARN Act To show your understanding of the WARN notice, answer these questions: (a) Who are the covered employers? (b) What format is required for a WARN notice? (c) When must the WARN notice be given? (d) To whom must the WARN notice be delivered?
3. The Family and Medical Leave Act In the sixth month of her pregnancy, Suzanne was advised by her doctors to slow down the hectic pace of her consulting career. Upon this advice, Suzanne requested and was granted by her employer 12 weeks of medical leave. During the 10th week of this leave, Suzanne had a healthy baby. How much fam- ily leave is Suzanne entitled to take under the FMLA to care for her newborn?
4. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act Robert left his position as commercial airline pilot to undertake his duties in the Marine Reserves for a tour of duty in Iraq. When he returns home a year later, his employer apologetically tells him that they filled his position during his absence and they “will call” when something comes available. They also express concern about his ability to fly commercial jets because he has not flown in the last year. What legal recourse does Robert have, if any?
5. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Larry, a machine operator, is concerned that the cardboard baler he is working on should have a safety shield to protect his arms from the moving parts. He is also worried that if he reports his concerns, he will be put on the night shift. What should he do? Does he have any protection if he reports the issue?
6. Pension Plans and Health Care Why has the aging of the baby boom generation put so much pressure on the financial stability of his- torically successful companies?
7. Limitations on Employment at Will Terry was hired as an assistant manager by the Assurance Manufacturing Company. There was no spe- cific time period related to Terry’s employment. During Terry’s first day at work, the personnel director of Assurance gave Terry a copy of the employee’s handbook. In this handbook, Assurance stated that no employee would be terminated without a justifiable explanation. Five months after beginning work at Assurance, Terry was notified that after an additional two weeks there would be no further job for Terry at Assurance. When Terry asked why this termination was occurring, the personnel director told Terry, “Under state law no reason for termination has to be given. In essence, you are an employee only for as
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long as Assurance desires.” What is the best argument Terry can make that the employment-at-will doc- trine is not applicable in this situation? Explain.
8. Workers’ Privacy John Hancock Life Insurance Company instructed its employees to create passwords to protect their e-mail accounts. Employees also were told to create personal folders for messages they send and receive. After a company investigation, Nancy and Joanne were terminated as John Hancock employees for using their e-mail accounts to send sexually explicit messages. These employees sued John Hancock for wrongful discharge on the basis that the company’s investigation had violated their rights of privacy. Was John Hancock entitled to examine these employees’ e-mail accounts?
9. Workers’ Compensation Acts If Sam fails to wear a hard hat, as required by Super Construction Inc., his employer, and is injured by a falling hammer, can he recover workers’ compensation from Super Construction Inc.? Your answer should explain the basis for recovering workers’ compensation.
10. Employment Eligibility Verification Sophia’s Glam Designs needs to hire 100 new workers to manufacture a new line of back-to-school out- fits. The company received hundreds of applications for the positions. Simone, Sophia’s Glam Designs Human Resources Manager, requires all new hires to complete an I-9 and to produce a valid passport or green card to prove employment eligibility. When one worker attempts to use a combination of a Geor- gia driver’s license and a social security card, Simone refuses to accept the documents. Because of the large number of workers hired, she wants to use documents she feels comfortable verifying and stream- line the documentation process. Is this permissible?
Employee Lawsuits 11. What is meant by the phrase “paper fortress”? 12. How does maintaining a paper fortress aid the employer when the employee claims unfair treatment?
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You just had one of those days—exciting and overwhelming. As your company’s direc- tor of human relations, you have dealt with an employee asking how much leave he can take when his wife has their first baby next month. A phone call from the company’s CFO involved discussions of potential layoffs in order to “make the budget.” A group of employ- ees came to meet with you, and they indicated they were talking with union organizers as a way to combat the company’s policy of monitoring phone calls and e-mail messages. Another group of employees expressed their feelings that they were not being paid for all the time they worked.
Before heading home, you take a few minutes to reflect and ask yourself the following questions: • How is the workday calculated? • What legal requirements have to be met before layoffs can occur? • What is the company’s responsibility to educate employees about their rights under the FMLA?
• Can your company properly monitor its employees’ phone calls and e-mail messages?
business discussions
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Learning Objectives In this chapter you will learn:
22-1 To understand the role unions play in the U.S. labor market.
22-2 To describe the development of early labor law, focusing on the Clayton Act, the Railway Labor Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
22-3 To appreciate the significance of the Wagner Act, including the creation of the National Labor Relations Board and unfair labor practices by management.
22-4 To recognize how the Taft-Hartley Act amended labor law to balance the power between labor and management, including the recognition of unfair labor practices by unions.
Labor—Management Relationship22 a katz/Shutterstock
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C hapters 20 and 21 pertain to “employ-
ment law,” the area of the law that con-
trols how employers must treat applicants
for employment, employees, and former employees.
As you know, employment law encompasses a wide
variety of employer–employee workplace issues. This
chapter focuses on labor laws, the area of the law
designed to equalize the bargaining power between
employers and employees. Specifically, labor law
prohibits employers and unions from engaging in
specified “unfair labor practices” and establishes
an obligation of both parties to engage in good-faith
collective bargaining. Labor laws pertain to the
relationships between employers and unions, grant-
ing employees the right to unionize and allowing
employers and employees to engage in certain activi-
ties (such as strikes, picketing, seeking injunctions,
lockouts). These laws regulating labor–management
relations are largely a product of the New Deal era
of the 1930s.
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Although union membership is not as large as it once was in the United States, unions are alive and well with active agendas on behalf of their members. They are also high-profile advocates during political elections and on labor-related topics such as international trade. A number of free trade agreements, discussed in Chapter 12, faced vocal opposition from labor unions. Despite their smaller numbers, labor unions continue to be formidable in the United States.
Labor Laws
What is your reaction to the word union? Do your thoughts have a mostly positive or negative connotation? Society’s reaction and the government’s response to the union movement have varied over time. Thus, your reaction is not right or wrong; it is likely formed by where you were raised and what your parents did to support you. Children of business managers probably have a very different perspective of unions than children of workers whose wages were increased and job security strengthened through the efforts of union bargaining agents.
A union is basically workers organizing their collective voices to increase their ability to communicate with their employer. As a concept, a union is neither good nor bad. How the concept is utilized makes all the difference in one’s view of unions.
Does such a viewpoint really matter today? Haven’t unions outlived their use- fulness? These questions and similar ones are very much in today’s public debate. Interestingly, this debate is occurring among union leaders as well. The statistics tell a varied story. Often cited is the declining percentage of the workforce that is unionized. However, Table 22.1 illustrates that story is more complex due to the decline in private employees being offset by the growth of public employees who are union members.
The largest unions in the United States represent teachers, government employ- ees, and service workers. The focus on how much time and money are dedicated to recruiting new members through intensive organizing campaigns at the work site ver- sus through political efforts caused a split in the AFL-CIO, labor’s longtime unified voice. Five of the larger unions formed a group called Change to Win. See Sidebar 22.1 for union statistics.
The goal of labor laws is successful collective bargaining, the process by which labor and management negotiate and reach agreements on matters of importance to both. Such matters include wages to be paid to workers, hours to be worked, and other terms and conditions of employment. Collective bargaining can be successful only if the bargaining power of the parties is equal. Most laws regulating labor–management relations seek to equalize this bargaining power. As a result, some laws add to the bargaining position of labor and others add to that of management.
LO 22-1
The National Education Association is the larg- est union with 2.7 million members.
“Forming this coalition is a step in the wrong direction because it’s the first step toward a truly divided labor movement. Splitting the AFL-CIO will mean less power for workers.”
–Gerald W. McEntee, president of the
American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees
“The basic principle that brings us here today is that American workers cannot win a better life unless more workers belong to unions.”
–Statement of five union presidents
announcing the Change to Win Coalition
Year Private Public Total Membership
1953 35.7% 15,540,000 11.6% 770,000 32.5% 16,310,000 1975 26.3 16,397,000 39.6 5,810,000 28.9 22,207,000 2004 7.9 8,205,000 36.6 8,131,000 12.5 15,472,000 2019 6.2 7,508,000 37.2 7,066,000 10.7 14,600,000
Source: Union Members Summary, Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 22, 2020. Changes in data collection methods over time can result in some variance.
table 22.1 Statistics on Union Membership
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These laws have been passed when Congress perceived that one side’s bargain- ing power was excessive. As in any balancing process, it is very difficult to hit the right middle point. Thus, as you read the following sections understand that the labor–management relationship is a delicate one involving many nuances. Table 22.2 lists the major federal labor laws. Sidebar 22.2 shows the impact of executive orders in changing the modern union landscape.
LAWS BEFORE 1935 Until 1935, Congress viewed management as having greater bargaining power in the labor–management relationship. This view certainly was justified since the union movement historically was met with strong and swift reprisals by employers. It was not uncommon in the 1800s and early 1900s for workers who tried to unionize to be fired or, worse, beaten, even killed. This treatment of workers engaged in unaccept- able behavior, from the employers’ viewpoint, certainly kept management in a strong bargaining position and prevented unions from growing. In a series of “prolabor” laws, Congress took action to correct the inequalities. It did so by passing the following:
• The Clayton Act • The Railway Labor Act • The Norris-LaGuardia Act
The Clayton Act The first federal statute of any importance to the labor move- ment is the Clayton Act of 1914, which was passed principally to strengthen the antitrust laws. Between 1890 (when the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed) and 1914, labor unions were weak in their ability to represent employees. At least one reason for the relative strength enjoyed by management was the fact that it could and did argue that employees acting together were restraining trade illegally under the Sherman Act.
The Clayton Act stated that antitrust laws regulating anticompetitive contracts did not apply to labor unions or their members in lawfully carrying out their legitimate
LO 22-2
“With all their faults, trade unions have done more for humanity than any other organization of men that ever existed. They have done more for decency, for honesty, for education, for the better- ment of the race, for the developing of character in men, than any other association of men.”
–Clarence Darrow, The Railroad Trainman
(1909)
Do recall that the Clay- ton Act is considered an antitrust law (see Chapter 16). Congress can use one law to impact various legal areas.
According to the Department of Labor: • Union members accounted for 10.3 percent of all
employed wage and salary workers. (In 1983, the first year comparable data was available, union mem- bership was 20.1 percent.)
• The union membership rate was the highest for local government, 39.4% (includes teachers, police offi- cers, and firefighters).
• Among demographic groups, the union membership rate was highest for black men and lowest for His- panic women.
• Union membership varies substantially by state. For example, Hawaii and New York had the highest union membership rate (23.5 percent and 21 percent, respectively), while South Carolina and North Caro- lina had the lowest (2.2 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively).
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 22, 2020, www.bls.gov/news.
sidebar 22.1
2019 Statistics on Union Membership
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activities. This exemption covered only legitimate union practices. Although the Clayton Act exempted employees from the claim that they were restraining trade through unionization, this law did not expressly grant employees the protected right to join a union. Therefore, the Clayton Act did not balance the bargaining power between labor and management. The latter group remained the stronger one.
The Railway Labor Act Among the first industries to unionize were the rail- roads. In 1926, Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act to encourage collective bargaining in the railroad industry. The goal was to resolve labor disputes that might otherwise disrupt transportation and result in violence. The act was later extended to airlines; today it applies to both air and rail transportation. It established the three- member National Mediation Board, which must designate the bargaining repre- sentative for any given bargaining unit of employees in the railway or air transport industries. The board generally does this by holding representation elections. Specifi- cally, when the parties to a dispute over proposed contract terms in the transportation industry cannot reach an agreement concerning rates of pay or working conditions, the National Mediation Board must attempt mediation of their differences. If media- tion does not resolve their differences, the board encourages voluntary arbitration. If the parties refuse arbitration and the dispute is likely to disrupt interstate commerce substantially, the board informs the president, who then appoints a special emergency
Year Statute Major Provisions
1914 Clayton Act 1. Exempted union activity from the antitrust laws. 1926 Railway Labor Act 1. Governs collective bargaining for railroads and airlines.
2. Created the National Mediation Board to conduct union elections and mediate differences between employers and unions.
1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act 1. Outlawed yellow-dog contracts. 2. Prohibited federal courts from enjoining lawful union activities, including
picketing and strikes. 1935 Wagner Act
(National Labor Relations Act) 1. Created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 2. Authorized the NLRB to conduct union certification elections. 3. Outlawed certain conduct by management as unfair to labor (five unfair
labor practices). 4. Authorized the NLRB to hold hearings on unfair labor practices and
correct wrongs resulting from them. 1947 Taft-Hartley Act (Labor–
Management Relations Act) 1. Outlawed certain conduct by unions as six unfair labor practices. 2. Provided for an 80-day cooling-off period in strikes that imperil national
health or safety. 3. Allowed states to enact right-to-work laws. 4. Created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to assist in
settlement of labor disputes. 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act (Labor–
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, LMRDA)
1. Created a Bill of Rights for union members. 2. Requires reports to the secretary of labor. 3. Added to the list of unfair labor practices.
table 22.2 Federal Laws Governing Labor–Management Relations
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board. This emergency board lacks judicial power, but it encourages the parties to reach an agreement by investigating the dispute and publishing its findings of fact and recommendations for settlement. During the investigation, which lasts 30 days, and for an additional 30 days after the report is issued, business is conducted without interruption. The parties, however, have no duty to comply with the special board’s proposals. Thus, if no new collective bargaining agreement is reached after the 60-day period, lockouts by management and strikes by workers become legal.
The Railway Labor Act has played a vitally important role in balancing the labor–management relationship in the transportation industries. However, due to this act’s limited application, the management of businesses outside the transporta- tion industry generally continued to have superior bargaining power following 1926.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act Because of management’s superior bargaining power, prior to 1932 management often made it a condition of employment that employ- ees agree not to join a labor union. Such agreements became known as yellow-dog contracts because any employee who would forsake the right to join fellow employ- ees in unionization was considered a cowardly scoundrel (yellow dog). Passed in 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act made yellow-dog contracts illegal. In essence, man- agement no longer could explicitly deny an employee the right to unionize.
Seeking injunctions to stop concerted activities had remained an important tool of management in fighting the growth of labor unions. The Norris-LaGuardia Act listed specific acts of persons and organizations participating in labor disputes that were not subject to federal court injunctions. Federal courts cannot enjoin:
• Striking or quitting work. • Belonging to a labor organization. • Paying strike or unemployment benefits to participants in a labor dispute. • Publicizing the existence of a labor dispute or the facts related to it (including
picketing). • Assembling peaceably to promote interests in a labor dispute. • Agreeing with others or advising or causing them to do any of the above acts
without fraud or violence.
Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act greatly restricts the use of injunctions in labor disputes, it does not prohibit them altogether. An injunction may be issued to enjoin illegal strikes, such as ones by public employees. In addition, a party seeking an injunction in a labor dispute must meet the test of a stringent, clean-hands rule. No restraining order will be granted to any person who fails to comply with any obliga- tion imposed by law or who fails to make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act restricts the use of federal court injunctions in labor disputes; it does not limit the jurisdiction of state courts in issuing them. The Supreme Court has upheld the jurisdiction of a state court to enjoin a union’s work stoppage and picketing in violation of a no-strike clause in its collective bargaining agreement.
The Wagner Act
The labor movement received its greatest stimulus for growth with the enactment in 1935 of the National Labor Relations Act, known as the Wagner Act. Perhaps most significantly, Congress explicitly affirmed labor’s right to organize and to bargain
“It is one of the charac- teristics of a free and democratic nation that it has free and indepen- dent labor unions.”
–Franklin Delano Roosevelt
The timing of the law (1932) likely limited its impact on help- ing unions. During the Depression, people were more concerned about finding a job than they were about joining a union.
LO 22-3
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collectively. Recognizing that a major cause of industrial strife was the inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers, Section 7 of the act states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.*
In addition to this Section 7 right to unionize, the Wagner Act contains several other key provisions:
• Creating the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to administer the act. • Providing employees the right to select a union to act as their collective bargain-
ing agent. • Outlawing certain conduct by employers that generally has the effect of either
preventing the organization of employees or emasculating their unions where they do exist; these forbidden acts are called unfair labor practices.
• Authorizing the NLRB to conduct hearings on unfair labor practice allegations and, if unfair practices are found to exist, to take corrective action including issu- ing cease and desist orders and awarding dollar damages to unions and employees.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Established by the Wagner Act, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) oper- ates as an independent agency of the U.S. government. This section discusses the organizational structure of the NLRB, its jurisdiction, and its quasi-judicial function. A later section of this chapter examines the NLRB’s authority to certify unions as the collective bargaining representative of employees. After this introduction to the NLRB, the remainder of the chapter will illustrate the significant role this agency plays in balancing the labor–management relationship.
NLRB Organization The NLRB consists of five members, appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, who serve staggered terms of five
“Long ago we stated the reason for labor orga- nizations. We said that they were organized out of the necessities of the situation . . . that [a] union was essential to give laborers opportu- nity to deal on an equal- ity with their employer.”
–NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937)
“If capitalism is fair then unionism must be. If men have a right to capi- talize their ideas and the resources of their coun- try, then that implies the right of men to capitalize their labor.”
–Frank Lloyd Wright
In May 2018, President Trump signed three Executive Orders aimed at reversing Obama-era rules viewed as “pro-union.” The Executive Orders: • Streamline the process for employee termination and
remove some preferences based on seniority. • Develop more cost effective collective bargain-
ing agreements with unions representing federal employees. The Office of Personnel Management will negotiate these agreements.
• Reduce the amount of time federal employees who have union-related duties can spend on these activi- ties during regular business hours. Although the implementation of these Executive
Orders was delayed nearly a year while unions pursued litigation, a federal judge now has permitted the orders to go into effect.
sidebar 22.2
Three Executive Orders Impacting Unions
*National Labor Relations Act (1935).
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years each. In addition, there is a general counsel of the board who supervises board investigations and serves as prosecutor in cases before the board. The general counsel supervises operations of the NLRB so that the board itself may perform its quasi-judicial function of deciding unfair labor practice cases free of bias. Administrative law judges are responsible for the initial conduct of hearings in unfair labor practice cases.
The general counsel also is responsible for conducting representation elections. In addition, the general counsel is responsible for seeking court orders requiring compliance with the board’s orders and represents the board in miscellaneous litiga- tion. The board determines policy questions, such as what types of employers and groups of employees are covered by the labor law.
Jurisdiction Congress gave the NLRB jurisdiction over any business “affecting commerce.” However, the following personnel are exempt from the NLRB’s authority:
• Governmental employees. • Persons covered by the Railway Labor Act. • Independent contractors. • Agricultural laborers. • Household, domestic workers. • Employees who work for their spouse or parents.
In FY2015, the NLRB issued nearly a record number of decisions regarding unfair labor practices. See, Sidebar 22.3 for an interesting discussion about whether college football players are employees.
The NLRB cannot exercise its powers over all businesses because it has a limited budget and time constraints. As a result of these self-imposed restrictions, however, federal labor laws do not apply to many small businesses. The management of these businesses may still need to know what state labor laws require of them. See Case 22.1 for an example of an important NLRB decision on social media and the workplace.
Case 22.1
HISPANICS UNITED OF BUFFALO, INC. AND CARLOS ORTIZ Case 03-CA-027872 (2012)
Chairman Pearce and Members Hayes, Griffin, and Block: . . .At issue in this case is whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging five employees for Facebook comments they wrote in response to a coworker’s criticisms of their job performance. Although the employ- ees’ mode of communicating their workplace concerns might be novel, we agree with the judge that the appropri- ate analytical framework for resolving their discharge alle- gations has long been settled under Meyers Industries and its progeny. Applying Meyers, we agree with the judge that the Respondent violated 8(a)(1) by discharging the five
employees. The relevant facts are as follows. Marianna Cole- Rivera and Lydia Cruz-Moore were coworkers employed by the Respondent to assist victims of domestic violence. The two employees frequently communicated with each other by phone and text message during the workday and after hours. According to Cole-Rivera’s credited testimony, Cruz-Moore often criticized other employees during these communications, particularly housing department employ- ees who, Cruz-Moore asserted, did not provide timely and adequate assistance to clients. Other employees similarly testified that Cruz-Moore spoke critically to them about
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Quasi-Judicial Authority Throughout this chapter, you will study the various unfair labor practices. Congress granted the NLRB the authority to conduct the quasi-judicial hearings that are required to investigate and to enforce sanctions if these unfair labor practices occur.
their work habits and those of other employees. This “criti- cism” issue escalated on Saturday, October 9, 2010, a non- workday, when Cole-Rivera received a text message from Cruz-Moore stating that the latter intended to discuss her concerns regarding employee performance with Executive Director Lourdes Iglesias. Cole-Rivera sent Cruz-Moore a responsive text questioning whether she really “wanted Lourdes to know . . . how u feel we don’t do our job. . . .” From her home, and using her own personal computer, Cole-Rivera then posted the following message on her Face- book page:
Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that we don’t help our cli- ents enough at [Respondent]. I about had it! My fellow coworkers how do u feel?
Four off-duty employees—Damicela Rodriguez, Ludimar Rodriguez, Yaritza Campos, and Carlos Ortiz—responded by posting messages, via their personal computers, on Cole- Rivera’s Facebook page; the employees’ responses generally objected to the assertion that their work performance was substandard. Cruz-Moore also responded, demanding that Cole-Rivera “stop with ur lies about me.” She then com- plained to Iglesias about the Facebook comments, stat- ing that she had been slandered and defamed. At Iglesias’ request, Cruz-Moore printed all the Facebook comments and had the printout delivered to Iglesias. On October 12, the first workday after the Facebook postings, Iglesias dis- charged Cole-Rivera and her four coworkers, stating that their remarks constituted “bullying and harassment” of a coworker and violated the Respondent’s “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting such conduct.
In Meyers I, the Board held that the discipline or discharge of an employee violates Section 8(a)(1) if the following four
elements are established: (1) the activity engaged in by the employee was “concerted” within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act; (2) the employer knew of the concerted nature of the employee’s activity; (3) the concerted activity was protected by the Act; and (4) the discipline or discharge was motivated by the employee’s protected, concerted activity. . . .
[T]here should be no question that the activity engaged in by the five employees was concerted for the “purpose of mutual aid or protection” as required by Section 7. As set forth in her initial Facebook post, Cole-Rivera alerted fel- low employees of another employee’s complaint that they “don’t help our clients enough,” stated that she “about had it” with the complaints, and solicited her coworkers’ views about this criticism. By responding to this solicitation with comments of protest, Cole-Rivera’s four coworkers made common cause with her, and, together, their actions were concerted within the definition of Meyers I, because they were undertaken “with . . . other employees.” 268 NLRB at 497. The actions of the five employees were also concerted under the expanded definition of Meyers II, because, as the judge found, they “were taking a first step towards taking group action to defend themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe Cruz-Moore was going to make to management.” . . .
In sum, because we have found that the Facebook post- ings were concerted and protected, and because it is undis- puted that the Respondent discharged the five employees based solely on their postings, we conclude that the dis- charges violated Section 8(a)(1).*
*Source: HISPANICS UNITED OF BUFFALO, INC. AND CARLOS ORTIZ Case 03-CA-027872 (2012).
KEY POINTS • The Board found that it was unlawful for a non-profit organization to fire five employees
who participated in Facebook postings about a co-worker who intended to complain to management about their work performance.
• The Board majority found that the Facebook conversation was concerted activity and was protected by the National Labor Relations Act.
[continued]
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This authority is extensive in that NLRB has discretion to order whatever action is necessary to correct the unlawful practice. However, as Sidebar 22.4 illustrates, there are limits to the NLRB’s authority to order remedial actions.
CERTIFICATION OF UNIONS An employer may voluntarily recognize that its workers want to have a certain labor union represent them. The employer is free to agree to bargain with the union as the collective bargaining representative of the employees. In actuality, such voluntary recognition occurs in relatively few situations. More common is the NLRB’s certifi- cation of a union as the bargaining agent for a group of employees. This certification process is the result of an election or occurs through authorization cards. These certification processes are discussed in the next two subsections.
Certification Elections Elections are by secret ballot and are supervised by the NLRB. The board decides what unit of employees is appropriate for purposes of col- lective bargaining and therefore which employees are entitled to vote in the election. It may select the total employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or any subdivision of the plant.
Obviously, how the board exercises its discretion in this regard may be crucial to the outcome of a given election. If all 100 workers at one plant operated by an employer desire to organize but 400 out of 500 at another of the employer’s plants do not, designation of the total employees as the one appropriate bargaining unit would ensure that both plants would remain nonunion.
The NLRB conducts elections upon receipt of a petition signed by at least 30% of the employees. In addition, an employer may file a petition for selection of an ini- tial representative. An employer may also file a petition for an election to invalidate certification of an incumbent union. It must show that it doubts, in good faith, the
Despite the declining percentage of the work- force that is unionized, unions are winning a greater percentage of the certification elec- tions being held.
The answer from the NLRB was “no,” averting a change to the landscape of college sports. In 2014, Peter Sung Ohr, NLRB Regional Director in Chicago, considered whether football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships from Northwestern University are “employees” within the mean- ing of the National Labor Relations Act and, therefore, enti- tled to choose whether or not to be represented for the purposes of collective bargaining. Ohr concluded that the players are employees, and he ordered that an election be conducted under the appropriate Regional Director.
Thereafter, 76 active Northwestern players voted on whether to certify a players’ union. Northwestern Univer- sity appealed and the NLRB granted its request for review. In a unanimous decision, the NLRB dismissed the football players’ petition, effectively denying their claim that they
are university employees who should be allowed to col- lectively bargain.
This case, however, likely provided incentive for the NCAA to discuss a restructuring plan involving the Atlan- tic Coast, Big Ten, Big 12, Pacific-12, and Southeastern Conferences regarding the ability to provide athletes with additional benefits. Although Ohr’s decision was contro- versial, it has sparked a much-needed discussion about the treatment of college athletes and proposals for better treatment.
Sources: Strauss, Ben, “N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid,” New York Times, August 17, 2017; Northwestern University and Col- lege Athletes Players Association (CAPA), NLRB Case 13-RC-121359 (2014); Strauss, Ben and Eder, Steve, “Labor Board to Review Northwestern Football Case,” The New York Times, April 24, 2014.
sidebar 22.3
Are College Football Players Employees?
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After presenting documents that verified his legal status to work in the United States, Jose Castro was hired by Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. Castro participated in a union-organizing campaign at the Hoffman facility where he worked. Hoffman laid off Castro and others engaged in this organizing effort. When it was presented with this factual situation, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ordered Hoffman to reinstate Castro (and the other employees) with back pay. During a compliance hearing before an NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ), Castro acknowledged that he did not have the proper paperwork to be a legal alien eligible to work. In essence, Castro admitted that he used another person’s birth certif- icate to get a driver’s license and Social Security number.
Because of these admissions, the ALJ concluded that the NLRB could not award Castro reinstatement and back pay. Castro appealed to the full board, which reversed the ALJ and awarded back pay. Hoffman sought review by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. This court upheld the NLRB’s award of back pay.
Upon further review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the NLRB’s decision. It concluded that back pay awarded to illegal aliens would “encourage the success- ful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations.”
Source: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
sidebar 22.4
Limitation of NLRB’s Remedies
continued support of the union by a majority of the employees. Votes to certify a union or to rescind a union’s authority also take place by petition.
After an NLRB election, another is not permitted for one year, regardless of whether the union wins or loses the certification vote. Within the term of a collec- tive bargaining agreement or three years after it has been signed, whichever period is shorter, no elections may take place.
Certification through Cards A union seeking to represent employees may solicit cards from them indicating their willingness for the union to represent them. An employer may then recognize the union as the bargaining agent for its employees if the cards are signed by a majority of the employees. Employers do not need to recognize the union based on a majority card showing and always have the option to insist on an election. But once an employer recognizes the union—no matter how informally—the employer is bound by the recognition and loses the right to seek an election.
Cards also may substitute for an election if certain conditions are met. The NLRB may issue a bargaining order based on such cards if the cards are unequivocal and clearly indicate that the employee signing the card is authorizing the union to represent him or her. The general counsel of the NLRB does not need to prove that the employees read or understood the cards. If a card states on its face that it autho- rizes collective bargaining, it will be counted for that purpose unless there is clear proof that the employee was told that it would not be used for that purpose.
Sidebar 22.5 provides an example of employees voting for unionization outside the traditional union industries.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY MANAGEMENT Remember that Congress desired to strengthen the bargaining power of labor unions when it passed the Wagner Act in 1935. A principal means of accomplishing this
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In February 2020, Kickstarter became the first company in the technology industry to vote to unionize. In a 46-37 vote the employees of Kickstarter, one of the earliest online crowdfunding sites, agreed to affiliate with Office and Professional Employees International Union.
Kickstarter is organized as a public-benefit com- pany, a for-profit company that considers its benefit to stakeholders and society, rather than focus primarily on shareholders. CEO Aziz Hasan did not support the effort to unionize the Brooklyn-based company. Two terminated employees filed a complaint with the NLRB alleging retali- ation due to their efforts to unionize.
The employees hope a union addresses issues of pay disparity and processes concerning hiring and
terminations. The company stated: “We support and respect this decision, and we are proud of the fair and democratic process that got us here. We’ve worked hard over the last decade to build a different kind of company, one that measures its success by how well it achieves its mission: helping to bring creative projects to life. Our mis- sion has been common ground for everyone here during this process, and it will continue to guide us as we enter this new phase together." Source: Jack Kelly, “Employees Cast a Historic Vote to Unionize at Kick- starter,” Forbes, February 19, 2020.
sidebar 22.5
A Historic Vote to Unionize at Kickstarter
goal was through the creation of five unfair labor practices by management. These practices are summarized as follows:
• Interfering with union activities. • Dominating a labor organization. • Discriminating based on union affiliation. • Discriminating as a result of NLRB proceedings. • Refusing to bargain in good faith.
Conduct may be, and often is, a violation of more than one of the listed unfair labor practices. Indeed, most violations constitute interference with the right to engage in concerted activity (the first category). For example, retaliation against a union leader for filing charges would constitute a violation of both the first and fourth categories.
Interfering with Unionization The first unfair labor practice has two dis- tinct parts. First, it is unfair for an employer to interfere with the efforts of employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations. The second part covers interfering with “concerted activities for mutual aid or protection.” This violation does not have to involve a union; the act protects any group of employees acting for their mutual aid and protection.
The first part of this unfair labor practice by management is a catchall intended to guarantee the right of employees to organize and join unions. It clearly prohibits “scare” tactics such as threats by employers to fire those involved in organizing employ- ees or threats to cut back on employee benefits if employees succeed in unionizing. In addition, less obvious activities are outlawed, such as requiring job applicants to state on a questionnaire whether they would cross a picket line in a strike. An employer can- not engage in any conduct calculated to erode employee support for the union.
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Interference with unionization may take the form of a carrot as well as a stick. The conferring of benefits by an employer may be an unfair labor practice. In one case, the employer reminded its employees two weeks before a representation elec- tion that the company had just instituted a “floating holiday” that employees could take on their birthdays. The union lost the election, but the NLRB set it aside. It was an unfair labor practice for the employer to engage in conduct immediately favor- able to employees. The conduct interfered with the freedom of choice for or against unionization.
Interfering with Concerted Activities The term concerted activity is given a liberal interpretation in order to create a climate that encourages unionization, collective bargaining, and all that may flow from such activity. For example, some employees refused to work after a heated grievance meeting. They followed their supervisors onto the workroom floor and continued to argue loudly until they were ordered a second time to resume work. The employer issued letters of repri- mand alleging insubordination. This was an unfair labor practice. The protection of employee conduct at grievance meetings is extended to a brief cooling-off period following an employer’s termination of such a meeting. Protection of employees’ par- ticipation in the meetings themselves would be seriously threatened if the employer could at any point call an immediate halt to the operation of the law simply by declaring the meeting ended.
The concerted-activity concept is quite extensive. In one case, an employer was investigating theft by employees. One employee asked that a union representative be present during her interview. She was refused. The Supreme Court held that the employee had a right to representation when there was a perceived threat to her employment security. The presence of a representative assures other employees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain aid and protection if they wish when there appears to be a threat to their job security. Refusing the assistance at the inter- view was an unfair labor practice.
In addition, the right to engage in concerted activity has been expanded to cover the actions of a sole employee under certain circumstances. If an employee has a grievance that may affect other workers, that employee has rights protected by the concerted-activity language of this unfair labor practice, even though no other worker participates in the activity.
Dominating a Labor Organization The second unfair labor practice pro- hibits the domination of a labor organization by employers or their contribution of financial or other support to any union. Under the Wagner Act, any organization of employees must be completely independent of their employers. In the case of a controversy between competing unions, employers must remain strictly neutral. It is an unfair labor practice for the employer to support a union by giving it a meeting place; providing refreshments for union meetings; permitting the union to use the employer’s telephone, secretary, or copying machine; or allowing the union to keep cafeteria or vending-machine profits.
Discriminating Based on Union Affiliation Under the third unfair labor practice, an employer may neither discharge nor refuse to hire an employee to either encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nor may the employer discriminate regarding any term or condition of employment for such pur- poses. The law does not oblige an employer to favor union members in hiring employ- ees. It also does not restrict him or her in the normal exercise of any employer’s right
The Supreme Court has held that an employer who reports the pos- sible existence of illegal aliens to the Immigra- tion and Naturalization Service engages in an unfair labor practice when that report is closely associated with the employees’ approval of a labor union as their bargaining agent.
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to select or discharge employees. However, the employer may not abuse that right by discriminatory action based on union membership or activities that encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization.
A company may not go partially out of business because some of its employees have organized, nor may it temporarily close that portion of its business that has unionized. If a company closes one plant because a union is voted in, such action discourages union activity at other plants. Partial closings to “chill” unionism are unfair labor practices.
Discriminating as a Result of NLRB Proceedings The fourth unfair labor practice prohibits discharge or other reprisals by their employers because they are enforcing their rights under the Wagner Act by filing charges or giving testimony in NLRB proceedings. This protection prevents the NLRB’s channels of informa- tion from evaporating by employer intimidation of complainants and witnesses. An employer cannot refuse to hire a prospective employee because charges have been filed by him or her.
The main defense of any employer accused of reprisal is that he or she dis- charged or discriminated against the employee for some reason other than filing charges or giving testimony. Most often such cases boil down to trying to prove what motivated the company in pursuing its course of action. If the company can convince the NLRB that the employee was discharged because of misconduct, low production, personnel cutbacks necessitated by economic conditions, or other legiti- mate considerations, the company will be exonerated. Otherwise, it will be found guilty of this unfair labor practice.
Refusing to Bargain in Good Faith The fifth unfair labor practice occurs when management refuses to bargain with the collective bargaining representative of its employees. The Wagner Act did not define the phrase “to bargain collectively.” Judicial decisions have added the concept of good faith to bargaining. To comply with the requirement that they bargain collectively in good faith, employers must approach the bargaining table with fair and open minds and a sincere intent to find a basis of agreement.
The employer’s duty to bargain collectively includes a duty to provide relevant information needed by a union for the proper performance of its duties as the employ- ees’ bargaining representative. For example, data about job related safety and health must be furnished so that the union can safeguard its members’ health and safety.
A more fundamental issue inherent in the requirement that parties bargain collectively is: “About what?” Must the employer bargain with the union about all subjects and all management decisions in which the union or the employees are interested? Are there subjects and issues upon which management is allowed to act alone? See Sidebar 22.6 for a discussion about the “Writers Strike.”
In answering these questions, the law divides issues into two categories— compulsory bargaining issues and voluntary bargaining issues. Compulsory, or mandatory, bargaining issues are those concerned with wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Although the parties may voluntarily consider other issues, the refusal by either to bargain in good faith on such other permissive matters is not an unfair labor practice.
Classifying an issue as compulsory or voluntary is done on a case-by-case basis. For example, questions relating to fringe benefits are compulsory bargaining issues because they are “wages.” The NLRB and the courts are called on to decide
Take-it-or-leave-it demands in a negotia- tion are considered bad- faith bargaining.
Refusing to meet at rea- sonable times with rep- resentatives of the other party, refusing to reduce agreements to writing, and designating per- sons with no authority to negotiate as representa- tives at meetings are examples of this unfair labor practice.
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whether management and labor must bargain with each other on a multitude of issues. A good example of a case in which bargaining was required is Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB (441 U.S. 488).
Employees of the Ford Motor Company belong to the United Auto Workers. Ford provides in-plant cafeterias and vending machines as two ways to ensure its employees with food services. An independent caterer managed both the cafeterias and vending machines. This caterer informed Ford that the increased costs associ- ated with these food services required food prices to go up. When Ford notified the union representative of these food cost increases, the union requested to bargain over the food prices and services.
Ford refused to bargain, and the union filed a charge with the NLRB, alleging Ford’s refusal to bargain in good faith, which is an unfair labor practice. The NLRB concluded that in-plant food and related services are “other terms and conditions of employment.” Therefore, Ford must negotiate with the union over this compulsory bargaining issue. The Supreme Court’s review of these facts results in the NLRB’s ruling being affirmed.
A party to labor negotiations may present a demand to bargain about a volun- tary issue as long as this issue does not have to be resolved before the parties can resolve compulsory bargaining issues. Tying a voluntary bargaining issue to a com- pulsory bargaining issue results in a failure to bargain in good faith and is in effect an unfair labor practice.
The 73,000 United Automobile Workers went on strike at Gen- eral Motors in 2007, seeking job security during restructuring of the company. GM was seeking to lower its cost structure and to have a more flexible workforce to compete with other automakers such as Toyota and Honda.
In November 2007, more than 12,000 film, television, and radio writers joined together in the Writers Guild of Amer- ica strike against the Alliance of Motion Picture and Televi- sion Producers, a trade organization representing nearly 400 American film and television producers.
WHAT WAS AT ISSUE? The most contentious issues at stake: DVD residuals; union jurisdiction over animation and reality program writ- ers; and compensation for “new media,” content written for or distributed through emerging digital technology, including the Internet.
HOW MUCH DID THE STRIKE COST? According to an NPR report, the strike cost the economy of Los Angeles an estimated $1.5 billion. The “Big Four” networks (ABC, CBS, FOX, and NBC) suffered ad shortfalls and declines in prime time ratings.
WHAT WAS THE OUTCOME OF THE DISPUTE? On February 12, 2008, the strike concluded after the parties reached an agreement creating formulas for
revenue-based residuals in new media; providing access to deals and financial data to help writers evaluate and enforce the formulas; and establishing the principle for the writers, “When they get paid, we get paid.” Another outcome was the solidarity that developed throughout the group from the most successful writers to those fight- ing to get into the business.
2017 Update: There was nearly another strike in 2017. After seven weeks of negotiations, a three-year agreement was reached. The Negotiating Committee reported gains, including contribution increases to health plans, a clear definition on what constitutes a “short sea- son” in television to calculate the amount of compensa- tion for work beyond the definition, increases in Pay TV residuals, and job protection for parental leave. Source: McNary, Dave, “Writers Guild Strike Averted Without Fanfare,” Vari- ety, May 2, 2017. For more information about the 2008 agreement, see http:// unitedhollywood.blogspot.com/.
sidebar 22.6
This Was No Joke: The Writers Guild of America Strike
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Courts tend to defer to the special expertise of the NLRB in classifying collective bargaining subjects, especially in the area of “terms or conditions of employment.” Issues such as union dues checkoff, health and accident insurance, safety rules, merit pay increases, incentive pay plans, Christmas and other bonuses, stock purchase plans, pensions, paid vacations and holidays, the privilege of hunting on a reserved portion of a paper company’s forest preserve, proposals for effective arbitration and grievance procedures, and no-strike and no-lockout clauses are compulsory bargaining issues.
Remember that neither the employer nor the union must make concessions to the other concerning a mandatory subject of bargaining. The law only demands that each negotiate such matters in good faith with the other before making a decision and taking unilateral action. If the parties fail to reach an agreement after discussing these problems, each may take steps that are against the wishes and best interests of the other party. For example, the employer may refuse to grant a wage increase requested by the union, and the union is free to strike. Sidebar 22.7 discusses the nuances of protected activities in the context of social media.
Can you imagine calling your supervisor a “scumbag” or comparing him to a psychiatric patient? Dawnmarie Souza, an employee of American Medical Response of Con- necticut (AMR), criticized her supervisor on her Facebook page. Souza was terminated for violating AMR’s policy, which states: “Employees are prohibited from making dis- paraging, discriminatory or defamatory comments when discussing the Company or the employee’s supervisors, co-workers and/or competitors.” The policy also prohibits “Rude or discourteous behavior to a client or co-worker.”*
The NLRB issued a complaint, claiming that AMR’s fir- ing was an unfair labor practice. The NLRB also alleged that AMR’s Internet policies were overly broad and
interfered with an employee’s right to engage in pro- tected activities under the NLRA.
The NLRB settled the case, requiring AMR to “revise its Internet policy to allow workers to discuss wages, hours and working conditions with co-workers outside of the workplace; and refrain from disciplining or discharg- ing employees for engaging in those discussions.”** AMR reached a separate, private settlement with Souza.
The NLRB’s complaint is available at www.employ- mentlawalert.com/uploads/file/PDFComplaint.pdf.
*American Medical Response of Connecticut. **Source: www.employmentlawalert.com/uploads/file/PDFComplaint.pdf.
sidebar 22.7
Fired! Venting about the Boss on Facebook
The Taft-Hartley Act
The Wagner Act opened the door for the rapid growth of the union movement. From 1935 to the end of World War II, the strength and influence of unions grew substan- tially. Where, prior to the Wagner Act, employers had the greater advantage in bargain- ing power, by 1946 many persons felt the pendulum had shifted and that unions, with their ability to call nationwide, crippling strikes, had the better bargaining position. To balance the scale, the Labor–Management Relations Act (the Taft-Hartley Act) was enacted in 1947 to amend the Wagner Act.
The purposes of the Taft-Hartley Act are to ensure the free flow of commerce by eliminating union practices that burden commerce and to provide procedures for avoiding disputes that jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest. It recognizes
LO 22-4
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that both parties to collective bargaining need protection from wrongful interference by the other and that employees sometimes need protection from the union itself. Finally, it sought to protect the public interest in major labor disputes. Congress authorized the creation of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to help achieve the goals of the Taft-Hartley Act. Members of this service are available to assist the parties in settling labor disputes.
EIGHTY-DAY COOLING-OFF PERIOD Somewhat like the 60-day period provided under the Railway Labor Act, the Taft- Hartley Act provides for an 80-day cooling-off period following certain procedures. This provision’s intent is to limit the adverse impact of the nationwide strikes by steelworkers, mineworkers, autoworkers, and longshoremen that can paralyze the economy. When a threatened or actual strike or lockout affecting an entire industry or substantial part thereof will, if permitted to occur or to continue, imperil the national health or safety, the 80-day period may be enforced. The procedure starts with the president recognizing the emergency and appointing a board of inquiry to obtain facts about the threatened or actual strike or lockout. The board studies the situation and reports back to the president. If the board finds that the national health or safety is indeed affected by the strike, then the president, through the attor- ney general, goes to the federal court for an injunction ordering the union to suspend the strike (or the company to suspend the lockout) for 80 days.
During the 80-day period, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service works with the labor–management parties to try to achieve an agreement. If during this time the reconciliation effort fails, the presidential board holds new hearings and receives the company’s final offer. The union members are then allowed to vote on this final proposal by the company. If they vote for the new proposal, the dispute is over and work continues as usual. If they vote against the proposal, the workers may again be called out on strike. At this point, the strike may continue indefinitely until the disagreement causing it is resolved by collective bargaining or unless there is additional legislation by Congress to solve the problem.
Experience has shown that disputes are often settled during the 80-day period. The injunction provided for in the Taft-Hartley Act may not be used for all strikes and lock- outs. This injunction is limited to national emergency strikes and lockouts, those that involve national defense or key industries or have a substantial effect on the economy. Sidebar 22.8 provides an example of the peril of unprotected activity on social media.
FREE SPEECH Employers complained that the Wagner Act violated their right of free speech. State- ments by management formed the basis of unfair labor practices claims. To meet this objection, Congress, in Taft-Hartley, added the following provision:
8(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.*
This provision gives employers limited free speech, at best. It is difficult to make statements that cannot be construed as a threat or a promise. For example, if an
President George W. Bush used this provi- sion to end the long- shoremen’s strike on the West Coast in 2002.
In its attempt to balance the bargaining power between labor unions and management, the Taft-Hartley Act: • Provides for an
80-day cooling-off period in strikes that imperil the nation’s health or safety.
• Reinforces the employer’s freedom of speech in labor– management relations.
• Outlaws the closed-shop con- cept but permits union shops in the absence of a state right-to-know law.
• Permits suits by union members for breach of contract against unions.
• Creates six unfair labor practices by unions.
*Source: The Taft-Hartley Act 29 U.S. Code § 158.
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employer predicts dire economic events as a result of unionization, such may be an illegal threat if the employer has it within his or her power to make the prediction come true. Whether particular language is coercive or not often depends on the analysis of the total background of facts and circumstances in which it was uttered. To be forbidden, the statements of an employer need not be proved to have been coercive in fact but only to have had a reasonable tendency to intimidate employees under the circumstances.
An employer’s threats to withdraw existing benefits if employees unionize is not speech protected by Section 8(c). However, mere predictions and prophecies are protected. For example, in one case an employer’s speeches and handbills during the union’s organizational campaign stated its intention to fight the union in every legal way possible and to “deal hard” with the union at arm’s length if it were voted in. The employer also warned that employees could be permanently replaced if the union called an economic strike. This language was held to fall within the protection of Section 8(c). The right of free speech guaranteed by the Taft-Hartley Act applies to labor unions as well as employers. However, there is a rule prohibiting either side from making election speeches on company time to massed assemblies of employees within 24 hours before an election. See Sidebar 22.9 for an important point about restrictions on workplace speech.
UNION SHOP—MEMBERSHIPS AND FEES The Wagner Act’s strong support of unionization gave unintended bargaining power to unions with respect to an employer’s hiring practices. In many bargaining situa- tions, the union became so strong that it successfully insisted on management’s hir- ing only union members. In essence, to apply for a prospective job, a person would have to join the union. These situations became known as closed shops.
The Arizona Daily Star fired one of its public safety report- ers for inappropriate and unprofessional tweets, including the following: • “You stay homicidal, Tucson. See Star Net for the
bloody deets.” • “What?!?!? No overnight homicide? WTF? You’re
slacking Tucson.” • “Suggestion for new Tucson-area theme song: Droe-
ning [sic] pool’s ‘let the bodies hit the floor’.” • “I’d root for daily death if it always happened in close
proximity to Gus Balon’s.” • “Hope everyone’s having a good Homicide Friday, as
one Tucson police officer called it.” • “My discovery of the Red Zone channel is like an
adolescent boy’s discovery of h . . . let’s just hope I don’t end up going blind.”
Even after Human Resources encouraged the reporter to discuss concerns with colleagues instead of Twitter and his managing editor told him that he should not make comments on social media that could damage the paper’s reputation, the reporter continued to tweet. The Arizona Daily Star did not have a written policy about using Twitter.
The reporter was fired. What was the position of the NLRB? In a memorandum, the NLRB stated “The charging party’s conduct was not protected and concerted: It did not relate to the terms and conditions of his employment or seek to involve other employees in issues related to employment.” Source: NLRB Advice Memorandum, Lee Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Arizona Daily Star, Case 28-CA-23267, April 21, 2011.
sidebar 22.8
Tweeting His Way to Termination
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One of the major changes brought about by the Taft-Hartley Act was outlawing of the closed shop. This act still permitted the union shop. In a union shop contract, also known as a union security clause, the employer agrees that after an employee is hired, that employee must join the union as a condition of continued employment. The Taft- Hartley Act prohibits such a requirement until the 30th day after employment begins.
Through a series of cases, the Supreme Court clarified the limited mandatory relationship created by the inclusion of the union security clause in a contract. This type of relationship requires that the union members pay reasonable membership fees and dues. In turn, the union can use these fees and dues only for collective bar- gaining, contract administration, and grievance activities. Unions are not allowed to use members’ dues to support political activities.
One of the sections of the Taft-Hartley Act most distasteful to unions is 14(b), which outlaws the union shop in states that have adopted a right-to-work law. Right- to-work laws prohibit agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of continued employment of a person who was not in the union when hired. Today 27 states have right-to-work laws. Workers in these states who do not belong to a union may not be required to pay representation fees to the union that represents the employees. However, such workers are subject to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and the union must handle their grievances, if any, with management.
SUITS AGAINST UNIONS Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that suits for breach of a contract between an employer and a labor organization can be filed in the federal district courts without regard to the amount in question. A labor organization is responsible for the acts of its agents and may sue or be sued. Any money judgment against it is enforceable only against its assets and not against any individual member. Moreover, individuals cannot be sued for actions such as violating no-strike provisions of a col- lective bargaining contract.
Right-to-work laws began mostly in the South and Southwest, areas that historically have been antiunion, but since 2012 have spread throughout the midwest.
Many suits against unions are by mem- bers alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation.
These NLRB cases shed light on the kinds of speech restrictions that are permissible—or not—in the workplace. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) guar- antees that all employees (regardless of union status) have the right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”
The Policy: Employees are prohibited from discuss- ing work conditions, wages, benefits, and discipline.
NLRB Decision: This policy is illegally broad and violates the NLRA by promulgating a confidentiality rule prohibiting employees from discussing disciplinary infor- mation, grievances and complaints, performance evalua- tions, or salary information with any persons outside the company or with fellow employees. See Double Eagle
Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB No. 17 (January 20, 2004), upheld by the 10th Cir (2005); see also Longs Drug Stores California, Inc., 347 NLRB No 45 (2006).
The Policy: Maintenance of work rules prohibit the use of “abusive and profane language,” “verbal, mental, and physical abuse,” and “harassment . . . in any way.”
NLRB Decision: The rule is lawful and could not rea- sonably be understood as interfering with employees’ Section 7 rights. The rule is lawful because it is based on the employer’s legitimate right to establish a “civil and decent” workplace to protect itself from liability for work- place harassment. Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB No. 75 (2004). Source: Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB No. 75 (2004).
sidebar 22.9
Restricting Workplace Speech: Setting the Parameters
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In addition, members may sue their union and recover the money damages they suffer because of an illegal strike. If a union activity is both an unfair labor practice and a breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRB’s authority is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of courts under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Because workers cannot bargain individually when represented by a union, the union has an implied duty of fair representation to act reasonably, with honesty of purpose, and in good faith. The union must represent all the employees in the bargaining unit, including those who are nonunion, impartially and without hostile discrimination. Failure to do so may give rise to a lawsuit.
The duty of fair representation applies not only to the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement but also to the administration of the agreement. Unions must fairly represent employers in disputes with the employer regarding the interpretation and application of the terms of an existing contract.
An employee may file suit against the union and its representatives for damages resulting from breach of their duty of fair representation in processing his or her grievance against the employer. A union may not process a grievance in an arbitrary, indifferent, or careless manner.
Finally, a union member may sue a local union for failing to enforce the inter- national union’s constitution and bylaws. Thus, Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes an employer to sue a union for breach of contract as well as employees to sue to enforce either the union–management collective bargaining agreement or a union contract with a member. Sidebar 22.10 is a good example of the extremes that protesters will go to call attention to alleged anti-union activity.
Over the last two decades, giant inflatable rats—as tall as 25 feet—have gained popularity as symbols of anti-union activity. The rats make a graphic visual statement in connection with union protests against companies that hire nonunion workers or do not pay union wages.
In one such protest, the Sheet Metal Workers Inter- national Association Local 15 staged a mock funeral in
front of a Florida hospital along with a giant rat. That case involved using a staffing agency that employed nonunion workers.
The NLRB ruled that the rats are legally permissible, that the tactic does not violate labor law and is protected speech. Ironically, the manufacturer of the balloons is allegedly a nonunion company. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 15, 356 NLRB No. 162 (2011).
sidebar 22.10
Making a Point: Union Protests with Giant Inflatable Rats
Bebeto Matthews/ AP Images
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY UNIONS Perhaps more than with any other provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress attempted to balance the bargaining power in the labor–management relationship by enacting six unfair labor practices by unions. These balance the unfair labor prac- tices by management in the Wagner Act, as discussed earlier in the chapter. Six unfair labor practices by unions are:
• Restraining or coercing an employee to join a union or an employer in selecting representatives to bargain with the union.
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• Causing or attempting to cause the employer to discriminate against an employee who is not a union member unless there is a legal union shop agreement in effect.
• Refusing to bargain with the employer if it is the NLRB-designated representa- tive of the employees.
• Striking, picketing, or engaging in secondary boycotts for illegal purposes. • Charging new members excessive or discriminatory initiation fees when there is
a union shop agreement. • Causing an employer to pay for work not performed (featherbedding).
Three of these illegal practices can be presented in a summary fashion due to the preceding discussions in this chapter or because they have very little impact today. The third unfair labor practice by unions is complementary to the fifth unfair labor practice by management. In essence, Congress requires unions to bargain in good faith as is required of management. The fifth unfair labor practice by unions simply means that unions cannot take advantage of the union shop agreement by charging unreasonable dues or fees when members and nonmembers are obligated to pay them. Today, the sixth unfair labor practice, involving featherbedding, or payment for work not actually performed, is of less importance than when it was enacted in 1947.
The other unfair labor practices by unions are presented in the following subsections.
Restraining or Coercing an Employee into Joining a Union This unfair labor practice includes misconduct by unions directed toward employees. The law makes it illegal for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to bargain collectively, just as it is an unfair labor practice by employers to inter- fere with the same rights. Employees also are guaranteed the right to refrain from union activities unless they are required to join the union by a legal union shop agreement.
Causing an Employer to Discriminate against a Nonunion Member If a legal union shop agreement is in effect, a labor organization may insist that the employer observe its terms. But even when a legal union shop contract is in effect, the law prohibits a union from attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee who has been denied membership or had his or her member- ship terminated for some reason other than failure to pay the dues and initiation fees uniformly required of all members. And even if an employee is a member, the union may not cause the employer to discriminate against him or her for not following union rules. This prohibition prevents the use of the union shop as a means of intimi- dating employees who were at odds with union officials over their policies.
Striking or Picketing for Illegal Purposes or Engaging in Secondary Boycotts Jurisdictional strikes are unfair labor practices. A jurisdictional strike is used to force an employer to assign work to employees in one craft union rather than another. Because the dispute is between the two unions and not with the employer, the law requires that such disputes be submitted to the NLRB by the unions.
It is also an unfair labor practice for a union to threaten or to coerce by picket- ing, for example, an employer to recognize or bargain with one union if another one has been certified as the representative of its employees.
It is an unfair labor practice for a union to threaten, coerce, or restrain a third person not party to a labor dispute for the purpose of causing that third person to exert pressure on the company involved in the labor dispute. This law requires that strikes and picketing be directed at the employer with which the union actually has a labor dispute.
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An example of illegal secondary activity occurs when a union induces the employees of an employer to strike or engage in a concerted refusal to use, handle, or work on any goods or to perform any service to force the employer to stop doing business with some third person. For example, assume that a supplier (like a bak- ery) has a workforce that is nonunionized. A customer (e.g., a grocery store) has employees who belong to a union. This union would like to be the bargaining repre- sentative for the supplier’s employees. It would be an illegal secondary boycott for this union to have its members either strike or picket the grocery store on the basis of it selling nonunionized baked goods from the bakery in the hope that the grocery store would discontinue its buying from this bakery. The union must deal directly with the bakery.
AMENDMENTS Congressional hearings in the 1950s uncovered widespread corruption, violence, and lack of democratic procedures in some labor unions. As a result, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act, or Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), in 1959. Its provisions constitute a “bill of rights” for union mem- bers and provide for union reform. Also in this act, Congress included some amend- ments to the unfair labor practices by management and unions.
In essence, in its continuing attempt to balance the bargaining power in the labor–management relationship, Congress added one unfair labor practice by man- agement and two by unions.
Agreeing to Engage in a Secondary Boycott You should recall from your reading in the preceding section that unions cannot engage in secondary boycotts. Technically, nothing in that unfair labor practice, as enacted in the Taft-Hartley Act, prohibited a union and an employer from agreeing to engage in a secondary boy- cott. The original restriction applied only to the unilateral acts of the union. The Landrum-Griffin Act clarified the concern over secondary boycotts by prohibiting a union–management agreement that would adversely impact a neutral third party.
It is also an unfair labor practice for both the employer involved and the union to enter into a hot-cargo contract. A hot-cargo contract is one in which an employer voluntarily agrees with a union that the employees should not be required by their employer to handle or work on goods or materials going to or coming from an employer designated by the union as “unfair.” Such goods are said to be hot cargo. These clauses were common in trucking and construction labor contracts. The law thus forbids an employer and a labor organization to make an agreement under which the employer agrees to stop doing business with any other employer.
Picketing When Not Certified In certain cases, it is illegal for unions to force an employer to recognize or bargain with the union if it is not currently certi- fied as the duly authorized collective bargaining representative. The purpose is to reinforce the effectiveness of the election procedures employed by the NLRB by out- lawing certain tactics used by unions backed by only a minority of the employees of a particular employer. Thus, picketing to force an employer to recognize an uncertified union is an unfair labor practice in the following cases:
1. When the employer has lawfully recognized another union as the collective bar- gaining representative of its employees.
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2. When a valid representation election has been conducted by the NLRB within the past 12 months.
3. When picketing has been conducted for an unreasonable time, in excess of 30 days, without a petition for a representation election being filed with the NLRB.
Including these amendments by the Landrum-Griffin Act, the law on unfair labor practices is summarized in the following concept summary. Remember, as you review these materials, Congress used three laws to create these lists. The first five items on management’s side were enacted in 1935. The first six on the union side came in 1947. The sixth item on the left side and the last two items on the right side were added in 1959.
concept summary
Unfair Labor Practices BY MANAGEMENT BY UNIONS
1. Interfering with unionization and concerted activities by employees.
2. Dominating a union or contributing to it, financially or otherwise.
3. Discriminating in hiring or tenure of employees on the basis of union affiliation.
4. Discriminating against employees who seek to enforce their Wagner Act rights.
5. Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith. 6. Agreeing with a labor organization to engage in a
secondary boycott.
1. Restraining or coercing an employee to join a union. 2. Causing an employer to discriminate against a
nonunion member. 3. Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith. 4. Striking, picketing, or engaging in secondary boycotts
for illegal purposes. 5. Charging excessive or discriminatory fees. 6. Causing an employer to pay for work not performed. 7. Picketing to force an employer to recognize or
bargain with an uncertified union. 8. Agreeing with an employer to engage in a secondary
boycott.
Key Terms Clayton Act 687 Closed shops 701 Collective bargaining 686 Compulsory bargaining issues 697 Concerted activity 696 Hot-cargo contract 705 Jurisdictional strike 704
Landrum-Griffin Act 705 National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) 690 National Mediation Board 688 Norris-LaGuardia Act 689 Railway Labor Act 688 Right-to-work laws 702
Taft-Hartley Act 699 Union security clause 702 Union shop 702 Voluntary bargaining issues 697 Wagner Act 689 Yellow-dog contract 689
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Review Questions and Problems Labor Laws 1. Law before 1935
(a) What is the specific purpose of (1) the Clayton Act, (2) the Railway Labor Act, and (3) the Norris-LaGuardia Act?
(b) Why did these laws not increase laborers’ bargaining power to the degree that is considered equal to management’s bargaining power?
The Wagner Act 2. National Labor Relations Board
Describe the nature and limitations of the NLRB’s jurisdiction. 3. Certification of Unions
The NLRB conducted a certification election, and the union won by a vote of 22–20. Management refused to bargain with this union. The reason for this refusal to recognize the union as the employees’ bargaining agent was that the union had used “recognition slips” as a means of indicating the employees’ support for the union. Several employees testified that they signed these slips to avoid the payment of the initiation fee. Further, at least a few employees indicated that they thought they had to vote for the union since they had signed a recognition slip. Should the NLRB set aside this election of the union? Explain.
4. Unfair Labor Practices by Management (a) List the five unfair labor practices created by the Wagner Act. (b) Describe a situation for each of these unfair labor practices.
The Taft-Hartley Act 5. Eighty-Day Cooling-Off Period
(a) Under what circumstances is the president authorized to order parties in a labor dispute back to work for 80 days?
(b) Describe the procedures that must be followed to invoke this cooling-off period. 6. Free Speech
The personnel director of your company has been asked to talk with the employees about the benefits and detriments of voting for or against the union in an upcom- ing certification election. What should this director keep in mind about the Free Speech Clause in the Taft-Hartley Act? Explain.
7. Union Shop—Memberships and Fees Pat lives in a state that has enacted a right-to-work law. The company that employs her has recognized the United Clerical Workers (UCW) as the bargaining represen- tative of its workers. The union has sought to collect union dues or their equivalent from Pat. Is she required to pay them? Why or why not?
8. Suits against Unions Ed is discharged for allegedly stealing property from his employer. He asks his union to have him reinstated because his discharge violates the collective bargaining agree- ment in force. However, the union does not investigate the incident until it is too late to file a request for arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. Assuming that Ed is innocent of the charges, does he have any rights against the union? Explain.
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9. Unfair Labor Practices by Unions (a) List the six unfair labor practices created by the Taft-Hartley Act. (b) Describe a situation for each of these unfair labor practices.
10. Amendments (a) What were the two basic purposes for Congress’s passing the Landrum-Griffin
Act? (b) What are the additional unfair labor practices added by this law?
1. For years, your small electronics company has given all its employees one week’s pay and a turkey each Christmas. But now a recession is eroding profitability and the company is operating at a significant loss, so you consider canceling the Christmas presents for this year. The employees have just voted for union representation, and the extra pay and turkeys are not mentioned in the collective bargaining agreement.
• Is a Christmas gift still purely a management decision? • Are you in trouble if you cancel the turkeys? • What is the union’s role in the decision?
2. Sarah works at a small accounting firm. The firm’s handbook contains the following policy:
Employees are prohibited from discussing their salary, bonuses, or any other forms of compensation, including benefits and vacation time.
Sarah is very careful not to violate the policy but, after she becomes married to her coworker Bill, Sarah realizes that her salary is 20 percent less than Bill’s salary. Bill and Sarah were hired at the same time and at the same position level. Sarah is even more upset when she learns that Bill started at the higher salary on his first day on the job. When Sarah asks her boss about the difference, she is terminated. • What potential claims could Sarah assert against her employer? • What defenses should the employer raise?
business discussions
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appendix I
Case Briefing and Legal Study Tips To gain the most from this textbook, you should learn how to study written material effectively. You can achieve effec- tive study through use of the SQ3R method, a method widely taught by study-skills psychologists for learning tex- tual material.
SQ3R stands for survey, question, read, recite, and review. As a study method, it has dramatically improved the grade-point averages of most students who have practiced it. It is based upon the concept that active study of written material improves memory and comprehension of informa- tion far better than passive reading. Unfortunately, many students have not recognized the difference between active study and mere passive reading.
Students often read a textbook chapter exactly as they would read a novel or a magazine article. They begin with the first sentence of the chapter and read straight through the material, pausing only to underline occasionally. This way of reading may be suitable for a novel, but it is quite inappropriate for a textbook. Psychologists insist that an active study method must begin with a survey of the mate- rial to be read. If you plan to spend two hours studying a 30-page chapter, take three to five minutes in the begin- ning and survey the chapter. First, read the bold-type sec- tion headings (each chapter of this book is divided into numbered sections). Second, read a sentence or two from the text of each section. The purpose of this survey is to familiarize yourself with the topics covered in the chapter. Fight the tendency to stop your surveying process in order to comprehend all of the concepts you are surveying. Com- prehension is not the goal of surveying.
Following the survey of all the sections, go back to the beginning of the chapter: Ask yourself a question before read- ing each section. Ask it aloud, if possible, but silently if circum- stances demand. The important thing is actually to “talk to yourself.” Normally, each section heading can easily be turned into a question. If the section heading reads Stare Decisis, ask yourself the question, “What does stare decisis mean?”
Only after asking a question are you finally ready to read a chapter section. In reading keep your question in mind. By so doing you will be reading for a purpose: to dis- cover the answer to your question.
Upon finishing each section, stop and recite the answer to your question. As an example, at the end of the section on stare decisis say to yourself, “Stare decisis refers to the legal tradition that a judge in a given case will follow the precedent established in similar cases decided by courts in the jurisdiction.” According to psychologists, to recite
this way greatly aids memory. Recitation also lets you know whether or not you have understood the material just read.
The last step of the SQ3R method is review. When devoting two hours to the study of a chapter, take the final 15 minutes of the time to review the material. Review the questions taken from the headings of each chapter section and recite the answers to them, rereading material if neces- sary to answer accurately.
A CASE BRIEFING SYSTEM Although the SQ3R method may be used effectively to study any subject, the case briefing system is uniquely designed to aid in the study of court decisions. In studying law, students frequently write up case briefs of each deci- sion they read. Whether you are required to write up every decision is up to your individual instructor. However, the case briefing system provides an excellent framework for comprehending complicated judicial reasoning processes, and you should brief cases whether required to do so or not.
To avoid getting lost in a maze of judicial terminology, you should ask yourself a standard set of questions about each case decision and read to discover the answers to these questions. These standard questions lie at the heart of the case briefing system. They are as follows:
1. Who is the plaintiff and who is the defendant? 2. What are the facts of the case? (Who did what to
whom? What is the behavior complained of?) 3. Did the plaintiff or the defendant win in the lower
court(s), and which party is appealing? (All decisions in this textbook come from appellate courts.)
4. What was the legal issue or issues appealed? 5. Does the plaintiff or the defendant win on the appeal? 6. What rules of law and reasoning does the appellate
court use in deciding the issue?
Here is an illustration of a written case brief. It is a brief of the first case in the textbook, which you can find in Chapter 3 Case 3.1. Before looking at the brief, you should now read that case. An important part of law requires you to learn new vocabulary. To understand the case you read, you need to know several new terms. You can find the terms in the glossary of this textbook, but to make it easier, we will define several new terms for you:
1. appellant The losing party at the district court level. 2. appellee The prevailing party in the district court
who is responding to the appellant.
3. appeal To ask a higher court to decide whether an inferior court (e.g., trial court) made a legal mistake
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in its decision; also to ask a higher court to review (decide) the case.
4. dissent To disagree with both the result and the legal reasoning of the majority opinion.
5. opinion The court’s decision in a case. 6. petitioner The losing party in the court of appeals
who asks (i.e., “petitions”) the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower court made a mistake.
7. respondent The prevailing party in the court of appeals who is responding to the petitioner.
8. reversed What an appeals court says when it dis- agrees with the court beneath it. If it agrees with the lower court, it says “affirmed.”
CASE BRIEF Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U.S. _____ (2019). How do I read this citation?
• “Iancu” refers to the petitioner. • “v” means versus or against. • “Brunetti” refers to the respondent. • 588 is the volume number of the official U.S. Supreme
Court Reporter, and _____ refers to the page number where the case begins (once it is assigned a page num- ber). The date, 2019, is the year the case was decided.
Facts Respondent Erik Brunetti sought federal trade- mark registration for the trademark “FUCT.” Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line that uses the trademark “FUCT.” The U.S. Patent and Trade- mark Office (PTO) denied his application under a provi- sion of the Lanham Act that prohibits the registration of trademarks that consist of or comprise immoral or scandal- ous matter. Brunetti challenged the “immoral or scandal- ous” bar, claiming that it was not an appropriate test under the First Amendment.
Procedural History The PTO examining attorney and the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decided that Brunetti’s mark failed the test and was, therefore, unregisterable. Brunetti then brought a facial challenge to the immoral or scandalous bar in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This means that he challenged the pro- vision of the Lanham Act alleging that it was unconstitu- tional and therefore void. The Federal Circuit agreed and held that the prohibition violated the First Amendment.
The case was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Because the lower court invalidated a federal statute, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue Appealed The key issue on appeal was: 1. Whether the Lanham Act prohibition on the regis-
tration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks infringes the First Amendment.
Who Wins and Why? 1. The Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act prohibi-
tion on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks infringes the First Amendment.
2. The Court found that the bar amounted to viewpoint dis- crimination. According to precedent, if a trademark reg- istration is unconstitutional is the bar is view-point based.
3. The Supreme Court invalidated the “immoral” or “scandalous” and affirmed the Federal Circuit.
What Does This Mean? This means that Brunetti was able to register the “FUCT” trademark. It should be pointed out that, although he has the right to register the mark, he could face opposition to advertising the mark or opposition from consumers who may be offended. More- over, other marks that may have been denied registration in the past under this bar, now can be registered.
Source: Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U.S. _____ (2019)
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appendix II
Sample Complaint
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CLARKE COUNTY, STATE OF GEORGIA
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO: 2011
RELIANT MOTOR COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
COMES NOW Plaintiff John Doe, by and through counsel, and hereby files his Complaint, showing as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and venue is proper in this judicial district pursu- ant to Ga. Const. Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI and O.C.G.A. §14-2-510(b) because the defendant conducts business, its registered agent is located and the cause of action originated in this judicial district.
2.
Plaintiff, John Doe, is a citizen of the State of Georgia and a resident of Athens, Clarke County, Georgia, and submits himself to the jurisdiction of this Court.
3.
Defendant “Reliant” Motor Company is a Georgia Corporation conducting business as an automobile dealer in Athens, Clarke County, Georgia. James Smith is the Registered Agent for Reliant Motor Company on whom service is proper. James Smith may be served at Terry Drive, Athens, Georgia, subjecting Reliant Motor Company to the jurisdiction of this Court.
Statement of Facts
4.
On or about February 1, 2011, John Doe purchased a 2010 Ford Explorer, Serial Number PJSJWMMAP 2010, from Defendant automobile dealership.
5.
The vehicle was identified as having undergone a 50 point inspection, and as having attained a “Platinum Check Quality Assurance.” Among the items listed as passed “inspection” were all components of the front-end.
6.
The vehicle was sold with a 90 day/3000 mile warranty that covered all major component parts, including, but not limited to, engine, transmission, drive axle, brakes, steering, and electrical.
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712 Appendix II
7.
While test driving the vehicle, Plaintiff noticed excessive road noise and informed Defendant of the prob- lem. Defendant assured Plaintiff that vehicle had been inspected and was mechanically sound. Defendant said that excessive noise was from worn tires and offered to replace tires.
8.
Relying on Defendant’s explanation and offer to replace tires, Plaintiff entered into a sales contract to buy the vehicle from Defendant. After Plaintiff purchased vehicle and had the tires replaced, the excessive road noise continued unabated. While Plaintiff returned the vehicle to Defendant several times to have the problem cor- rected, Defendant was unable to eliminate the excessive road noise. The vehicle became inoperative when the front-end locked up.
9.
Through an independent mechanic, Plaintiff learned that the entire problem with the vehicle was the “front- end” assembly. Component parts of the front-end were worn and damaged which caused the excessive road noise. Failure to fix the problem resulted in the front-end locking up. The independent mechanic also stated that the front-end had not been properly inspected.
10.
The fraudulent misrepresentations by Defendant that the vehicle had passed a thorough inspection induced Plaintiff to purchase the vehicle.
11.
Defendant refused to honor the warranty on the vehicle, make necessary repairs, or properly diagnose prob- lem with the vehicle.
12.
As a result of these willful and wanton acts by Defendant, Plaintiff has been harmed by purchasing an inop- erable vehicle for a sum exceeding $20,000. Plaintiff also has suffered other expenses, including the purchasing of another automobile for transportation and expenses in attempting to repair the vehicle at issue.
COUNT I
Fraud in the Inducement
13.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 12 of his Complaint as if fully restated herein.
14.
Defendant, by its actions, intentionally concealed from the plaintiff the damage to the vehicle.
15.
The intentional concealments, misrepresentations, and omissions set out herein were made by defendant in order to deceive plaintiff and induce him to purchase the vehicle.
16.
Plaintiff, in fact, reasonably relied on defendant’s misrepresentations, which did, in fact, induce him to purchase the vehicle and to incur damages for repair and replacement of the vehicle as well as other foreseeable and consequential damages.
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Appendix II 713
17.
Defendant’s fraudulent concealments, misrepresentations, and omissions showed willful misconduct malice, wantonness, and oppression and were conducted with specific intent to cause harm thereby entitling plaintiff to punitive damages.
COUNT II Breach of Warranty
18.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 17 of his Complaint as if fully restated herein.
19.
Defendant’s actions breached the express warranty made to plaintiff in connection with his purchase of the vehicle, thereby entitling plaintiff to compensatory damages.
Prayer for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court:
1. Grant to Plaintiff judgment in this action and against Defendant under Counts One and Two of this complaint;
2. Grant to Plaintiff compensatory damages in an amount reasonable and commensurate with the losses imposed upon him by Defendant’s unlawful acts, including his pain and emotional distress;
3. Grant to Plaintiff punitive damages in an amount reasonable and commensurate with the harm done and calculated to be sufficient to deter such conduct in the future;
4. Grant to Plaintiff his costs in this action and reasonable attorneys’ fees as provided by OCGA §13-6-11;
5. Grant to Plaintiff a jury trial on all issues so triable; and
6. Grant such additional relief as the Court deems proper and just.
Respectfully submitted this _____ day of, _____ 2011,
____________________
Lawyer
Ga. State Bar #000000
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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appendix III
The Constitution of the United States of America We, the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to our- selves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Con- stitution for the United States of America.
Article I Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall con- sist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be com- posed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Per- sons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thou- sand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Con- necticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Car- olina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be com- posed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Leg- islature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Conse- quence of the Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be Presi- dent of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice Presi- dent, or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach- ments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall neverthe- less be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec- tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof: but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.
Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elec- tions, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and
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a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Busi- ness; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceed- ings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one-fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Rep- resentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve, he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjourn- ment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concur- rence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Section 8. The Congress shall have the Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of for- eign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads; To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
and make rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation
of Money to that use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatso- ever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square)
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as may, by Cession of particular States, and the accep- tance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful buildings;—And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Govern- ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or Duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Inva- sion the public Safety may require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office or Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obli- gation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspec- tion Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use
of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
Article II Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a Presi- dent of the United States of America. He shall hold Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Leg- islature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office or Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with Themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Govern- ment of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Per- son having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the Presi- dent, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Major- ity, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Represen- tation from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this
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Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Pow- ers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a Presi- dent shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
Before he enters on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Con- sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, providing two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro- vided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such infe- rior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have the Power to fill up all Vacan- cies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge neces- sary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faith- fully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
Section 4. The President, Vice President, and all civil Offi- cers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Article III Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambas- sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;— between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi- zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min- isters and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
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The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punish- ment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
Article IV Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro- ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states.
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Author- ity of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labor in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be dis- charged from such Service or Labor, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labor may be due.
Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and noth- ing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Preju- dice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legisla- ture cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
Article V. The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amend- ments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Man- ner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Article VI. All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitu- tion, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affir- mation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
Article VII. The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.
Amendment I [1791]. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit- ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Amendment II [1791]. A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security for a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
Amendment III [1791]. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the con- sent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Amendment IV [1791]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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Amendment V [1791]. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.
Amendment VI [1791]. In all criminal pros- ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which dis- trict shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the Witnesses against him; to have com- pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Amendment VII [1791]. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol- lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Amendment VIII [1791]. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Amendment IX [1791]. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Amendment X [1791]. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Amendment XI [1798]. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citi- zens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Amendment XII [1804]. The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for Presi- dent and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and
in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the gov- ernment of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the pres- ence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representa- tion from each state having one vote; a quorum for this pur- pose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be neces- sary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice President shall act as President. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice- President, shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest num- bers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person con- stitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eli- gible to that of the Vice-President of the United States.
Amendment XIII [1865] Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Amendment XIV [1868] Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per- son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Section 2. Representatives shall be appointed among the several States according to their respective numbers, count- ing the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the exec- utive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for partici- pation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representa- tion therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole num- ber of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an execu- tive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitu- tion of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for pay- ment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But nei- ther the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebel- lion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Amendment XV [1870] Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Amendment XVI [1913]. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from what- ever sources derived, without apportionment among the sev- eral States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
Amendment XVII [1913]. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
Amendment XVIII [1919] Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this arti- cle the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exporta- tion thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Con- stitution, within seven years from the date of the submis- sion hereof to the States by the Congress.
Amendment XIX [1920]. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Amendment XX [1933] Section 1. The terms of the President and the Vice Presi- dent shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3rd day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3rd day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a dif- ferent day.
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Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the begin- ning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accord- ingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
Section 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.
Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.
Amendment XXI [1933] Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for deliv- ery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Consti- tution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
Amendment XXII [1951] Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article
was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or act- ing as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.
Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.
Amendment XXIII [1961] Section 1. The District constituting the seat of Govern- ment of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct:
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Amendment XXIV [1964] Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice Pres- ident, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or any other tax.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Amendment XXV [1967] Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take the office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the Presi- dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
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House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written dec- laration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immedi- ately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Presi- dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their writ- ten declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Con- gress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the Presi- dent shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
Amendment XXVI [1971] Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Amendment XXVII [1992]. No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Rep- resentatives shall take effect, until an election of Represen- tatives shall have intervened.
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appendix IV
Selected Sections of Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code §2-104. Definitions: “Merchant”; “Between Merchants”; “Financing Agency.”
1. “Merchant” means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employ- ment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
3. “Between Merchants” means in any transaction with respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants.
§2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
2. Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writ- ing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the require- ments of subsection (1) against such party unless writ- ten notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received.
3. A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
A. if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller’s business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate
that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or com- mitments for their procurement; or
B. if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
C. with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted (Section. 2-606).
§2-205. Firm Offers. An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.
§2-206. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract.
1. Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the lan- guage or circumstances
A. an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
B. an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods, but such a shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.
2. Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.
§2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
1. A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or
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agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made con- ditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
2. The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
A. the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
B. they materially alter it; or C. notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
3. Conduct by both parties which recognizes the exis- tence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not oth- erwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any sup- plementary terms incorporated under any other provi- sions of this Act.
§2-209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver.
1. An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.
2. A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be other- wise modified or rescinded, but except as between mer- chants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
3. The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions.
4. Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
5. A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the contract may retract the waiver by rea- sonable notification received by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a mate- rial change of position in reliance on the waiver.
§2-210. Delegation of Performance; Assignment of Rights.
1. A party may perform his duty through a delegate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other party has a substantial interest in having his original promisor per- form or control the acts required by the contract. No delegation of performance relieves the party delegat- ing of any duty to perform or any liability for breach.
2. Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer can be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance. A right to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right arising out of the assignor’s due performance of his entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise.
3. Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary a pro- hibition of assignment of “the contract” is to be con- strued as barring only the delegation to the assignee of the assignor’s performance.
4. An assignment of “the contract” or of “all my rights under the contract” or an assignment in similar general terms is an assignment of rights and unless the language or the cir- cumstances (as in an assignment for security) indicate the contrary, it is a delegation of performance of the duties of the assignor and its acceptance by the assignee consti- tutes a promise by him to perform those duties.
This promise is enforceable by either the assignor or the other party to the original contract.
5. The other party may treat any assignment which del- egates performance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and may without prejudice to his rights against the assignor demand assurances from the assignee (Section 2-609).
§2-301. General Obligations of Parties. The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract.
§2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
1. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
2. When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con- tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
§2-305. Open Price Term. 1. The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract
for sale even though the price is not settled. In such
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a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if
A. nothing is said as to price; or B. the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they
fail to agree; or C. the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed mar-
ket or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded.
2. A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith.
3. When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agree- ment of the parties fails to be fixed through fault of one party the other may at his option treat the contract as cancelled or himself fix a reasonable price.
4. Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must return any goods already received or if unable so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery and the seller must return any portion of the price paid on account.
§2-306. Output, Requirements and Exclusive Dealings.
1. A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated esti- mate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior out- put or requirements may be tendered or demanded.
2. A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale.
§2-307. Delivery in Single Lot or Several Lots. Unless otherwise agreed all goods called for by a contract for sale must be tendered in a single delivery and payment is due only on such tender but where the cir- cumstances give either party the right to make or demand delivery in lots the price if it can be apportioned may be demanded for each lot.
§2-308. Absence of Specified Place for Delivery. Unless otherwise agreed
1. the place for delivery of goods is the seller’s place of business or if he has none his residence; but
2. in a contract for sale of identified goods which to the knowledge of the parties at the time of contracting are
in some other place, that place is the place for their delivery; and
3. documents of title may be delivered through custom- ary banking channels.
§2-310. Open Time for Payment or Running of Credit; Authority to Ship Under Reservation. Unless otherwise agreed
1. payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the goods even though the place of shipment is the place of delivery; and
2. if the seller is authorized to send the goods he may ship them under reservation, and may tender the docu- ments of title, but the buyer may inspect the goods after their arrival before payment is due unless such inspection is inconsistent with the terms of the con- tract (Section 2-513); and
3. if delivery is authorized and made by way of docu- ments of title otherwise than by subsection (b) then payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive the documents regardless of where the goods are to be received; and
4. where the seller is required or authorized to ship the goods on credit the credit period runs from the time of shipment but post-dating the invoice or delaying its dispatch will correspondingly delay the starting of the credit period.
§2-503. Manner of Seller’s Tender of Delivery.
1. Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming goods at the buyer’s disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery. The manner, time and place for tender are determined by the agreement and this Article, and in particular
A. tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods they must be kept available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the buyer to take possession; but
B. unless otherwise agreed the buyer must furnish facilities reasonably suited to the receipt of the goods.
2. Where the case is within the next section respecting shipment tender requires that the seller comply with its provisions.
3. Where the seller is required to deliver at a particular destination tender requires that he comply with sub- section (1) and also in any appropriate case tender documents as described in subsections (4) and (5) of this section.
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4. Where goods are in the possession of a bailee and are to be delivered without being moved
A. tender requires that the seller either tender a negotiable document of title covering such goods or procure acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer’s right to possession of the goods; but
B. tender to the buyer of a non-negotiable document of title or of a written direction to the bailee to deliver is sufficient tender unless the buyer sea- sonably objects, and receipt by the bailee of noti- fication of the buyer’s rights fixes those rights as against the bailee and all third persons; but risk of loss of the goods and of any failure by the bailee to honor the non-negotiable document of title or to obey the direction remains on the seller until the buyer has had a reasonable time to present the document or direction, and a refusal by the bailee to honor the document or to obey the direction defeats the tender.
5. Where the contract requires the seller to deliver documents
A. he must tender all such documents in correct form, except as provided in this Article with respect to bills of lading in a set (subsection (2) of Section 2-323); and
B. tender through customary banking channels is sufficient and dishonor of a draft accompany- ing the documents constitutes non-acceptance or rejection.
§2-504. Shipment by Seller. Where the seller is required or authorized to send the goods to the buyer and the contract does not require him to deliver them at a par- ticular destination, then unless otherwise agreed he must
1. put the goods in the possession of such a carrier and make such a contract for their transportation as may be reasonable having regard to the nature of the goods and other circumstances of the case;
2. obtain and promptly deliver or tender in due form any document necessary to enable the buyer to obtain possession of the goods or otherwise required by the agreement or by usage of trade; and
3. promptly notify the buyer of the shipment.
Failure to notify the buyer under paragraph (c) or to make a proper contract under paragraph (a) is a ground for rejection only if material delay or loss ensues.
§2-507. Effect of Seller’s Tender; Delivery on Condition.
1. Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer’s duty to accept the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to
his duty to pay for them. Tender entitles the seller to acceptance of the goods and to payment according to the contract.
2. Where payment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is condi- tional upon his making the payment due.
§2-509. Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach.
1. Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier
A. if it does not require him to deliver them at a par- ticular destination, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the car- rier even though the shipment is under reservation (Section 2-505); but
B. if it does require him to deliver them at a particular destination and the goods are there duly tendered while in the possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are there duly so tendered as to enable the buyer to take delivery.
2. Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer
A. on his receipt of a negotiable document of title covering the goods; or
B. on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer’s right to possession of the goods; or
C. after his receipt of a non-negotiable document of title or other written direction to deliver, as pro- vided in subsection (4)(b) of Section 2-503.
3. In any case not within subsection (1) or (2), the risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.
4. The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement of the parties and to the provisions of this Article on sale on approval (Section 2-327) and on effect of breach on risk of loss (Section 2-510).
§2-510. Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss. 1. Where a tender or delivery of goods so fails to con-
form to the contract as to give a right of rejection the risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance.
2. Where the buyer rightfully revokes acceptance he may to the extent of any deficiency in his effective insur- ance coverage treat the risk of loss as having rested on the seller from the beginning.
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3. Where the buyer as to conforming goods already identi- fied to the contract for sale repudiates or is otherwise in breach before risk of their loss has passed to him, the seller may to the extent of any deficiency in his effec- tive insurance coverage treat the risk of loss as resting on the buyer for a commercially reasonable time.
§2-511. Tender of Payment by Buyer; Payment by Check.
1. Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condi- tion to the seller’s duty to tender and complete any delivery.
2. Tender of payment is sufficient when made by any means or in any manner current in the ordinary course of business unless the seller demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension of time reasonably nec- essary to procure it.
3. Subject to the provisions of this Act on the effect of an instrument on an obligation (Section 3-802), payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment.
§2-615. Excuse by Failure of Pre supposed Conditions. Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
1. Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
2. Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller’s capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his custom- ers but may at his option include regular customers not then under contract as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and reasonable.
3. The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus made available for the buyer.
§2-703. Seller’s Remedies in General. Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to a part or the whole, then with
respect to any goods directly affected and; if the breach is of the whole contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may
1. withhold delivery of such goods; 2. stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided
( Section 2-705); 3. proceed under the next section respecting goods still
unidentified to the contract; 4. resell and recover damages as hereafter provided
( Section 2-706); 5. recover damages for non-acceptance (Section 2-708)
or in a proper case the price (Section 2-709); 6. cancel.
§2-711. Buyer’s Remedies in General; Buyer’s Security Interest in Rejected Goods.
1. Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
A. “cover” and have damages under the next section as to all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or
B. recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (Section 2-713).
2. Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also
A. if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this Article (Section 2-502); or
B. in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as provided in this Article ( Section 2-716).
3. On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of accep- tance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care, and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like man- ner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
§2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale.
1. An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may
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reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
2. A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when ten- der of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
3. Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available
a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dis- missal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
4. This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes effective.
Source: Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code
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appendix V
Selected Sections of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
TITLE I—PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD
Sec. 101. Establishment; Administrative Provisions. (a) Establishment of Board. —There is established the Pub- lic Company Accounting Oversight Board, to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors. The Board shall be a body corpo- rate, operate as a nonprofit corporation, and have succession until dissolved by an Act of Congress.
(c) Duties of the Board. —The Board shall, subject to action by the Commission under section 107, and once a determi- nation is made by the Commission under subsection (d) of this section—
(1) register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for issuers, in accordance with section 102; (2) establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relat- ing to the preparation of audit reports for issuers, in accor- dance with section 103; (3) conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms, in accordance with section 104 and the rules of the Board; (4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning and impose appropriate sanctions where justi- fied upon, registered public accounting firms and associ- ated persons of such firms, in accordance with section 105; (5) perform such other duties or functions as the Board (or the Commission, by rule or order) determines are neces- sary or appropriate to promote high professional standards among, and improve the quality of audit services offered by, registered public accounting firms and associated persons thereof, or otherwise to carry out this Act, in order to pro- tect investors, or to further the public interest; (6) enforce compliance with this Act, the rules of the Board, professional standards, and the securities laws relat- ing to the preparation and issuance of audit reports and
the obligations and liabilities of accountants with respect thereto, by registered public accounting firms and associ- ated persons thereof; and (7) set the budget and manage the operations of the Board and the staff of the Board.
(h) Annual Report to the Commission. —The Board shall submit an annual report (including its audited financial statements) to the Commission, and the Commission shall transmit a copy of that report to the Committee on Bank- ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Repre- sentatives, not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of that report by the Commission.
Sec. 107. Commission Oversight of the Board. (a) General Oversight Responsibility. —The Commission shall have oversight and enforcement authority over the Board, as provided in this Act. . . .
TITLE II—AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Sec. 203. Audit Partner Rotation. (j) Audit Partner Rotation. —It shall be unlawful for a regis- tered public accounting firm to provide audit services to an issuer if the lead (or coordinating) audit partner (having primary responsibility for the audit), or the audit partner responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for that issuer in each of the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer.
Sec. 204. Auditor Reports to Audit Committees. (k) Reports to Audit Committees. —Each registered public accounting firm that performs for any issuer any audit required by this title shall timely report to the audit com- mittee of the issuer—
(1) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used; (2) all alternative treatments of financial information within generally accepted accounting principles that have been discussed with management officials of the issuer, ramifications of the use of such alternative disclosures and treatments, and the treatment preferred by the registered public accounting firm; and (3) other material written communications between the registered public accounting firm and the management of
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the issuer, such as any management letter or schedule of unadjusted differences.
TITLE III—CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
Sec. 302. Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports. (a) Regulations Required. —The Commission shall, by rule, require, for each company filing periodic reports under sec- tion 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that the principal executive officer or officers and the prin- cipal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted under either such section of such Act that—
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report; (2) based on the officer’s knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state- ments made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading; (3) based on such officer’s knowledge, the financial state- ments, and other financial information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report; (4) the signing officers—
(A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining inter- nal controls;
(B) have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the issuer and its consoli- dated subsidiaries is made known to such officers by oth- ers within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are being prepared;
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report; and
(D) have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on their evaluation as of that date; (5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer’s audi- tors and the audit committee of the board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent function)—
(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the issu- er’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report finan- cial data and have identified for the issuer’s auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and
(B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves man- agement or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal controls; and (6) the signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
(b) Foreign Reincorporations Have No Effect. —Nothing in this section 302 shall be interpreted or applied in any way to allow any issuer to lessen the legal force of the statement required under this section 302, by an issuer having rein- corporated or having engaged in any other transaction that resulted in the transfer of the corporate domicile or offices of the issuer from inside the United States to outside of the United States.
(c) Deadline. —The rules required by subsection (a) shall be effective not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
Sec. 303. Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits. (a) Rules to Prohibit. —It shall be unlawful, in contraven- tion of such rules or regulations as the Commission shall prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public inter- est or for the protection of investors, for any officer or director of an issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to take any action to fraudulently influ- ence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent pub- lic or certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially misleading.
Sec. 304. Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits. (a) Additional Compensation Prior to Noncompliance with Commission Financial Reporting Requirements. —If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of miscon- duct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief finan- cial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for— (1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that person from the issuer dur- ing the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and (2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period.
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Sec. 306. Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods. (a) Prohibition of Insider Trading During Pension Fund Blackout Periods.— (1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent otherwise provided by rule of the Commission pursuant to paragraph (3), it shall be unlawful for any director or executive officer of an issuer of any equity security (other than an exempted secu- rity), directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell, or otherwise acquire or transfer any equity security of the issuer (other than an exempted security) during any blackout period with respect to such equity security if such director or officer acquires such equity security in connection with his or her service or employment as a director or executive officer. (2) REMEDY.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Any profit realized by a director or exec- utive officer referred to in paragraph (1) from any purchase, sale, or other acquisition or transfer in violation of this subsection shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such director or executive officer in entering into the transaction.
(B) ACTIONS TO RECOVER PROFITS.—An action to recover profits in accordance with this subsection may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer fails or refuses to bring such action within 60 days after the date of request, or fails diligently to prosecute the action there- after, except that no such suit shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which such profit was realized.
TITLE IV—ENHANCED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
Sec. 404. Management Assessment of Internal Controls. (a) Rules Required. —The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring each annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to contain an internal control report, which shall— (1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and (2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fis- cal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting.
(b) Internal Control Evaluation and Reporting. —With respect to the internal control assessment required by sub- section (a), each registered public accounting firm that pre- pares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to,
and report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer. An attestation made under this subsection shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engage- ments issued or adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the subject of a separate engagement.
Sec. 407. Disclosure of Audit Committee Financial Expert. (a) Rules Defining “Financial Expert.” The Commission shall issue rules, as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors, to require each issuer, together with periodic reports required pursuant to sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is composed of at least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined by the Commission.
(b) Considerations. —In defining the term “financial expert” for purposes of subsection (a), the Commission shall consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a princi- pal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer of an issuer, or from a position involving the perfor- mance of similar functions—
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial statements; (2) experience in—
(A) the preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally comparable issuers; and
(B) the application of such principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves; (3) experience with internal accounting controls; and (4) an understanding of audit committee functions.
TITLE VIII—CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL FRAUD ACCOUNTABILITY
Sec. 801. Short Title.� This title may be cited as the “Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002.”
Sec. 804. Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud. . . . [A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or con- trivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement con- cerning the securities laws . . . may be brought not later than the earlier of—
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.
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Sec. 806. Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud. (a) Whistleblower Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies. —No company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to file reports under . . . the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner dis- criminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee—
(1) to provide information, cause information to be pro- vided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of . . . any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders, when the infor- mation or assistance is provided to or the investigation is conducted by—
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Con- gress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct); or (2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or oth- erwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating to an alleged vio- lation of . . . any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
Sec. 807. Criminal Penalties for Defrauding Shareholders of Publicly Traded Companies. (a) In General. —Chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
§1348. Securities fraud Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute.
a scheme or artifice— “(1) to defraud any person in connection with any
security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”; or
“(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pre- tenses, representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both.”
TITLE IX—WHITE-COLLAR CRIME PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS
Sec. 903. Criminal Penalties for Mail and Wire Fraud. (a) Mail Fraud. —Section 1341 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking “five” and inserting “20.”
(b) Wire Fraud. —Section 1343 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking “five” and inserting “20.”
TITLE XI—CORPORATE FRAUD ACCOUNTABILITY
Sec. 1106. Increased Criminal Penalties Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended—
(1) by striking “$1,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years” and inserting “$5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years”; and (2) by striking “$2,500,000” and inserting “$25,000,000.”
Sec. 1107. Retaliation Against Informants. (a) In General. —Section 1513 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(e) Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interfer- ence with the lawful employment or livelihood of any per- son, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible com- mission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”
Source: Selected Sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
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appendix VI
Selected Sections of Securities Act of 1933 Section 6—Registration of Securities and Signing of Registration Statement
1. Any security may be registered with the Commission under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided, by filing a registration statement in triplicate, at least one of which shall be signed by each issuer, its princi- pal executive officer or officers, its principal financial officer, its comptroller or principal accounting officer, and the majority of its board of directors or persons performing similar functions (or, if there is no board of directors or persons performing similar functions, by the majority of the persons or board having the power of management of the issuer) . . .
Section 11—Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registration Statement
1. In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue state- ment of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue—
A. every person who signed the registration statement; B. every person who was a director of (or person per-
forming similar functions) or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registra- tion statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
C. every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or partner;
D. every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a state- ment made by him, who has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration
statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified by him;
E. every underwriter with respect to such security.
Section 12—Civil Liabilities Arising in Connection with Prospectuses and Communications
1. In General. Any person who— A. offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, or B. offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communica- tion in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the cir- cumstances under which they were made, not mis- leading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable, subject to sub- section (b), to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
2. Loss Causation. In an action described in subsection (a)(2), if the person who offered or sold such security proves that any portion or all of the amount recov- erable under subsection (a)(2) represents other than the depreciation in value of the subject security result- ing from such part of the prospectus or oral commu- nication, with respect to which the liability of that person is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces- sary to make the statement not misleading, then such portion or amount, as the case may be, shall not be recoverable.
Section 17—Fraudulent Interstate Transactions
1. It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
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interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
A. to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
B. to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state- ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
C. to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
2. It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communica- tion in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, to publish, give publicity to, or circulate any notice, cir- cular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter, invest- ment service, or communication which, though not
purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security for a consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospective, of such consideration and the amount thereof.
Section 24—Penalties Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this title, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof, or any person who willfully, in a regis- tration statement filed under this title, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Source: Selected Sections of Securities Act of 1933
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appendix VII
Selected Sections of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 4—Securities and Exchange Commission
1. There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “Commis- sion”) to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three of such commissioners shall be members of the same political party, and in making appointments members of differ- ent political parties shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable. No commissioner shall engage in any other business, vocation, or employment than that of serving as commissioner, nor shall any commissioner participate, directly or indirectly, in any stock-market operations or transactions of a character subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to this title. Each commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years and until his successor is appointed and has qualified . . .
Section 10—Regulation of the Use of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com- merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
2. To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip- ulative or deceptive device or any securities-based swap agreement . . ., or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Section 16—Directors, Officers, and Prin- cipal Stockholders
1. DISCLOSURES REQUIRED.—
1. Directors, officers, and principal stockholders required to file.—Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered
pursuant to section 12, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file the statements required by this subsection with the Commission (and, if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange).
2. TIME OF FILING.—The statements required by this subsection shall be filed—
1. at the time of the registration of such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 12(g);
2. within 10 days after he or she becomes such ben- eficial owner, director, or officer;
3. if there has been a change in such ownership, or if such person shall have purchased or sold a security-based swap agreement . . . involving such equity security, before the end of the second busi- ness day following the day on which the subject transaction has been executed, or at such other time as the Commission shall establish, by rule, in any case in which the Commission determines that such 2-day period is not feasible.
3. CONTENTS OF STATEMENTS.—A statement filed—
1. under subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) shall contain a statement of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which the filing person is the beneficial owner; and
2. under subparagraph (C) of such paragraph shall indicate ownership by the filing person at the date of filing, any such changes in such ownership, and such purchases and sales of the security-based swap agreements as have occurred since the most recent such filing under such subparagraph.
4. ELECTRONIC FILING AND AVAILABILITY.— Beginning not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002—
1. a statement filed under subparagraph (C) of para- graph (2) shall be filed electronically;
2. the Commission shall provide each such state- ment on a publicly accessible Internet site not later than the end of the business day following that filing; and
3. the issuer (if the issuer maintains a corporate web- site) shall provide that statement on that corporate website, not later than the end of the business day following that filing.
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Section 18—Liability for Misleading Statements
1. Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this title or any rule or regulation there- under or any undertaking contained in a registration statement . . . , which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reli- ance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such state- ment, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or mis- leading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent juris- diction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including rea- sonable attorneys’ fees, against either party litigant.
2. Every person who becomes liable to make payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment.
3. No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within one
year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued.
Section 32—Penalties 1. Any person who willfully violates any provision of this
chapter . . . or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed under this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement . . . or by any self-regulatory organization in connec- tion with an application for membership or participa- tion therein or to become associated with a member thereof, which statement was false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, except that when such per- son is a person other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed; but no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
Source: Selected Sections of Securities Exchange Act of 1934
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glossary
Acceptance The contractual communication of agree- ing to another’s offer. The acceptance of an offer creates a contract. Accession Property acquired by adding something to an owned object. Accessory A term used at the state level that is similar to “aiding and abetting.” Accessory to a crime generally is either before the criminal act or after it. Accord and satisfaction Payment of money, or other thing of value, usually less than the amount demanded, in exchange for cancellation of a debt that is uncertain in amount. Act Legislation proposed by a legislative body such as the U.S. Congress. When enacted, it has a meaning iden- tical to “law,” or “statute.” Actual authority The authority a principal expressly or implicitly gives to an agent in an agency relationship. This authority may be written, spoken, or derived from the cir- cumstances of the relationship. Adjustment Under the Bankruptcy Act the procedure followed when a debtor’s debts are partly reduced and partly rearranged for repayment. Administrative agency An organization, usually a part of the executive branch of government, that is created to serve a specific purpose as authorized by the legislative branch. An agency’s function usually is characterized as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. Administrative law The legal principles involved in the workings of administrative agencies within the regulatory process. Administrative law judge The individual employed by an administrative agency who is in charge of hearing the initial presentations in a quasi-judicial case. Adverse possession Property ownership acquired through open, notorious, actual, exclusive, continuous, and wrongful possession of land for a statutorily pre- scribed period of time. Advisory opinion A formal opinion by a judge, court, regulatory agency, or law officer upon a question of law. Affidavit A sworn written statement made before an officer authorized by law to administer oaths. Affirmative action Positive steps taken in order to alle- viate conditions resulting from past discrimination or from violations of a law. Agent The person who on behalf of a principal deals with a third party.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) The WTO agreement that discusses the applicability of GATT principles and intel- lectual property agreements in the international sphere. Aiding and abetting A criminal action that arises from association with and from assistance rendered to a per- son guilty of another criminal act. Alien corporation A corporation created under the authority of a foreign country. Alien Tort Statute (ATS) The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is a U.S. federal law that gives the federal courts jurisdiction to hear lawsuits filed by non-U.S. citizens for torts com- mitted in violation of international law. Alter-ego theory One method used by courts to pierce the corporate veil when a shareholder fails to treat the corporate organization as a separate legal entity. Annual percentage rate (APR) A rate of interest that commercial lenders charge persons who borrow money. This rate is calculated in a standardized fashion required by the Truth-in-Lending Act. Answer The responsive pleading filed by a defendant. Anti-assignment clause A contractual provision that prevents a party from assigning rights or delegating duties without the permission of the other party. Apparent authority The authority that a third party in an agency relationship perceives to exist between the principal and the agent. In fact, no actual authority does exist. Sometimes also called ostensible authority. Appeal The right of the litigation parties to have the legal decisions of the trial judge reviewed by an appellate court. Appellant The party seeking review of a lower court decision. Appellate court A court that decides whether a trial judge has made a mistake of law. Appellee The party responding to an appeal; the win- ner in the trial court. Arbitration Submission of a dispute to an extrajudicial authority for decision. Arbitrator The individual or panel members authorized by disputing parties to resolve a dispute through the arbi- tration process. Articles of incorporation The legal document that forms the application for a state charter of incorporation. Articles of organization The document used to create a limited liability company. Its purpose corresponds to
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the purpose of the articles of partnership and the articles of incorporation. Articles of partnership Another name for a formally drafted partnership agreement. Artisan’s lien The lien that arises in favor of one who has expended labor upon, or added value to, another person’s personal property. The lien allows the person to possess the property as security until reimbursed for the value of labor or materials. If the person is not reim- bursed, the property may be sold to satisfy the claim. Assault The intentional creation of immediate appre- hension of injury or lack of physical safety. Assignee A third party, who is not an original contracting party, to whom contractual rights are trans- ferred. This party may enforce the original contract. Assignment A transfer of contractual rights. Assignor An original contracting party who assigns or transfers contractual rights to a third party. Assumed-name statute A state law that requires part- ners to make a public filing of their identities if their part- nership operates under a name that does not reveal the partners’ identities. Assumption of risk Negligence doctrine that bars the recovery of damages by an injured party on the ground that such a party acted with actual or constructive knowl- edge of the hazard causing the injury. Attachment The term attachment has three meanings. First, attachment is a method of acquiring in rem jurisdic- tion of a nonresident defendant who is not subject to the service of process to commence a lawsuit. By “attach- ing” property of the nonresident defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant to the extent of the value of the property attached. Second, attachment is a procedure used to collect a judgment. A plaintiff may have the property of a defendant seized, pending the outcome of a lawsuit, if the plaintiff has reason to fear that the defendant will dispose of the property before the court renders its decision. Third, attachment is the event that creates an enforceable security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). In order that a security interest attach, there must be a signed, written security agreement, or possession of the collateral by the secured party; the secured party must give value to the debtor; and the debtor must maintain rights in the collateral. Award The decision announced by an arbitrator. Bailee In a bailment, the person who takes possession of an object owned by another and must return it or oth- erwise dispose of it. Bailment An owner’s placement of an object into the intentional possession of another person with the
understanding that the other person must return the object at some point or otherwise dispose of it. Bailor In a bailment, the person who transfers posses- sion of tangible, personal property to another person with the understanding that the other person must return the object at some point or otherwise dispose of it. Bankruptcy Traditionally, the financial condition where debts exceed assets and one is unable to pay debts as they mature. Bankruptcy crime An action involving the falsification of documents filed in a bankruptcy case. Battery The cause of action for physical contact that is not consented to and is offensive. Benefit corporation A corporate form that requires directors to ensure that the corporation meets explicit social goals (i.e., confers a public benefit) in addition to producing shareholder profits. Beyond a reasonable doubt The burden of proof required in a criminal case. The prosecution in a criminal case has the burden of proving the defendant is guilty, and the jury must have no reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. See also Burden of proof. Bilateral contract An agreement that contains mutual promises, with each party being both a promisor and a promisee. Bill of lading A document issued by a carrier indicat- ing that goods to be shipped have been received by the carrier. Blue sky laws Securities law enacted by states. Blurring A type of trade mark dilution that occurs when the distinctiveness of a mark is reduced by another’s use of the same mark in a different context Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) A quali- fication that permits discriminatory practices in employ- ment if a person’s religion, sex, or national origin is reasonably related to the normal operation of a particular business. Breach of contract A party’s failure to perform some contracted-for or agreed-upon act, or failure to comply with a duty imposed by law. Brief A written document produced by a party for a reviewing court that contains the facts, propositions of law, and argument of a party. It is in this document that the party argues the desired application of the law and any contentions as to the rulings of the lower court. Bubble concept A procedure by which the Environ- mental Protection Agency (EPA) allows a business to treat its entire plant complex as though encased in a bubble. The business suggests its own methods of cleanup, pro- vided the total pollution does not exceed certain limits.
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Burden of proof The term burden of proof has two meanings. It may describe the party at a trial with the burden of coming forward with evidence to establish a fact. The term also describes the party with the burden of persuasion. This party must convince the judge or jury of the disputed facts in issue or else lose that issue. There are various degrees of proof. See also Beyond a reason- able doubt, Preponderance of evidence, and Clear and convincing proof. Burglary Theft by breaking and entering. Business judgment rule A presumption that a corpo- rate director is acting in good faith and with due care in the best interests of firm. The presumption is commonly applied in shareholder derivative suits. It can be over- come with a showing that a director has breached a fidu- ciary duty to the firm. Business necessity defense An affirmative defense under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It is raised to dispa- rate impact claims and asserts that a facially neutral but discriminatory policy is job related. Buy and sell agreement A contract, usually among partners, but perhaps among shareholders, wherein one party agrees to buy the ownership interest held by another party or the first party agrees to sell such an interest to the other party. These contractual provisions help provide for a transition of owners without harming the business of the organization. Buyer in the ordinary course of business A buyer who buys from someone who ordinarily sells such goods in his or her business. California Consumer Privacy Act A state law the regulations the collection and use of California consumer information. The disclosure and permission protections are similar to the European Union’s General Data Protec- tion Regulation (GDPR). Capacity Mental ability to make a rational decision that includes the ability to perceive and appreciate all rel- evant facts. A required element of a contract. Categorical imperative A concept by the philosopher Kant that a person should never act in a certain way unless he or she is willing to have everyone else act in the same way. Caucus The name used for a private meeting between a mediator and one of the parties involved in a mediation. Cause in fact The actual cause of an event; the instru- ment that is the responsible force for the occurrence of a certain event. A required element of a tort. Cease and desist order The sanction that may be issued by an administrative agency to prevent a party from violating the law.
Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) An agreement among the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon- duras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic designed to eliminate trade barriers. Charter The legal document issued by a state when creating a new corporation. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act A federal law administered by the FTC that prohibits online col- lection of information from children under the age of 13 without parental consent. The law also requires disclo- sures and data protection when consent is given. Citation The reference identifying how to find a case. Civil law The area of law governing the rights and duties between private parties as compared with the criminal law. This term also describes the system of codi- fying law in many countries as compared with the judicial orientation of the common law system. Class-action suit A method of litigation that allows one or more plaintiffs to file a lawsuit on behalf of a much larger group of persons, all of whom have a common interest in the claims being litigated. Clayton Act Legislation passed in 1914 that exempts labor unions from the Sherman Act. This law expanded the national antitrust policy to cover price discrimination, exclusive dealings, tying contracts, mergers, and inter- locking directors. Clean Air Act The principal federal law regulating air pollution. Clean Water Act The principal federal law regulating water pollution. Clear and convincing proof A burden of proof that requires the party with the burden to establish clearly the existence of the alleged facts. This burden requires more proof than merely having a preponderance of evidence on one’s side. Closed shop A contractual agreement between an employer and a union that all applicants for a job with the employer will have to join the union. This type of agree- ment was outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act. Closely held An organization that is owned by only a few people. Code A compilation of legislation enacted by a federal, state, or local government. Collateral The valuable thing put up by someone to secure a loan or credit. Collective bargaining The process used by an employer and a union representing employees to dis- cuss and resolve differences so that the parties can agree to a binding contract.
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Commerce clause A provision in Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution that grants the federal government the power to regulate business transactions. Commercial impracticability A Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) defense to contractual nonperformance based on happenings that greatly increase the difficulty of performance and that violate the parties’ reasonable commercial expectations. Commercial speech Speech that has a business- oriented purpose. This speech is protected under the First Amendment, but this protection is not as great as that afforded to noncommercial speech. Common law That body of law deriving from judicial decisions as opposed to legislatively enacted statutes and administrative regulations. Comparable worth Jobs that, although different, produce substantially equal value for the employer. Comparative responsibility A doctrine that compares the plaintiff’s contributory fault with the defendant’s fault and allows the jury to reduce the plaintiff’s verdict by the percentage of the plaintiff’s fault. Also called compara- tive negligence. Compensatory damages Usually awarded in breach- of-contract cases to pay for a party’s losses that are a direct and foreseeable result of the other party’s breach. The award of these damages is designed to place the non-breaching party in the same position as if the con- tract had been performed. Complaint In legal practice, the first written statement of the plaintiff’s position and allegations, which initiates the lawsuit. Complete performance A party performs all of its obli- gations under a contract. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) This legis- lation, also known as the Superfund, addresses the envi- ronmental cleanup of hazardous wastes from property. Compulsory bargaining issue Mandatory bargaining issue regarding wages, hours, or other terms or condi- tions of employment. Refusal to engage in good-faith bargaining with regard to these issues is an unfair labor practice. Concealment An intentional misrepresentation of a material fact occurring through the silence of a party. Concerted activities Those activities involving an agreement, contract, or conspiracy to restrain trade that may be illegal under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Concurrent conditions Mutual conditions under which each party’s contractual performance is triggered by the other party’s tendering (offering) performance.
Condition precedent An event in the law of contracts that must occur before a duty of immediate performance of the promise arises. Contracts often provide that one party must perform before there is a right to performance by the other party. For example, completion of a job is often a condition precedent to payment for that job. One contracting party’s failure to perform a condition prece- dent permits the other party to refuse to perform, cancel the contract, and sue for damages. Condition subsequent A fact that will extinguish a duty to make compensation for breach of contract after the breach has occurred. Conflict The common occurrence in life when two or more points of view exist. Conflict of law Rules of law the courts use to deter- mine that substantive law applies when there is an incon- sistency between laws of different states or countries. Confusion Property ownership that arises when identical masses of objects, such as grain, are mixed together. Conglomerate merger The merger resulting when merging companies have neither the relationship of com- petitors nor that of supplier and customer. Consent order Any court or regulatory order to which the opposing party agrees; a contract of the parties entered upon the record with the approval and sanction of a court. Consequential damages The amount of money awarded in a breach-of-contract case to the non-breaching party to pay for the special damages that exceed the normal compensatory damages. Lost opportunities may create consequential damages if the breaching party was aware of the special nature of the contract. Consequentialism An ethical system that concerns itself with the moral consequences of actions. Also called teleology. Consideration An essential element in the creation of a contract obligation that creates a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the promisor. Conspiracy A combination or agreement between two or more persons for the commission of a criminal act. Constitution When capitalized, the term refers to the U.S. federal Constitution, which sets out the basic frame- work for federal government and, as amended, for indi- vidual rights. Constitutional law The legal issues that arise from interpreting the U.S. Constitution or a state constitution. Constitutional relativity The idea that constitutional interpretation is relative to the time in which the Constitu- tion is being interpreted.
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) A federal regulatory agency established by the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. The CFPB has authority over federal financial consumer law. Contract A legally enforceable promise. Contract clause The constitutional provision that prohibits states from enacting laws that interfere with existing contracts. The Supreme Court has refused to interpret this clause in an absolute manner. Contract law The law of legally enforceable promises. Contributory negligence A failure to use reasonable care by the plaintiff in a negligence suit. Controlling person The person who has the control of, or is controlled by, the issuer of securities in securities laws. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) The agreement that sets forth standard international practices for the sale of goods. Conversion An unlawful exercise of dominion and con- trol over another’s property that substantially interferes with property rights. Copyright A statutorily created property right in creative expression that protects authors. Corporate governance A term that has at least two meanings. One relates to how business organizations are created and managed. A second concerns how the various levels of government regulate business organiza- tions as they transact business. Corporation An artificial, but legal, person created by state law. As a business organization, the corporation’s separation of owners and managers gives it a high level of flexibility. Corrective advertising A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) remedy that requires companies that have adver- tised deceptively to run ads that admit the prior errors and correct the erroneous information. Cost justification defense A defense to a price dis- crimination (Section 2 of the Clayton Act) case wherein the defendant seeks to justify charging different custom- ers different prices due to that defendant’s costs varying because of the differing quantities purchased by the customers. Counterclaim Any claim filed by the defendant in a lawsuit against the plaintiff in the same suit. Counterdefendant The party involved in litigation against whom a counterclaim is filed. This party is the original plaintiff. Counteroffer An offer made in response to another’s offer. Usually made in place of an acceptance. A counter- offer usually terminates an offer.
Counterplaintiff The party involved in litigation who files a counterclaim. This party is the original defendant who is making a claim against the original plaintiff. Courts of appeal A court that reviews decisions by lower courts. Covenant not to compete An agreement in which one party agrees not to compete directly with the business of the other party; may be limited by geography or length of time. Criminal law That area of law dealing with wrongs against the state as representative of the community at large, to be distinguished from civil law, which hears cases of wrongs against persons. Data Protection Directive A directive adopted by the European Union in 1995 that requires all member states to regulate the collection and processing of personal data by private firms. It will be replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018. De novo judicial review A proceeding wherein the judge or hearing officer hears the case as if it had not been heard before. Deed A document representing the title or ownership of land. Deeds of trust A type of document to secure an exten- sion of credit through an interest in the land. Defamation The publication of anything injurious to the good name or reputation of another. Default The failure of a defendant to answer a plain- tiff’s complaint within the time period allowed by the court. Upon the defendant’s default, a judgment is entered in the plaintiff’s favor. Defendant The party involved in a lawsuit that is sued; the party required to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. Deficiency In a land-based security interest, the amount of the loan which remains unpaid after the land has been sold. Delegate A transfer of contract duties. Delegatee A third party, who is not an original contracting party, to whom contractual duties are trans- ferred. This party will perform under the original contract. Delegator An original contracting party who delegates or transfers contractual duties to a third party. Delivery The physical transfer of something. In sale-of- goods transactions, delivery is the transfer of goods from the seller to the buyer. Deposited acceptance rule The contractual doctrine that a binding acceptance of an offer occurs when a mailed acceptance is irrevocably placed with the postal service. Deposition A discovery process outside the court’s supervision that involves the sworn questioning of a
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potential witness. This oral questioning is reduced to a written form so that a record is established. Derivative suit A lawsuit filed by one or more share- holders of a corporation against that organization’s man- agement. This suit is brought to benefit the corporation directly and its shareholders indirectly. Design defect A defect arising when a product does not meet society’s expectation for a safely designed product. Design patent A property right awarded for a new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture. Dicta Statements made in a judicial opinion that are not essential to the decision of the case. Digital Millennium Copyright Act A law passed by Congress in 1998 that makes circumvention of copyright protections illegal and requires Internet Service Provid- ers to remove infringing material when notified. Directed verdict A motion for a directed verdict requests that the judge direct the jury to bring in a par- ticular verdict if reasonable minds could not differ on the correct outcome of the lawsuit. In deciding the motion, the judge will view in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, and if different inferences may be drawn by reasonable people, then the court cannot direct a verdict. In essence, a directed verdict removes the jury’s discretion. Directors Those individuals who are elected by the shareholders to decide the goals and objectives for the corporate organization. Disability Any physical or mental impairment that sub- stantially limits a major life activity. Discharge In bankruptcy, the forgiving of an honest debtor’s debts. In contract law, an act that forgives further performance of a contractual obligation. Discovery Procedures by which one party to a lawsuit may obtain information relevant to the case from the other party or from third persons. Disparate impact A term of employment litigation that refers to the disproportionate impact of a policy neutral on its face on some protected class (e.g., race or sex). Disparate treatment A term of employment litigation that refers to the illegal discriminatory treatment of an individual in some protected class (e.g., race or sex). Dispute The circumstance when a party in conflict claims the right to do or have something and the other party denies, rejects, or ignores the claim. Dissent To disagree with both the result and the legal reasoning of the majority opinion. Dissolution The cancellation of an agreement, thereby rescinding its binding force. A partnership is dissolved anytime there is a change in partners. A corporation’s
dissolution occurs when that business entity ceases to exist. Diversity of citizenship The plaintiffs filing a lawsuit must be from states different from those of the defen- dants. This requirement, along with more than $75,000 at stake, is one method a federal court gains jurisdiction over the subject matter of a lawsuit. Domestic corporation A business organization created by the issuance of a state charter that operates in the state that issued the charter. dormant commerce clause concept The impact of the commerce clause as a means of limiting state and local governments’ powers to regulate business activities. Double jeopardy A constitutional doctrine that pro- hibits an individual from being prosecuted twice by the same governing body based on the same factual situation. Double tax A disadvantage of a corporate form of organization in that the corporation must pay a tax on the money earned and the shareholder pays a second tax on the dividends distributed. Dram shop acts Statutes adopted in many states that impose strict liability upon tavern owners for injuries to third parties caused by their intoxicated patrons. Due diligence defense A defense that experts may assert in a 1933 Securities Act case involving the failure to register securities or the failure to provide accurate documents. The expert utilizing this defense attempts to prove his or her reasonable investigation into all avail- able information. Due process clause A provision found in the Fifth and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. This clause assures all citizens of fundamental fairness in their rela- tionship with the government. Duress Action by a person that compels another to do what he or she would not otherwise do. It is a recognized defense to any act that must be voluntary in order to cre- ate liability in the actor. Duty A legal obligation imposed by the law. Duty of performance In contract law, the legal obliga- tion of a party to a contract. Easement The right of one other than the owner of land to some use of that land. Economic Espionage Act A federal law that creates criminal liability for trade secret misappropriation. Penal- ties are enhanced for misappropriation intended to ben- efit a foreign government. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) A fed- eral law that prevents interception of and unauthorized access to electronic communications such as e-mail.
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Eminent domain The government’s constitutional power to take private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. Emissions reduction banking The policy stating that businesses that lower pollution beyond the requirements of the law may use the additional reductions in the future. Employment at will A hiring for an indefinite period of time. Employment Eligibility Verification This document is used for verifying the identity and employment authori- zation of individuals hired for employment in the United States. Endangerment of workers A criminal act that involves placing employees at risk with respect to their health and safety in the work environment. Enforceable contract A contract that can be enforced in court. Environmental impact statement (EIS) A filing of documents required by the National Environmental Policy Act that forces governmental agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their actions. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) An admin- istrative agency established in 1970 to enforce federal laws concerning the environment. Equal protection clause A provision in the 14th Amend- ment of the U.S. Constitution that requires all citizens to be treated in a similar manner by the government unless there is a sufficient justification for the unequal treatment. Equitable remedy A remedy fashioned by a court when money damages are not adequate (i.e., there is “no adequate remedy at law”). Examples include injunctions and rescission of a contract. Establishment clause A provision in the First Amend- ment of the U.S. Constitution that prohibits the federal government from establishing any government-sup- ported religion or church. Estate The bundle of rights and powers of real prop- erty ownership. Ethics A systematic statement of right and wrong together with a philosophical system that both justifies and necessitates rules of conduct. European Union (EU) Created by the Treaty of Rome, an organization that seeks to facilitate the free move- ment of goods, services, labor, professions, transporta- tion, and capital among European countries. Exclusive dealing A buyer agrees to purchase a certain product exclusively from the seller or the seller agrees to sell all of his or her production to the buyer. Exclusive remedy rule The rule that limits an injured employee’s claim against the employer to workers’ compensation.
Exculpatory no The doctrine that merely denying guilt is not a criminal lie in response to a question from an agency of the federal government. This doctrine is no longer valid. Executed contract A contract that is fully accomplished or performed, leaving nothing unfulfilled. Execution To carry out some action to completion. With respect to enforcing a court’s judgment, an execution involves the seizure of the debtor’s property, a sale of the property, and the payment of proceeds to the creditor. Executory contract An agreement that is not com- pleted. Until the performance required in a contract is completed, it is executory. Exemplary damages Punitive damages. Monetary compensation in excess of direct losses suffered by the plaintiff that may be awarded in intentional tort cases where the defendant’s conduct deserves punishment. Exhaustion of remedies A concept used in adminis- trative law that requires any party to an administrative proceeding to give the administrative agency every opportunity to resolve the dispute before appealing to the court system. Expectation of privacy The expectation that one will not be observed by the state. Export controls Action taken on a national and multilat- eral basis to prevent the exportation of controlled goods and technology to certain destinations. Express conditions Conditions that are explicitly set out in a contract. Express contract A contract in which parties show their agreement in words. Expropriation A foreign government’s seizure of pri- vately owned property. Extradition The process that one state uses to have another state transfer to the jurisdiction of the first state a person accused of criminal activities. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Originally passed in 1938, this law provides basic protections for employees, including the minimum wage and maximum number of hours before overtime must be paid. Fair use A statutorily permitted use of another’s copy- right for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. False imprisonment The tort of an intentional, unjusti- fied confinement of a nonconsenting person who knows of the confinement. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) This law, which became effective in 1993, allows eligible workers up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave in any 12-month period to care for a newborn baby, to care for a child placed for adoption or foster care, to care for an immediate family member
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with a serious health condition, or when the employee is unable to work because of a serious health condition. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 (FEPCA) This law requires registration and labeling of agriculture pesticides and regulates the application of pesticides. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 A law that requires registration and labeling of pesticides. Federal question cases Litigation involving the appli- cation or interpretation of the federal Constitution, fed- eral statutes, federal treaties, or federal administrative agencies. The federal court system has subject matter jurisdiction over these issues. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure A law passed by Congress that provides the procedural steps to be fol- lowed by the federal courts when handling civil litigation. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) The federal regula- tory agency that enforces the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 and various antitrust and consumer protec- tion laws. Federal Trade Commission Act Passed in 1914, this legislation created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and authorized it to protect society against unfair meth- ods of competition. The law was amended in 1938 (by the Wheeler-Lea amendment) to provide the FTC with authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices. Federalism A term used to describe the vertical aspect of the separation of powers. The coexistence of a federal government and the various state governments, with each having responsibilities and authorities that are dis- tinct but overlap, is called federalism. Fee simple The maximum bundle of rights, or estate, permitted by law. Felony A criminal offense of a serious nature, generally punishable by death or imprisonment in a penitentiary; to be distinguished from a misdemeanor. Finance charge Any charge for an extension of credit, which specifically includes interest, service charges, and other charges. Financing statement An established form that a secured party files with a public officer, such as a state official or local court clerk, to perfect a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). It is a simple form that contains basic information such as a description of the collateral, names, and addresses. It is designed to give notice that the debtor and the secured party have entered into a security agreement. Firm offer An offer in signed writing by a merchant to buy or sell goods; it gives assurances that the offer will be held open for acceptance under the Uniform Com- mercial Code (UCC).
fixture An object of personal property that has become an object of real property (1) by physical annexation (attachment) to the land or its buildings or (2) because its use has become closely associated with the use to which the land is put. Focus group A group acting as a mock jury; attorneys present cases to such a group to get the members’ feedback on the merits of the various arguments presented. Force Majeure Clause A negotiated part of a contract that excuses total performance or delay in performance due to an extraordinary, unforeseeable event not caused by other party. The triggering events may be specifi- cally detailed and include natural disasters and political events. Foreclosure If a mortgagor fails to perform his or her obligations as agreed, the mortgagee may declare the whole debt due and payable, and she or he may fore- close on the mortgaged property to pay the debt secured by the mortgage. The usual method of foreclosure autho- rizes the sale of the mortgaged property at a public auc- tion. The proceeds of the sale are applied to the debt. Foreign corporation A business organization, created by the issuance of a state charter, that operates in states other than the one issuing the charter. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) A U.S. law that seeks to ban the payment of bribes to foreign officials in order to obtain business. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA) A federal law passed in 1976 that codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and rejects immunity for commer- cial acts carried on in the United States or having direct effects in this country. Foreign subsidiary A practice common in a multi- national corporation that conducts part of its business operations in a foreign country. Form I-9 This document is used for verifying the iden- tity and employment authorization of individuals hired for employment in the United States. Formalism An ethical system that affirms an absolute morality. Also called deontology. Franchise A marketing technique whereby one party (the franchisor) grants a second party (the franchisee) the right to manufacture, distribute, or sell a product using the name or trademark of the franchisor. Fraud A false representation of fact made with the intent to deceive another that is justifiably relied upon to the injury of that person. Free exercise clause A provision in the First Amend- ment of the U.S. Constitution that allows all citizens the freedom to follow or believe any religious teaching.
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Frolic and detour The activity of an agent or an employee who has departed from the scope of the agency and is not, therefore, a representative of his or her employer. Frustration of Purpose A defense to contractual per- formance that exists when it is still technically possible for a party to perform, but the result would be a fundamen- tally different outcome than the parties bargained for and expected. The frustration essentially destroys the value of performance. Full-line forcing An arrangement in which a manufac- turer refuses to supply any portion of the product line unless the retailer agrees to accept the entire line. Garnishment A legal proceeding whereby a creditor may collect directly from a third party who is obligated to the debtor. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) An international treaty that requires member countries to abide by the principles of open and free trade. General counsel An individual who is responsible for coordinating all law-related issues, such as the quasi- judicial hearings in administrative agencies. This term is also used to describe the principal lawyer of a company. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) A data privacy and security framework of the European Union that regulates the collection, use and export of personal information. It replaces the Data Protection Directive. General partner The owner of a limited partnership that enjoys the control of the partnership’s operation. This type of partner is personally liable for the debts of the limited partnership. Generic To lose distinctiveness in reference to the source of goods and thus to lose trademark protection. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) Prohibits covered employers from firing, refus- ing to hire, or otherwise discriminating against individuals on the basis of their genetic information or a family mem- ber’s genetic information. Geographic extension merger A combining of compa- nies involved with the same product or service that do not compete in the same geographical regions or markets. Gift Transfer of ownership by intent and the delivery of the object gifted. Good faith Honesty in dealing; innocence; without fraud or deceit. Good-faith meeting-of-competition defense A bona fide business practice that is a defense to a charge of violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Robinson-Pat- man Act is an amendment to the Clayton Act, which out- laws price discrimination that might substantially lessen competition or tends to create a monopoly. This excep- tion allows a seller in good faith to meet the equally low
price, service, or facility of a competitor. The good-faith exception cannot be established if the purpose of the price discrimination has been to eliminate competition. Good, the In philosophy the moral goals and objectives that people choose to pursue. Goods Tangible (touchable), movable personal property. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Federal law protecting personal health care information and limiting its disclosure and use by health plans and health care providers and clearinghouses. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) A measure of mar- ket concentration commonly used in merger analysis. It is calculated by squaring the market shares of competing firms and summing the results. Holding The precise legal response in an opinion by an appellate court on an issue of law raised on appeal. Horizontal merger Merger of corporations that were competitors prior to the merger. Horizontal price fixing A per se illegal agreement among competitors as to the price all of them will charge for their similar products. Horizontal restraint An agreement between direct competitors that restricts their rivalry, particularly related to the goods or services they offer. Horizontal territorial agreement An arrangement between competitors with respect to geographical areas in which each will conduct its business to the exclusion of the others. This type of agreement is illegal per se under the Sherman Act. Hostile work environment Under Title VII, an environ- ment where co-workers make offensive sexual com- ments or propositions, engage in suggestive touching, show nude pictures, or draw sexual graffiti. Hot-cargo contract An agreement whereby an employer agrees to refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of another employer or to cease doing business with any other person. Immunity Status of exemption from lawsuits or other legal obligations. Implied authority Actual authority that is incidental to express authority. Implied conditions Conditions to a contract that are implied by law rather than by contractual agreement. Implied-in-fact contract A legally enforceable agree- ment inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties. Implied-in-law contract A quasi-contract. Impossibility of performance A defense to contractual nonperformance based on special circumstances that
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render the performance illegal, physically impossible, or so difficult as to violate every reasonable expectation the parties have regarding performance. In pari delicto The parties to an illegal contract are equally at fault. Incorporators Those individuals who are responsible for bringing a corporation into being. Indefiniteness When the terms of an agreement are not sufficiently specific, the agreement does not rise to the level of a contract because of the doctrine of indefiniteness. Independent contractor A person who contracts to do work for another person or entity, who is not considered to be an employee. Indictment A document issued by a grand jury formally charging a person with a felony. Industry guide Guidance from a regulators, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), defining the agency’s view of the legality of an industry’s trade practice. Infliction of mental distress An intentional tort of the emotions that causes both mental distress and physi- cal symptoms as a result of the defendant’s outrageous behavior. Information A written accusation by the prosecutor pre- sented in court charging an accused person with a crime. Infringement The tort establishing violation of intellec- tual property rights. Injunction A court order directing a party to do or to refrain from doing some act. Injurious falsehood A statement of untruth that causes injury or damage to the party against whom it is made. Insider A person who owns 10 percent or more of a company or who is a director or officer of the company; a term used in securities law. This term is also used to describe a person possessing nonpublic information. Intangible personal property Something that rep- resents value but has no physical attributes, such as a copyright, patent, or franchise right. Intellectual property A type of property in information and its application or expression. Patents and copyrights are examples. Intent A legal doctrine indicating that parties meant to do what they did. Intent to defraud Applies to an individual who know- ingly and willfully makes a misrepresentation of a material fact that is relied on and thereby causes injury or harm. Intentional interference with contractual relations The tort of causing another to break a contract. Intentional tort Noncontractual legal wrong caused by one who desires to cause the wrong or where the wrong is substantially likely to occur from the behavior.
International Court of Justice (ICJ) The judicial branch of the United Nations, which sits at The Hague in the Netherlands and consists of 15 judges representing the world’s major legal systems. International Monetary Fund (IMF) An international economic organization. Interrogatory A written question submitted by one party to another in a lawsuit; a type of discovery procedure. Invasion of privacy A tort based on misappropriation of name or likeness; intrusion upon physical solitude; or public disclosure of objectionable, private information. Investigative consumer report A consumer report under the Fair Credit Reporting Act that arises when a credit reporting agency goes beyond reporting financial transactions and also reports the habits and practices of someone seeking credit or a job. Irreconcilable conflicts When a state of local law requires something different than a federal law or regu- lation and both laws cannot be satisfied. Under a Com- merce Clause analysis, the state or local law is declared invalid and void. Irrevocable letter of credit Reduces the risk to parties in cases where business is extended across national borders between strangers by providing guarantees of payment and delivery of goods. Issuer The term in securities law for an individual or busi- ness organization offering a security for sale to the public. Joint tenancy A property ownership that is undivided (common) and equal between two or more owners. Per- mits survivorship. Joint venture Two or more persons or business organi- zations agreeing to do business for a specific and limited purpose. Jointly and severally liable The legal principle that makes two or more people, usually partners, liable for an entire debt as individuals or in any proportional combination. Judgment Official adjudication of a court of law. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict The decision of a court that sets aside the verdict of a jury and reaches the opposite result. Judgment on the pleadings A principle of litigation, in the form of a motion, whereby one party tests the validity of the allegations contained in the complaint and answer. Upon this motion, a judge might determine that the pleadings contain no issues of fact or law and thus grant a judgment prior to a trial. Judicial activism An activist judge tends to abide by the following judicial philosophies: (1) The political process cannot adequately handle society’s difficult issues; (2) the courts can correct society’s ills through the decision-making
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process; (3) following precedent is not crucial; and (4) “judge-made law” is often necessary to carry out the legislative intent of the law. See also Judicial restraint. Judicial restraint A judge who abides by the judicial restraint philosophy (1) believes that the political process, and not the courts, should correct society’s ills; (2) decides an issue on a narrow basis, if possible; (3)follows precedent whenever possible; and (4) does not engage in “judge-made law” but interprets the letter of the law. See also Judicial activism. Judicial review The power of courts to declare laws enacted by legislative bodies and actions by the execu- tive branch to be unconstitutional. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act Act of 2012 eases federal regulations of initial public offerings to promote investment in start-up companies. Jurisdictional strike A stoppage of work that arises from a dispute between two or more unions as to what work should be assigned to the employees belonging to the disputing unions. This work stoppage is an unfair labor practice. This dispute between the unions should be resolved by the NLRB. Jurisprudence The science of the law; the practical sci- ence of giving a wise interpretation of the law. Jury instruction A statement made by the judge to the jury informing them of the law applicable to the case the jury is bound to accept and apply. Kickbacks Payments made to a person who has facili- tated a transaction. Knowingly Intentionally. Land sales contract A type of document to secure an extension of credit through an interest in the land purchased. Landrum-Griffin Act The federal law passed in 1959 that provides union members with a “Bill of Rights” and requires union officers to file reports with the Department of Labor. This law, which is known as the Labor–Manage- ment Reporting and Disclosure Act, also added unfair labor practices by unions. Lanham Act of 1946 A federal law that establishes the rules for federal trademark registration and enforcement. The law also provides a means for firms to sue competi- tors for false or misleading advertising. Lapse of time When the offeree fails to accept by a deadline defined in the offer or after a reasonable period of time. Larceny The unlawful taking of personal property with the intent to deprive the right owner of this property. Law The rules of the state backed up by enforcement. Leading object rule An exception to the statute of frauds’ writing requirement for collateral promises. It
occurs when the promisor’s commitment is primarily intended to serve the promisor’s own interests. Leashold estate The property granted to tenants (les- sees) by a landlord (lessor). Legislation Laws passed by an elected body such as Congress, a state legislation, or local council/commis- sion. Those laws enacted at the federal and state levels are called statutes. At the local level, such laws are often referred to as ordinances. Libel A defamatory written statement communicated to a third party. License A common method of controlling product or technology transfers across national borders. Life estate A property that grants land ownership for the lifetime of a specified person. Likelihood of confusion Standard employed in trade- mark law to determine if the use of a mark by two com- panies is too similar. Limited liability company (LLC) A type of business organization that has characteristics of both a partner- ship and a corporation. The owners of an LLC are called members, and their personal liability is limited to their capital contributions. The LLC, as an organization, is not a taxable entity. Limited liability partnership (LLP) A hybrid business partnership. Limited partners Those owners of a limited partner- ship who forgo control of the organization’s operation in return for their liability being limited to the amount of their investment. Limited personal liability See Limited liability. Liquidated damages A contractual provision that specifies a predetermined amount of damages or a for- mula for such a determination to be utilized if a breach of contract occurs. Liquidation The process of winding up the affairs of a business for the purpose of paying debts and disposing of assets. May be voluntary or under court order. Long-arm statute A state statute that gives extrater- ritorial effect to process (summon) in specified cases. It allows state courts to obtain jurisdiction in civil actions over defendants who are beyond the border of the state provided the defendants have minimum contact with the state sufficient to satisfy due process. Mail fraud The use of the U.S. Postal Service or any interstate carrier to conduct fraudulent activities with the intent to deprive an owner of property. Mailbox rule The rule that an acceptance is effective once it is sent. See Deposited acceptance rule. Malicious prosecution An action for recovery of dam- ages that have resulted to person, property, or reputation
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from previous unsuccessful civil or criminal proceedings that were prosecuted without probable cause and with malice. Manager A person designated and charged with day- to-day operations of a limited liability company. Mandatory arbitration A form of resolving a dispute, as an alternative to litigation, that is required by a statute. Manifest system A documentary system required by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Used in the disposal of toxic chemicals. Market extension merger An acquisition in which the acquiring company increases its market through product extension or geographical extension. Material breach Materially deficient or nonexistent per- formance of one’s obligations under a contract. Mechanic’s lien A lien on real estate that is created by statute to assist suppliers and laborers in collecting their accounts and wages. Its purpose is to subject the owner’s land to a lien for material and labor expended in the construction of buildings and other improvements. Med-Arb An abbreviation for an alternative dispute res- olution system that involves parties going through media- tion and agreeing to resolve as many issues as possible. These parties agree that any matters not resolved in the mediation process will then be arbitrated. Mediation An alternative to litigation whereby a third party attempts to assist the disputing parties in reaching a settlement. The third-party mediator lacks authority to impose on the parties a binding solution to the dispute. Mediator An individual who assists disputing parties in their efforts to resolve their differences. Mediators must rely on their persuasive abilities because they have no authority to settle the dispute. Members The individuals or business entities that belong to a limited liability company. Merger The extinguishment of a corporate entity by the transfer of its assets and liabilities to another corporation that continues in existence. Minimum rationality A legal test used by courts to test the validity of governmental action, such as legislation, under the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. To satisfy this test, the government needs to demonstrate that there is a good reason for the government’s action. Mirror image rule The common law rule that the terms of an acceptance offer must mirror exactly the terms of the offer. Any variation of terms would make the attempted acceptance a counteroffer. Misappropriation A term referring to the wrongful tak- ing of what belongs to an owner. Often used in intellec- tual property law. Misappropriation theory The legal doctrine supported by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the courts that any person who shares nonpublic infor- mation with another party or who trades on the informa- tion violates the securities laws if that information was intended to be kept confidential. Misdemeanor A criminal offense of less serious nature than a felony, generally punishable by fine or jail sen- tence other than in a penitentiary. Misrepresentation An untrue manifestation of fact by word or conduct; it may be unintentional. Mitigate To lessen the consequences of. Usually used to refer to the contractual duty to lessen damages follow- ing breach of contract. Money laundering The process of taking the proceeds of criminal activity and making them appear legal. Monopoly Exclusive control of a market by a business entity. Morality The values of right and wrong. Mortgage 1. A transfer of an interest in property for the purpose of creating a security for a debt. 2. A type of security interest in land, usually securing an extension of credit. Mortgagee The creditor in a mortgage agreement. Mortgagor The owner of land who places a mortgage on it. Motion The process by which the parties make writ- ten or oral requests that the judge issue an order or ruling. Mutual mistake A situation in which parties to a contract reach a bargain on the basis of an incorrect assumption common to both parties. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Legislation that imposes specific requirements on federal agencies to protect the environment, including the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) prior to taking certain actions. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) The federal administrative agency created in 1935 to conduct certifi- cation/decertification elections of unions and to conduct quasi-judicial hearings arising from the labor–manage- ment relationship. National Mediation Board Created by the Railway Labor Act, this federal agency is to help the parties resolve labor–management disputes arising in transpor- tation industries. Nationalization A claim made by a foreign government that it owns expropriated property. Negligence A person’s failure to exercise reasonable care that foreseeably causes another injury. Negotiation The process used to persuade or coerce someone to do or to stop doing something.
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Noerr-Pennington doctrine This doctrine exempts from the antitrust laws concerted efforts to lobby govern- ment officials regardless of the anticompetitive purposes. It is based on the First Amendment freedom of speech. Nolo contendere A plea entered by the defendant in a criminal case that neither admits nor denies the crime allegedly committed but, if accepted by the court, per- mits the judge to treat the defendant as guilty. Nontrading partnership A business organization made up of two or more partners engaged in buying and sell- ing goods. Norris-LaGuardia Act The federal legislation adopted in 1932 that attempted to increase union membership by prohibiting the use of injunctions issued by federal courts against certain union activities and by outlawing yellow- dog contracts. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) An agreement reached in 1993 among the United States, Mexico, and Canada to increase economic growth through mutual trade. Novation The substitution of a new contract in place of an old one. Nuisance A physical condition constituting an unrea- sonable and substantial interference with the rights of individuals or the public at large. Obscenity A category of speech not protected by the First Amendment. Obstruction of justice A criminal act involving the interference of the administration of the laws during the investigations and conduct of trials. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) The organization that has jurisdiction over complaints about hazardous conditions in the workplace. Offer A contractual communication that contains a spe- cific promise and a specific demand. The offer initiates the process of making a contract. Offeror death or insanity When the offeror no longer has the capacity to make the offer. Officers Those individuals appointed by directors of a corporation to conduct the daily operations of the corpo- rate organization. Opinion The decision of a judge, usually issued in a written form. Option A contractual arrangement under which one party has for a specified time the right to buy certain property from or sell certain property to the other party. It is essentially a contract to not revoke an offer. Oral argument Attorneys appear in person before the appellate court to explain orally to the court their position in the case and answer the court’s questions about the case.
Ordinance The legislative enactment of a city, county, or other municipal corporation. Organizers The parties responsible for bringing a lim- ited liability company into existence. These parties cor- respond to the functions of incorporators with respect to corporations. Originalism Stands for the idea that courts should interpret the Constitution according to the intentions of those who wrote it. Overbreadth doctrine A principle used by courts to invalidate legislation that is broader in scope than is nec- essary to regulate an activity. This doctrine may be utilized to protect constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, against a wide sweep of some governmental action. Overt act An essential element of a crime. Without this action by a party, the intent to engage in criminal activity is not wrongful. Ownership The term refers to the exclusive legal right to possess, transfer, and use resources. It is a synonym for “property.” Paper fortress A term referring to the documentation an employer should keep about an employee’s performance. Parol evidence rule Parol evidence is extrinsic evi- dence. In contracts, the parol evidence rule excludes the introduction of evidence of prior written or oral agree- ments that may vary, contradict, alter, or supplement the present written agreement. There are several exceptions to this rule. For example, when the parties to an agree- ment do not intend for that agreement to be final and complete, then parol evidence is admissible. Partnership A business organization involving two or more persons agreeing to conduct a commercial venture while sharing its profits and losses. Patent A statutorily created property right in inventions and discoveries. See Utility patent, Design patent, and Plant patent. Patent troll A firm or individual that produces no prod- ucts or services and owns patents only to obtain licens- ing fees from other firms. Pattern of racketeering Under RICO, two or more simi- lar acts of organized crime in a ten-year period. Per se illegality Under the Sherman Act, agreements and practices are illegal only if they are unreasonable. The practices that are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable are per se illegal. If an activity is per se ille- gal, only proof of the activity is required, and it is not nec- essary to prove an anticompetitive effect. For example, price fixing is per se illegal. See also Rule of reason. Peremptory challenge The power granted each party to reject a limited number of potential jurors during voir dire examination. No reason for the rejection need be given.
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Perfection The status ascribed to security interests after certain events have occurred or certain prescribed steps have been taken, for example, the filing of a financ- ing statement. Personal jurisdiction The power of a court over the parties involved in the litigation process. Personal property All property that does not involve land and interests in land. Petit jury The fact-finding body during a trial. Also called a trial or traverse jury. Petitioner The party filing either a case in equity or a petition for a writ of certiorari before a supreme court. Piercing the corporate veil The legal doctrine used by courts to disregard the existence of a corporation, thereby holding the shareholders personally liable for the organization’s debts. Piracy Traditionally a form of theft on the high seas, but also applied to criminal misappropriation of intellectual property, particularly copyrighted media. Plaintiff The person who initiates a lawsuit. Plant patent A property right awarded for a new vari- ety of plant that can be produced asexually. Note that inventions involving plants may be protected as utility patents. See Utility patent. Pleadings The system for defining and narrowing the issues by parties who file formal documents stating their respective positions in a lawsuit. Point source Any source of air pollution that must be licensed under the Clean Air Act. police powers The authority a state or local govern- ment has to protect the public’s health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Positional bargaining A method of negotiation that focuses on the parties exchanging offers, with conces- sions being made so that parties find a middle ground. The seller refers to the last offer made as its bottom line, and the buyer refers to the last offer made as its top dollar. Postdispute arbitration agreement Can be appli- cable to arbitration, mediation, or other methods of ADR; such a clause is signed by parties that are already in dispute. Posteffective period As it relates to an initial public offering of securities, this is the period during which the securities may be sold. This period usually follows a 20-day waiting period. Precedent A prior judicial decision relied upon as an example of a rule of law. Predatory pricing A policy of lowering the price charged to customers for the purpose of driving
competitors out of business. Typically, this policy involves prices that are below the seller’s costs of the products sold with resulting losses to the seller. Predispute arbitration clause Applicable to ADR sys- tems agreed to by contracting parties prior to a dispute arising; usually this clause is a part of the original contract between the parties. Preemption A condition when a federal statute or administrative rule governs an issue to the extent that a state or local government is prohibited from regulating that area of law. Prefiling period As it relates to an initial public offering of securities, this is that period of time prior to the filing of a registration statement with the SEC. Premerger notification Requirement under the fed- eral Hart-Scott-Rodino Act that requires firms involved in large mergers and acquisitions to notify the FTC and DOJ before they occur. Preponderance of evidence In the judgment of the jurors, evidence that has greater weight and overcomes the opposing evidence and presumptions. Presumption of innocence The basis of requiring the government to prove a criminal defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Prevention of significant deterioration A rule imple- mented under the Clean Air Act that prohibits the degra- dation of air quality in regions where air quality is better than required by primary air quality standards. Price fixing An agreement or combination by which the conspirators set the market price, whether high or low, of a product or service whether being sold or purchased. Primary air quality standards The standards neces- sary to protect human health. Secondary air quality stan- dards are stricter standards necessary to protect various environmental amenities. Primary jurisdiction A doctrine used by reviewing courts to determine whether a case is properly before the courts or whether it should be heard by an admin- istrative agency first since such an agency might have expertise superior to the courts’. Principal The person who gives an agent authority. Principled, interest-based, negotiations A method of negotiation that focuses on the parties’ interests as opposed to positions. The language used to describe this bargaining includes options, alternatives, objective criteria, and relationships. Prior restraint A principle applicable under the freedom of press and speech clauses of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The courts have announced decisions that encourage governments to allow the publication or expression of thoughts rather
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than to restrain such thoughts in advance of their publi- cation or expression. Private international law A body of rules that deal with controversies between private persons, such as those created by commercial transactions. Private law A classification of legal subject matters that deals most directly with relationships between legal enti- ties. The law of contracts and the law of property are two examples of this classification. Private nuisance An unreasonable use of one’s land so as to cause substantial interference with the enjoy- ment or use of another’s land. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) A 1995 federal statute that limits the recovery for securities violations against third parties who are not directly respon- sible for the violation. For example, only the Securities and Exchange Commission can pursue these claims. This law also requires lead plaintiffs in class-action securities suits and restricts recovery of damages and attorneys’ fees. Probable cause The reasonable basis on which lawen- forcement officials convince a judge that criminal activ- ity has occurred. This is the basis that must be satisfied before a judge will issue a criminal search warrant. Procedural due process The process or procedure ensuring fundamental fairness that all citizens are entitled to under the U.S. Constitution. Procedural law The body of rules governing the man- ner in which legal claims are enforced. Product extension merger A merger that extends the products of the acquiring company into a similar or related product but one that is not directly in competition with existing products. Production defect A defect arising when a product does not meet its manufacturer’s own standards. prohibiting discrimination A standard of review under the Commerce Clause that can invalidate state and local laws. When state and local laws discriminate against or negatively impact interstate commerce, such laws are invalid and void. Promise A commitment or willingness to be bound to a contract obligation. Promissory estoppel Court enforcement of an oth- erwise unbinding promise if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. A substitute for consideration. Property A bundle of private, exclusive rights in people to acquire, possess, use, and transfer scarce resources. Property law The law of the legal fence that establishes exclusive right in someone called an owner.
Prospectus The legal document required by the 1933 Securities Act to be made available to potential purchas- ers of securities. Protestant ethic A set of beliefs urging that human desire and indulgence be bent to God’s will through hard work, self-denial, and rational planning. Proximate cause In tort law and legal requirement that an act foreseeably causes an injury. Proxy The legal document whereby a shareholder appoints an agent to vote the stock at a corporation’s shareholders’ meeting. Public international law A body of rules that examines relationships among nations and seeks to bind them to common principles in the international community. Public law A classification of legal subject matters that regulates the relationship of individuals and organiza- tions to society. Public nuisance An owner’s use of land that causes damage or inconvenience to the general public. Publicly held A business organization that has hun- dreds, if not thousands, of owners who can exchange their ownership interests on public exchanges. Punitive damages Monetary damages in excess of a compensatory award, usually granted only in intentional tort cases where defendant’s conduct involved some element deserving punishment. Also called exemplary damages. Purchase money security interest (PMSI) A secu- rity interest given to the party that loans the debtor the money that enables the debtor to buy the collateral. Qualified disabled A disabled person who can perform the duties of a job. Quasi-contract A quasi-contract, often referred to as an implied-in-law contract, is not a true contract. It is a legal fiction that the courts use to prevent unjust enrich- ment and wrongdoing. Courts permit the person who conferred a benefit to recover the reasonable value of that benefit. Nonetheless, the elements of a true contract are not present. Quasi-judicial Administrative actions involving factual determinations and the discretionary application of rules and regulations. Quasi-legislative This term describes the rule-making functions of administrative agencies. Quasi-strict scrutiny A legal test used by courts to test the validity of governmental action, such as legislation, under the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. To satisfy this test, the government needs to demonstrate that the purpose of the action is substantially related to an important governmental objective.
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Racketeering A crime under RICO involving a pat- tern of actions that are indictable under state or federal laws. Railway Labor Act The federal law passed in 1926 to encourage collective bargaining in the railroad industry. The law also created the National Mediation Board. Ratification What occurs when a principal voluntarily decides to honor an agreement. Real property Property in land and interests in land. Reasonable accommodation The actions that an employer must take under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and under the Americans with Disabilities Act to adapt employment conditions to an employee’s religious belief or disability. Reciprocal dealing A contract in which two parties agree to mutual actions so that each party can act as both a buyer and a seller. The agreement violates the Clayton Act if it results in a substantial lessening of competition. Redlining An act or refusal to act that results in a dis- criminatory practice. For example, refusing to make loans in low-income areas can discriminate against minorities in granting credit. Registration statement The legal document required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to securities being offered for sale to the public. Rejection The refusal of an offer. A rejection terminates an offer. Release The relinquishment of a right or claim against another party. Remediation Restoring land to its previous condition. Remedy The action or procedure that is followed in order to enforce a right or to obtain damages for injury to a right; the means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compensated. Request for an admission A method of discovery used to narrow the issues to be litigated by having a party request that the other party admit the facts that are not in dispute. Request for production of documents A method of discovery whereby one party asks the other to provide documents for the requesting party’s review. Requirements contract A contract under which the buyer agrees to buy a certain item only from the seller. Res judicata The doctrine that deems a former adju- dication conclusive and prevents a retrial of matters decided in the earlier lawsuit. Resale price maintenance Manufacturer control of a brand- or trade-name product’s minimum resale price.
Rescission A contractual remedy that cancels the agreement and returns the consideration exchanged to each party. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) A federal law regulating the disposal of hazardous waste and non-hazardous solid waste. Respondeat superior The doctrine imposing liability on one for torts committed by another person who is in his or her employ and subject to his or her control. Respondent The party answering a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Restitution A contractual remedy involving one party returning to another the value previously received. Restraint of trade Monopolies, combinations, and con- tracts that impede free competition. Retaliation Striking back against someone for what they did to you. Used in labor law, employment dis- crimination cases, and whistle-blowing as part of a doctrine prohibiting an employer from firing or taking other adverse actions against employees for reporting the employer to federal agencies for violating various laws. Reverse Overturn or vacate the judgment of a court. Reverse discrimination The advancement and recruit- ment of minority workers ahead of similarly qualified non- minority workers. Revocation The contractual communication of with- drawing an offer. RICO The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act. Right of redemption The right to buy back. A debtor may buy back or redeem his or her mortgaged property when he or she pays the debt. Right-to-work law A state statute that outlaws a union shop contract—one by which an employer agrees to require membership in the union sometime after an employee has been hired as a condition of continued employment. Robbery Illegally taking something by force. Robinson-Patman Act The amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act covering price discrimination. As origi- nally adopted, the Robinson-Patman Act outlawed price discrimination in interstate commerce that might substan- tially lessen competition or tends to create a monopoly. Rule against perpetuities The rule that prohibits an owner from controlling what he or she owns beyond a life in being at the owner’s death, plus 21 years. Rule of first possession The rule that says one becomes an owner by reducing to possession previously unowned objects or abandoned objects.
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Rule of law The general and equal application of laws, even to lawmakers. Rule of reason Under the Sherman Act, contracts or conspiracies are illegal only if they constitute an unrea- sonable restraint of trade or attempt to monopolize. An activity is unreasonable if it adversely affects competi- tion. An act is reasonable if it promotes competition. The rule of reason requires that an anticompetitive effect be shown. See also Per se illegality. S corporation A business organization that is formed as a corporation but, by a shareholders’ election, is treated as a partnership for taxation purposes. Sanctions Penalties imposed for violation of a law. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 The law enacted to cor- rect inadequacies in the law that existed and allowed numerous examples of corporate fraud. In essence, through increased criminal sanctions and specific requirements, this law attempts to make corporate CEOs more responsible. Scheme to defraud A plan to misrepresent a material fact in order to obtain something, usually money, from another. Scienter With knowledge; particularly, guilty knowledge. Scoping A regulatory step required of a federal agency by the Council on Environmental Quality. Before prepar- ing an environmental impact statement, an agency must designate which environmental issues of a proposed action are most significant. Search warrant A court order required by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to be obtained from government officials prior to private property being searched or seized. Secondary air quality standards Clean Air Act stan- dards designed to protect environmental quality other than human health. Section 1981 That provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that forbids racial discrimination in the making of contracts. Section 5 Section of the Federal Trade Commission act which authorizes the commission to regulate unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade. Secured transactions Any credit transaction creating a security interest; an interest in personal property that secures the payment of an obligation. Securities Act of 1933 The federal law that regulates (through disclosure requirements) the initial sale of secu- rities to the public. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) The fed- eral administrative agency that regulates the securities industry.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 The federal law that regulates sales (other than the initial sale) of securities. This law governs the resale of securities whether by indi- viduals or through brokers and exchanges. Security Under the securities law, an investment in which the investor does not participate in management. Security interests An application of property that gives someone an interest in what belongs to another, usually to secure an extension of credit. Self-regulation An entire industry’s regulation of itself, as opposed to government regulation of the businesses in the industry. Seller In commercial law, a person who sells or con- tracts to sell goods. Seniority system A plan giving priority to employees based on the length of time an employee has worked for an employer. An employer may apply different standards pursuant to a good-faith seniority system if the differ- ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate. Sentencing guidelines Adopted by the U.S. Sen- tencing Commission as a means of standardizing the sentences given to similar criminals committing similar crimes. Separation of powers The doctrine that holds that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern- ment function independently of one another and that each branch serves as a check on the others. Sexual harassment Under Title VII, for an employer or workplace supervisor to promise benefits or threaten loss if an employee does not give sexual favors. Shareholders The owners of corporations. Typically, these owners vote on major decisions affecting their corporations, most commonly the election of a board of directors. Sherman Act An 1890 congressional enactment designed to regulate anticompetitive behavior in inter- state commerce. Short-swing profits The proceeds gained by an insider buying and selling, or vice versa, securities within a six- month time period. Such profits are considered to be illegal. Slander An oral defamatory statement communicated to a third person. Small-claims court A court of limited jurisdiction, usu- ally able to adjudicate claims up to a certain amount, such as $3,000, depending on the state. Social contract theory A theory by John Rawls that proposes a way for constructing a just society. Sole proprietorship The simplest form of business organization, created and controlled by one owner.
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Solid Waste Disposal Act A federal law requiring environmentally sound disposal of household, industrial, commercial, and municipal waste. Sovereign immunity A doctrine of state and interna- tional law that permits a foreign government to claim immunity from suit in the courts of other nations. Specific performance Equitable remedy that requires defendants in certain circumstances to do what they have contracted to do. Stakeholder theory Ethical theory that asserts that in order to be ethical, a business must take into consider- ation not only the making of a profit, but the impacts of the business on all interests that are affected by the business. Standing to sue The requirement that a plaintiff must satisfy by demonstrating a personal interest in the out- come of litigation or an administrative hearing. Stare decisis The doctrine that traditionally indicates that a court should follow prior decisions in all cases based on substantially similar facts. State action exemption The Sherman Act exemption of the sovereign action of a state that replaces competi- tion with regulation if the state actively supervises the anticompetitive conduct. State-of-the-art defense A defense that the defen- dant’s product or practice was compatible with the cur- rent state of technology available at the time of the event in question. Statute A legislative enactment. Statute of limitations A statute that sets a date after which a lawsuit may not be brought. The statute begins running after the happening of a certain event, such as the occurrence of an injury or the breach of a contract. Statute of repose A statute that applies to product liability cases. It prohibits initiation of litigation involving products more than a certain number of years (e.g., 25) following their manufacture. Stored Communications Act A federal law the pre- vents unauthorized access to stored electronic communi- cations that are still in transit or purposely archived. Strict liability The doctrine under which a party may be required to respond in tort damages without regard to such party’s use of due care. Strict products liability The cause of action under which commercial sellers of defective products are held liable without negligence. Strict scrutiny A legal test used by courts to test the validity of governmental action, such as legislation, under the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. To satisfy this test, the government needs to demonstrate
that there is a compelling state interest justifying the gov- ernment’s action. Subject matter destruction When the object of the contract is destroyed or legally eliminated. Subject matter illegality When a change in the law renders the agreement illegal, acceptance is no longer possible. Subject matter jurisdiction The authority of a court to hear cases involving specific issues of law. Submission The act or process of referring an issue to arbitration. Subprime Mortgages Mortgages that secure loans for consumers who do not qualify for ordinary market rates of interest because of lack of credit worthiness. Substantial performance Degree of performance rec- ognizing that a contracting party has honestly attempted to perform but has fallen short. One who has substantially performed is entitled to the price promised by the other less that party’s damages. Substantive law A body of rules defining the nature and extent of legal rights. Summary judgment A judicial determination that no genuine factual dispute exists and that one party to the lawsuit is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summons An official notice to a person that a lawsuit has been commenced against him or her and that he or she must appear in court to answer the charges. Superfund The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. Supremacy clause Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which states that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States shall be the “supreme law of the land” and shall take precedence over conflicting state laws. Supreme Court The highest appellate court. Sustainability Sustainability encompasses many concerns but a key concept involves maintaining the environment so that it will adequately meet the needs of future generations. Symbolic speech Nonverbal expression. Taft-Hartley Act The federal law enacted in 1947 to increase the bargaining power of management by creat- ing unfair labor practices by unions, by outlawing the closed shop, by creating an 80-day cooling-off period, by permitting states to adopt right-to-work laws, and by cre- ating the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Tangible personal property Physical property. Tarnishment A type of trademark dilution that occurs when a mark’s reputation is harmed by another’s use of the same mark in a different context.
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Tenancy in common A property ownership that is undi- vided (common) but not necessarily equal between two or more owners. Tender performance The offer by one contracting party to perform a promise; usually associated with the offer to pay for or to ship items under the contract. Third party One who enters into a relationship with a principal by way of interacting with the principal’s agent. Third-party beneficiaries Persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights created for them by a con- tract to which they are not parties and for which they have given no consideration. Third-party defendant A party who is not a party (plaintiff or defendant) to the original litigation. Typically, a defendant might file a claim against a third party stating that if the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, then this third party will be liable to the defendant. Tippee A person who learns of nonpublic information about a security from an insider. Title A synonym for ownership. Sometimes repre- sented as a document. Tombstone ad An advertisement announcing the public offering of securities; these usually run during the waiting period. Tort A civil wrong other than a breach of contract. Tort law Tort law helps protect property boundaries by providing compensation when someone wrongfully crosses such boundaries. Toxic Substances Control Act A law passed by Con- gress in 1967 to meet the special environmental prob- lems posed by the use of toxic chemicals. Trade dress A legal doctrine giving someone owner- ship of a distinctive overall appearance or look and feel of a product or service. Trade practice regulation A term generally referring to laws that regulate competitive practices. Trade secret Any formula, pattern, machine, or process of manufacturing used in one’s business that may give the user an opportunity to obtain an advantage over its competitors. Trade secrets are legally protectable. Trademark A statutorily created property in a mark, word, picture, or design that attaches to goods and indi- cates their source. Trademark dilution Using someone’s trademark in such a way so as to reduce the value of the trademark’s significance, reputation, and goodwill, even if the public is not confused by the use. Trading partnership A business organization made up of two or more partners engaged in providing services.
Trespass An act done in an unlawful manner so as to cause injury to another; an unauthorized entry upon another’s land. Trial court The level of any court system that initially resolves the dispute of litigants. Frequently, but not always, a jury serves as a fact-finding body, while the judge issues rulings on the applicable law. Triple damages (or treble damages) An award of dam- ages allowable under some statutes equal to three times the amount found by the jury to be a single recovery. Trustee One who holds legal title to property for the benefit of another. Tying contract A contract that ties the sale of one piece of property (real or personal) to the sale or lease of another item of property. Underwriter The party that, in securities law, guarantees the issuer that the securities offered for sale will be sold. undue influence A defense to contract enforcement available when one is taken advantage of unfairly by a party who misuses a position of relationship or legal confidence. Unenforceable contract A contract that cannot be enforced in court. Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) The most suc- cessful attempt to have states adopt a uniform law. This code’s purpose is to simplify, clarify, and modernize the laws governing commercial transactions. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) The act that protects the rights of individuals who voluntarily or involuntarily leave employ- ment positions to undertake military service. Unilateral contract A contract in which the promisor does not receive a promise as consideration; an agree- ment whereby one makes a promise to do, or refrain from doing, something in return for a performance, not a promise. Unilateral mistake Arises when only one of the parties to a contract is wrong about a material fact. It is not usu- ally a basis for rescinding a contract. Union security clause The contractual provision that creates a union shop agreement. This clause requires any person hired as an employee to join the union repre- senting the employees. Union shop This term applies, in labor law, to an agreement by management and labor that all employ- ees of a business will be or become union members. Union shops are not allowed in states with right-to-work laws. United Nations The principal political organization of the world.
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United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) An agreement reached in 1993 among the United States, Mexico, and Canada to increase economic growth through mutual trade. Unreasonable search and seizure A violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution that occurs when a valid search warrant is not obtained or when the scope of a valid warrant is exceeded. Utilitarianism A form of consequentialist ethics. Utility patent A property right awarded for a new and nonobvious process, machine, or composition of matter that has a useful function. Valid contract A contract that contains all of the proper elements of a contract. Verdict Findings of fact by the jury. Vertical merger A merger of corporations where one corporation is the supplier of the other. Vertical price fixing An agreement between a seller and a buyer (e.g., between a manufacturer and a retailer) to fix the resale price at which the buyer will sell goods. Vertical restraint An restrictive agreement between parties in the supply or distribution chain, such as between a manufacturer and retailer. Vertical territorial agreement Arrangement between a supplier and its customers with respect to the geo- graphical area in which each customer will be allowed to sell that supplier’s products. This type of agreement is analyzed under the rule of reason to determine whether it violates the Sherman Act. Limitations on intrabrand competition may be permitted if there is a corresponding increase in interbrand competition. Void contract A contract that is empty, having no legal force; ineffectual, unenforceable. Voidable contract Capable of being declared a nullity, though otherwise valid. Voir dire The preliminary examination of prospective jurors for the purpose of ascertaining bias or interest in the lawsuit. Voluntary arbitration A method of resolving a dispute, as an alternative to litigation, that the parties agree to utilize. This agreement may be made before or after a dispute arises. Voluntary bargaining issue Either party may refuse to bargain in good faith regarding matters other than wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment. This refusal does not constitute an unfair labor
practice. An issue over which parties may bargain if they choose to do so. Wagner Act The federal law passed in 1935 that recognizes employees’ rights to organize. This law also created the National Labor Relations Board and defined unfair labor practices by management. It is formally known as the National Labor Relations Act. Waiting period As it relates to an initial public offering of securities, this is the period of time that follows the fil- ing of documents with the SEC and that precedes when the securities can be sold. Unless the SEC objects and extends this period of time, the waiting period lasts only 20 days. Waiver An express or implied relinquishment of a right. WARN Act The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Noti- fication Act of 1989; this law requires employers to give notice of plant closings and mass layoffs. White-collar crime Violations of the law by business organizations or by individuals in a business-related capacity. Willful and wanton negligence Extremely unreason- able behavior that causes injury. Willfully With intent to defraud or deceive. Wire fraud The use of radio, television, telephone, Internet, or other wired forms of communication to con- duct fraudulent activities with the intent to deprive an owner of property. Workers’ compensation A plan for the compensation for occupational diseases, accidental injuries, and deaths of employees that arise out of employment. Compensa- tion includes medical expenses and burial costs and lost earnings based on the size of the family and the wage rate of the employee. World Bank The world’s principal financial institution. World Trade Organization (WTO) Mechanism for enforcing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that allows GATT member countries to bring complaints and seek redress. Writ of certiorari A discretionary proceeding by which an appellate court may review the ruling of an inferior tribunal. Yellow-dog contract An agreement in which a worker agrees not to join a union and that discharge will result from a breach of the contract. Zoning ordinance Laws that limit land use based usu- ally on residential, commercial, or industrial designations.
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A Abandonment, 504, 586 Abercrombie & Fitch, 627 Abortions, 633 Accenture, 540 Acceptance of offers, 236–240 Accession, 207 Accessories to crime, 408 Accommodating behavior, 121 Accord and satisfaction, 241 Accountant codes of conduct, 45 Accounting fraud. see also Fraud
business cultures supporting, 55 criminal liability, 357, 392–393, 533–534
Accounting reforms, 540 Acquisitions, 502–503. see also Mergers Acts, legislative, 15 Acts of God, 203 Actual authority, 437 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 643 Adams, John, 1, 62 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 639–640 Adelphia, 511 Adjustable-rate mortgages, 573 Adjustment of debts, 576 Adler, Mortimer, 49 Administrative agencies
common criticisms, 470–471 created under Dodd-Frank, 543–544 false statements to, 402–403 influencing decisions of, 461–462 judicial review of decisions, 461–470 major functions, 455–457 overview of role, 452 rationale for, 452–455
Administrative law, 13, 15 Administrative law judges, 459, 464 Administrative Procedures Act, 463 Admissibility of evidence in arbitration, 136 Admissions, requests for, 98 Advance fee schemes, 394 Advancement, 52 Adverse actions based on credit reports, 570–571 Adverse possession, 206–207 Advertising
corrective, 554 deceptive, 554–564 pharmaceuticals, 170 tobacco, 170
Advisory councils, 458
Advisory function of administrative agencies, 456 Advisory opinions, 553 Affidavits, 100 Affirmative action programs, 638–640 Affirmative defenses, 300 Affordable Care Act, 56, 162 After-acquired property, 211 Age Discrimination in Employment Act
arbitration agreements and, 134–135 employee discharge provisions, 673 major provisions, 640, 642, 649
Agency law, 42, 435–438 Aggrieved parties, 462 Agnew, Spiro, 384 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 347, 365 Agreements not to sue, 241 Agricultural pollution, 596, 598, 600, 608 Aiding and abetting, 408 AIG, 511 Air conditioning systems, 610 Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATPCO), 482 Air pollution, 589–594 Airport searches, 387 Air rights, 195 AJM Packaging Corporation, 564 Akerman, Nick, 273n Aktiengesellschaft, 372 Alcohol consumption, 298 Alcohol testing, 387 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 134 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 326–327 Alien corporations, 423 Alien Tort Statute, 373–375 Alito, J, 78 Alito, Samuel, 77, 78, 80, 162, 166, 388, 440, 625, 660 Allen v. Cooper, 342 Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers, 698 Alli v. U.S., 427–428 All-public panel of arbitrators, 128 Almasy, Steve, 170 Al Minor & Associates, Inc. v. Martin, 319–320 Alter-ego theory, 427 Alternative dispute resolution systems
arbitration basics, 127–133 federal policies, 133–137 focus groups, 126–127
Alternative fuel cars, 590 Alternatives to negotiation, 124 Amazon.com, 30, 331, 490 Amazon Watch, 376
index
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Amendments to Constitution, 152, 160 American Airlines, 482–484 American Arbitration Association, 129, 145 American Bar Association, 65 American Express, 636 American Express, Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 136 American Home Products, 303 American Institute of Architects, 485 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code
of Professional Conduct, 45 American Marketing Association, 44, 45
ethics, 44 American Medical Response of Connecticut, 699 American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,
487–489 Americans with Disabilities Act, 376, 643–646, 650 Analogy, rule of, 81 Anderson, Pamela, 377 Animal cruelty depictions, 167 Annual percentage rates, 572 Answers, 96 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act of 1999, 339 Antideficiency judgment statutes, 210 Antidiscrimination laws, 10 Antiretaliation suits, 660–662 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act
of 2004, 494 Antitrust law
basic purpose, 10 Clayton Act, 479, 498–499, 687–688 European Union, 505 exemptions from, 495–497 Federal Trade Commission Act, 479, 503–505 monopoly prohibitions, 490 origins, 473, 478–479 price fixing prohibitions, 382, 479, 482–485 principles for applying, 481, 494 recent fines for violation, 477 restraint of trade under, 478–489 sanctions under, 494–495 territorial agreements and concerted activities under,
486–489 Antoninetti, Maurizio, 645 AOL TimeWarner, 94 Apparent authority, 437 Appeals, 67, 110–112, 709–710 Appearance requirements, 638 Appelbaum, Binyamin, 472 Appellants, 110, 709 Appellate courts
basic role in court system, 66 federal, 69 procedures, 111–112 state, 67
Appellees, 110, 709 Apple Inc., 93, 333, 490 Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 491–493 App Store, 491–492 Arbitration
current trends, 128 employment discrimination, 649–650 federal policies, 133–137 international, 376–377 judicial review of, 137–142 main features, 129–133 mandatory, 128, 133–137, 138, 142 overview, 127–128 voluntary or contractual, 129, 137, 142
Arbitration clauses, 128–130, 134 Arbitration law, 141 Arbitrator.com, 129 Arbitrators, 127, 128 Arcana, Richard, 92 Archer Daniels Midland, 485 Arendt, Hannah, 48 Aristotle, 11 Arizona Daily Star, 701 Armstrong, Lance, 377 Art and obscenity, 163 Arthur Andersen, 45, 540 Articles of Confederation, 151 Articles of incorporation, 423 Articles of organization, 433 Articles of partnership, 421 Artificial intelligence (AI), 29, 325 Artisan’s liens, 212 Asarco, 608 Ash, Anthony, 624 Ashcroft, John, 158 Assault, 19 Assault and battery, 284–285 Assignee, 276 Assignment, 276 Assignor, 276 Assumed-name statutes, 421 Assumption of risk, 301, 301–302, 675 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, 603 Atkins, Paul S., 534 Atlanta Ballet, 669 Atlantic Richfield v. Christian, 605 AT&T, 43, 138 Attachment, 211 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 138n, 245n Attorney-client privilege, 66 AT&T Tech., Inc., 130 At-will employment doctrine, 672–674 Audits, 114, 540 Avoiding behavior, 121 Awards in arbitration, 132–133, 137
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B Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter, 597 Bad faith, 42 Bailees, 200–203 Bailments, 200–204 Bailors, 200–203 Balancing test, 42 Ball, Danny R., 273 Ball, Larry J., 273 Ball, Larry M., 273 Ball, Mary H., 273 Bank of America, 88, 126, 407, 511 Bankruptcies, 88
fraudulent, 399 impact on retirement plans, 671 proceedings, 576
Bankruptcy Act, 153 Banks
false statements to, 402 as foreign sales intermediaries,
370–371 regulation, 154
Barclays PLC, 485 Barrett, Devlin, 88n Barrie, Dennis, 163 Bartz, Diane, 456 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 535–536 Baskin-Robbins, 501 Batson v. Kentucky, 103 Battery, 19, 284–285 Bayer, 337 Beards, 638 Beneficiaries, 275–276 Benefit corporation, 439 Benkler, Yochai, 316n Ben-Shahar, Omri, 245n Bentham, Jeremy, 12, 37 Berman v. Parker, 174–175 Berne Convention, 340, 347 Best available technology standard, 596 Best practicable technology standard, 596 Bextra, 126 Beyond reasonable doubt, 107 Bhopal accident, 373 Bias
of arbitrators, 129 excusing prospective jurors for, 103 of juries, 126 potential in state courts, 69
Bierce, Ambrose, 51 Bigelow, Lyda, 649 Big Tech, 490 Bilateral contracts, 227, 228, 237, 240
Bill of Rights. see also Constitution (U.S.); First Amendment rights applicable to states, 177 basic purpose, 160–161 Fifth Amendment rights, 389–391 First Amendment rights, 161–170 formalism in, 35 Fourth Amendment rights, 386–389 full text, 718 protections in criminal proceedings, 386–392 Second Amendment rights, 171–172 Sixth Amendment rights, 391–392 Tenth Amendment, 152
Bills of lading, 371 Bishara, Norman, 247n Biskupic, Joan, 109 Black, Hugo, 478 Black, Jeremiah, 65 Blackstone, William, 175 Bloom, Katia, 9 Blue sky laws, 512, 538–539 Blurring, trademark dilution, 339 Boards of directors, 20 Boeing, 46, 401 Boeing Satellite Systems, 361 Boeing’s 737 MAX aircraft, 47 Boggs, John, 195 Boggs v. Merideth, 195, 195n Boletín Círculo, 55 Bona fide occupational qualifications, 618,
619, 630, 643 Bonds, Barry, 205, 401 Borden Inc., 485 Border fence, 588 Bosely v. Andrews, 16 Bose, Nandita, 456 Boundaries, 207 Bower, Tim, 633 Boycotts, 164, 704–705 Bradsher, Keith, 318 Brady, Maureen E., 214 Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 304 Brainstorming, 124, 144 Branch, Kenneth, 401 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 162 Brands, trademarks versus, 333 Branham, Jesse, 304–305 Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 304–305 Breach of contract, 18, 271–274
damages, 271–272 equitable remedies, 273–274
Break times, 660 Bretton Woods conference, 365 Breyer, Stephen, 80, 162, 167, 172, 390, 625, 635, 660 Bribery, 355–357, 408–409
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Bridgestone, 373 Bridgestone/Firestone, 42 Briefs, 111 Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production Co., 196–197 British Petroleum, 300 Broadcast censorship, 464 Broadcom, 111 Brogan v. United States, 403 Brooklyn Museum, 163 Brown & Bryant, Inc., 603–605 Brown, Peter, 236n Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,
167–168 Brow, Robbie, 322n Brunetti, Erik, 78 Bryant, Paul, 291 BSA Corporation, 427–428 Bubble concept, 591 Buck, Linda, 668 Budget Rent-A-Car, 497 Burden of proof, 107–109, 291 Bureau of Consumer Protection, 553–556 Burger King, 296–297 Burglary, 403 Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United
States, 603–605 Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 622 Burroughs, Callum, 14 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 162, 442 Bush, George W., 41, 307, 700 Businesses’ religious conscience, 56 Business ethics, 28–32, 40 Business judgment rule, 439 Business necessity defense, 620–621 Business Roundtable, 27, 28, 46, 50 Business torts, 293 Butler, Stephen, 48, 53 Butts, Wallace, 291 Buy and sell agreements, 422, 426 Buyer in the ordinary course of business, 212
C California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), 561 California Court of Appeals, 261 California spotted owl, 587 Calvin Klein, 293 Cameras in courtroom, 109 Campbell, Mikey, 93 Campbell Soup, 501 Cancer, pesticides and, 598 Capacity to contract, 244–245 Cap and trade principle, 591
Capital formation, 191–192 Cardozo, Benjamin, 81–82 Cards, union certification via, 694 Care, duty of, 203, 295–297 Careless assignor, 277 Cargo containers, state tax on, 155 Carnegie, Andrew, 478 Carolinas, Inc., 201–202 Carothers, Thomas, 7 Carpenter v. United States, 557–558 Carter Land Surveyors & Planners, Inc., 201 Case briefing system, 709–710 Case law, 15–17 Caseria, Leo, 136n Casta, Nicole, 664n Castro, Jose, 694 Categorical imperative, 35 Cathy, Dan, 56 Cat’s paw theory, 667, 669 Caucuses, in mediation, 144 Causation in fact, 299 Cause of action, failure to state, 100 Causey, Richard, 396 CBS, 164 Cease-and-desist orders, 456, 504, 554 Ceglia, Paul, 92 Cell-site location information (CSLI), 557–558 Censorship by FCC, 163, 464 Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement, 362 Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 534n CEOs, 649 Certificates of limited partnership, 430–431 Certification marks, 332 Certification of unions, 693–694 Certified public accountants, 45 Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 664 Chairperson, 457 Chairpersons, agency, 457 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 154, 679 Change to Win Coalition, 686 Chan, Sewell, 144 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 162 Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 576 Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 576 Charters for corporations, 423 Chase, 511 Cheney, Dick, 401 Chevron, 373, 376 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 466 Chick-fil-A (restaurant chain), 56 Chief executive officers, 649
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Chief Justice, appointment of, 73 Chief trust officer, 29 Child pornography, 163 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 560 Chipotle Mexican Grill, 645 Chiquita Brands International, 372 Chlorpyrifos, 598 C.H. Robinson, 633 Chrysler, 636 Churches, 161 Cicero, 11 Cigarette warning labels, 170 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 649 Cisco Systems, 43, 362 Citations, 15 Citicorp, 126, 485 Cities, laws of, 15 Citizen enforcement provisions, 606–607 Citizenship, 44 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 56, 442 Citizen Works, 31 City of Ontario v. Quon, 674 Civil law, 12–13 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 618, 641 Civil Rights Act of 1964
ethical commitments from, 41 general provisions and enforcement, 618–621 importance, 617, 618 national origin discrimination, 627 racial discrimination under, 623–627 religious discrimination under, 628–629 sex discrimination under, 629–636
Civil trials, burden of proof in, 108–109 Clarke County School District v. Breeden, 631 Class-action suits
arbitration versus, 137 defined, 88 proposed tort reforms regarding, 303 requirements for, 92–95 securities fraud, 527, 532, 538
Classified documents, publication, 171 Clayton Act, 479, 491, 498–500, 687–688 Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 304 Clean Air Act, 589–594, 673 Clean-vehicle Projects, 93 Clean Water Act, 154, 595–596, 673 Clear and convincing proof, 108 Clear Channel Communications, 164 Clinton, Bill, 663 Closed shops, 701 Closely held organizations, 416, 426 Coaches, 291 Coal burning, 589 Coal mine explosion, 403
Coca-Cola, 322, 333, 335, 636 Code of Conduct, of Google, 29 Code of Hammurabi, 7 Codes, legislative, 15 Codes of conduct, 362 Codes of ethics, 32, 36, 43–47 Coercion by unions, 703–704 Cognizant, 29 Coleman, Daniel, 665 Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 665 Colgate doctrine, 438 Collaboration, 121 Collateral, 211 Collateral promises, 250–251 Collection agencies, 574–575 Collective bargaining
arbitration in, 129, 130 elements of, 686–687 employer refusal, 696–697 right of, 690
Collective marks, 332 Color, discrimination based on, 623–626 Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, 50 Commerce clause, 155–157 Commerce Department (U.S.), 360 Commercial impracticability, 270 Commercial speech, 169–170 Commission (EU), 366 Commissions, illegal, 498–499 Commitment in negotiations, 124 Common carriers, 203, 305 Common good, 48, 217–218 Common law, 13, 227 Common-law privacy torts, 559 Common property, 9, 190 Communications
constitutional freedoms, 162–170, 442, 700–701
importance to negotiation, 123 by jurors, 103 openness in, 53–54 privileged, 291
Communism, 190 Compaq Computer Corporation, 43 Comparable worth theory, 635 Comparative responsibility, 300 Compelling state purpose, 178 Compensation
as incentive for risk-taking, 21 just, 194
Compensatory damages for breach of contract, 271 for discrimination, 619 purpose, 18, 307
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Competition. see also Antitrust law government promotion of, 478–479 in negotiations, 121 regulation as substitute, 454 role of intellectual property, 315–316 unfair, 503–505
Complaints, 66–67, 95 Complete performance, 266 Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 603 Compromise, 121–122. see also Negotiation Compulsory bargaining issues, 697–699 Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, 323 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 273 Computers, ethical use, 38 Concealment, 292, 399 Concerted activities, 487–490, 695 Concurrent conditions, 264 Concurrent ownership, 199 Condition precedent, 263–265 Condition subsequent, 263–265 Confidentiality, 42–43, 66, 321 Confirming banks, 371 Conflict-free mineral supply chain, 55 Conflicts
disputes versus, 120 of law, 16–17
Conflicts of interest, 43 Confusion, acquiring property by, 207 Conglomerate mergers, 502 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 418 Consent orders, 456, 470, 554 Consequential damages, 18, 271 Consequentialism, 37–40 Conservatives, judicial, 77 Consideration, 234–235, 240–244 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 671 Conspiracy. see also Antitrust law
elements of, 399–400 to restrain trade, 478, 479
Constitution (U.S.). see also Bill of Rights activist view, 76–77 basis for federal question cases, 69 intellectual property support, 315, 323, 347 protections in criminal proceedings, 385–392 regulatory process under, 452
Constitutional Accountability Center, 75 Constitutional law, 13 Constitutional relativity, 16 Constitutions, 15 Constructive delivery, 208 Consulting services, 64, 540 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 673 Consumer data, protection for, 204
Consumer debt, 574 Consumer expectations test, 304 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 457,
567–568, 575 Consumer privacy, 556–563 Consumer Product Safety Act, 578 Consumer Product Safety Commission, 454, 458, 578 Consumer protection
in bankruptcy, 576 credit-granting regulations, 567–574 in debt collection, 574–578 FTC role, 553–556 privacy protections as, 556–566 selected federal laws, 577–579
Contemporary Arts Center, 163 Contingency fees, 88 Continuity of businesses
corporations, 423–425 LLCs, 433 partnerships, 421, 421–422 proprietorships, 420 as selection factor, 417
Contract Clause, 156–157 due process and equal protection under, 176–180 full text, 714–722 overview, 151–153, 156–157 separation of powers, 153 Supremacy Clause, 153–154
Contract law basic concepts, 226–227 basic purpose, 9, 13 sanctions under, 18–19
Contracts arbitration clauses, 128, 130 assignment and delegation of, 276–278 basic concepts, 226–227 conflicts of law and, 16–17 constitutional protection, 156–157 creating, 234–249, 277–278 defined, 193 forms, 249–253 importance to property systems, 204–206 international, 368 interpretation, 260–261 land sales, 210 performance issues, 261–271 in restraint of trade, 478–479 social, 36 terminology of, 227–234 tortious interference with, 294
Contributory negligence, 300–301, 675 Control
of corporations, 425–426 as factor in selecting business form, 416–417
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of LLCs, 433–434 in partnerships, 422
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 158 Controlling persons, 515 Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 362,
364, 367 Conventions, international, 363 Conversion, 19, 290 Cook v. Sullivan, 215–216 Cooling-off periods, 700 Cooper, Christopher R., 230 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls, 359 Coordination, registration by, 538 Copyright Act of 1976, 340 Copyright Office (U.S.), 342 Copyrights, 217, 339–346 Copyright Term Extension Act, 341 Cordray, Richard, 457 Corporate codes of conduct, 362 Corporate governance, 610–611
basic purpose, 9 directors’ role, 425–426 elements of, 20–21, 214 failures of, 20–21, 52 Sarbanes-Oxley impact on, 540
Corporate personhood, 442 Corporate social responsibility (CSR), 22 Corporate tax, 418 Corporations
as business forms, 416, 423–430 capitalization, 192 citizenship issues, 69 criminal sanctions against, 382, 409–410 defamation of, 290–291 defined, 20 ethical challenges within, 50–56 free speech rights, 164 growth in U.S., 50 lack of Fifth Amendment protections, 389–390 non-profit, 434–435 sales volume of largest, 54–55 subchapter S, 432
Corrective advertising, 554 Corruption, 140 Corruption Perceptions Index, 356 Cost-benefit analysis, 471 Cost justification defense, 499 Costs of mediation, 143 Costs of regulation, 471 Coughlin, Thomas M., 397 Council of Ministers (EU), 366 Council on Environmental Quality, 586 Counterclaims, 88, 96
Counterdefendants, 89 Counterfeiting, 338, 398, 405 Counteroffers, 236 Counterplaintiffs, 89 Counties, laws of, 15 Countrywide Financial, 292 County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 595 County of Washington v. Gunther, 635 Course of dealing, 237 Court-annexed mediation, 142, 144 Court of Justice (EU), 367 Courts of appeal, 67, 69, 70 Court systems
civil versus criminal procedures, 13–14 judicial review, 73–82 organization in U.S., 66–73 personnel, 62–65
Covenants not to compete, 246 COVID-19 pandemic, 72, 245, 353,355, 383, 442, 562
force majeure and, 268 Cowley, Stacy, 6 Cracker Barrel, 336–337, 632 Creation of businesses, 417 Credentials, discrimination and, 624 Credit card theft, 407 Creditor beneficiary, 276 Creditor priority, 576–577 Creditors, infliction of mental distress by, 286 Credit regulations, 567–574 Credit reporting agencies, 570 Credit Suisse Securities LLC v. Billing, 497n Credit unions, 402 Crimes. see also Fraud
aiding and abetting, 408 antitrust violations as, 494–495 bribery and kickbacks, 408–409 conspiracy, 399–400 cyber, 406 defined, 381 endangering workers, 406–407 fraud, 392–399 involving trade secrets, 322–323 larceny, 403–404 major types and concepts, 384 obstruction of justice and false statements, 400–403 RICO offenses, 404–406 sentencing guidelines, 409–410 torts versus, 293 trends, 410
Criminal courts burden of proof in, 107 grand juries, 384–386 jurisdiction of, 92 sentencing guidelines, 409–410
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Criminal law basic purpose, 9, 13, 382–383 constitutional issues, 386–392 grand juries, 384–386 sanctions under, 18 sentencing guidelines, 409–410 trends in, 410
Criminal liability, 357, 533–534 Critical habitats of species, 597 Crowd control guidelines, 670 Crowdfunding, 546 Crude film, 376 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 291 Custom, international, 363 Cyber crime, 406
D Daimler, 356, 358 Damages. see also Punitive damages
for antitrust violations, 495 for breach of contract, 18–19, 271–272 in discrimination cases, 619–620, 641 for equal credit violations, 568 for fair credit reporting violations, 570–571 in tort law, 19, 306–308
Darrow, Clarence, 687 Data analytics and litigation, 98 Data analytics tools, 98 Data Protection Directive, 562 Davies, Margaret, 188 Death squads, 372 Debt
bankruptcy and, 399, 576–577, 671 collection laws, 574–578 credit regulations, 567–571 discharge, 577 unlawful, 404 unlimited liability for, 422
Debt collectors, infliction of mental distress by, 286 Deceased partners, 422 Deception, 553, 554, 564 Deceptive advertising, 248, 554–555, 564 Decrees, enforcing, 112–113 Deeds defined, 209 Deeds of trust, 210 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 126 Defamation, 170, 290–292 Default orders, 96 Defeasible ownership, 198 Defective products, 302–305 Defendants, 88, 91 Defense Department (U.S.), 360
Defenses to defamation, 291 in employment discrimination cases, 620, 632, 643 to fraud, 395 to negligence, 300–302, 676 to price discrimination, 499 to price fixing, 484 to product liability, 303 to securities violations, 518, 519, 532 to trademark infringement, 335, 338
Defibrillators, 292 Deficiency balances, 210 Delays in agency decisions, 463 Delegation of quasi-legislative authority, 463 Deliberateness of monopolization, 493 Delivery, 264–265 Del Monte, 373 Delta Airlines, 671 Democratic Republic of Congo, 55 Denny’s restaurants, 641 De novo judicial review, 139 Department of Health and Human Services, 162 Department of Housing and Urban Development (U.S.),
427–428 Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 586 Deposited acceptance rule, 239 Depositions, 98 Depression, 667 Derivative suits, 426 Derogatory remarks, 628 Desegregation, 76 Design defects, 302 Design patents, 324 de Soto, Hernando, 192 Destination contracts, 265 Deutsche Bank, 6, 88 Dial-up law in a broadband world, 560 Diamond, Sidney A., 332n Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 325 Dickinson, John, 213 Dicta, 16 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 345–346 Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 545 Dilution of trademarks, 339 Dimon, Jamie, 6 Directed verdicts, 106 Direct foreign investment, 372–373 Director of operations (agency), 459 Directors
basic role in corporations, 20 growing shareholder influence with, 434 larceny by, 403–404
Disability, discrimination based on, 643–646 Disaffirmation, 244
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Discharge, 261, 577 Disclosures, securities, 514 Discovery
for arbitration, 136 misconduct during, 111 scope, 98–99 steps in, 96–97
Discrimination. see also Employment laws; Labor laws age-based, 642–643 Civil Rights Act (1964) overview, 621–622 current trends, 649–650 against disabled workers, 643–646 genetic, 646–647 in granting credit, 567–568 health insurance and, 646–647 in hiring and employment rules, 637–640 in jury selection, 104 mental distress from, 286 national origin, 628 price, 498–499 race or color, 623–627, 641 religious, 628–629 sex, 41, 102–104, 567–568, 629–636 state laws, 620, 648 as unfair labor practice, 647, 696, 703–704
Dishonest assignor, 277 Disney, 335 Disparagement, 293 Disparate impact
in age discrimination, 642 elements of, 620–621 of employment tests, 625–626, 637 racial examples, 621
Disparate treatment, 620, 625–626, 642 Dispute resolution
arbitration basics, 127–130 federal policies, 133–137 focus groups, 126–127 in international commerce, 373–377 judicial review of, 137–142, 145 mandatory arbitration, 128, 133–137, 137–140, 142 by mediation, 142–145 options for, 125 voluntary arbitration, 127, 137, 142
Disputes, 120 Dissents, 710 Dissolutions, 417, 421–422 Distress, 286 District attorneys, 384 District courts (federal), 69 District of Columbia v. Heller, 171n Diversity of citizenship, 69 Diversity of ethical values, 30 Dividends, 429–430
Divisibility of performance, 267 Divisibility of property ownership, 192 Document abuse, 678 Documents, requesting in discovery, 98 Dodd-Frank Act, 457
major provisions, 439, 513, 543 reliance on administrative agencies, 543–544
Dolan v. Postal Service, 661 Domain names, 339, 377 Domestic corporations, 423 Domestic partner benefits, 636 Dominating labor organizations, 696 Donaldson, Thomas, 36 Donee beneficiaries, 276 Donziger, Steven, 376 Dormant commerce clause concept, 157 Dorsey & Whitney, 530 Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 702 Double jeopardy, 390 Double taxation, 429, 432 Dow Chemical, 603 Dram shop acts, 305 Drones, attack, 195 Drug regulations, 578 Drug testing, 387, 675 Drummond Company, 373 Due care, 42 Due diligence, 42, 519, 605 Due Process Clause, 176, 177 Due process of law, 73 Due process requirements, 91, 176–177 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 201 Duke Energy Carolinas v. Gray, 201–202 Dumpster diving, 397 Duration limitations on property, 217 Dursban, 598 Duties
with bailments, 203–204 of care, 203, 295–297 ethics based on, 35 of performance, 261
Dyncorp, 373
E Easements, 199–200 East Capitol View Community Development Corp. v.
Robinson, 269–270 Ebbers, Bernard, 52, 385 Economic Espionage Act, 322 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer
Protection Act, 571 Economic interdependence, 30–31
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Ecosystem loss, 609 Efficient breach, 275 Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp.,
287–288 Eighteenth Amendment, 152 Eighty-day cooling-off period, 700 Eisenberg, Theodore, 425n Eisenhower, Dwight D., 8 Elections, union, 693–694 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 560–561,
657, 675 Electronic contracts, 252 Electronic data, 98 Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 578 Electronic privacy protection, 560–561 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act, 252 Electronic surveillance, 386 Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity, 393 Eli Lilly, 126 Elonis v. United States, 169n E-mail, 111, 112 Embezzlement, 403 Eminem, 377 Eminent domain, 172, 194, 359 Emissions reduction banking, 591–592 Emotional distress, 286 Employee handbooks, 672 Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 675 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 670, 673 Employees. see also Employment laws
competition, 247 criminal conduct by, 382 endangering, 406–407 illegal alien, 678–679, 694 larceny by, 403–404 mass layoffs, 662–663 private lawsuits, 649, 679–680 protecting trade secrets from, 321 workers’ compensation for, 675–679
Employers, liability of, 299, 676 Employment agencies, 618–619 Employment-at-will doctrine, 672–674 Employment conditions, discriminatory, 623 Employment Eligibility Verification forms, 678–679 Employment exams, 625–626 Employment laws. see also Discrimination; Labor laws
at-will employment limits, 672–674 employee eligibility, 678–679 employee lawsuits and, 649–650, 679–680 Family and Medical Leave Act, 663–666 on pension and health plans, 671 on plant closings and mass layoffs, 662–663 safety, 669–670
wages and hours, 656–661 worker privacy, 674–678
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, 636 Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 657 Endangered Species Act, 596–597 Endangering workers, 406–407 Enforceable contracts, 233 Enforcement. see also Penalties; Remedies
of contracts, 233 importance to social order, 9 of property ownership, 188–189
Enough Project, 55 Enron, 45, 94, 126, 382, 395–396, 400, 410, 439, 533,
539, 540, 542 Entrepreneurs, 68 Environmental assessments, 586 Environmental impact statements, 586–588 Environmental law, 10 Environmental protection
air pollution, 589–594 endangered species, 596–597 federal government role, 585–588 hazardous waste disposal, 600–606 overview, 583–584 pesticide control, 597–598 private suits for, 607–608 solid waste disposal, 599–600 sustainability approaches, 608–612 water pollution, 594–596
Environmental Protection Agency, 473. see also Environmental protection importance of rulings, 15 issues leading to creation, 454, 473 major functions, 454, 589
Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 593–594
Environmental, social and governance (ESG), 439 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 141 Epstein, Richard, 222 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 553, 567 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 473.
see also Discrimination arbitration agreements and, 136 major functions, 453, 473, 619 types of complaints received, 621 work/family balance suggestions, 664
Equal Pay Act, 635–636 Equal Protection Clause, 104, 176–180 Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 535–536 Ericsson, 358 Establishment Clause, 161 Estates, defined, 198 Ethical Norms and Values for
Marketers, 44
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Ethics basic connection to law, 28–29 codifying, 43–47 corporate codes of conduct, 362 current concerns, 28–31 implementing in businesses, 50–56 individual values, 48–49 as legal requirements, 40–43 modern ethical challenges in innovation and
technology, 29–30 nature of, 32–34 rewards of upholding, 54–55 standard-setting as price fixing, 484 systems of, 35–40
Ethics & Compliance Initiative, 29 Ethics & Compliance Officers Association, 53 Ethics officers, 29 Ethnic slurs, 628 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 562 European Union, 366–367, 367n, 505 E-Verify system, 679 Evidence
administrative agencies’ decisions on, 469 appealing rulings on, 113 in arbitration, 137 presentation at trial, 106 searches for, 386–387
Examinations, employment, 625–626 Exchange, 204 Exclusionary right of property, 9, 183, 189 Exclusive dealing contracts, 501 Exclusive remedy rule, 677–678 Exculpatory no exception, 402–403 Executed contracts, 233 Execution of judgments, 113 Executive director for administration (agency), 458 Executive Orders, 690 Executory contracts, 233 Exemplary damages, 19, 307 Exemptions from blue sky laws, 538–539 Exhaustion of remedies, 468 Exigent circumstances, 386, 387 Expectations of privacy, 387 Expense accounts, 429 Experts, arbitrators as, 130 Experts in administrative agencies, 454 Export Administration Act, 360 Export controls, 359–361 Export Enforcement Coordination Center, 360 Express claims, 564 Express conditions, 264 Express contracts, 229 Expropriation, 359 Extradition, 92
Exxon, 298, 331 ExxonMobil, 373
F Facebook, 28–29, 38, 92, 103, 315, 331, 490, 559,
562, 674, 691–692, 699 Facial hair, 638 Failure to disclose, 292 Failure to state a cause of action, 100 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACT), 571 Fair Credit Billing Act, 578 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 545, 553, 559, 569–571, 575 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 553, 559, 574–575 Fairfield Greenwich Advisors, 393 Fair Labor Standards Act, 656–661, 673 Fairness, 44, 46, 69 Fair representation duty, 702–703 Fair use, 338, 345 Fajardo, Pablo, 376 “Fake news,” criticism, 38 False advertising, 563–566 False arrest, 289 False Claims Act, 398, 398n False imprisonment, 289 False statements, 402–403 Families, decline of ethics in, 30 Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), 672 Family and Medical Leave Act, 663–666 Family Medical Leave Act, 665–666 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 467 Fastow, Andrew, 400 FBI Sports Bribery Program, 408 Feaheny, Thomas, 304 Featherbedding, 704 Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 462 Federal Arbitration Act, 129, 131, 133, 137, 138,
140–141, 245, 297, 649–650 Federal Aviation Administration, 453, 624 Federal Communications Commission
discrimination prohibitions, 647–648 major functions, 453 penalties imposed by, 163 power to restrict speech, 163, 464 state law preemption, 154
Federal courts, 67–71, 94 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 453 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 598 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 578 Federal government’s authority, business regulation of
foreign commerce, 155 interstate commerce, 155–156 limitation, 156
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Federal Guidelines for Sentencing for Criminal Convictions, 42
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, 598
Federalism, 153 Federalism and state rights under commerce clause, 158 Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 145, 700 Federal Pesticide Acts, 598 Federal question cases, 69, 72 Federal Register, 472 Federal Reserve Board, 453, 454 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on class-action suits, 105 as court procedure guide, 69 on discovery, 99 on frivolous cases, 100–102
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 28–29, 93, 248, 473 authority delegated to, 463 credit-granting regulation enforcement, 567–574 major functions, 453, 553–556 origins, 473, 479 politics and, 555–556 price discrimination oversight, 498–499
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 479, 503–504, 553, 575
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 339 FedEx Corporation, 638 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., 340 Fellow-servant rule, 676 Felonies, 384. see also Crimes Female CEOs, 649 Fiduciary duties in LLCs, 433 Fifth Amendment, 172, 389–391, 402 Fighting words, 162 File-sharing programs, 345 Finance charges, 572, 573 Financial crisis and high legal costs, 88 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 97, 127 Financial Stability Oversight Council, 545 Financial statements, 534, 542 Financing statements, 211, 572 Fines, 357, 554. see also Penalties Fintech, 204 Firearm possession, 171 Firefighters, 625 Fireman’s Fund Home Insurance Co., 485 Firm offers, 243 Firms, 556 First Amendment rights
defamation and, 291–292 press freedom, 170–171 religious freedom, 162 speech freedoms, 162–168, 442
First possession, rule of, 205 Fish and Wildlife Services, 597 Fisher, Roger, 123 Fisk, Margaret Cronin, 532 “Fixing” sporting events, 408 Fixtures, 198 Flagging system, 38 Flexibility in contract law, 227 Flitter, Emily, 6 Focus groups, 126–127 Food and Drug Administration, 170, 453, 462, 465–466 Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation, 465–466 Football coaches, 291 Force majeure clause, 267–268 Ford Motor Company, 42, 303–304, 332, 335,
338, 636, 698 Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 698 Foreclosure, 210, 275 Foreign commerce, 375. see also Trade Foreign commerce regulation, 155 Foreign corporations, 423 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 355–357 Foreign subsidiaries, 372 Foreseeable risk, 300 Forest Service (U.S.), 586–588 Forgues, Chantalle R., 98 Formalism, 35–36, 39–40 Fourteenth Amendment
applied to jury selection, 104 basic purpose, 152 due process provision, 18, 91, 176 equal protection provision, 104, 177–180
Fourth Amendment, 386–389 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 72 Franchising, 371, 501 Francis v. Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 522–523 Fraud
in arbitration, 140 business examples, 383, 385 criminal types, 392–399, 405 as intentional tort, 292 securities laws against, 518, 521–529 voidable contracts with, 233
Freedom of religion, 73 Freedom of speech, 73 Free Exercise Clause, 161 Free Lucia v. Sec, 459–460 Freeman, Morgan, 377 Free speech rights
constitutional guarantees, 162–170, 442 of employers, 700–701
Friedman, Lawrence, 77
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Friedman, Milton, 28 Frivolous cases, 100–102 Frivolous lawsuits, 102 Frohlich, Silja, 361 Frustration of purpose, 269 FUCT, 78 Fuld, Richard, 52 Full-line forcing, 499 Full warranties, 578 Fulton, Robert, 155 Fungible goods, 207 Furadan, 598 Future interests, 198
G Gabor, Zsa Zsa, 393 Gandhi, Mohandas, 49 Gap, Inc., 362, 373 Garcia, David, 136n Garnishment, 113 Garvey, Steve, 139 Gasoline blends, 590 Gasoline price gouging, 34 Gay marriage, 179 GEICO General Insurance Company, 570–571 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 365 General Assembly (UN), 363 General counsels, 458, 691 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 563 General jurisdiction, 66 General Motors, 47, 54, 600, 636 General partners, 430 Generic terms, 335, 337 Genes, patenting, 325 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 646–647 Geographic extension mergers, 502 George, Elizabeth, 2 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 342 Getting to Yes (Fisher et al.), 123 Getty Oil, 294 Gibbons, Thomas, 156 Gibbons v. Ogden, 156 Gifts, 208–209 Ginsberg, Allen, 163 Ginsberg v. New York, 167 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, 77, 78, 80, 105, 162, 167, 172,
390, 395, 530, 542, 593, 625, 660 Giuliani, Rudolph, 163 Gladstone, William, 15 GlaxoSmithKline, 126 Global Business Ethics Survey (2016), 29 Global Compact, 362
Global financial crisis corporate governance lapses, 20–22 examination for wrongdoing, 381–382 legislative responses, 543–544
Global warming, 588, 597, 609, 611 Golden Rule, 35 Goldman Sachs, 14, 631 Gonzales v. Oregon, 158n The good, 33 Good faith
as fraud defense, 395, 532 as price discrimination defense, 499 refusal to bargain in, 697–699, 703
Good-faith meeting-of-competition defense, 499 Goods, 227, 251 Goodyear, 635 Google, 29, 103, 331, 490, 505 Google’s Code of Conduct, 29 Gorsuch, Neil, 80 Gottlieb & Co., Inc. v. Alps South Corporation, 238–239 Government
enforcement of ethics by, 31–32 growth in twentieth century, 473 growth in U.S., 473 privacy protections from, 559 state and local, authority, 157–160 takings by, 359
Grand juries, 384–386 Grand Metropolitan PLC, 530 Gray, Herbert, 201 Great Depression, 158 Greenhouse effect, 610 Greenhouse, Steven, 144 “green” products, 248 Grievance meetings, 696 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 626 Grimm’s Fairy Tales, 168 Grooming standards, 638 Gross domestic product (GDP), 418 Groups, impact on ethical behavior, 51 Grutter v. Bollinger, 619 Guidant Corporation, 292 Guidelines, administrative, 456 Gulf oil spill, 126, 300 Gun possession, 171
H Habitat destruction, 587, 597, 610 Hague Service Convention, 375 Hale, Kori, 14 Halliburton, 535–536 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 535–536
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Hammurabi’s Code, 7 Handguns, 171 Hand, Learned, 298 Handwritten terms in contracts, 260 Harper, Sherry, 285–286 Harper v. Winston County, 285–286 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 631 Hasan, Aziz, 695 Hayashi, Patrick, 205 Hazardous substances, 600–606 Hazardous workplaces, 669–670 HCG Diet Direct, 564 Health care, 671 Health care fraud, 398 Health care privacy, 559 Health insurance coverage, 647, 667, 671 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), 559, 647, 671 HealthSouth, 511 Height and weight requirements, 638 Henry, David, 6, 6n Henry Schein v. Archer & White Sales Inc., 141 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 502 Hertz Corporation, 46, 497 Hewlett-Packard, 358 Hierarchy of law sources, 15 Highlight bias, 328 Hilton, 295–296 Hiring practices, 623–624, 637–640 Hiring Veterans (Labor Dept.), 667 Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. and Carlos Ortiz,
691–692 Historical school of jurisprudence, 12 Hithon, John, 624 Hithon v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 624 HIV/AIDS, 644 Hockey fan injuries, 301 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 694 Holdings, 16 Holds on data for litigation, 99 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., 12, 34, 42, 81 Homeland Security Department (U.S.), 360 Homestead Act of 1862, 207 Homosexuality
discrimination against, 636 free speech regarding, 162–164 same-sex marriage, 179
Honda, 698 Honest services, 393–395 Honesty, 44, 46, 47 Hooters restaurants, 630 Horizontal mergers, 502 Horizontal price fixing, 482–485 Horizontal restraints, 479–480, 481
Horizontal territorial agreements, 486 Hostile work environments, 628, 631, 632, 635, 641 Hot-cargo contracts, 705 Hourly lawyers’ fees, 88 Housing bubble, 21 Howey-in-the-Hills Services Company, 514 HSBC, 393 Hsu, Sara, 11 Hughes Electronics, 263, 361 Human rights suits, 373 Hurricane Katrina, 34, 393 Hussein, Fatima, 670
I Iancu v. Brunetti, 77–79, 334 Iannelli, Nicholas and Jodiann, 296–297 Iannelli v. Burger King Corp., 296–297 IBM, 540 Ideas, 162, 231 Identity theft, 204, 397, 406, 407 Illegal aliens, 694, 696 Illegal contracts, 233, 248 Illegal strikes, 689, 703 Illinois Brick, 492–493 Illinois Tool Works, 501 Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 501 Illness, discrimination based on, 647 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 678–679 Immunity, 459 Implied authority, 437 Implied claims, 564 Implied conditions, 264 Implied-in-fact contracts, 229–231 Implied-in-law contracts, 232 Implied warranties, 232, 276, 578 Impossibility of performance, 268–270 Incentive, 9, 191, 315 Incidental beneficiary, 276 Incorporation doctrine, 177 Incorporators, 423 Indecent programming, 163 Indefiniteness, 235 Independent Ink Inc., 501 Indictment, 384 Indirect price fixing, 486 Individual rights, 41 Individual values, 48–49 Indoor air pollution, 592 Industrial commissions, 455 Industry guides, 553 Infliction of mental distress, 286 Information, 384
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Information as property, 314. see also Intellectual property
Infringement copyright, 341, 345, 345–346 patent, 324 trademark, 335–338
Injunctions for antitrust violations, 477, 489, 495 in labor disputes, 688–689, 700 for nuisance, 213 protecting trade secrets with, 318–319 for securities violations, 512 for trade practice violations, 554
Injuries, 295, 679–682 Injurious falsehood, 293–294 Injury, 666 Innocence, presumption of, 385 Innocent misrepresentation, 246–248 In re Musical Instruments, 483 In re Target Corporation Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation, 204n Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, 512, 532 Insider transactions, 43, 528–529. see also Securities laws Instructions to juries, 107 Insurance coverage
for employment discrimination claims, 650 health, 667, 671 for pollution, 605 for tort liability, 307 workers’ compensation, 675–678
Insured banks and credit unions, 402 Intangible property, 193–194 Intel, 55, 505 Intellectual property
copyright, 339–346 defined, 315 international agreements, 340, 367–368 justifications for, 314–315 limitations on rights, 217 patents, 324–331 trademarks, 331–339, 488 trade secrets, 317–323
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, 323 Intent
to abandon property, 205 criminal, 293, 384 defined, 283 to defraud, 393 fraud, 246–248
Intentional interference with contractual relations, 294 Intentional torts, 19, 283–284 Interdependence, economic, 30–31 Interest-based negotiations, 123, 142
Interests, communicating, 123 Internal Revenue Service, 430, 432, 433, 435, 453,
574, 673 International agreements, 525 International Court of Justice, 363 International Franchising Association, 37 International franchising ventures, 371 International intellectual property rights, 346–347 International law. see also Trade
arbiters of, 364–368 business transactions under, 370–373 inconsistencies and risks, 355–361 sources, 362–364 trade agreements under, 367–369
International Monetary Fund, 365 International organizations, 364–369 International privacy protection, 561–562 International trade. see Trade Internet
copyright infringement, 345–346 crimes using, 406 focus on ethics, 31 policies for using, 236, 699 press freedom, 171 privacy issues, 236, 675 trademark issues, 338 use in jury selection, 102–103
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 338
Internet service providers, 346 Internships, 659 Interpretation of contracts, 260–261 Interrogatories, 97 Interstate commerce
impact on, 156 regulation, 155–156
Interviews, discriminatory, 637 Intoxicated persons, 244, 298 Intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, 487 Invasion of privacy, 287–288 Inventions, 315, 323. see also Patents Invention sharing during public emergency, 331 Investigative consumer reports, 569 Investigative function of administrative agencies, 456 Investment, foreign, 372. see also Securities laws Involuntary petitions for bankruptcy, 576 iPhone, 491–492 Irreconcilable conflicts, 159 Irrevocable letters of credit, 370 IRS Whistleblower Reform Law, 673 Isaac, Mike, 490 Issuers of securities, 538 Issuing banks, 370, 371 Itel Containers In’t Corp. v. Huddleston, 155n
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J Jackall, Robert, 39, 52 Jackson, Antonio, 131 Jackson, Michael, 261 J. C. Bradford & Company, 294 Jefferson, Thomas, 102, 323. see also Intellectual property Jefferson, William, 409 Jeffries, Mike, 627 Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles, 393 Job descriptions, 679 Job references, 291 Joffe v. Google, 560 Johnson, Belinda H., 9 Johnson & Johnson, 358 Joint and several liability, 300, 604, 605 Joint production ventures, 489 Joint tenancy, 199 Joint ventures, 359, 373, 484 Jones, Marion, 402 Jones, Quincy, 261 Joyce, James, 163 JP Morgan, 511 J. P. Morgan Chase Bank, 511 JPMorgan Chase & Co., 6, 485 JPMorgan Chase Mortgage Lending, 126 Juarez, Carlos, 516 Judges
basic role in court system, 62–63 decision-making process, 82–83 as major sources of law, 15–16 potential conflicts of interest, 43 role in common law systems, 13
Judgment as a Matter of Law, 106 Judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 109 Judgment on the pleadings, 100 Judgments
defined, 109 on directed verdict motions, 106 enforcing, 112–113 pretrial, 100
Judicial activism, 74, 76–77 Judicial admissions exception, 253 Judicial procedures, civil versus criminal, 13–14 Judicial restraint, 74–76 Judicial review
of administrative agency decisions, 462–470 approaches to, 73–78 decision factors in, 78–79, 82–83 of dispute resolutions, 137–142, 145 examples, 77–82
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 673 Juliana v. United States, 90
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, 513, 545–546
Juries basic role in court system, 63–65 bias against corporations, 126 constitutional right to, 391–392 deliberation process, 109 instructions to, 107 selection, 102–104 televising deliberations, 109 using focus groups to model, 126–127
Jurisdiction Jurisdictional strikes, 704 of National Labor Relations Board, 690–693 personal, 88, 91–92 subject matter, 66, 89
Jurisprudence, 11–12 Jury awards for damages, 306–308 Jury consultants, 64 Jury duty, 64 Jury instructions, 107 Jury verdicts, 63–65 Just compensation, 176 Justices
appointment to Supreme Court, 74 basic role in court system, 62–63 Juvenile courts, 66, 391
K Kagan, Elena, 77, 80, 105, 167, 622, 660, 668 Kant, Immanuel, 35 Kaplan, Lewis, 376 Kasten, Kevin, 660–661 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
660–662 Katrina, Hurricane, 34, 393 Katzenberg, Jeffrey, 393 Kavanaugh, Brett, 80 Kelly, Jack, 695 Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, 173–175 Kennedy, Anthony, 77, 166, 179, 625, 660 Khan, Yusuf, 14 Kickbacks, 383, 395, 396, 398, 408 Kickstarter, 695 Kiel, Fred, 38 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 643 King, Larry, 393 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 49 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 374 KKR, 33 Knowledge assets, 314, 315. see also Intellectual
property
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Knowledge of crimes, 384 Koch Industries, 595 Kolodziej v. Mason, 235n Korea Teachers Pension, 393 Korenchuk, Michael, 668–669 KPMG, 37, 48, 53, 289 Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC. v. Cracker Barrel Old
Country Store, Inc., 336–337 Kravis, Henry, 33 Krugman, Paul, 21 Kyoto Protocol, 608
L Labeling laws, 578 Labor contracts, arbitration in, 130 Labor laws
basic purpose, 10, 686–687 early U.S. measures, 695–699 NLRB authority, 690–691 Taft-Hartley Act, 699–706 unfair practices, 690, 694–699, 703–706 union certification, 693–694 Wagner Act advances, 690
Labor-Management Relations Act, 154, 672–673, 699–706
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 705 Lagom, 51 Lamps Plus Inc v. Varela, 141 Land. see also Property; Real property
adverse possession, 206–207 defining, 195 sales of interest in, 250 security interests in, 210 types of ownership, 198–199
Landfills, 600 Landrum-Griffin Act, 154, 705–706 Land sales contracts, 210 Language, 627, 632 Lanham Act, 79 Lanham Act of 1946, 332 Lapse of time, 236 Larceny, 403–404 Law
classifications, 13–15 corporate governance under, 20–21 everyday importance, 1 as foundation for business practice, 354 as guide to values, 41–43, 49 importance to effective economies, 7–8, 192 judicial review, 73–84 jurisprudence, 11 property rights under, 9–11
relation to ethics, 28–29, 33–34 sanctions under, 17–21 sources, 14–17
Lawrence, D. H., 163 Lawson v. FMR, 542 Lawyers
assistance in drafting contracts, 278 basic role in court system, 65 ethical lapses, 111 fees, 18, 88, 125 illegal activity by, 404 representing debtors, 573
Lay, Kenneth, 395, 400 Layoffs, 662–663 L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, 113 Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED), 218 Lead poisoning, 600 LeanSpa, 564 Leasehold estates, 198 Leaves of absence, 663–666 Ledbetter, Lilly, 635 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 635 Lee, Arthur, 213 Lee, Daniel, 98 Leegin Creative Leather Products, 485 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 485 Lefkowitz, Jerome, 144 Legal Arizona Workers Act, 679 Legal costs, 88 Legalese, 279 Legality of purpose for contracts, 245 Legal liability, 6 Legal liability, cautionary tales of, 6 Legal realism, 12 Legal sanctions, 17–20 Legal study tips, 709–710 Legal systems, 9–11 Legislation, major types, 15 Legitimacy in negotiations, 124 Lehman Brothers, 511 Lehman Brothers Holdings, 52, 353 Lenders
legal security, 191 role in 2008 recession, 21 with security interest in polluted land, 605
Lennick, Doug, 38 Letters of credit, 370 Letter-writing campaigns, 461 Levi, 335 Lewis, Marlo, Jr., 472 Lewis, Spencer, 642 Leyden, Christine, 230
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Leyden v. American Accreditation Healthcare Commission, 230–231
Liability administrative law judges’ immunity, 461 for antitrust violations, 495 Cat’s Paw theory, 669 contractual authority, 436–437 criminal, 439 of employers for worker injuries, 299, 675 as factor in selecting business form, 417 joint and several, 300 legal, 6 in limited partnerships, 430–431 in LLCs, 433 for related actions, 273 under Securities Act of 1933, 517–518 of sole proprietors, 417 strict, 19, 293, 302–305, 676 tort, 438–439 for toxic waste disposal, 602 for workers’ compensation, 676
Liability insurance, 307 Liautaud, Susan, 30 Libby, I. Lewis, 401 Libel, 170, 290 Liberals, judicial, 77 Liberty, 10, 41 Liberty Mutual Insurance, 485 Licensing
to foreign firms, 371 team logos, 487–489 trademark, 488
Lie detector tests, 675 Liens, 275 Life estates, 198 Lighthizer, Robert, 368 Light, odor, noise, and property fence, 214 Likenesses, privacy of, 287 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 635 Limited jurisdiction, 66 Limited liability companies, 433–434 Limited liability partnerships, 433 Limited partnerships, 430–433 Limited personal liability of shareholders, 426 Limited resources, 190–191 Limited warranties, 578 Lincoln, Abraham, 290, 315 LinkedIn, 674 Liquidated damages, 271 Liquidation of property, 576 Litigation. see also Court systems; Dispute resolution
avoiding, 114 costs to corporations, 63 by employees against firms, 649–650, 679–680
against foreign firms, 376 major principles, 88–95 percent settled early, 120 posttrial issues, 110–112 pretrial procedures, 95–102 Superfund, 605
Litigation holds, 99 Litov, Lubormi, 7n Livingston, Robert, 155 Lobbying, 497 L’Occitane, 564 Locke, John, 10, 11, 41, 188, 208 Lockheed Martin, 113, 401, 623 Long-arm statutes, 91 Long Island Railroad, 301 Longs Drug Stores California, Inc., 702 Lorsban, 598 Los Angeles Times (2013), 31 Lost items, 206 Lucas-Forman, Inc., 201 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 622 Lutheran Heritage
Village-Livonia, 702 Lynch, Merrill, 94
M Maastricht Treaty, 8 MacDonald, John D., 35 Mackey, John, 50 Mack, Olga V., 9 MacPherson suspension, 304 Madison, James, 11, 213, 219 Madison Square Garden, 648 Madoff, Bernard, 393 Madonna, 377 Madrid System for International Registration
of Marks, 347 Mafia, 405 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 145, 578 Mahoney, John J., 541 Mailbox rule, 239 Mail fraud, 394–395 Maitland, Frederick, 289 Major League Baseball Players Association
v. Garvey, 139 Major life activities, 644 Malice, 291 Malicious prosecution, 289 Malkovich, John, 393 Malpractice, 42, 297 Malum in se, 382
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Managers assault by, 284–285 control of corporate resources, 50–51 excessive risk-taking, 21, 31, 52 larceny by, 403 of LLCs, 433 role in corporations, 21 as role models, 52 unfair labor practices, 690–691, 694–699
Mandatory arbitration, 128, 133–135, 138, 142 Mandatory retirement, 642 Manifest system, 601 Manufacturers’ Credit, 276–277 Mapplethorpe, Robert, 163 Marbury v. Madison, 73 Marchand v. Barnhill, 440–442 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, 596 Maritime piracy, 361 Marketable rights approach, 591 Marketers’ code of ethics, 44, 45 Market extension mergers, 502 Market power, 493 Marriage, same-sex, 179 Marshall, John, 73, 156 Martin, Casey, 645 Martin Marietta, 46 Maryland Court of Appeals, 665 Mason, James, 235 Mass extinction and its consequences, 610 Massey Energy Co., 403, 403n Mass layoffs, 662–663 Matal v. Tam, 79, 334 Material breaches, 266 Material facts, 395, 517, 518 Materiality, 518, 525 Mattel, 355 Matyus, Allison, 38 Maximum daily load (pollutant), 596 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 326 McCarthy, Kevin, 205 McDonald’s, 299, 331, 333, 371 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 172n McEntee, Gerald W., 686 McLaughlin, Eliott C., 169 McLean Parks, Judi, 649 Meal, Douglas H., 204n Mechanic’s liens, 212 Meche, Gil, 32 Med-Arb, 145 Media freedom, 170–171 Mediation, 142–145, 688 Mediators, 142, 144
Medical condition, discrimination based on, 647 Medical malpractice claims, 297 Medicare fraud, 50 Meeting of the minds, 246 Members of LLCs, 433 Memphis Fire Dept. v. Stotts, 640 Mental distress, 286 Mentally impaired persons, 245 Mental stress claims, 678 Merchantability, 232 Merchants, 237 Merck, 126 Mercury poisoning, 600 Mergers
Clayton Act oversight, 502–503 tortious interference with, 294
Merideth, William, 195 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 631 Merrill Lynch, 511 Meteorites, 205 #MeToo movement, 128, 631 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 345 Microsoft, 30, 331, 362 Military service, 666–667 Millennium Development Goals (UN), 364 Miller, Geoffrey, 425n Miller, Henry, 163 Miller, Judith, 385 Miller, Sandra K., 434n Miller v. California, 163 Minimum rationality approach, 177, 178, 180 Minimum wage, 656–658 Minority interests, 426 Minors
incapacity to contract, 244–245 rights in juvenile courts, 391 wage/hour rules, 660–661
Miranda rights, 389 Miranda v. Arizona, 389 Mirror image rule, 237 Misappropriation of trade secrets, 321 Misappropriation theory, 530–531 Misconduct by arbitrators, 140 Misdemeanors, 384 Misgovernance of corporations, 20–21,
51–52 Mislaid items, 206 Misleading statements, 517–518 Misrepresentation, 246–248, 292 Misuse defenses, 303 Mitigation of damages, 272 Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 377 Mobile source pollution, 590 Mock juries, 126
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776 Index
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Modern ethical challenges in innovation and technology, 29–30
Molasses flood, 306 Money damages, 271–273 Monopolies, 490–492 Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 231 Moral Intelligence (Lennick/Kiel), 38 Morality
ethical systems, 35–40 shared values, 32
Morgan Stanley, 631 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Company, 294 Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 526–527 Mortgagees, 210 Mortgages
common uses, 210 defined, 192 subprime, 210, 573 walking away from, 275
Mortgagors, 210 Mosely v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 339 Motions, 100, 111 MTV, 164 Mulally, Janice, 667–668, 668 Muslims, discrimination against, 629 Mutual mistakes, 248 Mystery of Capital (de Soto), 192
N NAFTA, 369 Nalley, Dennis M., 539 Names, discrimination and, 624 Names of businesses, 421 National ambient air quality standard, 593 National Arbitration Forum, 129 National Business Ethics Survey (2018), 29 National Car Rental, 298 National Cooperative Research Act, 489 National Credit Union Administration v. First National
Bank & Trust Co, 463n, 622 National Disaster Medical System, 666 National Environmental Policy Act, 585–586 National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 710 National Football League, 487–489 National Forest Service, 586–588 Nationalization, 359 National Labor Relations Act
amendments to, 699 key provisions, 690 NLRB authority under, 690–693 prohibited discrimination under, 647, 696–697
unfair practices under, 690, 694–699 union certification, 693
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), discrimination monitoring by, 647, 697 major functions, 453 organization and authority, 690–693 union certification role, 693–694
The National Law Review, 94 National Marine Fisheries Services, 597 National Mediation Board, 688 National Non-Point Source Pollution Program, 596 National origin discrimination, 627 National Rent-A-Car, 497 Natural easements, 200 Natural ecosystems, loss of, 609 Natural law theory, 11 Negative easements, 200 Negligence
defenses to, 300–302 as due care violation, 42 elements of, 19, 293–302 environmental suits for, 607
Negotiation. see also Alternative dispute resolution systems collective bargaining, 130 mediation, 142–145 need for, 121 offers in, 235, 237 styles, 121–124
Netflix, 559 Net operating losses (NOL), 429 New Haven firefighters, 625 New London Development Corporation (NLDC), 173 New Prime Inc v. Oliveira, 141 News media
constitutional freedom, 170–171, 288, 291–292 focus on ethics, 31
New York Convention, 377 New York Department of Corrections, 636 New York Knicks, 648 New York Mafia, 405 The New York Times, 22 New York Times v. Sullivan, 291 New York Times v. United States, 171 New York University, 393 Nicas, Jack, 245n, 490 Nichols, Philip, 205 Nigerian letters, 374 Nike, 331 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 72 Nixon, Richard, 671 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 690 Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 497 Nolo contendere pleas, 384, 496
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Noncompete covenants, 321 Nonconforming uses, 217 Nondisclosure, 319 Nonobviousness, 327–329 Nonperformance of contract terms, 268–271 Non-point source pollution, 596 Non-profit corporations, 434–435 Nonpublic information restrictions, 529–532 Nonviolent crimes, 382 Normative values, 30 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 689 North American Free Trade Agreement, 369 North American Stainless, 621–622 North, Douglas C., 8 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 478 Northwest Airlines, 671 Notes, 210 Notice, copyright, 340 Notice of proposed rules, 461 Notification, registration by, 538 Novartis, 126, 631 Novations, 278 Novelty, 327–329 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 454, 468, 606 Nuisance doctrine, 213–218, 552, 607 Nursing mothers, 660
O Obama, Barack, 80, 467, 543, 545, 635, 690 Objective intent, 235 Obscenity, 163 Obstruction of justice, 400–401 Obviousness, 328 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 154, 657, 673 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 669–670
major functions, 407, 453 Och-Ziff Capital Management Group, 358 O’Connell, Vanessa, 88n O’Connor, Sandra Day, 465, 619 Offensive language, 631–632, 632 Offeror death, 236 Offers
acceptance, 237, 239–240 options on, 244 termination, 236
Offers to contract, 235–236 Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, 639 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 154 Officers, corporate, 529 Official Gazette, 333 Ofili, Chris, 163, 182 Ogburn, Louise, 299
Ogden, Aaron, 155 O’Hagan, James Herman, 530–531 Oil States Energy Services v. Green’s Energy Group, 194 Oliver v. Ball, 273–274 Olympic rings, 331 Onassis, Jacqueline Kennedy, 287 One-year requirement, 251, 328 Online privacy protection, 560 Open communications, 53–54 Opening statements, 106–107, 143 Openness, 44 Open source property, 316 Opinions, 15, 710 Options, 124, 244 Oral argument, 111 Oral contracts, 249, 252 Ordinances, 15 Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA), 158 O’Reilly, Bill, 632 Organizational ethics codes, 46–47 Organizational forms
compared, 421–422 corporations, 423–427, 429 factors in choosing, 416–417 limited liability organizations, 433–434 limited partnerships, 430–431 management trends, 439–442 partnerships, 420–423 S corporations, 432 sole proprietorships, 420
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 418
Organizers, 433 Originalism, 16 Originally possessed resources, 188 Outside directors, 426 Overbreadth doctrine, 169 Overt acts, 399 Overtime pay, 656–658 Ownership, 8–9, 192, 198–199 Oxley, Michael, 539 Ozone, 609–610
P Pain and suffering, 307 PaineWebber, 294 Palsgraf, Helen, 301 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 301n Pannell, Charles A., Jr., 113 Paper fortress, 679 Paper waste, 599 The Paquette Habana, 362
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Paralegals, 66 Parker v. Brown doctrine, 497 Parliament (EU), 366 Parloff, Roger, 93n Parody, 338, 339 Parol evidence rule, 260–262 Partial or corrupt arbitrators, 140 Parties to litigation, 88–89 Partitions, 199 Partnerships
basic features, 420–423 limited, 430–431 limited liability, 433–434 personal liability in, 423
Part performance doctrine, 252 Past consideration, 243 Patent Act, 326 Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), 78, 79 Patent assertion entities, 331 Patent Cooperation Treat, 347 Patent examiners, 324 Patents
enforcing, 329–330 limitations on, 217 misusing, 501 obtaining, 324–329 overview, 323
Patent trolls, 330–331 Patterns of racketeering, 405 Patterson v. McLean, 641 Patton, Bruce, 123 Payne v. Clark, 274 Penalties. see also Remedies
Clean Air Act, 590 consumer protection violations, 554–555 against corporations for crimes, 383, 410 for debt collection violations, 575 for equal credit violations, 568 for fair credit reporting violations, 570–571 FCPA, 355–356 major types of sanctions, 18–21 pesticide control, 597–598 securities violations, 532 Sherman Antitrust Act, 494–496 truth-in-lending, 574 for violating ethics codes, 49
14 Penn Plaza LLC. v. Pyett, 134–135 Pennzoil, 294 Pension plans, 671 Pentagon Papers, 171 Pepsi, 322 Pepsi-Cola Bottling, 485 Peremptory challenges, 104 Perfection of security interest, 211–212, 212
Performance evaluations, 680 Performance of contracts, 233, 261–271 Permits, under Clean Air Act, 592 Perpetuities, rule against, 217 Per se illegality, 481, 486 Personal jurisdiction, 88, 91–92 Personal property, 193–194 Personhood rights, 56 Personnel files, 680 Personnel manuals, 679 Persons, corporations as, 442 Persuasion, burden of, 107 Pesticides, 53, 597–598 Petitioners, 110, 710 Petitions for leave to appeal, 67 Petitions for union certification election, 694 Petit juries, 63 Petroecuador, 376 Pfizer, 126 Pfizer Claims, 126 Phelps, Fred, 165 PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 457 Philadelphia, 405 Philadelphia Mafia, 405 Philip Morris, 370 Phillips, Carter G., 308 Phishing, 397 Photographers, 287 Physical and mental impairments defined, 644 Pichai, Sundar, 29 Picker, Leslie, 22 Picketing
First Amendment protections, 164–166 trespass during, 289 as unfair labor practice, 704, 705
Piercing the corporate veil, 427–428 Pillsbury Company, 530 Pineapple Inc., 276–277 Pinedo, Anna T., 516 Piracy, copyright infringement, 345 Pirates, 361 Plagiarism, 342 Plaintiffs
defined, 19, 88 personal jurisdiction over, 91–92 requirements in class-action suits, 94 standing to sue, 89
Plame, Valerie, 385 Plant closings, 662–663 Plant patents, 324 Plato, 48 Pleadings, 95–96 Point source pollution, 591, 595 Police courts, 66
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Police-created exigency doctrine, 387 Police powers, 157–160, 216
dual regulation, 159 exclusively federal, 157 exclusively state, 157–158 federal preemption, 159 limitation, 157–160 no federal regulation, 159–160 no preemption, 159
Policies arbitration, 133–136 Internet, 236, 699 public, 138, 139, 160 workplace, 680, 699
Pollution, 583–584. see also Environmental protection Pollution credits, 591 Ponzi schemes, 394 Popov, Alex, 205 Port Authority of New York, 298 Positional bargaining, 122–123 Positive law theory, 11–12 Possession, acquiring property by, 205–207 Postdispute arbitration agreements, 137 Posteffective period, 516 Post-traumatic stress disorder, 667 Posttrial issues, 110–112 Poverty, property rights and, 192 Prayer breaks, 629 Precedents
activist view, 76–77 defined, 13, 15 stare decisis doctrine, 16 strict constructionist view, 76
Precision in contract language, 227 Predatory conduct, 491 Predatory pricing, 499 Predispute arbitration clauses, 137 Preemption, 154 Preexisting obligation rule, 243 Prefiling period, 516 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 633 Preponderance of evidence standard, 108 Prescott, J. J., 247n Prescription drug regulation, 578 Prescription, easement by, 200 Present interests, 198 Press freedom, 170–171 Presumption of innocence, 385 Pretrial procedures, 95–102 Prevention of significant deterioration, 592 Price discrimination, 498–499 Price fixing, 382, 479, 482–485 Price gouging, 34, 245 PricewaterhouseCoopers, 540
Primary air quality standards, 589 Primary jurisdiction, 468–469 Principal Register, 334 Principled negotiation, 123–124 Prior art, 324, 328 Priority of security interests, 211–212, 576–577 Prior restraints, 170 Privacy
constitutional protection, 387 invasion of, 287–288 legal protections, 556–563 website policies, 236 for workers, 674–678
Privacy Act of 1974, 558 Private information, publication of, 288 Private international law, 362–364 Private law, 13 Private markets, property rights, 9–11, 188–189 Private nuisance, 214, 607 Private property, 9. see also Property Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
512, 534 Privileged communications, 291 Probable cause, 384 Probate courts, 66 Procedural due process, 177 Procedural law, 14 Processes, patentable, 325–326 Procter & Gamble, 34, 37, 48, 293 Product extension mergers, 502 Production defects, 302 Product safety, 578 Products liability, 302–305, 306 Professional-client relationships, 42 Professional ethics codes, 43–45 Professional Golf Association, 645 Profit motive, 50 Profits
as price gouging, 34 short-swing, 529 unethical pursuit, 51
Prohibiting discrimination, 160 Prohibition amendment, 160 PRO IP Act, 323 Promises, 226 Promissory estoppel, 244 Proof, standards of, 108, 293 Property. see also Intellectual property
acquisition methods, 204–209 defining, 9, 188, 313 easements and bailments, 199–200, 200–203 elements of concept, 9–11 historic views of, 187 importance to private markets, 8–9, 189
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Property—Cont. information as, 314 (see also Intellectual property) legal divisions, 193–194 limitations on uses, 183, 191, 212–219, 552 prosperity from, 191–193 resource limitations and, 190–191 security interests in, 209–212 types of ownership, 198–199
Property law, 13 Proposition 8, 179 Proposition 209, 640 Proprietorships, 420 Prospectuses, 516–517 Prosperity, 191–193 Prosterman v. American Airlines, Inc., 482–484 Protection payments, 372 Protective clothing, 658, 661 Protestant ethic, 38–39 Proximate causation, 300 PSKS, Inc., 485 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 540 Public domain information, 316, 329 Public figures, 288, 291 Public hearings, 461 Public international law, 363 Public law, 13 Publicly held organizations, 416, 425–426 Public notice of proposed rule, 461 Public nuisance, 213, 607 Public policy
arbitration awards against, 137–140 Bill of Rights versus, 160
Public property, 9, 190 Public use, 173–175 Punishment, 18–21. see also Penalties; Sanctions Punitive damages. see also Damages
in discrimination cases, 619–620 international enforcement, 375 for negligence, 298 Supreme Court rulings on, 177 when warranted, 307–308
Purchase money security interests, 211 Purity Distilling Co., 306
Q Qualcomm, 111 Qualification, registration by, 538 Qualified disabled, 644 Quasi-contracts, 232 Quasi-judicial authority
implementations, 456, 459 inherent in administrative agencies, 452
of NLRB, 690–692 of SEC, 514
Quasi-judicial proceedings, 459 Quasi-legislative authority
implementations, 455 inherent in administrative agencies, 452 of SEC, 514 terms of delegation to agencies, 463
Quasi-strict scrutiny approach, 177, 178–180
Questionnaires, 637 Questions of arbitrability, 141 Quid pro quo cases, 631 Quincy Jones v. MJJ Productions, Inc., 261n Qui tam lawsuits, 398 Quitclaim deeds, 209 Quotas, 639
R Race-based preferences, 178 Race norming, 637 Racial discrimination, 103, 623–627, 641 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 357, 404–406 Racketeering, 405 Radiation pollution, 606 Radio communication, 560 Railway Labor Act, 688–689 Rainforests, 609 Rand, 667 Rathje, Bill, 599 Ratification of contracts, 244, 438 Rational-basis test, 178 Rat protests, 703 Rawls, John, 36 Raysman, Richard, 236n Razor bumps, 638 Real property, 193, 198–199 Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc., 134 Reasonable accommodation under ADA, 644 Reasonable doubt standard, 109 Reasonable measures to protect trade secrets,
318–319 Reasonableness standard
for antitrust enforcement, 481 credit reporting, 570–571 for deceptive advertising, 564 in fraud cases, 520 in negligence cases, 303 performance of contractual obligations,
265–266 in products liability cases, 303
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Index 781
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Recession of 2008 corporate misgovernance leading to, 21 economic interdependence revealed by,
30–31 subprime mortgage collapse, 573
Reciprocal dealing arrangements, 499 Reckless conduct, 384, 570–571 Reckless disregard, 291, 384 Recording security interests, 210 Recycling, 600 Redemption rights, 210 Redlining, 568 Reebok, 487 Reed, John S., 50 Reeves, Ingrid, 633 Reform. see also Securities laws
export control, 360 patent law, 330 strict constructionist view, 75 Superfund, 605 tort, 303 workers’ compensation, 678
Regalado, Miriam, 621–622 Regional agency offices, 459 Registration
copyright, 342 property ownership, 208 securities, 520–521, 538 trademarks, 333–335
Registration statements, 515–518 Regulation Crowdfunding, 546 Regulations, trends, 473 Regulatory law
basic purpose, 10 ethics and, 32 as guide to values, 41–43, 49 sanctions under, 19
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 646 Rejections, 236 Relationships, negotiating, 123 Relative-value scales, 484 Releases, 270–271 Relevant markets, 493 Relief, for antitrust violations, 495 Religion
as basis for peremptory challenges, 104 constitutional freedom, 160, 162 discrimination based on, 628–629 influence on ethics, 38
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 442 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA), 162 Remainder interests, 199 Remediation, 602
Remedies for age discrimination, 643 for breach of contract, 271–274 consumer protection violations, 554–555 defined, 18 for disability discrimination, 646 under ECOA, 568 for nuisance, 217 truth-in-lending, 573
Rent-A-Center, 637 Rent-a-Center, West, Inc., v. Antonio Jackson,
131–132 Reporters, 15 Request for an admission, 98 Request for production of documents, 97 Requirements contracts, 501 Resale price maintenance, 485 Rescission, 271, 272, 573 Research and development, 315–316 Res judicata, 114, 391 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 601–602 Resources. see also Property
defined, 188 limited, 190–191
Respect, 44 Respondeat superior, 438 Respondents, 110, 461, 553, 709 Responsibility, 44, 45, 51 Restatements, 541 Restitution, 272, 410 Restraining orders, 298 Restraint of trade, 479–489 Restrictive Business Practices Code, 365 Retaliation against employees
as illegal discrimination, 621–622 over Fair Labor Standards complaints, 658–659
Retirement plans, 671 Reversals, 710 Reverse discrimination, 639 Reverse engineering, 321 Reversion interests, 199 Reviewability of agency rulings, 462 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA), 431 Revocations, 236 Revolving door relationships, 470 Rexrode, Christina, 88n Riccio, Anthony V., 306n Ricci v. Destefano, 625–626 RICO offenses, 404–410 Right of redemption, 210 Rights, property as, 188–189 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 558 Right-to-work laws, 702 Riley v. California, 388–389, 556
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Risk, assumption of, 301–302, 676 Risk-taking by managers, 21 R. J. Reynolds, 170 Robbery, 403 Roberts, John, 62, 74, 75, 77–78, 80, 165, 166, 535,
625, 660 Roberts, Julia, 377 Robinson, Denean, 269–270 Robinson-Patman amendment, 498–499 Rockefeller, John, 478 Role models, top management as, 52 Rolex, 338 Rolls-Royce, 338 Roosevelt, Franklin, 158 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 618, 689 Rottenberg, Erika, 9 “Rouge” Bankers, 14 Rowling, J. K., 377 Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, 485 Royal Dutch Petroleum, 373–374 Royalties, 340 Rubin, Carl, 604 Rule against perpetuities, 217 Rule 10b-5, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
521–528 Rule-making authority of agencies, 455–457, 462–467 Rule of analogy, 81 Rule of first possession, 205 Rule of law, 7–8
principles, 8 Rule of reason, 481, 486
S Safeco Insurance Company, 570–571 Safeco Insurance Co. v. Burr, 570–571 Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 596 Safety regulations, 669. see also Occupational Safety
and Health Administration Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp, 660–662 Salesforce, 30 Sales, foreign, 370–371 Same-sex marriage, 56, 179 Sample complaints, 95, 711–713 Sam’s Club, 628, 630 Sanctions, 18–20 Sanders, Anucha Browne, 648 Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 658–659 Sanitary landfills, 600 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
impact on corporations, 410 impact on Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 532 major provisions, 513, 540–543
selected sections, 729–732 Supreme Court decisions, 459–460
Sarbanes, Paul, 539–540 Saturday Evening Post, 291 Savigny, Friedrich, 12 Scalia, Antonin, 105, 131, 167, 622, 625, 658 Schemes to defraud, 395 Schoeff, Mark, 97 Scienter, 518, 525 Scope of discovery, 98–99 Scoping, 585–586 S corporations, 432 Scott v. Harris, 661 Searches and seizures, 386–389 Search warrants, 386 Seatbelt sleeves, 303 Second Amendment rights, 12, 17, 171 Secondary air quality standards, 589 Secondary boycotts, 705 Secondary meaning, 335 Secrecy of grand jury proceedings, 384–386 Secretaries, agency, 458 Secret monitoring, 39 Section 1981, 641 Section 404 compliance, 541 Section 10(b), Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 521–528 Secured transactions, 211–212 Securities Act of 1933
major functions, 514–515 major provisions, 512, 514–520 nonpublic information restrictions, 529–532 selected sections, 733–734
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 473. see also Securities laws major functions, 453, 473 nonpublic information restrictions, 529–532 origins, 454 restrictions on, 386 Sarbanes–Oxley impact on, 540 whistleblower regulations, 542
Securities, defining, 513–514 Securities Enforcement Remedies Act, 512, 532 Securities Exchange Act of 1934
additional civil and criminal liability, 532–533 fraudulent purchase and sale provisions, 521–528 importance, 397 insider trading prohibitions, 528–529 major provisions, 512, 520 nonpublic information restrictions, 529–532 selected sections, 735–736
Securities fraud, 397, 532–533 Securities laws
antitrust laws versus, 497 basic purpose, 10, 511–512
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Index 783
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Dodd-Frank Act provisions, 513, 543–545 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012,
513, 545–546 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 512,
535–539 Sarbanes–Oxley provisions, 513, 540–543 Securities Act of 1933, 513, 514–520 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 513, 520–534 state blue sky laws, 513, 538–539
Security Council (UN), 364 Security interests, 209–212 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 514n Self-examination, 33 Self-incrimination, 389–390 Self-regulation, 32, 45 Sellers of securities, 515 Senate Banking Committee, 31 Senate Judiciary Committee, 74 Seniority systems, 640 Sensa, 564 Sentencing guidelines, 42, 409–410 Separation of powers, 153 Sepe, Simone, 7n Service Employees International Union, 134 Service marks, 332 Service of process, 91 Services, Sherman Act application, 484 Settlements, 125–126, 126
and judgment, 88 Severe Violator Enforcement Program, 670 Severson, Kim, 322 Sex discrimination
in employment, 629–636 in granting credit, 567–568 growth of awareness, 41 in jury selection, 103
Sexual harassment, 631–633, 648 Sexual orientation discrimination, 636 Shared values, 32 Shareholder primacy, 28 Shareholders
increasing activism, 440 lack of corporate control, 51–52 personal liability, 426 power in closely held corporations, 426 property interests, 192 role in corporations, 20, 424–426 S corporation, 432
Shea, Robert M., 130 Sheet Metal Workers International Association
Local 15, 703 Shell Oil, 484, 602, 603 Sherman Act, 491 Sherman Antitrust Act
exemptions from, 495–496 legal application, 481 monopoly prohibitions, 490–493 origins, 478 preemption by, 154 price fixing ban, 382, 479, 482–485 restraint of trade under, 479–489 sanctions under, 494–496 territorial agreements and concerted activities under,
486–487 use against organized labor, 687
Shoplifting, 289 Short-swing profits, 529 Shuey, Randall, 215, 216 Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 642 Siemens AG, 358 Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 586–588 Silence as nonacceptance, 237, 239 Silence, Miranda rights and, 390 Silver, Adam, 30 Six-person juries, 63 Sixteenth Amendment, 218 Sixth Amendment, 391–392 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 343–344 Skilling, Jeffrey, 395–396, 396 Skilling v. United States, 395–396 Skimming, 397 Skip-tracing, 574 Slander, 290 Smale, John, 48 Small-claims courts, 68 Smart permits, 592 Smartphone, 329 Smerdon, Jason, 610 Smith, Adam, 32 Smith, Geoffrey, 93n Smoking, 40, 170, 465–466. see also Tobacco Snapchat, 564 Snowden, Edward, 171 Snyder, Albert, 165 Snyder, Matthew, 165 Snyder v. Phelps, 165–166 Social contract theory, 36 Social media, 674, 701 Social Security Act, 657 Société anonyme, 372 Sociological jurisprudence, 12 Socrates, 33 Soft law, 22 Software, 316, 328 Sole proprietorships, 420 Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 595 Solid Waste Disposal Act, 599–601
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Solitude, invasion of, 287 Somali attacks, 361 Sony BMG, 39 Sony Music, 261 Sotomayor, Sonia, 77, 78, 105, 162, 167, 172, 388, 390,
625, 660 Souter, David, 570, 625, 635 Southland Corp, 485 Souza, Dawnmarie, 699 Sovereign immunity doctrine, 374 Sovereignty, 375 Special interest groups, 8 Special trial judges (STJs), 460 Special warranty deeds, 209 Species protection, 596–597 Specifically manufactured goods rule, 253 Specificity, regulatory, 453–454 Specific performance, 19, 271–273 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 376 Speech, freedom of, 162–164, 442, 700–701 Speed limits, 12 Spielberg, Steven, 393 Sporting events, fixing, 408 Sports Bribery Program (FBI), 408 Sports team merchandise, 487–489 Springfield Armory, 50 Spyware, 39 SQ3R method, 2, 709 Squatters, 207 Stakeholder capitalism, 28 Stakeholder theory, 54 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 481 Standing to sue, 88, 89, 90, 462, 606 Staples, 541 Stare decisis, 16 Starr, Evan, 247n State action exemption, 497 State blue sky laws, 513, 538–539 State courts, 66–67 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v.
Campbell, 308 State Governments and Copyright, 342 State Implementation Plan, 593 State laws
antidiscrimination, 620, 648 antitrust, 479 consumer protection, 578 debt collection, 575 denying arbitration, 133 federal versus, 154 personal jurisdiction under, 91–92 privacy and, 556 sexual orientation discrimination,
635, 636
sources, 15 trial coverage, 104
Statements, false or fraudulent, 395–396 State-of-the-art, 303 State Oil Company v. Khan, 486n States, Bill of Rights applicable to, 177 State v. Davis, 104 Stationary source pollution, 590 Statistical imbalances, 621 Statute of Anne, 340 Statute of frauds, 250–252 Statute of repose, 303 Statutes, basic principles, 15, 19, 227 Statutes of limitations, 100, 518, 525 Statutorily mandated arbitration, 133–137, 137–140 Sterling, Donald, 30 Stern, Howard, 164 Stevens, John Paul, 172, 173, 390, 603, 625, 635 Stevenson, Alexandra, 22 Stewart, Martha, 401 Stiglitz, Joseph E., 7 St. Louis Produce Market v. Hughes, 263–264 Stock, 20 Stock options, 43 Stockton Steel of California, 628 Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 138n Stored Communications Act (SCA), 556, 560–561 Stout, John H., 6 Stover, Hughie Elbert, 403 Stratford, Tim, 11 Strict constructionism, 75 Strict liability
elements of, 19, 293 environmental suits based on, 608 for torts, 302–306 for toxic waste disposal, 602 under workers’ compensation laws, 675–676
Strict scrutiny approach, 177–180 Strikes, 698–700, 703, 704 Strip search hoax, 299 Study tips, 2, 709–710 Stumpf, John, 31 Stumpf, John G., 6 Stumpf’s testimony, 31 Subject matter destruction, 236 Subject matter illegality, 236 Subject matter jurisdiction, 66, 89 Submission to arbitration, 129 Subpoenas, 456 Subprime mortgage scandal, 573 Subsidiaries, 372 Substantial performance, 266–267 Substantive law, 14 Subsurface rights, 196
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Subway, 371 Sulfur dioxide reductions, 592 Sulkowski, Adam J., 610 Sullivan, Diane, 215 Sullivan, Edwin H., 382 Sullivan, John, 215 Sullivan, Scott, 385 Summary judgment, 100 Summonses, 91, 95 Super Bowl, 164 Superfund, 602–606 Supplemental Register, 335 Supremacy Clause, 153 Supreme Court (U.S.)
activist versus restrained justices, 73–77, 76 appointments to, 74 case, 77 judicial review example, 77–82 position on due process, 176, 177 role, 73 role in federal court system, 71–73 support for arbitration, 133, 137 view of class-action suits, 93
Supreme courts, state, 67 Surprise witnesses, 97 Survivorship rights, 199 Suspect classes, 178–179 Sustainability and integrity, 6, 608 Sweetheart regulations, 470 Symbolic speech, 162
T Taco Cabana, 333 Taft-Hartley Act, 699–706 Tailhook scandal, 295 Taking a species, 597 Takings, in international law, 359 Tangible property, 193 Tarnishment, trademark dilution, 339 Taxation
of corporations, 429–430 as factor in selecting business form, 418 as limitation on property rights, 217–218 of LLCs, 434 of partnerships, 422–423 regulation as, 471 of S corporations, 434 of sole proprietors, 418
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 418 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), 418 Tax-exempt status, 435 Tax fraud, reporting, 673
Team apparel, 487–489 Technology. see also Internet
electronic signatures, 252 forcing, 591 privacy and, 657
Telemarketing fraud, 394, 553 Televised jury deliberations, 109 Television industry, 231 Tellabs, Inc. v. Mabor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 534n Tenancy in common, 199 Tenants’ property rights, 199 Tendering performance, 265 Tender of delivery, 265 Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v.
Thomas, 160 Tenth Amendment, 153 Termination of business activity, 422 Termination of offers, 236 Territorial agreements, 486–487 Terrorism, 298, 372 Testamentary gifts, 208 Tests, discriminatory, 637 Test use in hiring, 625–626, 637 Texaco, 294, 373, 376, 484 Texaco v. Dagher, 484 Text messages, 674 Theft, 290, 393 Thermal effluents, 594 Third parties’ rights
beneficiaries, 276 contracts, assignment of, 276–278 novations, 278
Third-party beneficiaries, 275 Third-party defendants, 89 Thirteenth Amendment, 152 Thomas, Clarence, 77, 78, 80, 134, 175 Thompson, Eric, 621–622 Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 621–622 Threats
by employers, 695, 700 by unions, 705
Three Mile Island nuclear plant, 606 Timberlake, Justin, 164 Time limits, 100 Time periods, blue sky laws, 538 Tipped employees, 657 Tippees, 529 Tire recycling, 600 Title to property, 207, 208, 210, 275 Tobacco
ethics of, 40 FDA regulation, 170, 465–466 global business restrictions, 370 punitive damages against manufacturers, 177
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Tobacco Control Act, 170 Tombstone ads, 516 Top management. see also Managers
compensation disclosures, 540 criminal conduct by, 404, 409 shareholder review of compensation, 439
Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Operating Co., 332 Tortfeasors, 283 Tortious behavior, 283 Tort law
basic purpose, 9, 13, 154, 283–284 due care requirement, 42 environmental suits under, 607–608 reform efforts, 303 sanctions under, 19
Tort reform, 303 Torts
basic intentional types, 284–294 damages for, 19, 306–308 defined, 19, 283 negligence, 294–302 strict liability, 302–305
Toxic substances, 600–606 Toxic Substances Control Act, 600–601 Toyota, 698 Toy recalls, 355 Trade. see also International law
contracts to restrain, 246 dispute resolution in, 373–377 major international agreements, 367–369 methods of conducting, 370–373 risks, 355–361 U.S. policy, 354
Trade deficit (U.S.), 354 Trade disparagement, 293 Trade dress, 333 Trademark dilution, 339 Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 339 Trademarks, 331–339, 488, 501 Trade practice regulation, 552 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement, 347 Trade secrets, 113, 317–323 Trade secrets and international relations, 318 Trade usage, 260 Trading emissions rights, 592 Traditional business privacy, 559 Traffic courts, 66 Training of mediators, 145 Transfer of Technology Code, 365 Transparency, 44 Transparency International, 356, 356n Transportation industry labor laws, 688–689 Travelers Corp, 485
Treaty of Rome, 366 Trespass, 19, 289–290, 608 Trial by jury, 63–65 Trial courts
appellate courts’ deference to, 112 in federal court system, 66 as starting point in litigation, 67
Trial judges, 62–63 Trials
appeals following, 110–112 burden of proof in, 107–109 decisions, 110 jury selection for, 102–104 stages of, 104–107
Trident, Inc., 500 Triple damages, 494, 495 TRIPS, 365 Trust, 53 Trust arrangements, 217 Trustees, 217, 478, 576 Truth, as defamation defense, 291 Truth-in-Lending Act, 553, 572–574 Truth-in-Lending Simplification Act, 574 Tuchman, Barbara, 36 Turner, Lynn, 545 Turquoise Lament, 35 Twain, Mark, 354 Twenty-first Amendment, 152 Twitter, 103, 701 Two Pesos, 333 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 333 Tyco, 94, 439, 540 Tying contracts, 499–500 Tyson Foods, 624
U Uber, 315 UBS, AG, 485 Ultrahazardous activity, 305 Unanimous jury verdicts, 64 Unauthorized access devices, 398 Unauthorized foreign workers, 679 Unconscionable contracts, 245 “Underwater” mortgages, 275 Underwriters, 515 Undue hardship, 645 Undue influence, 249 Undue means, 140 Unenforceable contracts, 233 Unfair competition, 503–504 Unfair labor practices, 694–699, 703–705 Unfair or deceptive acts or practices, 552, 553
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Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, selected sections, 723–728 basic purpose, 15, 193 good faith requirement, 41–42 implied warranties, 232 influence on contract law, 227 preexisting obligation rule, 243
Uniform Commercial Information Transactions Act, 240 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 377 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act, 657, 666–669 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 252 Uniform Partnership Act, 423 Uniform Securities Act, 538 Unilateral contracts, 228–229, 237, 240 Union Carbide, 373 Union dues, 628, 699, 707 Unions. see also Labor laws
certification, 693–694 compulsory membership, 701–702 current status, 686, 687 interfering with formation of, 695–696 right to form, 690 suits against, 702–703 unfair practices by, 703–705
Union security clauses, 702 Union shops, 702, 704 Uniroyal, 639 Unitaid, 331 United Airlines, 671 United Automobile Workers, 698 United Nations, 362–365 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 364 United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, 364 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 377 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, 372 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA),
368, 369 United States v. Brown, 104 United States v. Causby, 195 United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 428 United States v. O’Hagan, 530–531 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 167 United States v. Stevens, 167 United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 639 Unjust enrichment, 232 Unjust laws, 49 Unlimited damages, 641 Unlimited liability, 422, 426, 431 Unocal, 373 Unreasonable behavior, 298 Unreasonableness test, 481
Unreasonable searches and seizures, 386 Unsolicited ideas, 231 URAC, 230–231 Ury, William, 123 U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement, 369 U.S. Export Enforcement and Economic
Espionage, 360 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 324, 334 Utilitarianism, 37 Utility patents, 324
V Valid contracts, 233 Values
based on law, 40–43 based on organizational codes, 46–47 based on professional codes, 43–45 diversity in U.S., 30 individual, 48–49 moral, 32
Values-based management, 38 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 478 Variances, 217 Vassilkovska v. Woodfield Nissan, Inc.,
241–242 Vehicle emissions, 590 Veil of ignorance, 36 Venetian Patent Act of 1474, 323 Venmo, 562 Verdicts, 109 Verniero, Peter G., 77 Vertical agreements, 481 Vertical mergers, 502 Vertical price fixing, 485–486 Vertical restraints, 479–480 Vertical territorial agreements, 487 Vetoes (UN Security Council), 364 Viacom, 164 Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 346 Video game violence, 167 Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 559 Violent crime, 382 Vioxx, 126 Voidable contracts, 233 Void contracts, 233, 245 Voir dire, 102–103 Volkswagen, 555
emissions scandal, 93 Voluntary arbitration, 127, 137, 142 Voluntary bargaining issues, 697, 698 Voluntary petitions for bankruptcy, 576 Vulgar language, 633
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W Wachovia, 511 Wacky Warning Label contest, 101 Wagner Act, 689–690, 694, 696 Waiting periods, 515, 516 Waivers, 270–271 Wallace, Pearl D., 201 Wallison, Peter J., 516 The Wall Street Journal, 291 Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 296 Wal-Mart, 54, 298, 358, 397, 628 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 105 Walt Disney World, 638 Walton, Sam, 397 Warnaco, 293 Warranties, 232, 578 Warrantless searches, 387, 388 Warranty deeds, 209 Warren, Earl, 76 Warren, Elizabeth, 31 Washington, George, 323 Waste disposal laws, 599–602 Watchdog group, 31 Water pollution, 594–596 Watnick, Valerie, 240n Wealth, 219 The Wealth of Nations, 32 Weapons, right to possess, 171 Website privacy policies, 236 Webster, Daniel, 94 Weise, Karen, 490 Weiss, Melvyn I., 405 Wells, Christina, 171n Wells Fargo, 6, 31 Westboro Baptist Church, 165 Wheelchair accessibility, 645 Wheeler-Lea amendment, 503 Whistleblowers, 398, 542, 673 White-collar crime, 382–383 Whitehead, Charles, 7n Whitman v. American Trucking, 590 WikiLeaks, 170, 171 Willful acts, 384 Willful and wanton negligence, 298–299 Willfulness, 293 Wilson, Michelle, 9 Winters v. New York, 167 Wire fraud, 394–395 Wiretap Act, 560 Wiretapping, 287 Witnesses, surprise, 97
Wolfe, Randy, 343 Women as CEOs, 649 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN)
Act, 657, 662–663 Workers’ compensation, 675–679 Workers, endangering, 406–407 Work/family balance, 664 Work-for-hire, 341 Work hours, 656–658 Workplace safety, 669–670 World Bank, 365 WorldCom Inc., 52, 94, 382, 385, 511, 533, 540 World Health Organization Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, 370, 370n World Intellectual Property Organization,
347, 377 World Justice Project, 8 World Trade Center attacks, 298 World Trade Organization, 347, 365 World-Wide Volkswagen case, 91 Wright, Frank Lloyd, 690 Wright, Sandra, 285 Writers Guild of America strike, 698 Writs of certiorari, 67, 71, 72, 110 Written contracts, 249–251 Written warnings to employees, 680 Wyatt, Edward, 472, 545
X Xerox, 337
Y Yahoo, 373 Yankelovich, Skelly ad White, 600 Yanza, Luis, 376 Yarbrough-Williams & Houle, Inc., 201 Yellow-dog contracts, 689 Yeshiva University, 393 YouTube, 346, 562
Z Zarroli, Jim, 385 Zip codes, 568 Zitter, Jay M., 252n Zoning ordinances, 217 Zuckerberg, Mark, 29, 38, 92 Zyprexa, 126