3-5 page Essay - Media Management and Innovation
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DIGITAL JOURNALISM: MAKING NEWS, BREAKING NEWS
MAPPING DIGITAL MEDIA: GLOBAL FINDINGS
Mapping Digital Media is a project of the Open Society Program on
Independent Journalism and the Open Society Information Program
Th e project assesses the global opportunities and risks that are created for media by the switch-
over from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting; the growth of new media platforms as
sources of news; and the convergence of traditional broadcasting with telecommunications.
Th ese changes redefi ne the ways that media can operate sustainably while staying true to values
of pluralism and diversity, transparency and accountability, editorial independence, freedom of
expression and information, public service, and high professional standards.
Th e project, which examines the changes in-depth, builds bridges between researchers and
policymakers, activists, academics and standard-setters. It also builds policy capacity in countries
where this is less developed, encouraging stakeholders to participate in and infl uence change.
At the same time, this research creates a knowledge base, laying foundations for advocacy work,
building capacity and enhancing debate.
Covering 56 countries, the project examines how these changes aff ect the core democratic service
that any media system should provide—news about political, economic and social aff airs.
Th e MDM Country Reports are produced by local researchers and partner organizations in
each country. Cumulatively, these reports provide a unique resource on the democratic role of
digital media. In addition to the country reports, research papers on a range of topics related to
digital media have been published as the MDM Reference Series.
Th ese publications are all available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/mapping-digital-media.
E D I T O R I A L C O M M I S S I O N
Yuen-Ying Chan, Christian S. Nissen, Dušan Reljić,
Russell Southwood, Damian Tambini
The Editorial Commission is an advisory body. Its members are not responsible for the
information or assessments contained in the Mapping Digital Media texts
O P E N S O C I E T Y P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M T E A M
Marius Dragomir, senior manager/publications editor;
Mark Thompson, policy projects offi cer; Meijinder Kaur, program coordinator;
Sameer Padania, program offi cer; Stewart Chisholm, associate director;
Gordana Janković, former director
O P E N S O C I E T Y I N F O R M AT I O N P R O G R A M T E A M
Vera Franz, senior program manager; Darius Cuplinskas, director
Mapping Digital Media
Global Findings
A R E P O R T B Y T H E O P E N S O C I E T Y F O U N D A T I O N S
W R I T T E N B Y
Fernando Bermejo
Ying Chan
Iulian Comanescu
Carlos Cortés
Aboubakr Jamaï
Tanja Kerševan Smokvina
Marko Milosavljević
Christian S. Nissen
Rita Ruduša
Justin Schlosberg
Russell Southwood
Jelena Surčulija Milojević
Damian Tambini
Martijn de Waal
Graham Watts
E D I T E D B Y
Marius Dragomir and Mark Thompson (Open Society Program on Independent Journalism)
July 2014
© 2014 Open Society Foundations
Th is publication is available as a pdf on the Open Society Foundations website under
a Creative Commons license that allows copying and distributing the publication,
only in its entirety, as long as it is attributed to the Open Society Foundations
and used for noncommercial educational or public policy purposes.
Photographs may not be used separately from the publication.
ISBN: 978-1-910243-03-9
Published by
OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS
224 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10019
United States
For more information contact:
MAPPING DIGITAL MEDIA
OPEN SOCIETY PROGRAM ON INDEPENDENT JOURNALISM
Millbank Tower, 21–24 Millbank
London, SW1P 4QP
United Kingdom
Website
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/projects/mapping-digital-media
Layout by Judit Kovács, Createch Ltd., Hungary
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Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 9
Marius Dragomir and Mark Th ompson
MAJOR TRENDS BY THEMES AND REGIONS ....................................................... 21
Themes ..................................................................................................... 39
CHAPTER ONE
Public Interest and Commercial Media: Digital Trends ............................ 41
Carlos Cortés
CHAPTER T WO
Public Media and Digitization: Seven Th eses ........................................... 75
Damian Tambini
CHAPTER THREE
Journalism and Digital Times: Between Wider Reach and Sloppy Reporting... 107
Ying Chan
CHAPTER FOUR
News Choice and Off er in the Digital Transition ..................................... 129
Jelena Surčulija Milojević
CHAPTER FIVE
Telecoms and News .................................................................................. 145
Iulian Comanescu
CHAPTER SIX
Access to Spectrum: Winners and Losers .................................................. 159
Marko Milosavljević and Tanja Kerševan Smokvina
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S6
CHAPTER SEVEN
Distributing the Digital Dividend ............................................................ 175
Christian S. Nissen
CHAPTER EIGHT
Business and Ownership of the Media in Digital Times ........................... 191
Martijn de Waal
Regions ..................................................................................................... 211
CHAPTER NINE
Digital Media in the European Union ...................................................... 213
Justin Schlosberg
CHAPTER TEN
Digital Media in the EU Enlargement Countries ..................................... 239
Justin Schlosberg
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Digital Media in the Former Soviet Union ............................................... 253
Rita Ruduša
CHAPTER T WELVE
Digital Media in Latin America ................................................................ 265
Fernando Bermejo
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Digital Media in South-East Asia ............................................................. 277
Graham Watts
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Digital Media in Asia: India and Pakistan................................................. 293
Graham Watts
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
Digital Media in the Arab World.............................................................. 301
Aboubakr Jamaï
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
Digital Media in Africa: Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa .............................. 313
Russell Southwood
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Project Information ......................................................................... 327 Published reports ..................................................................................... 329
Translated reports ..................................................................................... 336
Reference series ........................................................................................ 337
Regional editors ....................................................................................... 337
Methodology ........................................................................................... 338
REPORT STRUCTURE ......................................................................................... 341
Context .................................................................................................... 341
1. Media Consumption: Th e Digital Factor ........................................... 341
2. Digital Media and Public or State-Administered Broadcasters ............ 344
3. Digital Media and Society .................................................................. 335
4. Digital Media and Journalism ............................................................ 347
5. Digital Media and Technology ........................................................... 349
6. Digital Business ................................................................................. 352
7. Policies, Laws and Regulators ............................................................. 354
8. Conclusions ....................................................................................... 358
9. Recommendations ............................................................................. 359
Introduction
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Mapping the World’s Digital
Media Marius Dragomir and Mark Thompson
The Project
Over the course of the past decade, digital television and internet have brought about
radical changes for media businesses, journalists, and citizens at large. Platforms
distributing journalistic content have proliferated, technological advances have driven
media companies to revamp their operations in the sometimes desperate attempt to
remain lucrative and relevant, while journalists operate in an ever faster-paced industry,
and citizens have access to a cornucopia of sources of news and information.
By the end of 2013, over 55 percent of households worldwide had a television set
receiving digital signal, some 25 percentage points more than in 2008. In the developed
world that fi gure stood at more than 81 percent. By the end of 2014, the world is
forecast to number almost three billion internet users, two thirds of them in the
developing world. With mobile phone saturation standing at nearly 100 percent of the
global population, consumption on mobile platforms has surged dramatically as well.
Mobile broadband subscriptions are predicted to reach 2.3 billion by the end of 2014.1
But is this ever-more-connected world a better place for independent journalism? Th is
is one of the questions that the Mapping Digital Media (MDM) project sought to answer.
Th e Program on Independent Journalism (PIJ), formerly the Media Program, and the
Information Program at the Open Society Foundations launched MDM in 2011 as a
global research and advocacy project that would assess the global opportunities and risks
for journalism and media created by the switch from analog to digital broadcasting,
the emergence of new media platforms—particularly online—and the convergence
between internet, broadcasting, and telecommunications.
1. Data released by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) between December 2013 and May 2014..
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 2
During 2011 and 2014, the project generated a total of 56 country reports authored by
almost 200 local researchers coming chiefl y from academia, journalism and civil society
sector. Th e reports were based on a methodology common for the entire project. (See
the Project Information.) Th e country reports were supplemented by 20 expert papers
on specifi c new trends such as mobile television, net neutrality and online advertising.
Th e countries included in the project are diverse in terms of technological and economic
development, media systems, and social background. Th ey range from small nations
with under one million souls such as Montenegro to giants like China and India, from
heavily rural Chile and India to the city-state Singapore, from low GDP Kenya with
under US$ 1,000 per capita to rich Sweden, Canada, Netherlands or the U.S. steadily
advancing towards the US$ 50,000 threshold. Th ey include overwhelmingly Muslim
Pakistan, Tunisia and Turkey, the largely atheist Czech Republic, and many religiously
diverse countries. Th e total combined population of all 56 countries included in the
study surpasses 5.1 billion, almost three quarters of the globe’s people today. In total,
Mapping Digital Media generated 5,575 pages of analysis. Th is publication gathers the
main fi ndings of the project.
Journalism in Digital Times
The Profession
Digitization has been one of the main drivers behind the changing nature of journalism
as it aff ected news values, professional ethics, workfl ows, working conditions and
newsroom management. On the positive side, it tremendously improved access to
information and dissemination channels, but at the same time it has unleashed a spate
of unethical practices, the most worrying being plagiarism and lack of verifi cation.
Investigative journalists in particular have gained access to a fl urry of new platforms
to put out their stories, particularly on the internet. However, in most countries, the
social impact of journalistic investigations remains limited. As never before, citizens
engage in investigations and reporting and post their write-ups on the internet, but in
many cases the quality of these stories has come under critical scrutiny.
Th e biggest gain from digitization is the growing space for free expression by minority
groups, particularly ethnic and sexual minorities. More than ever before, marginalized
groups have the opportunity to make their voices heard. Paradoxically, however,
traditional media have not signifi cantly reduced their bias, marginalizing practices,
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or sensational coverage of minorities and other sensitive issues. Secondly, digitization
has boosted more than ever before the space for political expression. Candidates in
elections almost everywhere in the world use the internet and social media to reach
voters. Th is has created more vibrant political debates and dialog, but it has not often
translated into an increased number of political actors.
Overall, with all these ups and downs, journalism entered an era of opportunities that
it has never had before. But how the environment journalists operate in has changed in
the past years is a diff erent story.
The Environment
With few exceptions (mostly in Europe), governments have bungled the policies and
regulation governing digital switch-over. Coupled with the disarray of an industry
hit by economic crisis, changing audiences and technology challenges, it did little to
improve the environment in which journalism operates. Political wrangling and special
interests and/or lack of vision and interest in the policy-making process have defeated
the hopes that digitization would deliver a more diversifi ed media. We have more
channels, but not more owners—and sometimes fewer than before.
Public interest is rarely at the core of national digital switch-over policies. Public
consultations are wholly lacking or, in some cases, a charade. Public media continue
to suff er from political interference and funding cuts, as well as demoralization and
uncertainty. Public service obligations outside public service media are rarely present.
On the business side, media operators increasingly cut back funding for in-depth
journalism as this content does not bring healthy returns. State advertising and
advertorials compromising editorial independence are rife.
Th e outcome is an unprecedented crisis in the supply of public interest journalism—
meaning journalism that is, independent, contextual, accountable, and relevant to
citizenship.
Brave New Digital World: A Myth and A Waste
Although it was expected to create space for more players and voices, digitization has
been almost everywhere an engine for faster consolidation and vertical integration,
reinforcing the familiar problems of media markets. Th anks to the more effi cient use
of frequencies, digitization has freed transmission frequencies that were occupied
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 4
by the old analog transmission and has thus made room for a much higher number
of broadcasters than before. Practically, there are more frequencies available for
broadcasters today in any given place than any functioning and robust market in the
world can ever accommodate.
But despite this staggering resource opportunity, the number of players in most of
the countries that have reached an advanced stage of the digital switch-over has not
increased signifi cantly as expected. Instead, you have the handful of old, dominant
broadcasters running more channels than before and in many cases struggling to fi ll
out the newly gained space and to pull in cash to cover this channel frenzy.
In most countries in the world, television remains the most popular medium in terms
of audience size, followed by radio. Th ere are exceptions such as Kenya (and other
African countries) where radio and cell phones beat that. On the other hand, the
increased use of other devices and platforms has not dented the television viewership.
On the contrary, people increasingly watch television on multiple devices. In Europe,
where television is the most used source of news, viewing time has spiked in recent
years precisely thanks to new platforms and devices.
However, more means rather less in our times.
Astonishingly, after fi ve or even ten years of transition to digital, there is no country
in this project where a new television entrant has become the most popular channel.
On the contrary: in all countries in Europe that have completed the digital transition,
incumbent players have strengthened their position. Even worse, in some former
members of the Soviet Union, there is a danger that the number of broadcasters may
reduce, unable to keep up with the digital transition.
Public service media are not faring better despite new opportunities created by
digitization to expand their reach and capacity. In Europe, public service media are
granted privileges in exchange for the responsibilities upon them. Th ey receive funding
to pay for upgrading production and transmission facilities as well as extra frequencies
for which they do not had to pay or compete. However, for some public service media,
particularly in countries where they struggle fi nancially and are grappling with audience
declines, the award of more frequencies is rather a burden as they lack the capacity,
money, and in some cases also the vision to fi ll extra channels.
In countries where broadcast content off ering has increased, this has not meant more
quality and not at all more diversity either. What newly-licensed television channels
often do is to recycle or replicate content on more channels at staggered hours.
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Th is failure to inject fresh blood into media markets has been the result of badly
planned digital licensing strategies, political barriers and governments and regulators
that retain a discretionary power in awarding broadcast licenses, or the lack of interest
in investing in new media outlets (this has happened in most of Latin America because
digital television is a hefty and risky investment in poorer markets).
Generally, the attitude of regulators in disbursing digital frequencies is to sell them
to the highest bidders, which favors incumbent actors and disadvantages local and
community media. Government favoritism towards well-established broadcasters
continues to guide the licensing policies in all of the countries outside north-western
Europe, perpetuating habits from the old times when governments give licenses to
media mostly to secure obedient and loyal coverage.
Policy-making on digital switch-over has mostly been led by industry and government,
taking little account of public interest issues, and rarely involving civil society in any
way. No public interest provisions were adopted in digital switch-over policies in
almost two thirds of the MDM countries from Bulgaria and Georgia to Japan and
Kazakhstan. In most of the countries, there is no civil society group able to engage in
this debate or even to show interest in this issue.
In some countries, public consultation was bogus. In Hungary, the government called
for public consultations on the digital switch-over strategy, but it did not use a word
of the contributions received. In many places, such as Pakistan, Egypt or some in
Southeast Asia, there is not even a plan for the digital switch-off . Procrastination has
become a tactic for certain governments to minimize and conceal the opportunities
created by digital switch-over, in order to deter new entrants and voices. So far, only a
few countries, particularly those with strong public service media, have made diversity
of channels a principle of their licensing policy. Th ese countries are mostly Western
and Northern European. Elsewhere, public service and state-administered broadcasters
are undergoing profound crises. Th eir audiences are tumbling and they grapple with
severe fi nancial downturns.
Digitization has often been used by media companies to reinforce the argument for
media consolidation. Th e argument goes that traditional media have to consolidate
their operations under one roof to be able to remain lucrative in the digital market.
Several countries have imposed tighter ceilings on concentration; ranging from Chile
and Argentina in Latin America to Albania, Montenegro, Croatia, and the Czech
Republic in Europe, and South Africa, most of these exceptional outcomes were the
result of a long political struggle for media pluralism.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 6
A major problem that the media sector has faced is the lack of transparency of media
ownership and funding sources. Generally, there is little information on media owners
and fi gureheads are often used to hide the actual entities that own media. Where legal
provisions on transparency are in place, they are seldom enforced.
Th anks to reduced entry costs, new media ventures were launched mostly on the
internet. Th ey include commercial news portals as well as new forms of media such as
hyper-local citizen media, media run by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
media funded by political and religious groups. However, only a few business models
in this sector have been successful commercially and no pure-player (online-only)
media outlet has yet taken the lead in audience-size over the biggest television, radio
and press outlets. In many countries, the most trusted and visited websites among news
providers are run by traditional media. Th is does not mean that traditional media have
not been hit. Print newspapers have, with major exceptions, suff ered the most.
In television, the growth in the number of channels (not owners) has not been matched
by a surge in funding. At the same time, funding for media has become increasingly
fragmented among more players and platforms. Th is has forced many media outlets to
make cuts, aff ecting fi rst of all and mostly in-depth journalism, a costly business that
brings low (or no) returns. Instead, media focus increasingly on sensational content,
which captures eyeballs and revenue. Moreover, the sector is in a desperate quest for
new sources of money, some of which threaten journalistic independence. Advertorials
not labeled as such or involvement of advertisers in shaping and framing content are
common place in a number of countries ranging from Russia to Bosnia and Herzegovina
to Mexico. In others such as Estonia, Chile or Latvia, product placement disguised
as editorial content has been on the rise. In India, “private treaties” between media
and advertisers are an industry norm, forcing journalists to refrain from criticizing
advertisers.
But probably the most detrimental eff ect on independent journalism in recent years
has been state advertising. With ad money shrinking or insuffi cient to support media
markets and no new major sources of funding, state advertising money is often the
lifebuoy for media companies in dire fi nancial straits. Unfortunately, state ad money
comes almost always with strings attached and is widely used to discriminate against
independent, critical journalism. Examples abound from Pakistan to Georgia to South
Africa to Colombia to Hungary to Spain.
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Who Is Afraid of Telecoms?
Th e major novelty introduced by digitization is the increased importance of the
transmission sector in the media market. Transmission companies have a major say in
content production, program sale, distribution, transmission and access to content,
and in equipment choice. Problems related to the gatekeeping role of the transmission
providers are not widespread as yet. However, this is a contentious area as it off ers a
signifi cant and cheap potential to bar access of media outlets to audiences (or vice
versa).
As expected, telecommunications businesses have become a major player in this fi eld.
In most of the countries where digital switch-over has made progress, telcos became the
natural player in digital transmission as they have the technical capability to run digital
multiplexes (transmission facilities fi t for distributing digital channels) or to deploy
television over broadband, which is likely to become the most feasible form of carrying
television content in the near future. With convergence of technologies and services
leading to bundling of television, data and voice services in one package, telecoms
and cable companies are increasingly operating in the same market and overall have
become key players in distributing content.
However, when it comes to the actual impact of these new arrangements on media and
journalists, fears that telecoms will emerge as a new pressure factor for news providers
have proved groundless. Th ere is not much evidence that these companies use their
growing say in the media markets to make pressures on news providers to infl uence
coverage. Moreover, the interest of telcos in entering media businesses has been frail
to date; this is partly because telcos function according to a totally diff erent business
logic than that of media content providers, and partly because of the high level of risk
that the media industry, more ravaged than other industries by the economic crisis,
presents.
Nevertheless, in some countries, particularly developing states and countries undergoing
democratization where fl agship telcos are still state-controlled or have close links to
state authorities, telcos are able to exert pressures on news providers and journalists
on behalf of the authorities. Secondly, telcos, particularly mobile operators, are among
the largest ad spenders everywhere in the world and are thus in a position to use their
fi nancial muscles to gag news providers and journalists. Th is has so far only happened
in a few cases.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 8
Digital Champions
Western and Northern Europe have the most progressive and fast-developing digital
states in the world, thanks to the right kind of involvement by governments, supporting
rather than reducing media independence. Finland is a leading force, with one of the
highest levels of public support for the media per head and a broadcast licensing policy
strongly favoring plurality and diversity.
Elsewhere, such examples are rare. In South-east Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina has
been praised for establishing a robust broadcast and telecom regulator, admittedly an
institution that was imposed—and continues to be protected—by the international
community. In the former Soviet Union, the picture outside the Baltic countries is
rather grim. However, Georgia stands out for the creative use of internet tools in
strengthening democracy and stirring debate. In Latin America, Uruguay received
kudos for promoting transparency and staving off arbitrariness in licensing new
broadcasters, a process intended to increase the number of voices in the television
market, including community media for which the law reserves a third of the country’s
frequencies. In South-east Asia, Singapore was authoritarian before digital technology
and is more open today because of it, but it remains a laggard when it comes to freedom
of expression. Indonesia is applauded for its open digital policy-making process. In the
Arab world, Tunisia may be the country with the most promising prospects of using the
switch-over to increase diversity in the media. But this promise has yet to be fulfi lled.
What to Watch Next
Most of Europe has completed the digital switch-over. Latin America and Africa come
next along with a number of countries in the Middle East and Asia that are waking
up to the challenge. But overall, technology is advancing at a very rapid pace in this
industry and broadband is increasingly emerging as the most feasible, economical and
supple technology to carry television, likely to soon outperform terrestrial multiplex
operators in many countries. Decisions on the choice of transmission have been
generally random as no cost eff ectiveness or feasibility studies are ever conducted. As
a result, governments made massive investments in distribution facilities that are not
and are unlikely to be ever used.
In the short- to medium-term, policy debates in this fi eld are likely to focus largely on
the distribution of licenses and on ownership. Th ere are few indications that anything
will change in the pattern of regulating these issues as this process continues to be
1 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
government- and industry-led as and civil society is little involved. Access to licenses
for new entrants, including community media, a fair, transparent and open policy
decision-making process, independent regulators and balanced ownership control in
all digital media market segments are the factors that would help to create a healthier
environment for journalism to operate. Standards and rules on all these issues should
be central to the future media policies.
In the longer term, internet and mobile are—given the convergent nature of
technology—the platforms most likely to be folded into a more inclusive media and
communications policy. Online news is already governed by a set of growing set of
laws and regulatory rules, mostly related to defamation, discrimination, or incitement
to violence or hatred. In some countries, there are rules that badly hurt independent
journalism. In others, government regulation infringes crassly on freedom of expression.
In Africa, mobile is already a major communication tool. Elsewhere, content on
mobile platforms is rapidly growing. Relaxed regulation of journalistic content on
these platforms, along with obligations or incentives to carry public interest content
and—as the third element—legislation to ensure balanced and diverse ownership: this
combination should lie at the heart of a progressive media policy for the digitized
media sector.
Major Trends
by Themes
and Regions
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THEMES: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R O N E
Public Interest and Commercial Media:
Digital Trends
1. REDEFINING PUBLIC MEDIA
Public service and public interest media are defi ned very diff erently in diff erent places.
In some countries, the public interest is invoked as a cloak for state interference and
domination. In others, it is extremely underdeveloped. In a quarter of the MDM countries,
private/commercial media also have a public service obligation.
The most common form of state support for public service media during digitization has
been fi nancial—although competition for funding is intensifying. Public service media also
get places on multiplexes. Overall, digitization creates opportunities for public service media
to expand content, add new services, and boost penetration.
2. INCUMBENT POWER
Far from necessarily increasing diversity and plurality, digitization can reinforce traditional
problems in media markets.
In many countries, public service and commercial media gained digital frequencies without
contest. The lack of policy to support channel diversity has barred new voices from entering
the market.
Ineffi cient and weak legal obligations compelling the transparency and disclosure of
ownership information compound the power of incumbents.
3. INFLUENCING POLICY
Governments generally fail to ensure civil society participation in the policy process. Even
where consultations took place—in less than 20 of 56 countries—civil society’s infl uence
over resulting policies was questionable.
Some countries held open and vigorous consultations that did not result in regulation guided
by public interest. Others avoided consultations yet included public interest provisions in
policy.
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C H A P T E R T W O
Public Media and Digitization: Seven Th eses
1. REDEFINING PUBLIC MEDIA
Only in parts of Europe are public service media institutions strongly placed. Elsewhere,
public service broadcasting is not understood as a concept and digitization has brought no
pressure for reform.
Digitization and choice may increase pressure on public service broadcasters to become
more impartial. Digitally-enabled competition has led viewers and listeners in some
countries to trust public service and state broadcasters less, because they are exposed to a
wider range of views, opinions, and standards.
Public service broadcasters often perform a balancing act, observing their public service
remit while trying to attract audiences. Success in striking this balance is limited.
2. FUNDING
Audience share and reach on broadcast platforms for state and public service broadcasters
fell in most countries between 2005 and 2010. The exceptions, including Canada and
Sweden, indicate that a well-run, trusted public service broadcaster can still thrive.
Where established public service broadcasters have developed a compelling off er on new
platforms, they are among the very biggest providers of news. But the long-term effi ciency
benefi ts of digitization only become available after very signifi cant new investments.
The overall funding of public service broadcasters has shifted slightly from advertising to
the license fee and other public funds.
3. EVIDENCE FOR BETTER POLICIES
Most governments off er very little vision or direction in building public service media
equipped for the digital market.
The future of state and public service broadcasters is not being decided in a rational process
of evidence-based debate. Policy discussion is limited to a clique of interested parties’ input
on technical standards, distribution costs, spectrum planning, and competition policy—not
on the public interest.
THEMES: MAJOR TRENDS
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THEMES: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R T H R E E
Journalism and Digital Times:
Between Wider Reach and Sloppy Reporting
1. JOURNALISM AS AN ACT, NOT JUST A PROFESSION
Citizen reporters play a notable role in developed countries and some emerging markets,
where user-generated content platforms have achieved massive popularity.
In many countries, civic groups conduct independent investigations, tackle important
policy issues, and become valuable alternative sources of information. Yet independent
investigators or bloggers often face prosecution, intimidation and threats from special
interest groups, and do not enjoy the same attention or protection as journalists.
More than 60 percent of countries saw a surge in new publishing platforms such as blogs,
independent websites, and email groups for investigative journalism. However, less than
one-third of countries found that digital media have helped to expand the social impact of
investigative journalism.
2. TRANSPARENCY
The internet is the main alternative platform for content that mainstream media outlets do
not carry because of pressure from the state, advertisers, or political parties. It has enlarged
debate on sensitive topics that are little covered in mainstream media.
By far the biggest, most unequivocal gain for investigative journalism has been the increased
access to sources, information, and data in some 80 percent of countries.
Digitization has increased public knowledge about power-holders and boosted political
activism. Yet digital media may not be playing a signifi cant role in broadening the range of
new political actors.
3. CONDITIONS
Digitization is driving changes in journalism, aff ecting news values, professional ethics,
workfl ows, working conditions, and newsroom management. It off ers faster news delivery,
better access to sources and information, and more interaction with readers. Yet it does not
necessarily foster better journalism.
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THEMES: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R F O U R
News Choice and Off er in the Digital Transition
1. CONSUMPTION
Digitization of broadcasting has not triggered massive changes in news consumption
patterns. Television is still watched overall as scheduled broadcasting, and is still the most
popular source of news and information. However, there has been a slight rise in on-demand
viewership.
People tend to consume the traditional media they trust, but in more convenient forms.
News consumption via social networks is rising daily.
Newspaper circulations have fallen rapidly in most countries. (Exceptions include China,
India, Brazil, and North Africa.) Yet online access to print media content has increased. The
most popular media online—including the most trusted and visited news sites—belong to
traditional outlets and carry the same information as their print editions.
2. DIVERSITY
Digitization has not signifi cantly aff ected total news diversity. Newly established digital
terrestrial channels mainly off er sports or entertainment. There is no case where a new
entrant has become the leading television station by audience. Also, there is no pure-player
(online only) media outlet in any country that is the most popular outlet by audience.
3. ONLINE NEWS
The most visited public service broadcasting website belongs to the BBC, which has invested
heavily in its online newsroom and become the only online news provider in the global top
10 that is subject to public service regulation.
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C H A P T E R F I V E
Telecoms and News
1. CONVERGENCE OR CONCENTRATION?
The essential fact about media convergence is that it helps to spread news and
entertainment content.
The diff erences between cable companies, telecommunications companies, and mobile
providers have disappeared as cable operators became internet service providers (ISPs) and
landline telephony companies add mobile voice and internet services to their off er.
Increasing concentration of ownership is complemented by technological convergence,
meaning the dissemination of news on similar or partly similar platforms—most notably
Direct-to-Home satellite and Internet Protocol Television.
2. POLITICAL PRESSURES
There is little evidence of pressure on news providers by telecoms, cable, or mobile
companies. And no evidence that telecoms companies use news or mainstream television
operations for political infl uence, or infl uence the editorial policy of media outlets owned by
the same group.
The ownership structure in developing countries is more scattered, because the companies
are smaller.
3. NEWS AT THE MARGINS
The ever-increasing spread of entertainment delivers both the most popular type of content
among young, connected users—and is also politically safe.
Public interest news content is not a top priority for telecoms companies because it is less
attractive to young mobile users.
Telecoms and cable companies’ ownership of mainstream and all-news television is dwarfed
by their involvement in niche thematic channels such as sports or movies in bundled
packages.
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THEMES: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R S I X
Access to Spectrum: Winners and Losers
1. UBIQUITOUS MEDIA, UNEQUAL ACCESS?
Terrestrial broadcasting remains one of the most important delivery platforms for household
consumption. Its importance rises during times of crisis in developed countries. However,
broadband is increasingly the most economically viable mode of television transmission.
The digital divide separates demographic groups in each country: between urban and rural
areas, generations, genders, income groups, and groups separated by education.
These divides are expressed in terms of access to information and communication
technology, and of information competency and media literacy.
2. DIVERSITY OF DEVICE, OR CONTENT?
Increasing the number of channels does not mean increasing the quality or diversity of
content. The main question facing the media is (still) this: what matters most—the quality of
the picture, the number of channels, or the quality of the programs?
New entrants in digital broadcasting are scarce. The same content multiplies and replicates
across channels and platforms.
3. EFFECTIVE REGULATION
The problems of the analog environment are replicated in the digital one. Trends in spectrum
management and allocation, where spectrum is sold to the highest bidders, empower
incumbent actors and reduce the opportunities and prospects for local and community
media.
The granting of portions of the digital dividend to telecoms operators can be seen as
ensuring access to (mobile) broadband internet for diff erent demographic groups, regardless
of whether they live in urban or rural environments.
In the context of digital switch-over, gatekeeping problems most often concern the
economic aim of incumbent actors to gain a competitive advantage; or the political aim of
privileging a technical standard, often connected with wider national interests.
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THEMES: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R S E V E N
Distributing the Digital Dividend
1. REGULATION
In most countries where digital switch-over has been completed, it has improved
competition among terrestrial broadcasters by providing space for more television channels
and digital add-on services.
Yet many of the new digital terrestrial distribution channels make marginal contributions
to overall content diversity. Only a few countries, mostly those with strong public service
media, have factored the public interest of channel diversity into licensing policy.
The chief regulatory issue in digital switch-over has been to what extent the allocation of
bandwidth reserved for digital television ensures transmission effi ciency, fairness for the
parties involved, and transparency in the process.
2. POLICY
Outside North-Western Europe, governments control the distribution of new digital
television channels to secure obedient coverage. New channels are often given to well-
established incumbents with close ties to specifi c political and economic interests. The
prospects for countries still preparing a tender are no better.
The legal framework for regulating digital switch-over usually includes rules to secure an
open and fair process. In very few countries are these rules followed.
The best hope for a strong public interest policy for using the digital dividend may lie
in the engagement of civil society groups, helped by international institutions and non-
governmental organizations.
3. CHOICE
Broadband wireless services (mobile telephony and internet), used daily by practically all
citizens, serve social purposes no less than broadcasting does.
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THEMES: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R E I G H T
Business and Ownership of the Media
in Digital Times
1. FUNDING JOURNALISM / REVENUE
Traditional business models for print journalism face severe pressure. Some governments
have pushed their funding beyond the traditional domain of public broadcasting. In a few
countries the question has arisen whether the state should intervene to safeguard the civic
functions of media, e.g. with special funds for journalists.
Many countries report rising income from pay-TV, but it remains unclear how much of this
supports journalism.
Websites, blogs, and local community platforms have been launched in nearly all countries.
These pure online players have diffi culty becoming sustainable.
The increase in available content does not necessarily lead to diff erentiation among
dominant content providers.
2. OWNERSHIP AND INFLUENCE
Ownership consolidation is a worldwide trend, often associated with a decrease in media
plurality. But a few smaller countries report that media concentration in larger companies
has had a positive eff ect.
Although channels have multiplied since switch-over, the number of owners has not.
The infl uence on media content of media barons and their political or business allies is not
always traceable or provable. However, in a range of countries there is ample evidence of
owners trying to infl uence journalists.
It is not clear whether trends in foreign and cross-national ownership have implications
for independent journalism. However, foreign media companies often import standardized
formats and foreign programs at the cost of more local coverage.
3. ADVERTISING
While net advertising spend has not grown in most countries, the portion represented by
online advertising has risen signifi cantly, though not everywhere. Most of this money goes
to content aggregators, search engines, and social networks.
In some countries, rising pressure in the advertising market has boosted the editorial
infl uence of advertisers and media funders, as well as product placement and advertorials.
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REGIONS: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R N I N E
Digital Media in the European Union
1. MONETIZATION
The struggle to monetize news audiences has harmed the provision of good-quality public
interest news and journalism.
Most publishers off er online news for free. Some high-profi le news organizations charge for
part of the content.
An emergent third sector of journalism exploits hybrid models of foundation funding, cross-
subsidies, crowdfunding, and commissions.
2. DIGITAL POLICY
Digital switch-over of television is complete in all 19 EU member states in the Mapping
Digital Media project. Digitization of radio has, by contrast, largely failed or stalled.
Broadband coverage reached nearly universal levels in almost all EU members by 2011. But
digital divides in Eastern and Southern Europe are signifi cant.
Digitization has little impact on dominant market positions or mergers.
3. NEWS AND JOURNALISM
Television remains by far the most widely used source for news and information, although
online and mobile news services, particularly from established news brands, are increasingly
important, especially through referrals from social media
News increasingly targets individual preferences and niche audiences. Online consumption is
increasingly structured around personalization and aggregation.
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REGIONS: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R T E N
Digital Media in the EU Enlargement Countries
1. POLITICIZATION
Digital switch-over of television has suff ered from bureaucratic delays and political
obstacles. The legal and regulatory frameworks lack clarity, and coordination between
responsible agencies is often poor.
The independent performance of media is under threat from endemic politicization
(regardless of digitization), increased reliance on state aid, and worsening labor conditions.
2. PLURALISM GOOD AND BAD
Except in Turkey, newspapers have lost substantial infl uence—although newspaper content
online reaches more people than ever. Diff erences in circulation loss can be traced to
performance online.
The emergence of online news services fosters plurality in the overall news landscape but
has not usually led to a more diverse or higher-quality news off er.
In most countries minority expression in the news has expanded—to the benefi t of sexual
and ethnic minorities.
3. QUALITY
Digitization has prompted public broadcasters and commercial incumbents to invest in new
services online—with mixed results.
Broadband internet coupled with IPTV and other modes of digital television already enhance
access to plural news sources. Yet the gains are off set by tabloidization and declining
standards of journalism.
New providers of online news are few in number, but they make a signifi cant contribution to
the news off er and agenda in several countries.
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C H A P T E R E L E V E N
Digital Media in the Former Soviet Union
1. ACCESS
Internet users in this region are among the most active in the world. Yet vast segments of
society still lack access to the internet.
Digital switch-over is expected to make media more accessible to more communities, but
not necessarily to improve the plurality of news sources or content. (Russia and Kazakhstan
have not opened up the abundance of frequencies to new players.)
Urban populations select among dozens of satellite and terrestrial channels, and broadband
internet, while rural communities have access to a handful of channels and slow, if any,
internet connections.
2. FUNDING
With the fi nancial crisis, the state gained prominence as an advertiser and source of funding,
and the preferential allocation of advertising—already common practice—became even more
widespread, putting extra pressure on cash-starved independent media outlets across the
region.
3. INDEPENDENCE OF THE MEDIA
The internet off ers a tangible and fast-growing alternative to state-controlled media
channels, and investigative journalism units are beginning to emerge.
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REGIONS: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R T W E LV E
Digital Media in Latin America
1. POWER
Established groups in the television market can transition smoothly into digital television
and replicate their dominance in the new environment—especially when regulation privileges
incumbents.
Digital divides are numerous and broad, refl ecting age, wealth, education, and the urban/
rural split. Except for a few initiatives—such as Uruguay’s Ceibal plan—little has been done
to narrow these divides and improve digital literacy.
Public service media either function as state media or are indistinguishable from private
media. Digitization creates opportunities for rethinking and strengthening the role of public
media, and also of community media.
2. MONETIZATION
There are no successfully replicable business models to sustain online journalism. News
websites mostly replicate offl ine outlets owned by dominant groups; and journalists seem
increasingly vulnerable to pressure in various forms.
The shortage of credible and current data on equipment ownership, audience, and news
consumption predates digitization. It has become more acute as media markets and media
consumption grow more complex.
3. NEWS ONLINE
The leading incumbent media outlets, particularly newspapers, have become leading news
sources on the internet.
Online communication is, however, a signifi cant and growing force. The internet has cut the
fi xed costs of launching new media outlets. New voices produce and distribute high-quality
journalism, including investigative journalism, in a number of countries.
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REGIONS: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R T H I R T E E N
Digital Media in South-East Asia
1. MOBILE
Television is still the dominant medium and primary source of news in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand. But audiences are going online and connecting via mobile at an
astounding pace.
Singapore was authoritarian before digital technology and is more open today because of it.
The government and its media establishment show willingness to widen the parameters of
acceptable debate. Singaporeans move seamlessly from offl ine to online and mobile, while
still reading in print and watching television and movies on mobile devices and sharing news
in a variety of forms.
2. JOURNALISM
Most countries in the region have signifi cant ethnic/religious divides, and digital media have
provided new and prolifi c opportunities for these to be exploited through hate speech and
extremist content.
Journalism has suff ered from a lack of critical and independent professionalism. The news
agenda is set by politicians, offi cials, and the PR industry. There is very little “added value”
reporting in the form of background, context, analysis, balance, or multiple sourcing.
Digitization has made this bad situation even worse.
3. INDEPENDENT REGULATION
None of these countries has a truly independent broadcast and/or telecoms regulator.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 6
REGIONS: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R F O U R T E E N
Digital Media in Asia: India and Pakistan
1. COMMERCIALIZATION
Rapid economic growth has driven remarkable growth of digital media consumption.
Expanding pay-TV and mobile telephony contrasts sharply with strikingly low rates of
internet usage.
The state has largely left the development of media technology to business. This has
delayed progress towards digital switch-over.
Spectrum allocation and regulation focus on pricing logic and commercial potential
(maximizing government rents), not on public interest considerations and institutional
independence.
Aggressive commercial goals color every aspect of the new media landscape, pushing up
ratings and circulations while dragging down journalistic standards and ethics.
2. POLITICIZATION
Blatant corruption aside, India’s fragmented policy apparatus creates fertile ground for
politicization and favoritism in decisions on resource allocation, technology choice, licensing
criteria, and ownership.
The nominally public broadcasters have further degenerated into government mouthpieces.
3. PLURALISM
India and Pakistan have traditions of robust public discourse. Digital media have multiplied
the voices and audiences that can participate. Marginalized groups express their own
vision online and air issues of importance to them, even though little fi lters through to the
national conversation.
Digital media make a signifi cant contribution to political and civil campaigns.
Big media companies have subsumed much of the critical blogosphere, providing platforms
for leading commentators, co-opting the more independent voices.
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C H A P T E R F I F T E E N
Digital Media in the Arab World
1. ACCESS
Media consumers have more choice than ever before. Personal computer ownership is
rising steadily and mobile telephony boosts the provision of digital content and news. Yet
television still reigns as the media platform of choice.
Lack of aff ordability and access impede digitization. Most households are not equipped
to access digital content, and internet use is largely limited to urban areas and educated
segments of the population—and predominantly to men.
If illiteracy and poverty impede the spread of the benefi ts of digitization in Egypt and
Morocco, relatively high levels of education and literacy in Jordan and Lebanon present great
opportunities.
The Arab Spring showed how social media uptake has intensifi ed political activism and
debate. Since 2011, a culture of protest has taken hold amid fast-growing access to digital
media. The media reform movement is now embedded in the wider struggle for political
change.
2. JOURNALISM AND SUSTAINABILITY
The impact of the internet on professional ethics is mostly negative, with less fact-checking
and more sensationalism.
There is no viable business model for online news media.
Digitization has had little or no eff ect on the media market, ownership, economics, or
independence. The incestuous relationship between commercial media interests and political
elites remains strong.
3. INDEPENDENT REGULATION
The benefi ts that digitization should bring for strengthening free speech have been
hampered by a hostile regulatory environment, where independent voices are suppressed
and political and commercial interests are protected.
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REGIONS: MAJOR TRENDS
C H A P T E R S I X T E E N
Digital Media in Africa: Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa
1. ACCESS
The digital divide is in many ways an access-to-electricity divide.
Internet use remains largely urban, forming a signifi cant part of middle-class news
consumption and debate. However, it continues to ripple outwards to smaller towns and
some rural areas.
Citizens have access to an ever wider range of sources and news materials, most notably
foreign news—especially about their own countries.
2. NEWS AND MOBILEY
Local news sites are among the 20 most used websites in all three countries.
Given the high level of mobile internet use for news and information, it is notable that all
media output to mobile phones is a cut-down version of other output or the internet version
seen on a small screen. Dedicated news products for mobile handsets are keenly awaited.
3. ENTRENCHED INFLUENCES
Digital switch-over has proved particularly challenging across Sub-Saharan Africa as it
requires government resources plus the ability to work with a stakeholder group that
includes private broadcasters.
Public broadcasting is state-run with the partial exception of South Africa. Viewers in Nigeria
and Kenya have little trust in their state broadcasters. Nevertheless, the state broadcasters
in Nigeria and South Africa are powerful players with signifi cant resources.
Relationships between politicians and the media, and between government as one of the
largest advertisers and the media, are usually opaque. Politicians lurk in the shadows but
there is no way of knowing who the benefi cial owners of particular companies are.
Lack of market data makes it impossible to know whether government advertising decisions
are objectively grounded or refl ect political and economic interests.
Themes
4 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Public Interest and Commercial Media: Digital Trends Carlos Cortés
Introduction
Public service broadcasters face an ambiguous situation in both the course and the
aftermath of digitization.1 While digitization opens an opportunity for them to broaden
and strengthen their public mission by expanding content, adding new services, and
boosting penetration, it also threatens their very existence: it is likely to increase and
dramatically enhance the commercial off er, reinforcing the case against using taxpayers’
money to produce information via public service broadcasters. Digitization requires,
moreover, substantial investments (infrastructure, equipment, training), which, in the
case of public service broadcasters, means more public funding—an unpopular cause
to advocate.
For commercial media, meanwhile, digitization has accelerated consolidation, cross-
ownership deals, and vertical integration. Far from being an opportunity for increased
diversity and plurality, digitization seems to reinforce traditional problems in media
markets.
Th is chapter explores developments in four main areas. First, it explores how public
interest provisions are present in digital switch-over policy. While there is no single
defi nition of the public interest, several countries have addressed the concept in various
ways. Second, it analyzes how regulation ensures a role for public service broadcasters in
the digital era. Th is was achieved in some countries by securing frequencies for public
1. Digitization has also challenged the term “public service broadcaster,” and the term “public service media” is now
often used. Th is chapter uses both terms, though “public service broadcasting” is preferred, depending on context.
C H A P T E R O N E
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S4 2
media in digital multiplexes and introducing must-carry provisions for commercial
transmission operators, or by requiring commercial media to produce and disseminate
public service content. Although the latter provisions are common, they are mostly
unrelated to digitization.
Th ird, the chapter describes the changes that commercial media have undergone
in the digital transition. A number of countries have introduced reforms (again,
not always related to digital switch-over) to address issues such as ownership limits,
market share, foreign investment, and transparency. On the other hand, in the area
of licensing and operation of digital multiplexes, the automatic renewal of licenses
for incumbent commercial broadcasters and the automatic award of digital licenses to
certain commercial operators have had a negative impact on media diversity.
Finally, the chapter maps models of regulation of news online, which takes the form of
general or specifi c regulation. Most of the general laws in this area are related to crimes
like defamation, discrimination, or incitement, while some other laws apply both
offl ine and online to publishers and news editors. In addition, special legislation for
the internet addresses intermediary liability, net neutrality, and content dissemination.
1. Public Interest
Th e notion of public interest in democratic societies relates to the collective goals that
the state should pursue on behalf of its citizens. An issue of public interest aff ects all of
society or a part of it, rather than specifi c individuals. In media and communications,
policy concerned with public interest seeks to ensure that publishing, broadcasting,
and telecommunications systems deliver political, social, and economic welfare.
Values such as freedom of expression, cultural diversity, and innovation underpin this
objective.2
Beyond this theoretical common ground, public interest is a contextual concept that
varies widely among national regulatory frameworks, as the Mapping Digital Media
(MDM) research shows. Th ere is no common defi nition of public interest in the digital
switch-over process across the 56 countries in this project.
2. See Jan Van Cuilenberg and Denis McQuail, “Media Policy Paradigm Shifts: Towards a New Communications
Policy Paradigm,” European Journal of Communications 18 (2003), p. 181.
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In some countries, the public interest concept is not identifi ed as such, yet policies and
legislation still refer to it in various ways. In France, the National Audiovisual Council
(Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel, CSA) has to take into account “the interest of each
project for the public,” safeguarding pluralism, diff erent socio-cultural expressions,
and the diversity of operators.3 Similarly, the 2008 Digital Switch-over Strategy in
Montenegro seeks to “ensure the preservation, protection and promotion of national
heritage and cultural diversity; create and promote possibilities to satisfy the needs of
people with disabilities and of vulnerable groups among the Montenegrin population.”4
Th e 1977 Broadcasting Law of Uruguay states that broadcasting services are of public
interest, yet the relevant provisions were only developed in the 2007 Community
Broadcasting Law. Article 3 establishes three principles under which the state shall award
broadcasting frequencies: plurality, promotion, and diversity; non-discrimination; and
transparency and publicity.
Brazilian digital television is also guided by several public interest goals. Inter alia, this
system is required to promote social inclusion and cultural diversity, encourage research
and development of Brazil’s information and technology sectors, and foster the entry
of new companies to the sector.5 Finally, the public interest in digital broadcasting
policy in South Africa comes in the form of provisions to grant access to content for
people with disabilities and through requirements for broadcasters to disseminate local
content in the country’s 11 offi cial languages. Furthermore, in the process of licensing
new digital channels, the South African policy says, the public interest is invoked
through a public value test run by the Independent Communications Authority of
South Africa.
Other countries have not drafted broad public interest principles, but have included
related provisions in the general digital switch-over regulation. For example, the
Armenian Ministry of the Economy drafted in 2009 a Concept Paper on digital
switch-over that called for at least one must-carry social package to be included in each
multiplex. Likewise, the broadcasting law of Kazakhstan has must-carry provisions on
“socially signifi cant information” that ensure “the right to information, free speech,
freedom of expression and foster pluralism of voices.”6 Th e Russian Government
Commission on Development of Television and Radio Broadcasting introduced must-
3. Law on Freedom of Communication, Article 29. Th is law has been modifi ed by Law No. 2004-669 of 2004.
4. Broadcasting Agency of Montenegro, Digital Switch-over Strategy, Chapters 1 and 2.
5. See Decree No. 4,901 of 2003.
6. Statute on Television and Radio Broadcasting, Article 12.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S4 4
carry provisions on “an all-Russia information channel that covers the main events that
take place in our country and abroad,” and several other channels on entertainment,
cultural life, sports, and public aff airs.7
Th e “all-Russia information” must-carry provisions package became a platform for the
government to advance its political agenda. Th is situation illustrates the aversion to
public interest legislation in many countries, where the public interest is invoked in
media and communications policy as a cloak for state interference and domination. In
China, this kind of regulation serves the objective of regime control of the broadcasting
sector. In October 2011, the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television
issued the notice “On Going a Step Further to Strengthen the Management of Satellite
Television Programs,” ordering satellite television channels to air more cultural,
education, and technology news and programs, along with a requirement to broadcast
a “morality show” that “promotes traditional Chinese moral virtues and core socialist
values.”
In other countries, the very concept of public interest is controversial and associated
in the public mind with the interests of political power. In others again, it is extremely
underdeveloped. Argentina, for example, has no general public interest safeguard in
its digital switch-over policy. Public interest provisions are totally absent from digital
switch-over policies in many of the MDM countries, including Bulgaria, Egypt,
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, and Spain, among others.
It is striking that the existence of clear public interest provisions does not necessarily
mean that a country had a robust policy consultation process with civil society. In other
words, there is no direct correlation between public consultation and public interest
regulation. Th e examples discussed below show various kinds of correlation between
consultation and regulation. Some countries held open and vigorous consultations that
did not result in regulation guided by public interest, while others skipped consultations
altogether, yet included public interest provisions in the policy.
According to France’s 2007 Law on the Modernization of Audiovisual Broadcasting,
the prime minister would approve the digital switch-over scheme only after the CSA
had carried out a public consultation. Th e CSA received 80 contributions from
diff erent stakeholders, ranging from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to
7. “Concept of Development of TV and Radio Broadcasting in Russian Federation in 2008–2015,” Collection of
Laws of the Russian Federation, No. 49, 2007.
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local authorities, which were used afterwards by the prime minister’s offi ce. In the
end, public interest provisions formed part of the law. In Uruguay, another country
with public interest provisions in its digital switch-over policy, the Community
Broadcasting Law was adopted following input from citizens. Article 14 of this law
requires the government to establish mechanisms for ongoing public participation in
the implementation of public policies for the community broadcasting sector.8 Along
the same lines, public consultations on the digital migration policy in South Africa
took place before its adoption in 2008 and also before its amendment in 2012. A
similar consultation process was launched at the end of 2013 in Uruguay to introduce
new changes.9
Brazil, on the other hand, did not experience similar public participation. Although
Decree No. 5820 of 2006 did provide for the creation of a forum to discuss the
Brazilian digital broadcasting standard, it restricted participation to the industry and
the technical and scientifi c community. Th ere were similar restrictions on civil society
involvement in developing digital media policy in Kazakhstan.
Th ere are also cases of countries with public participation that did not necessarily result
in public interest provisions in digital switch-over policy. In the United Kingdom,
the 2003 television switch-over policy was preceded by a public consultation by the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Department of Trade and Industry.
Contributions were submitted by 42 organizations and fi ve individuals, but their
impact on the policy decisions that followed is not clear.
In the United States, the President’s Advisory Committee on the Public Interest
Obligations of Digital Broadcasters included representatives from organizations
such as the American Enterprise Institute, Media Access Project, Native American
Public Telecommunications, Action for Children’s Television, and the National Parent
Teacher Association. However, the diff erences between these groups and the industry
representatives were insurmountable, which prevented the committee’s report from
having an impact on policy.
In some other countries consultations were bogus. Hungary is perhaps the most
relevant case. In 2006, the prime minister’s offi ce carried out a consultation to gather
input for the digital switch-over strategy. Further on, in 2010, the Ministry of National
8. For the last fi ve years the government has been conducting consultations on a bill known as the Law on Audio-
visual Communication Services (LCSA). Last December the House passed the bill, and at this time of writing it
faces debate in the Senate.
9. Government Notice, Department of Communications, No. 954, 6 December 2013.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S4 6
Development held another consultation, this time on the digital renewal action plan.
But the gathered feedback was not used at all. Th e Executive apparently lobbied
some members of parliament to push the plan through quietly without including any
feedback from the consultation.
Something similar happened in Armenia, where an initial Concept Paper was drafted
by an interdepartmental commission under the minister of the economy and approved
by the government in 2009. Th e same body also oversaw draft amendments to the
Law on Television and Radio in 2010. Th e Concept Paper was adopted without
consultation and, to make matters worse, it only became publicly available after
government approval. Facing strong criticism from NGOs, the National Assembly
held parliamentary hearings on the proposed amendments to the law. However, most
of the input was dismissed.
Setting aside these diff erences, most countries in the MDM project have in common
a lack of civil society participation in the policy process. Whether because the topic
was too technical and uninteresting for general audiences, because government did not
raise awareness, or because the industry was able to keep the policy discussion inside
closed circles (or for a mix of these reasons), civil society did not have a say in digital
switch-over policymaking in countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, China, Colombia,
Czech Republic, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Peru, Poland,
Russia, and Spain.
It is diffi cult to assess the precise extent to which public interest provisions in
digital switch-over policy were the outcome of civil society participation. First, as
mentioned above, there is no correlation between one and the other. Second, even
where consultations took place—in 15 out of the 56 countries—their impact was
questionable.10
Furthermore, public interest provisions in digital switch-over policy, when present,
did not always infl uence policymaking down the road. In other words, they were not
a guarantee of public interest safeguards in legislation. When it comes to the public
interest concept in digital media policymaking, the devil—as we will see—is in the
details.
10. Th e following MDM country reports refer to public consultation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Croatia, Fin-
land, France, Indonesia, Moldova, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, United
States, and Uruguay.
4 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Table 1. Public interest provision in digital switch-over-related legislation, and public consultation in digital policymaking
Country Public interest provisions Public consultation
Albania No Limited
Argentina No Limited
Armenia Yes No1
Bosnia and Herzegovina Limited Yes
Brazil Limited Limited2
Bulgaria No Limited
Canada n/a Limited3
Chile No Yes4
China No Yes4
Colombia Yes Limited5
Croatia Yes Yes
Czech Republic No Limited
Egypt6 Not applicable Not applicable
Estonia No No
Finland No Limited
France Yes Yes
Georgia No Limited
Germany Yes Limited
Guatemala No No
Hungary No Yes
India No Limited
Indonesia Yes Yes
Italy n/a Limited
Japan No Yes
Jordan Not applicable No
Kazakhstan No Limited
Kenya No n/a
Latvia No Limited
Lebanon No No
Lithuania No No
Macedonia No Limited
Malaysia No Yes
Mexico No Limited
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S4 8
Country Public interest provisions Public consultation
Moldova No Limited
Montenegro No No
Morocco6 Not applicable No
Netherlands Not applicable No
Nicaragua6 No No
Nigeria6 Not applicable No
Pakistan6 No No
Peru No No
Poland No Limited
Romania Yes Limited
Russia No Limited7
Serbia Yes Yes4
Singapore No Limited
Slovakia No No8
Slovenia No Limited
South Africa Yes Limited
Spain No No
Sweden No Yes
Thailand6 Not applicable n/a
Turkey No No
United Kingdom Yes Yes
United States Yes Yes
Uruguay Yes Yes
Notes: n/a: not assessed; (1) civil society exerted pressure and organized a number of public events; (2)
consultation mainly involved industry although civil society has made numerous attempts to
be part of it; (3) the process was opened and led by industry; (4) there was no guarantee that
civil society input would be taken into consideration; (5) there are signs that public participa-
tion has been growing recently; (6) no policy has yet been adopted; (7) civil society showed no
interest in the debate; (8) the debate was open to civil society
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
4 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
2. Public Service Media
In countries where digital switch-over has been completed or is underway, digitization
laws tend to refl ect the legitimacy, role, and importance of public service broadcasters.
Indeed, these laws do not so much create a legal framework for digital switch-over
in general as much as they equip public service media for the digital age. As Petros
Iosifi dis puts it, “new communications technology is not inherently pro-democratic;
it can be just as eff ective at sustaining propaganda and authoritarian regimes. New
forms of citizenship and public life are simultaneously enabled by new technology and
restricted by market power and surveillance. What is certain is that media are not the
public sphere per se; they are a vehicle through which such a space can be created.”11
Th e most common form of state support for public service media in the digitization
process has been fi nancial. In Germany, the funding needed by the public service
broadcaster for costs related to switch-over were included in the license fee; in Latvia,
the public service broadcaster saw its transmission fees reduced after the completion
of switch-over, and in Slovakia, the public service broadcaster was entitled to
compensation for simulcasting in 2011. Similarly, offi cial fi nancial support was granted
to public service broadcasters in Estonia, Kenya, Montenegro, Romania, Singapore,
and Slovenia. Singapore is a special case as the main player on the broadcast market is
MediaCorp, a conglomerate of state-owned media companies.
Other mechanisms of state support took the form of legal provisions allowing
broadcasters to create alliances and networks between public service broadcasters to
better distribute and manage programs. Th e Brazil Communications Company (BCC),
for example, was awarded the task of switching over the existing public channels.
BCC was also authorized to establish partnerships with other public broadcasters in
a move to build a National Network for Terrestrial Digital Public TV (Rede Nacional
de TV Pública Digital Terrestre). Th e objective of this network was to secure a shared
infrastructure and common platform for all public service broadcasters.12
Another form of support for public broadcasters involved content creation. Facing the
diffi culty of supplying enough content to meet the appetite of the digital realm, some
11. P. Iosifi dis, Digital Television, the Public Interest, and European Regulation, Mapping Digital Media Reference
Series No. 17 (2012), p. 11, at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/fi les/mapping-digital-
media-digital-television-public-interest-and-european-regulation-20120312.pdf.
12. Law No. 11,652 of 2008 on principles and goals of public broadcasting services.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S5 0
states have worked on building content databases and networks for both national and
local public media. In Argentina, the Advisory Council for Digital Terrestrial Television
(DTT), comprising representatives of diff erent ministries, designed a strategy that
became known as the National Contents Base. Similarly, the Local and Digital Content
Development Strategy for South Africa included the creation of “content generation
hubs.” Th e United States has supported the creation of digital content with grants and
other kinds of funding, though not in a systematic or permanent fashion. Similarly,
local media in Croatia are encouraged to produce public interest content with money
from the Electronic Media Fund, and the Law on Electronic Media in Montenegro
requires the state to fund programs about citizens’ rights, antidiscrimination, disability,
development, culture, and science.
Th ese provisions are certainly useful for public broadcasters. Digital technologies
encourage economies of scale (reducing the cost of producing more of the same) and
economies of scope (reducing the cost of additional products).13 It follows that public
media outlets need—especially where they are small and numerous—to coordinate
operations in order to be viable, effi cient, and relevant for the public. Content hubs
or databases are a good solution, so it is surprising that only a couple of countries in
the MDM project included them in their switch-over strategy. At the same time, the
centralization and syndication of content may result in a net reduction of diversity and
pluralism.
2.1 Frequency Allocation, Digital Licensing, and Must-carry
Provisions
In many countries that have commenced switch-over, both public service and
commercial incumbent media have been granted digital frequencies, without contest.
In Brazil, Decree No. 5,820 of 2006 stipulated that each existing channel would
receive six MHz “to enable the transition to digital technology without interrupting
the transmission of analog signals.”14 In Japan, as well, public and private broadcasters
received digital frequencies automatically, and no new entries were allowed at that
stage.
Similar but more problematic was the case of Italy, where regulation protected the
duopolistic incumbents RAI (the public service broadcaster) and Mediaset (a private
group owned by the former prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi). Initially, the law
13. A. Graham, “It’s the Ecology, Stupid,” in Can the Market Deliver? Funding Public Service in the Digital Age, John
Libbey Publishing, New Barnet, 2005.
14. Decree No. 5,820 of 2006, Article 7. (Unoffi cial translation.)
5 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
provided that until the digital switch-over process was complete, those companies alone
were allowed to undertake digital broadcasting.15 Th e situation triggered widespread
criticism from NGOs and a subsequent investigation by the European Commission
for infringing competition law. Th e process was suspended in 2009 when Italy’s
communications regulator, AGCOM (Authority for Communications Guarantees,
Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni), issued new criteria for digital broadcast
licensing in line with the Commission’s recommendations.16
In some countries, broadcasters with a public service role were prioritized in the
allocation of frequencies. According to the Dutch Telecommunications Act, amended
in 2012, although public service broadcasters must apply for digital licenses along with
commercial broadcasters, those licenses for “vital government functions” and public
media duties (included in the Media Act of 2008) were deemed to be a priority.17
Similarly, the French Law on Freedom of Communication, amended in 2007,
established that the public service channels France Télévisions, Audiovisuel Extérieur
de la France (ARTE), and the Parliamentary Channel had a priority right to use DTT
frequencies.
Public service media were also secured a place in the digital landscape through
multiplexes. Here are some examples of the ways in which this was done:
• In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the digital switch-over strategy reserved one of the
four multiplexes available in the country to the national public broadcasters.18
• In Armenia, the Law on Television and Radio provided that the public channels
had their place in the state-operated multiplex without competition.
• Th e Law on Croatian Radio and Television (known as the HRT Act) granted the
public television network HTV two specialized channels in one of the multiplexes
without requiring them to participate in licensing bids.19
15. Law 66 of 2001. Th e regulation was incorporated with some changes in the Consolidated Broadcasting Act No.
117/2005.
16. Among other matters, AGCOM established that while incumbents’ digital frequencies would be guaranteed to
protect their investments, the freed frequencies should be used for new entrants. (Decision No. 181/09/CONS
[2009].)
17. Dutch Telecommunications Act, Article 3.3.2.
18. After some delays, the Draft Action Plan on Switch-over was approved in 2012. Switch-over is expected to be
completed in 2015.
19. Similar to the automatic renewal examples, the HRT also granted specialized channels to other incumbents.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S5 2
• In the Czech Republic, both Czech TV and Czech Radio were granted the Public
Service Multiplex to operate.20 Commercial broadcasters, meanwhile, had to go
through a long process to get a digital license.
• In Poland, the 2011 Act on DTT gave Telewizja Polska control over the operation
of Multiplex I.
• In Slovakia, the 2007 Digital Broadcasting Act granted Slovak Television (afterwards
merged into a single radio and television broadcaster, RTVS) a digital multiplex.
• Likewise, the 2011 Lithuanian Law on National Radio and Television was amended
to allocate a digital network to the public broadcaster.
• In Spain, the government allocated two digital multiplexes to RTVE while a 2010
Royal Decree set aside two multiplexes for each Autonomous Community and,
in each municipality, at least one channel in each multiplex for public service
broadcasting.21
• At an early stage of Slovenia’s digital switch-over, in 2005, the public broadcaster
was granted radio frequencies preferentially to develop the fi rst nationwide DTT
network. (Instead of using them all, the public service broadcaster rented out some
of the channels in the multiplex.)
Finally, regulation in many countries includes must-carry provisions to secure a place
for public service broadcasters on private digital platforms. Must-carry provisions are
by no means new in broadcasting policy. In the European context, for example, the
Universal Service Directive of 2002 provides that:
Member States may impose reasonable “must carry” obligations, for
the transmission of specifi ed radio and television broadcast channels
and services, on undertakings under their jurisdiction providing
electronic communications networks used for the distribution of
radio or television broadcasts to the public where a signifi cant number
of end-users of such networks use them as their principal means to
receive radio and television broadcasts. Such obligations shall only
be imposed where they are necessary to meet clearly defi ned general
interest objectives and shall be proportionate and transparent. Th e
obligations shall be subject to periodical review.22
20. Electronic Communications Act, 2005, amended in 2011, on issues related to networks and services of electronic
communications.
21. Royal Decree No. 365/2010 regulating the assignment of digital terrestrial television multiplexes after the end of
analog terrestrial television broadcast.
22. Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and
users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), Article 31.
5 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Sweden, for example, did not award any multiplex to public service broadcasters
because the country already had strong must-carry provisions for private transmission
operators, which have been reconfi rmed in the digital era to cover all platforms.
According to Sweden’s 2010 Radio and Television Act, “any natural or legal person
owning or otherwise controlling an electronic communication network used to
relay television casts by cable to the general public shall … ensure that residents in
the households that are connected can receive television broadcasts” from operators
fi nanced by public fees.23
In the same way, Lithuanian law provides that every distributor of television programs
must rebroadcast at least one program from the public service broadcaster (LRT) along
with all unencrypted terrestrial television programs from commercial broadcasters.24 In
Kazakhstan, once every three years the Commission for Development of Broadcasting
determines the list of must-carry channels for each multiplex.25
In South Africa, pay-TV companies delivering 30 channels or more must carry the
signal of the public South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), a rule that is
expected to remain in place after switch-over is completed.26 Various forms of must-
carry obligations can be found in France, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Poland, and the United Kingdom.
Th e underlying objective of all these provisions is to secure the public media’s place
once the digital switch-over process is fi nished. However, this does not mean that
they necessarily help public service broadcasters to better fulfi ll their role through the
digital switch-over process and beyond. Several of the pioneering countries faced crises
at some point, characterized by a stalled market, bankrupt broadcasters or postponed
switch-off timetables. “Switch-over has proved neither commercially nor politically
simple,” argue García and Starks.27
23. Radio and Television Act, at http://www.radioochtv.se/Documents/Styrdokument/Radio%20and%20Televi-
sion%20Act.pdf.
24. Law on Public Provision of Information to the Public of 1996 (amended in 2006).
25. Statute on Television and Radio Broadcasting of 2012.
26. Broadcasting Digital Migration Policy for South Africa (amending Electronic Communications Act No. 36 of
2005). Amended in 2012: see Government Gazette Nos. 35,014 and 35,051.
27. M. García and M. Starks, “Digital switchover across the globe: the emergence of complex regional patterns,”
Media Culture Society 31 (2009), p. 787.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S5 4
Adding this to the fact that switch-over took off prematurely in some countries, the
road ahead for many public service broadcasters was by no means easy.28 Depending
on the strength of the public service broadcaster and the overall health of the
communications market in a given country, some of the regulation, such as awarding
whole multiplexes or several channels, can turn out to be more of a burden than a
support for the broadcasters.
2.2 Public Service Obligations on Commercial Media
Legal provisions on commercial media to produce and disseminate public service
content are present in only a quarter of the MDM countries, and in many cases they
are unrelated to digitization. Rather, they are long-standing provisions or even part of
recent communications reforms outside the switch-over process. Besides this, there are
a few examples of countries that have just a few such provisions, or none at all.
Several countries have established program quality obligations among other provisions.
In France, both private and public broadcasters have to sign a convention with the CSA
about programming standards and obligations. Among other elements, broadcasters
cannot encourage delinquent behavior; must respect political, cultural, and religious
diff erences; cannot broadcast opinions that are discriminatory in terms of race, gender,
religion, or nationality; must promote national integration and values of solidarity,
and must take into consideration the diversity of the origins and cultures of society.29
Along the same lines, Latvia’s Electronic Media Law requires all broadcasters to
respect the diversity of opinions and support values such as the country’s sovereignty,
democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Moreover, radio and television organizations
must ensure that facts and events are fairly and objectively refl ected, promote the
exchange of opinions, and comply with the generally accepted principles of journalism
and ethics. In Japan, broadcasters are required by law to secure maximum availability
and benefi ts to the public; ensure freedom of expression, impartiality, integrity, and
autonomy, and “contribute to the development of a healthy democracy by clarifying
the responsibility of those people engaged in broadcasting.” Similar obligations can be
found in countries ranging from Armenia to Colombia, Germany, and Hungary.
28. K. Jakubowicz, “Digital Switchover in Central and Eastern Europe: Premature or Badly Needed?,” Digital Switch-
over in Europe 14 (1) (2007), pp. 21–28.
29. For example, the Convention for the TF1 Channel.
5 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Table 2.
Specifi c public service content-related obligations on commercial media
Country Public service content obligations imposed
on commercial broadcasters
Public service
obligations imposed
on commercial
broadcasters as part of
digital switch-over
Albania No No
Argentina No No
Armenia No No
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
License conditions include obligations to air
specifi c public interest programs
No
Brazil Obligations on educational content and news
(which are ignored)
No
Bulgaria General provisions applying to all stations
(license conditions are confi dential)
No
Canada Specifi c obligations on all broadcasters No
Chile Provisions on fair political representation,
cultural programming
No
China No No
Colombia Quotas for programs for children; obligation to
receive feedback from audience; obligation to
give space to consumer organizations
No
Croatia No No
Czech Republic No No
Egypt No No
Estonia Quotas for news and original programming;
obligation to carry messages in emergency
situations
No
Finland Obligation to carry emergency announcements No
France General provisions applying to all stations No
Georgia No No
Germany1 News content should convey plurality of opinion;
equal opportunity for expression for political and
social groups; respect for minority views
No
Guatemala No No
Hungary Obligation to provide news content No
India No No
Indonesia No No
Italy Broadcast a daily news bulletin (1990); provide
balanced and proportionate airtime to all political
parties before elections (2000)
No
Japan No No
Jordan No No
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S5 6
Country Public service content obligations imposed
on commercial broadcasters
Public service
obligations imposed
on commercial
broadcasters as part of
digital switch-over
Kazakhstan No No
Kenya No No
Latvia No No
Lebanon Broadcast free-of-charge government
announcements on national guidance, education,
health awareness, principles on political programs
No
Lithuania No No
Macedonia No No
Malaysia Quotas for local content No
Mexico No No
Moldova No No
Montenegro No No
Morocco No No
Netherlands No No
Nicaragua No No
Nigeria No No
Pakistan Obligation to carry public interest programs at
the request of the government
No
Peru No No
Poland No (eliminated) No
Romania No No
Russia No No
Serbia No No
Singapore All commercial stations come under the ambit of
MediaCorp
No
Slovakia No No
Slovenia Quotas on local content No
South Africa Quotas for children’s programming, drama,
documentary, “knowledge-building” programs,
and current aff airs
No
Spain No No
Sweden No2 No
Thailand Access for disabled to programs; quotas for news
programs and regional news programs
No
Tunisia No No
Turkey No No
United Kingdom Broad sets of PSB obligations Demand from private
players to cut down on
such obligations
5 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Country Public service content obligations imposed
on commercial broadcasters
Public service
obligations imposed
on commercial
broadcasters as part of
digital switch-over
United States Three hours of children’s educational content;
limited advertising during these programs;
guaranteed political advertising at a specifi ed
fee; obligation to keep track of public service
programs
No
Uruguay Obligation to provide space for public service
campaigns, promote national contents, and
provide access for individuals with visual and
hearing impairments
Yes
Notes: (1) All public service obligations apply to generalist stations; (2) an exception was TV4, a
hybrid commercial-public channel, which ceased its public service function in 2007
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
Quotas are another tool to ensure that commercial media produce and disseminate
public service content. Th ese quotas are usually imposed on broadcast production or
programming. Examples include the following:
• Pay-TV operators in Brazil are required to produce and distribute content that
complies with three types of quotas:
1. certain channels have to transmit at least 3.5 hours of regional and national
programs in primetime per week;
2. a third of the channels in each pay-TV package must be Brazilian production;
and
3. pay-TV packages consisting of channels that air journalistic content must
include at least a second news channel to ensure plurality of voices in the news
off ering.30
• In Slovenia, 20 percent of commercial broadcasters’ daily output must be in-house,
at least 60 minutes of which must be broadcast between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. All
television channels, except local ones, are required to air material that originated
in the European Union (EU) in the majority of their programming (excluding
sports, events, and teleshopping). Since 2006, commercial channels have not been
required to broadcast news or current aff airs.
30. Law 12,485 of 2011, Chapter V.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S5 8
• In Estonia, 5 percent of all radio and television programming must be news (except
for thematic channels). Commercial television channels must also air original
productions in 10 percent of the entire broadcast time and half of that must be
shown during primetime (again except for thematic channels).31
• In Colombia, 70 percent of the output during primetime has to be national
production;32 in Peru, the 2004 Radio and Television Law foresees a quota of
30 percent of locally produced content for broadcasters, aired between 5 a.m.
and midnight; and in Argentina, the Audiovisual Communication Services Law
obliges public and private media to increase original and independent production,
establishes quotas for screen-time of national productions, and also defi nes diversity
and plurality obligations. (None of the examples from Latin America is related to
digitization.)
• In contrast, Hungary removed public service provisions for commercial media in
2010. Nowadays, commercial broadcasters are only obliged to specify the amount of
public service content they are planning to broadcast when they apply for a frequency.
• In the United Kingdom, four commercial terrestrial television broadcasters and
more than 300 commercial radio stations are subject to public service obligations,
enforced by the regulator Ofcom (Offi ce of Communications). Th e latter range
from advertising and news provision quotas to rules on providing access for
the hearing-impaired population. Th ere are also general obligations in terms of
impartiality and balance applied to all broadcasters.
• Th e Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States requires
three hours per week of educational content for children, and restricts advertising
during this period to no more than 12 minutes per hour. In addition, terrestrial
broadcasters are required to maintain a public fi le that keeps track of programming
that is deemed to be in the public interest.
Several countries have legal provisions requiring commercial media to broadcast
presidential statements or important public announcements, which some local experts
and policymakers see as a type of public service obligation. Such is the case in the Czech
Republic, where broadcasters must provide airtime to authorities for those purposes;33
likewise in Estonia, where Parliament can also make announcements via commercial
broadcasters.34
31. Media Services Act of 2010.
32. Law 680 of 2001.
33. Radio and Television Broadcasting Act of 2001.
34. Media Services Act of 2010.
5 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In Colombia this provision is more limited: the president can address the nation
through private channels at any time and for a reasonable amount of time as long as it
is the president in person and the intervention is related to issues of public interest.35
Lithuania and Slovakia, among other countries, have similar provisions; whether related
to emergencies, disaster, or war, broadcasters must transmit offi cial messages.36 In
Uruguay, the Digital Television Act of 2012 requires both private and public channels
to give offi cial institutions up to 15 minutes daily for public interest campaigns related
to health, children, and safety.37 In Guatemala, by contrast, the government has to
purchase airtime from broadcasters to be able to communicate messages to the public.
Content and production obligations for commercial media are quite common in
legislation around the world. Most of these provisions predate digitization or are
unrelated to it. Th is indicates that the digital switch-over did not trigger more or
specifi c regulations of this type. At the same time, there are very few cases (the United
Kingdom being one) where digitization pressures have been adduced as reasons to
weaken or remove such provisions.
3. Commercial Media
3.1 News Media Ownership
Th e argument for media consolidation has gained considerable traction in the digital
era. To remain viable, the argument goes, traditional media need to consolidate their
operations under one roof to take advantage of the effi ciencies aff orded by merged
newsrooms, platforms, and equipment. A similar rationale underpins arguments in
favor of cross-media ownership to encourage consolidation across diff erent sectors. For
the market as a whole to be able to produce a suffi cient quantity, quality, and diversity
of media services, so the argument goes, proprietors should be allowed to diversify
their assets across platforms.
Although pressure keeps mounting on parliaments and governments to follow this
path, digitization in many countries did not lead to immediate changes in ownership
rules for the media (which does not mean that the media markets are not becoming
35. Law 182 of 1995.
36. Lithuania: Law on Public Provision of Information to the Public of 1996 (amended in 2006); Slovakia: Broad-
casting and Retransmission Law No. 308 of 2000.
37. Th e communications bill currently under discussion (known as the Law on Audiovisual Communication Ser-
vices) includes as well quotas of national production.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S6 0
more concentrated). Some reports—from France, India, Mexico, Serbia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, among others—state specifi cally that no reforms
have occurred in this area in the last fi ve years. Despite the lack of legal change, policy
debates on media ownership have taken place. In Serbia, several attempts to reform the
regulatory framework on media ownership have failed. Th e latest was in 2013 when
there was an attempt to divest the state from media ownership.
In the United Kingdom, proposals to deregulate ownership are undoubtedly tied to
digitization, but “have been met by strong opposition from campaigners who argue
that economic pressures (emanating in part from digitization) are being used as a
mask to cover what is, in reality, a continuation of a decades-long, ideologically-driven
policy paradigm.” Similarly, proposals by the FCC in the United States to relax cross-
ownership rules have stalled. Th e FCC’s review on the subject is long overdue.
Other countries lack rules on media ownership. Malaysia has no prohibitions against
the formation of media monopoly or cross-ownership. Th e sole provision in this area
is the regulator’s scope to intervene in cases of possible anti-competitive conduct. Peru,
Romania, and Sweden are other countries with no laws on cross-ownership. In Sweden,
“there has been a long political debate about the necessity of such a law, but a majority
in Parliament has rejected the idea, arguing that a law would be impossible to control
and could be bypassed with unscrupulous business methods.”
On the other hand, a number of countries have experienced reforms in media ownership
during the last seven years, though these changes are not necessarily related to switch-
over. New provisions in this area are related to ownership and concentration, foreign
ownership, defi nition of market share, and the obligation to disclose information
about ownership of the media.
In Hungary, regulation before 2010 established that the owner of a national broadcaster
could not have a controlling stake in a national newspaper, and vice versa. However,
the Media Services and Mass Media Act of 2010 lifted this restriction. Th e reform took
place during switch-over. In Italy, the 2004 Gasparri Law loosened rules on media
ownership, allowing broadcasters operating more than one nationwide channel to
acquire shares in newspaper publishers.38 Likewise, in Moldova, a 2010 amendment to
the Broadcasting Code relaxed ownership rules by allowing individuals and companies
to own up to fi ve broadcasting licenses in a single region.39
38. Law No. 112 of 2004.
39. Th e 2006 Broadcasting Code was last amended in 2012.
6 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In contrast, several countries seem to have tightened restrictions on media ownership
concentration or introduced new restrictions:
• Although Chile has not changed media ownership regulation over the past fi ve
years, a bill on digitization maintains a prohibition on controlling more than one
media franchise in the same zone.40
• Albania’s Law on Broadcasting of 2007 changed ownership regulation as part of
the legal provisions on digital switch-over: a legal entity could not thus have more
than one digital terrestrial network license. However, during the digital transition,
holders of analog licenses could both keep their license and have another as network
operators or broadcasters.41
• Th e 2010 Law on Electronic Media in Montenegro specifi es that if a company
broadcasts simultaneously on radio and television or also publishes a daily
newspaper, or if it has more than one broadcast license, it cannot own shares in
another broadcaster, publishing company, or news agency.
• Th e Electronic Communications Act in South Africa ensures that no person
controlling a newspaper can hold more than 20 percent of the shares in any
broadcasting licensee in the same area. Th e act also establishes that a person
controlling a newspaper cannot control fi nancially any broadcasting licensee.
• According to the 2010 General Law on Audiovisual Communication in Spain, an
individual or company holding more than 5 percent of the capital or voting rights
of a broadcasting licensee cannot hold “signifi cant” shares in any other broadcaster
in the same coverage area. Th ere are certain exceptions for national broadcasters in
case of a merger. Th e degree of “signifi cance” is determined according to commercial
regulation, which takes into account both quantitative and qualitative criteria such
as the number of shares and the possibility to exert infl uence. However, the term
“signifi cant” is not clearly defi ned in law.
• Th e 2009 Electronic Media Act in Croatia prohibits cross-media ownership
between state-level television or radio broadcasters and regional or national ones
when either party controls more than 25 percent of the capital of another outlet.
40. Th e bill has been in Congress since 2008. In January 2014, it was under discussion in the Transport and Com-
munications of the Senate. See http://www.camara.cl/pley/pley_detalle.aspx?prmID=6579.
41. Th e MDM report for Albania states: “After numerous debates, the Law on Digital Broadcasting was adopted in
2007. Th e Strategy for Digital Switch-over, with diff erent stakeholders already consulted, has yet to be approved.
With this in mind and, in view of the fact that the Law on Radio and Television is undergoing comprehensive
revision, the Law on Digital Broadcasting is also likely to change, without being implemented.” In fact, the 2013
Law on Audiovisual Media postponed digital switch-off until 2015 and introduced several changes. It remains
unclear if this provision changed as well.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S6 2
Th e failure to enforce these provisions prompted proposals to amend the Electronic
Media Act that are still under debate.
• A 2006 Broadcasting Act amendment in the Czech Republic prohibits cross-
ownership between the operator of an electronic communications network and
a broadcasting licensee, in order to prevent content discrimination on digital
multiplexes. Th is law also established that a single entity cannot hold more than
one license for a nationwide terrestrial television or radio station.
• Th e Audiovisual Communications Services Law in Argentina (2009) introduced
several changes aimed at pluralizing the media market. Among other restrictions,
operators can have only one satellite television license for the entire country, and
possession of such a license prevents them from operating any other broadcasting
service. Also, companies can have up to 10 licenses for television and radio
broadcasting services (there are no nationwide coverage licenses). Unrelated
to digitization, these changes resulted from a long political struggle over media
pluralism.
Some countries have introduced reforms in the past fi ve years to limit the presence
of state and public offi cials in the media. In Armenia, the 2010 Law on Television
and the Radio extended the prohibition on ownership of private television and radio
companies to include the president of the country, members of the government,
National Assembly members and judges. (Th e list already included state governors
and local self-governance agencies, and members of the regulation sector and political
parties, among others.) In Turkey, as of 2011, political parties, unions, cooperatives,
foundations, and local government bodies can no longer have a broadcasting license.
Th is prohibition includes intermediaries and companies partially owned by them.
Regulation has also addressed the issue of foreign capital. Armenia limits foreign
capital in television and radio companies to 50 percent of voting shares. In Japan,
foreign investment in terrestrial broadcasting cannot exceed 20 percent. In Poland, the
Broadcasting Act, amended in 2004 to comply with EU requirements, sets a maximum
of 49 percent on non-EU owners. In Russia, transactions that give a foreign investor
50 percent or more shares in a media outlet, as well as those that give foreigners the
right to appoint the management of a strategically important company, require prior
permission from a government agency.
In South Africa, the Electronic Communications Act limits the foreign capital
allowed in media companies to 20 percent. Th e act also states that “no person may
control more than one commercial television channel or more than two FM or two
6 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
AM commercial radio stations.” And in Turkey, the 2011 Law on the Establishment
of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services increased the limit on
foreign participation in Turkish media from 25 percent to 50 percent.
A second set of rules introduced in the past fi ve years has to do with market share.
Once again, most of these rules were not triggered by or directly related to digitization:
• In Germany, rules on ownership of news media are framed in terms of audience
market share. Any given broadcaster can have a maximum of 30 percent of the
broadcasting market. A lower quota of 25 percent is imposed “if a company
dominates a media-relevant related market (like newspapers, journals or internet
services) or if the company’s overall infl uence on the broadcasting market and
media-relevant related markets can be compared to an audience market share of 30
percent.”
• In Hungary, linear media service operators (i.e. broadcasters) with more than a
35 percent average audience share per year cannot create a new similar media
operation or hold a stake in a company providing media content.42
• Th e Law on Competition in Lithuania does not have specifi c provisions on media
ownership; however, its provisions apply to the media, according to which a
company holds a dominant position if it has 40 percent of market share (in terms
of revenue) by itself, or if three or fewer companies owned by a group hold jointly
70 percent of the market.43
• In Russia, television and radio companies reaching more than half of the population
are included in a list of strategically important companies. Any foreign investor
acquiring more than 4 percent of the stock in such companies must report it to the
Federal Antimonopoly Service.
• In Slovakia, the Digital Broadcasting Act allows nationwide broadcasters to own
thematic channels in addition to general interest channels. In practice, the two
dominant private broadcasters include their thematic channels in the only available
commercial multiplex, in a format that absorbs much of the transmission capacity,
which in turn aff ects diversity.
• Competition law in the Czech Republic prohibits the abuse of a dominant position,
defi ned as a market share of 40 percent or more. All mass media are considered to
constitute a single market, which means such a position is not easy to achieve.44
42. Act CLXXXV of 2010, on Media Services and Mass Media.
43. Law on Competition No. VIII–1099 of 1999.
44. Consolidated Act on the Protection of Competition of 2001 (amended last in 2007).
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S6 4
3.2 Transparency and Disclosure of Information
Several countries have legal obligations relating to the transparency and disclosure
of information, but these obligations are widely regarded as ineffi cient. Information
about ownership is not detailed or it is out of date; fi gureheads are used to disguise
the real benefi ciaries behind nominal owners; legal provisions on transparency are
often not enforced. Th ese problems are particularly grave when provisions concerning
information disclosure are the only regulation on media ownership in place.
Some of these rules were promoted by civil society, as in Georgia where the Broadcasting
Law was amended in 2011—to require print media to publish ownership information
on their website—after a group of NGOs drafted a reform proposal. Print media have
the same obligation in Kazakhstan where ownership information has to be included
in each publication. Television programs, in contrast, only have to display the offi cial
logo of their outlet, and broadcast media must announce their name on-air at least
four times a day.45
In other cases, companies have to submit ownership information when applying for
a broadcasting license. In Slovakia, electronic media companies must disclose their
ownership structure at that initial moment and subsequently report any changes in
ownership to the regulator. In Latvia, likewise, the Electronic Mass Media Law requires
ownership information when companies bid for a broadcast license. Th e provision
does not specify how detailed this information should be.
Th e Mass Media Act in Slovenia requires all media to register information in the Offi cial
Gazette about shareholders with more than 5 percent of the shares or of voting rights.
Similarly, in Montenegro all audiovisual media must publish the information about
any person or company holding more than 10 percent of the shares in that outlet.46
Th e same rules are in place in Lithuania where, in contrast to most MDM countries,
transparency provisions have grown in importance and eff ectiveness.47
45. Law on Mass Media of 1999 No. 451-I (amended last in 2012).
46. Law on Electronic Media, 2010.
47. Law on Public Provision of Information to the Public of 1996 (amended in 2006).
6 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Table 3.
Transparency of media ownership
Country What is the estimated level
of transparency of media
ownership?
Has it improved since 2010?
Albania Reasonable Yes
Argentina n/a n/a
Armenia Low No
Bosnia and Herzegovina Moderate Worsened
Brazil Low No
Bulgaria Low Worsened
Canada n/a n/a
Chile Low No
China State owns everything No
Colombia Low1 No
Croatia Low2,3 No
Czech Republic Reasonable No
Egypt Low No
Estonia High No
Finland High No
France Low No
Georgia High Yes
Germany High Maintained
Guatemala Low No
Hungary Reasonable No
India Low3 No
Indonesia High4 No
Italy Moderate No
Japan High4 Maintained
Jordan High Maintained
Kazakhstan Low No
Kenya Low n/a
Latvia Low No
Lebanon Low No
Lithuania High Maintained
Macedonia Low No
Malaysia Reasonable Maintained
Mexico Reasonable No
Moldova Low No
Montenegro Reasonable Yes
Morocco Low No
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S6 6
Country What is the estimated level
of transparency of media
ownership?
Has it improved since 2010?
Netherlands Reasonable No
Nicaragua Low No
Nigeria Low No
Pakistan High Maintained
Peru n/a n/a
Poland Reasonable No
Romania Reasonable Yes
Russia Low No
Serbia Low No
Singapore High Maintained
Slovakia Reasonable Yes
Slovenia Reasonable Yes
South Africa Reasonable No
Spain Reasonable4 Yes
Sweden Moderate No
Thailand Reasonable No
Turkey Low No
United Kingdom Reasonable No5
United States Moderate Improved
Uruguay Reasonable6 Maintained
Notes: Th e estimates in this table refl ect the assessments in the MDM country reports. Each eval-
uative term (Low, Reasonable, etc.) covers a wide range of context and circumstances, and
should not be taken as implying a direct or detailed equivalence between countries with the
same estimate; n/a – not assessed; (1) no culture of accountability; (2) particularly when it
comes to online outlets; (3) there is no culture of accountability and there are no specifi c rules
compelling media companies to disclose their ownership structures. Company information
can be found on government websites, such as that of the Trade Registry, in an accessible man-
ner and for a fee, but broad use of proxies hides ownership and not all news media companies
comply with the request to send ownership information to government; (4) stock exchange
rules forcing companies to be transparent helps improve transparency of ownership; (5) there
are no specifi c rules compelling media companies to disclose their ownership structures and no
publicly available databases; (6) use of fi gureheads is allegedly widespread
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
3.3 Licensing and Digital Gatekeepers
Th e discretionary power enjoyed by governments or regulators in awarding or renewing
broadcast licenses remains a salient issue for media diversity in the digital age. Mexico
renewed all analog broadcast licenses, arguing that it wanted to encourage incumbents
to invest in digitization. In Estonia, fees payable by licensees for digital television were
6 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
waived on the grounds—as the MDM report explains—that “digital programming can
be disseminated by cable, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), and satellite—without
employing terrestrial networks.” In Kazakhstan, the regulator granted digital licenses to
incumbents only during the transition stage. In Spain, state-wide analog broadcasters
were automatically granted a digital license by law; these licenses have since been renewed.
And in the United States, following apparently meager debate, all incumbents received
digital broadcast licenses without having to hand in their analog ones.
Where the fee for digital licenses was waived for private broadcasters, this was justifi ed
by three considerations. First, the migration to digital would already impose major costs
on broadcasters. Second, during the digital transition, broadcasters have to simulcast
for a certain period until they can ensure that digital broadcasting is fully operational,
and this period also involves extra costs for broadcasters. Th ird, if digital programming
was already available through other non-terrestrial, license-free platforms, it did not
make sense to charge broadcasters for using a digital license for terrestrial networks.
(Th is third argument was most forcibly postulated in Estonia.) Overall, the arguments
for not imposing fees for digital licenses on private broadcasters were chiefl y linked
with the need to incentivize broadcasters to invest in digitization at a time when
broadcast businesses face a string of signifi cant new costs.
3.4 Bottlenecks
Various regulations have led to bottlenecks being created in commercial media by
a number of gatekeeping players. Private operators can form such bottlenecks at
various points in the digital chain: in content creation, program wholesale and retail,
distribution, transmission and access, and equipment for customers.48 Gatekeeping
problems have appeared to date to be mostly related to transmission and access.
Digital gatekeeping problems are the exception rather than the rule in the MDM
countries. In Serbia, where the Broadcasting Equipment Company carries out
transmission network management and distribution, there have been no such issues.
In Russia, licensing was awarded to privately-owned local digital multiplexes and the
government, but there was a lack of interest from broadcasters, which considered that
the digital television projects were not profi table due to the small audience.
In Sweden, few problems were reported, and those present were limited to controversies
between gatekeepers and specifi c companies. Digital gatekeeping issues in the United
48. M. Cave and K. Nakamura, Digital Broadcasting: Policy and Practice in the Americas, Europe and Japan, Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham, 2006.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S6 8
Kingdom have in general been dealt with adequately by the converged regulator Ofcom,
which has updated and implemented regulations in regard to Subscription Management
Systems (SMS) and must-carry obligations applied to SMS operators and Electronic
Programming Guide (EPG) populators. “Carrier gatekeeping has not been a signifi cant
issue in the development of UK digital broadcasting,” the MDM report concludes.
Th e situations in Poland and Slovenia looked alike: in the former, must-carry obligations
were imposed on all digital multiplexes, ranging from 21 to 35 channels, and no
gatekeeping issues emerged. Th e latter faced a diminished content off er (such as
in Russia). No gatekeeping problems are reported in Armenia either, where digital
broadcasting is scheduled to start in January 2015 with a free package of programs
distributed through four state multiplexes.
In Germany, managers of EPGs were expected to become digital television gatekeepers,
but by 2011 no issues of concern had appeared. By the same token, there was concern
in the Netherlands about access to content because of the EPGs. According to the
MDM report, “local broadcasters fi nd themselves in a diffi cult position and risk losing
large numbers of viewers that have already switched to digital reception but can no
longer easily fi nd the analog channels on their television sets.” India has also had
problems with EPG, stemming mostly from compatibility setbacks in the language
display standards and channel bundling for distribution in multiplexes.
In Singapore there is no risk of private gatekeepers emerging in digital broadcasting,
because the state controls and owns the whole process. However, the state-owned
MediaCorp—as the national broadcaster and only free-to-air operator—is obliged
to grant free access to all its content to the population. In short, according to the
MDM report, “there are no commercial or other separate interests between the digital
gatekeeper, broadcaster, and content producers because they are all part of the state-
monopoly structure set up to avoid confl ict.”
Something similar occurs in Latvia, where the entire spectrum for digital broadcasting
was awarded to the former state-owned Lattelecom, giving it total control over program
packaging. Th e company had, in the words of the MDM report, “a monopoly in the
terrestrial broadcasting sector and a high level of independence from the regulatory body
of the radio and television market.” Th e license was due to expire in December 2013,
but the company was the only bidder in the new tender and won it in June 2013.49
49. See “Electronic communications company Lattelecom is the only bidder for terrestrial digital TV broadcast-
ing in Latvia from January 1, 2014,” Th e Baltic Course, 29 May 2013, at http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/
Technology/?doc=75482.
6 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Czech broadcasting went through deep changes in the digital licensing process. In
2007, tenders were replaced by a short application process. Having an agreement with
the multiplex to carry its programs, an interested party can apply for a license, which
will be assessed on fi nancial, technical, and organizational grounds. According to the
MDM report, “there will be no need for powerful lobbying to gain a license. Th e
multiplex operators will have a rather hard time fi lling dozens of channels available
in four multiplexes and will chase such opportunities. A much harder task for the
newcomers will be their ability to survive in what is to become an overly saturated
market.”
In Japan, must-carry obligations can be imposed on cable operators in diffi cult-to-
watch areas, for example where there is technical interference or insuffi cient coverage.
Beyond these areas, cable companies need permission to rebroadcast terrestrial
television signals. In some Japanese cities, terrestrial operators are stronger in terms of
fi nancial power and penetration than cable companies—a situation diff erent from the
United States, for example.
Many of the gatekeeping situations described in the MDM reports pose risks for
broadcasting diversity in structural terms. If a company has the possibility to determine
which players can reach audiences, it will probably favor those that will not compete
or aff ect its business. According to Des Freedman, “a digital broadcast environment
dominated by existing voices and organized along commercial lines is likely to serve
unequal consumers and reproduce well-established patterns of concentration and
infl uence.”50
Regulation that grants free-of-charge digital frequencies or automatic renewals to
both private and public incumbents has come under critical scrutiny.51 Although it is
arguably an incentive for private investment—as mentioned—and a form of support
for public broadcasters, such provisions also did little to diversify the communications
markets. At the same time, newly adopted digital switch-over regulation did not always
solve the market diffi culties. While it is too early in the transition process to see serial
bankruptcies among digital television stations (including Quiero TV in Spain and Z1
in the Czech Republic), many countries—such as Russia, Spain, and most of the Latin
American countries—have suff ered from investors’ lack of interest in this area.
50. D. Freedman, Th e Politics of Media Policy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 178.
51. See, among others, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, and the United States.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S7 0
4. News Online
Th e MDM reports show that online news is no longer an unregulated frontier, and
that a range of general (and in some cases specifi c) laws and regulatory rules have been
adopted. Again, the nature and extent of such laws and rules vary considerably; not all
of them threaten internet freedom. Specifi c laws can serve positive purposes in terms
of freedom of expression and access, or inhibit the online environment altogether. Th e
same is true for general laws and regulation, which nonetheless carry the inherent risk
of being disproportionate and applied out of context.
Most general norms on activities online are related to defamation, discrimination, or
incitement to violence, discrimination or hatred. Th ey have led to legal proceedings
against authors of online content in many of the MDM countries.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, to start with, does not have specifi c regulations for the
internet; yet the law on defamation applies online as well. According to this law, “the
author, editor, and the person in charge of checking the content where libel has been
found could be held responsible for that.”52 Similarly, in Bulgaria, which does not have
specifi c regulation of the internet either, online editors can be criminally liable for
“incitement to various types of discrimination, in addition to violence and hatred on
‘electronic information systems’ based on race, nationality, ethnic group, and religion.”
Th e Law on Freedom of Opinion and Expression in Georgia provides that these rights
may be suspended for the sake of state security, public safety, or crime prevention.
Colombia, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Mexico, Pakistan, and France53 have similar
provisions, ranging from defamation to anti-terrorism and national security.
Other laws apply to publishers and media specifi cally, without distinguishing between
offl ine and online platforms. Lithuania’s Information Law establishes that liability for
content rests with the editor-in-chief (instead of the author, as would be expected) or
any other person in the outlet responsible for the disputed content. A blogger, as
the sole creator and responsible for the content published online, is the sole liable
entity.54 In Malaysia, the 1998 Communications and Multimedia Act criminalized the
publication of “obscene, indecent, false, menacing or off ensive in character with intent
to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person,” which also extends to the internet.
52. Law on Protection Against Defamation, 2001.
53. Th e Law on Confi dence in the Digital Economy of 2004 extended specifi cally the application of penal off enses,
such as insults, racist or sexist comments, to the online realm.
54. Law on Public Provision of Information to the Public of 1996.
7 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
An original provision on online news media is the right to reply as defi ned in French
legislation. Th e 2004 Law on Confi dence in the Digital Economy (developed by
Decree 249 of 2007) establishes that “every person named or indicated in an online
communications service has a right of reply.” Having a comment section is not enough
to comply; people who read the fi rst piece have to access the reply in the same manner
and under the same terms. When the original content is no longer available to the
public, the online service has to include the standalone reply with a short reference.
Th e reply shall be available at least for a day.
On the whole, specifi c internet regulation tends to address issues like intermediary
liability, net neutrality, and content dissemination. While many pieces of legislation on
the internet may be inconvenient, the Chinese provisions stand out as a most stringent
framework for online news outlets and general content dissemination. In 2002,
the News Offi ce of the State Council and Ministry of Information Industry issued
“Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet Publishing,” which provided
that no person or organization can undertake publishing activities without prior
approval from the General Administration of Press and Publication. Furthermore,
the 2005 “Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services”
commissioned the State Council Information Offi ce to examine online news content.
Somehow related to such rules, but quite distant nonetheless, some countries have
registration requirements for online media outlets. According to the 2009 Electronic
Media Act in Croatia, electronic publications—portals or websites with publicly
available information—have to join the Register of Electronic Publications Providers
prior to launching. Online newspapers and content providers in Singapore also have
to register with the Media Development Authority.55 In Kenya, anyone seeking
to disseminate news on any platform needs a license from the Communications
Commission.
Another set of provisions on online news content pertains specifi cally to the liability of
online intermediaries. Th e underlying idea is to protect those who transmit and publish
information while promoting the diversity of online speakers. Th e EU Electronic
Commerce Directive (2000) is the source for its members:
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the transmission
in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service,
or the provision of access to a communication network, Member States shall ensure
55. Broadcasting Act, amended last in 2012.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S7 2
that the service provider is not liable for the information transmitted, on condition
that the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.
Th e Information Society Services Act in Estonia (2004), the Telemedia Act in Germany
(2007), the Law of Information Society Services and Electronic Communication in
Spain (2002), the Law on Information Society Services in Latvia (2004), and the
Electronic Commerce Regulations in the United Kingdom (2002), among others,
all implement this EU directive. Th is provision mirrors Section 230 of the U.S.
Communications Decency Act, which establishes that “no provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”
Some countries have taken diff erent approaches to liability regulation. According to the
Computer-related Crime Act in Th ailand, authors, posters, webmasters, and bloggers
can be liable for content published online. Eventually, even internet service providers
(ISPs) can be liable. In Turkey, access providers must take down illegal content posted
by their customers should the Telecommunication Board require them to. And in
Morocco, both authors and ISPs can be liable for online content; besides, ISPs are
required to screen and fi lter content in line with the Anti-Terrorism Law provisions.
Many countries have specifi c legislation for online copyright enforcement. Such laws
have tighter safe-harbor rules for media outlets and online intermediaries in general,
obliging them in some cases to remove supposedly infringing content upon notifi cation.
Th e U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act is the most prominent and infl uential
piece of legislation in this respect. Countries with similar regulation include Moldova56
and Chile,57 the latter implementing a provision in the Free Trade Agreement with
the United States. Th e Chilean case, however, only allows takedowns on the basis
of a judicial order, balancing better copyright and freedom of expression. Likewise,
EU countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Spain, and the United Kingdom have similar
regulations based on the Copyright Directive of the European Union.
56. Law No. 139 on Copyright and Neighboring Rights of 2010.
57. Law No. 20,435 of 2010.
7 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
A batch of laws on the net neutrality principle has been adopted in a number of
countries. According to the Dynamic Coalition on Network Neutrality, net neutrality
is “the principle according to which internet traffi c shall be treated equally, without
discrimination, restriction or interference regardless of its sender, recipient, type or
content, so that internet users’ freedom of choice is not restricted by favoring or
disfavoring the transmission of internet traffi c associated with particular content,
services, applications, or devices.”58 Chile was the fi rst country to incorporate this
principle in law,59 followed by the Netherlands60 and Slovenia.61
Th ere is no silver bullet regulation for online news media, and regulation may have
a positive or negative impact on content output. In general terms, an overreaching
application of general provisions can chill online debate and information dissemination.
It cannot be dismissed, however, on those grounds alone. Registration provisions for
media, on the other hand, aff ect mostly independent initiatives and citizen-based
projects, while blocking and fi ltering pose the biggest threat to the free fl ow of content.
Intermediary liability is a double-edged sword: the safe-harbor provisions are crucial
for news outlets, social networks, and ISPs, but copyright regulations—especially those
with removal mechanisms—have in many cases proven to be arbitrary and unbalanced
vis-à-vis freedom of expression and the widest dissemination of information.
58. Model Framework on Network Neutrality (initiated by the Council of Europe and developed by the Dynamic
Coalition on Network Neutrality), at http://networkneutrality.info/sources.html.
59. Law 20,435 of 2010.
60. Dutch Telecommunications Act of 2012.
61. Electronic Communications Act of 2012.
7 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Public Media and Digitization: Seven Th eses Damian Tambini1
1. Introduction
1.1 Public, State, and Private: A Crossroads for National Media
Systems
Th e rise of broadcasting in the twentieth century established new relationships among
the state, the public, and the media.
Alongside private commercial media, some countries established broadcasters with a
closer relationship with the state, and a non-market model of accountability to the
public. Th e relationships between these institutions and governments and other centers
of power became key challenges in the governance of open societies.
A unique set of institutional arrangements for broadcasting evolved in each national
setting. Some set out a clear constitutional legal framework of fundamental duties for
all broadcasters. In others, ownership and operation remained in private hands, with
duties left legally undefi ned. In some countries the market share of publicly owned
broadcasters was small, while in others they were, and in many cases still are, dominant.
In all countries, allocation of broadcasting frequencies has rested with agencies of the
state. Governance of the broadcasting institutions that generate the meanings and
narratives that frame reality for citizens has been a source of ongoing confl ict that
resurfaces at times of change.
1. Th e author is grateful for comments from Sally Broughton-Micova, Marius Dragomir, Natalie Fenton, Ruth
Garland, Natali Helberger, David Levy, Christian Nissen, Manuel Puppis, and Mark Th ompson.
C H A P T E R T W O
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S7 6
State-administered and public service broadcasters all over the world face challenges as
they come to terms with the new realities of digital media. A major structural shift is
underway, with the outcome uncertain. Some broadcasters have been able to parry the
challenges of new competitors and declining audiences, and grasp the opportunities
aff orded by new services and delivery platforms. Others, due to political and regulatory
constraints, or to a lack of demand, have been less able to respond and have seen their
audiences dwindle. How this adjustment plays out in each national context, and the
extent to which new global and regional norms of governance emerge, will play a key
role in the evolving structure of democratic communication systems for some time to
come.
In the long term, the key question is how long state-administered or public service
media institutions will survive in the digital age. Public service broadcasters have been
created from scratch, even quite recently in Th ailand and Taiwan, but the invention of
large new public service media organizations is rare. It is the evolution of existing media
institutions that will shape the future. Th is is why focusing on the policy settlement
for state/public media is important: the extent to which these organizations are able
to fl ourish in the digital era is likely to have a profound impact on the future balance
between state, commercial, and public media.
After more than a decade of debate about how broadcasting governance should respond
to digitization, this paper examines the evidence about how it is responding. Th ere is
no shortage of theories about what is happening; some claim that the fundamental
economic models of state and public service broadcasters are broken due to long-term
decline in audiences and funding, while others argue that new funding models, as
well as digitization-related reductions in costs, are off setting these challenges, leading
to a new golden age of public media. Th ere are claims that broadcasters’ remits are
being watered down and commercialized amid a radical restructuring of the basic
regulatory compact that underpins broadcasting.2 And while some commentators
argue that digitization leads to pressure for more independence of broadcasters from
government, others are skeptical, claiming that media policy reform has been subsumed
into an opaque politics that serves only political incumbents and undermines trust in
democracy. Th is paper examines each of these claims in the light of evidence from
Mapping Digital Media (MDM), the largest international study of media policy ever
conducted.
2. Use of the scarce public resource of electromagnetic spectrum often entails obligations to meet public interest
requirements. Th is is only a part of the regulatory deal struck between states and broadcasters. Also relevant are
laws and regulations that govern other distribution networks such as broadband, the competition framework, and
fi scal policy as it impacts broadcasters. Each regime can be used to implement public interest regulation.
7 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
1.2 State and Public Media around the World
Th e globe can be divided into four basic “ideal types” of system as regards the historic
role of state-administered/public service broadcasting:
1. media systems with established public broadcasters and a mixed system that balances
public and commercial funding. Broadly, this refers to Europe, some former
colonies of Britain, and several countries (such as Japan, Taiwan, Th ailand, South
Korea, and Chile) that have developed independent—albeit small—public service
broadcasters;
2. countries with state-administered broadcasters such as CCTV in China in which
the broadcaster is the voice of the party and plays a propaganda role for the
government;
3. purely commercial broadcasting systems with only a small role, if any, for state or
public service media. Much of North and South America (with the exception of
Canada and Chile and some other cases) belongs in this group; and
4. hybrid and transitional systems, for example those with former state broadcasters of
questionable independence. It is notable that the rising BRICS powers (with the
partial exceptions of South Africa and India) are not generally classifi ed as having
independent public service media.3
1.2.1 Defi ning Terms
Th is overview of MDM fi ndings focuses on “state-administered and public service
broadcasters” (SA/PSBs). Th is is a broad category, comprising institutions from the
independent Dutch Public Service broadcasters that form NPO, to China’s state-run
China Central Television.
It is of course important to respect the distinction between media controlled by the
state and independent public service broadcasters. In this article, the generic term state-
administered/public service broadcasters (SA/PSBs) refers to the common group, while
the sub-categories of state-administered (SA) and public service broadcasters (PSBs)
are used as appropriate. Th e term public service media (PSM) is used to underline that
public service organizations are providing services on non-broadcast platforms. Th e
question of how digitization impacts on the balance between SA and PSBs is addressed
in the concluding section.
3. Th e BRICS countries are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S7 8
Th e Mapping Digital Media project has focused on the dynamics and tensions faced
by publicly owned broadcasters (both state and public service) that enjoy state-
granted funding and/or distribution privileges that have historically guaranteed
huge audiences, but also brought the danger of political interference. Non-market
ownership and control is the common defi ning feature of “state-administered/public
service broadcasters.”
Th e reason why the MDM research combined such diverse broadcasters in a single
category is that it let us compare and contrast the fortunes of both PSBs and state
broadcasters. It also avoids the problems that would arise from creating a category of
“pure” PSBs, which would be disputed by those claiming that this or that broadcaster
has been captured by state power.
1.2.2 SA/PSBs and the Digital Transition
Th ere has been a sustained eff ort on the part of media reform campaigners and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to use the reform opportunities triggered by
digitization to encourage the transformation of state-administered broadcasters into
genuinely independent PSBs. Many of those involved saw the digital transition as
an opportunity to open up markets and transition state-controlled broadcasters into
independent PSBs.4 Where PSBs were fi rmly established prior to the introduction of
digital media, civil society campaigns have focused on renewal: the transformation of
public service broadcasting into “public service communications,”5 or “public service
media.”6
While public service enthusiasts tend to focus on the opportunities of digital for
developing independent PSM, there are other possibilities. Th e digital environment
may be one in which state broadcasters rather than independent public broadcasters
tend to thrive, or one in which purely commercial media are becoming more dominant.
4. See, for example, E. Smith, A Road Map to Public Service Broadcasting, Asia Pacifi c Broadcasting Union/UN-
ESCO, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2012; and T. Mendel, Public Service Broadcasting: A Comparative Legal Survey,
UNESCO, Paris, 2011.
5. D. Tambini and J. Cowling, From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Communications, IPPR, London,
2004 (hereafter, Tambini and Cowling, 2004).
6. P. Iosifi dis, Public Television in the Digital Era: Technological Challenges and New Strategies for Europe, Palgrave
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007 (hereafter, Iosifi dis, 2007); P. Iosifi dis, Global Media and Communication Policy,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011 (hereafter, Iosifi dis, 2011); K. Jakubowicz in B. Klimkiewicz (ed.), Media
Freedom and Pluralism: Media Policy Challenges in the Enlarged Europe, CEU, Budapest, 2010. See also Council
of Europe, Committee of Ministers CM/Rec (2007) 3 on the Remit of Public Service Media in the Information
Society, and G.F. Lowe and J. Steemers (eds), Regaining the Initiative for Public Service Media, Nordicom, Goth-
enburg, 2012.
7 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
And the current period may be one in which the major and rising powers lack any
form of sustainable public service media, or one in which public service broadcasting
gradually replaces the state broadcasters in China, Brazil, and Russia, and underscores
the independence of South African and Indian public service broadcasters. Th us, the
analysis of current reforms, confl icts, and the direction of institutional change is crucial.
2. Seven Theses on SA/PSB and Digitization
2.1 The Audience for State-administered/Public Service Media is in
Decline
Many argue that as broadcasting channel choice and access to on-demand services
expand, state-administered and public service media inevitably suff er rapid decline
in audience. However, an examination of available data shows us that recent years
have not featured a simple, linear decline in SA/PSM audiences. In broadcasting there
is a range of experiences and many complicating factors other than the process of
digitization.
International comparative research confi rms that viewing of publicly funded channels
has declined as a proportion of total television viewing between 2009 and 2011 in
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, and India.7 Some MDM
reports that focus on the period 2005–2010, such as Slovakia, identify the rise of new
digital channels in competition with PSBs as directly responsible for audience decline.
MDM data indicate that SA/PSB audiences did not decline everywhere between
2005 and 2010; the exceptions include Canada, Australia, and Sweden. Th ere were
some countries where SA/PSM have experienced audience growth in recent years.
Argentina’s Canal 7 has increased its audience from a very low bottom, in the 1–2
percent range. (Growth is due to that channel’s acquisition of soccer rights rather than
the sudden popularity of public service journalism.) In Armenia, the state-administered
broadcaster H1 maintained and to an extent increased its audience in the last decade.
In China (where television ownership and audiences are rising), all fi ve of the top
rating television news programs and indeed all major national television channels
are broadcast by the state-administered China Central TV, which remains the only
national broadcaster in the country.
7. Ofcom, International Communications Market Report, London, 2012, Fig. 3.38 (hereafter, Ofcom, ICMR
2012).
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S8 0
Th at having been said, MDM reports do show in most countries some decline of
audience share and reach on broadcast platforms for SA/PSBs. A limited exception is
found in countries where access to television broadcasting is still rapidly expanding such
as Morocco, though even here audiences for the PSB have declined as a proportion of
total television audience (MDM Morocco; 25). It should also be mentioned that even
where PSB channels are in decline relative to other broadcasters, the rise in television
viewing per viewer per day in most countries means that more PSB television is being
viewed in absolute terms. Th is applies to most European markets, though multi-tasking
(simultaneous use of several media)8 does need to be taken into account.
Th e data do not permit us to attribute audience decline solely to digitization. In Turkey,
for example, digitization coincided with the end of SA/PSB monopoly. Th is led to a
rapid decline of audience share for the ad-funded SA/PSB between 2005 and 2010.
Th e precipitous decline in SA/PSB audiences in Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
however, contrasts with a gradual decline in most other countries with signifi cant PSBs.
Th ere is ample evidence that a well-run, trusted PSB can thrive even during periods of
audience fragmentation. MDM Estonia reports that ETV has managed to maintain
audience shares of around 15 percent and improve audiences in some demographic
groups such as the more educated. In the longer term, audiences have declined
somewhat with increasing competition since the 1990s, as ETV dropped more populist
programming such as game shows in order to focus on public service programming.
Conversely, where the PSB is less trusted and perceived as a government propaganda
mouthpiece, as with RTM in Malaysia, audience declines have been seen as an
opportunity for commercial competitors who are trying to improve their audience
trust.
Even where audiences for PSBs remain high, viewers may be watching less public
interest content, as this is traditionally defi ned. It was observed a decade ago that
audiences were migrating away from PSB “remit programming”9 as channel choice
expanded during the digital transition.
In some cases, SA/PSBs have large audiences on new platforms. Th e MDM reports
show that there is a divide between those PSBs able to mitigate audience decline
on their main channels by launching new digital services, and those still reliant on
8. Ofcom, Communications Market Report, London, August 2013, p. 33.
9. Remit programming is programming that clearly and unambiguously fulfi lls the public service remit.
8 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
traditional platforms. While individual channel audiences are declining, the launch of
new channels (many of which have less onerous PSB obligations) compensates. France
Television, for example, has not launched new channels for digital terrestrial television
(DTT). But it has made France 5 a 24-hour channel and launched a new information
service using DTT. In general, audience declines are much less pronounced in radio
thus far, although radio switch-over may change this.
In some of those cases where SA/PSB numbers are down, audiences have compensated
by consuming public service media on new platforms such as mobile, online, catch up,
and on-demand. Th ere appears to be one group (many European countries, such as
the United Kingdom) where online services are compensating—rising in proportion
to PSB losses—and another group where PSBs are not able to launch new services in
digital media. NHK in Japan, for example, has been tightly constrained to broadcasting
and broadcasting-related services and has a limited online off ering.
2.2 PSM Funding is in Decline
It is widely assumed that as a consequence of declining audiences, the revenue of PSB
channels has been in decline around the world. Some commentators have seen the
end of receiver license fees as an inevitable result of audience decline and digitization:
“the principal funding source for public service broadcasters—the license fee—will not
survive for long unless it is radically rethought.”10
Th e picture revealed as digitization progresses is more complex. Expressed as a
proportion of overall television revenue, the role of public funding varies extremely
widely: from zero in China (where funding is not transparent, but state-controlled
CCTV is 100 percent funded by advertising) to Japan which raises US$8–9 billion in
license fee revenue per year.11
10. OSF, “Television Across Europe,” Regulation, Policy and Independence (Vol. 1, Report Summary), Open Society
Institute, New York, 2005, p. 41.
11. See also MDM country reports, section 6; Ofcom, ICMR 2012, Fig. 3.1, Fig. 3.18.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S8 2
Figure 1.
Public service media total funding in the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)
area (€ million), 2006–201112
+2 .6%
–2.7% –2.0%
+4 .5%
+0 .4%
33,050.39 33,911.69 32,980.74 32,319.76 33,779.02 33,930.69
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
10,000.00
20,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
Figure 1 shows the overall level of PSB revenue in the 39 member countries of the
European Broadcasting Union, and shows that the overall funding level of PSBs has
not declined, but remained more or less static over the period 2006–2011.
Figure 2.
Public service media funding mix in the EBU area (2006–2011)
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
8
9
9
11
13
13
62
63
63
64
64
64
16
17
15
12
11
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
12
10
11
11
11
11
Public funds License fee Advertising Sponsorship Other
Source: EBU Media Intelligence Service, 2013
12. EBU data are from the presentation by Dr Roberto Suárez Candel of the EBU at the EBU Euroradio Assembly,
1–3 May 2013 (not published).
8 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
While overall revenues have been static, the balance of revenue types has changed. Th e
EBU research shows a slight shift of PSB funding from advertising to license fee and
other public funds. In part, this refl ects the removal of advertising funding from public
service broadcasting in France, and in part it refl ects the crisis of advertising funding,
which is more sensitive to audience losses and the overall economic environment.
Advertising funding for PSBs is vulnerable. In general, the digital transition has
increased the volatility of PSB funding.13
Declining audiences and weak revenues matter a great deal in the competition for
talent and programming. According to Runar Woldt and colleagues, writing about
European PSB in 1998,
the varying conditions governing public service broadcasters in
individual countries create very diff erent situations with regard to
the fl exibility available to them in facing up to the challenges of new
technology and stiff er competition. A country’s or public service
broadcaster’s … fi nancial clout … allows broadcasters to maintain or
enhance traditional levels of quality programming, while at the same
time allowing them to make the necessary leap to new technology. Also
many countries have legal and political barriers which make it diffi cult
for public service broadcasters to get the most out of the technical and
programming options currently available.14
PSBs in smaller and poorer markets—such as Moldova, Macedonia, Montenegro,
and even Slovenia—have always faced particular challenges because of the challenges
in maintaining the high per capita revenues necessary to fund quality services. Even
with smaller markets, however, the story is not one of universal decline. SA/PSBs in
Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina have gained in both audience share and funding
in recent years.
A combination of austerity and an aversion to state funding programs creates new risks
for some funding models. In Africa, in particular where state and public broadcasters
have relied heavily on direct government grants and other forms of direct funding,
“the adoption of new economic policies, which favor reduction or the elimination of
13. See Ofcom, ICMR 2012, Fig. 3.18; R. Kleis Nielsen and G. Linnebank, “Public support for the media: A six-
country overview,” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Oxford, 2011.
14. R. Woldt, J. Dries, A. Gerber, and B. Konert, “Perspectives of public service television in Europe,” Media Mono-
graph 24, European Institute for the Media, Düsseldorf, Germany, 1998, pp. 129–130.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S8 4
subsidies to state linked enterprises mean that state grants will no longer be necessarily
available.”15 Th is political and ideological opposition to state-aided broadcasting comes
alongside the impact of the economic crisis and pressure on public spending, but the
data just reviewed suggest that commercial advertising models have suff ered more than
taxation or license fee funding. According to Stylianos Papathanassopoulos and Ralph
Negrine, “As a result of the economic downturn we may be entering a period when the
British duopoly model triumphs: a strong public sector and a strong(ish) commercial
sector.”16
Th e funding of public media is part of a wider settlement including tax exemptions
and spectrum pricing. Other privileges that increase the audience for PSM might also
be taken into account (for example through regulation of electronic program guides,
must-carry rules, and net neutrality rules), and a wider perspective would include
publicly owned and funded news agencies, and the legal framework which governs the
PSB’s commercial activities. In assessing the transition as a whole, these must be taken
into account. Th e evidence gathered by MDM shows that the relationship between
audience and public funding is not straightforward. Whereas purely advertiser-funded
revenues go down proportionately with audience share, a PSB may be funded to do
more when its broadcast audiences are in decline, but if audiences decline beyond a
certain level, political support for subsidies may collapse.
Th e need for transitional funding for PSBs to invest during the transition is key, and
the U.S. and European experience suggests that given the political will, it is likely that
public sources (rather than capital markets or donations from viewers, for example) are
most likely to provide such funding. Given pressures on the license fee, a number of
countries are experimenting with new forms of license fees. Th e EBU, the representative
body for PSM in Europe, is actively seeking alternative models.
MDM reports show no overall pattern in the ratios of public to private media funding
and revenue levels between 2005 and 2010. It is not appropriate to pool these data
because of data-gathering discrepancies between countries (e.g. some include state
advertising), but it gives a useful indication of change over time. In many cases,
public funding has fallen in absolute terms during this period of spending cuts, and in
others it has remained constant. And commercial broadcasters have in many cases also
15. E.A. Mbaine, “Viability and sustainability of public service broadcasting,” in Article XIX, Broadcasting Policy and
Practice in Africa, London, 2003, p. 157 (hereafter, Mbaine, “Viability and sustainability”).
16. S. Papathanassopouolos and R.M. Negrine, Communications Policy: Th eories and Issues, Palgrave Macmillan, Bas-
ingstoke, 2010, p. 144 (hereafter, Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2010).
8 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
experienced revenue declines, particularly in advertising-funded services. Th e Ofcom
data in Figure 3 therefore mask considerable country-level variation.
Figure 3.
TV industry revenues, by source
£211bn £221bn £221bn £242bn £258bn
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
£98bn £98bn £91bn £102bn £105bn
£19bn £19bn £19bn £20bn £20bn
£95bn £103bn £111bn £121bn £133bn
P ro
p o
rt io
n o
f re
v e
n u
e s
YOY CAGR (4yr)
6.7% 1.8%
3.5% 1.8%
–0.2% 1.4%
10.5% 9.0%
Advertising Public funds Subscriptions
Notes: Net TV advertising revenues for Russia have been calculated by discounting 15% of TV
advertising spending to remove agency fees and production costs. Interpretation and manipu-
lation of data are solely Ofcom’s responsibility. Ofcom has used an exchange rate of USD1.604
to the GBP, representing the IMF average for 2011.
Source: Ofcom, International Communications Market Report (ICMR) 2012
While global fi gures suggest continuity in ratios of public (license fee + taxation) and
commercial (advertising + subscription) revenues, there have been some countries
where more radical shifts have taken place. In South Africa, public funding shifted
from 39 percent of the total funding in 2005 to 51 percent in 2010, whereas in Georgia
it shifted from 15 percent to 32 percent, and it also increased in Russia. In Moldova, in
contrast, it decreased from 19 percent to 13 percent over the same period.
Th ese jumps in funding may be explained by one-off payments to enable PSBs to cope
with extra expenditure, together with advertising revenue losses due to digitization,
rather than by any long-term shift in commitment to public funding. It may also
be the case that fl ows of funding to broadcasters increase for political reasons when
elections are approaching.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S8 6
Figure 4.
Evolution of the public/private ratio of funding in selected countries, 2005–2010
Germany Japan Georgia Turkey
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
75 81 85 9475 81 68 93
25 19 15
6
25 19
32
7
Private Public
2005 2005 2005 20052010 2010 2010 2010
Note: Public funding includes license fees, allocations from the state budget, and all forms of fund-
ing channeled from public sources such as underwriting. Private funding includes all forms of
commercial income, mainly advertising revenues and sponsorship
Source: Calculations based on data in Mapping Digital Media reports
In summary, while there may be a slight relative decline in the funding of PSM, and
some MDM reports even reported a PSB funding crisis (for example Slovakia, South
Africa, Poland, among others), public funding does appear in absolute terms to be
a relatively robust funding source, fl uctuating less markedly than advertising. Public
service media funding as a whole has been relatively stable, but is based mainly on
advertising and license fees, both of which have been questioned in terms of their
long-term viability.
Th e funding settlement is more complex than these direct forms of revenue, however,
and a longer term assessment should take account of tax policy and the distribution
settlement as indirect support. MDM researchers were asked to report on the overall
balance of public and private funding and trends and innovation in new funding
models, including public funding. Th e following non-exhaustive table indicates some
of the new directions in media funding, including experimenting with alternatives to
public service license fees.
8 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Table 4.
The search for new public funding models
New funding source Country
Subscription (TV) Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Latvia
Sponsorship Hungary
New forms of advertising Thailand (multi-platform advertising)
Online pay per view Latvia
Donations/crowd-funding US, Moldova, Netherlands
E-commerce/converged models Nigeria
Public-private partnerships Nigeria, South Africa
New taxation models Thailand (the “sin tax”), France (newspaper subsidy,
levies on telecoms/internet companies)
Receiver subsidies (during switch-over) UK, US
Source: Mapping Digital Media, various reports/the author
SA/PSB funding reform inevitably raises questions about independence. A general shift
of funding from license fees to direct government subsidy (Germany, Netherlands,
and Spain) may be seen as a threat to independence. But public perceptions of
independence do not seem to be impacted by funding structures alone, and the shift to
direct government funding does not lead directly to threats to independence.
Broadcaster independence can be questioned even where funding is provided via a license
fee. Recent crises at several European PSBs, such as the Greek PSB and the Valencia
PSB,17 illustrate the potential for funding crises and reform to undermine independence
and the diffi culty of executing reforms without threatening independence. New forms
of licensing (e.g. levies on telecoms companies and direct grants from government)
could create more problems for PSM independence than traditional viewer license fees
and advertising, but they may be the only option if the goal is to secure public service
alternatives to commercial media.
2.3 Digitization Reduces PSM Costs
Effi ciency is a key rationale for digitization, and if digitization reduces costs for PSBs,
this may mitigate the challenges of declining audiences and funding. However, the
long-term effi ciency benefi ts of the digital transition only become available after
very signifi cant new investments, investments that could take 15 years to recoup,
and spectrum re-planning may mean that not all effi ciency benefi ts accrue to the
17. See C. Crustafon, at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/11/21/the-shutdown-of-the-public-region-
al-television-in-valencia-the-fi rst-step-towards-the-end-of-regional-public-service-broadcasting-in-spain, 2013.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S8 8
broadcaster. Given these conditions, it is clear that signifi cant transition costs will need
to be taken into account before the benefi ts of cost reduction are enjoyed.
Th e public service broadcaster in Uruguay reported that digitization of transmission
was likely to improve geographic coverage, and in other countries where the transmitter
network has yet to achieve universality, similar gains are likely to be made with the
digitization of transmission equipment and re-allocation of spectrum. But these benefi ts
come at the price of signifi cant increases in distribution costs and transitional costs.
Th e benefi ts emerge only toward the end of the process, perhaps after institutional,
political, and reputational damage has been done.
Many PSBs around the world face large transitional costs, in terms of the capital
investment needed to upgrade both production and facilities, and to retrain staff . In
cases where transitional funding cannot be accessed, this is resulting in the closure
of PSB services. In the United States, transitional funds have been accessed at both
federal and state levels and this has enabled public television and radio stations to
launch new services and access new audiences. In a range of other countries, including
the United Kingdom, above-infl ation funding increases have been provided to allow
the PSB to meet the costs of digital transition. While effi ciency gains have been slow,
“opportunities to share programming at low cost are only beginning to emerge, and
innovative approaches have yet to take root except in the most forward-looking stations”
(MDM USA). In the long term, new digital technologies introduce effi ciencies and cost
reductions—for example, in terms of the necessity of maintaining transmitters—but
the transitional period of multiple distribution platforms including Internet Protocol
Television (IPTV), mobile platforms, and on-demand is expensive.
Are there any other regulatory assets that will be drawn in, or may be drawn in in
the future, to reduce costs for PSM? Th ere is a long-established approach of applying
must-carry rules to ensure that PSM are carried on all platforms, even where audiences
are small (as in Brazil).
Similar questions arise in the IPTV world. For example, if network owners and operators
are permitted to discriminate in terms of the quality of distribution provided to various
content operators, might network neutrality principles or specifi c regulations prohibit
discrimination against public service media?
Th e key transitional question is whether PSBs should enjoy continued and new
distribution privileges, and how these might be conditional on performing a particular
social function. Central to this is the question of allocating multiplex slots on the new
8 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
digital terrestrial television platform, launched in most MDM countries. Broadcasters
that meet public interest standards generally enjoy preferential treatment in analog—
paying zero or non-market prices for use of the sought after UHF spectrum. As
distribution on other platforms becomes more important, policy debate focuses on
how distribution privileges are allocated in the new order and whether a genuine
commitment to serve the public—and not state or political interests—is the quid pro
quo. Central to this question is what the responsibilities of public service media are,
and who decides if they are being met.
In summary, any general claims that PSBs are more effi cient in the digital era beg
questions about what the objectives are, and what “effi ciency” means in an environment
where audiences are harder to reach. While in some cases there will be benefi ts such as
universal coverage and reduced costs, these may accrue only after signifi cant transitional
costs have been met.
2.4 The “Remit” for State and Public Media is Increasingly
Contested, and Standards are Under Threat
MDM reports show that while there is a very wide variety of PSB remits, there are
common themes, and there appears to be some global convergence of PSB remits.
PSB remits fall into three groups:
• Th ose based on defi ned genres of content, such as impartial news, information,
educational programming (e.g. Th ailand).
• Th ose based on social functions of the broadcaster(s) such as serving citizenship
(e.g. Peru, Egypt, Germany).
• Th ose based on general values and/or fundamental rights (e.g. Romania).
Most are hybrids of these types and all face challenges in terms of measurement in a
regulatory context. With lack of clarity comes political discretion and challenges to
independence.
MDM reports confi rm the following pressures and trends:
(i) Commercialization increases pressure to meet audience demand rather than pursue cultural or educational objectives.
(ii) Digital innovation undermines remit defi nitions that are based on broadcasting technologies and raises questions about whether public service has a role in new
media.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S9 0
(iii) Th ese and other trends call into question the institutions responsible for monitoring and enforcing the remit.
In contrast to PSBs, state broadcasters do not tend to have a public statement of remit
and responsibilities. Th ey are, however, subject to lines of authority and accountability
to political power. Historically, both state-administered and public service broadcasters
pursued ideological goals rather than market demands and did so to a captive audience.
With digitization and increased channel choice, they found it increasingly necessary to
provide more attractive content in order to secure an audience.
Th is leads to a “Catch 22” situation: SA/PSM increasingly need to compete with
commercial media. As a result they are accused of populism—providing content that
is indistinguishable from that of commercial competitors and watering down their
propaganda or public service remit. Th is is not a viable long-term strategy, however, at
least for public broadcasters, because providing commercial content undermines their
claim to make a distinctive contribution to public service and receive public benefi ts
in order to do so. If, on the other hand, SA/PSBs remain closer to their propaganda,
cultural, or educational remit, they may well be perceived as dull and old-fashioned,
further compounding the audience crisis.
Th is section focuses on public service, rather than state-administered broadcasters
because the “remit Catch 22” is more serious for them. According to Charlie Beckett,
“Th ere is a danger that public service journalism will eff ectively become a rump fi nanced
by the world’s more welfarist governments, like the railways in post-war Britain or
the postal service in Italy—dull, ineffi cient, out of touch with the latest technological
developments, and servicing an ageing sector of the public.”18
Th is prospect has led other experts to ask: “in a system characterized by market
competition and audience fragmentation, what is the distinctive contribution of the
public service provider?”19 Th is question was identifi ed as key as long ago as 1999, when
a report commissioned by the BBC analyzed how diff erent PSBs around the world were
choosing between distinctiveness on the one hand and market share on the other.20
18. C. Beckett, Supermedia: Saving Journalism so it Can Save the World, Blackwell-Wiley, Malden, Massachusetts,
2008, p. 37.
19. R. Kuhn, in P. Iosifi dis (ed.), Reinventing Public Service Communication: European Broadcasters and Beyond, Pal-
grave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 168 (hereafter, Iosifi dis, 2010).
20. McKinsey, “Comparative review of content regulation,” McKinsey Report for the Independent Television Com-
mission, 1999, pp. 4, 22.
9 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
A 2013 reiteration of the study found that PSBs create a “race to the top” by setting a
benchmark and raise the quality threshold for the market as a whole.21
Competitive pressure on established broadcasters is not limited to the established
public service systems. In 2003, E.A Mbaine summarized the situation in Africa as
follows:
Th e opening up of the airwaves has been a good step in the right
direction, as it has broken the monopoly of the state on information
within the broadcast media. However, opening the airwaves does
not necessarily lead to a plural and diverse broadcasting landscape.
[It] has also brought forth a fl urry of competition in which national
broadcasters have had to wake up and provide better services, if only
to survive.22
In response to this, the PSBs described in MDM country reports often perform a
balancing act, observing the remit while attempting to be attractive to audiences.
Success in striking the balance appears to be limited: a focus group study in Th ailand in
2010 found that some viewers struggled to distinguish the output of the independent
PSBs from that of the state broadcaster. Elsewhere, as in Italy, commentators have
criticized PSBs for output indistinguishable from that of commercial broadcasters.
Digital innovation also poses the question of whether the remit of public service media
should extend beyond broadcasting. Many commentators have argued that digitization
should lead to an evolution from public service broadcasting to public service media
or even to public service communications.23 However, Nanne Priebs (2004) found
that restrictive remits and regulations in Germany and Japan limited public service
activities to broadcasting and related services, and acted as a restraint on the launch of
new digital services by the PSBs. According to Brevini (2010),24 the Italian PSB RAI
spent only 0.2 percent of its total budget on online services, in comparison to the BBC
spend of around 5 percent during the same period.
21. J. Simon, “Public and private broadcasters across the world—the race to the top,” BBC, London, 2013 (hereafter,
Simon, 2013).
22. Mbaine, “Viability and sustainability,” pp. 160–161.
23. Tambini and Cowling, 2004; N. Priebs, “Learning from abroad: Regulating public service broadcasting in Ja-
pan and Germany,” 2003, in Tambini and Cowling, 2004; Iosifi dis, 2007, 2010, 2011; K. Jakubowicz, “Rude
awakening. Social and media change in Central and Eastern Europe,” Javnost. Th e Public, 8(4) (2001), 59–80
(hereafter, Jakubowicz, 2001).
24. B. Brevini, “Towards PSB 2.0,” European Journal of Communication, 25(4), 348–365.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S9 2
In many MDM countries, the debate about PSB remits in the digital age is ongoing
and there is no consensus about new roles and rationales in the online space. Mark
Th ompson as Director General of the BBC, and previously, had advocated a niche,
rather than a universal approach to PSB whereby the PSB should seek to serve sub-
audiences as the “new tribes” of PSM users, and do so on all potential new platforms as
“Martini Media” (anytime, anyplace, anywhere).25 Others see the transition as spelling
the end of the possibility of regulating for universal access and use of PSM services, the
end of the PSB as a “nation builder” or provider of “social cohesion.”26 But other PSBs,
particularly in smaller markets such as Estonia, have retrenched to their core mission
and the defense of smaller national identities in the face of globalization.
MDM reports show that a growing number of countries apply some general public
service obligations to all broadcasters (e.g. Italy, Brazil), but these general requirements
have not been eff ectively enforced. In most cases, they do not apply to new channels
and online services, and there is often a lack of clarity regarding how public service
obligations apply to DTT services. In many markets, all licensed broadcasters must
ensure that news is impartial, but the extent to which these obligations apply to digital
platforms is yet to be resolved in most countries. As an example, the public service
broadcasters such as Channel Four and ITV in the United Kingdom should under
the Communications Act 2003 also seek to promote public service principles through
their services. However, the shift to digital has involved an ongoing loosening of these
obligations in negotiations with the regulator over license terms.
In Chile, the “Law of Correct Operation” of broadcasters in theory applies a set of
public service principles to all broadcasters. Th e regulator has the responsibility to
ensure that television broadcasters ensure respect for “the Nation’s moral and cultural
values, dignity of persons and protection of the family, for pluralism; for democracy;
for peace; for the protection of the environment; and for the spiritual and intellectual
formation of children and the youth within the said value framework.” In general,
this form of principle-based regulation has not been successful. Vague aspirational
principles are diffi cult to enforce, and if they were enforced it would be likely to be
regarded as an attack on broadcasting freedom.
Th e reports confi rm that the PSB Catch 22 undermines innovation and new services
in the public service space. For example, surveys of perception of the public service
25. M. Th ompson, 1999, cited in M. Price and M. Raboy (eds), Public Service Broadcasting: A Documentary Reader,
Kluwer Law International, Th e Hague, Netherlands, 2003 (hereafter, Price and Raboy, 2003).
26. See, for example, Jakubowicz, 2001.
9 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
broadcaster in Th ailand and Germany indicate that they are perceived as somewhat dull
and old fashioned. Most PSBs are experiencing diffi culty reaching younger listeners.
Th ere is a need for a policy decision if this is the case: if the view is that a mixed
broadcasting system of PSBs and other commercial channels is a long-term goal, then
it may be necessary to relax genre-based remits to create more popular broadcasters.
It is thus possible to identify a limited number of possible courses of action as regards
the PSB remit:
• Focus on core remit. One response to digitization is for the PSB to focus on core
PSB programming such as news, education, and culture, and to move away from
the mixed broadcasting schedule addressing a mass audience which the market
now provides. Few have chosen this route, though some such as Estonia have
adopted a more “pure” PSB approach.
• Dilute the remit—and risk undermining PSB privileges such as the license fee in
the long term. Most PSBs have been accused of this, but MDM data suggest that
in the main they have avoided the populist route. Th ere is some evidence that
there is less news provided as part of the remit in Sweden and Egypt, for example.
(Quality public service news is one of the most expensive genres to produce.) In
the context of a funding squeeze, quality journalism faces challenges, and several
MDM reports highlighted the rise of “cut and paste news” as a cost-cutting
approach.
• Develop a new remit—for example updating it to permit the launch of new
online, mobile, and on-demand services, and developing an innovative approach
to what public service means in the new environment. In many cases, the policy
debate about the public service role and innovation in the new world has been
dominated by discussion of “crowding out” of commercial by publicly funded
services rather than a discussion of what the public interest demands in the new
digital environment.27 New, updated remits have been outlined in many European
countries, and even in Germany and Japan—where new services were constrained
in the early years of digital—a remit more conducive to public service innovation
has been agreed, often infl uenced by the BBC’s approach to public value.28
• Change the enforcement and monitoring framework, including who is subject.
Th ere are several instances of advertising-funded public service broadcasters exiting
27. Simon, 2013; Patrick Barwise and Robert Picard, “What if there Were No BBC?”, Reuters Institute for the Study
of Journalism (RISJ), Oxford, February 2014, at https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fi leadmin/documents/
Publications/Other_publications/Barwise_and_Picard_FINAL.pdf.
28. See, for example, MDM Sweden, p. 26.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S9 4
the public service system. (Sweden’s TV4 is one such.) In the European Union,
state aid regulation increasingly requires a clear and consistently applied remit.29
A number of these options have been pursued in countries with greater consensus
over the desirability of a managed transition to post-broadcasting PSM. Th e Swedish
commercial PSB TV4 has eff ectively ceased to be a public service broadcaster, but the
main PSB was permitted to launch new online services after a government commission
concluded in 2010 that “public service internet activities were legitimate and should
aim at reaching as many people as possible.”
In cases where established PSBs have been able to develop a compelling PSM off er
on new platforms, the PSM provider is among the very biggest providers of news. In
the United Kingdom, for example, the BBC leads on some platforms, and in Spain
RTVE is the second most visited site. In others, including Japan and to a certain
extent Germany, regulation has prevented the development of public service on new
platforms.
Despite this, there is some evidence of policy learning between countries and the
emergence of global norms regarding the remit of PSB/PSM. For example where the
PSB mission is codifi ed in law or regulation, there is a family resemblance among the
mission statements, with the list of principles of the broadcasting service in Peru bearing
a strong resemblance to similar principles in Germany and the United Kingdom. More
research would be needed to ascertain if an international convergence with regard to
the PSB mission was taking place, and whether these apply to all media or only to
broadcasting.
2.5 Digitization Undermines the Traditional “Regulatory Toolkit”
for SA/PSM
State-administered and public service media respond not primarily to consumers,
shareholders, and the laws of supply and demand, but rather to institutionalized
accountability relationships to the public and to the state. Th ese relationships,
summarized in Table 5 below, have always been debated and contested, but technological
and market changes have led to new pressures for change.
29. D.A.L. Levy, “Negotiating Europeanization: State aid guidelines, public broadcasting and new services in three
major member states,” OXPO (Oxford—Sciences Po Research group) Working Papers 2011–12, Oxford, January
2013, at http://oxpo.politics.ox.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/wp_11-12/OXPO_11_12e_Levy1.pdf.
9 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Digitization has led in many cases to the beginning of a fundamental rethink of how
SA/PSM should be funded and regulated. In France and Spain we have seen important
legal changes, with PSBs (e.g. RTVE) not being permitted to carry advertising.
Elsewhere, as in Sweden, public service obligations on some broadcasters have been
relaxed. Despite some attempts at standardization,30 there is no universally accepted
defi nition of public service broadcasting. Th e following table outlines the range of
institutions and structures in the MDM reports as ideal types.
Table 5.
The public service media compact31
Framework type Content
accountable to
Rights Duties Broadcaster
(e.g.)
State • Government • Funding • Access to
distribution
• Must-carry rules • EPG prominence • Monopoly • Access
• Propaganda • Universal
availability
• Fundamental rights
• Protection of minors
CCTV China
Public service
(PSB)
• Public as citizens
• Parliament
• Funding • Access to
distribution
• Must-carry rules • EPG prominence
• “Public service remit”
• Universal availability
• Fundamental rights
• protection of minors
STV
Sweden
30. International organizations including UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the EC, and the UN Development
Programme have each developed numerous declarations and principles on public service broadcasting. See es-
pecially Council of Europe, 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy Prague (Czech Re-
public), 7–8 December 1994. Th e Media in a Democratic Society; also, Communication from the European
Commission on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (Offi cial Journal C 257 of 27
October 2009); also, the list of resources noted in: United Nations Development Programme; Bureau for Devel-
opment Policy; Democratic Governance Group Supporting Public Service Broadcasting; Learning from Bosnia
and Herzegovina’s experience, at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/demo-
cratic-governance/dg-publications-for-website/supporting-public-service-broadcasting/A2I_Pub_PublicService-
Broadcasting.pdf. See also the UNESCO Media Development Indicators (2008), according to which “PSB is
broadcasting made, fi nanced and controlled by the public, for the public. (…) It is free from political interference
and pressure from commercial forces.” Th ere is also an ISO standard applicable to public service broadcasters, ISO
9001, which has been used to accredit a small number of broadcasters, at http://www.iso.org/iso/livelinkgetfi le-
isocs?nodeId=15354090.
31. Th is chart presents, in a simplifi ed way, some of the key elements of the institutional relationship between broad-
casters and the state.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S9 6
Framework type Content
accountable to
Rights Duties Broadcaster
(e.g.)
Commercial PSB • Consumers • Shareholders • Regulators
• Funding • Access to
distribution (on
terrestrial)
• Must-carry rules • EPG prominence
• “Public service remit”
• Universal availability
• Fundamental rights
• Protection of minors
ITV UK
Commercial • Consumers • Shareholders
• Basic speech rights • Fair competition • Access to
distribution (at
commercial price)
• Fundamental rights
• Protection of minors
TV Globo
Brazil
Other (e.g.
public news
agency,
subsidized
press/media)
• Consumers • Regulators • Self/co-
regulation
councils/
shareholders
• Funding • Oligopoly/
monopoly/access
to news
• Funding
• Obey law • Self-regulate
Agerpres/
Mediafax
Romania
Schibsted/
Aftonbladet
Sweden
Source: Th e author, based on Mapping Digital Media, 2013
Th e precise arrangements for these key institutional relationships, and their relative
importance in the power relationships between governments/parties and broadcasters
are subject to volatility and redefi nition during the digital transition. In particular:
• Broadcast/spectrum licensing may become less important as services move online
and on-demand.
• Broader regulation of PSB, such as decisions on whether the PSB should be
permitted to launch new services, becomes more important to the long-term
survival of the PSB.
• Competition rules and their application to the PSB are more contested, and
increasingly impact on questions of PSB remit.
• Th ere may be new forms of intervention, such as net neutrality rules, access
requirements, must-carry rules that can be provided in support of public service.
In 2003, Syvertson remarked that digitization of television “continues to decimate
the array of privileges that governments have at their disposal to grant to selected
broadcasters.”32 In the analog broadcasting environment, where states control market
32. T. Syvertsen, “Challenges to public television in the era of convergence and commercialization,” Television and
New Media, 4(2) (2003), 155–175; p. 160, cited in Papathanassopoulos and Negrine, 2010, p. 137.
9 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
entry and the number of players is strictly limited by frequencies available, spectrum
licensing can be a very eff ective vehicle to apply PSB requirements to all broadcasters.
Whereas SA/PSBs enjoyed privileged access to consumers in the form of monopolies
and privileged spectrum access, they have weaker distribution privileges in the new
digital environment and have to compete with commercial media. Commentators
have argued that the commercial PSB sector has been particularly vulnerable during
the process of digital switch-over.33
Th e value of spectrum as an informal subsidy of public service activity should
theoretically decline with the value of broadcasting licenses. With the rise of alternatives
to terrestrial broadcasting the value of these licenses declines, but there is a huge
uncertainty about rates of decline. All the country reporters were asked to consider the
level of public service obligations on commercial operators. While the MDM reporters
reported few formal public service obligations on broadcasters, there are a number of
countries such as Brazil where the constitution categorizes some or all broadcasters
as services of public interest rather than as purely private organizations. Th ese legal
requirements, which in some cases include obligations to broadcast public information
in emergencies, are often seen as endangering the independence of PSBs and can be a
source of tension and mistrust. Th is was often the case in the Latin American context,
for example in Brazil and Guatemala.
One interesting fi nding is that whereas public service requirements attach to analog
terrestrial licenses in a signifi cant number of cases, such obligations are either weaker or
absent on new platforms including digital terrestrial. Broadcast licenses for terrestrial
television frequencies are the main vehicle of the spectrum-for-service deal. In many
cases, these licensing obligations are not adequately enforced and the potential for
leveraging funding for PSBs in this way is clearly in decline.
Th e remit dispute in Europe has led to the creation of the so-called “public value”
framework, whereby PSBs must prove that new services deliver in the public interest
before they can be funded in accordance with EU competition law. Several reports
expressed concern that public value tests may undermine PSM in the long term (e.g.
Sweden), may not be eff ective (Germany) or objective, and may be very costly to
implement (United Kingdom before 2006). While a transparent framework that sets
33. R. Collins and C. Murroni, New Media, New Policies: Media and Communications Strategies for the Future, Black-
well, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996; R. Collins and J. Purnell, Commerce, Competition and Governance: Th e
Future of the BBC, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), London, 1995; Ofcom, Th e First Review of Public
Service Broadcasting Television, Ofcom, London, 2004, at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/reviews-
investigations/public-service-broadcasting.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S9 8
out the evidence base for a decision to grant or refuse permission for an independent
broadcaster to launch a new service is in principle good for PSB independence, in
practice public value tests are not objective and will always involve an element of
judgment.
Th e complex balances of regulatory assets applied to public service media do not
apply to state media in the same way. Th e MDM reports show that state-controlled
broadcasters are more likely to be free to launch new services (e.g. Nigeria, Kazakhstan),
whereas independent broadcasters face controls and restrictions such as public value
tests.
2.6 The Digital Transition has Become a Battlefi eld in Ongoing
“Media Wars” that are a Feature of all Democratization
Processes
Because of the size and infl uence of PSBs, policy debates become “Media Wars,”
where once settled policy balances (such as funding, the relationship with commercial
competitors, and new services) are contested.34 What is the evidence surrounding the
battles that are being fought over SA/PSM? Is civil society involved? And to what
extent are the subtle balances between government, political parties, public media, and
private media being altered by the processes of digitization?
Technological and market change may in this case lead to maneuvers (for example the
removal of advertising from PSB services in France by the Sarkozy administration),35
which might under stable circumstances have been seen as an attack on media freedom.
Katrin Voltmer argues that confl icts between governments and PSBs follow a pattern:
At the center of the ongoing confl icts over public service broadcasting
in the region are attempts by governments to compromise the
independence of the broadcast organization by manipulating the
regulatory and administrative bodies. Th e issue of who controls these
bodies has been contested right from the start of media transformation
in Eastern Europe.36
34. Jakubowicz, 2001, p. 70; K. Voltmer, Th e Media in Transitional Democracies, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp.
151–157 (hereafter, Voltmer, 2013); Price and Raboy, 2003, p. 226.
35. See R. Kuhn in Iosifi dis, 2010, p. 162; also MDM France, p. 35.
36. Voltmer, 2013, p. 156.
9 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In the United States, policy debates about the (very small) subsidies provided to PSM
are conducted with reference to a politicized set of assumptions about perceived state
interference and liberal bias of PSM.37
Th e “media wars” thesis casts doubt on optimistic views that digitization and the
consequent increase in the openness of markets improves the transparency of media-
state relationships and contributes to the breakup of opaque media-state relationships
and other forms of “political parallelism.”38
Some theorists off er a more optimistic view of the political and policy process and the
role of ideas in policymaking processes. Kunzler argues that a pragmatic discussion
about ideas for change is the crucial variable in determining the degree to which
structural shifts (such as digitization and other forms of technological and market
change) are linked to outcomes (such as media liberalization or the decline of PSBs).39
His analysis suggests that policy outcomes are not the direct result of technological
changes but are mediated by ideas about the role of broadcasting in society.
In the light of the MDM reports, it is important to acknowledge the role of power and
institutions in most cases. Th e key constituencies in PSB debate are as follows:
• Government (or political parties), which can control access to key resources and ultimately infl uence the institutional and regulatory framework by dominating the
legislature and infl uencing public opinion.
• Competing media, which may want access to resources such as spectrum, but may also want to keep control of advertising markets. Th ey also have very important
infl uences and resources in terms of infl uence over politicians.
• SA/PSBs themselves, which have key resources such as lobbying/access, control over news agendas and framing, and clear institutional interests.
In summary, the MDM reports suggest that policymaking with regard to PSBs is
particularly contested and opaque because policy issues are very technical and because
the PSB is a key gatekeeper of framing reality, with a huge sway over the political and
cultural life of the nation. Th us, the relationships among state/government/political
37. Analysis of policy processes in relation to PSBs includes D. Freedman, Th e Politics of Media Policy, Polity Press,
Cambridge, 2008, and comparative analysis includes N. Just and M. Puppis (eds), Trends in Communications
Policy Research, Intellect, Bristol, 2012 (hereafter, Just and Puppis, 2012). See also Iosifi dis, 2007.
38. D. Hallin and P. Mancini, Comparing Media Systems. Th ree Models of Media and Politics, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2004.
39. M. Kunzler, “It’s the idea, stupid! How ideas challenge broadcasting liberalisation,” in Just and Puppis, 2012.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 0 0
parties and the SA/PSB remain a constant source of confl ict and contest. Th ere is no
unifying pattern among the countries studied for MDM. Th e MDM reports off er little
evidence to support the view that commercial media are inherently more transparent
and less captured than publicly owned media. Both are subject to political pressures
on independence.
Th e future of SA/PSBs is not being decided in a rational process of evidence-based
policy debate about long-term priorities and the public interest. While policy can
occasionally spill over into popular consciousness—and even into street protests, as
in Georgia in 2008—policy discussion on the role of both state and public service
broadcasters tends to be limited to a very small clique of interested parties’ input into
technical issues (e.g. technical standards, distribution costs, spectrum planning, and
competition policy) which determine the long-term viability of public service media.
Th e results are not promising. As the reporter in Bosnia put it: “PSBs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina are still not capable of fulfi lling their public role (…) Th e infl uence of
politics in the media and the heritage of the past are still very strong.” Pressures brought
to bear on broadcasters are not transparent. Even the role of Parliament in most cases
is limited, in the subtle obscure reciprocities according to which broadcasters’ power is
allocated and regulated.
2.7 State-administered Broadcasters are Undermined by Digital
Transition, Creating Demand for Independent PSBs
Media reform activists like to tell a digital fairytale. Once upon a time, a state broadcaster
suff ered audience collapse in the face of rising digital competition. Th is inevitably led
to more diverse, independent news and an irresistible groundswell of pressure either to
reform the state broadcaster into an independent public service provider or to create
a new PSB.
Unfortunately, the MDM reports provide little evidence to support this. Th e fairytale
assumes that viewers will actively seek out new sources of independent, public service
content. However, the private broadcasters are themselves likely to be captured by
private interests. Secondly, audiences may stick with a state broadcaster even when
there are other choices. Th irdly, even when the audience does decline, there is no
guarantee that the state broadcaster will “respond, in its organization, management
structures and relations with civil society, to the rise of networked, non-hierarchical
forms of multi-stakeholder governance.”40
40. K. Jakubowicz, in Iosifi dis, 2010.
1 0 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Th e MDM reports are not universally pessimistic, however. Although there is no
direct causal relation between digitization and PSB independence, the introduction of
commercial competition has apparently led viewers and listeners in some countries to
become less trusting of PSB and state broadcasters, because they are exposed to a wider
range of views, opinions, and professional standards. In Jordan, audiences for the state-
controlled JTV news have dipped below 50 percent of the television news audience
since 2008 with the rise of satellite television. In Estonia and Th ailand, increased
demand for public service material was reported, but such demand is weak and may not
lead to fi nancial sustainability for PSM. Citizens may continue to mistrust information
provided by public broadcasters if they have a history of a lack of independence, or
view “remit” programs as boring or worthy.
Many claim that digital choice will lead audiences away from state-controlled media.
However, of 43 of the MDM countries studies where reliable data could be found, 32
of the SA/PSM providers appeared in the top fi ve most used sources of news. Even in
cases where the PSM providers were state controlled,41 they remained among the most
used news providers. Of 19 countries where data were available and the broadcaster
was clearly state controlled, 14 were among the fi ve most popular sources of news, and
there were only fi ve instances in which the PSM were clearly state controlled but failed
to appear among the list of most used news sources.
It seems apparent that states have not lost control of distribution to the extent that users
are moving decisively away from state broadcasters to more independent sources of news.
It is also likely that sport and premium content, rather than quality, independent news,
drives audience, and in some cases internet fi ltering and blocking may hinder competition
in new services.42 Th e independence of the PSBs seems to have made little diff erence. In
the 14 countries where PSM were identifi ed as clearly independent, they were more likely
to appear in the list of most used news sources (12 countries) than not (two countries).
Outside the PSB heartlands of Europe—in Kazakhstan, for instance—public service
broadcasting is simply not understood as a concept, and digitization has brought no
pressure for reform.43 Africa contains a number of rapidly developing media markets
41. A researcher was asked to code the reports according to whether country reporters gave a clear indication of
whether the public sector broadcaster was categorized as (1) state-administered, (2) independent public service,
or (3) hybrid or transitional. Th is was checked against main NGO reports such as those produced by Freedom
House and Reporters Without Frontiers.
42. R. Diebert, J. Palfrey, R. Rohozinski, and J. Zittrain (eds), Access Controlled. Th e Shaping of Power, Rights and Rule
in Cyberspace, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2010.
43. See also the report by the PANOS institute, “Public service broadcasting in the MENA region,” May 2012, at
http://iwsaw.lau.edu.lb/publications/documents/PSB-Book.pdf.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 0 2
that tend to have state-administered media of limited independence from the state,
and a high proportion of foreign public funding. In Nigeria, the federal broadcaster
is involved in a joint venture with Chinese state media. Th e South African PSB is
relatively independent, in contrast with most other African countries surveyed. Th e
continent also contains the countries with the lowest gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, with the lowest television and radio penetration, and the most distant digital
transitions. Th e SA/PSB in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, is poorly
funded and is not available over the whole territory of the country.44
If there is no fairytale of digitally driven media reform, there are pressures and
opportunities for change. In almost all the markets studied, large numbers of
consumers have gained access to large numbers of new services in the last decade due
to digitization. Only in a few cases (such as Kazakhstan and Pakistan) have regulators
successfully excluded new broadcasting channels from terrestrial spectrum during the
digital transition. Even in Pakistan, new broadcasting entrants on other platforms
have put pressure on the dominant state broadcaster. Th is is not an isolated case: new
entrants in Malaysia and Kenya are generating signifi cant pressure for reform of state-
administered broadcasters.
MDM reports thus show that while digitization has not broken state broadcasters, it
may in some cases have undermined them. In particular:
• Where state broadcasters are captured by political interests, audiences in many
cases tend to decline as digitization makes alternative sources more available.
• In an environment of intense competition for audience (from the internet and
mobile telephony as well as television), PSBs and state broadcasters both tend to
lose audience (with some exceptions, such as Chile and Argentina).
• If there is rapid audience decline, the PSB can become a pressure group for editorial
independence, particularly if it is suff ering a revenue decline and job losses.
Public broadcasters face uncertainty and a need for political agreement on a renewed
statement of purpose and transitional funding if they are to survive the digital transition.
Th ere is a need for a clear, publicly debated restatement of the desirability of the mixed
system and the necessity of public service media in the digital age. In most countries,
such a debate has not taken place outside narrow technical circles.
44. See the Afrimap Report of the Open Society Foundations, “Public broadcasting in Africa. An overview,” 2013, at
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_PBA_Overview_Nov2013.pdf.
1 0 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Th e proven ability of state broadcasters to (1) maintain broadcasting share and (2)
transition dominant positions into the online environment show that independence
is not the only or even the most eff ective way to guarantee audience. More analysis
would be needed to understand the detail of audience shifts during the transition, but
if state broadcasters are in a position to monopolize talent and premium content such
as sports rights, they may be able to use this to maintain news dominance.
Where there is widespread public awareness that broadcasting content may be captured
by political interests, digitization and choice may increase pressure on PSBs to become
more impartial. In Italy, Romania, Malaysia, Georgia, Kenya, and to some extent Japan
(where NHK has legally been independent since 1950), broadcasters face pressures to
become more impartial.
Th is, however, depends on wider pressure from civil society to ensure that bodies
using valuable public resources (license fees, spectrum) do serve a wider public interest
and not a narrow political interest, and provide a signifi cant level of transparency
and understanding regarding the potential for state capture. In Th ailand, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and Canada, where the perception of PSB independence and
impartiality is greater, there is less pressure for change. However, PSBs may be vulnerable
to political pressure if they do not have “patrons” in power who are committed to the
principles of independence.
In some cases, state-administered broadcasters are not under genuine pressure from
new commercial competition, and remain tightly controlled by the state. Th ey are
being permitted to launch new services to the exclusion of potential competitors.
Th e state broadcaster in Kazakhstan has been permitted to launch a large number of
new digital niche channels, which benefi t from must-carry rules and have the eff ect
of excluding new entrants from the market. Similarly in China, CCTV has been
permitted to launch new channels to the exclusion of new entrants on the dominant
terrestrial platforms. Consequently, there is new competition in the form of regional
and municipal channels, but CCTV has been able to maintain a national broadcasting
monopoly by launching new services in competition with its own existing channels.
In sum, digitization and increased choice do not make the decline of state-controlled
broadcasters inevitable. It is likely that considerations other than public service values
(considerations such as control of sports rights, production budgets, and access to
talent and celebrities) determine demand for a broadcast service. Only where there is
widespread awareness of the value of PSB independence and trust among audiences
will state capture infl uence audience choice to a greater extent.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 0 4
Th e central question for national PSM is whether they can be successful in maintaining
a position in a mixed communications ecology of commercial and publicly owned
media. Th e MDM reports indicate that most national governments have off ered very
little long-term vision and policy direction in answering the question of whether PSM
are fundamentally a phenomenon of the century of analog broadcasting or whether they
should be able to fl ourish in the new digital communications cornucopia. Th e MDM
data off er only a limited indication of their ability to develop in the web environment.
Only in a few countries (including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) do the
PSM appear among the most visited websites. Regulatory and political constraints
have clearly hindered the development of state and public service media in the web space.
3. Conclusions: PSM and the Digital Transition: Virtuous Circle or Death Spiral?
Audiences of state-administered and public service broadcasters are declining almost
everywhere. But this masks a more complex picture. On one hand, channel audience
declines may be accompanied by a move away from state propaganda, or from public
service programming genres, as SA/PSBs off er more commercial programming. On the
other hand, while the share of television audiences of core broadcast channels declines,
SA/PSBs in some countries have been able to launch a large number of new services
on new platforms.
Th e future of both state and public service media around the world remains uncertain.
While there are many examples of successful innovation in public service and of
potential pressures for increased levels of independence, state broadcasting is well
adapted to survive the digital transition.
Th ere are some cases where audience decline, a tightening of the remit, and funding
reductions combine to create a self-reinforcing spiral of decline. In other cases,
innovation and new services create a virtuous circle of reform. MDM reports yield
both types. Sweden could be cited as an example of virtuous reform, where a clear
policy commitment has permitted public service innovation and the PSM enjoys
both independence and high levels of public support. In Turkey, on the other hand,
rapid audience decline and a funding squeeze are diffi cult to reverse amid rising public
criticism. And this will not lead inevitably to more broadcaster independence. Where
public support is weak, PSBs may become more reliant on political support.
Only in Europe are public service media institutions in a strong position. In Europe
the norm of the “mixed broadcasting system” may be becoming more prevalent with
1 0 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
the incorporation of formerly state-administered broadcasters from Central and
Eastern Europe into the conventional PSM model, and regulatory changes such as
the European Commission’s Communication on the Application of State Aid Rules
to Public Service Broadcasting (2009). In the Middle East and North Africa there
are numerous challenges to PSB independence, in particular senior appointments and
funding. Th e notable absence of the model in the rising powers of Brazil, Russia, and
China underlines the importance of PSBs in India and South Africa in global terms.45
Th e reports confi rm that the policy process is characterized by strong and opaque links
between political interests and broadcasters. In public service broadcasting this may take
the form of “dividing the spoils” among governing interests. Th e public broadcasters in
Russia are divided between the ruling tandem (president and prime minister), while in
Italy there is an established if informal procedure known as “lottizzazione” for dividing
PSB channels among parties in the ruling coalition.
Th is amounts to a picture of huge pressure for reform, but no overall direction of change.
Acknowledging the contested nature of PSB policy should inform how to think about
advocacy in this fi eld. Th e notion of advocacy presupposes a political environment of
rational-critical debate in which the force of the better argument (based on principle and
the public interest) prevails.46 Th is is not the case with the reform of state or politically
dependent broadcasters. A strategic approach that seeks allies with self-interest in under-
mining state broadcasters (such as commercial broadcasters) might be more eff ective.
Lazy assumptions that audiences will migrate to independent PSBs are wrong. Audiences
tend to follow commercial content such as sports rather than PSM “remit” programming.
Th ere is evidence to support all seven of the theses but no outcomes are pre-determined,
and there are exceptions and qualifi cations in each case. SA/PSB audiences do tend to
decline, but what this means for audience revenue and costs or a watered down remit
varies from country to country and no overall pattern emerges on the implications
for broadcaster independence. Th e transition to digital does open up for discussion
every aspect of the fundamental social contract upon which SA/PSM is based. On
the basis of the evidence in the MDM reports, however, it is rare to hold an open
and transparent debate about the public interest in the long-term evolution of the
relationships among state, public, and media.
45. See MDM country reports; and Ofcom, 2012, Tables 3.16–3.17.
46. See P. Lunt and S. Livingstone, Media Regulation. Governance and the Interests of Citizens and Consumers, Sage,
London, 2012, p. 77. Th ese authors outline a Habermasian approach to understanding regulatory policymaking
by Ofcom in the UK.
1 0 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Journalism and Digital Times: Between Wider Reach and Sloppy Reporting Ying Chan
Introduction
Digitization is one of the primary driving forces behind recent changes in journalism,
including news values, professional ethics, workfl ows, working conditions, and
newsroom management. Th e Mapping Digital Media study shows that digital media
have not only changed journalism practices in developed countries but have also
signifi cantly shaped the way journalists work in emerging markets. Digital media bring
opportunities, risks, and challenges to journalism. While digitization facilitates news
gathering and dissemination, it does not necessarily foster better journalism. Plagiarism,
lack of verifi cation, and other unethical journalistic practices have increased alarmingly
in many countries.
Specifi cally, when it comes to investigative journalism, digitization has created new
publishing platforms and dissemination channels for professional journalists and
aspiring citizen reporters alike, but in the majority of countries investigative reports do
not seem to be having an increased social impact. Some MDM country reports claim
that digitization has wrought havoc on investigative journalism.
While digitization provides opportunities for citizen journalists and independent media
to conduct their own research and investigation and in turn publish and distribute
their reports, in many countries the accountability of such original content created by
citizen journalists is questionable.
C H A P T E R T H R E E
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 0 8
Th e emergence of digital media has enabled minority groups to have a voice in the
public arena, but it has not shifted the traditional media’s practice of covering sensitive
issues in a restricted, biased, or sensational manner.
Almost all candidates in general elections use social media platforms to communicate
with voters, but the emergence of new political actors because of digitization is
something that has occurred in only a few countries. Digital media have, however,
remarkably increased the volume of political discussion and raised the political interest
of the general public.
1. Risks and Opportunities for Good-quality Journalism
Digitization brings new opportunities to journalists in three notable respects: faster
news delivery, better access to sources and information, and more interaction with
readers. Nearly two-thirds of the 56 countries in the study noted that digitization
had quickened news production and delivery cycles, trends that are most remarkable
in countries in Asia and in North and South America. In about half of the countries,
most of which are emerging economies such as China, Brazil, India, and South Africa,
digital media have provided more sources and information to journalists. In almost
all the countries digital media enhanced the interaction between the editorial team
and readers, making it easier for reporters to learn about customers’ reading habits
and interests.
In Germany, for example, digital technology has not only given journalists the
possibility of reaching more sources but it also has let them dig into the details of a story
to improve their copy. In Canada, meanwhile, digitization has enabled the creation of
large databases and archives that allow journalists to retrieve background information
much faster than was the case in the analog world. Building stronger relationships with
readers and viewers has been one of the biggest benefi ts that digitization has brought
to journalists:
Digital transformations in the newsroom and in use out in the fi eld have
enabled journalists to exploit digital media tools to their advantage. By
enhancing their ability to retrieve information through search engines
and smartphones, locating sources and building relationships with
new and old audiences through j-blogs and social networking sites
1 0 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
and democratizing the former role of the copy taster, journalists are
able to widen their source base and improve their interview questions
when under pressure.
Similar trends are found in Singapore where “the internet has become an important
source for news stories, a crucial platform for distributing news, as well as receiving
instant feedback from readers.”
However, digitization has also posed challenges and risks to journalistic standards as
the news cycle shrinks, and the internet has made it more convenient for journalists
to commit plagiarism. In more than half the countries, reporters pay less attention to
verifying the facts and sources for their stories. Th e prevalent use of published materials
and rumors in news stories has posed “the most pervasive threats” that digitization has
brought to journalism.
In developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Finland,
as well as developing countries like China, South Africa, Brazil, India, and Egypt, there
were declines in original content and increasing copy-and-paste journalism in the news
media. An equal number of emerging and developed economies reports noted practices
like prevalent plagiarism, violation of copyright law, or quoting without attribution.
Such practices span a broad spectrum of countries, ranging from the United States
and Canada in North America, and Egypt, Kenya and South Africa in Africa, to Asian
countries like China, Japan, India, and Indonesia.
Time pressures and fast-paced journalism have made journalists more prone to mistakes.
In Brazil, “the quality of news has been compromised by an editorial workfl ow that
privileges speed over accuracy. Th e race to deliver news as fast as possible can lead to
defi cient revision practices and inconsistent fact checking, along with a tendency to
reproduce content as it is received—in the format of, for example, press releases—as
opposed to properly fi nding and checking sources.”
In Malaysia, newspaper editors said that plagiarism was very easy online using the
copy-and-paste function. According to Yong Soo Heong, editor-in-chief of Bernama,
Malaysia’s state-owned news agency: “Previously, some news editors would say ‘Do not
read the Bernama ticker tape,’ and come up with an original story fi rst. But we can’t do
that now because everyone can read online and search Wikipedia or Google.”
Digitization has also posed a threat in terms of data security and individual privacy. In
almost a fi fth of the countries, digitization has made the theft of information and the
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 1 0
illegal interception of conversations easier. Countries experiencing this include largely
Eurasian countries such as Russia, China, and India, and those African countries
where there is greater connectivity, such as Kenya and Morocco. In the United States,
potential leaks of information pose a bigger threat to good journalism than plagiarism.
Th e United States report cited the State Department cables released by WikiLeaks and
observed that “it is clear that the possibilities of involuntary institutional transparency
are considerable, and this has forced the journalism profession in the United States to
examine how to engage with sources that hold massive caches of data.”
Th e working conditions for journalists have generally worsened as a result of
digitization. As news production has become faster with higher information volumes
being generated, journalists are increasingly expected to work longer hours and possess
diverse digital skills. Journalists in the digital age not only write articles but also shoot
and edit images and videos, and manage social media, all of which increases their
workload. In the context of tightening fi nancial resources and increasing competition,
journalists’ working conditions have been deteriorating as they are required to work
extra hours and assume new roles to accommodate demands that derive from digital
news delivery.
Perhaps the biggest role that digitalization plays in journalism lies in news gathering
and dissemination rather than in news quality. In France,
Th e expansion of online news has not substantially enlarged the
volume of valuable information, as most content is still based on the
same sources as before digitization: press agencies, press conferences, or
internal sources of information. It is rather a system of dissemination of
the news (the hypermedia system) that has changed, as similar content
is now delivered on the main websites, commented on by blogs, and
promoted on Twitter and Facebook.
Digitization has become a watershed for good and average journalism. One journalist,
Bernard Poulet, said that “digitization has the same eff ects on journalism that
globalization has on the middle class,” comparing digitization with the death of the
middle class of journalists. Mr Poulet projected that the profession of journalism
will split into two distinct groups: a majority of “blue-collar” underpaid journalists,
performing routine tasks and “feeding the machine,” and a few high-ranking journalists
with great expertise and a unique personal style, whose names might even become
brands.
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Digital media are likely to trigger changes in media structure in countries where news
remains heavily censored. In China, in the last few years
many media have been transformed from tools for party propaganda
into semi-autonomous, market-oriented media. During this change,
the party line has weakened while market infl uences have been
strengthened, solemn news reporting has decreased while human
interest stories, entertainment news, and tabloid journalism have
abruptly increased. Th ese changes have profoundly infl uenced the
public’s news demands, the media’s news off er, and the role of
journalists.
2. Watchdog Journalism
Digital media have created unprecedented opportunities for investigative journalists,
with new publishing platforms and distribution channels. More than 60 percent of the
countries have seen a surge in new publishing platforms such as blogs, independent
websites, and email groups for investigative journalism. Th e encouraging trends span
the spectrum of countries from emerging economies such as China, India, Kenya,
Egypt, Morocco, and Brazil to developed economies such as the United States and
France.
However, less than one-third of the countries noted that digital media have helped to
expand the social impact of investigative reports. In Asian countries such as China,
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Th ailand, digitization facilitated the production and
dissemination of investigative reports and helped them enlarge their social impact. In
some European countries, such as Russia and Germany, the impact of investigative
journalism in the digital age has been increasing due to digital platforms. In contrast,
in several Latin American and Western European countries, the impact of investigative
reports on the digital side was limited. Th ese countries include the Netherlands and
Spain, and Mexico, Peru, and Argentina.
In India, there are several digital media platforms that publish investigative reports,
such as Indiareport.com, Youthcurry.blogspot.com, and Churumuri.wordpress.com.
Th e impact of the investigative reports published on these platforms is amplifi ed by
television news channels and social media networks and has resulted in the resignation
or arrest of senior government offi cials and high-profi le politicians and corporate
executives.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 1 2
In Pakistan, the proliferation of media outlets has helped to increase the audiences and
reach of investigative stories. Th anks also to cross-media ownership, media groups have
been able to promote their investigative work across platforms. At the same time, the
internet has become the main publication alternative for content that is not published
or broadcast by mainstream media outlets owing to pressure from the state, advertisers,
and political parties. Th e reach of these stories is further amplifi ed by social media
such as Twitter and Facebook that are widely used by media groups to promote news
content. Other online platforms such as YouTube give journalistic content a longer
shelf life. Investigative journalism has had a social impact in Pakistan, even though
there is a blurring line between leaks, whistleblowing, and real investigative reporting:
Anonymous contributions featuring violent incidents or documenting
abuses of power via internet have led to judicial inquiries and
prosecutions. In particular, the blog of Malala has drawn the world’s
attention to the threat posed by militancy to girls’ education. Th e attack
she survived from Taliban militants led to national and international
condemnation and has sparked a global activist movement on behalf
of girls’ education.
In Jordan, there has been a “big response by society and the government to investigative
journalists’ video evidence.” An investigative piece by the Arab Reporters for Investigative
Journalism (ARIJ)1 was picked up by local news websites and subsequently tweeted,
re-tweeted, and posted on Facebook. Th is triggered a fl ood of intense commentary
and helped spark a public debate, which in the end inspired competitors to run their
own investigations. For example, the investigation of abuses at private centers for the
handicapped spurred public outrage, prompting the king himself to visit the centers
and demand punishment for those responsible.
Similar trends are found in Japan where the “internet is a useful information source
and study tool for investigative journalists.” In Armenia, as well, where investigative
reporting has traditionally been rare, digitization has multiplied the readers of
investigative reports. In Argentina, mobile phones have played a remarkable role in
disseminating investigative reports: “Digitization, including mobile phones, cameras
and the internet, has saved the cost of journalist enquiry.” Th e positive impact on
investigative journalism is also noted in Brazil where “digitization improved the
dissemination and eff ectiveness of investigative reports.”
1. Th e Amman-based Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism was formed in early 2005 to support independent
high-quality professional journalism.
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Even in China, where the government imposes tight control on news media and
journalists, investigative reporting is being revamped in the age of the internet:
Social media have become a vanguard for breaking censorship and
creating space for traditional media to report stories they could not
years ago. More importantly, they are making investigative reporting
into a process rather than a product. Twitter-like microblogging as
well as conventional blogging have added further possibilities that
allow journalists not only to publish what has been investigated, but
to turn the investigation into a public conversation and ask for tips.
A particular phenomenon in China is microblogging and its massive impact on
journalism: “It breaks the boundaries of news organizations, and investigative reporters,
even if they are competitors, tend to form a temporary community on microblogs for
information-gathering to meet their various needs … Th e image of the investigative
reporter as a lone wolf is no longer correct.”
Digitization has made possible big data and data journalism, which is another approach
to promoting government transparency and accountability. In almost all the MDM
countries, the internet makes it easier for journalists today to access and compare data.
Increasingly digital platforms have been boosting data-driven journalism. Digitization
was very often mentioned by journalists interviewed for this project as a driving force
behind the creation and use of databases. Data-driven journalism has been developing
fast in Western Europe and North America, with Eastern Europe coming up fast behind.
For investigative journalism, the biggest, most unequivocal gain from digitization by
far has been the extended access to sources, information, and data. Th is has happened
in approximately 80 percent of the countries in the project.
Meanwhile, digital media have posed new challenges for investigative journalism.
Th e most common problems include hacking websites; reporters and sources being
followed, monitored, and threatened; prosecution; the theft of information; diffi culties
in reaching sources; and the interception of information by the government.
In addition, the fast and huge fl ow of news has adversely aff ected investigative journalism.
In countries as varied as Japan, Russia, Slovakia, Estonia, and India multiple forms of
digital media, increasing numbers of media outlets, fi erce media competition, and
journalists’ pressure to break news have led to the inclusion of erroneous, misleading,
and misinterpreted information in the news. Th ere is unverifi ed or biased coverage
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 1 4
even in investigative reports. In Malaysia, journalists’ exaggerated reliance on user-
generated content such as Wikipedia led to misreporting. In Moldova there have also
been more misleading and misinterpreted data in journalistic stories.
In Canada, although the ways in which digitization has improved or hindered
investigative journalism are still unclear, new opportunities are being made available
through digital media tools for sources to contact journalists and for journalists to
discover new sources. Th e digitization of huge volumes of information has improved
access, particularly access to government documents. Yet digitization has also increased
the demand for immediacy in news delivery: the drive to be there, live, on location.
Investigative journalism suff ers in this context as the news content suff ers in quality.
Th e negative impact of time pressure on journalists’ output has been also noted in India:
Th e frenetic pace, partially set by digitization and partly by
competition, has led to mistakes, even blunders. In addition, round-
the-clock schedules leave reporters and editors with less time to pursue
serious, long-term, in-depth investigations. Apart from a few print
publications, mainstream television channels and websites have been
unable to pursue investigative journalism seriously. Even though access
to information has become easier, few journalists have been trained or
take the time to wade through the enormous amount of data available
online.
A phenomenon that has not been spawned by digitization and that survives in many
countries, badly aff ecting the editorial output and the journalistic profession, is self-
censorship. Countries as varied as Nigeria, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and China have
continued to experience the bad eff ects of self-censorship on investigative reporting
in particular. In China above all, there have been numerous threats to investigative
journalism:
In the digital age, investigative journalism still encountered obstacles
from the government, social organizations, and individuals, in the form
of state supervision systems and the self-censorship practices of both
media and individuals. Professional journalists who publish sensitive
stories still face punishment such as loss of status, reduced wages, being
fi red, or permanent expulsion from the media community. Also, the
government has not allowed websites to be set up to host investigations
into specialized subjects or themes, such as corruption, human rights,
energy and the environment, health and safety.
1 1 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In Japan, “investigative reporting by mainstream mass media still has the most infl uence
and gains the most public attention.” Although there has also been some investigative
reporting by independent and eminent individuals, most of them “have reached an
advanced age and rarely publish on the internet.”
Th e fi ndings of the MDM reports are supported by leading journalists and experts.
Dick Tofel, president of the American-based nonprofi t news organization ProPublica,
says that big data along with new ways to tell stories are two key trends shaping
the future of investigative journalism. “Investigative journalists can cover new and
diff erent kinds of stories using big data sets and digital storytelling. Using data to let
people localize national stories is just one important way that investigative journalism
is changing for the better.”2
Aron Phihofer, associate managing editor of digital strategy at Th e New York Times,
and Francesca Panetta, audio producer at Th e Guardian, have also noted that “digital
doesn’t mean the death of investigative and long form journalism,” citing award-
winning projects such as “Snow Fall” and “Firestorm.”3 Barry Sussman, editor of
the Nieman Watchdog Project, agrees that websites have created new multimedia
platforms for news organizations to display their investigative pieces. Nonprofi t
entities and individuals are also given the chance to publish their own investigative
work. However, few investigative assignments will be or should be completed online.
It is still important to work with actual sources. “Databases, and the computer tools
we have to work with, are a terrifi c resource,” he said, “but there still need to be stories
about real people and real people’s lives.”4
3. Citizen Journalism and Free Content
Citizen reporters have played a notable role in journalism in developed countries such
as France and the United States, and emerging markets such as China, India, Jordan,
Estonia, and Nicaragua. Citizen reporters are using the internet, video, mobiles,
and other digital tools to gather information, interview people, watch events, seek
comments from experts, and publish their stories via blogs, videos, Wikipedia, and
other platforms. Facebook, Twitter, microblogs, and other social media help citizen
2. Susan Gunelius, “Th e Future is Bright for Non-Profi t Investigative Journalism,” at http://newstex.com/2014/
01/15/the-future-is-bright-for-non-profi t-investigative-journalism.
3. “Investigative Journalism: the Future’s Digital,” at http://www.tcij.org/resources/investigative-journalism-futures-
digital.
4. Barry Sussman, “Digital Journalism: Will It Work for Investigative Journalism?,” at http://www.nieman.harvard.
edu/reports/article/100073/Digital-Journalism-Will-It-Work-for-Investigative-Journalism.aspx.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 1 6
reporters disseminate their work. Social media have facilitated citizen journalism in
news production, distribution, and consumption.
Citizen reporters also help monitor traditional news media, correcting errors and
contributing to news coverage. In Egypt, the rapid spread of news on the internet and
the lack of information verifi cation make citizen reporters eff ective supervisory bodies
that can identify inaccuracies or bias in the news coverage:
With readers becoming more interactive and watchful, mistakes and
fl aws are easier to uncover. Th e resulting increased public scrutiny has
pushed media outlets to perform better. Citizen reporters also upload
images, videos or fi les to the internet, waiting for professional reporters
to use for their investigative reporting. But on the other hand, online
activism and citizen reporting have also improved readers’ tolerance
towards inaccurate news.
In Germany, blogs have had an impact on journalistic investigations as a source of
inspiration for citizen journalists as well as becoming a means to identify the most
covered topics and monitor reactions to such reports. Th e blog that contributes most
to journalism, in the view of German editors-in-chief, is the media-watch blog
Bildblog.de.
In many countries, civil groups conduct independent investigations, tackle important
policy issues, and become valuable alternative sources of information. Yet independent
investigators or bloggers often face prosecution, intimidation, or threats from special
interest groups. Th e eff ectiveness and impartiality of their work have also been
questioned. For instance, in Malaysia, one renowned blogger, RPK, who became
known for many exposés of the government and political parties, had published offi cial-
looking documents to lend credibility to his articles. He was detained without trial and
charged by the government with criminal defamation. He exiled himself to London
and then returned to Malaysia, sparking criticism that he had sold out to the Barisan
National (BN) government. Even in China, where the party-state has maintained strict
control over the news media, there has been an increase in the number of “citizen
journalists, non-professional journalists who use the internet, video, mobile phones,
and other digital tools to gather information, interview people aff ected by events, and
seek out specialists’ opinions.”
Th ere are still countries where citizen journalism is in its infancy. In Japan, it has
not taken root; several organizations set up in the early 2000s had limited success.
1 1 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
For example, JANJAN was established in 2003 and OhmyNews Japan in 2006. Both
aimed to host reports and comments from ordinary citizens on events and issues
relevant to their lives and communities. However, page views on OhmyNews Japan
fell from 200,000 a day in 2006 to 70,000 just a year later.
Th e role of social media in news consumption is notable in China where there
have been several major cases of news stories or packages, such as the 2008 Sichuan
earthquake, being disseminated via blogs and microblogs. Th e 7.8-magnitude
earthquake was fi rst covered by Twitter-like microblogs, instant messages, and forum
websites such as QQ.com and Tianya.com. News about the earthquake quickly spread
across the world way ahead of traditional mainstream media. Also, microblogs have
become a formidable tool for grassroots reporting and social or political activism in
China. Twitter and domestic microblogs often distribute information not reported
by traditional media, creating an alternative network of news challenging established
media. Educated citizens, especially journalists and academics, regularly use proxy
servers to access blocked sites, in defi ance of government policy:
Microbloggers break news; they link a vast network of educated
Chinese in real time to the events and issues of the moment; they
expose wrongdoing and corruption; and they campaign for the victims
of arbitrary power, sometimes in person. In doing so, their reports
remain beyond the reach of editor-censors as they are forwarded
instantly across cyberspace. Digital media have helped reporters
and citizens alike to realize a more authentic China, rather than the
idealistic image that is propagated by offi cial media sources. Th ese
trends bring with them the promise of further development of an
independent and vibrant Chinese civil society.
User-generated content (UGC) websites have achieved massive popularity in a
considerable number of countries. Of the top 10 most popular visited sites in Malaysia,
fi ve are UGC sites, that is, Facebook, Wikimedia, WordPress, Mudah.my, and 4shared.
com. Th e local site Mudah.my is similar to eBay, and 4shared.com is a fi le-sharing site.
Th ese UGC platforms are also increasingly used by politicians and companies in their
attempt to connect with ordinary Malaysians. For example, the prime minister, Najib
Razak, has his own website, blog, Twitter account, Facebook site, YouTube page, and
Flickr photo site. Many established traditional media in Malaysia have also expanded
their presence online, establishing their presence on UGC sites. National newspapers
including Th e Star have set up Facebook and Twitter accounts.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 1 8
In the United States, by contrast, UGC is not well received by news organizations:
News employers and platforms pay little to nothing for UGC,
which often has high traffi c potential. Th e local news institutions
and newspapers most under threat from the collapse of traditional
journalistic business models have been the least likely to embrace
pioneering forms of networked, collaborative reporting. Research
suggests that while many online news sources are embracing the
notion of participatory journalism, they do so with some reluctance,
and certainly not to the full extent that technology allows. Th at said,
new platforms such as Th e Huffi ngton Post and Townhall.com have
achieved considerable reach for more progressive writers and for
conservative writers and comment-makers.
In Germany, although the relationship between professional and participatory media is
widely discussed and researched, little evidence has emerged that blogs and other forms
of participatory media are replacing traditional journalism. Th e types of UGC provided
on popular websites include comments on news articles, message and discussion boards,
social networking, and photo/music/video/document sharing. “While the potential
off ered by the internet to establish a genuine two-way conversation between producers
and users still seems to be at an experimental stage, most journalists have understood
that they can no longer assume an attitude of passivity on the part of their audience.
Over 50 percent of the journalists stated that social media have a high or very high
relevance for journalistic work.”
Professional journalists’ attitudes toward UGC vary from country to country. Journalists
in Japan are not much infl uenced by opinions posted on the internet, with under 10
percent of journalists feeling “a little infl uence” on their reporting from the internet.
Less than 15 percent expressed worries about being targeted by critics for their stories
on the web, while more than half (51.1 percent) say they felt no such concern.
4. Social, Cultural, and Political Diversity
Th e most recurrent sensitive issues covered in the media include religious groups,
ethnic minorities, women, child labor, domestic violence victims, migrants, and sexual
minorities. Th e emergence of digital media has given a voice to minority groups and has
helped expand the coverage of certain problematic issues. However, digital media have not
changed the restricted, biased, or sensational coverage of such issues by traditional media.
1 1 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In Brazil, freedom of expression, sexual minorities, privacy and copyright, abortion,
and racial and ethnic issues are all sensitive topics. Th e groups aff ected either do not
have much space to express themselves on traditional media or are victims of biased
coverage. Th e internet has provided these communities with a technology that enables
them to cogently express their concerns and to better assert their rights:
Th e Voz da Comunidade case is the emblematic example in Brazil of the
changes brought about by digitization. As the Complexo do Alemão
favela was being invaded by the police and the army in November
2010, Voz da Comunidade transcended its reach as a community
newspaper through the use of Twitter, with constant updates of the
invasion going out to a wider readership. Th e coverage provided by
Voz da Comunidade was very diff erent in tone from that of the major
newspapers and television; it was a live account of the invasion created
by actual members of the community.
In South Africa, digital media have improved and enlarged the space for debate on sensitive
topics that have little exposure in the mainstream media. Th ese include class frustrations,
racial tensions, gender-based discrimination, and violence. Th ere are South African blogs
that cover minority sexualities, including links to other sites and gay communities. Other
sites are personal blogs about living as a homosexual in South Africa.
In Singapore, race, religion, sexual minorities, and bilateral relations with Malaysia
and Indonesia all belong to the category of sensitive topics, according to the report.
Stringent legal guidelines govern coverage of matters pertaining to race and religion.
Coverage of the gay community refl ects the offi cial standpoint, and information on
practices such as homosexuality, lesbianism, and incest is treated with the utmost
caution to ensure that they are not promoted, justifi ed, or glamorized.
In neighboring countries, the mainstream media tend to follow very closely the offi cial
policy promoting friendship with other nations. But the online forums of these same
media have taken a more defi ant position, in particular in Malaysia where the media
occasionally attack Singapore: “As with so many other areas, the online world in
Singapore allows considerably more room for the expression of stronger and more
controversial views than are tolerated in the offl ine world.”
Similar diffi culties over covering minority issues are found in Pakistan, where new
media outlets have provided much greater coverage of marginalized groups than the
state-owned channels of the pre-digitization era. But the coverage is neither even nor
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 2 0
consistent: “Religious minorities, residents of Balochistan and other remote parts of
Pakistan, and non-mainstream or little-known political actors have yet to fi nd a voice
on the broadcast media.”
Table 6.
Sensitive issues in the media and impact of digital media on coverage
Country Issue Media coverage Impact of
digital media
Albania • Religious minorities
• Ethnic minorities
• Sexual minorities
Limited (sexual minorities) E (sexual
minorities)
Argentina • Indigenous population
• Migrants
• Sexual minorities
• Disabled
• Child labor
Biased
Sensationalistic
E
Armenia • Sexual minorities
• Religious minorities
Biased
Unprofessional
E
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
• Ethnic divisions
• Ethnic minorities
(Roma)
• Sexual minorities
Biased R1
Brazil • Freedom of expression
in traditional media
• Sexual minorities
• Piracy and copyright
• Abortion
• Racial and ethnic issues
• Housing development
• Drug-traffi cking
• Corruption
• Gender discrimination
• Communications policy
Usually biased: television
promotes gender discrimination
and disrespect of minorities
(sexual minorities were usually
treated better)
E
Bulgaria • People with psychiatric
problems
• Domestic violence
• Roma minority
• Sexual minorities
Unbalanced, stereotypical
(improvements in coverage of
Roma)
E
Canada • The English-French
divide
• Aboriginal issues
• Race
• Sexual minorities
• Economic inequality
• Immigration and
refugees
• Reproductive rights
n/a E
1 2 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Country Issue Media coverage Impact of
digital media
Chile • Neighbors and migrants
• Women
• Indigenous people
• Poverty
• Sexual minorities
• Environment
Unbalanced E
China • Authority of the
communist party
• Ethnic minorities
• Sexual minorities
• Religion
• Marches and
demonstrations
Scarce and censored E
Colombia • Media
• Social and economic
disparities
• Land
• War
• Ethnic minorities
Marginal (ethnic minorities)
Biased (other)
E
Croatia • Minority rights
• Tolerance and
multiculturalism
Biased or marginal E
Czech Republic • Roma minority
• Foreigners and migrants
Biased, marginal, and
stereotypical
E1
Egypt • Religious minorities
• Ethnic minorities
• Sexual minorities
Biased and stereotypical E
Estonia • Nationality
• Sexual minorities
• Ethnic minorities
Intolerant2 N
Finland • Immigration and
immigrants
• Ethnicity
• Religious minorities
Somewhat objective, but
fundamental issues tend to be
neglected
E3
France • French identity
• Immigration
• Muslim customs
• Unemployment
Poor E
Georgia • Ethnic minorities
• Religion
• Sexual minorities
• Breakaway republics
Biased (sexual minorities)
Good coverage public service
broadcaster (ethnic minorities)
Marginal (breakaway republics)
E (ethnic
and sexual
minorities)
Germany • Immigration and
immigrants
Stereotypical E
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 2 2
Country Issue Media coverage Impact of
digital media
Guatemala • Racism and social
discrimination
• Extractive industries
• Drug-related violence
• Religion
• Sexual minorities
Marginal (indigenous
populations)
Biased
E
Hungary • Roma minority
• Sexual minorities
• Poor people
Biased E (Roma)
India • Territorial, ethnic and
religious divisions
• Social biases based on
caste, gender, sexual
orientation
• Natural resources
Varied4 E
Indonesia • Religious and sexual
minorities
• Ethnic minorities
Biased E
Italy • Immigration
• Religion
Biased E
Japan • Foreign residents
• Ethnic minorities
• Gender matters
Marginalized E and R
Jordan • Child abuse
• King
• National security
• Religion
Marginalized (with the exception
of English media)
E
Kazakhstan • Ethnic minorities
• Sexual minorities
Generally neutral (ethnic
minorities); biased or marginal
(sexual minorities)
E
Kenya • Ethnicity
• Women
• Religion
• Sexual minorities
Biased E
Latvia • Ethnic minorities
• Sexual minorities
• Disabled
Biased (Russians)
Polarized (sexual minorities)
E
Lebanon • Sexual minorities
• Immigrant workers
Marginal (sexual minorities)
Poor (immigrants)
E
Lithuania • Sexual minorities Objective but marginal E
Macedonia • Ethnic tensions
• Dispute with Greece
• Sexual minorities
Biased E and R
Malaysia • Race
• Religion
• Traditional Malay rulers
• Indigenous groups
• Sexual minorities
Marginal and biased E
1 2 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Country Issue Media coverage Impact of
digital media
Mexico • Migration to the US
• Drug-traffi cking
• Abortion
• Same-sex marriages
Objective (migration)
Superfi cial (crime)
E (migration)
N (crime)
Moldova • Sexual minorities
• Homeless people
• HIV
• Former prisoners
• Roma
• Confl ict in Transnistria
Negative
Nationalistic (Transnistria issue)
E1
Montenegro • Ethnic minorities
• Women
• Children
• Sexual minorities
• Corruption
• Relation with Serbia
Objective
Biased (ethnic minorities and
relation with Serbia)
E
Morocco • Language
• Ethnicity
• Gender
Biased (improving) E
Netherlands • Cultural minorities
• Religious minorities
(particularly Muslims)
Marginal (in mainstream media) E
Nicaragua • Sexuality
• Gender rights
• Homosexuality
Biased5 E
Nigeria • Ethnic, linguistic, and
religious distinctions
• Sexual minorities
Biased E
Pakistan • Religious identity
• Religious minorities
• Sexual minorities
• Military
Marginal6 E
Peru • Social confl icts Objective (biased stories are an
exception)
E
Poland • Anti-Semitism
• Jewish-Polish relations
• Relations with Russia
and Germany
• Abortion
• Sexual abuse (incest)
• Sexual minorities
n/a E
Romania • Roma Biased (improving) E
Russia • Ethnicity (particularly
in Moscow)
• Sexual minorities
n/a E
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 2 4
Country Issue Media coverage Impact of
digital media
Serbia • Ethnic minorities
• Religious minorities
• Sexual minorities
• Abuse of children and
women
Biased and unethical E1
Singapore • Race
• Religion
• Sexual minorities
• Relations with Malaysia
and Indonesia
Marginal (reserved tone) E
Slovakia • Ethnic minorities
• Immigrants
• Social minorities
• Sexual minorities
• Gender stereotypes
Biased (improving) E1
Slovenia • Ethnic minorities
• Religious minorities
• Sexual minorities
• Immigrants (particularly
other former Yugoslavs)
Biased n/a
South Africa • Class clashes
• Racial tensions
• Gender discrimination
• Language rights
• Sexual minorities
• Immigration
Marginal and biased E
Spain • Terrorism
• Language
• Religion
• Language issue
• Immigration
Relatively objective E
Sweden • Immigration
• Ethnicity
Marginal E
Thailand • Monarchy
• Ethnic confl ict
• Sexual minorities
Biased (improving) E
Turkey • Ethnic minorities
• Religious minorities
• Sexual minorities
• Armenian genocide
• EU accession
Marginal E
United Kingdom • Multiculturalism Objective on broadcasting,
biased in some print media7 E
United States • Immigration
• Race
• Sexual minorities
• Muslims/Arabs
• Economic inequality
• Reproductive policies
Biased E
1 2 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Country Issue Media coverage Impact of
digital media
Uruguay • Minorities
• Domestic and gender
violence
• Children and young
people
• Sexual minorities
Biased E
Notes: n/a – not assessed; E – enlarged or improved the space for public expression of these groups,
the coverage of these issues, and the content targeted at these groups; N – didn’t change any-
thing; R – reduced or deteriorated space for public expression of these groups, the coverage
of these issues, and the content targeted at these groups; (1) space for racist and xenophobic
discourse has also widened; (2) in opinion articles; (3) space for hate speech has also increased,
particularly on social media; (4) with variations between regions, media outlets, and type of
press. Better coverage was identifi ed in the English press in Bangalore, and better reporting
was also found in regional media. Overall, problems related to selectivity, superfi ciality and
sensationalism remain in coverage of these topics; (5) better coverage only of women’s rights;
(6) these are taboo topics, rarely covered; (7) negative portrayal of Islam—related to similar
portrayal of immigrants and asylum-seekers—in some print media
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
Political parties in almost all the country reports use digital media to deliver their
messages during election campaigns. A rare exception was Bosnia and Herzegovina
where political parties have not yet fully adopted digital media in their communications.
In Finland, “both incumbent parties and state authorities have made use of new
digital channels to disseminate their messages, but in general they have not exploited
opportunities to engage in dialog with citizens.” Small parties are generally not covered
in the mainstream media, but they managed to fi nd a platform to make their voices
heard online. Th e Finnish government has increasingly used social media as part of its
communication strategy, more as a one-way channel for disseminating government
messages than as a means of engaging citizens in dialog.
However, digital media have not played a signifi cant role in bringing to life new
political actors. In less than one-third of the countries, the rise of digital media has
given minority political groups, activists, and independent candidates the opportunity
to participate in politics, but they are generally ignored by the mainstream media.
Pakistan, China, and Finland experienced the greatest emergence of new political
actors. In Eastern European countries, such as Poland, there were no changes in
political actors due to digitization. In France, on the other hand, digitization has not
made it possible for smaller political candidates to bypass the gatekeeping role held by
traditional media, because their more prominent counterparts make better use of the
internet’s opportunities.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 2 6
Th e emergence of new political actors is most noticeable in China where the digital
media have instilled a new sense of political dynamism into the political scene: “In
2011 and 2012, individuals announced their candidacy for seats at the town- and
county-level people’s congresses at various local districts throughout China. Th ose
independent candidates have run their campaigns primarily by using microblogging
sites Sina Weibo or Tencent Weibo.”
In Egypt, digital media, particularly social media, have given voice to many political
entities that were otherwise ignored by the traditional media:
From blogs to Facebook pages to Twitter accounts to YouTube videos to online
radio stations, many entities have managed to establish themselves and have
a following, particularly among young people. With the introduction and
popularity of blogs and social networking sites, Egyptian bloggers emerged
as a leading authority in the Arab world on publishing political content and
pioneering political activism through online means. Facebook and Twitter in
particular have been very popular in Egypt, especially since the 25 January
2011 revolution. Many people joined Facebook looking for news about the
revolution and subsequent political and social activism.
Digital media do not necessarily facilitate discussion or increase citizen interest in
politics. In less than half of the MDM countries, digital media have raised public
interest in politics. Th ese include emerging economies such as Brazil, China, Th ailand,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Kenya and developed countries such as Canada, the
United States, Germany, Finland, and Sweden. In China, digitization has increased
public knowledge about those holding power and made engagement in political
activism livelier. Before, Chinese people had overwhelmingly ignored the possibility
of directly participating in elections and did not care about the results. However,
nowadays information about candidates in provincial or national elections can be more
easily found on the internet.
Interest in politics in many Western countries has not grown massively because of digiti-
zation. In France, there is no evidence of obvious growth in online political engagement,
which has remained rather stable, with some increases (such as during the 2007 and
2012 presidential elections) and decreases during the less politically interesting periods.
Independent websites, blogs, and other digital media platforms have given minority
political parties and civic groups more opportunity to monitor elections and political
events. Nicaragua 2.0, the Autonomous Women’s Movement, and the Movement for
1 2 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Nicaragua organized a system to register irregularities with a civil society information
center by phone and via the web. Th is system allowed videos and photographs to
be uploaded to a website and published on social networks, making it possible to
aggregate the irregularities and report them to a national election observer. It was hoped
that the voters in the 2011 election would register as many multimedia grievances
as possible. However, the government counterattacked by saturating all the available
communication outlets, many of them under its control, with its own messages and
ignoring all the irregularities reported by the voters: “Th e government made concerted
eff orts to hinder citizens from fi lming or photographing what occurred in the voting
centers and to stop opposition party observers obtaining copies of offi cial documents.”
1 2 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
News Choice and Off er in the Digital Transition Jelena Surčulija Milojević
Introduction
Th e move to digitization has not led automatically to a more diverse media landscape.
Content providers off er old information on new platforms. Th e main benefi t is that
online platforms allow constant updating of content and access to this content at any
time, not only when broadcasters schedule it. In addition, digitization has allowed
more interaction with consumers in the form of user comments and easy ways of
surveying the public.
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), more than half of
the households in the Americas, the Arab States, and Europe which received television
signals at the end of 2012 were doing so through digital technologies. (In the Arab
world, this proportion was due to the prevalence of satellite receivers.) Th is compared
with only 30 percent in 2008. However, there is a huge disproportion between the so-
called developed world, in which over 80 percent of households are digitally equipped,
and the developing world where only 42 percent of television households can receive a
digital signal—which is, even so, almost three times more than in 2008.1
Despite these fi gures, there are states such as Pakistan or those in South-East Asia where
there is no plan for digital switch-off . A new digital divide is apparent in broadcasting
between those who gain access to a healthy digital free-to-air off ering of television
programs and those who are stuck with a few analog channels.
C H A P T E R F O U R
1. International Telecommunication Union, “Measuring the Information Society 2013,” at http://www.itu.int/en/
ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/publications/mis2013.aspx.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 3 0
Th e cessation of print in favor of wholesale transfer online has not yet been seen in too
many countries. Th e same goes for television. Although radio listenership is declining
in many countries in the MDM project, this trend has been bucked in Africa and some
Asian countries. Elsewhere, too, radio has sought and sometimes found ways to remain
via new digital platforms. Th ere are only a few examples of online-only media that
have managed to build a signifi cant audience. Generally, people tend to consume the
traditional media they trust, but in new, more convenient, and more easily accessible
forms.
A serious digital divide has opened up between generations. While younger people
tend to rely more on new digital platforms when searching for news, older generations
still stick to traditional media, particularly terrestrial television and radio. Nevertheless,
in many countries, the number of senior users accepting digital technologies has been
increasing. Another divide that digitization has created is between urban and rural
areas, with the former having access to much poorer sources of information.
1. News Sources: Multiplication and Uniformity
Digitization has not signifi cantly aff ected the diversity of the total news off er. For
example, the digital switch-over in broadcasting has not opened the television market
to new channels. Th ere is no case in the MDM countries where a new television entrant
has become the leading media outlet by audience. Also, there is no pure-player (online
only) media outlet in any country that is the most popular outlet by audience, beating
the biggest television, radio, and press outlets.
In most of the MDM countries, television remains the most popular medium by
audience size, followed by radio. However, in countries such as Kenya, radio has the
highest audience, but it is mostly accessed via new digital platforms such as cell phones,
car radio, and various mobile devices. In yet others, such as Argentina or Brazil,
although television remains the most popular medium, radio continues to have high
popularity, attracting young people who listen to radio via computer or mobile phone.
Th e audience generally still relies on trusted channels, mostly public media, when it
comes to news. Also, although people in all the MDM countries have more access
to the internet now than in 2005, not many online news providers have taken the
leading role in providing news. Still, the most trusted and visited websites among news
providers belong to the traditional media. Newspaper websites usually off er regular
updates during the day, allowing users to leave comments or take part in surveys. Th e
1 3 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
same goes for television and radio station websites. Th e main benefi t for these stations
is that they can off er their program on demand or turn video and audio content into
text that is available at any time to consumers.
Th e main change triggered by digitization is in citizens’ attitude to the news off er.
Citizens nowadays use several platforms to acquire news and do not wait for it to
arrive on television or radio as before. Th ey are more active in obtaining news through
various channels of communication, such as PCs, cell phones, car radios, and portable
computers.
News consumption continued to account for the lowest audience share in the total
television production. Factual programming, which includes news, documentaries,
political and religious factual programming, accounted in 2012 for 21 percent of
the total consumed television output. Fiction and entertainment accounted for the
remainder. Generally, news consumption remains stable. In contrast, entertainment
saw its share go up in 2012 by 2 percentage points to 37 percent.
Digitization has also led to changes in the profi le of the news audiences. Younger
generations tend to use newer platforms to access news while older generations remain
more oriented to traditional media. Th ere are exceptions to this. In Estonia, people aged
over 60 with higher education are mostly oriented towards traditional media. Younger
generations in almost all the countries tend to use social media, such as Facebook and
Twitter, to obtain news and information.
1.1 Print Media
Newspaper circulations have experienced a rapid drop in most MDM countries. Th ere
are exceptions such as China, India, and Brazil where newspapers are still the most
popular source for news consumption by audience. In Kenya, some newspapers such
as Th e Star, launched in 2007, have continued to grow their circulation fi gures.2
In contrast, there are countries with very low newspaper readership such as Pakistan,
where only 4 percent of the population reads newspapers. In a separate example,
Mexico does not have an authentic nationwide press due to the diffi cult geographical
coverage and socio-economic factors.
2. Interviews with editors of Th e Star indicated that the newspaper was selling some 15,000–20,000 copies a day in
2010 compared with 5,000–8,000 when it was launched.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 3 2
Th e main change brought about by digitization is the migration of newspaper content
to online platforms where it has become one of the most important sources of
information, boosting press outlets’ presence online while draining the revenue from
print circulation.
In many countries, it is still not possible to get accurate information about newspaper
circulation. Th is is usually due to state control over newspapers or editors who want
to hide the real numbers for political or economic reasons, such as not scaring off
advertisers who might withdraw if they learned the real circulation data.
1.2 Television
Television is still the most popular source of news and information and the medium
with the highest reach in most MDM countries. In 2013, the worldwide average
television viewership time was 3 hours and 14 minutes a day, according to Eurodata
TV Worldwide. Th is was the highest viewing time for television ever recorded. Th e
most avid consumers of television in 2013 were in North America where the viewing
time stood at 4 hours and 46 minutes. Th ey were followed closely by Middle Eastern
populations where the daily viewing time stood in 2013 at 4 hours and 39 minutes.
Th e lowest viewing time was recorded in 2013 in Asia-Pacifi c (2 hours and 41 minutes
a day).
However, it is questionable whether digitization has contributed to increasing the
diversity of news off ering in television. Very few digital channels off er news programs.
Newly established digital terrestrial channels, especially those with higher audiences,
mainly off er sports or entertainment programs.
On the other hand, cable and free-to-air satellite stations have contributed more than
digital terrestrial television to the diversity of the news off er. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
digitization has helped cable operators to increase the reach of local and regional
stations across the entire country. In Jordan, large swathes of audiences moved from
terrestrial to free-to-air satellite channels broadcasting news programs with regional
political analysis. Between 2005 and 2010, the penetration of these stations almost
doubled to nearly 97 percent.
Th e biggest drop in cable television take-up happened in the Netherlands. Although
traditionally known as a “cable country” where only 1.5 percent of households were
dependent on the terrestrial signal at the time of the digital switch-off in 2006, four
years later 11.7 percent of households were using the digital terrestrial signal. Th e reason
for this is that digital terrestrial reception is a much cheaper option than digital cable.
1 3 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Commercial television stations and entertainment programs still command large
audiences in most MDM countries. Nevertheless, audiences in a number of countries
still prefer to access the public television service and other traditional media to acquire
news. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia there is a high
degree of trust in the public service broadcasters. In Russia, 74 percent of the population
over 18 prefers television news, a poll from 2011 shows. In the United Kingdom,
television remains the most important news platform. Th ere is an interesting situation
in Slovakia where polls show that the public STV news is most trusted, although the
program’s ratings have fallen steadily.
1.3 Radio
In many countries outside Europe and North America, radio has burgeoned in recent
years. It is the most valuable source of news and information in Pakistan, Nigeria, and
Kenya, where people listen not only via radio sets but also via cheap mobile phones.
Latin America also maintains a healthy level of radio listenership. In Peru, radio was
the most trusted medium in 2005 and remained so until 2009, when approximately
72 percent of listeners rated radio news as good or very good. In some Latin American
countries, including Chile, radio has a high audience but off ers mostly music and
entertainment shows, except during disasters, such as the earthquake in February 2010
when it played an important role in informing citizens.
Radio is also healthy in Jordan, where the industry experienced a major shift in the type
of technology used to access radio programs. Th e ownership of radio sets in households
has dropped by half from 71 percent in 2005 to a bit over 34 percent in 2010. Th is
fall could be explained by new platforms that Jordanians use to access radio output: in
cars, via internet or mobile phones.
1.4 Online
Online media are still struggling for a piece of the media audiences. Th e most popular
media online are still the websites of traditional outlets that off er the same information
as in their print edition along with user-generated content such as comments, popular
blogs, and surveys.
Th e most visited public service broadcasting website in the world belongs to the BBC,
which has invested heavily in its online newsroom and become the only online news
provider in the top 10 in the world that is subject to public service regulation.
Th e number of countries that have experienced growth in news consumption via social
networks is rising daily. It especially applies to the younger generation who simply click
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 3 4
to links that either media post on social networks (with Facebook and Twitter as the
most popular) or follow the news recommended by their friends on these networks.
Social networks have played an important role in recent events throughout the world.
Facebook was used in Egypt and Tunisia during the 2010 “Arab Spring,” often to
give an accurate picture of real developments on the street in contrast to news from
traditional media. Japan is also a good example of a country with a signifi cant use
of social network services. For example, the number of Twitter users in Japan had
increased three times in only six months from 2.57 million in September 2009 to
7.52 million in March 2010. However, social networking has not been used massively
for digital activism. Countries with high levels of digital activism include the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Latvia in Europe, Canada and the United States in
North America, Brazil in Latin America, and China in Asia.
2. Public Service Goes Digital
Digitization seems to have made life for public service broadcasters more diffi cult,
because they now have to compete with more commercial channels and often they have
lost audience share. Th ey also have to share increasing proportions of their advertising
revenue with commercial operators.
In some countries, mostly within the European Union, public service broadcasters have
launched new thematic digital terrestrial channels and increased their reach by off ering
their content online. Specialized channels launched by public service broadcasters are
usually reserved for sports, entertainment, children’s programs, and in some countries—
including Slovenia, Hungary, Macedonia, and Turkey—also for parliamentary sessions.
In Poland, PTV Parliament was planned to be launched 2009, but then suspended for
lack of funds. In the United Kingdom, the running of the BBC Parliament channel is
outsourced, with the BBC providing journalistic and editorial support.
An example of a successful venture into digital business is France Télévisions’ website,
praised for being well structured and off ering the entire broadcast output by channel or
type of program. Th e website off ers written content, pictures, and video-streaming of
the network’s programs. It also allows viewers to get involved in forums and discussions
about programs, leave comments, or visit blogs about various programs. In addition,
the website has accounts on social networks in a move to attract younger audiences.
It also off ers Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds and applications for cell phones.
Online live-streaming was introduced in 2012.
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Th e second positive example of the successful launch of a good-quality news operation
by a public service broadcaster is Spain’s RTVE. Th eir recipe is to bring experienced
digital editors from commercial media to lead the website from more or less an online
program schedule to a full online television and radio programming portal, off ering
streaming and podcasts as well as a comprehensive digital archive. In addition, the
RTVE hosts several online communities, boasts the largest number of blogs a media
outlet has in Europe, and has many Facebook and Twitter accounts and profi les.
Finally, it also runs a channel on YouTube and La Villa (the fi rst sports social network
in Spain) and off ers applications for Google Android, Apple’s iPhone, and Sony’s Play
Station. Th e achievements of the website were a total average visitor time of 37 minutes
a day and second position among top broadcast internet portals with over 11.1 million
unique visitors in June 2012.
Table 7.
New services launched by public service broadcasters during digital migration
Country Outlet Service Quality Relevance Popularity
Armenia TV and radio Website n/a n/a Low
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
TV and radio Websites Low Low Low
TV Website Decent Low Low
Bulgaria TV and radio Website n/a High n/a
Canada TV and radio Websites High High High
Chile TV Digital satellite operations n/a n/a High
China TV Video website High High High
Radio Digital channels n/a n/a n/a
Colombia TV and radio Website High High n/a
Croatia TV and radio Website/new channels (2012) High High High
Czech
Republic
TV and radio Website/new channels High High High
Egypt Not applicable
Estonia TV and radio New programs (children)/
Website
High High High
Finland TV and radio Web-TV service High High High
France TV and radio Websites High High High
Georgia TV Website Low Low Low
Germany TV and radio Website (streaming) High High High*
India TV DTH channels, HD broadcasts
(tests), mobile broadcast
services (pilot)
Decent Decent Low
TV Websites Low Low Low
Japan TV HDTV High High High
TV Mobile broadcasting High High High
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Country Outlet Service Quality Relevance Popularity
Jordan TV Websites n/a n/a n/a
Kazakhstan TV Website Varies from outlet to outlet
(there are numerous
state-owned TV outlets)
TV and radio Website Low Low Low
Lithuania TV and radio Integrated portal n/a High High
Macedonia TV and radio Website High High n/a
Moldova TV and radio Websites Low Low Low
Montenegro TV and radio Integrated portal High Decent Decent
Morocco TV Website High n/a n/a
Radio Website High n/a n/a
Netherlands TV On-Demand service High High n/a
TV Thematic channels n/a n/a n/a
Radio Studio web stream High High n/a
TV and radio Networked websites High High n/a
Peru TV and radio Websites Low Low Low
Poland TV New channels High Decent Decent
Romania TV, radio Website Low Low n/a
DTH, HD
channels
Website Low Low n/a
Serbia TV Website Decent Decent n/a
Singapore TV Website High High Moderate
to High
New channels High High Moderate
to High
Slovakia TV and radio Websites Low Low Low
TV New channel Closed after a short time
Slovenia TV and radio Website n/a High High
South Africa TV and radio Websites High n/a n/a
Spain TV and radio Websites High High High
Sweden TV Website High High High
Radio Website High High High
Thailand None
Tunisia
Turkey TV and radio Websites n/a High n/a
United
Kingdom
TV Additional channels High High Decent
TV Website High High n/a
United States None
Uruguay TV Digital channels n/a High n/a
Notes: n/a – not assessed or no information available; * based on more recent data from ZDF
Source: Mapping Digital Media report
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3. Consumer Migrations
3.1 Europe and North America
In most European countries, television remains the most accessed news platform
and the main source of information. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 98 percent of the
population watches television on a regular basis and television is considered the most
credible news provider. Macedonia ranks second in the world in terms of average
time spent watching television. Even the young generation still relies on television
news as a main source of information, as a poll in Latvia shows, although they prefer
multitasking between digital platforms.
Television is still watched overall as scheduled broadcasting. However, there has been
a slight rise in on-demand viewership. Digitization of broadcasting has not triggered
any massive changes in news consumption patterns. Th e shifts have been linked to
technology and platforms. Newly licensed digital channels have not signifi cantly
changed the viewership markets anywhere, although in some countries they have slowly
eaten into the audience shares of established broadcasters. In France, for example, new
digital television channels gained 5 percent of the total combined audience while analog
channels lost viewers. In countries where the digital switch-off has not happened or has
occurred only recently, there have been no changes in the news consumption audiences.
Regarding newspapers, the main change is linked to how news is consumed. Although
newspaper circulations have dropped in almost all European countries, access to online
content of print media has increased and the content from print media remains an
important source of information for news websites. Most of the newspapers’ online
platforms introduced additional features from the print edition such as regular news
updates, comments, opinion surveys, RSS feeds, videos, audio content, and links
to news content from other sources. Generally, newspapers in many countries have
reached a much bigger readership online than in hard copy.
Exceptions to this include the Czech Republic, where 72 percent of the population
still read newspapers regularly and this has been the same for a long time. In parallel
with this, the most popular internet news providers in the Czech Republic are run by
television channels: three-quarters of all internet users in the country follow television
news on the internet at least once a day.
Radio listenership has dropped enormously in most European countries. Radio has
apparently ceased to be a news provider, and is now an entertainment and music
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 3 8
medium. Many radio stations across the continent launched internet streaming in a
move to survive competition from web-based radio services.
Access to news on the internet is mostly free. For young generations, visiting news
portals through links on social media (chiefl y via Facebook) has become the most
popular way to acquire news. Older people who surf the internet prefer traditional
media content on websites.
In the United States, it is hard if not impossible to fi nd a television station with neutral
political views. Th e audience has also become politically homogeneous; for example,
Fox News is viewed primarily by Republicans while Democrats watch Current. Th e
most dramatic change on the American news landscape involves the newspapers,
however; their audience fell by more than 30 percent between 2003 and 2009. Th e
most diverse television off er comes from cable operators who include in their basic
packages at least six domestic 24-hour news channels, while there are many more
available from abroad. While ethnic minorities in the United States have grown in size,
the number of television stations catering to them has dropped.
3.2 Northern Africa
Although television is still the most infl uential medium in northern Africa (93 percent
of the population in Egypt watches television), online media use has grown signifi cantly
in these countries since the Arab Spring in 2011. Television remains the main source
of news and information, also because of low internet penetration and high illiteracy.
However, in broadband-connected households, the internet takes people away from
television, especially in primetime (after 9 p.m.).
Contrary to European trends, newspaper circulation has been rising steadily in this part
of the world. In Egypt, it was expected to reach 4.686 million copies in 2013, up from
3.627 million in 2007. Newspapers remain a principal source of news consumption in
these countries, although younger people tend to read newspapers online. In Morocco,
new digital platforms are used by media outlets only for audio- and video-streaming
while other opportunities created by the internet, such as comments, sharing content
via social networks, blogs, and other forms of user-generated content are not off ered at
all. Northern Africa demonstrates a signifi cant digital divide between urban and rural
areas as rural populations lack access to the internet or are not internet-literate.
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3.3 Sub-Saharan Africa
Despite major developments in the media sector, radio remains the main source of
news and information in many sub-Saharan African countries. For Kenyans, radio is
the main source of news, followed by television. Th e same is true in Nigeria. Radio sets
are cheap, which is a major trigger for the high radio listenership. Even the remotest
rural areas are covered by radio signals. Also, even the cheapest mobile phones in Africa
allow access to radio programs, making this device a perfect choice for young people.
As a result, the number of national and local radio stations has soared in the last 20
years. It is worth noting that the web radio most listened to in Nigeria is foreign: the
BBC in the local language.
An exception that stands out is South Africa. Although radio has the most stable
audience in South Africa, television has shown the highest growth in consumption
over the past fi ve years, followed by the internet: online traffi c has doubled during
the period. Newspapers have been stable, showing only a mild increase in readership.
Digital satellite has also shown a signifi cant growth, doubling its number of viewers
during the past fi ve years, although this was from a much lower base.
Newspaper readership is extremely low. Th e reason is poverty. In Nigeria, more than
50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and cannot aff ord to buy
newspapers. In the last few years, however, mobile phones have started to challenge radio,
especially in urban areas where people can access the internet regardless of their location.
Th e embrace of mobile platforms has not had an impact on news quality. As in Europe,
the change triggered by digitization has been more technical (involving devices and
platforms) than substantive. Th e news off er on mobile phones replicates that in
traditional media.
In countries where traditional media are still controlled by the government or by
powerful families, their owners try to extend their control on the internet as well by
fi ltering or blocking websites.
3.4 Former Soviet Union
Television remains the main medium for news consumption in Armenia, Kazakhstan,
and Georgia. A poll from 2011 showed that 90 percent of Armenian citizens receive
news from television, and only 7 percent from the internet, 2 percent from radio, and
1 percent from newspapers. Some 36 percent of internet users accessed the internet
for reading news. Similarly, in Georgia only 2 percent of the population named
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 4 0
newspapers or magazines as their main source of news, and only 1 percent listened to
the radio for news.
Use of the internet for news consumption in Georgia rose from 3 percent to 5 percent
of the total preferences for news platform from 2007 to 2009. Traditional media,
although they have static news online platforms, have gained more audience by inviting
prominent experts to blog on their websites or by sharing news via social networks.
However, internet penetration is still low in the former Soviet Union and it remains
reserved for those living in urban areas. Although it emerged as an alternative source
of news, the internet has faced numerous challenges in this region as governments
increasingly clamped down on critical voices online. In Kazakhstan, the government
closed several critical print and broadcast media in 2012. A number of critical websites
are also blocked, fi ltered, or denied service. Cable television is used on a large scale in
the region to access news from abroad, mainly from Russia.
3.5 Middle East
In Lebanon and Jordan, television remains the main source of news and information.
In Lebanon, international news satellite programs do not feature among the preferred
top 10 channels; citizens still prefer local channels. Interestingly, there is a very popular
new digital service in Lebanon that was established as a response to the unstable
security situation in the country. Almost all media (online, radio, television) deliver
breaking news via text messages for a US$10 monthly subscription fee. In Jordan, the
household ownership of radio sets fell by half as a result of new ways of accessing radio
programs, chiefl y in cars, via mobile phones, or the internet.
Th e quality of news has not seen major improvements. Th e media scene in Lebanon,
for example, is polarized; most media outlets are supported by a political party or
support a political agenda. It can be argued that this situation ensures media pluralism
because of the variety of opinions on the political communication market. Th is trend
is valid for both traditional and new online media. Online readership of print media
exceeds hard copy readership in Lebanon.
3.6 Asia
Asian trends in media consumption vary broadly from region to region and even
country to country. In China, the broadcasting system is decentralized and falls into four
categories, in line with the “Four-level development policy for broadcasting industry”
introduced in the 1980s: central, regional, municipal, and local. Th at resulted in more
1 4 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
than 3,000 television stations that operate in China. CCTV is the dominant broadcaster
on the news market, under strict government control. It has defended its leading position
in terms of audience despite competition from satellite operators. Its dominance has,
however, declined: its audience share fell from 22.9 percent in 2005 to 13.3 percent in
2009. Radio airs mostly music and traffi c news, rather than news bulletins as such.
On the other hand, China has been the leading market in the world by newspaper
circulation for 10 consecutive years. All print media are state-owned. Th ere are two
types of management: “offi cial papers” are managed by local party committees and
recipients of government subsidies, while “city papers” are founded by “offi cial papers”
but have a more market- and consumer-oriented approach. Th ey also publish occasional
investigative reports, giving them a distinctive character compared with offi cial papers.
Although both television and print media remain the main source of news in China,
specialized news websites are eroding their dominance. News websites can be grouped
into commercial portals and websites of traditional media. Internet portals have also
given harbor to a range of human rights activists, advocates, and whistle-blowers. Japan
joins China among the countries with high circulations of newspapers and magazines.
In India, the main factor in shaping news consumption patterns is the dispersion
of languages across media platforms. Th e country has a variety of both state-owned
and commercial media outlets. However, it is notable that the interest in news on
political issues in Hindu and English fell from 23.1 percent to 10.9 percent in only
three years, from 2005 to 2007. In contrast, the interest in non-factual content such
as sports and entertainment grew from 27.9 percent to 53.1 percent in the same
period. In 2010, the English television channels devoted more than 50 percent of
their news output to crime and sports combined, followed by political/government
(19.1 percent) and entertainment news (12.6 percent). On the other hand, crime, law,
and order (26 percent) dominate on leading Hindi television channels, while sport
news, entertainment news, and political or government news almost have the same
proportion of news themes (16 percent, 14 percent, and 13 percent respectively).
Television and radio are still the main sources of news in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Th ailand. In Malaysia, paid satellite television increased its penetration from 24.9
percent to 40.1 percent between 2006 and 2012, while free-to-air television penetration
dropped from 75.1 percent to 59.9 percent over the same period. In addition, there has
been a greater news off er on satellite, including local all-news channels, sport channels,
and international news channels. In Th ailand too, consumers have been abandoning
terrestrial television for satellite and cable.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 4 2
Radio holds a steady position in South-East Asia, reaching more than 90 percent of the
population in Malaysia and Singapore. However, Malaysian teenagers have lost interest
in radio over recent years as a result of the growing entertainment off er and the lack of
radio stations which target their age group.
As print media in Malaysia require prior permission to operate and are mainly
established by the ruling parties, the internet has become an alternative source for news
and information that cover issues not addressed by traditional media.
For Malaysians, social networks have become a source of news as well as of user-
generated content. Much of the content on these networks clarifi es or contradicts
the offi cial news in traditional media. In Th ailand, Twitter is a favored platform and
has become widely used by politicians for communicating with citizens as well as for
spreading news.
In Pakistan, radio represents the main source of information for rural areas and
undeveloped provinces. Th e reason is that almost half the population has limited access
to news from the state-owned PTV broadcaster that airs terrestrially. On the other
hand, citizens of major towns benefi t from the massive growth of cable and satellite
television in urban areas over the past fi ve years. Th is has helped to increase diversity
in the news off er by allowing access to local and foreign news programs, not interfered
with by the state.
Interestingly, news content on the radio is strictly regulated and local radio stations are
not allowed to broadcast news of their choice according to the law, but can rebroadcast
news bulletins produced by the state-owned Radio Pakistan and the BBC Urdu Service.
Th ey are also allowed to broadcast local news programs such as weather forecasts and
traffi c news. Print media in Pakistan reached only 4 percent of the population in 2008,
which was one of the lowest newspaper reaches in the MDM project. However, print
media companies in Pakistan are optimistic, seeing massive potential in the growth of
this sector. By 2010, some 25 percent of the population said that they were newspaper
readers, according to a survey by InterMedia.
3.7 Latin America
Traditional television and radio programs are still the main source of information in
most of Latin America. Nearly 97 percent of Brazilians watched television frequently
in 2010. Of those, 83.5 percent watched free-to-air television. Radio retains a steady
second place in preferred platforms; in 2010, over 80 percent of Brazilians listened
to radio.
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In Colombia too, television is dominant. News was the second-most popular use of
television in 2010 with 86.3 percent, just behind entertainment, up by 5 percentage
points from 2005. Colombia has a very low internet penetration. Internet subscription
in Colombia and Peru stood at 10 percent of the population in 2011.
Low internet penetration is a main reason why traditional media hang on to their
dominant position in the news market. Most online news portals are versions of
traditional media: newspapers, television channels, and radio stations.
As a consequence of the increase in pay-TV in Colombia, the international channels
have gained audience, growing from 41.8 percent in 2005 to 55.8 percent in 2010.
International channels are rapidly fueling the expansion of news sources, at least in
television, although news channels are not the most viewed cable channels.
Despite these developments, terrestrial television has an undisputed dominance
in Latin America. In Guatemala, the primary source for news is still television (46
percent), followed by radio (28.1 percent), newspapers (16.2 percent), cable television
(6.7 percent), and the internet (with less than 3 percent). Most people watch news
in Guatemala on free-to-air television on a daily basis. Nevertheless, urban dwellers,
younger people, and the middle class increasingly consume news on digital media,
and this growth is somewhat spurred by the increase of mobile services. Interestingly,
the number of internet cafés in rural areas has increased in Guatemala, but this was
prompted by the need to communicate with friends and relatives who live in the
United States and neighboring countries rather than the need for news content.
Terrestrial free-to-air television is still the most dominant news source in Mexico as
well, despite a slight fall from 77 percent in penetration in 2005 to 70 percent in 2009.
On this platform, public service television reaches only 47 percent of all households,
much less than private broadcasters that reach 98 percent of households. Regarding
technologies, only 13.6 percent of television households had a digital set, of which
only 46.6 percent (6 percent of the total population) could receive digital television
free-to-air programs.
In the Peruvian capital city of Lima, free-to-air television was the main news source
for 94 percent of citizens in 2009. It was followed by print media (82 percent),
radio (72 percent), and the internet (47 percent). Despite its third position in media
consumption, radio was the most trusted medium for news, followed by the internet
and television, with newspapers trusted least. User-generated content has had a notable
impact on shaping regular news, with consumers using mobile platforms on a large
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 4 4
scale to contribute to the news off er by, for example, sending self-produced videos to
traditional media. Bloggers in Peru have also contributed to boosting the diversity of
the media off er and have become an alternative source of news, revealing corruption or
criminal cases. Surveys indicate that 57 percent of internet users in Lima visited blogs
in 2010.
Overall, despite the dominance of television in Latin America, the internet has risen
slowly but steadily in the preferences for news sources. Th e speed of this growth
apparently refl ects the low internet penetration. In Mexico, for example, internet users
make the internet their main source of news as soon as they start using this technology.
Mobile phones are also used increasingly for news consumption in Mexico, another
indication of the popular appetite for new platforms to access news.
1 4 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Telecoms and News Iulian Comanescu
Introduction
Th e most essential fact about media convergence is that it helps to spread news and
entertainment content. Over recent years, the availability of new platforms for video
and text distribution has increased everywhere, bringing obvious benefi ts in terms of
the reach of news content.
Th e most common form of convergence of content is the bundled services package
that started to be off ered by cable, telecommunications, and mobile providers. In many
countries, the diff erences between such companies have tended to disappear, as cable
operators, for example, became powerful internet service providers (ISPs) and landline
telephony companies added mobile voice and internet services to their off er.
Because landline telephony is the fi rst-born among such services, telecoms companies
are or were state-owned. Most of them added television carrying services to their
off er, usually direct-to-home (DTH). In some cases, they became capable of exerting
pressure on broadcasters on behalf of the authorities. Such situations exist in developing
countries or countries undergoing democratization.
Th e direct involvement of telecoms companies, cable television companies, and mobile
operators in content production (i.e. television channels or news websites) is more
dispersed across the MDM countries. Th e model of involvement diff ers from market to
market, with the only common characteristic seeming to be the inclination of telecoms
or mobile companies to invest in alternative video or text distribution methods, such as
video-on-demand (VoD) platforms, news portals, or SMS news services.
C H A P T E R F I V E
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 4 6
1. Telecoms, Cable, and News Distribution
Cable has been used to distribute television signals since the 1950s. Since the 1990s,
traditional media brands such as newspapers and television channels have been among
the fi rst to spin off their content online. Both these phenomena can be considered as
evidence of media convergence, which has become a pervasive trend in most of the
world’s media markets.
In the past decade, the two main perspectives on media convergence have been
ownership (meaning media groups entering market sectors other than the one they
originally operated in, i.e. television companies buying news portals) and technology
(meaning diff erent platforms performing tasks similar to traditional media outlets, i.e.
online portals acting as virtual newspapers).
1.1 Consequences of Convergence
During the last 20 years, the diff erences between cable, mobile, and telecoms companies
have become blurred. Th e process was related less to actual concentration of ownership
(mergers and acquisitions) than to the launch of various services that complemented, or
even competed with, other companies’ areas of expertise. In most countries worldwide,
most telecoms and cable companies provide similar services, consisting of bundled
off ers of television, landline telephony, and landline internet. Tagged commercially as
triple play, this off er is often supplemented with mobile telephony and mobile internet,
closing the gap between cable-telecoms companies and mobile.
Th e development of the German market is typical from this point of view. Deutsche
Telekom, which was set up in 1996 by privatizing the communications division of
Deutsche Bundespost, still holds a dominant market position, with 60 percent of the
landline connections in 2013. Th ree of its subsidiaries, T-Home (formerly T-Com,
telephone and fi xed network carrier), T-Mobile (mobile provider), and T-Online
(internet provider) provide fi xed telephony, mobile, and internet access.
However, cable television in Germany, where the dominant carrier had almost 40
percent of total households in 2013, is operated by unrelated or only partly related
companies such as Kabel Deutschland. Previously a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom,
Kabel Deutschland was taken over in 2003 by Providence Equity Partners, an
international investor group which holds the majority. In autumn 2013, Vodafone
purchased Kabel Deutschland in a deal worth €7.7 billion (US$10 billion).
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Th e MDM report on the United Kingdom fi nds that the U.K. market is also typical
of this development. Virgin Media, for example, is among the leading providers of
quadruple-play services, consisting of landline telephony, mobile, television, and
internet broadband, and competes with the former state company British Telecom.
Such services are described in other countries as quintuple, because mobile also
includes 3G (mobile internet).
Th e ownership structure in developing countries is, unsurprisingly, more scattered,
because of the smaller size of the companies. In Kenya, cable exists only in affl uent
areas of Nairobi, while broadband is only off ered in four cities. According to the
MDM report on Kenya, only one internet service provider, Wananchi Group, has
started off ering IPTV.
Virtually all the cable and telecom companies providing television content also have a
signifi cant role in distributing content, including news or other programs with political
relevance, especially in markets with a weak penetration of terrestrial television, such
as Lebanon, Argentina, Latvia, Hungary, and the Netherlands. In countries with high
terrestrial coverage, cable or direct-to-home (DTH) distribution is less necessary and
theoretically less fi nancially viable, so private players have lower penetration rates for
this kind of distribution.
Th e structure of a typical off er of cable plus satellite services is a basic package,
consisting of 20–60 domestic and international channels, with various add-on or
premium packages, commonly referred to as pay-TV. Such packages are bundles of
specialized channels such as documentary/factual entertainment, sports, lifestyle,
children, movies, adult, ethnic programming, and others. Some of the markets in
federations or former federations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) or the former Yugoslavia, include channels from neighboring countries, more
developed both economically and in terms of television production.
If cable companies in countries such as Macedonia or Montenegro broadcast Serbian
or Croatian channels, or Armenian and Kazakh providers include Russian television
channels in their off er, Moldova is a more interesting example. In addition to Russian
channels, several important Romanian channels are broadcast by cable companies,
because the Romanian language, which is similar to Moldovan, is understood in the
country.
Such situations have cultural as well as political implications, similar to the global
presence of English-, German-, and French-language all-news or public channels
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 4 8
on cable and DTH. While the ubiquity of channels such as BBC News Worldwide
means spreading the universal values of journalism and democracy, the domination by
Russian channels in CIS countries is more ideological and related to the momentary
needs of propaganda. In the case of Moldova, the television landscape is a metaphor
for the country’s complex status as both a member of the CIS and an aspirant to
membership of the EU.
As an alternative to terrestrial, cable and DTH have been boosting the dissemination
of news by the inclusion of all-news channels in their off er. Following the example
of Cable News Network (CNN), such stations have preferred cable and satellite as a
cheaper distribution alternative, compared with the old expensive terrestrial analog
relays.
In countries dominated by cable reception, such as Romania, all the private broadcasters
achieved quasi-national coverage by aggregating local licenses, because of conservative
regulation that prevented commercial companies from acquiring national licenses.
Whenever it exists, the terrestrial license is nominal and the channels are viewed almost
exclusively by cable or DTH.
1.2 Technological Convergence
Convergence in terms of ownership is complemented by technological convergence,
meaning the dissemination of news on similar, or partly similar, platforms. Cable
television has been around since the beginning of the 1990s in most of the MDM
countries. In terms of television reception, the relative novelties of the last decade are
DTH and Internet Protocol Television (IPTV).
DTH, mostly digital, entered countries as diff erent as Bulgaria and India in 2008,
where—the MDM reports say—they proved to be a valid alternative to cable
distribution, especially for rural or dispersed residential areas very diffi cult to reach
by cable networks. Th eir off er from the end-user viewpoint is similar to digital cable
off ering (television content and Electronic Programming Guide, EPG). Th erefore, to
a certain extent DTH has been competing with cable or terrestrial television only on
geographical grounds. After a certain point, however, diff erentiation of the off er in
terms of channels became an incentive to purchase DTH services. DTH providers,
overwhelmingly telecoms, started to attack cable providers in their own backyard with
similar programming off ers. Diff erentiation was achieved by launching channels of
their own.
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IPTV had a diff erent life. Possible only on broadband internet and most of the time
associated with an assortment of supplemental facilities such as time-shift (reruns),
video-on-demand (VoD), or personal video recording (PVR), IPTV arrived—
according to the MDM reports—slightly later than DTH, for example, in 2008 in
Italy, in 2009 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 2010 in China. Still, IPTV adoption
is usually very low-level. Only four of the MDM countries exceed the 10 percent mark
in take-up, namely Slovenia, France, Montenegro, and Croatia.
Another alternative carrying method, so-called mobile television, is present as such in
countries like Pakistan, Singapore, or Japan. Th e term is very wide, however, and can
refer to any type of television reception on a mobile device, from the pervasive over-
the-top to one-seg, a standard based on digital terrestrial that includes error correction.
In Japan, one-seg users accounted for 21 percent of all mobile users in 2010.
Obviously, mobile internet does much more than off er video. Its increasing popularity
has had similar implications for the spread of written (online) news. Although it is
traditionally associated with urban areas and higher education or income the internet
is a useful distribution channel everywhere, especially in an economic crisis that led
to the closure of various print media outlets. Such titles often survive on the internet:
Newsweek, the international print news magazine absorbed by Th edailybeast.com,
being the best-known case of online survival, noted in the MDM report on the United
States.
Regarding written news, the Middle East and North Africa region has an interesting
characteristic. In the context of poor internet adoption rates, mobile carriers started to
provide popular news services by SMS. In Jordan, where 3G was only implemented in
2010, mobile operators provided updates with content from Al Arabiya, BBC, and Al
Jazeera. In March 2013, Info2Cell, a local mobile provider, also announced it would
off er updates of social media feeds twice a week, by SMS texts. Such news updates
are off ered in Lebanon and Egypt, but also elsewhere in countries such as Singapore,
Th ailand, and Poland.
One common characteristic of all the developments in technological convergence
described above is the increased spread of entertainment, which is both the most
popular type of content among young, connected users, and also safe from a political
point of view, which can be an important issue for both content distributors and
providers.
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2. Telecoms, Mobile and Cable Companies: How Much Pressure on Broadcasters
2.1 Political Pressure
Most of the MDM researchers reported no pressures on broadcasters by telecoms,
cable, or mobile companies. Other researchers discussed the fees required by these
operators to carry a certain channel, or the attempt to prohibit a station’s broadcast on
rival distribution networks.
Table 8.
Pressures of telecoms and cable providers on news providers
Are telecoms and cable companies putting pressure on news providers?
Yes No
Argentina, Canada,1 India,2
Jordan, Latvia, Nicaragua,
Pakistan,3 Poland, Thailand
Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile,
China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt,4 Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova,
Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, Singapore,5 Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey,6 United Kingdom, United States,7
Uruguay
Notes: n/a – not assessed or no information available; (1) ISPs and mobile operators blocking content;
(2) cable operators blocking channels; (Egypt) it is the government that usually puts pressure
on telcos; (4) proxies for government intervention and pressure; (5) state owns everything; (6)
an exception was the refusal by Turkcell to advertise in Dogan media; (7) rarely
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
However, some of the pressures on news providers in countries with less developed
markets, outside Western Europe and North America, are connected to politics.
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Cases of politically related pressures involving telecoms, cablecoms, and mobile operator companies (from MDM reports):
• Bosnia and Herzegovina: the public television signal was switched off by cable oper-
ators during the broadcast of certain programs and the interruption was interpreted
as an attempt at censorship by local commentators.
• Argentina: the alliance between telecoms companies and certain political forces
led to discrimination against broadcasters with a diff erent perspective. Cablevision
(Grupo Clarin) refused to include in its off er, at a certain point, two pro-government
news stations, CN23 and Telesur.
• Egypt: the telecoms and internet providers were used by the government to exert
pressure on 28 January 2011, known as “the Friday of Anger.” Mobile telephony and
text messages were cut off for a day, while online access was interrupted for another
four days.
• Georgia: Silk TV, a cable operator, refused to include Maestro TV, a channel critical of
the government, in its off er. One of Maestro TV’s hosts organized a protest in front
of Silknet’s offi ce.
• In India, cable operators in the Telangana region blacked out some Andhra TV chan-
nels after they criticized a campaign for a separate Telangana region.
• In Kazakhstan, a television broadcast of “Borat,” Sasha Baron Cohen’s movie, was
banned, following the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs’ suggestion that distributors should
“responsibly refrain” from bringing the “insulting fi lm” to Kazakhstan.
• In Lebanon, illegal cable providers have modifi ed their channels’ off er according to
fi nancial incentives from television broadcasters or in line with political interests.
A satirical program on 1 June 2006, which mocked Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s
Secretary General, led some illegal providers in areas controlled by Hezbollah to ban
LBC, the program’s broadcaster. LBC was reincluded in the off er after things calmed
down.
• In Pakistan, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority routinely relies on
cable operators to block the transmission of certain types of content. In August
2010, the regulator ordered providers to block Geo TV and ARY TV after they aired a
story about a protestor throwing a shoe at President Asif Zardari during the latter’s
visit to Birmingham in the UK.
• In Russia, the opposition news channel RTVi, founded in 2002 by Vladimir Gusinski,
is not included in the packages of the most important operators.
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2.2 Advertising Budgets
Mobile companies are among the biggest advertising spenders everywhere. In 2012,
according to a Nielsen study, telecoms occupied seventh place in top global ad spending,
with a steep increase of 7 percent year on year.1 In Albania, in 2010, mobile operators
accounted for 60–70 percent of the total television ad spending, while in Nigeria, in
2009, they accounted for up to 16 percent of the above-the-line spend.2
However, in spite of their high budgets, there is little factual evidence that mobile
operators have attempted to infl uence broadcasters’ editorial policy. One exception
was an incident in Turkey in 2008, when—as the MDM report recounts—Turkcell,
Turkey’s leading mobile operator by revenue, decided not to advertise on Dogan Media
Group’s stations, blaming the high price of advertising. Dogan Media offi cials claimed
Turkcell wanted to avoid upsetting members of the Islamist government, who were
often criticized by Dogan’s stations.
Although there is little evidence that telecoms or mobile telephony companies put
pressure on broadcasters, their high advertising budgets ensure that they are strongly
placed to exert such pressure on content producers should they wish to do so.
3. Telecoms, Cable, and Mobile Companies in News Production
While media convergence is a widespread phenomenon in terms of ownership
and the diversifi cation of carrying services, it has occurred less frequently in news
production, with little or no involvement of telecoms, cable, and mobile companies
in content production. Although telecoms companies are fi nancially much stronger
than broadcasters or digital publishers, the acquisition or launching of television or
digital content brands on their part is contingent and depends on the local market
specifi cities.
1. “Unsigned – Ad Spend by Sector: Consumer Goods and Telecom Take the Cake in 2012,” Nielsen.com, 25 April
2013, at http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2013/ad-spend-by-sector--consumer-goods-and-telecom-take-
the-cake-in-.html.
2. Th e term “above-the-line” refers to classic television advertising campaigns, as opposed to less conventional
means. In such campaigns, most of the expenses are related to media costs (fees to the stations for including the
spots in their ad breaks). In the total of advertising expenditures, most industries have a one-digit share, so 16
percent is a high percentage.
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3.1 Carriers and Broadcasters: Ownership Links
In Western Europe and global markets, the acquisition of content businesses by carriers
or common ownership structures among telecoms, cable or mobile and content
providers appears to follow plain investor logic and largely predates the latest wave of
technological convergence.
In France, the Bouygues group owns both Bouygues Telecom and three television
channels (TF1, NT1, TMC). SFR, another telecoms company, is part of Vivendi,
also the owner of Canal+, Direct Star, and D8. Such common ownership structures
are often found in businesses operating globally. Th e Stenbeck family owns both the
Modern Times Group (MTG) (a big broadcast group in northern Europe and also the
parent company of Viasat) and Tele2, a mobile operator with activities in 11 markets.
Both groups started in Sweden.
A similar evolution was followed by Central European Media Enterprises (CME), a
television group founded by the U.S. billionaire Ronald S. Lauder in 1994, which
now operates in six Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). In 2009, Time-Warner, an entertainment
conglomerate that owned Time-Warner Cable at that time, acquired 31 percent of
CME and has since increased its stake to almost 50 percent.3
Such ownership structures usually operate on a global or regional level, and are formed
traditionally through takeover of content providers by conglomerates or telecoms
carriers that are fi nancially powerful. However, in Mexico, the originally broadcast
companies, Grupo Televisa and Television Azteca (Grupo Salinas), became the most
powerful entertainment conglomerates and extended their control to the cable, satellite,
and telecoms market by means of subsidiaries or related companies. Th e MDM reports
have not identifi ed evidence that telecoms companies infl uence the editorial agenda of
media outlets owned by the same group.
3. Central European Media Enterprises press releases, at http://www.cetv-net.com/en/press-center/news/index.
shtml.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 5 4
Table 9.
Telecoms ownership in the media outlets
Country Outlet Sector Telecoms owner Change since 2010
Albania No
Argentina Eight free-to-air
TV stations
Television Telefónica No
Armenia No
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
No
Brazil Terra (portal) Online Telefónica No
iG Online Oi Likely to sell out
Bulgaria No
Canada Bell telco, CTV,
The Globe and
Mail newspaper
Internet/
television/print
Same owner
(BCE)
No
City Television Television Rogers (cable
and ISP)
No
Global Television Television Shaw
Communications
(cable and ISP)
No
Sun Media Print Quebecor (owner
of cable and ISP)
No
Chile No (media bought telecoms)
China No
Colombia No
Croatia Tportal Online T-Mobil/VIP Launched in 2005
Czech
Republic
No
Egypt No
Estonia No
Finland No
France Not direct, but media are part of giant state-owned utilities that also run telcos
Georgia No
Germany No
Guatemala No
Hungary No
India Several media
outlets
TV, fi lm
production
Conglomerate
Reliance Capital
Purchase of outlets
Indonesia TelkomVision,
YesTV, GrooviaTV
TV PT Telkom No
ANTV, TVOne TV Bakrie Telecom No
Italy La7 Broadcast Telecom Italia No
MTV Italia Broadcast Telecom Italia No
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Country Outlet Sector Telecoms owner Change since 2010
Japan No
Jordan No
Kazakhstan No
Kenya No
Latvia No
Lebanon No (state owns, however, many outlets in both telecoms and media sectors)
Lithuania Zebra.lt Online Teo LT No
Macedonia No
Malaysia No
Mexico TV Azteca Broadcast Grupo Salinas
(owner of
Iusacell and
Unefon telcos)
Telmex trying to
enter media sector
Moldova No
Montenegro No
Morocco Medi1 TV Broadcast Maroc Telecom Deal in 2008
Netherlands No
Nicaragua No
Nigeria No
Pakistan No
Peru No
Poland No
Romania No
Russia No
Serbia No
Singapore No
Slovakia No
Slovenia Siol.net Online Telekom Slovenia No
South Africa No
Spain No
Sweden MTG/Tele2 Broadcast Stenbeck No
Thailand TrueVisions
channels
Broadcast True Corporation No
Turkey No
United
Kingdom
No
United States Comcast/NBC Broadcast Comcast No
Uruguay No
Note: Th e table includes signifi cant involvement of telcos in media content providers until the date
the respective Mapping Digital Media reports were published
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 5 6
3.2 Telecoms and Cable Companies in Mainstream and All-news
Television
Th e extent of involvement by telecoms and cable companies in the ownership of
mainstream and all-news television stations is dwarfed by their involvement in niche,
thematic channels such as sports or movies off ered in bundled packages. Also, there
is no evidence that telecoms companies which enter or launch their own news or
mainstream television operations use these channels for political infl uence. Th is is the
case in Romania and Italy where there are such operations and no political infl uence
has been detected. Th ere are, however, exceptions. In Th ailand, the history of the iTV
news channel bristles with examples of political and corruption-related scandals. Th e
station’s founder has eventually become the country’s prime minister.
In several markets, cable, telecoms, and mobile providers started to have a signifi cant
stake in important television channels. After taking over Tele Monte Carlo and
rebranding it as La7 in 2001, Telecom Italia launched a new channel in 2011 called La
7d, focused on movies and light entertainment. Telecom Italia Media also has a stake
of 51 percent in MTV Italia.
Cable and telecoms companies’ involvement in all-news channels is also signifi cant in a
number of countries. While achieving lower ratings, such channels have a considerable
democratic relevance. In Chile, VTR, the dominant telecoms company, launched
CNN-Chile in 2009 as a joint venture with Turner Broadcasting from the United
States. Cable and mobile companies in the United States have started various television
channels, such as Verizon’s FiOS1 or Time Warner Cable’s NY1.
A similar development aff ected the Romanian market. On 1 March 2012, RCS &
RDS, which originated at the beginning of the 1990s as a cable company and became
a provider of bundled services in eight countries, launched Digi24, an all-news station
provided exclusively to its subscribers. With high production values, a good-quality high-
defi nition (HD) signal and a team of respected journalists, Digi24 achieved in several
months the reputation of an alternative station very diff erent from the numerous all-
news channels on the Romanian market, which have often—and convincingly—been
accused of political bias.
In an interview, George Orbean, the project manager of Digi24, explained the station’s
diff erent editorial strategy:
In the morning, Mr. X says something on live TV. At lunch, we have
Mr. Y’s answer, and in the afternoon, Mrs. Z’s reaction, everything in
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breaking news, on all stations. Th is is politicians’ craft. We’ve looked
for more facts, relied more upon action and less on emotions. I think
this is the diff erence. Ah, and by the way: I’ve fulfi lled a dream at Digi:
I’ve killed the breaking news! … It’s something that I’ve told people
from the fi rst day: Whoever says “breaking news” dies! It’s disgusting;
one can see all kinds of nonsense transformed into breaking news. Th e
others are monitoring you and here they go too.4
In spite of some allegations connecting RCS & RDS and Digi24 to President Traian
Băsescu or political forces supporting him, commentators and ordinary viewers
remarked on Digi24’s neutral tone of voice and diff erent agenda.
In Th ailand, telecoms companies’ involvement in news production was apparently
related to corruption. In 2000, Th aksin Shinawatra, a business tycoon and politician,
acquired iTV, a news channel launched in 1992 as an independent station, by means of
Shin Corporation, a telecoms company controlled by his family. A total of 23 of iTV’s
news staff protested against the takeover, but they were sacked and Mr Shinawatra duly
won the elections in 2001 with his newly-formed Th ai Rak Th ai party, and became
prime minister until he was overthrown in 2006 by a military junta, the Council for
National Security. Mr Th aksin had sold his stake in Shin Corporation several months
earlier to Temasek Holdings, an investment company owned by the government of
Singapore. iTV was subsequently nationalized and became Th ai PBS (public service
broadcaster) in January 2008.
3.3 Digital Publishing, Mobile Television, Online Video-on-Demand
Th e relative lack of revenue-generating capacity in the online content market has
prompted some telecoms and mobile companies to make major investments in this
fi eld. In Croatia, the MDM report says that two major telecoms, T-Mobile and VIP,
launched their news portals, Tportal.hr and VIP.hr. Tportal.hr was the third most
popular news site in the country in 2011. Lithuania’s Teo LT had launched a similar
portal in 1998, Takas.lt, rebranded as Zebra.lt, while Telekom Slovenia is also involved
in the online business with Siol.net (news), Nadji.si (search engine), and Dajmedol.si
(adult).
4. Interview in writing with George Orbean, Project Manager at Digi24, answer to the author’s questions, Bucha-
rest, 7 August 2013. Also published on Comanescu.ro, on 9 August 2013, at http://www.comanescu.ro/george-
orbean-digi24-mi-am-indeplinit-un-vis-am-ucis-breaking-news-ul.html.
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In Bulgaria, Spectrum Net, one of the large internet service providers by number of
subscribers, took over a stake of 49 percent of Economedia, the largest business media
group, in 2010. Th e new entrant boosted Economedia’s transition to digital through
the launch of Kindle editions of its publications or through setting up paywalls on
Economedia’s websites.
In Japan, similar developments have taken place in online video-on-demand. Usen
Corporation and NTT both launched their own movie-viewing services, Gyao
and Hikari TV. In 2011, Indonesia’s PT Telekom launched Groovia TV, an IPTV
broadcasting service, accessible only by subscribers.
In other markets, online content delivery has been achieved by alliances between mobile
companies and content producers. One such example are the information services
launched by Plus GSM in Poland. Also in Poland, Orange launched in 2008 its own
Orange Sport Info, available on satellite and IPTV. Other alliances have been forged
by the largest Russian mobile operator, MTS, and the RIA Novosti news agency, to
launch the MTS News service, or by Serbia’s B92 broadcast group and state-owned
Telekom Srbija to implement an interactive podcasts portal.
In competitive markets, such alliances are usually built on commercial content (i.e.
entertainment and sports), which can be monetized easily or be a strong marketing
tool for telecoms companies. Serious, public interest news content is not the main
priority for such carriers because it is less attractive to young mobile users. If content
consumption on such platforms is to increase in future, a shift in terms of off ering
good-quality news content is likely.
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Access to Spectrum: Winners and Losers Marko Milosavljević and Tanja Kerševan Smokvina
Introduction
Digital terrestrial television (DTT) is often the most strictly regulated of all media
platforms because it uses a limited natural resource and because of its history; for decades
it was the only platform for television distribution and therefore in many countries it
remained under strict state monopoly control. Due to the policies of allocation and
licensing, DTT is still a platform which favors certain interests—sometimes political,
sometimes economic, and very often a combination of both. Th e current trends in
spectrum management and allocation, where spectrum is sold to the highest bidders,
are increasing the dominance of incumbent actors and reducing the opportunities and
prospects for local and community media
Th e consequences of digital switch-over (DSO) in economically less strong countries
mostly remain to be seen. Even the Mapping Digital Media (MDM) reports from
smaller countries (in terms of population and gross domestic product) in an otherwise
economically strong Europe indicate that many factors limit the potential benefi ts of
digital broadcasting. Specifi cally, there seems to be a lack of new entrants in digital
broadcasting and of more diversifi ed content. In many cases we are faced with the
multiplication and replication of the same content on diff erent channels and platforms.
In most of the MDM countries that have completed DSO, the incumbent media seem
to have strengthened their position.
Moreover, the strength of the telecoms and cable sectors—not just in terms of distribution
and gatekeeping—has increased at the same time, leading to the concentration of
digital media. Th e need to address problems of gatekeeping and regulation so as to
prevent bottlenecks and enhance the plurality of media off ers therefore appears to be
even more urgent.
C H A P T E R S I X
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 6 0
It was forecast at the end of the 1990s that digital television would “replace the
traditional forms of public service broadcasting by markets in which consumers are
sovereign and content regulation will become no more important than it has been in
relation to the content of phone calls.”1 Th e experience of many countries that have
completed DSO (particularly smaller ones) suggests that such claims were rash.
1. Extension of Dominant Positions and Controls
Historically, terrestrial broadcasting used an interval of the ultra-high frequency range
(UHF) and a part of the very high frequency range (VHF). Before the introduction of
digital technologies, the UHF (470–862 MHz) and VHF (173–230 MHz) bands were
used for broadcasting one television service per frequency channel, mostly via high
power transmitters, and therefore consumed a lot of spectrum capacity.
When digital transmission standards with effi cient coding systems are used together
with statistical multiplexing, they enable far more economical use of the spectrum
and help to improve the position of the terrestrial platform in comparison with other
content delivery platforms, which have already been transmitting signifi cantly larger
numbers of television services for years.
Th e transition from analog to digital transmission and reception over the airwaves is
a very complex process that requires good preparation and coordination. One of the
major infl uences on the process is the high cost of digital transition as this falls on
broadcasters and television viewers, but also on state budgets, especially if consumer
subsidies are provided. It should come as no surprise that DSO has been completed
in more developed countries, where the saturation of analog radio spectrum (used
by television) was most evident, and terrestrial television suff ered a steady loss of
market share due to its limited possibilities for competing with other, technically more
advanced platforms.
As the frequency bands that broadcasters used ensure better territorial coverage at a
lower cost than other segments of the spectrum, an important incentive for fast and
complete digital switch-over was also the interest of the telecommunications industry
(strongly supported by governments, multinational companies, and international
organizations) to acquire part of the released spectrum for mobile broadband services.
1. David Goldberg, Tony Prossner, and Stefaan Verhulst, EC Media Law and Policy, Longman, London, 1998, p. 5.
1 6 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Th e digital dividend (spectrum freed thanks to digitization) was even sometimes
presented as a promising means to fi ght the digital divide between urban and rural
areas, but the digital divide is too complex to be overcome by repurposing the released
spectrum.2 Across the span of MDM countries, the digital divide among countries is
more than evident, but it can also be observed between diff erent demographic groups in
each country. Th e most evident diff erences are between urban and rural areas, as well as
those related to age, gender, income, and education. Th e gap can be expressed in terms
of access to information and communication technology, and in terms of information
competency and media literacy. Even the most developed countries are not exempt
from the so-called “knowledge divide” that aff ects mainly the older and less educated
segments of the population, as the MDM report on the United States makes clear.
By 2010, many countries, especially in Europe, had switched off analog television
broadcasting or at least initiated the transition to DTT through policymaking or the
adoption of laws. Th e currently available information3 complementing the fi gures
provided by the MDM reports shows that most countries of the European Union
(EU), as well as Japan, have switched off the analog terrestrial transmitters completely,
while the United States has kept some low power analog transmitters in operation.
Other parts of the world are progressing at diff erent speeds, with many countries—
especially in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America—not even having started
digital transmissions yet. Th e situations in these countries are also quite varied, as some
have not taken even the basic initial decisions, while others have already adapted their
legislation, but for various reasons without concrete outcomes as yet.
Th ere are also some examples of good practices, as for instance in Tanzania (not
included in the MDM project), which was the fi rst country in Africa to switch off its
analog television in the most important cities. Tanzania will most probably be followed
by Mauritius; some progress can be noted also in Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, and Kenya.
In Egypt, on the other hand,
the eff orts to upgrade the network have been sporadic and disjointed,
and there are doubts as to whether Egypt will meet its international
commitment to switch off analog signals by 2015. On the consumer
2. A detailed survey of possibilities for exploiting the digital dividend was prepared by the SEE Digi.TV project,
co-fi nanced by the EU and aimed at harmonizing digital switch-over activities in South-East Europe. Th e study is
available at http://www.see-digi.tv/shared_fi les/wp5/survey_on_digital_dividend_exploitation_possibilities_a10.
pdf.
3. Detailed information on the roll-out of DTT can be found at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/Pages/default.aspx;
http://www3.ebu.ch/cms/en/home; http://www.dvb.org/news/worldwide, and at http://www.digitag.org.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 6 2
side, there is little incentive and no assistance to purchase set-top
boxes (STBs), given the absence of any off er of new services from
state broadcasters (which retain an exclusive monopoly over terrestrial
television) or subsidy from the government.
Progress is also slow in Latin America. Mexico was one of the fi rst countries in this
area to start the DSO and completed the fi rst regional analog switch-off in Tijuana in
June 2013. Th e fi nal switch-off date is foreseen to be the end of 2015. Brazil launched
DTT in São Paolo in 2007 and is progressing region by region. Analog switch-off is
expected in June 2016. Peru started with its fi rst DTT services in 2010 and is to switch
off analog television broadcasts by July 2020. Argentina introduced DTT in Buenos
Aires in 2008, and complete switch-off is anticipated by September 2019.
In some countries the transition to digital television has been or is being implemented
in phases, region by region, as for example in Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and India. In others, the whole country switched
off the analog transmitters simultaneously—for example in Finland, the Netherlands,
Slovenia, and the United States. Th e latter approach is usually considered fairer to the
viewers and other stakeholders, since all of them are treated equally, but it is far riskier
than the former, which gives the institutions involved a chance to adapt along the
way if anything goes wrong. Th ere is ample evidence that in such a complex process
many things can go wrong, even in developed countries such as the United States or
Italy where analog switch-off was postponed for various reasons, above all because of
forecasts that substantial portions of the population would remain without a television
signal (i.e. 6.5 million in the United States) if switch-off had been carried out according
to the initial plans.
A number of characteristics and factors infl uence the course of the transition: the size
and the structure of the television market in a certain country; the extent of popular
dependence on terrestrial television; the specifi cs of the relevant legislation; technical
development; geomorphology (mountainous terrain is diffi cult to cover completely;
diverse terrain requires more transmitters); climatic conditions (long winters aff ect the
possibility of installing transmitters); demography (the relationship between the urban
and rural population, the share of the elderly population or people living in single and
low-income households, general literacy, technical and media literacy), to list but a few.
A prompt and comprehensive information campaign and the inclusion of all
stakeholders and segments of society in the decision-making process have been more
the exception than the rule. In Argentina, the decision on the digital broadcasting
1 6 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
standard “was not the result of democratic debate but of strong business lobbies, and
the defense of corporate interests.” A similar case was reported in Slovakia, where—
as Justin Schlosberg explains elsewhere in this volume—the dominant terrestrial
broadcasters “have been seen as highly infl uential in determining the compression
standard for DTT. Th is eff ectively closed off the space for new entrants into the DTT
market.”
Th e award of digital frequencies in Argentina was strongly criticized by media groups
for being granted directly and without public competition, and because many licenses
are granted to cable operators that had no analog license but are now obtaining a
digital one without either due procedure or competition having taken place.
Some steps toward the digitization of terrestrial platforms were made also in Colombia,
where switch-off is predicted for 2018, and although civil society is often left out of
the decision-making process (e.g. in relation to technical standards or content issues),
a public information campaign is now underway.
In a number of countries, the launch of DTT or the digital switch-over in general
is or was seen by many as an opportunity to build up new competition and break
up incumbent monopolies, duopolies, or other dominant positions. However, there
are concerns in a number of countries (including Italy) that the ongoing process of
digitization will make it virtually impossible for new operators to enter the broadcast
market and therefore perpetuate the old market positions.
Despite the numerous opportunities off ered by digitization, the problems of the analog
environment are therefore very often replicated in the digital one. Many countries have
failed to take the opportunity to tackle dominant positions and refresh the market
more transparently and equitably. As a consequence, the previous power relations have
been preserved.
1.1 Selling Off the Radio Spectrum: Weaken the Weak, Strengthen
the Strong
For Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Mongolia, and the territory of the former Soviet
Union, the international planning of channels for digital terrestrial broadcasting took
place at the Regional Radio-communication Conference (RRC-06) under the auspices
of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Geneva in 2006. RRC-06
resulted in the new agreement and frequency plan GE06, which replaced the outdated
frequency plan ST61, designed in Stockholm in 1961. It was agreed that the entire
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 6 4
radio spectrum used for analog television should be dedicated to digital television,
and 119 countries agreed to switch off analog terrestrial television by 17 June 2015
at the latest. However, the EU set the much earlier year of 2012 as a target date for
analog switch-off and this objective was met by most member states (Bulgaria, Greece,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania are now striving to meet the ITU date).
On the basis of the principle of equitable access, each European country was entitled
to seven national Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) layers for television in the UHF
band and one in the VHF band. However, it soon became evident that the upper part
of the UHF band (channels 61–69, occupying the interval 790–862 MHz) would
need to be freed up for services other than broadcasting. Since the Global Systems for
Mobile Communications (GSMs) operate in the 900 MHz band, where there is not
enough capacity for effi cient broadband coverage of large areas, the telecommunications
industry wanted to expand into the 800 MHz band, which extends over similarly low
frequencies as the 900 MHz band. After years of international discussions, the World
Radio-communication Conference (WRC-07) in 2007 resulted in the approval of the
introduction of new types of services in the terrestrial bands traditionally reserved for
broadcasting services.
Th e decision to grant digital dividend to telecoms operators can be seen as a good way
of ensuring access to (mobile) broadband internet for diff erent demographic groups,
regardless of whether they live in urban or rural environments. On the other hand, it
led countries to renounce signifi cant capacities for television broadcasting, despite the
lack of clear evidence of the real potential of the digital dividend to reduce the digital
divide.
Nevertheless, current developments indicate that the next ITU World Radio-
communication Conference (most likely in 2015) will defi ne the second digital dividend
in the 700 MHz band (channels 49–60, 694–790 MHz), in which mobile services
will be allowed in addition to broadcasting, further shrinking the space for television
services. Combined with the introduction of market principles to the allocation of
radio frequency spectrum, already practiced for many years in the United States and
now in several European countries too, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and
Italy, these developments aff ect the television sector in general, particularly the small
broadcasters.
Since pioneering spectrum auctions as the dominant paradigm for frequency assignment,
the United States has seen diversity and competition suff er greatly, with plummeting
levels of independent carriers and minority and women-owned spectrum licenses and
1 6 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
rising consolidation of spectrum ownership. Th e auction approach, especially given the
prohibitive upfront costs of purchasing exclusive rights to spectrum, disproportionately
benefited powerful economic interests, privileged profit-making uses, and contributed
to delay the coverage of less populated areas.
Similar developments can be observed in Turkey, where the national regulator, the
Radio and Television High Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu, RTUK), awarded 33 national DTT licenses to a range of private broadcasters in the spring of 2013,
following an auction, and collected 419 million Turkish liras (approximately €178
million (US$ 247 million)) in fees. In the case of high-defi nition (HD) thematic
channels, the licenses went to the highest bidders, Al Jazeera Turk, NTV News, and A
Haber, which each paid €17 million (US$ 23.6 million). Th e licenses for HD general
entertainment channels achieved prices of over €20 million (US$ 27.8 million), so
it comes as no surprise that they went to established Turkish television companies
(DTV Haber, Samanyolu TV, AKS Televizyon, Isil Televizyon). For the 11 standard
defi nition (SD) general entertainment channels, the successful bidders had to pay a
lower sum (€11 million to €12 million (US$ 15.3–16.7 million)) each. Th e lowest fee
(€450,000 (US$ 624,767)) was paid for thematic SD channels that were granted the
remaining 11 licenses.4
Th e recent expansion of spectrum selling in the EU, where in the time of the economic
crisis more and more governments (e.g. the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Ireland,
Slovenia, Romania)5 are trying to replenish the state coff ers by auctioning the most
valuable radio spectrum, has provoked concern in the European Commission (EC),
which is about to present draft legislation to give the EC powers to review and even
reject the auction plans of national governments.6
Hence, the current trends in spectrum management and allocation do not favor more
equitable access to spectrum, which—despite the seeming abundance, due to more
effi cient utilization—remains a scarce, valuable, and therefore expensive resource.
4. C. Papavassilopoulos, “Turkish regulator awards 33 DTT licenses,” at http://www.screendigest.com/news/2013_
04_the_dtt_channel_licensing_process_in_turkey_has_summed_178_million_euros_in_fees/view.html, 2013.
5. Caroline Gabriel, “European LSE auctions line up,” Rethink Wireless, 19 March 2013, at http://www.rethink-
wireless.com/2013/03/19/european-lte-auctions-page1.
6. Francis Robinson, “EU seeks more power over radio spectrum sales,” Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2013, at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324263404578611961144819552.html.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 6 6
2. Growing Space for More Media
Th e better management and use of spectrum is often seen as an opportunity for the
additional expansion of television services on the terrestrial platform, which has with
regard to the number of services on off er for decades been lagging behind the multi-
channel cable platform. With more effi cient transmission and coding standards, such
as DVB-T2 and MPEG-4 that are being introduced especially in those countries which
have started DSO only recently (e.g. Serbia, Russia), the chances for more services and
for better picture quality are even higher.
Th ose countries with a longer DTT history (e.g. the United Kingdom, France,
Croatia, Italy) are applying the new standards together with new services, such as high-
defi nition television (HDTV) or pay-TV, but although they are envisaging a gradual
transition to DVB-T2 in the future, they are currently keeping the older standards
DVB-T and MPEG 2 in operation, since the migration to the new standards will
require a similar eff ort and cost on the part of the viewers as the transition from analog
to digital television.
According to the March 2013 report by MAVISE, HD channels—which are
increasingly popular, 40 percent of new channels in the EU on all platforms are
broadcast in HD—are available on DTT networks in 22 European countries.7 Due
to spectrum limitation, the number of HD channels on DTT is still smaller than on
other digital platforms, but the trend toward superior picture quality is obvious. Th e
same is true for pay-TV services, since they are already available in 17 EU and 21
European countries.8 However, the capacities of the terrestrial platform in this regard
are still not comparable with those of the other platforms; the results are steady growth,
but at the same time a decrease in market share compared with cable and IPTV.
Despite the trends toward improved picture quality—with ultra-HD even four times
sharper than HD—the question remains as to the extent to which the added pixels
actually aff ect the decisions, purchases, and habits of viewers, at least as long as there
is little to watch that justifi es the purchase of rather expensive equipment. Warnings
7. Press release on the report “22 of the 27 EU Member States have implemented the 2012 analogue TV switch-off
in line with European Union recommendations,” at http://www.obs.coe.int/about/oea/pr/mavise_2013mars_
dtt_so.html, 2013.
8. Press release on the report “22 of the 27 EU Member States have implemented the 2012 analogue TV switch-off
in line with European Union recommendations,” at http://www.obs.coe.int/about/oea/pr/mavise_2013mars_
dtt_so.html, 2013.
1 6 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
that it is the quality of the content and not the quantity of content or the quality of the
picture that really matters were expressed at the start of digitization of broadcasting.
“Everybody assumed that increased image quality was the relevant course to pursue.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Th ere is no proof to support the premise that
consumers prefer better picture quality rather than better content.”9
Contemporary media users, especially those who consume media services on connected
devices, care less and less through which content distribution platform or device
they receive media content and data. Th ey also do not want to be limited by time or
place, as they were in the times of analog media. With the new platforms for content
delivery, terrestrial broadcasting has lost its former primacy, especially in countries
with developed and proliferated media markets and an advanced off er of electronic
communication services. Nevertheless, terrestrial broadcasting remains one of the most
important television delivery platforms. In addition, in times of crisis its importance
rises further in developed countries, as it is often the only platform off ering free-to-air
television services and also the only one with universal or near-universal coverage of
the national territory.
One of the least disputed outcomes of DSO in relation to the content off er on the
terrestrial platform has been the increased territorial coverage by established television
channels and the emergence of additional, mostly specialized television services, often
launched by established broadcasters, but also telecoms operators and other content
providers. Technological development enabled the multiplication of television channels
in most countries, but it also led to the fragmentation of markets and thence to smaller
revenues, particularly for smaller channels and companies, which in turn prevented the
improvement of content quality. Th e economic crisis also served to reduce television
advertising revenues and endangered the chances of new entrants to survive in the
market. Several new television channels and other media services have been launched
not because of their market potential, but in an attempt by established market players
to block competition, or simply to reuse existing content and maximize revenue while
minimizing investment.
Th e question has arisen in larger media landscapes as well as in smaller ones10: is the
main challenge now facing broadcasting and the media really the quality of the picture
9. Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital, London, Coronet Books, 1995, p. 38.
10. Marko Milosavljević and Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin, “Who will control the controllers?,” in Tim Lees, Sue Ralph, and
Jo Langham Brown (eds.), Is Regulation still an Option in a Digital Universe? (Current Debates in Broadcasting,
No. 9), University of Luton Press, Luton, 2000, pp. 253–257.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 6 8
or the number of channels, or is it the quality of the programs? In other words, is it
a question of how or what we are watching?11 To spell out the obvious, increasing the
number of channels does not also mean increasing the quality or diversity of content.12
If these questions around content production and quality are not taken suffi ciently
into account, digital switch-over may result in no signifi cant improvement in the
diversity and quality of services, despite the abundance of space on the multiplexes and
the technological advantages of digital broadcasting, and also despite the promises of
the promoters of DSO.
Th is is also true in the case of the potential and development of local and community
media due to DSO. On the one hand, the development of these outlets is connected to
the general development (particularly the economic development) of a country and its
society. For example, the Country Ranking of Community Media in Europe for 2012,
prepared by the Community Media Forum Europe (CMFE), an international non-
profi t organization, shows that the so-called “third sector” of media, complementing
public service and commercial media, is most advanced in Western Europe, as the fi rst
15 countries on the list of 39 are without exception Western European countries with
developed media markets.13
Among the MDM countries, the top places were taken by the Netherlands (ranked
third on the list, just behind Norway and Denmark), Sweden, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Finland. Both radio and television community media are present in
these countries. In other countries that are reported to have community media, radio
community outlets were far more numerous than television community outlets; in
most of these countries there were only radio community media and no television
broadcasters. Such was the case for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, and Macedonia, to list only the MDM countries.
In other countries, neither radio nor television community media were present—for
instance in Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, and Montenegro. One of the ranking
11. For more on this issue, see Marko Milosavljević, “Th e consequences of the digital broadcasting for content pro-
duction,” Medijska istraživanja, 15(1) (2009), pp. 43–59, at http://hrcak.srce.hr/fi le/58623.
12. Th e “Economic survey on the implementation of new services” was commissioned by APEK and prepared by
Marko Milosavljević from the Faculty of Social Studies, University of Ljubljana: for the purpose of this section
(2) we have reproduced some fi ndings from this study. Th e complete study can be found at http://www.see-digi.
tv/shared_fi les/wp5/wp5a3_apekfi nal.pdf.
13. Th e CMFE rated the countries according to a number of criteria, including the number of community media in
relation to population size and fi nancial situation, regulation properties, public funding, technical infrastructure,
and general development trends.
1 6 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
criteria was also the extent to which community media interests were taken into
account during switch-over.14
On the other hand, insofar as current trends in spectrum management and allocation
do not generally favor more equitable access to spectrum, they encourage the
dominance of incumbent actors and diminish the opportunities and chances for local
and community media, especially since the predominance and/or introduction of
market principles in the allocation process. As these principles are particularly present
or indeed dominant in a number of economically well developed countries, they have
increasingly driven the DSO process in less developed countries, thereby reducing the
scope and opportunities for local and community outlets.
Table 10.
Digital migration: incumbents and new players in television
Country Audience share:
most negative
performance
since 2005
Audience share:
most positive
performance
since 2005
Leading outlet
by audience in
2011
Is the leading
channel by
audience a newly
licensed digital
channel?
Armenia Public TV Commercial TV Public TV No
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Public TV Commercial TV1 Commercial TV No
Brazil Commercial TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
Bulgaria Similar decline
for most TV
stations
n/a Commercial TV No
China Central state TV Satellite channels Central state TV No
Colombia n/a n/a Commercial TV No
Croatia Public TV Commercial TV
(new players)
Commercial TV No
Czech Republic Commercial TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
Egypt State TV Satellite channel Satellite channel No
Estonia Commercial TV Public TV Commercial TV No
Finland Similar decline
for most TV
stations
Public TV Public TV No
France Similar decline
for most TV
stations
Commercial TV
(new players)
Commercial TV No
Georgia Commercial TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
14. “First Country Ranking of Community Media in Europe,” at http://www.epra.org/news_items/fi rst-country-
ranking-of-community-media-in-europe.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 7 0
Country Audience share:
most negative
performance
since 2005
Audience share:
most positive
performance
since 2005
Leading outlet
by audience in
2011
Is the leading
channel by
audience a newly
licensed digital
channel?
Germany No major change2 No major change2 Commercial TV3 No
Hungary Similar decline
for most TV
stations
Commercial
channels
Commercial TV No
India State TV (DD
News – bilingual)
Commercial TV
(NDTV 24/7 –
English market)
CNN-IBN and
Times Now
(English market)
Aaj Tak (Hindi
market)
Commercial TV
(Hindi market)4 No
Markets for languages other than Hindi and English,
some of them bigger than the English market: n/a
No
Italy No major change No major
change: public/
private duopoly
defended its
position
Public station No
Kazakhstan n/a n/a State-owned
channel
No
Latvia Similar decline
for most TV
stations
Commercial TV5 Commercial TV No
Lebanon Commercial TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
Lithuania Commercial TV Commercial TV5 Commercial TV No
Macedonia Commercial TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
Malaysia Commercial TV n/a Commercial TV No
Mexico n/a n/a n/a No
Moldova n/a n/a Commercial TV No
Montenegro No major change No major change Commercial TV No
Morocco State TV n/a State TV No
Netherlands No major change No major change Public TV No
Nicaragua Commercial TV Government TV Commercial TV No
Nigeria n/a n/a n/a No
Pakistan State TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
Peru n/a n/a n/a No
Poland Public TV Commercial TV6 Public
broadcaster
No
Romania Public TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
Russia n/a No major change n/a No
Serbia Commercial TV No major change Public TV No
Singapore n/a
1 7 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Country Audience share:
most negative
performance
since 2005
Audience share:
most positive
performance
since 2005
Leading outlet
by audience in
2011
Is the leading
channel by
audience a newly
licensed digital
channel?
Slovakia Public TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
Slovenia Commercial TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
South Africa No major change Public TV Public TV No
Spain Similar decline
for most TV
stations
Commercial TV Public TV No
Sweden Public TV No major change Public TV No
Thailand Public TV Commercial TV Commercial TV No
Tunisia n/a n/a n/a No
Turkey n/a n/a n/a
United Kingdom No major change No major change Public TV No
United States n/a n/a n/a No
Notes: n/a – not assessed; (1) from Croatia and Serbia; (2) slight increase in the audience of special-
ized channels; (3) closely followed by public TV; (4) based on comparison between private
Hindi and English channels and PSB; (5) Russian; (6) all-news station
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
3. Access to Digital Content
Th e concept of gatekeeping is of course not limited to content distribution. Gatekeeping
is the process by which selections are made in media work, especially decisions as to
whether or not to admit a story into the news channels by means of a news medium.15
As such, it is present in all the phases of media production and distribution.16 In our
context, we are particularly interested in the access-related problems related to the DSO
that have been caused by digital gatekeepers and the reasons for access restrictions, as
well as who benefi ted from them.
In the context of DSO, the problem of gatekeeping is most often related to economic
or political causes. It concerns either the aim of incumbent actors to gain a competitive
advantage and prevent or hinder the (potential) competition; or the political aim of
privileging a certain standard, often connected with wider national interests (helping
15. See, for example, Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Th eory: An Introduction, Sage Publications, London, 1994.
16. For a detailed analysis of gatekeeping in digital media, see the report by Peter Olaf Looms, “Mapping Digital
Media: Gatekeeping in Digital Media” in the MDM Reference Series, at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/
sites/default/fi les/mapping-digital-media-gatekeeping-20110815.pdf, 2011.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 7 2
the production of hardware equipment or establishing the national standard as an
international standard, thereby increasing infl uence and power).
Much of the impetus for the Chinese and Brazilian DSOs, for example, comes from an
interest in setting a technological standard internally and among their neighbors, which
can provide a market for Chinese and Brazilian products.17 In 2011, Digital Terrestrial
Multimedia Broadcast (DTMB), the offi cial name for Chinese DMB-T/H, became the
fourth international digital television standard, following those of the United States,
Europe, and Japan, paving the way for its adoption in other countries. Th e MDM
China report says that this phenomenon is best understood in terms of a “neo-techno-
nationalism.” Regardless of whether DTMB is widely taken up, its existence shows
China’s interest in seeking to control the technical standard (and thus also the potential
content and programs on off er) and to exert economic and geopolitical infl uence by
promoting its standard abroad.
New entrants to broadcasting exploit other activities to become important actors in
this sector. A number of MDM reports warn about the increasing role of the telecoms
companies and their potential power in the very near future due to their gatekeeping
role, which is at the same time not effi ciently regulated in many countries, as the
regulations are either not adequately developed—ignoring the issue of gatekeeping—
or are lagging behind the new developments. Th e report on Macedonia states that
telecoms operators will remain extremely important because of their position as the
“ultimate gatekeepers.” Especially if this area remains inadequately regulated, they could
become a “key factor in determining the success or failure of certain TV service[s].”
In Italy, too, the role of the telecoms operators remains unclear. Th e main question
is this: “Will they limit themselves largely to their traditional practice of providing
networks or will they move further into the slippery fi eld of content distribution?”
A similar example of the strength and infl uence of telecoms is also reported in India,
where, as demands on spectrum have increased, some users including telecoms
operators “have been given priority in spectrum assignment since the government saw
them as potentially bringing in higher revenues to the exchequer.”
17. L.A. Albornoz and M.T. García Leiva, “Th e political economy of DTT: An international overview,” Inter-
national Journal of Digital Television, 3(3) (2012), pp. 301–319; Marko Milosavljević and Sally Broughton Micova,
“Because we have to: Digitalization of terrestrial television in South East Europe,” International Journal of Digital
Television, 4(3) (2013), pp. 261–277; M.T. García Leiva and M. Starks, “Digital switchover across the globe: Th e
emergence of complex regional patterns,” Media, Culture and Society, 31(5) (2009), pp. 787–806.
1 7 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Considering the MDM fi ndings as a whole, the issue of gatekeeping seems to be
inadequately addressed by the national regulators, while new questions and problems
develop with new technologies and new developments in many other aspects of
digitization (not just DSO and DTT), often gaining more attention or being prioritized
by regulators or even non-governmental organizations and civil society (for example,
the gatekeeping issues related to aspects of technology such as mobile platforms and
apps or social media).
At the same time, in addition to gatekeeping issues and setting standards, the renewal
of receiving equipment is another essential aspect of a successful DSO. Th e availability
of digital receiving equipment does not depend solely on purchasing power, but also
on timely decisions regarding technical specifi cations for receivers and on eff ectively
informing suppliers, vendors, and installers about these specifi cations, as well as on
how the equipment is distributed.
Lessons from countries that have successfully completed their DSO also point to the
helpfulness of the labeling systems for suitable receivers and the help schemes for
the most vulnerable groups in society, but often also for broadcasters and network
operators (provided that state aid rules are not infringed). In Slovenia, the help scheme
for broadcasters during the simulcasting phase, as well as the provision of free digital
decoders for the most vulnerable demographic groups, contributed to a successful
switch-over. Not all the network operators and television channels have been able to
survive in the digital market, however.
1 7 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Distributing the Digital Dividend Christian S. Nissen
Introduction
New compression technologies make it possible to multiply the capacity of a given
analog bandwidth of frequencies by means of the digital switch-over (DSO) of terrestrial
transmission networks. Th is extra capacity is often called the digital dividend. It can be
used to make room for more television channels, or for other electronic non-television
communication.
According to the plans of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
confi rmed by the fi ndings of the Mapping Digital Media (MDM) project, the present
frequency planning of most countries seems to make room for a dramatic rise in the
number of television channels. Previous concerns about terrestrial television being
squeezed have so far, apparently, proven groundless.
As to whether DSO creates a more diversifi ed television off er for viewers, the MDM
reports present a rather clear pattern. In countries where terrestrial distribution accounts
for a large market share of television reception, DSO has brought about a considerable
expansion of the channels off ered for terrestrial-only households. Many of these new
channels will, however, only support the overall content diversity marginally, as most
of them are—or will be—channels already provided by cable and satellite. Only few
countries, mostly those with strong public service media, have made the public interest
of channel diversity an element of their channel licensing policy.
Th is rather pessimistic perspective also applies to how the new digital television
spectrum is divided among potential operators. With a few exceptions in north-western
Europe, most countries have conducted the processes of frequency licensing in a non-
C H A P T E R S E V E N
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 7 6
transparent and much politicized way. Th e new television channels are often given to
well-established incumbent actors with close ties to specifi c political and economic
interests—and the prospects for the countries still preparing a tender are no better.
Finally, it should be stressed that although some general patterns can be observed,
signifi cant variations and specifi c circumstances separate the individual countries in
the MDM program.
1. Public Interest in the Distribution of Freed Spectrum
Th e shift from analog to digital technology in the terrestrial transmission of radio and
television signals is more than a technological development. Because radio spectrum
capacity is a limited resource that can be put to a variety of uses (e.g. radio, television,
and diff erent forms of telecommunication), the shift entails a number of economic,
commercial, and cultural-political elements of great societal importance.
1.1 The Rising Demand for Radio Frequency Bandwidth
Two broadly opposite trends explain this importance. On the one hand, we see a rising
demand for transmission capacity caused by the fast growing volume of national and
international communication spurred by new technologies and services—a volume
of which the growing number of television channels is not the largest fraction. On
the other hand, digital technology permits the compression of signals, which in turn
enables the expansion of communicative capacity per bandwidth unit.1
Besides digital compression, the total transmission capacity has also for a longer period
gradually been enlarged, fi rst by analog cable and satellite technology and later by
telecommunication networks (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line, ADSL) and fi ber
optic networks, which have not been constrained by the bandwidth limitations of the
radio frequencies of analog terrestrial broadcast. At the end of last century, terrestrial
broadcast television gradually lost its dominating market position in most countries,
exactly because it was unable to accommodate the fast growing number of television
channels.
1. Th e balance—and compromise—between quality of signal and quantity of services is described by David Wood
in “Technical Standards in Terrestrial Television,” Open Society Foundations, Mapping Digital Media, Reference
Series No. 9, 2011.
1 7 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Consequently, in order to catch up with technology and market developments, the
actors most dependent on terrestrial transmission—meaning old national television
companies (public service and commercial), states in control of the frequencies, and
national telecommunications companies operating the spectrum—began to see their
interest in expanding the capacity of terrestrial networks by switching to digital and
harvesting the fruits of the new compression technology.
Parallel to this, the demand for bandwidth in the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band
between 300 MHz and 3 GHz (3,000 MHz), where the 470–862 MHZ band has
been serving analog television, has increased due to the explosive growth of mobile
communication (GSM, 3G, 4G-LTE, and WiFi). It should also be mentioned that
terrestrial broadcast transmitted from one transmitter to many receivers (one-to-many)
entails the special competitive advantage vis-à-vis one-to-one telecommunication
(for instance telephony) of a zero marginal cost when the number of users expands.
Broadcast can therefore off er a very cost-eff ective method to transmit large amounts of
data to many receivers also in businesses outside television.
All in all, these combined technological and market-driven developments form the
rationale behind the work carried out by the ITU and the decisions by governments to
switch over the use of terrestrial frequencies from analog to digital. In countries where
DSO has occurred or is planned, there has been a broad consensus on the merits of
switch-over itself among the parties involved. Th e question of the purposes to which
the freed spectrum (the “digital dividend”) should be put is, however, another matter.
To get a sense of the size of the dividend, consider that the space used to broadcast
a single analog transmission channel of 6 MHz to 8 MHz bandwidth can carry a
multiplex of up to 20 digital channels of equivalent quality. In addition, most digital
television standards allow the implementation of single frequency networks (SFN),
thereby permitting the reuse of the same spectrum over much larger areas and further
increasing spectrum effi ciency compared to the analog networks.2
Because radio frequencies spill over between countries, frequency planning cannot take
place solely within national borders. Th erefore it is coordinated along with the use of
the digital dividend by the ITU in three regional areas: Region 1 (EMEA—Europe,
Middle East, Africa), Region 2 (Americas), and Region 3 (APAC—Asia, Pacifi c).
2. ITU, “Digital Dividend: Insights for Spectrum Decisions,” 2012, p. 1.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 7 8
Th e overall picture of the DSO status worldwide is rather clear. Th e European part of
Region 1 has (or is very close to having) completed the launch of digital transmission
and the switch-off of the analog signals (Table 11). Also Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States have fi nalized the transition. It should be mentioned though, that a number
of south-eastern and Eastern European countries (Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia) are at diff erent
stages of DSO preparation with target dates set in the period 2015–2020.
Countries in the rest of the world are—with considerable variations—lagging behind.
Some are preparing the necessary legislation and/or planning both technical solutions
and the licensing of the new frequencies. Th at is for instance the case with the 10
member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), planning
to switch fully to digital broadcasting between 2015 and 2020. In a considerable
number of countries in South America and Africa, DSO has not yet become an issue
for planning and regulation. Some of these countries with relatively low coverage
of terrestrial television broadcast outside large cities might in the coming years give
mobile broadband a higher priority than terrestrial broadcast to reach full, nationwide
coverage of digital transmission.
Table 11.
Digital switch-over dates in Europe (2012)
Country Digital switch-over (DSO)
launch date
Analog switch-off (ASO)
completion
UK* 1998 2012
Sweden* 1999 Completed
Spain* 2000/2005 Completed
Finland* 2001 Completed
Switzerland 2001 Completed
Germany* 2002 Completed
Belgium (Flemish) 2002 Completed
Netherlands* 2003 Completed
Italy* 2004 2012
France* 2005 Completed
Czech Republic* 2005 Completed
Denmark 2006 Completed
Estonia* 2006 Completed
Austria 2006 Completed
Slovenia* 2006 Completed
Norway 2007 Completed
1 7 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Country Digital switch-over (DSO)
launch date
Analog switch-off (ASO)
completion
Lithuania* 2008 2012
Hungary* 2008 Completed
Ukraine 2008 2014
Latvia* 2009 Completed
Portugal 2009 2012
Croatia* 2008 Completed
Poland* 2009 2013
Slovakia 2009 2012
Ireland 2010 2012
Russia* 2009 2015
Note: * Covered by the MDM country reports
Source: ITU, “Digital Dividend: Insights for Spectrum Decisions,” pp. 29–30
1.2 Digital Dividend
In its simple version, the issue of the use of the digital dividend concerns the uses
to which the spectrum freed by compressing the signals previously used for analog
television should be put. Should it be for television only (e.g. more channels, HDTV,
and a range of add-on services) or should it be used for other communication purposes
as well?3
Th is question is sometimes characterized by an underlying value assumption (at least
among television people) that the freed spectrum “belongs” to television and that other
uses should be seen with some skepticism as market-driven and commercially rather
than societally motivated. Going beyond this assumption, the question appears to be
more complex, begging a variety of additional interpretations and questions.4
• Broadcast television is no longer alone in the area of societal communication
playing a central role in political life, culture, and entertainment. Mobile broadband
increasingly serves some of the same purposes, both by connecting people one-to-
one (voice, short message services (SMS), and e-mail) and by providing wireless
infrastructure for the internet carrying television programs and social networks.
3. Analysys Mason Ltd, DotEcon Ltd, Hogan & Hartson LLP, “Report for the European Commission, ‘Exploiting
the Digital Dividend’—A European Approach. Final Report,” London, 19 August 2009, pp. 61–99, at http://
ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/fi les/dd_fi nalreport.pdf.
4. G. Pogorel, “Th e Digital Dividend,” Open Society Foundations, Mapping Digital Media, Reference Series No.
10, 2011 (hereafter, Pogorel, “Th e Digital Dividend”).
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 8 0
• Th e societal benefi t accruing from the digital dividend also depends on whether it
is used to deliver “more of the same” (additional channels not very diff erent from
those already in existence) or for a more diversifi ed channel off er, and for enabling
digital technology to deliver new add-on services, such as HDTV, mobile reception
of terrestrial television channels (DTB-H), and services for disabled users.5
• Finally, it is relevant to ask if the digital dividend has been used to secure a more
diversifi ed television output in terms of providing space for new actors, i.e.
television companies and channel distributors (gatekeepers) in the market, or only
to give incumbents the opportunity to expand their channel off er.
Considering the relatively few countries that have completed DSO, and the fact that
decisions on how to use the digital dividend are not necessarily synchronized with
DSO itself, it is still too early to draw a full picture of how much of the freed spectrum
will be used for television and telecommunication purposes respectively.
Following a recommendation of the World Radio Conference (WRC) from 2007, a
general pattern seems to have emerged. Many if not most countries within ITU Region
1 and 3 are converging toward the 790–862 MHz allocation of the digital dividend
spectrum to wireless broadband (4G) and Region 2 aligns itself in the 700 MHz band.
If it is executed in the coming years, this will result in roughly 20 percent to 25 percent
of the original broadcast spectrum being transferred to wireless broadband.6
Th is may look like a signifi cant chunk. According to the MDM country reports, however,
no cases have apparently been reported where this allocation of spectrum to wireless
broadband—or other non-television usages for that matter—has seriously limited the
development of digital television, or has been criticized for serving (illegitimate) non-
societal purposes. Th is can probably be explained by three considerations:
• 75 percent to 80 percent of the original broadcast spectrum is considered to be
suffi cient for the needs of future television in view of the potential for further
compression of the signals. In the countries where DSO has been completed, it has
opened up bandwidth for a substantial number of additional television channels.
• Th e prospects of confl ict over the use of the digital dividend in the early days
of DSO planning may have been infl uenced by a conception of non-television
5. P. Looms, “Making Television Accessible. Report,” International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and G3ict,
Telecommunication Development Sector, Geneva, Switzerland, December 2011, at https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/
sis/PwDs/Documents/ITU-G3ict%20Making_TV_Accessible_Report_November_2011.pdf.
6. Pogorel, “Th e Digital Dividend,” p. 12.
1 8 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
purposes as business-oriented telecommunication estranged from civil society. Th e
subsequent development of broadband wireless services (mobile telephony and
internet), used daily by practically all citizens, has changed this understanding.
• It is too early to judge because it is all still at a planning stage and no specifi c steps
have so far been taken to expand (beyond wireless broadband) the usage of the
freed spectrum to non-television purposes.
Th is is not to say that DSO and the way it has been planned and carried out is without
confl icts, as will be seen below.
2. Diversity and Competition
In many countries television transmission has traditionally been controlled by a single
terrestrial operator (a national, private telecom, or the state) in combination with a few
satellite and cable operators, often owned by giant international corporations. Th ese
companies have de facto control over which channels are delivered to viewers. Th e more
eff ective use of terrestrial transmission capacity after DSO was seen from the beginning
by many as a way to change this and increase diversity in the television sector.
DSO could potentially create space for new television companies and more channels
and also bring about a more competitive environment for distribution platforms. And
indeed, DSO has, in most of the countries where it has been completed, improved
competition among terrestrial broadcasters by providing space for more television
channels and digital add-on services, both of which were previously only possible for
the two competing distribution systems: cable and satellite.
On closer inspection, however, this very visible result of DSO becomes less clear.
Diff erences among national television markets and disparities in government
interventions have led to wide variations across the MDM countries in how DSO has
aff ected the diversity of television provision and the gatekeeper oligopoly.
Some general patterns can, however, be seen.
2.1 More Diversity in the Television Channel Off er?
Obviously, viewers who were previously only able to receive the relatively few analog
terrestrial channels (usually around 10, depending on the topography of the country)
have benefi ted from the DSO as this creates space for many times as many channels.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 8 2
Th is has led to a huge expansion of multi-channel reception by citizens in countries
s uch as Italy, the UK, Japan, Spain, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, and Finland
where digital terrestrial reception (DTT) is the leading platform with 40 percent to 80
percent of households as users. (See Figure 5.)
Figure 5.
Digital television platforms (% of total households), 2009–2010
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Terrestrial Satellite Cable Other
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Source: MDM reports. Data for 2010 for Netherlands, Latvia, USA (cable), Macedonia (terrestrial
and satellite), Croatia, Georgia, and Bulgaria
It is quite another question, however, whether this expansion of the channel off er
represents genuinely new channels or the transmission of already existing channels
previously only provided via cable and/or satellite.
Here, two very infl uential factors are important: government regulation and market
forces. First of all, governments control the DTT frequencies. As described below,
digital frequencies are allocated by governments or by more or less independent public
bodies to television companies and/or platform providers (the gatekeepers).
In some countries where digital frequencies have been allocated (especially in Western
Europe with strong public service media), the public service media received an extra
bundle of channels, one to two digital multiplexes each containing six or more channels
in Standard Defi nition Television format (SDTV). Often this extra capacity is provided
on condition that it is used to off er new television channels, typically niche channels
1 8 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
with news, children, cultural content and so forth seldom provided by commercial
competitors.
Secondly, market forces have been decisive because the remaining multiplexes in
the freed spectrum reserved for television have been licensed to private, commercial
television through diff erent tender procedures. Because it is very costly to operate a
(new) television channel with dedicated in-house produced programming, commercial
companies usually chose a more profi table and less risky way of using the extra
frequencies. In many European countries that have implemented DSO, most of the
extra capacity is used to transmit existing cable and satellite channels. Genuinely new
channels, where they exist, are often characterized by relatively cheap output of a well-
tested popular standard type bought from international program producers.
It may be too early to make similar judgments concerning most of the countries outside
Europe still preparing for the digital switch-over. However, it also seems reasonable
to expect a qualitatively more diverse television off er in countries already enjoying a
relative high degree of programming with a societal purpose, whereas the prospects
for most other countries is likely to be a proliferation of the already existing types of
channels and programs.
2.2 More Competition?
Th e general tendency in most MDM countries is to allocate the digital dividend for
new channels to the incumbent television stations and gatekeepers. Th is outcome is
determined by a combination of business and politics.
In both developed and less developed television markets, building a new television
station or establishing a new delivery platform business requires heavy investment and
great risk due to high entry costs and very uncertain turnover, especially during the last
decade’s fi nancial crisis and the collapse of conventional media business models.
As most commercial free-to-air channels as well as new channels (especially in smaller
countries with rather weak advertising markets) have become pay-TV channels based
on subscription, providers have to administer complex and very expensive Subscriber
Management Systems (SMS) keeping track of the customers’ usage and payments.
Economies of scale explain why existing national and international television companies
and platform operators have been in the forefront when tenders for new channels have
been announced and licenses are awarded.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 8 4
Further to this, the MDM fi ndings reveal a clear and widespread tendency of
government favoritism toward well-established incumbent actors in most countries.
Sad to say, outside north-western Europe this often takes place in its most corrupt
form, favoring companies with “special relations” to governments or serving personal,
economic interests of individual politicians and political parties.
Th is is, however, not a malpractice specifi cally related to the distribution of new digital
channels. Rather, it perpetuates the way that analog channels previously were licensed
by governments, using their power to secure obedient and loyal coverage by dependent
television channels. Against this background, there are good reasons why the licensing
procedure is such a controversial and contested issue in most countries with less
democratic, or authoritarian, political systems.
Th e concentration of responsibility for operating DTT platforms within a single
company or a few companies can certainly be a serious limitation to diversity and
competition. On the other hand, there are relevant, technical reasons why this has
often been the result of deciding who should operate the digital platform, especially
in smaller countries with a few multiplexes. Th is is because the bandwidth needed
for each digital channel in the multiplex depends on the complexity of the picture.
(Th e transmission of a football match, for example, needs a relatively large bandwidth
because of fast moving elements and many details in the picture, whereas a quiet
conversation between two persons requires less spectrum space.)
By using dynamic (“statistical”) multiplexing, the operator can squeeze in more
channels or obtain a better signal quality by compensating one channel’s high demand
for bandwidth at a given moment by compressing the signal for other channels which
carry simpler signals at that same moment, i.e. pictures with less detail and movement.
Concentrating the management of channels to one operator or a few operators is a way
to obtain higher bandwidth effi ciency.
3. Public Regulation of the DSO
Th e digitization of the media industry has challenged the traditional public (national
and international) regulation of media, because diff erent businesses—which used
to be regulated separately within each regulatory regime—now overlap and merge.
Th at is the case with the internet carrying a combination of services which used to be
either television or telecommunication. Th e same holds for sectors such as newspapers,
music, fi lm, and publishing.
1 8 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
For television, the regulatory question has primarily been whether it is possible to
maintain a specifi c television regulation separate from the transmission via the
internet of services of very much the same kind. Or if an all-encompassing regulation
of electronic transmitted text, video and audio, regardless of technology, is a better
solution. In the light of fundamental principles of freedom of expression, how shall
the balance be found between, for instance, the hitherto unregulated content of one-
to-one telecommunication (telephony) from which the internet has developed and
broadcast television with legal liability toward rules on the coverage of a certain area
of (sensitive) issues?7
Very generally speaking, some of the MDM reports show a slow but gradual adoption
of regulatory frameworks to meet the new situation with merging media and delivery
systems. An example on the international level is the European Union’s 1989 directive
on Television without Frontiers, which was revised in 2007 with a new title, the
Audiovisual Media Services Directive,8 to accommodate some of the regulatory needs
caused by linear and non-linear media convergence.
3.1 Regulation of Bandwidth Allocation for Digital Television Channels
Focusing on DSO, the chief regulatory issue—apart from planning and implementing
the technical switch-over itself, and taking decisions on the allocation of the digital
dividend—has been to what extent the allocation of bandwidth reserved for digital
television ensures transmission effi ciency, fairness for the parties involved, and
transparency in the process.
Th e allocation of digital television channels in the wake of DSO does not diff er in
essentials from the licensing of analog channels. Each situation involves a publicly
owned, limited resource (bandwidth in the terrestrial transmission network), a number
of interested potential operators (public and private television, and telecommunication
companies), and a public authority (government/parliament or independent institution)
setting the conditions, laying out the tender procedures and rules, and eventually
choosing which applicants will receive the bandwidth (channels/multiplexes).
Nevertheless, the allocation process following DSO has raised special concerns, for a
number of reasons:
7. C. Wong and J.X. Dempsey, “Th e Media and Liability for Content on the Internet,” Open Society Foundations,
Mapping Digital Media, Reference Series No. 12, 2011.
8. Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and Council of March 2010, on the coordination of certain
provisions laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of
audiovisual media services.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 8 6
• In most countries, the original spectrum planning for radio and television
transmission concerned a single or a few analog channels operated by a national
radio and television station (public service, state, or private). As radio and television
expanded, additional channels were allocated by the gradual accommodation of
one or a few channels, sometimes only regionally or locally. Th is was in contrast to
DSO, which is a simultaneous revamp of the whole television spectrum, aff ecting
the transmission of both existing and new channels.
• Since the public/state broadcasting monopoly was abandoned in most countries,
television has become big business, involving huge economic interests in the
telecoms and media industry. Being wiped off the market altogether or seeing a
bouquet of channels reduced by losing a tender for the new digital channels can
deal a heavy blow to a media company.
• In the many countries with unstable and weak democracies, television is heavily
politicized. Running (or controlling) a television channel is usually seen by political
parties and groups of economic interests as an instrument to infl uence political
processes and public opinion.
Taken together, these considerations have in many countries raised the level of awareness
around the allocation of transmission rights—not only among those directly involved,
but also in sections of the public concerned with media freedom and independence
from government interference, most especially in countries where those values are not
undisputed.
3.2 Formal Rules are One Thing, Implementation is Another
Th e overall picture revealed by the MDM reports is rather disturbing. Most countries
that have implemented DSO, or are in the course of doing so, have established some
kind of legal framework regulating the process. Th is framework usually includes rules
aimed at securing an open and fair process. In very few countries, however, are these
rules followed in practice.
With considerable variations, and disturbing omissions, the following four elements
feature in the DSO regulatory regime of many of the MDM countries, and can be
taken together to be regarded as a somehow ideal model:
• Part of the spectrum for television (typically one or two multiplexes) is reserved
upfront for public service media companies or television channels operated by the
state.
• Th e rest of the television spectrum is off ered to commercial television companies
and/or platform operators in a tender procedure, as:
1 8 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
– a “beauty contest” where bidders are asked to put forward their plans for what
kind of channels and content they intend to broadcast, or
– a purely market-based approach (an “auction”), awarding the channels to the
applicants off ering the highest bids.
• An independent authority is established to arrange and oversee the bidding,
and to decide which applicants get the channels/multiplexes. Th is authority’s
independence from government, as well as from political and economic special
interests, is essential to guarantee a fair process.
• Information campaigns and public consultations ensure openness and transparency
around the process.
According to the reports, the procedures in almost all the MDM countries are remote
from this ideal model. In report after report, the DSO process is described as politicized,
controlled by powerful business interests, and lacking in transparency. Some of these
countries have certainly established legal frameworks that do not depart much from
the model, but rules are often bent, procedures are evaded, and public protests are
neglected.
Along with Japan and the United States, the fi ve countries in north-western Europe—
Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, and the United Kingdom (with their
neighboring countries)—constitute exceptions to this general and somewhat depressing
pattern. Th is is not because their legal frameworks diff er greatly from those of many
other countries, but because the spirit of the law is usually respected. In the seven
countries mentioned above, civil society involvement has been rather low and public
criticism of the process has been negligible.
Th e question of which method to use for the tender has, however, been controversial in
many countries. Th e auction model has been criticized as purely economic and market-
oriented, favoring big business without concern for the public interest or program
diversity. Such considerations can be better met by using the “beauty contest,” which
is, however, more open to manipulation by special interests. Th is may explain why
critics of tender procedures in countries with politicized and non-transparent practices
often argue for auctions as the best alternative.
3.3 Can Successful DSO Models Be Replicated?
With many countries still in the process of DSO, it is worth asking if the experiences
of relatively successful DSO can help others to prepare.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 8 8
Th e Swedish case can be taken as an illustration. In 2010, 35 percent of all Swedish
households received terrestrial television with cable and satellite reception accounting
for 42 percent and 21 percent of the market, respectively. DSO was launched in
1999 and the analog network has now been switched off . Parliament decided that
one multiplex should be given to public service media with the rest of the available
television bandwidth later allocated by the Swedish Broadcasting Authority (SBA).
Although the SBA is part of the state administration, it has apparently handled the
licensing procedures without interference by government, political parties, or special
interests. Th e entire digital television spectrum was allocated to the state-owned
telecom Teracom/Boxer, making it the sole terrestrial multiplex operator (gatekeeper).
Th e present Teracom off er to the Swedish viewers comprises 40 commercial pay-TV
channels, half of which are foreign, in a handful of subscription packages and 10 free-
to-air channels, of which seven are public service channels. An initial confl ict with the
Modern Times Group (MTG) over the gatekeeper role has been resolved and there
has been practically no public criticism of the way the licensing has been handled.
Communication-wise the whole eff ort was directed toward motivating households to
switch to digital receivers (television sets or set-top boxes, STBs) before the closure of
the analog network. No public subsidies were given to off set the cost of STBs.
Th e relative success of the Swedish model can probably be explained by Sweden’s
political-administrative culture, which is characterized by high accountability, no
corruption, and strong public confi dence in political authority. Th e formal rules and
procedures of public regulation have probably played a less important role.
Against this background, it seems reasonable to suggest that although the Swedish
model and similar models used in north-western Europe can serve as an inspiration,
it is more doubtful if their legal framework and the formal procedures would work as
well if they are copied and used in countries with less mature political-administrative
systems. Here, reference can be made to countries that share some of the characteristics
used by Petros Iosifi dis in his description of southern, central, and eastern Europe:
“lack of accountability of media market players, the influence exerted by commercial
operators, the impact of corporate power in setting the political agenda, and limitations
of freedom of speech and of participation by citizens in society.”9
9. P. Iosifi dis, “Digital Television, the Public Interest, and European Regulation,” Open Society Foundations, Map-
ping Digital Media, Reference Series No. 17, 2012, p. 18.
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Anybody who has experienced tight state control over media and heavily politicized
frequency licensing will probably hesitate to suggest that the role of the state should
be as dominant as it has been in the Swedish DSO process. At the least, non-
governmental civil society interests should play a more prominent role. Also, people
with such unfortunate experiences could regard a large international company—often
more independent of local and/or national government interference—as an attractive
alternative to local operators in a tender procedure, although the same people might
in general be skeptical about transnational corporations entering the domestic market.
4. Conclusion
Th e MDM reports suggest that the frequency planning of the ITU and the follow-
up by national governments have indeed reserved the bandwidth needed for digital
television to grow. Th ey also suggest that the issues of DSO and the digital dividend
have been overshadowed by the parallel development of wireless broadband and the
internet, which are capable of serving a broad range of social purposes.
Turning to the important question as to whether DSO will increase diversity in
the television off er and boost competition among television providers and platform
operators, the outlook is not very good. Outside north-western Europe, most countries
have not conducted the frequency licensing process transparently. Partisan politics and
corporate interference have dominated over the interests of civil society. Consequently,
new television channels and the function of platform operation are often given to
incumbent actors with close ties to governments. According to the MDM reports from
countries still preparing a tender, the prospects for future tenders are not much better.
A consistent regulatory framework for DSO is a necessary condition for securing
transmission effi ciency, fairness for the parties involved, the societal interests of the
public, and transparency in the process. However, this is not a suffi cient condition
to ensure a proper DSO process. A political-administrative culture characterized by
accountable government institutions and public confi dence in political authorities
seem to be just as important, if not more so.
In the many countries lacking these elements, the best hope for a strong public interest
policy on the digital dividend may be the engagement of civil society groups, assisted
by international institutions and non-governmental organizations.
1 9 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Business and Ownership of the Media in Digital Times Martijn de Waal
Introduction
Developments in the digital media business may be summarized thus: the rise of new
media means generally more media. Digitization has worldwide led to an enormous
increase in available media channels, in both the television business as well as on the
internet, a development that in many countries, however, has come at the cost of print
media. Th ere is no single global conclusion to draw from this on the development of
business models, and whether this development is strengthening or weakening the role
of media in a democratic society.
On the upside, especially on the internet, it has become cheaper than ever to start a
media venture, and many countries report new voices being able to express themselves
thanks to that, be they hyper-local citizen initiatives or nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) or political or religious organizations starting their own media.
On the downside, even though the number of channels has grown, the number of
owners has not, which has led to further consolidation of ownership. On top of that,
the funds available for all media channels (coming from either users’ contributions,
advertising, or state coff ers) have not kept up with the increase in the number of
channels. Th is means less money for in-depth journalism as well as an increase in
competition between channels, often leading to the sensationalization of programming.
Commercial departments of media channels are also becoming more creative in
adapting to the needs of advertisers, increasingly allowing product placement and
advertorials within the journalistic content.
C H A P T E R E I G H T
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 9 2
Finally, although the online production and distribution of journalistic content are
cheaper than broadcasting or print, there are only few successful business models for
online news platforms. In some countries, the crisis of the old business models has led
to the emergence of new ways of thinking about the role of the state in safeguarding the
production of independent journalism, for instance by establishing funds to support
this important function in democratic societies.
1. Cash-fl ows in the Media
Digitization has led in most countries to an increase in media channels and platforms
available to the public. However, in most countries advertising budgets have not grown
correspondingly: indeed they are under pressure due to the fi nancial crisis, with the
exception of some emerging countries. As advertising is still the main source of income,
this means that competition between channels has intensifi ed.
Th is intensifi cation is accompanied by shifts in the advertising market. First, advertisers
have many more options. Online they can make use of specialized advertising platforms
such as websites specializing in job search, classifi eds, dating, and so forth. Many
countries report that as a consequence of these developments good-quality media are
under increasing fi nancial pressure.
1.1 Print Losses
Printed newspapers in most countries—with the exception, again, of some emerging
economies—have suff ered more than other media from changes in business models.
Th eir readerships have declined and aged, and advertising income has suff ered. Th is
is a structural trend. Classifi eds are moving to the online space, and older newspaper
readers are less attractive to advertisers.
Th ese declines have been signaled across all kinds of newspapers as well as print
magazines, although about half of the European countries in the MDM project report
that good-quality media especially have suff ered as audiences migrate to free newspapers
and online news sites. In general, specialist newspapers (in terms of language, region,
or content) fi nd themselves better positioned than the more general newspapers.
Th ere are a few exceptions to this trend. Emerging countries such as Brazil and Malaysia
still report strong advertising revenues for newspapers. In Brazil, this is partly due
to a diversifi cation in state advertising, benefi cial to newspapers and magazines. Th e
1 9 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
National Association of Newspapers (Associaç ã o Nacional de Jornais, ANJ) is extremely
vocal in raising concerns about the sustainability of revenue streams for newspapers
in the long run. In Malaysia, the newspaper sector still retains the largest portion of
advertising expenditure, as businesses prefer traditional media for their campaigns,
although there are some early signs that this may be changing.
1.2 Business Models: Television Managing Quite Well
At fi rst glance, the outlook for television is better. Advertising budgets in many countries
have suff ered from the crisis, but the decline is not structural as many countries have
already started to bounce back. However, as the number of channels has increased,
the pie has to be shared among more players. Many countries report rising income
from pay-TV, demonstrating that consumers are willing to pay for content. However,
it seems that much of this is spent on sports and entertainment channels. It remains
unclear how much of the income from pay-TV actually supports journalism.
Budgets for online advertising have grown signifi cantly, although not everywhere. In
Lebanon, for example, this still represents only a small percentage of total advertising
budgets. At the same time, countries like South Africa and the United States report that
up to 30 percent of advertising budgets are now spent online, mostly going to content
aggregators, search engines, and social networks. Content providers, particularly of
news, have benefi ted less. In Italy and the Netherlands this has led to controversy,
with news providers claiming it is unfair that news publishers make money organizing
access to content that they do not produce, while the producers themselves get hardly
any income.
Nevertheless, due to the relatively low cost of operating an online publication, the
launch of websites, blogs, and local community platforms has been reported in nearly
all countries. In many of them, these pure online players have diffi culty becoming
sustainable. In some countries foreign donors, political groups, or anonymous private
backers have stepped in. Valuable as these contributions may be, they encourage
dependency among these outlets, increasing the volatility of the online media landscape.
1.3 Main Changes in Business Models
Th e changes in the media landscape have prompted media companies to adopt three
main strategies:
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 9 4
• Income generated by content
Against the dominant trend of advertising revenue mainly enriching search
providers and social networks, online news publications in some countries have
been able to operate successfully. In the United States there have been a number of
successful online media initiatives such as Politico and Th e Huffi ngton Post. Th ere
is a lot of interest in hyper-local sites such as Patch.com, with successful examples
from other countries too, such as the Geen Stijl blog in the Netherlands. Th e online
subsidiaries of Der Spiegel, Rheinische Post, and Süddeutsche Zeitung in Germany
have become profi t-making by themselves. In Lithuania some publications shifted
their print operations to the internet because of lower costs, a strategy also followed
by a few newspapers in the United States.
Publishers in a number of countries are experimenting with paywalls, so far with
mixed results. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Spain, Latvia, Slovenia, and Estonia,
these paywalls did not attract enough income to sustain the sites. In the United
Kingdom, some successes have been reported in the domain of business-to-business
and specialist news markets (including the Financial Times Online). However, the
paywall experiment at Th e Times has not worked.
In the United States, Th e New York Times blazed the trail with a “freemium” model,
in which users can gain access to a number of articles free, but have to pay if they
want to consume content beyond a certain threshold. Publishers in Slovakia have
set up a “Spotify” model where users pay a single monthly fee for access to a series
of publications across the participating publishers’ portfolios.
Th ere is a hope that special apps for tablet and desktop will introduce a new
payment or subscription opportunity. Although it is too early to tell, newspapers
in a few countries are experiencing an increase in income from these sources.
Italy’s Il Fatto Quotidiano reports that 20 percent of its subscribers subscribe to the
electronic edition. Th e Japanese Nikkei Shinbun has 140,000 paid subscribers to
its e-paper, while in Morocco (a country with limited literacy and internet access),
Aujourd’hui Maroc has 6,000 paying subscribers.
In the Netherlands, news providers and regulatory bodies worry that this trend may
lead to news organizations becoming dependent on new intermediaries such as
Apple’s App Store to reach their audience and advertisers. Intermediaries often take
a large cut of up to 30 percent of the subscription fees to a certain line of content.
In Brazil, the ANJ is worried about the role of aggregators such as Google News
which guide users to content harvested from various sources. It has recommended
its members to withdraw content from Google News. As an alternative, a leading
1 9 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
publisher has set up its own online store (Iba.com.br) targeting tablet users. Th e
store is also open to competing publishers.
Crowd-funding is still a marginal practice, mentioned in a few reports as an
alternative way of generating income to support content. New institutional
platforms have emerged in the United States and the Netherlands, where an
unprecedented campaign raised around €1 million within a few weeks to start a new
in-depth online platform for journalism. Hungary’s well known Klubrádió reached
out directly to its audience, asking listeners to “adopt” minutes of programming.
Funds from donor organizations are mentioned as an important part of the funding
mix in the media. Th e source of these funds varies from wealthy individuals (like
those behind ProPublica in the United States), to NGOs or intergovernmental
organizations such as the European Union and religious or political organizations.
Obviously, these funds refl ect the agenda of their sources, ranging from improving
democracy to advancing a particular religious belief.
• Income generated by services
Where income that is directly generated by content is under threat, publishers have
started to experiment with making money through services. In Japan, e-books are a
new source of income for media organizations. In Spain, Japan, and the Netherlands
newspapers now sell merchandise such as books, DVDs, travel packages, wines, and
so forth. Th e Guardian newspaper operates one of the most successful online dating
agencies in the United Kingdom. In Georgia, a publisher set up a website aimed at
tourists who planned to spend their holidays by the seaside, providing services such
as ads and information on accommodation, transport, and restaurants.
In France, websites of media outlets also off er classifi eds targeting particular
groups (e.g. jobs for managers or real-estate ad sections). Th e MDM report from
Argentina speaks about a shift to “journalism as a service,” consisting of classifi eds,
job searches, and other services crammed on a diverse online portal. In other
countries news organizations are also trying to reclaim the online classifi eds space
that they have lost to non-media companies such as eBay.
In Asia particularly, Chinese publishers have started selling communication and
game-like apps as well as virtual goods such as avatars.
• Cost-cutting
Another strategy to improve publishers’ balance sheets reported in many countries
is cost-cutting, resulting among other things in the dismissal of journalists. Th e
MDM report from Japan describes how this has led to a decrease in the quality
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 9 6
of journalism. A related trend is that media companies have steadily reduced their
investment in original reporting. Online outlets rely especially on repackaging wire
services.
Convergence is another way of cutting costs. Where cross-media newsrooms have
been established (in Slovenia, Georgia, France, and elsewhere), a single editorial
department produces news for various platforms. Often a single sales force
is employed to sell advertisements on all platforms. In Singapore, for instance,
MediaCorp worked with Microsoft’s MSN to create the online portal Xinmsn.
com, which features content created by MSN Singapore as well as MediaCorp’s
radio and television units.
In the United States, publishers are experimenting with user-generated content,
produced by readers rather than paid journalists. Moldova and Montenegro have
seen an increase in the purchase of low-cost foreign content by television stations
to the detriment of local production as a means to cut costs. Similarly, foreign
media owners in Bulgaria and Colombia have started broadcasting international
television formats and cutting down on programs addressing local issues.
1.4 Eff ects on Good-quality Journalism
Increased competition in the media landscape has led to a rise in niche channels,
meaning that news is sometimes removed from general interest channels and isolated
in special interest channels, begging the question to what extent the general public
encounters news in its media diet.
In some countries, reporters have noted a sensationalization of the news, with journalists
adding more drama to news stories in order to attract the attention of the audience.
Th is is usually described in negative terms, although it does not have to be negative
in practice. Research in the Netherlands has shown that adding drama and personal
stories to the news may make it easier for audiences to engage with it.
Increased competition has also led to growing interest in monetizing media
productions, often at the cost of creating public value. Slovenia and Georgia report
that channels have increased the time allocated to commercials, in the case of the latter
even surpassing the legal quota.
Other countries including Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Mexico report that
rising pressure in the advertising market has boosted the infl uence of advertisers and
media funders on the editorial department. Some news organizations run advertorials
without labeling them as such, or grant advertisers direct infl uence on content.
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A few reports also mention an increase in product placement. Reporters from Estonia,
Chile, and Latvia mention the rise of hidden advertising, where commercial products
or ideological points of view are presented as independent journalism. In India,
media companies have even taken a vested interest in media companies in exchange
for airtime to promote their products, a practice that has become known as “private
treaties.” As the MDM report notes: “newspapers have reported that BCCL journalists
were advised not to write ‘negative’ stories on private treaty clients.”1
Even without direct investment, large companies as well as public-sector advertisers
put pressure on Indian media companies. For instance, a major corporate house and
advertiser withheld ad spends on three leading mainstream publications after they
published a series of unfl attering reports about the company. In another case, the top
management of the Mumbai-headquartered Tata Group asked the companies part of
the group to “reevaluate their engagements” with media that had carried out “biased
reporting” to the group’s detriment.2
Only a few countries reported that telecommunications operators are increasing their
infl uence on content. However, it should be noted that these operators are one of the
largest advertising spenders —if not the single largest spender—in many countries. In
Albania, this situation has had a direct impact on critical coverage of these companies.
In Spain, Telefónica pressured the newspaper El Pais to spike a critical article by
threatening to withdraw its ads from the newspaper. Similar stories have emerged
elsewhere; in Peru, mass media refrain from critical reporting about various companies.
2. Patrons and Owners
2.1 Trends in Ownership
Consolidation of ownership is a worldwide trend, with few exceptions. However, there
is no evidence of a clear link between this process and digitization.
In many countries the consolidation of ownership is associated with a decrease in
media plurality. Th e Kenya report notes that large players have set up national networks
of radio stations, buying up local stations in the process, forcing them to toe their
editorial line.
1. Bennett, Coleman and Company Ltd (BCCL) is the largest media company in India.
2. Th e Tata Group is an Indian giant business conglomerate comprising over 100 companies in a myriad of sectors, from communications to engineering to energy to chemicals.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S1 9 8
Perhaps counter-intuitively, one or two countries do report that media concentration
in larger companies has had a positive eff ect. Th e Peru report notes that larger media
companies take a more solid position when confronted with government pressure.
However, this eff ect is only felt when these companies are truly independent, whereas
in many countries close ties between media owners, business interests, and politics are
still the rule, with grave consequences for critical reporting.
On the positive side, digitization has opened up the media landscape, with an emerging
blogosphere or increase in community media in many countries.
2.2 Media Barons
It may not be a new story, but it is unsettling nonetheless: close ties exist between
media owners, companies, and politicians in many countries, from the oligarchs in
Russia to the media tycoon Rupert Murdoch in the UK, from the friendly relations
between the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy and the owners of large media
companies in France, to the growing interest of Czech businessmen in owning media
companies to secure their interests.
Reports about similar links have reached us from countries across the globe, from
Pakistan to Macedonia, from Georgia to India, from Moldova to Malaysia, and from
Romania to Egypt. Th e Albania report notes that media operations are allowed to
operate at a loss because owners use these outlets to further their business or political
aims.
Th ese links are often obscured through opaque ownership schemes, with off shore
companies or local “straw men” who operate on behalf of business or political actors.
Transparency laws can be helpful; however, they may also be paper tigers when they
are not concretely enforced.
Th e infl uence on media content of media barons and their allies in politics or business
is not always directly traceable or provable. However, in a range of countries there is
ample evidence of media owners trying to infl uence journalists. Signifi cant pressure
was put on Egyptian journalists by owners and owners’ allies, as witnessed in the case
of the independent daily newspaper Al Dostour. Shortly after the paper was acquired
by Al Sayed Al Badawi (owner of Al Hayat television stations and chairman of Al
Wafd party), the editor-in-chief Ibrahim Eissa was fi red for publishing a critical article.
In Malaysia, close links between business owners and politicians make it rare to fi nd
articles in the traditional print media that openly criticize the prime minister.
1 9 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In Slovakia a current aff airs report covering the dubious fi nancing of the leading
political party Smer-SD was cancelled because one of the owners of the media
enterprise J&T asked the management of Joj, the second-largest broadcaster in the
country by audience, to do so. In Slovenia two free weekly newspapers, Ekspres and
Slovenski Tednik, emerged just before the parliamentary elections in autumn 2008.
Only a few issues were published, full of articles with unidentified or pseudonymous
authors, mostly attacking left-wing parties and praising right-wing parties.
What makes it even more diffi cult to disentangle these relationships is another trend,
signaled in a few countries, whereby media companies are becoming part of larger
conglomerates that also operate in other industries. When this happens, as in Lithuania
and India, it makes critical coverage of these companies somewhat problematic.
Even without direct ties in ownership, owners in some countries are closely connected
with business and political actors. In Guatemala, ownership of news outlets is heavily
concentrated in the hands of a few actors with similar political views, alliances, and
interests. Th is is explained by the fact that their commercial viability depends entirely
on the goodwill of a right-wing business elite. Since advertising from the business
sector represents 75 percent of the news outlets’ total revenues, Guatemalan media
cannot aff ord to lose advertising without endangering their economic viability.
Th ere are a few positive reports as well. In Germany, for example, the infl uence of
media barons is decreasing as many media companies are now owned by shareholders
who demand dividends rather than political infl uence.
2.3 Horizontal, Vertical, and Diagonal Mergers
Despite scattered examples, there are no clear worldwide trends of media companies
buying each other, or cable or telecoms companies becoming active players in media
production.
Having said that, traditional media companies are starting to branch out in the digital
domain almost everywhere. In some places, broadcasters have launched integrated
newsroom operations or online portals. In Indonesia, for example, Metro TV and
TVOne have branched out to online news portals. Worldwide, almost all newspapers
now have web editions, making them the dominant online news providers in many
countries.
However, the place of traditional newspapers in the online space is far from secure,
particularly as proven business models to sustain their online presence are still scarce.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 0 0
In addition, there are reports of competition from internet-only news providers whose
heavy reliance on wire services allows them to operate at reduced cost.
It is notable that vertical integration (e.g. telecoms companies entering content
production) is only mentioned in a few countries. Brazilian and Croatian telecoms
companies own portals, in Lithuania Teo LT owns the online channel Zebra.lt, and
in France, some media are part of large utility behemoths that also run telecoms
companies. In Italy, Mexico, Th ailand, and the United States there are reports of
telecoms companies owning television channels. In Japan, household electronics
companies such as Sony are investing in media content and distribution.
2.4 Foreign Owners
Foreign investors are reported in a number of countries in South and Central America.
International media companies are also eyeing emerging economies. Th e Huffi ngton
Post, Th e New York Times, CNN, and the Chinese media behemoth Xinhua are
investing in Brazil. Many companies are also trying to set up a presence in India where
limits on foreign ownership make it harder, forcing foreign investors to partner with
locally owned channels.
Eastern Europe was a popular investment destination for various European media
companies in the 1990s and early years of this century. In some countries, foreign owners
still have a large presence; most newspapers in the Czech Republic are owned by foreign
companies. However, the fi nancial crisis has also led some foreign investors to divest from
countries in Eastern Europe such as Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Latvia. Notable for its
international aspirations is Al Jazeera, which has set up a presence in Turkey, India, the
Balkans, and the United Kingdom. At the same time, Russian and Chinese news stations
such as Xinhua and CCTV are also seeking access to cable platforms in various countries.
However, it is not clear whether the trends in foreign and cross-national ownership have
implications for the provision of independent journalism. Th e Colombia report notes
that foreign owners have no local political ties and enough leverage to invest in better
services. Such advantages also create vulnerability: when foreign companies divested
from Latvia, the gap was fi lled by local businessmen with close ties to politicians.
Moreover, foreign media companies also import standardized formats and foreign
programs without considering local audience preferences, and often at the cost of more
local coverage. In Bulgaria, foreign-owned television stations may have undermined
the local tradition of analytical and investigative journalism by investing heavily in
reality formats and soap operas with mass appeal.
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2.5 New Players, New Alternatives?
In addition to the increase in the number of television channels in most countries,
usually provided by incumbent media companies, the low entry costs of new media
publishing have led to the rise of new media platforms in many countries, broadening
the representation of minorities, adding marginalized political views, and even helping
to circumvent government censorship.
Th is trend has been signaled from China and Singapore to India, Malaysia, Pakistan,
and Jordan, as well as in a number of European countries such as Italy and Hungary
where the shortcomings of the mainstream media are analyzed and deconstructed in
the blogosphere. Some of these new platforms are commercial initiatives, but often
they get funding from other sources ranging from political and religious donors to
NGOs. Some are run by citizens and community organizations.
Especially in the United States, some new news providers have become very successful
and infl uential. Often cited examples are non-profi t and/or privately funded:
ProPublica, the MinnPost, Texas Tribune, California Watch, and the Wisconsin
Center for Investigative Journalism. In addition, a number of infl uential commercial
enterprises have sprung up in the blogosphere, such as Th e Huffi ngton Post and
Politico.
Th ese successes are not limited to the United States. Th e Pozareport.si blog in Slovenia
has become an important actor in terms of agenda-setting and influence even though
it has been accused of political bias and political links, particularly to left-wing parties.
In Latvia, changes in media ownership or disagreements with management have led
journalists to leave media companies and launch their own outlets. In Colombia there
has been the rise of LaSillaVacia, an independent platform created by journalists. As a
local expert notes, only fi ve years ago such a thing would have been impossible without
investment by a powerful family or a conglomerate.
A few country reports mention the rise of local and community platforms. In Poland,
a new category may be emerging of social or community media that are neither
public nor commercial but paid for by donations from audiences and/or stakeholders.
Guatemala reports the rise of hyper-local media in rural areas, covering issues that were
neglected by traditional media. In Th ailand too, community media are on the rise.
Th en there is the role of citizen media. Especially in countries with authoritarian
regimes, bottom-up initiatives are opening up the public sphere. In Pakistan, citizen
media played a part in organizing protests against the emergency rule of General Pervez
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 0 2
Musharraf in 2007. An increase in amateur blogging platforms and the use of social
media for peer-to-peer communication are reported in China and Singapore. Some of
these blogs aspire to become commercial operations. In other countries, however, the
promises of citizen journalism have not materialized. In Japan, for example, most of
these initiatives have failed.
In other countries new channels have emerged with the help of foreign donors,
varying from religious organizations based in Saudi Arabia to NGOs and European
Union funds. In Jordan, NGOs and foreign aid agencies have sometimes contributed
to the creation of online media outlets. Not all the news here is positive. Many of
the initiatives in the last two categories mentioned depend on donor funding, which
can easily be withdrawn, or on the enthusiasm of a small team. In many cases these
platforms are too small to grow into commercial viable ventures. As such, they have
a hard time institutionalizing and forming a structural addition to the public sphere.
In addition, some countries report a tightening of restrictions on media companies,
often after short bursts of liberalization. Following the 25 January 2011 revolution in
Egypt, 16 new satellite channels entered the broadcasting market. In September 2011,
however, the Egyptian authorities stopped issuing licenses to new channels. Tahrir
Channel, a start-up that was considered “the voice of the revolution,” has since been
bought by a business tycoon with ties to the old regime.
In other countries, the fi nancial crisis has made it hard for newcomers to succeed. Six
new digital channels in the Czech Republic were licensed in 2006, but only one is still
in business. Th e failures included the only digital news channel, Z1.
On a diff erent note, not all new initiatives represent positive contributions to an open
and pluralistic public sphere. In Th ailand it was noted that because new stakeholder
media are not dependent on advertising, some tend to be more radical and politicized.
In other countries, including Poland, Pakistan, and Macedonia, there are reports of a
rise in hate speech forums because of digitization.
In the end, new platforms can only contribute to plurality if audiences know where to
fi nd them. Defi nite fi gures are still lacking, but some reports suggest that the increase
in available content has not led to much diff erentiation in terms of the dominant
content providers. When we look at news consumption in the Netherlands, seven large
companies and institutions are still responsible for 80 percent of news consumption
across all media, measured by audience shares. Th is has prompted worries that audience
concentration may be replacing provider concentration as a risk to the public sphere.
2 0 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Th e rise of search engines and social networks as new intermediaries may contribute to
such a development.
As well as posing a challenge in relation to the plurality of media consumption, this
may also have a negative impact on media business models. In a few countries, various
actors have criticized how aggregators attract most of the advertising money. Th is is
why, in Brazil, all major news outlets have prohibited Google from featuring so much
as a link to their content.
3. State Involvement
Th e state funding of media has always been problematic. Open democratic societies
require independent media that fulfi ll a number of civic functions. When media are
left completely to the market, however, the provision of some or all of these functions
may suff er. However, if the state steps in to compensate market failure or merely to
stimulate media that serve the public interest, the question is whether these media can
remain truly independent.
Digitization has further complicated this dilemma. As we have seen, partly because of
digitization, traditional business models for print journalism face severe pressure. In a
few countries the question has been raised as to whether the state should intervene to
safeguard the civic functions of journalism, for example by setting up special funds for
journalists.
Related to this discussion is the debate about the future of public broadcasting.
Technological convergence has fi nancially empowered public broadcasters to become
online news providers as well, a move criticized by commercial publishers who argue
that it distorts the online news market, endangering their fragile business models even
further.
3.1 Public Broadcasting and License Fees
In a number of countries, digitization has contributed to debates about the funding
of public broadcasting. One question is how it can best be funded to safeguard its
independence from the state. Direct contributions from the state may jeopardize this.
Th e collection of license fees is an alternative that keeps the state at arm’s length, as its
only involvement is the introduction of the legal obligation on citizens to pay these
license fees.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 0 4
However, digitization has complicated this approach. Th e collection of license fees
used to be tied to the possession of radio or television sets. Th is link is no longer
workable in today’s technological context, as public service media may be consumed
on all kinds of devices ranging from phones to gaming consoles.
Countries such as Slovenia and Sweden have been discussing whether or not to abolish
the license fee for this reason. In Montenegro, the license fee was abolished and
public broadcasting is now funded directly through the state budget. In Macedonia,
an eff ective scheme for collecting the license fee has never materialized, and public
broadcasting is funded by the state.
In the UK, the BBC seems to have found a way to make the license fee compatible
with the new media era. Liability is now contingent on the use of any form of linear
broadcasting within the household, regardless of platform.
In the Netherlands, the license fee was fi scalized more than a decade ago, meaning it is
now part of general taxation rather than a separate fee. However, public broadcasting
offi cials have argued to reinstate it. After a number of budget cutbacks, some of
them politically motivated, they feel that direct government funding makes public
broadcasting much more dependent on the whims of politicians.
Another important discussion in a few countries (including Sweden, Germany, the
UK, and the Netherlands) addresses what public broadcasting is allowed to spend
its resources on. Th e free-market argument that expanding public service output on
new platforms unfairly distorts national media markets has been strongly made. In
Germany, however, despite criticism from commercial publishers, the Constitutional
Court has made it clear that the obligation of public service providers to provide basic
broadcasting services to the public is not limited to television and radio; it includes
the online realm. In Sweden and Germany, public broadcasters have to prove that
their online initiatives fulfi ll a democratic, social, or cultural function. Some criticize
this obligation as it can increase bureaucracy and may also hamper innovation in the
fulfi llment of public media services.
In a number of countries, governments have broadened their funding outside the
traditional domain of public broadcasting. France has set up various support measures
for the printed press. President Sarkozy pushed through a controversial law in 2009 to
protect copyright on the internet; the so-called HADOPI law was replaced in 2013.
In Sweden a fund supports print newspapers, but this was criticized by the European
Union authorities as constituting unfair competition. In the Netherlands, the National
Fund for the Press started a special program to stimulate innovation in journalism.
2 0 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Broadcasting and print media used to operate in separate domains. With the advent
of online platforms and digital distribution, however, the media market has become
much more integrated. In response, some countries have adopted a function-centered
approach, establishing funds to subsidize media productions that fulfi ll particular
functions such as local news, cultural heritage, education, science, arts, and cultural
programming, regardless of platform. In Croatia, the Electronic Media Fund fulfi lls
such a role, and countries such as Estonia, Chile, and Slovakia have implemented such
a provision. In a number of these countries, these funds play an important part in
sustaining media plurality and journalistic quality.
Although these funds are often small, they seem to have the potential to overcome some
of the hurdles that digitization and convergence have raised. First, the function-based
approach makes no distinction between various media or providers. In many cases,
public and private media companies alike may apply for the funding, and broadcasters,
publishers, or independent producers are all eligible, although this diff ers from country
to country. Second, these funds are often held at arm’s length from the state itself,
which could help prevent direct media infl uences by the state.
Th ese funds receive their resources from various actors. Th e audiovisual fund in
Slovakia receives its resources from state subsidies as well as from commercial media
operators such as cable companies, commercial television stations, and cinemas, which
are required to donate a percentage of their income.
Finally, discussion has arisen in a few countries over who should contribute fi nancially
to producing media content. A number of countries have considered a levy on
(communication) infrastructure such as electricity or internet service provider fees,
to fund public-interest journalism. Discussions about this have emerged in the UK
and the Netherlands, so far without conclusion. Th e introduction of a fee on top
of internet subscription rates to be used to subsidize publishers has been considered
in Italy. In France, lawmakers considered a tax to be levied on search engines that
republish content without the authorization of the original content producers. In
reaction, Google off ered to donate €60 million to stimulate innovation in the press.
3.2 Government Interference in the Media Market
As seen above, state interference in the media market is not always negative for pluralism
and good-quality journalism. Th ose who value the provision of public services above
the logic of the free market welcome the ability of governments to correct market
failure or stimulate the provision of independent media that fulfi ll civic functions.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 0 6
However, the MDM reports show that state intervention in media markets is not
always motivated by public-spirited benevolence. On the contrary, such interventions
are usually carried out to undermine the independence of media organizations rather
than to safeguard it. Most such strategies do not seem directly related to digitization or
the fi nancial crisis except in so far as these developments have forced media companies
to search for new income streams, making them perhaps more vulnerable to state
coercion.
Th e most common strategy is the use of state advertising. Of all the means that states
have to support media, state advertising is arguably the least transparent and thus
the most problematic. Across the globe, this resource is misused by states to support
friendly media and discriminate against critical journalism. Direct links are not always
easy to prove, but countries where suspicions that quid-pro-quo arrangements are rife
include Pakistan, Uruguay, Georgia, Argentina, Th ailand, South Africa, Colombia,
Kenya, Pakistan, Hungary, Moldova, Macedonia, and Spain (mostly at the local level).
At times, even if direct state advertising is absent, politicians may still wield infl uence
through the advertising budgets of stated-owned companies. In Slovenia, a number of
state-owned or state-controlled companies have shifted their advertising budgets away
from particular media in recent years, allegedly due to their editorial policy.
Some countries report that even if direct infl uence is not always clearly demonstrable,
government advertising is considered a risk factor for press freedom and media
independence. In Colombia, local media depend for more than half of their income
on government advertising.
On the positive side, these practices have led in some countries to discussion and
a demand for more transparent funding, as in Brazil. In Peru, state advertising has
become regulated by law, which requires publication of the reasons for investing in
specific media outlets and the amounts paid. Th anks to this requirement, a possible
case where state authorities took advantage of a television channel (RBC Television,
with one of the lowest ratings in the free-to-air terrestrial sector) was made public.
Th ere are further strategies to favor friendly media or punish critical ones. In Georgia
a program for the debt relief of media companies was carried out in a non-transparent
way, allegedly favoring media outlets friendly to the state.
Other countries are suspected of abusing their regulatory framework to sanction critical
media companies disproportionately. In Turkey, the company Digitürk was persecuted
2 0 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
for broadcasting the movie “Kill Bill” on the charges that the violent scenes in the
movie might cause psychological damage to viewers. While the regulator maintains
that it was merely upholding current laws and regulations, company offi cials suspected
that the fi ne was triggered by the broadcaster’s critical coverage of the government. In
Albania there have been reports of the increased frequency of the tax authorities’ audits
of media outlets that have criticized the government.
Table 12.
Direct government fi nancial support to media: advertising, subsidies, and other
Country
D o
e s g
o v
e rn
m e
n t
s u
p p
o rt
m e
d ia
fi n
a n
ci a
ll y ?
T y
p e
o f
s u
p p
o rt
Is s
u ch
f u
n d
in g
u s e
d t
o m
a n
ip u
la te
m e
d ia
?
H o
w s
ig n
ifi c
a n
t is
s ta
te f
u n
d in
g t
o
m e
d ia
o u
tl e
ts ? *
In w
h a
t fo
rm d
o e
s
g o
v e
rn m
e n
t fu
n d
th e
m e
d ia
?
Albania Yes State subsidy n/a Signifi cant1 Direct allocation
State advertising Yes Insignifi cant Advertising contracts2
Argentina Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant Advertising contracts
Armenia Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Yes Non-transparent
way of support
Yes Signifi cant
and non-
transparent
Direct allocation
Bulgaria Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant Non-transparent
Yes State subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
Brazil Yes State advertising n/a Signifi cant Advertising contracts
State subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
China Yes Non-transparent Yes Non-
transparent
Non-transparent
Chile Yes Grants No Insignifi cant Project-based grants
Colombia Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant3 Advertising contracts
Croatia Yes Grants Yes Non-
transparent
Project-based grants
Czech
Republic
No
Egypt Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
Estonia Yes State subsidy No Signifi cant Direct allocation
Finland Yes State subsidy No Insignifi cant Direct allocation
France Yes State subsidy No Signifi cant4 Direct allocation
Georgia Yes State advertising Yes Non-
transparent
Direct agreement
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 0 8
Country
D o
e s g
o v
e rn
m e
n t
s u
p p
o rt
m e
d ia
fi n
a n
ci a
ll y ?
T y
p e
o f
s u
p p
o rt
Is s
u ch
f u
n d
in g
u s e
d t
o m
a n
ip u
la te
m e
d ia
?
H o
w s
ig n
ifi c
a n
t is
s ta
te f
u n
d in
g t
o
m e
d ia
o u
tl e
ts ? *
In w
h a
t fo
rm d
o e
s
g o
v e
rn m
e n
t fu
n d
th e
m e
d ia
?
Germany No
Guatemala Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant Advertising contracts
Hungary Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
State advertising Yes Signifi cant Indirectly5
India Yes State advertising6 Yes Signifi cant7 Advertising contracts
State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Equity, grant-in-aid, loans
Indonesia Yes State subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
State advertising Yes Signifi cant Advertising contracts
(non-transparent way of
support)
Italy Yes Press subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation8
Japan Yes State advertising No Insignifi cant Advertising contracts
Jordan Yes Non-transparent n/a Non-
transparent
Non-transparent
Kazakhstan Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant Public procurement
Kenya Yes State advertising n/a n/a Advertising contracts
Latvia Yes State subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
Lebanon Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
Lithuania Yes State subsidy No9 Insignifi cant Through an
independently managed
fund
State subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
Macedonia Yes State subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
State advertising Yes Signifi cant Advertising contracts10
Malaysia Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
Mexico Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant Advertising contracts
State subsidy n/a Insignifi cant Direct allocation
Moldova Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
Montenegro Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
Media aid package n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation11
Morocco Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
Netherlands Yes State subsidy No Signifi cant Direct allocation
State subsidy No Signifi cant12 Direct allocation
Nicaragua Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant Non-transparent
Nigeria Yes State subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
2 0 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Country
D o
e s g
o v
e rn
m e
n t
s u
p p
o rt
m e
d ia
fi n
a n
ci a
ll y ?
T y
p e
o f
s u
p p
o rt
Is s
u ch
f u
n d
in g
u s e
d t
o m
a n
ip u
la te
m e
d ia
?
H o
w s
ig n
ifi c
a n
t is
s ta
te f
u n
d in
g t
o
m e
d ia
o u
tl e
ts ? *
In w
h a
t fo
rm d
o e
s
g o
v e
rn m
e n
t fu
n d
th e
m e
d ia
?
Pakistan Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant Advertising contracts
Offi cial bribes Yes Signifi cant
Peru Yes State advertising Yes Signifi cant Advertising contracts
Poland Yes State subsidy No Insignifi cant Direct allocation
Romania Yes State funding No Non-
transparent
Non-transparent
State advertising Yes Non-
transparent
Non-transparent
Russia Yes Federal subsidy No Signifi cant Direct allocation
Serbia Yes State subsidy Yes13 Signifi cant Direct allocation
Singapore Yes State subsidy No Signifi cant Direct allocation
Slovakia Yes State subsidy Yes Signifi cant Direct allocation
Slovenia Yes State advertising Yes n/a Advertising contracts
State subsidy Yes n/a Direct allocation
Subsidy from
municipalities
Yes n/a Direct allocation
South Africa Yes State advertising No Signifi cant Advertising contracts
State subsidy Yes Insignifi -
cant14 Direct allocation
Spain Yes State subsidy n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
State advertising Yes15 Signifi cant15 Advertising contracts
Sweden Yes Press subsidy No16 Insignifi cant Direct allocation
Thailand Yes State subsidy17 n/a Signifi cant Direct allocation
Turkey No
UK Yes State subsidy No Signifi cant18 Other19
State advertising No Signfi cant18 Advertising contracts20
United
States
Yes Federal subsidy No Insignifi cant Federal appropriation
Uruguay Yes State advertising No n/a Advertising contracts
Notes: n/a – not assessed; * the signifi cance of funding is assessed in terms of the amount and the
share it represents of the outlet’s total budget or the total media market in the country. If
the amount of money or its share of the total budget or media market was substantial or the
funding was instrumental in helping outlets to stay afl oat, we assessed the fi nancial support as
“signifi cant”. (1) Only to the public broadcaster (almost a quarter of its annual budget); (2)
from the Ministry of the Interior, the largest ad spender in 2010, and among the 10 largest
spenders in the market; (3) i.e. 50 to 60 percent of the revenues of local media outlets; (4) sub-
sidies for community media are benefi cial to diversity, but state subsidies for press and public
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 1 0
broadcasters have been criticized as they were used to salvage certain newspapers rather than
invest in innovative projects; (5) through ads for state-owned companies (railways, electricity,
post, and gambling provider); (6) this refers to ads by various ministries (as noted in Report)
and does not include ads by public sector companies; (7) this varies: it is insignifi cant for TV
news channels, more signifi cant for newspapers and most signifi cant for small/regional news-
papers; (8) according to Rasmus Kleis Nielsen with Geert Linnebank, Public Support for the
Media: A six-Country Overview of Direct and Indirect Subsidies, Reuters Institute for the Study
of Journalism, University of Oxford, August 2011; (9) this fi nancial support has been praised
as it fi nances cultural projects; (10) government is one of the largest ad spenders in the coun-
try: state advertising accounted in some years for half of the total ad spending in the market.
Th e money is disbursed through central government and publicly owned companies; (11) the
package included forms of indirect support such as debt write-off s and lowering of transmis-
sion fees; (12) given for specifi c projects; (13) the allocation process has been more transparent
since 2009; (14) crucial in recent years, however, as it helped to bail out the station; (15) at
regional and municipal levels; (16) criticized, however, for distorting the market; (17) sin tax
for public media; (18) for printed media; (19) VAT exemptions for printed publications; (20)
local newspaper advertising
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
State interference in the media market is not always employed to muzzle criticism.
Sometimes, business motives seem to be the most important incentive, although again
this is hard to prove. In Italy, many of the new regulations on advertising seemed to
work in favor of free-to-air channels, such as those operated by the dominant Mediaset,
where the prime minister at the time, Silvio Berlusconi, was also the largest shareholder.
In Mexico, the state has postponed the organization of tenders to license new
broadcasters. In this way, the state authorities helped to perpetuate the Televisa-Azteca
duopoly in the television market and an oligopoly in the radio market.
Finally, in some countries the state intervenes to stimulate the media market. Singapore
has an active policy to promote creative industries. Industry players in the broadcast,
animation, fi lm, music, interactive media, games, and publishing sectors are eligible to
apply for grants totaling US$72 million in the fi rst stage of this program.
Regions
2 1 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Digital Media in the European Union Justin Schlosberg
Context
EU member states are predominantly urbanized societies and densely populated,
although there are signifi cant regional variations and inequalities. Of the 19 countries
surveyed in this chapter, over 70 percent of people and over 80 percent of wealth
are concentrated in the “big fi ve”: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and
Spain.1 Although secularism prevails culturally and politically, Christianity is the
predominant religion across the region.
Th e EU has high rates of GDP per head, and recovery from the 2008 global economic
crash is underway in most countries, albeit to varying degrees. Several member states
remain acutely aff ected by the eurozone currency crisis which developed in the aftermath
of the crash.2 Th e issue of eurozone reform remains highly political and uncertain,
C H A P T E R N I N E
1. Th e 19 member states of the EU included in the MDM project are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
2. All member states of the EU except for Denmark and the UK are obliged to adopt the euro as their currency when
they meet the “convergence criteria.” Th e so-called eurozone currently comprises 18 countries, including 10 in the
MDM project: Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 1 4
and in virtually all member states, stagnant economic recovery has disproportionately
aff ected youth unemployment.
Figure 6.
Percentage of households owning a PC, 2012
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
N e
th e
rl a
n d
s
S w
e d
e n
F in
la n
d
U K
G e
rm a
n y
F ra
n ce
S lo
v a
k ia
S lo
v e
n ia
E s to
n ia
C z e
ch R
e p
.
S p
a in
P o
la n
d
H u
n g
a ry
L a
tv ia
C ro
a ti
a
It a
ly
L it
h u
a n
ia
R o
m a
n ia
B u
lg a
ri a
97 92
88 87 87
81 79
76 76 75 74 73 71 70
68 67 64
57 52
Note: Th is fi gure draws on data from the ITU that may not have been included in the Mapping
Digital Media reports, which were published over several years as they were completed
Source: ITU, Mapping Digital Media reports
Figure 7.
Internet penetration (% of total households), 2012
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
N e
th e
rl a
n d
s
S w
e d
e n
F in
la n
d
G e
rm a
n y
U K
F ra
n ce
S lo
v a
k ia
E s to
n ia
S lo
v e
n ia
C z e
ch R
e p
.
P o
la n
d
L a
tv ia
H u
n g
a ry
S p
a in
C ro
a ti
a
It a
ly
L it
h u
a n
ia
R o
m a
n ia
B u
lg a
ri a
94 92
87 85
83 80
77 75 74
71 70 69 69 68 66
63 62
54 51
Note: Th is fi gure draws on data from the ITU that may not have been included in the Mapping
Digital Media reports, which were published over several years as they were completed
Source: ITU, Mapping Digital Media reports
2 1 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Introduction
By the end of 2013, digital switch-over of television had been completed in all 19
member states of the EU included in the Mapping Digital Media (MDM) project.
However, there is wide variation in content availability and take-up of free-to-air digital
terrestrial television. Th is largely depends on the legacy and strength of competition
off ered by cable and satellite providers. Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) is also
a signifi cant force in several countries, although even in Slovenia (where take-up is
highest) it accounts for less than a third of viewing.
As a whole, television remains by far the most popular medium in all countries surveyed,
and is the most widely used source for news and information. In most countries viewing
time has actually increased in recent years, partly as a result of additional content
off ers produced by digitization. Th is has broadly favored thematic and entertainment-
based channels. Th e enduring competitiveness of incumbent broadcasters in the digital
environment has been marked by the extent and quality of new services launched.
In contrast to television, digitization of radio has been largely a failed or stalled project
throughout the EU. In some countries (such as Bulgaria and Estonia) digital radio
broadcasting remains a non-starter, while in Sweden development actually halted
in 2006 due in part to low consumer take-up. In most other states, digital radio is
progressing at a very slow rate, hampered by lackluster demand from both consumers
and broadcasters. Consequently, governments have tended to defer or abandon plans
to switch off FM radio signals. Overall, radio audience fi gures have not suff ered more
than a marginal decline over recent years. But the nature of listening is evolving, with
growing numbers of people listening online and via a plethora of diff erent devices.
Print newspapers have been the hardest hit by digitization and circulation decline has
occurred in all the countries surveyed. In some cases, this decline is occurring more
or less equally across the board of print media. But in around half of the countries
surveyed, it is acutely aff ecting the high-quality end of the spectrum. In general,
the types of newspaper that have fared best over recent years have been those with a
specialist focus (in terms of language, region, or content) and free-sheets.
Th e extent to which the decline in print media circulation is attributable to online
migration is not clear. In countries such as the UK and the Netherlands, structural
decline in the newspaper industries long predates the internet, while in Lithuania,
print media circulation grew steadily in the years running up to the global fi nancial
crisis of 2008. In all countries it is diffi cult to disentangle digital disruption from
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 1 6
the eff ects of the global economic downturn that followed this. But it is clear that
newspaper markets remain gripped in crisis. Th is is in contrast to television, and to a
lesser extent radio advertising, which have largely recovered their losses over the last
fi ve years.
Although in many countries the internet has now eclipsed print media as a source of
news and information, the latter still account for a dominant share of news consumption
in Sweden and Estonia. What is more, major newspaper brands across Europe have
fi rmly established their online presence and are among the most visited online news
sites. Th is is especially true of Western European countries (UK, France, Germany, and
Spain), although pure-play news websites are also well established across the region.
Internet accessibility has expanded signifi cantly across the region over the last fi ve
years, due in part to the largely successful roll-out of fi xed broadband technologies
as well as the development of mobile platforms. By 2010, the majority of households
in all but two of the countries surveyed owned a PC and, according to the European
Commission, broadband coverage based on standard technologies had reached nearly
universal levels (over 90 percent) in almost all countries by 2011. Th e percentage of
populations using the internet varied, however, from 44 percent in Romania to over 90
percent in the Netherlands, according to the International Telecommunication Union.
Th e fi gures suggest that signifi cant digital divides remain, particularly in eastern and
southern European countries.
A central fi nding of the MDM project is that there is a big crisis in the supply of public
interest journalism, defi ned as independent, contextual, and providing accessible
reporting of issues arising out of the exercise of citizenship. Th is is aff ecting diff erent
countries in diff erent ways and degrees. Th e causes are manifold and not limited to
the proliferation of digital media, although digitization has played a role both directly
and indirectly in precipitating the crisis. Both the crisis and its eff ects are especially
signifi cant in Europe, where the regional framework of media laws and democratic
standards is uniquely well developed, and where policy debates over media plurality
have in recent years become intense.
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1. Opportunities
1.1 Enhanced Access to Content
Digitization has increased the overall news off er available to European populations
in two primary ways. First, the development of free-to-air digital terrestrial television
(DTT) has made multi-channel services the norm and this has had a particular impact
in countries where the terrestrial platform is dominant (such as Italy, Spain, and
France). In these countries, DTT brought rolling news channels and access to foreign
news providers into a majority of households for the fi rst time. Although most new
services have tended to focus on entertainment, they have nevertheless expanded the
range of factual programming available.
Th e second area in which news services have expanded and proliferated is online.
News-focused services feature in the top 10 most visited websites in all the countries
surveyed. Traditional news brands have established a strong online presence and in
many cases this has translated into a broader range of content than that off ered on
conventional platforms. Th is is particularly the case with regard to public service
broadcasters and national newspapers in Western European countries—the UK, Spain,
France, Italy, and Germany—where they have established entrenched positions as the
leading providers of online news. In Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, pure-play
online news services are substantially more prominent and are among the leading news
sites in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Finland, and Lithuania. (Delfi , an Estonian online
news site established in 1999, is now the leading provider of online news in Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania.)
In addition to widening the space for news, digitization has also enhanced access to
diff erent types of news and blurred the boundaries that have traditionally defi ned
journalism. While the blogosphere in Europe is generally personalized, entertainment-
focused, and largely dependent on mainstream media as sources, there are particular
countries where it has had signifi cant impact in widening access to the news. In Italy
and Hungary, for example, there is a strong current of blogs with a media-critical bent
off ering scrutiny of mainstream news output.
Th e ease and effi ciency of online publishing has made the internet a useful repository
for investigative stories. Controversial issues ignored or neglected by traditional media
have found refuge in journalist blogs and online-only news sites. Th is, in turn, has
made it easier for traditional media to overcome libel restrictions on the basis that
information is already in the public domain.
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In this context, online platforms have emerged as potentially signifi cant agenda-setters
for the wider media. Th e depth and quality of reports are also enhanced through
interactive features and links to primary source material, enabling users to plug a gap
in fact-checking that has emerged in conventional newsrooms.
1.2 New Business Models
Th ere is a wide discrepancy across the region in the extent and application of new
media business models by traditional news groups. In Romania, Hungary, and Italy,
smartphones and tablets are widely perceived as keys to potential revenue growth, with
publishers developing ad hoc applications and formats for trial on the market. Th ere
is some feeling of resignation among media managers that online outlets may never be
able to monetize content in the face of competition for audiences from public service
broadcasters, alongside competition for advertisers from search and social media.
In contrast, however, Spanish media businesses, for example, have shown a tendency to
shun experiments with mobile applications on the basis that specialist content with in-
depth analysis is seen as the key revenue generator in the digital domain. In this respect,
several media businesses across Europe have begun to experiment with paywalls either
individually or collaboratively.
In Slovakia, for instance, the majority of print publishers participate in a joint paywall
which charges users a monthly fee of €2.90. In exchange, users get access to a variety
of specifi c content across the publishers’ portfolios. Each subscription payment is
distributed between the paywall operator, the website through which payment was
accepted, and the participating publishers. Most publishers continue to off er daily
online news for free and only restrict more specialized content such as in-depth
commentaries. Some off er subscribers access to advertising-free versions of their
websites and/or archived and current print editions that are downloadable in full.
Product diff erentiation has thus become a crucial component of paywall strategies. But
it is too early to assess the eff ectiveness of these strategies and whether paywalls will
be sustainable over the long term. Th e uncertainty is partly due to the reluctance of
publishers to divulge fi nancial data which will likely benefi t their competitors. In the
UK, there is some evidence that paywalls have been successful in business-to-business
and specialist news markets (including the Financial Times Online). But Rupert
Murdoch’s solo experiment with paywalling Th e Times online has so far not tempted
his competitors to follow suit. Th e BBC’s success online, among other free digital news
sources, is likely to limit the potential of paywall subscriptions to off set print revenue
decline.
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In light of this, some publishers are looking at ways to diversify their products, rather
than simply diff erentiate them. Recent survey data from market analysts suggest
that product diversifi cation combined with innovative pricing strategies are essential
to satisfy consumer demand for tailor-made news packages, particularly locally and
regionally. In the Netherlands, high-quality newspapers such as NRC Handelsblad now
sell books, fi lms, music, wine, travel, and art via their websites, while the Guardian
newspaper operates one of the UK’s most successful online dating agencies.
An alternative means of revenue generation which circumvents online intermediaries is
crowd-funding. In 2010, Klubrádió in Hungary launched a “minute-adoption” scheme,
inviting listeners to sponsor a minute of particular programs. Between October 2010
and July 2011, the scheme raised over US$ 650,000 (€470,000). Generally speaking,
however, crowd-funding is a very marginal practice that is only likely to achieve success
in certain niche outlets with particularly loyal audiences.
What crowd-funding and paywalls share is a reliance on end-users, rather than
advertisers, as a source of new revenue. Th is is not surprising: in countries where online
advertising has experienced considerable growth in recent years, the primary benefi ciaries
have been Google and Facebook rather than publishers or broadcasters. But there have
been notable cases where online news outlets have generated profi ts independently
of other platforms. In Germany, several online subsidiaries of legacy media brands—
including Spiegel Online, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Rheinische Post, and Berlin Online—
were no longer reliant on cross-subsidies as of 2007. Nevertheless, sustainability in this
context seems largely contingent on the size of the market. Smaller markets may never
have the capacity to support online operations through advertising alone.
1.3 Interactivity and Participation
Th ere is a developing culture of user participation in news across the region. But there
is some variation in the nature and extent of participation, which can be considered
principally in terms of selectivity, production, and dissemination. In regard to selectivity,
online news consumption is increasingly structured around seemingly confl icting but
actually related trends of personalization and aggregation. News is increasingly targeted
at individual preferences and niche, fragmented audiences. Th is fosters a degree of
diversity on one level (content) but reduces diversity in terms of audience exposure.
On the other hand, aggregation, whereby stories are ranked and accorded prominence
in line with their popularity, may be having the opposite eff ect. While this practice has
arguably enhanced the democratization of news to the extent that it allows users to
infl uence the selection of headline stories and reduces the gatekeeping power of editors,
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it is also widely associated with tabloidization in online news and a constriction of the
news agenda to a smaller number of issues (reconfi guring, to some extent, the agenda
limits of the pre-digital news era).
User participation in news production consists predominantly of commenting on the
news, either directly on news sites or via blogs and social media. Th ere is evidence
from some countries that this practice has evolved since the mid-2000s from forum
postings to blogging and micro-blogging, mainly via Twitter. But the picture is mixed:
while there is a thriving culture of commentary on newspaper articles online in Estonia
and the Czech Republic, the practice is on the wane in France. And while blogging is
popular and growing in the UK, it appears to have peaked in Germany and Estonia.
User-generated content (UGC) is also associated with the proliferation of hate speech
online, especially in countries such as Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.
A clear fi nding across the board is that user participation in the news occurs primarily
in dissemination. In particular, social media platforms have greatly enhanced the
sharing of news content. Th is practice drives traffi c predominantly to the websites of
established or legacy media, reinforcing their agenda-setting power. Although there is
evidence to suggest that social media platforms are themselves becoming increasingly
signifi cant as sources, they are not generally perceived as authoritative news outlets in
their own right.
1.4 Minority Expression
Digitization has helped to broaden opportunities for minority participation and
expression in the news. Some important initiatives have emerged which are specifi cally
designed to give voice to underrepresented groups in mainstream outlets. In Hungary,
an audiovisual series entitled “Make your voice visible” contains short interviews with
Roma people aimed at reaching a wider audience on digital platforms. In Slovakia, the
Roma Press Agency strives to leverage minority content on to mainstream platforms. In
particular, it produces a documentary series focused on Roma communities for public
service broadcasting. And in Poland, the growing presence of ethnic minorities online
has been linked to a corresponding increase in their representation on conventional
media platforms.
Concerns about a lack of interethnic communication and integration in the digital
sphere have not been borne out by recent research. For instance, surveys in Germany
and the Netherlands have found that immigrant populations use local language and
generalized social media platforms in conjunction with, as well as over and above,
community-focused forums.
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Digital media have fostered political as well as cultural diversity, and have enhanced
the exercise of citizenship and political participation in most countries. Social media in
particular have been instrumental in this respect, with Facebook becoming a key tool
of engagement and campaigning both within and outside formal political structures.
Although most countries have seen little change to the status quo of political
representation in recent years, there are important and noteworthy exceptions. In
particular, the potential impact of the internet in reducing barriers to entry in politics
was demonstrated in Italy by the rise of the former comedian and blogger Beppe
Grillo’s anti-corruption movement, and by the liberal party Freedom and Solidarity in
Slovakia. Dubbed the “internet party” by journalists, it emerged online in 2008 and
rose quickly to become one of the main political parties in the country. It came third in
the general elections of 2010 and now participates in the coalition government.
At the same time, the internet has provided space for dissenting political groups
and activists who are not represented in mainstream politics. In Spain, among other
countries, this has enabled social movements excluded by the politically aligned media
to fl ourish, including those associated with republicanism, anarchism, and separatism.
On the other hand, the internet has provided refuge for a growing presence of racist
and extremist ideologies and has enabled hate speech to spread faster and more easily.
1.5 Transparency
Digitization has enhanced journalistic enquiry in a number of ways. It has improved
access to whistleblowers (most notably through online intermediaries such as
WikiLeaks), experts, and other alternative sources; it has led to innovative methods
of information-gathering such as wikis, social networking, and crowdsourcing; and
it has provided new capacities for storing, indexing, and securing the raw material of
investigative reports.
Th e internet has also fostered a culture of openness in most European countries that
has been refl ected in the increasing accessibility of public data. Th is is due to proactive
disclosure on the part of governments and other public bodies via their own websites;
enforced disclosure via freedom of information laws whose usage has been enhanced by
online tools; and unauthorized disclosure as a result of online leaks, whistleblowers, or
hacking. In Eastern European countries in particular, the internet has greatly enhanced
access to public registries covering commercial companies and the courts. Perhaps most
important, digitization has vastly increased the speed of access to such information in
all countries.
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New digital tools for analyzing and presenting data have been vital in overcoming
barriers presented by the ever-growing scale of data available. Following the Guardian
Datablog in the UK, the Czech news site iHNed.cz recently created a similar platform
to help users make sense of public interest data.
Nevertheless, there is a strong sense that the potential of open and data journalism is
yet to be realized. In the Netherlands, this is put down to cost, a skills shortage, and the
reluctance of some public bodies or state agencies to disclose data. In Germany, rigorous
privacy laws have restricted the scope of computer-assisted reporting. In the UK, a
culture of excessive secrecy is said to persist in the various branches of the security state.
And in all countries, the employment and reach of data journalism remain limited to a
few outlets and a small, if growing, audience of active news consumers.
1.6 Civil Society and Digital Activism
Digital media—and social media in particular—have provided a strong stimulus for
the practice of citizenship and mobilization around issues of public concern. Th e most
eff ective initiatives have been in the areas of environment, political corruption, and
internet freedom. A local initiative started in Estonia in 2008 rapidly developed into
a global movement mobilizing 7 million volunteers in 96 countries, for the World
Cleanup Action of 2012. Signifi cantly, the campaign used Google imaging software
to identify target areas of environmental waste, as well as social media platforms to
generate and spread awareness. Th is demonstrated the potential of digital tools for
empowering civil society movements.
However, most country reports testify to the fact that digital mobilizations have had
little bearing on policymaking, particularly in respect of economic policy, and that
the extent to which campaigns or causes reach the public consciousness still largely
depends on take-up by the mainstream media. Without it, the reach of online civil
society remains limited to a minority of already engaged citizens. In the UK, there
is some evidence that multi-issue mobilizing groups such as Avaaz and 38 Degrees
are reaching beyond the usual suspects of digital activism, and the number of online-
initiated campaigns in all countries continues to grow in tandem with social media
platforms. Even if legacy media retain the keys to the public agenda, the decisive
criteria for selecting causes are unclear. In some cases at least, attention generated
through social media and other digital platforms may simply become too big to ignore.
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1.7 New Models of Journalism
Th ere is an emergent third sector of journalism that exploits hybrid models of
foundation funding, cross-subsidies, and commissions. Many of these initiatives
also adopt a multimedia approach involving both self-publishing online and the
production of exclusive content for newspapers or broadcasters. In the UK, the Bureau
of Investigative Journalism has operated along such lines since 2010. Established with
a £2 million grant from the Potter Foundation, the agency has secured over 34 front-
page stories and produced a number of award-winning web, radio, and television
reports.
In Italy, Chiarelettere specializes in major journalistic investigations which are
published in a series of books. It was founded in 2007 as a multimedia publisher
strictly independent of political and business interests. Readers can meet the journalists
on its website to discuss the topics of investigations and there are related blogs by both
journalists and readers. Th e website also features documents and materials linked to
each journalistic investigation, as well as additional material that cannot be published
in book format due to physical space constraints. Th e publisher has also launched the
annual Investigative Journalism Festival, now in its third year, based in Sicily.
In 2001, journalists and editors in Germany founded Network Research (Netzwerk
Recherche) to foster investigative journalism. Its activities include publications, courses,
and training for journalists, as well as conferences and political lobbying.
Similar entities are embryonic in other countries, including Latvia and the Netherlands.
But they are still very marginal and their long-term viability hangs in the balance. A
secure funding footing remains the elusive prize and the EU has potentially a role to
play in assisting the development of this emergent sector. Local and regional support
for low-cost start-up models might be especially pertinent given the scale of local
newspaper closures, cutbacks, and political clientelism in these markets across Europe.
2. Risks
2.1 Media Concentration
Overall, digitization has had little impact on dominant market positions or the rate of
merger activity within and across media sectors. Th ere has been a general dearth of new
entrants in broadcasting and print markets, and where new players have emerged they
have tended to be companies dominant in other media markets or other countries.
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In some cases, the consolidation of broadcasting ownership has continued on a
trajectory unaltered by digitization. In Sweden, the share of viewing time commanded
by the top three commercial broadcasters rose from 48 percent to 55 percent between
2004 and 2009. In other countries, ownership structures in broadcasting have remained
relatively stable over the last 5–10 years, but there have been signifi cant changes in
press ownership. In the UK, accelerated concentration in the provincial news markets
since 2005 has resulted in fi ve groups accounting for over 70 percent of local and
regional newspaper circulation.
Elsewhere, ownership concentration has diminished somewhat in recent years, due in
part to the economic downturn. Th ere has been a fall in concentration levels in Spain
in both print and broadcasting, albeit from a high peak around 2005. In Romania,
media markets began to fragment in 2009 after a sustained period of consolidation,
with the economic crisis prompting dominant media groups to shed assets. But it is
worth emphasizing that the sale of media assets has not always benefi ted plurality. Th e
withdrawal of Newscorp from Latvia, for instance, has opened up a power vacuum
which has consolidated links between dominant media outlets and the political
coalition, For a Good Latvia.
Entrenched links between media and political elites have been observed in several
countries and in various ways. In Slovakia, such links have been manifest in fi nancial
dealings between major media groups and dominant political parties. In Romania
and the UK, it is manifest in excessive personal contact and meetings between media
proprietors and government ministers, both informally and formally. However, the
power dynamics of these relationships vary greatly between countries. In Hungary,
favored media outlets are thought to be rewarded through the licensing process or
offi cial advertising spends in return for supportive coverage. Th e situation in the UK
appears to be the reverse of this; according to many observers, political leaders and
parties who adopt compliant policies are duly rewarded by the dominant press groups
with supportive coverage. Evidence of such deal-making between media and political
elites is largely anecdotal, but the intimacy of relations between them is clear and
undermines the health of democracies, old and new alike.
Such links may well be contributing to a further erosion of journalist autonomy,
already compromised by austere economic conditions and the growing pressure to
deliver news in ever greater quantities and within ever narrower timeframes. A recent
survey of journalists in Poland revealed a close association between pressure emanating
from politicians, media owners, and advertisers, which is fostering a collapse in ethical
standards.
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Th e media’s infl uence on politicians (and vice versa) is further leveraged by opaque
ownership structures. Media concentration has enabled some controversial interests to
hide behind growing complexities in the make-up of cross-media conglomerates. Th is
is particularly a problem in countries such as Latvia and Slovakia, where authorities
only inspect the fi rst level of media ownership. With no scrutiny of parent company
shareholdings, proprietors can circumvent transparency and cross-ownership rules
applied to the media. In Latvia, this has prompted widespread speculation about the
covert involvement of local oligarchs and political elites in the ownership of major
media outlets.
In most countries, however, media ownership transparency has improved over recent
years, as the result of new rules governing the declaration of proprietary interests or of
civil society engagement with the issue. Whether this will have a positive impact on
reducing the cross-infl uence between media and political groups remains to be seen.
Media concentration in the digital age is also related to market decline or saturation. In
the United Kingdom, consolidation in local and regional news markets is widely seen
as a consequence of classifi ed advertisers fl ocking to online search and social media.
In several countries, the pre-existing dominance of cable and/or satellite platforms has
limited the space for a competitive DTT market. Th is has placed limits on demand
for digital frequencies from private broadcasters in countries such as Germany and the
Netherlands. In Slovenia, the spectacular rise of IPTV (accounting for just under 40
percent of all television consumption in 2011) has diminished the viewership of DTT
among households.
Th e adoption of less effi cient compression standards in some countries (such as
MPEG-2 over MPEG-4) has been favored by dominant analog broadcasters seeking
to protect their market positions. When the Slovak telecommunications regulator
started the tender for the fi rst two multiplexes in 2008, MPEG-4 was established as
the compulsory compression standard, a move that did not suit the existing television
broadcasters. Th e head of the telecoms regulator was subsequently removed and the
tender was called off . Th e guidelines for a new tender allowed the operator to choose
the compression standard, resulting in the adoption of MPEG-2.
But it is not just technicalities which have led to incumbent analog broadcasters
retaining their dominant positions in the DTT market. In Italy, the lobbying power of
the public broadcaster on the one hand and the commercial network owned by a three-
times serving prime minister on the other have been widely perceived as instrumental
in sustaining an eff ective duopoly. Following an EU infringement procedure in 2006,
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the Italian authorities committed to adopt a national plan providing for a total of fi ve
national multiplexes, with two reserved for the incumbents (RAI and Mediaset) and
the remaining three up for open tender.
Some attenuation of the RAI–Mediaset duopoly in the terrestrial digital television
market may also derive from the European Commission’s decision of 20 July 2010 to
allow Sky Italia to compete in a forthcoming “beauty contest” for a digital multiplex,
on condition that it broadcasts free-to-air programs on the terrestrial platform for fi ve
years. But there has been renewed concern since 2011 when Mediaset began merger
talks with DMT Towertel, the leading company operating broadcast transmission
networks. If the deal goes ahead, the new Mediaset-controlled entity will become
the leading operator, owning and hiring the use of transmission towers to its digital
broadcasting competitors. Th e other operator is the RAI-controlled company RAI
Way, which leases its infrastructure exclusively to RAI.
2.2 Dilution of Free-to-air Television News
Digitization has brought intensifi ed competition for ratings and advertisers in free-to-
air terrestrial television markets. Amid this competition, there has been a marked shift
away from so-called hard news in favor of more entertainment-friendly topics and
formats. In Slovenia, commercialization of public television news has been catalyzed
by an intensely saturated market, stirring considerable controversy among both the
general public and civil society institutions. In Poland, during 2009 alone the number
of serious news topics covered by public service programs fell by 50 percent.
Elsewhere the trend has been more subtle, often refl ected in shorter time slots and
later scheduling for current aff airs programs. Newsroom cuts in countries such as the
UK and Latvia have resulted in a marked growth in live interviews and discussion
formats at the expense of long-form journalism. Th is raises important questions for
the sustainability of public interest news amid pressures emanating from both the state
and the market.
2.3 Politicization and Capture
In several countries there have been accusations of political clientelism, expediency, or
ideological bias in the allocation of digital spectrum. Th e problem is particularly acute
at the local and regional levels where a democratic defi cit has been identifi ed in some
countries, with devolved procedures for digital licensing.
Spain still has no nationwide regulatory authority for audiovisual media. Th e only
such authorities exist at the regional level and one of those, the Audiovisual Council
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of Navarre, was forced to shut down in 2011 for fi nancial reasons. Other regional
authorities are seen as acutely vulnerable to political infl uence and interference. In
2008, the chair of the Audiovisual Council of Andalusia resigned, claiming that
political parties were unwilling to respect the independence of the council. Meanwhile,
broadcast licensing and media content regulation at the national level remain exclusively
in the control of ministers, and successive governments have been accused of exploiting
this vacuum to suit their political convenience.
Hungary has been particularly problematic. In 2009, the frequencies of two commercial
radio stations expired and were reallocated to two bidders who had, according to the
chair of the licensing authority who subsequently resigned, “unrealistic business plans.”
But a Freedom House report noted that one of the bidders had fi nancial links to the
governing party while the other was connected to the political opposition, prompting
speculation about backroom deals between the two dominant parties.
On other occasions, the regulator has been accused of arbitrary and politically
motivated licensing decisions, as when the left-wing regional radio station, Klubrádió,
lost its Budapest frequency in December 2011. New legislation in 2010 reasserted
government power over media regulation in a range of areas. With regard to broadcast
licensing, a regulatory body whose members were nominated and elected by Parliament
was replaced with one whose members are appointed exclusively by the government.
Government infl uence is further enhanced by the absence of detailed legal guidelines
and defi nitions in respect of spectrum allocation. Th e discretionary power aff orded to
a constitutionally weak regulator enhances the government’s room for maneuver.
Th e signifi cance of appointments as a lever of government interference was
demonstrated in Romania in 2006. Th e head of the telecoms regulator, the National
Authority for Communications of Romania (Autoritatea Naţională pentru Administrare
şi Reglementare în Comunicaţii, ANCOM), was replaced twice within a single year.
Both outgoing chairs subsequently won lawsuits over their dismissal but rather than
reinstate either of them, the government changed the name of the regulatory body
and reorganized the system so as to consolidate its control. Th e ongoing political
manipulation of the regulatory framework drew heavy criticism from the EU in 2010.
Th is emergency eventually prompted the Senate to transfer control over ANCOM
appointments from the government to Parliament.
Attempts to depoliticize the appointment and election procedures of regulatory
authorities and public broadcasters have been less successful in Poland. A new draft
public media law, prepared by a citizens’ committee of television producers and
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artists, was eventually rejected by Parliament despite an assurance to the contrary by
the governing party in 2010. At the end of 2011, the National Broadcasting Council
(Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, KRRiT) presented its own draft reforms over the
fi nancing of public media and elections of their offi cials. But the bill was rejected by
the Minister of Culture, describing it as “controversial and with legal faults.”
Th e politicization of media regulation is perhaps nowhere more acute than in Italy.
Th e Authority for Communications Guarantees (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle
Comunicazioni, AGCOM) is exposed to particularly strong pressures from both the
government and major political parties. An episode in 2010 serves as a case in point
and led to the resignation of Giancarlo Innocenzi Botti, one of its board members.
(Mr Botti was previously an executive for Fininvest, the company owned by the
former prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, and the parent company of Italy’s dominant
commercial media conglomerate.) Published wiretaps revealed frequent telephone calls
from Mr Berlusconi while in offi ce to his former employee, urging him to intervene
and halt a current aff airs program produced by the public broadcaster, RAI. A judicial
inquiry is seeking to determine, among other things, whether Mr Berlusconi was guilty
of duress or threat to a political, administrative, or judicial body. Despite this, in July
2010, Parliament appointed another former Fininvest executive and former MP for
Mr Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party as Mr Botti’s successor.3
It is not only political pressures which may encroach on independence; the funding of
media regulators can also provoke confl icts of interest. In several countries, regulators
rely on a levy applied to commercial broadcasters. In Lithuania, this model is seen by
some experts as threatening the independence of the Lithuanian Radio and Television
Commission (Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija, LRTK), inducing it to adopt a soft
and sometimes compromising position toward commercial broadcasters, especially
over advertising rules. In simple terms, this is because the regulator’s fi nancial interests
are consonant with those of the broadcasters it oversees. Th e LRTK acknowledges that
it is not quick to apply fi nancial sanctions against commercial broadcasters, preferring
an approach that centers on advice and cautions.
Vulnerability to capture may also depend on the degree of market power wielded by
particular players or platforms. In Romania, strong lobbying by cable companies has
been seen as instrumental in the delaying of digital switch-over and postponement of
3. On 31 January 2013, the judge at the preliminary hearing dismissed the accusations against Mr Botti, Mr Berlus-
coni, and the then director-general of RAI. Th is dismissal was requested by the public prosecutor on the grounds
that “no law had been breached” and “there was no evidence of damage,” because the current aff airs program had
been broadcast as usual.
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DTT licensing tenders. In contrast, dominant terrestrial broadcasters in Slovakia have
been seen as highly infl uential in determining the compression standard for DTT.
Th is, as we have seen, eff ectively closed off the space for new entrants into the DTT
market.
2.4 State Aid
State aid to the media in EU member states is critical, in view of a twin assault on
media revenues in the last fi ve years. First, the global economic crisis has severely
aff ected commercial media advertising. In the case of newspapers, this has precipitated
a perfect storm following long-term declines in readership. As mentioned, this has
been exacerbated at least to some extent by consumer and advertising migration to
digital platforms. Th e second assault has stemmed from the convergence of media
platforms, which has rendered the traditional license fee for public service broadcasting
less eff ective as a means of fi nancial support and, in some cases, obsolete.
Both of these assaults have left media across the public/private divide more dependent
on state aid, which in many cases has compromised their independence. Th is has
compounded some of the problems with political bias in licensing identifi ed above.
In some countries, state funds are increasingly used to infl uence and interfere with the
media, as well as other policy levers associated with digitization which have provided a
channel for political favoritism.
Arguably the most problematic form of state aid to the media is offi cial advertising, given
its inherent opacity. In several EU member states, this form of funding is indirectly used
to support politically friendly media and discriminate against those outlets that are less
supportive of offi cial positions. In Hungary and Romania, digitization has done little if
anything to check long-standing traditions of exercising political infl uence in this way.
Infl uence is often wielded not through direct government-funded campaigns but
through companies and institutions that are majority or wholly state-owned, and
which happen to be some of the largest media advertisers. In Slovenia, a number of
instances have been reported in recent years where state-owned or state-controlled
companies withdrew advertising from particular outlets, allegedly due to their editorial
policy. Th e fact that such withdrawals coincided with changes in government adds
weight to complaints of political favoritism. For instance, the daily newspaper Dnevnik
claims to have been particularly hard hit under the right-wing government from 2004
to 2008. In 2007 the company reported that it had lost around €800,000 of income
due to the withdrawal of ads by state-owned companies (promised under the previous
government).
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However, in most countries, offi cial advertising of all types has been signifi cantly
reduced in recent years, largely as a result of fi scal austerity. But the transparency of state
funding through media advertising contracts remains critical. Th is transparency defi cit
is often made worse by a lack of interest or engagement from journalists, politicians, and
civil society organizations. And it is further exacerbated by the blurring of boundaries
between editorial and advertising content in media across diff erent platforms.
A compelling example occurred in Latvia during a pre-election period in 2010. A
commercial television channel broadcast several pseudo-journalistic discussions entitled
“Latvia, we hear you!,” which were presented as legitimate political debates. On closer
analysis, the topics appeared to be presented in a manner favorable to the election
campaign run by the coalition called For a Good Latvia. Th e broadcaster subsequently
acknowledged that the program had been funded by a nongovernmental organization
(NGO) also called For a Good Latvia, launched shortly before the elections with the
goal of supporting the political campaign of the same name.
As already mentioned, state funding of public service broadcasting has increased in
some countries in response to declines in both license fee and advertising income.
In Romania, the state subsidy share of the public broadcaster’s income rose from 19
percent to 31 percent between 2005 and 2009. In Slovenia, attempts to preserve the
license fee by linking it to household electricity consumption (rather than ownership
of apparatus) were thwarted by the economic downturn, with the result that public
broadcasting has been wholly funded by direct subsidies since January 2013.
Several other countries may go the same way in the medium term future, including
Sweden, where there is a general belief among politicians and public service executives
that the system has to change. In other countries, however, the license fee mechanism
has proved adaptable to technological convergence. In the UK, the BBC’s income
remains almost exclusively derived from the license fee and this has been relatively
stable over recent years. Liability for the fee is now contingent on the use of any form
of linear broadcasting within the household, regardless of platform.
Other countries have experienced increases in direct state subsidies over recent years,
notably Spain, where a dramatic hike in state support followed the banning of public
service broadcasting advertising in 2009. But while banning or reducing advertising
on public service broadcasting channels might be considered a legitimate attempt to
preserve the vitality of DTT markets, the switch in emphasis to direct subsidies can
threaten the viability and independence of public service media, even in countries
with strong reputations for public service broadcasting’s independence and credibility.
2 3 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In the Netherlands, the budget for public broadcasting has been considerably more
volatile in recent years and is subject to annual reviews as part of overall government
spending decisions. Th ere are concerns that this may lead to excessive monitoring and
reporting obligations that will compromise the independence of public broadcasters.
Where direct subsidies have not increased or have been cut in recent years, some
public service broadcasters face mounting losses. Th is is the case in Slovenia, where
a reduction in the public service broadcasting advertising quota coincided with the
general advertising crunch. In Romania, the increase in state subsidies has not plugged
a defi cit that is generally attributed to poor management.
In terms of direct subsidies for non-public service media, there have been a number
of controversial cases in recent years. In 2011, a parliamentary committee in Slovenia
uncovered evidence of fi nancial ties between weekly newspapers, published in the run-
up to the last general elections, and the party which won the election. As we saw in the
case of digital licensing, interference is often strongest at the local and regional levels.
In the Netherlands, decreasing revenues for local media have led to local or provincial
governments stepping in to support the sector fi nancially. In some incidental cases
this has led to offi cials expecting positive coverage of local governments in return for
fi nancial assistance.
Th e problem appears to be more widespread in Spain, with each Autonomous
Community and municipality managing its own budgets for institutional advertising
and press subsidies. Th ese budgets produce relationships of dependence between the
regional or local political power and the media. Th e potential lever of infl uence is
enhanced by the fact that regional and local authorities are aff orded wide discretion in
allocating the funds, unburdened by oversight authority.
Not all forms of direct subsidy to the media are controversial, however, as we shall see
below.
Digitization has also opened new avenues for preferential state support via a range
of policy levers beyond funding. Th is is most obviously the case in regard to digital
licensing, but other aspects of media policy have been exploited in recent years for
political favoritism and expediency.
In Italy, a case in point is the Decreto Romani, a legal framework for broadcasting
adopted in 2010. Specifi cally, new regulations on advertising appear to have been
designed to reduce the number of commercials on Sky Italia, a satellite competitor
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to Mr Berlusconi’s Mediaset and favor their proliferation on DTT (to the further
advantage of Mediaset). Specifi cally, the new regulations restrict advertising on pay-TV
(a sector dominated by Sky Italia) to 12 percent of airtime but raise the threshold for
commercial terrestrial broadcasters to 20 percent.
Pay-TV broadcasters also now face a greater burden in terms of regional and national
programming quotas as well as an increase in VAT on pay-TV subscriptions. Th ese
new regulations have raised serious question marks over the government’s impartiality
in respect of broadcasting policy. Th ey came on the back of controversial consumer
subsidies for set-top boxes, which the European Commission found to be illegal under
state aid rules. A report in 2007 accused the government of breaching the principle of
technological neutrality among broadcasting systems and unfairly penalizing satellite
television.
Finally, there is considerable—albeit circumstantial—evidence to support the view that
governments have tailored media ownership policy in favor of particular groups. In the
UK, the Leveson inquiry into the ethics and practices of the press exposed improper
personal contacts and negotiations between successive governments and Rupert
Murdoch’s News Corporation (New Corp). Whether this amounted to backroom
deals in policymaking remains a matter of dispute. But it serves as a telling reminder
of the enduring power and political infl uence of traditional media conglomerates after
digitization.
2.5 Audience Fragmentation
Audience fragmentation has presented a balance of opportunities and risks for new
business models in the digital environment. While the launch of niche or thematic
channels has been a key driver of success in digital television markets, this applies
predominantly to entertainment-based formats. Rolling news channels have met with
mixed success and there have been several failed or stalled attempts to launch new
services, including the recent closure of CNN+ in Spain and the ITV news channel in
the UK. Th ere have also been notable cases in which new channels that encompass news
have been forced to drop that strand of their program off er. Slovakia’s TV Pink launched
in 2010 with a mixture of Serbian and Slovakian entertainment programming as well
as a newsroom. However, the newsroom was closed and journalists made redundant
just weeks after the launch, with the company citing major fi nancial diffi culties.
Th e scale of migration of news audiences away from the traditional main news bulletins
has varied across the region. In some cases, the decision to shift news programming
away from the main channels in favor of new ones has reduced the audience exposure
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to news programs. Investment in niche news services raises particular issues for public
service broadcasting, with its traditional mission to foster social cohesion and serve
national communities, as opposed to targeted audiences.
Indeed, most public service broadcasters have sought to exploit the emergence of
new platforms in a bid to re-engage with minority and younger audiences. But niche
programming and audience segmentation have not reversed the aging demographic of
public service broadcasting audiences, which is a fi nding consistent across all countries.
It seems clear that the primary means for public service institutions to engage
meaningfully with younger audiences is the internet. To this end, the record to date is
very mixed. While the BBC in the UK and RTVE in Spain have developed websites
that consistently rank as the most popular nationally, their counterparts in Latvia and
Lithuania rarely feature among the top 20. In such countries, public broadcasters have
done little to expand their internet presence, and their online engagement remains
weak.
2.6 Journalism Funding Crisis
Th e success of some public service broadcasters’ online presence is said to have further
eroded opportunities for commercial news providers to reach and monetize niche
audiences. Some major commercial news initiatives have met with spectacular failure
in recent years. In 2009, the Prague-based investment group PPF launched a network
of 150 hyper-local weeklies, 900 websites, and 90 news cafés called Naseadresa.cz, with
seed funding of US$ 10.3 million (€7.45 million). Th e project assumed a growing
public hunger for local information, notwithstanding the fall in demand for national
and political reporting. After just a year of operations, however, mounting losses forced
the business to close.
On a much smaller scale, instability in the blogosphere refl ects the diffi culties in
sustaining niche audiences in the digital environment. Even in countries such as
Lithuania, where the blogging community remains a viable source of news, commentary,
and analysis, the leading blogs are in a state of constant fl ux. Th is is partly to do with
the reality that very few if any bloggers are able to make a living from their websites.
Th e struggle to monetize news audiences has had a signifi cant impact on the provision
of good-quality public interest news in several contexts. In the face of an undeveloped
and uncertain market online, many news publishers have maintained their focus on
traditional platforms in a drive to squeeze more revenue, or at least stem the tide of
decline. Th is has led in some cases to a growing emphasis on advertorials alongside a
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general weakening of the divide between editorial and advertising content, particularly
in local newspapers.
An example of this kind of closer cooperation between publishers and advertisers
is the local Dutch news platform Dichtbij.nl, which openly produces editorial
content paid for by businesses and local authorities. For some, this is not necessarily
a harmful development from the consumer’s perspective, provided that publications
are transparent about what they are doing. Others consider it a dangerous precedent
which threatens the autonomy of journalists and the reputation of journalism. Nor is
the practice restricted to print: Slovakia’s Ta3 news channel has been fi ned on several
occasions in recent years for facilitating hidden advertising in its news programs.
Some publishers have concentrated on lobbying to force online aggregators to pay for
using their news content. In 2009, German newspaper publishers publicly demanded a
new law to ensure that journalists and publishers are compensated for the exploitation of
their material by ancillary websites. Th e proposal received support from the governing
coalition but drew criticism on the basis that the measures would restrict the free fl ow
of information online. In Italy, publishers have lodged appeals with both the national
Antitrust Authority and the European Commission for similar redress in light of what
they consider to be copyright infringements by third parties online.
In 2013, Google announced settlements with news publishers in France and Belgium,
based on the creation of a Digital Publishing Innovation Fund in France, and
advertising commitments in Belgium. It remains to be seen whether the company is
willing to establish similar initiatives elsewhere in Europe or whether such initiatives
would be acceptable to publishers.
One adaptation of traditional business models common to broadcasters and publishers
alike has been accelerated restructuring, with cost-cutting and resource rationalization.
Jobs, wages, and marketing budgets have all been slashed to varying degrees in recent
years. Two of Lithuania’s leading newspapers reportedly made up to 25 percent of their
journalists redundant in 2009 alone. Elsewhere, broadcasters increased the number
of repeat and imported programs in their schedules, while publishers reduced page
numbers and circulation volumes, closed some titles, and reduced the frequency of
others.
Th ese cuts are implicated in the widely observed trends of tabloidization in news,
which is occurring to varying degrees in all countries and across all platforms. It is said
to be manifest in increasingly homogenized output; recycled and plagiarized content;
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a growing emphasis on celebrity and entertainment news over politics, the economy,
and foreign aff airs; and an increasing emphasis on sensationalism and headlines over
in-depth features and analysis.
3. Digital Champions4
Generally speaking, western and northern member states remain the most progressive
and fast-developing digital states in Europe. Th is is not attributable to the absence
of state involvement in the media (through public subsidies, press laws, regulation,
and so forth) but rather to the right kind of involvement, which supports rather than
constrains media independence. For instance, Finland has routinely topped global
press freedom indices in recent years, and it has one of the highest levels of public
support for the media per head, stringent laws on privacy and libel, and a broadcast
licensing policy that is strongly oriented toward plurality and diversity.
3.1 Regulatory Independence and Transparency
Th ose countries where authorities are broadly recognized as impartial tend to have
explicit licensing criteria enshrined in statute law. Germany has a clear two-step process
for digital licensing that involves fi rst deciding whether a given frequency gets allocated
to public or private broadcasting. Procedures resulting in mutual consent between
broadcasters are allowed for, failing which the regional authority can decide based
on statutory provisions for diversity, consideration of local issues, minority interests,
and so forth. If the frequency is to be allocated to private broadcasters, the second
step involves a “beauty contest” in which applicants compete—again on pre-defi ned
legal criteria—with an eff ective appeals mechanism in place following the regional
authority’s decision.
Fairness, transparency, and accountability are also bolstered in countries where there is
a clear separation of powers, limiting the degree to which governments can intervene
in regulatory decisions. In the Netherlands, for instance, decisions over which award
instrument to use in the allocation of spectrum (by beauty contest or auction) are taken
4. Given that most EU countries have completed digital switch-over, this section focuses on the emergent policy
challenges since digitization. One key area not covered here is the regulation of media ownership. Th is is because
none of the MDM countries appears to have adequate measures in place to deal with the digital challenges to me-
dia plurality. Instead, the default response of policymakers has been to deregulate ownership rules or maintain or
design cross-media limits that are insuffi cient for the task. Hence, the focus here is on those areas where member
states have made substantive progress toward regulatory independence, transparency, and accountability; and on
support for public service and third-sector media.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 3 6
by Parliament rather than government, while in Sweden constitutional provisions ensure
that public administration outside the government structure is highly independent.
An important factor underpinning reputations for transparency is the extent to which
authorities hold regular, timely, and relevant public consultation on key decisions,
particularly those which are politicized and subject to strong lobbying eff orts. In the
UK, Ofcom (Offi ce of Communications) holds public consultations on all spectrum
license awards over and above its periodic strategy reviews. Full details about the
consultations are published on its website, and there is a dedicated department for
research enquiries and freedom of information requests.
In countries such as Sweden, constitutional protection provides intrinsic protection
for regulatory independence. Th e Swedish Broadcasting Authority is part of the public
administration and traditionally, the political system has made a clear-cut division
between legislative, executive, and administrative powers. It seems reasonable to
assume that the more entrenched legal protections are in statute law, the greater the
bearing they are likely to have on the political culture at large.
Th ere are also more specifi c legislative provisions which can aff ect regulatory
independence. In Germany, broad representation is guaranteed among state media
authorities, which include so-called “pluralistic councils,” composed in the main of
civil society representatives with a minority of other members drawn from Parliament,
expert fi elds, and a single representative from government. In addition, each authority
has tailored rules for appointment and election procedures designed to minimize
political infl uence and confl icts of interest, along with specifi c regulations for funding
and fi nancial auditing.
In Lithuania, independence is enhanced by the involvement of civil society in the
appointment procedures themselves. Th e majority of appointments to the board of
the LRTK are made not by Parliament or the government, but by NGOs. But this has
given rise to new controversies concerning their representative legitimacy. For example,
the Lithuanian Journalists’ Union has the right to nominate members to the LRTK
board, although it is not widely seen as representative of the journalistic community.
What seems certain is that the regular rotation of appointments, as well as explicitly
defi ned criteria and procedures, are important for safeguarding independence, at least
in the formal sense.
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3.2 Support for Public Service and Third-Sector Media
In western and northern European countries, public service broadcasting funding
remained relatively stable during the early 2000s. Th is enabled them to invest heavily
in new digital services including niche channels, on-demand, and mobile applications.
As a result, they stemmed the tide of audience losses following increased competition
in the multi-channel environment. Th ere are also signs that ratings for the main public
service broadcasting channels are stabilizing. Th e United Kingdom, Germany, and
Sweden have experienced steadily declining audiences for fl agship television news
bulletins level off in the last two to three years. In the Netherlands, there has actually
been a reversal in fortunes, with public service broadcasting audiences increasing in
2010 for the fi rst time in a decade. Th is is generally attributed to a new programming
model that targets specifi c socio-demographic groups.
Th e success of these public service broadcasters is demonstrated in the assessments of
their public value. Survey data in 2010 suggested that German audiences saw public
broadcasters as more informal, modern, and entertaining compared with 2005, but
without losing their reputation for credibility and quality. Similarly in the Netherlands,
the move away from hard news has been characterized as a shift in emphasis from the
state to the street, and is not generally considered as a dumbing down of news quality.
While some forms of state aid have posed signifi cant risks for the independent
performance of news media (as discussed above), others have had the opposite eff ect,
helping to foster a space for news provision immune to both state and market pressures.
Some forms of public support have targeted particular areas of provision underserved
by the market, including outlets targeting children and facilitating minority expression.
In Lithuania, for instance, subsidies for the media are channeled via an independent
body known as the Press, Radio and Television Support Fund (Spaudos radijo ir
televizijos rėmimo fondas, SRTRF). Th e fund primarily fi nances cultural projects and
media services aimed at children, allocating funds to a wide variety of applicants. It has
also been used to compensate print media following the cancellation of VAT subsidies
in 2008. Since then, internet media projects have received around US$ 350,000
(€250,000) per year, including the news portal Bernardinai.lt. Th ere is no evidence
that this support has compromised the independent performance of its benefi ciaries.
In the Netherlands there are several funds and temporary projects to support the
press. Two of these were implemented following recommendations by the Brinkman
Commission in 2009, which examined the challenges for newspaper publishing in the
digital age. A €4 million project over two years funded 60 young journalists to work
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 3 8
for newspapers and opinion magazines, and the Press Fund distributed a further €8
million to fund innovation in the press and media. Besides these, the government also
supports a permanent fund for Special Journalistic Projects which receives an annual
contribution of €450,000 from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science,
including specifi c support for investigative journalism.
In Sweden, the state has a similarly strong role and tradition in funding various media
initiatives. For instance, state subsidies to support second-ranking regional newspapers
remain a distinctive feature of the press system. However, this system has been subject
to growing scrutiny and debate over recent years. Th e European Commission has
criticized the subsidies, claiming that selective state support to newspapers poses a
serious threat to free competition and should be perceived as a substantial market
distortion. Th e government has, as a fi rst step, decided to reduce support to subsidized
newspapers in metropolitan areas.
2 3 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Digital Media in the EU Enlargement Countries Justin Schlosberg
Context
Th is chapter covers six countries in south-eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. Th ese countries all aspire
to join the European Union. By European average standards, they are characterized
by small populations (except Turkey) and high political instability. Th ese factors have
infl uenced and shaped the transition to and spread of digital media. Th ey also refl ect
the region’s recent turbulent past, plagued by ethnic confl ict following the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Ethnic and
regional tensions continue to create insecurity, with occasional outbreaks of violence.
C H A P T E R T E N
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 4 0
Figure 8.
Population (million inhabitants), 2013
20
40
60
80
Turkey Serbia Bosnia and Herzegovina
Albania Macedonia Montenegro
76.484
7.199 3.878 2.788 2.071 0.623
Note: Th is fi gure draws on data from the IMF that may not have been included in the Mapping
Digital Media reports, which were published over several years as they were completed
Source: Data from local statistical offi ces gathered by IMF
Figure 9.
Rural–urban breakdown (% of population), 2012
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Montenegro Turkey Macedonia Albania Serbia Bosnia and Herzegovina
37 28 41 46 51 51
63 62 59 54 49 49
Rural Urban
Note: Th is fi gure draws on data from local statistical offi ces collected by the World Bank. Th ese data
may not have been included in the Mapping Digital Media reports, which were published over
several years as they were completed
Source: World Bank
2 4 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Figure 10.
GDP (2013) and GNI (2012) in US$
4,000
2,000
0
8,000
6,000
12,000
10,000
16,000
14,000
20,000
18,000
Turkey Montenegro Macedonia Serbia Bosnia and Herzegovina
Albania
1 8
,3 9
0
1 4
,5 9
0
1 1
,5 4
0
1 1
,4 3
0
9 ,6
5 0
9 ,2
8 01
0 ,8
1 5
7 ,0
2 6
4 ,9
4 3
5 ,9
0 6
4 ,5
9 7
4 ,6
0 9
GNI (per head) GDP (per head)
Note: Th is fi gure draws on data from the IMF and the World Bank that may not have been included
in the Mapping Digital Media reports, which were published over several years as they were
completed
Source: Data from local statistical offi ces gathered by the IMF and World Bank
Figure 11.
Unemployment (% of total labor force), 2013
10%
5%
20%
15%
30%
25%
35%
Macedonia Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia Montenegro Albania Turkey
30 27
19 19
13
10
Note: Th is fi gure draws on data from the IMF that may not have been included in the Mapping
Digital Media reports, which were published over several years as they were completed
Source: Data from local statistical offi ces gathered by the IMF
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 4 2
Introduction
Th e digital switch-over of television in south-eastern Europe has been beset by
bureaucratic delays and political obstacles in all the countries under review, and it is
not clear whether current targets are achievable. Th ere is a general lack of adequate
preconditions in terms of access and aff ordability. With regard to the former, Albania
and Serbia have set modest access requirements, stipulating that digital signals must
reach 80 percent and 90 percent, respectively, of their populations before analog
signals can be turned off . Legal provisions concerning the aff ordability of switch-over
for citizens are inadequate in Montenegro, Serbia, and Albania. At the time of writing,
only Macedonia has completed the switch-over process. Transitions are in progress in
Serbia, Turkey, and Albania, but are yet to commence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Montenegro. All fi ve countries yet to complete the switch-over have deadlines in place
for 2015.
More generally, there is a lack of clarity in the legal and regulatory frameworks governing
digitization. In Montenegro, the transfer of responsibility for digital policy from the
Ministry of Transport to the new Ministry of Information Society created uncertainty,
leading to confusion over the transmission standard for digital broadcasting; application
procedures for the fi rst digital terrestrial multiplex were prepared with no clear vision
of the exact number of channels it would carry.
In Serbia, there is much still to be done in order to fully implement the government’s
Media Strategy (adopted in 2011 in consultation with the European Commission),
including new legislation to ensure harmonization with the European Union’s
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, progress
towards switch-over has been marred by insuffi cient funding, institutional inertia, and
political divisions. In particular, there is a lack of coordination between the regulator,
relevant government ministries, and the various public broadcasters. Th is was epitomized
when one regional public broadcaster (in the entity called Republika Srpska) began
autonomous experiments with digital broadcasting in 2009, using diff erent standards
from those formally adopted by the country’s converged communications regulator.
Th is episode resulted in considerable confusion and a loss of public confi dence, along
with enforcement action against the broadcaster. Advances in the rest of Europe have
put pressure on the authorities to get their act together, and the new deadline of 2015
for analog television switch-off in Bosnia and Herzegovina may yet be achievable.
2 4 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Th ere has been notably more success in developing broadband infrastructures and
expanding internet use and access. By 2010, more than half of the households in
Macedonia and just under half in Serbia owned a PC. Th is compared with just over
10 percent of households in Albania, where internet penetration is relatively high. Th e
proportion of people regularly using the internet more than doubled in all countries
between 2005 and 2009.
Nevertheless, television remains the dominant medium for news and information in all
these countries. In Montenegro, the last 5–10 years have seen the previous dominance
of terrestrial television eroded amid rapid growth of other platforms, including Internet
Protocol Television (IPTV). In all other countries terrestrial television has lost ground
to cable, satellite, or IPTV but the overall television platform ecology remains largely
unaltered.
Th e impact of digital media on the reach of newspapers has varied across the region.
Historically, print circulations were always low, yet—despite a dearth of credible
industry data—there is strong evidence to suggest that most of the countries surveyed
have experienced a signifi cant and sustained decline in print news circulation over
recent years. Th e exception is Turkey where print newspapers remain an important
source of news, reaching 4.6 million people (predominantly in Istanbul and other
urban centers). Circulations and advertising revenues remained relatively stable over
the last decade, despite newspapers accounting for a declining share of the advertising
market as a whole. Th is may yet prove to be an ominous sign for the future sustainability
of the print news sector. As for the other countries, diff erences in the rate of decline
among newspapers can be traced to the success of their online activities. Only one
of the leading news websites in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an established newspaper
brand, while newspapers dominate online news traffi c in Serbia and Macedonia.
While much of digital media development in the region has been positive from
the point of view of pluralism and diversity, the gains have been off set by trends of
tabloidization and declining standards of journalism. Above all, the independent
performance of media is under threat from the endemic politicization of electronic
media, the increased reliance of some outlets on state aid, and a growing precariousness
in the journalism workplace.
One regional feature of news provision in south-eastern Europe has been the
patterns of political and ethnic polarization, patterns which have shaped the impact
of digitization, rather than the other way around. Th e proliferation of news outlets
has fostered diversifi cation to some extent, but often only in line with the particular
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 4 4
lobbying eff orts and interests of media owners. In other contexts, digitization appears
to have done little to weaken political parallelism among mainstream media brands.
Political and ethnic polarization has also undermined the digital public sphere through
the spread of hate speech and the continued exclusion or marginalization of some
minority groups. Finally, there is broad evidence of polarization in the newsroom,
as evidenced by the development of distinct traditional and online cultures of news
production.
Th is polarization in diff erent guises does not detract from the very real opportunities
that digital media present for enhancing democratic citizenship, participation, and
transparency through the news media.
1. Opportunities
1.1 Enhanced Access to Content
Although digital switch-over is still in its infancy, the growth of broadband internet
coupled with the expansion of IPTV and other digital modes of television reception
have enhanced access to plural news sources. In particular, the number of multi-channel
television households has grown signifi cantly across the region, increasing access to a
wider range of news programming, including foreign news channels. Th is has been
further stimulated by the growth of social media platforms and the culture of linking
and sharing news online. In Macedonia, such practices have favored niche and foreign
providers and the coverage of issues that are underreported in mainstream outlets.
At the same time, digitization has prompted public broadcasters and commercial
incumbents to invest in new services, particularly for building their online presence.
Th ese investments have met with mixed results. In Montenegro, they have helped to
ensure the relevance of the public broadcaster and the dominant commercial channel
as the leading news providers. In Macedonia, by contrast, the public broadcaster has
been accused of dragging its heels over investment in new services and there has been
no measurable increase in the quality or quantity of news output. While the Serbian
public broadcaster’s website has achieved high quality, relevance, and popularity, the
websites of various public broadcasters in Bosnia and Herzegovina are described as
“visually unattractive” with “limited functionality.”
Th ere are wider divergences in the progress over news coverage of, for, and by minorities.
In Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey the space for minority expression in the
overall news landscape is judged to have expanded and this has particularly favored
2 4 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
sexual and ethnic minorities. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia, however,
the opposite trend has been observed; online platforms for minority expression have
to some extent been colonized by hate speech and there has been a perceptible increase
in bias against minorities—as well as stereotyping of them—in the mainstream media.
Th e most consistent positive indicator for enhanced access to news services is evident
in the emergence of new entrants, primarily online. Th ough these are few in number,
they have made a signifi cant contribution to the overall news off er. In Montenegro,
Analitika was launched in 2009 and attracted over a million visits during its fi rst
year. Th e website remains an important alternative news source featuring a mix of
multimedia, interactive, and user-generated content as well as in-depth analysis.
In Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, new entrants funded by charitable
foundations have had a notable impact on the mainstream news agenda, making the
most of digital innovation in news provision. Th is includes not only multimedia and
multi-platform strategies of dissemination, but also deep linking to original source
material.
1.2 Interactivity and Participation
Social networking now dominates online activity in all the countries surveyed, although
citizen journalism is underdeveloped. Video and photo sharing as well as comments
and forum posts are the most popular forms of user-generated content. Th ere has
been an observed decline in the quality and relevance of independent blogging in
Macedonia over recent years, leaving a residue of predominantly issue-specifi c and
opinion-led blogs with limited audience reach. Th is is set against the expanding
presence of established news brands online.
In one sense, the growth of established news brands also owes something to new forms
of audience participation, particularly in respect of sharing, linking, and selection of
news topics via social networks. News items are increasingly selected according to peer
recommendations based on shared interests, demographics, political affi liations, and
social status. On the one hand, this trend refl ects a growing diversity in available news
content and wider opportunities for the expression and representation of minority
groups. Th is is especially noted in Montenegro where news sites and forums targeting
Bosniak and Croat minorities have emerged and grown signifi cantly, along with those
representing religious and sexual minorities. On the other hand, questions remain—in
this region as elsewhere—over how much intersection of diverse views the internet
is facilitating, and whether diversity in content exacerbates the fragmentation of
audiences.
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1.3 Transparency
Overall, digitization has improved access to public information. In some cases this has
proved to be a signifi cant resource for journalists. In Montenegro, two of the most
useful websites in this respect are those of the Police Headquarters and the Central
Registry of the Commercial Court, which publish extensive and unprecedented
volumes of data relating to crime and corporate activity.
But enhanced access to sources has yet to translate into the wider production,
dissemination, and impact of investigative journalism. In Serbia, this is partly because
some of the most well-resourced media outlets, such as Tanjug news agency and
Politika newspaper, remain signifi cantly infl uenced by and dependent on the state. In
Macedonia, the growth of publicly available data has failed to stimulate investigative
reporting due to a lack of data journalism skills, awareness, and resources. Th is has left
journalists in a somewhat passive position, largely dependent on the research reports of
public bodies, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Transparency of media ownership is a signifi cant problem, particularly in Serbia,
Albania, and Turkey. Recent legislative provisions have improved the situation in
Albania over the last four years, although transparency of media funding remains
problematic.
1.4 Civil Society and Digital Activism
Online civil society is not yet fl ourishing in south-eastern Europe, but the seeds of
digital activism have been sown and civic participation online is expanding rapidly in
tandem with social media. Key events in recent years have served as catalysts for this
growth; the death of a young activist at the hands of the Serbian special police during the
2011 elections set off not just extensive protest via social networks, but also continuing
Facebook campaigns against police brutality. In Turkey, the 2011 imprisonment of
online journalists accused of involvement in an alleged terrorist conspiracy triggered
widespread public outrage and waves of protest both on- and offl ine.
Th e nature and extent of digital activism varies across the region. In Serbia, it has grown
through petitions, protest initiatives, and public debates. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
social media have mobilized protests and aided the emergence of new civil society
organizations. In Montenegro, civil society activism online is eclipsed by the growth
of mainstream political activism as both ruling and opposition parties consolidate and
expand their online presence. In Albania, civil society organizations are seen as late
adopters of digital tools, particularly in comparison with political parties. Most NGOs
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have yet to capitalize on social media as vehicles of mobilization and dissemination.
And across south-eastern Europe, political activism online has predominantly taken the
form of one-way communication fl ows with little opportunity for citizens to infl uence
or participate in debate with political actors.
Turkey is again an outlier here, with the strength of digital activism seemingly growing
concomitantly with reactionary measures by the government. For instance, the two-year
YouTube ban in 2008–2010 prompted activists and academics to create exceptionally
infl uential protest blogs such as the Internet without Censorship Movement (Sansürsüz
İnternet, Sansursuzinternet.org.tr), the Cyber Rights Movement (Cyber-rights.org.tr),
and the Censoring Censorship Movement (Sansuresansur.org).
2. Risks
2.1 Dilution of Public-interest News
Television remains by far the dominant medium for news and information throughout
the region. But the provision of accessible public interest news is threatened by
the proliferation of platforms and channels, which has diminished the space for a
competitive market in terrestrial free-to-air broadcasting. At the same time, some
public service broadcasters face acute fi nancial and political pressures. Th at public
service broadcasting should be enabled to function as a mainstay for serious news and
original current aff airs programming is all the more important given the instability of
broadcasting markets, which probably heralds further ownership consolidation.
Th is is particularly the case in Montenegro where the decline of terrestrial television
has resulted from the growth of internet, cable, and wireless reception. IPTV is now
the second most popular television platform, accounting for a third of non-terrestrial
viewing. Commercial terrestrial broadcasters face intensifying competition without the
security of must-carry rules. Tabloidization has also aff ected Montenegro’s public service
broadcaster, and recent reforms and the much-needed stabilization of funding have not
translated into recognizable improvements in output. Th is appears to support concerns
that the public broadcaster’s increasing reliance on state funding has compromised its
independence.
Elsewhere in the region, public broadcasters face an ongoing crisis of both funding and
legitimacy. In Macedonia, an acute shortage of funds, broad misunderstanding of its
public role, and growing competitive pressures from global media and IPTV threaten
the sustainability of public service broadcasting in the digital age. Th is matters; in
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2010, 77 percent of the population still used television as their primary news source,
and public service broadcasting’s must-carry privileges aff ord it a central role in news
delivery.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the provision of public interest news on the terrestrial
platform is threatened by a perfect storm of market saturation and decline in public
service broadcasting. Th e many new platforms and channels have favored commercial
broadcasters and prompted public broadcasters to commercialize their news content.
Th e fi nancial crisis is refl ected in a 74 percent drop in the advertising tariff for public
service broadcasting over recent years.
Although the growth of online news services has widened the playing fi eld and fostered
a degree of plurality in the overall news landscape, this has not translated into a more
diverse or higher-quality news off er. Resource constraints and a lack of professionalism
have left online journalism largely dependent on agency sources and recycled content,
a phenomenon that has become known as “Google journalism.”
Th is is especially true of Turkey, where the multiplication of news sources both on
television and online has fostered a growth in recycled news content, rather than a
genuine increase in diversity. Added to this, fi nancial pressures in newsrooms have left
little appetite to invest in analysis and in-depth coverage, leading to a rise in opinion
journalism in newspapers mirroring the blogosphere culture.
Th e roots of these problems are not limited to the pressures of digitization. Th e
fi nancial crisis and withdrawal of international donors and institutional investors from
the media have opened the door to preferential and politicized state funding in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, for example, with political elites vying for infl uence and control over
the media landscape.
2.2 Audience Fragmentation and Digital Divides
Both digital and cyclical pressures have mixed with long-term patterns of audience
fragmentation that threaten the viability of an inclusive public sphere in the digital age.
Th e challenge of fostering greater unity among audiences that are highly fragmented
along ethnic lines is signifi cant across the region. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, only
the national public broadcaster presently commands near-universal technical coverage
across the entire country, with the remaining 44 licensed terrestrial broadcasters
confi ned to regional areas.
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In multi-ethnic Macedonia, the growth of social networking has been concentrated
among the Macedonian-speaking population. Audience diversity in this sense has been
more restricted online than in conventional broadcasting, where approximately 20
percent of total output is in minority languages.
However, the break-up of national audiences as a result of digitization should not be
overstated. In Serbia, patterns of television viewing have not changed signifi cantly in
recent years and the public broadcaster continues to command the highest ratings,
particularly for news.
Traditional news brands from both print and broadcasting have also been extending
their reach online in all countries surveyed. In many cases, newspapers now reach bigger
audiences than ever, thanks to their online editions. Serbia’s best-selling daily, Blic, has
lost some 50,000 sales over recent years, reducing its paid circulation to 150,000. But
its website now draws in 1.5 million unique visitors per month.
Progress in bridging access divides has been mixed. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there
is evidence that gender, ethnic, and urban–rural digital divides are being gradually
eroded, although internet activity is still heavily concentrated in younger age groups.
Serbian society still suff ers from an acute digital divide, with rural areas lagging behind
cities in computer ownership and internet connections. Th e expansion of pay-TV
services in Montenegro has fostered an access barrier to broader content and services
beyond the terrestrial off er, which remains the preserve of the less affl uent north of the
country.
2.3 Diffi culties in Monetizing New Platforms
Online migration of news audiences has occurred in varying degrees with varying
consequences. In Macedonia, the disruption of media business models by online
migration has left newspapers increasingly dependent on state support or cross-
subsidies. In 2008, the government became the second-largest media advertiser and
has accounted for almost half of commercial media revenues over the last fi ve years.
Th is has created a perceptible shift in editorial policies in favor of the government
and deterred major news groups from experimenting with new or alternative business
models.
Conventional media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, have not been hit by
signifi cant migration of advertisers or audiences to online outlets. Economic recovery
and industry consolidation are widely seen as antidotes to the present crisis in news
funding. Th is may explain why established media groups have not experimented with
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 5 0
new business models or sought alternative revenue sources. Attempts to erect paywalls
around online news have proved unsustainable.
In Turkey, the potential for achieving political infl uence through the media has meant
that many outlets are cross-subsidized and run as loss leaders. A lack of transparency of
ownership has obscured funding sources, however, as well as the precise relationships
among the political establishment, the Islamic networks, and media conglomerates.
2.4 Censorship and Government Interference
Although digitization is not a causal factor in media censorship and government
interference, it has done little to curb their prevalence across the region. In some
countries, indeed, there are signs that government attempts to control the media are
intensifying.
In 2011, the forced closure of Macedonia’s A1 conglomerate, which comprised one-half
of a cross-media duopoly, raised precisely such suspicions. Th e closure was ostensibly
the result of a tax investigation which led to the sentencing of its proprietor to 13
years’ imprisonment, and opened a door to new entrants both on- and offl ine. But
the fact that A1 outlets were generally aligned editorially with the political opposition
sharpened concerns about a crackdown on critical media.
Th e media regulator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Communications Regulatory
Authority, has faced penalties for what many perceive as its attempts to maintain its
autonomy from government. In 2008, the Law on Salaries and Compensations in State
Institutions was seen as retribution for the regulator’s demonstrable independence,
resulting in wage cuts of up to 60 percent for some employees.
In Albania, the problem is more one of self-censorship associated with deteriorating
working conditions for journalists. Most journalists continue to work without contracts
and with below-average salaries, particularly in rural areas. Th is has translated into a
culture of journalism that refl ects the whims and interests of media owners.
In Turkey, digital media have become the site of an intensifying battle over free speech
involving the authorities, journalists, and civil society activists. Of particular concern
is the power vested in the telecommunications authority to ban websites considered to
host inappropriate content without recourse to judicial proceedings.
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2.5 Crisis of Ethical Legitimacy in Journalism
Th e development of digital news is associated with a lowering of professional standards
across the region. Th is is particularly cited in relation to plagiarism and misinformation
in online journalism. Th e absence of regulatory frameworks for online journalism has
also facilitated the spread of hate speech and slander, which has not been off set by the
growing presence of established news brands in the digital sphere.
Some progress has, however, been observed in recent years. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
ethical standards for online journalism are gradually being adopted as proprietors
recognize the benefi ts in terms of credibility and protection from potential legal threats.
Th us, 2011 saw the beginnings of a transformation of the self-regulatory Press Council
into a Council for the Press and Online Media.
3. Digital Champions
Th e converged media authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mentioned above,
warrants special attention given the positive precedent it has set for the region. Th e
Communications Regulatory Authority was established in 2001 to govern broadcasting
and telecommunications. Its procedures, as codifi ed by the Law on Communications
in 2003, granted it considerable authority over both the content and means of
broadcasting, hence over the transition to digital terrestrial television as well as over
the regulation of media plurality.
For both analog and digital licensing, the authority drew up comprehensive plans based
on this law and in line with European Union precedents. In its licensing decisions to
date, there are no indications whatsoever that certain users, groups, or institutions
have been favored over others. Th e authority’s conduct is generally perceived as fair,
effi cient, and transparent.
Th is is in spite of intense political pressure from the outset, much of which has been
applied through state levers of funding and appointments. Political pressures have
been cited as one possible reason why the authority’s enforcement actions have been
somewhat lackluster in recent cases. Nevertheless, its commitment to transparency
as well as to professional and ethical regulatory standards has won international
commendation.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 5 2
Although no legal obligations require the authority to make its decisions public, it is
actively engaged in proactive disclosure via its website and has organized numerous
workshops, seminars, and roundtables on digital terrestrial television. Th ese activities
are in addition to the regular public consultations it has held in line with legal
stipulations.
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Digital Media in the Former Soviet Union Rita Ruduša
Context
Th e fragile democracies of the former Soviet Union, whether oil-rich or lacking in
natural resources, were all heavily hit by the fi nancial crisis and subsequent recession.1
Th e crisis that followed a period of unparalleled double-digit growth slowed down
their economies, dramatically reduced the much-needed funding for the emerging
independent media, and in the case of Moldova added to the mass migration of
economically active people.
Economic growth has returned in recent years, bringing momentous political change
to those countries with a comparatively strong civil society—Moldova and Georgia—
while strengthening the hands of the rulers in the bigger ones, Russia and Kazakhstan.
Long-standing territorial disputes remain unsolved: over Nagorno-Karabakh between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, over South Ossetia and Abkhazia between Georgia and
Russia, and over Transnistria between Moldova and Russia.
C H A P T E R E L E V E N
1. Five current or former members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were included in the MDM
research: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Russia. Georgia withdrew from the CIS in 2008.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 5 4
Th e years of pre-crisis economic boom contributed to an explosion in equipment
ownership: between 2005 and 2010 the number of PCs in Moldovan and Russian
households tripled. However, the overall number of PC-equipped households remains
comparatively low, particularly in the less affl uent countries of the region: in Georgia
it stood at 16.9 percent and in Armenia at 21 percent in 2010. Th e same is true
for internet penetration; overall numbers are low, at 9.6 percent in Kazakhstan and
6.4 percent in Moldova in 2010. Only Russia with 60 percent can compare with
penetration levels in Western Europe.
Th e number of active SIM cards, by contrast, is very high and in several countries
exceeded the total population several years ago: 125 percent in Armenia (2010) and
163.6 percent in Russia (2009).
Table 13.
Internet subscription (% of total population), 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Russia 13.3 17.3 41.7 48.4 62.5 n/a
Kazakhstan 1.9 2.0 4.4 4.5 4.8 9.6
Georgia 3.9 3.6 1.0 2.9 4.0 5.8
Moldova 1.9 2.4 3.0 4.3 5.6 6.4
Armenia 5.2 5.6 6.0 6.2 15.3 37.0
Note: n/a – not available
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
Moldova, the poorest of the surveyed countries (GNI per head at US$ 3,010 in 2009
compared with Russia at US$ 18,350), made headlines in 2009 with what was later
dubbed the “Twitter Revolution,” which fi nally ended Communist Party rule (see
section 2). In Georgia too there was a shift in its political ecosystem, with 2012 marking
the end of the virtually unquestioned dominance of President Mikheil Saakashvili and
his supporters. Mr Saakashvili, brought to power in 2004 by the “Rose Revolution,”
had in recent years started employing the same authoritarian practices that he had once
denounced.
In Russia, meanwhile, the power of President Vladimir Putin (who briefl y served as
the prime minister) has grown more pronounced, as has his government’s hold on
the media, particularly broadcasting. Th e government’s control over media is also
increasing in Kazakhstan.
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Introduction
Broadcast television in analog format continues to be the most popular platform for
news across the region. Printed press and radio are in decline and, in Moldova and
Armenia the internet has already entered the list of top three sources of news. Th e
internet is rapidly gaining prominence in Russia too. Half of all internet users there—
more than 20 million people—regularly read news online.
Th e key platform for television reception remains terrestrial (98 percent in Russia
and almost 90 percent in Georgia in 2010), and in the more infl uential, oil-driven
countries of the region, Russia and Kazakhstan, terrestrial invariably means tightly
government-controlled because the terrestrial infrastructure is in the hands of the state.
Digital switch-over is expected to result in the greater accessibility of media, bringing
signal to previously underserved communities, but not necessarily in greater plurality.
Civil society played only a token role in Russia’s digital transition, but in Georgia
and Armenia it is keeping a close eye on the switch-over, and in Kazakhstan too the
outspoken local media freedom nongovernmental organizations and broadcasters’
associations make it harder for the government to use digitization to strengthen its
control over broadcasting.
Th e understanding of the role of public service broadcasting remains generally low
across the region both among the general public and the politicians, with some partial
exceptions (Georgia and Moldova), and none of the countries has a foolproof funding
model that would ensure independence of public broadcasters. A direct and variable
subsidy is used in all countries, and the regulatory authorities are open to political
pressures. Th e only country in the region with a consistent public discussion on the
subject of alternative public service broadcasting funding models is Moldova.
Th e internet has provided a tangible and fast-growing alternative to state-controlled
media channels. It is worth noting that in Russia and the neighboring countries where
Russian remains widely spoken, the internet does not automatically mean global
English-language sites. Th e Russian-language internet site known as Runet serves a
vast community of users (46 million in Russia alone in 2010), providing access to
thousands of online news sources in Russian and to Russia-based social networks,
such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, which in Russia and Kazakhstan are much
more popular than their global counterparts such as Facebook and are among the top
social networks elsewhere in the region. Social networks are used increasingly for news
consumption and digital mobilization. With the exception of Kazakhstan, where the
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 5 6
approach to online media is increasingly hardline, these countries enjoy a high degree
of freedom online.
Th e gap between rural and urban populations in terms of access to a variety of media
remains wide. In Armenia, 83 percent of people in rural regions do not use the
internet at all (compared with 57 percent in the capital, Yerevan). Urban-dwellers and
rural-dwellers across the region choose from dramatically diff erent news menus: the
former can select among dozens of channels, satellite as well as terrestrial, and enjoy
broadband internet with a rich selection of resources, including pure-play multimedia
news sites, while the latter has access to only a handful of channels and has a slow, less
multimedia-friendly internet connection. Th e spread of broadband (again, mainly in
cities) has contributed to the popularity of video-sharing. Having emerged from their
largely piratical past, video-sharing websites across the region now off er an increasing
variety of services, including live-streaming and archives of the most popular television
channels, and thus contribute to news consumption.
1. Risks
Th e shrewd and less plurality-friendly governments of the region, Russia and Kazakhstan,
are using digitization to strengthen their grip on the message, mainly via broadcasting.
Both states have a long history of using television as an organ of executive power and
this trend is set to become more pronounced in the digital era. Neither country has
undergone a genuine transition from state to public broadcasting; they both lack the
legislative framework for such a transition; and debate on the subject has been sporadic
and weak or initiated from top down, and is lacking in true public support.
Governments have numerous ways to infl uence the public by dominating the airwaves.
Th e fi rst is access, by increasing the reach of the signal that the consumer receives. Th e
government of Russia has set itself the very ambitious target of reaching 100 percent
of national territory by the switch-off date in 2015, delivering eight channels of the
must-carry package and thus serving the communities that previously had access to
two channels or none.
Th ere is, however, a catch. All eight channels are government-controlled and included
in the package by a presidential decree, without any competition. Control over these
channels is exercised either directly, through state ownership, or via loyal oligarchs and
commodity companies. For example, Channel 1, the fl agship channel of the joint-
stock company Russian Public Television (public only in name), is 51 percent-owned
2 5 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
by Rosimuschestvo (the Federal Agency for State Property Management), while the
remainder belongs to private companies owned by the oligarchs Roman Abramovich
(24 percent) and Yury Kovalchuk (25 percent). Both men are known to be close friends
of President Vladimir Putin.
Kazakhstan decided to start digital transition with satellite; in this vast and sparsely
populated country only a third of the population uses terrestrial as the main platform
because there are patches of very weak signal. In 2011, the government invested heavily
in an expansion of satellite services: a basic 39-channel package provided by a state-
owned operator, OTAU-TV, and available to users who have purchased (or been given,
in the case of low-income households) an OTAU-TV satellite dish, is now available
without a subscription fee in remote regions that have limited or no access to either
terrestrial or cable.
In the past, media consumers in these regions mostly consumed television via
unlicensed satellite dishes that had no access to local and/or nationwide networks
and instead received Russian channels. Local critics point out that, while providing
a service to remote populations is a commendable aim, media plurality is not served
by this solution, for OTAU-TV gives preference to state media, further entrenching
state dominance in broadcasting. Th e company plans to expand its signal to reach
95 percent of the population by the end of 2014 (currently, it reaches about half of
the population). In the process of digitizing terrestrial television, the state-controlled
nationwide channels are winners too, at the expense of more independent regional
broadcasters.
While it lags behind Russia in terms of limiting media plurality in terrestrial
broadcasting, Kazakhstan is ahead of its neighbor in restricting freedom of expression
on the internet. In 2009, Kazakhstan introduced a set of restrictive amendments to
the legislation on the internet, replacing the defi nition of the website with the broader
term “internet resource,” thereby equating all internet resources, including social
networking websites and personal blogs, with mass media. User-generated content
became subject to the state regulation applied to mass media, including defamation
(which is a criminal off ence).
Kazakhstan is a regional champion in silencing independent voices on the internet (and
a champion of restricted media freedom in general, for that matter: it ranked at 160 out
of 179 countries in the RSF Press Freedom Index for 2013).2 Kazakhstan commonly
2. See http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 5 8
uses content-blocking, fi ltering, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Th e
attacks have increased since the 2009 adoption of the Law on the Internet and, due to a
lack of sophisticated content-blocking technology, they have often resulted in blocking
an entire website instead of the particular content deemed unlawful (a recurrent target
is the blogging platform LiveJournal).
Another eff ective method of controlling the message is through media funding. After
the fi nancial crisis, the state in most countries of the region gained prominence as an
advertiser and source of funding, and preferential allocation of advertising became
even more widespread. In Kazakhstan, the practice is pervasive and comes in the form
of goszakaz or the state procurement of media services. Goszakaz has clear editorial
strings attached: generous contracts are awarded in exchange for a pro-government
editorial line. Having lost other means of income, many outlets have now become
dependent on these funds.
In Russia, advertising allocation and direct subsidies are a common practice. Th e
government covers all distribution costs of Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper and has
steadily increased the reach of its distribution. Th e subsidies enable the newspaper
to have a low price, which is nearly half of what a media consumer would have to
pay for an independent privately owned publication. Selective application of laws and
arbitrary decisions aimed against independent outlets, as well as physical attacks on
journalists are other tools of pressure.
Th e governments of Mr Saakashvili’s era in Georgia were known to exercise infl uence
over the media, mainly by means of licensing, selective fi nes, and the allocation of
state advertising. In 2008, more than 80 percent of state television ads appeared on
the pro-government channel Rustavi 2, and there were reports of state and municipal
offi cials pressuring private advertisers to steer clear of independent media. At the time
of reporting, the popular private television channel Kavkasia, which broadcasts in
Tbilisi, has received no municipal advertising. Th ere were no state ads (or business, for
that matter) in the quality independent weekly Liberali, even after a campaign off ering
free advertising space, and none on the independent television channel Maestro, even
though it launched a similar campaign—off ering advertising for the symbolic sum of
GEL 1 (less than US$1).
Th e ownership concentration that started in the fi rst decade of this century in nearly all
countries of the region has increased the infl uence of politically affi liated owners. Th e
legislative means of restricting concentration are weak or non-existent and ownership
transparency is limited (some transparency exists in the broadcast media in Georgia
2 5 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
and Moldova). As a result, the media market is divided between political groups in
freer countries or is almost entirely controlled by the ruling ones in those prone to
greater authoritarianism.
In Moldova at least half of the market (two out of four leading media groups) is controlled
by politically affiliated local owners. Th e benefi cial owners are unknown, but editorial
policies suggest that one is Vlad Plahotniuc, a leading figure in Moldova’s Democratic
Party, and that the other is the still infl uential Communist Party. In Kazakhstan, one
of the leading players in the media market, alongside outlets entirely owned by the
state, is Nur Media, a media holding reportedly owned by the government (51 percent)
and the ruling party, Nur Otan (49 percent). It has one television station, two radio
stations, and eight newspapers with a cumulative weekly circulation of 440,000 copies,
as well as magazines. Nur Media has entered the online market and now owns several
websites.
Political ownership is also widespread in Georgia and Armenia, where many outlets only
exist due to subsidies from their owners. In Armenia, virtually the entire newspaper
market relies on subsidies from political patrons (the top dailies publish only 2,000–
6,000 copies per day and would not survive in a functioning market). Patrons use the
papers to deliver a political message. In Georgia, hugely infl uential politicians own
media: before entering politics and becoming prime minister in October 2012, the
billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili entered the media market with TV9, a
television channel.
An additional risk to open society values is that independent outlets across the region
are cash-starved and investigative journalism is embryonic. Th ere are a few strong
players in the investigative fi eld, such as the investigative weeklies Hetq (Armenia)
and Ziarul de Garda (Moldova), and a few reputable mainstream newspapers are
known to have investigated public spending, such as Kommersant and Vedomosti
(Russia); all of them use websites and social networks for dissemination. Overall,
however, investigative reporting in the region could be described as feeble. In Russia,
investigations are sporadic and those conducting them are mindful of repercussions.
Th ere is only one journalist in the whole of Kazakhstan to whom local experts refer
as an investigative reporter: Gennady Benditsky, the host of a weekly television show.
Given the restrictive laws, the extent of government control, and the grip exercised
by powerful pro-government owners, few outlets in Kazakhstan have the desire to
investigate controversial or challenging issues, and the changes in internet legislation
mean there is little chance for bloggers or other new entrants to take on investigations.
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Investigations, although assisted by the availability of online expertise, databases,
and the speed of information-gathering, suff er from the same ills as other forms of
journalism in the digital era, namely “Google journalism” (where computer searches
replace legwork and face-to-face interviews), negligent fact-checking, the use of
unverifi ed resources, and a diminished diversity of opinion. Th ese trends, although
global, present a particular risk in the new democracies of the former Soviet Union,
where government accountability is still far from being a norm.
2. Opportunities
Internet users in the surveyed countries of the former Soviet Union are among the most
connected and active in the world. Th e internet has transformed the communicative
possibilities for these societies. Russia is known for its gigantic social networks, Georgians
are very active users and producers of videos, Armenians have a lively blogging scene, and
Moldovans have linked the name of Twitter with historic digital mobilizations. Even in
the more restrictive environment of Kazakhstan the internet is a source of fresh air.
As noted above, internet penetration and the spread of PC usage have soared across
the region, admittedly from a very low starting point. However, digital development
has moved at two dramatically diff erent speeds: one in metropolises, and the other
in smaller towns and remote, sparsely populated rural areas. Th ere are vast territories
where the internet remains unavailable or comes via a 20th-century connection.
Russia leads the world in time spent on social networking sites: Russians devote about
40 percent of their total time online to social networks (equaling about 10 hours per
month). Between 2008 and 2011, social networks in Russia grew at 30 percent a year.
In 2010, the combined user base of the fi ve most popular social networks (of which the
top three are local) amounted to some 60 million people. Th e most popular, VKontakte,
had twice as many users as Facebook, which came to the Russian-speaking market late.
Although there are no systematic data on news consumption online in general or on
social networking sites in particular, Rumetrika statistics suggest that about 46 percent
of time spent on the internet is devoted to news consumption (2011). Blogs are
another source of information; there were 15 million active blogs as of 2010, and the
most popular blogs reach tens of thousands of readers. Th e statistics for user-generated
content activity reveal a phenomenon unique to Runet, namely the prominent role of
local search engines in building UGC communities. Unlike the global engine Google,
which features mainly the search function and keeps its other services hidden, Yandex.
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ru and Mail.ru show such services on their home page, thereby giving equal importance
to the search function, news, and UGC. Both resources attracted more than 27 million
unique users per month in 2010.
While there is little doubt that the internet has contributed greatly to the freedom
of expression in Russia, the conclusions are less clear-cut when it comes to digital
activism. Some prominent campaigners have managed the transition from internet
to mainstream. Th e anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny is one example; another
is Alexey Dymovsky, a police offi cer whose video exposing corruption in the police
force went viral and arguably contributed to police reform. In general, however,
mass mobilization by digital means is more likely to happen in Russia over local or
environmental issues that are not tied to mainstream politics rather than in relation to
more abstract questions around democratic values. Specifi c, practical issues get a bigger
response than a broad sociopolitical agenda.
Such is not the case in Georgia and Moldova where the internet can serve the ends
of wholly political activism. Moldovans, like Russians, are keen social network users
(Odnoklassniki alone has nearly 1 million users), and that is where the mass protests
following the fraudulent April 2009 elections originated. Having originated on Twitter
(hence the nickname the Twitter Revolution), the protests spilled into the unwired
sectors of the population, eventually bringing an end to the Communist era. Local
experts believe the record high voter turnout in the November 2010 parliamentary
elections also owes something to the internet.
In Armenia, online activism is mainly environmental. Th e most successful examples
of civic activism online include a campaign against a major mining project in Teghut
forest and protests against the demolition of an open-air cinema in Yerevan to make
space for the construction of a new church. Blogs, one of the most popular types of
UGC in Armenia, frequently serve as platforms for political discussions.
Arguably, Georgia can claim to be a veteran of digital mobilizations in the region. An
online forum, Forum.ge, one of the oldest online resources not only in Georgia but in
the region, has been a key virtual place for public discussion and political activism for
more than a decade (established in 2001). However, it has been overtaken by Facebook
as the primary originator of campaigns and protests. One of the most notable—and
fastest—mobilizations happened in May 2011, when Facebook was used to mobilize
a response to the violent dispersal by police of an opposition demonstration outside
the Parliament building in Tbilisi. Th e police had used excessive force to disperse
demonstrators, and some journalists were also among those who suff ered violence. Th e
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spontaneous mobilization on Facebook brought at least 3,000 people on to the street
just two days after the dispersal.
Th e most popular type of user-generated content in Georgia is video-sharing. Th e
lack of data prevents us from gaining a thorough picture, but the trend of active
video consumption and production is partly illustrated by the prominence of the
global network YouTube and the local portal Myvideo among online resources. Th e
popularity of video-sharing has contributed to the rapid development of alternative
ways of consuming television content. Myvideo now off ers live streaming and video-
on-demand from the most popular channels, and also serves as a success story in
monetizing content by charging foreign consumers for videos produced by local
television stations.
Mobilizations remain rare in the increasingly tightly controlled online environment
of Kazakhstan, but it has brought a notable benefi t: previously marginalized voices
have now acquired a place for expression. In pre-digital Kazakhstan, the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community was virtually invisible, whereas it now
has a vibrant online presence.
In Russia too, where the LGBT community is routinely denied an opportunity to
exercise its freedom of assembly and homophobic violence is widespread, the online
presence of the LGBT community is signifi cant. It is not only ethnic, religious, and
migrant communities who have also acquired new space for public expression across the
region. Th e internet has also opened new opportunities for groups expressing radical
views. In Moldova, the Iron Guard, an extreme Romanian right-wing movement that
lay dormant during the Soviet period, has resurfaced because of the internet, likewise
some Bolshevik and racist groups.
Another opportunity in the region has arisen due to the reform of public broadcasters.
Unlike in Kazakhstan and Russia where both the understanding of and the demand
for a public service broadcaster remain weak, the former state broadcasters in Moldova
and Georgia have undergone reforms and have moved away from being government
mouthpieces toward more balanced reporting and greater independence. In Moldova,
in the course of a single year under a non-political management (2009–2010), the
public broadcaster managed to achieve more objective coverage. Th e Independent
Journalism Center (Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent, CJI) in Chisinau noted
during the monitoring of the November 2010 elections that Tele-Radio Moldova
had managed to renounce “its habit of beginning news bulletins by reporting on the
Government and the ruling parties.” Progress in Armenia is slower.
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For a number of years, the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) was criticized for being
pro-government. GPB was one of the targets of public discontent during the anti-
government protests in 2007–2009. “We fund you and you must serve our interests!”
was a slogan used by the protesters. Th e management of public television has since been
changed, introducing a higher proportion of civil society representatives to its board,
and GPB is now perceived as the least biased news provider. However, its relevance in
society is low, as is its audience.
3. Digital Champions
One could argue that Russia is a regional champion in the digitization of broadcasting.
Compared with its neighbors, it was quick and disciplined in choosing technical
standards and developing a legal framework; the Target Program “Development
of television and radio broadcasting in the Russian Federation in 2009–2015” was
adopted in 2009. It was also swift in deciding on the composition of programs available
free, and in setting targets and deadlines.
However, this effi ciency does not tell the whole story. Behind it stands unconcealed
favoring of government-controlled channels and a lack of meaningful public discussion
about the purpose of the transition and its potential benefi ts to the consumer. Th e
government chose television channels to include in the fi rst digital multiplex based
on the criteria that matched exactly the description of eight government-affi liated
nationwide channels. Although these broadcasters had substantial funds at their
disposal, the government decided to pay all the transmission costs of the fi rst multiplex.
Meanwhile, all other (mostly medium-sized or small companies) television channels
will have to pay for transmission services.
When it is complete, the switch-over in Russia will have brought the television signal
to previously underserved areas and will have increased access to niche programs (such
as sports and children’s television), without having done anything to increase plurality.
Moreover, the eff ect of digital switch-over is likely to be multiplied by processes that
will follow. With the distribution costs of broadcasting set to increase sharply after
switch-over, a number of regional (and, traditionally, more independent) broadcasters
are likely to be forced out of the market altogether or may seek fi nancial support
from local authorities. In this way, the infl uence of political power in the media will
go beyond the current nationwide level, with inevitable negative consequences for
pluralism, media diversity, and independence.
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Russia’s leadership in the internet is more straightforward. Runet is a gigantic player
in the global internet ecosystem, with its 46 million users at home and several million
more in neighboring countries, as well as Russian-speaking communities in Europe
and elsewhere. Strikingly, Russia is the only country in the region where the digital
gap between rural and urban populations has started shrinking; nearly a third of its
internet users live in small towns and villages. Th e multitude of resources available
in Russian contributes greatly to the news menu of Russian-speakers. Th e growing
internet penetration, the spread of constantly evolving handheld devices, and the
mushrooming of UGC websites occurred in an unregulated environment, with
benefi cial consequences for the diversity of online news outlets and news content, and
also for the pluralism of voices across the new media. Th e internet is virtually the only
medium where criticism of President Putin and the ruling party can be found.
Th e prominence of the internet as the source of news is set to keep growing. Th e
average daily audience of the leading news websites on Runet already exceeds the
average readership of the top daily newspapers; for example, the monthly audience of
Mail.ru/novosti.ru was 10.5 million unique visitors per month in 2010, when Yandex/
novosti.ru had 9.8 million, and the readership of the leading daily, Kommersant, was
under 2 million. Th e explosion of internet usage is also forcing the media to innovate,
search for new ways to reach audiences, and apply new business models. Tablet and
mobile apps are becoming commonplace and the leading print outlets have started
applying brand extension (360º publishing).
Georgia is another digital leader, albeit of a markedly diff erent kind. Its digital power
does not lie in numbers but rather in the creative application of internet tools for
strengthening democracy, due to three factors: a vibrant civil society, strong independent
outlets, and an internet-savvy population. Th e internet from its very early days has
contributed to public debate in Georgia and, with the ascent of social networks, rapidly
became a tool for political activism. Likewise, it has been swiftly incorporated into the
activities of independent outlets such as the weekly Liberali; most independent voices
and investigative outlets are leaders in digitization. With computer ownership, internet
penetration, and even mobile usage still having plenty of room for growth (standing at
16.9 percent, 5.8 percent, and 73 percent of households respectively in 2010), Georgia
is likely to increase its standing as a best-practice hub in the former Soviet Union.
2 6 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Digital Media in Latin America Fernando Bermejo
Context
Most of Latin America is fl ourishing in both economic and political terms. Th e
fi nancial and economic crisis aff ecting other regions since 2008 had less impact here
than in other regions. After decades in which authoritarian military regimes were the
norm, and despite certain local lapses, democracy has spread and consolidated over the
past 20 years. Favorable trends have reduced poverty and led to sustained growth of
the middle class.
However, there are various diff erences between blocs of countries in Latin America.
Th e fi rst involves the special situation of most Central American countries, in which
democratic processes and state institutions show obvious weaknesses when compared
with other countries in the region.
Th e second refers to the role of the state and its level of intervention in diff erent
markets—including the media market. In this respect, the region can be roughly
divided into two zones. Th e fi rst, characterized by a market-friendly approach and
limited state intervention, is composed of “Pacifi c” countries: Chile, Peru, Colombia,
and even Mexico and Guatemala. Th e second zone comprises the countries of the so-
called Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (Alianza Bolivariana para los
Pueblos de Nuestra America, ALBA), namely Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Bolivia, all ruled by leftist governments with a clearly interventionist approach. Among
C H A P T E R T W E LV E
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 6 6
these countries, only Nicaragua was part of the Mapping Digital Media (MDM)
project. A few countries are more diffi cult to place: Argentina, which seems to lean
toward the ALBA group; Brazil, which has become an obvious regional leader; and
Uruguay, which seems to be fi nding a balance between the two aforementioned zones.
In terms of equipment ownership, television and radio show high penetration rates.
Television, particularly free-to-air broadcasting, is the main source of news across the
region. Digital broadcasting remains marginal and readiness for analog switch-over is
still low. Nonetheless, internet connectivity is growing steadily across the region, as is
the use of mobile phones, smartphones, and mobile internet connectivity.
Introduction
Latin American media systems are being transformed by digitization at two levels. First,
most countries are switching from analog to digital television. Second, the internet is
becoming a central element in communication systems across the region.
Th is dual impact represents an obvious opportunity for democratic communication,
but it also presents risks and challenges. However, digitization cannot be examined in
isolation as an autonomous force transforming the communicative landscape, for it
is interwoven with other far-reaching changes in the political, economic, and social
environments, generating a fabric that cannot be properly understood and assessed
unless it is considered in all its complexity.
In this sense, media systems in Latin America have been shaped over decades by two
types of interests: those of economic groups aiming to maximize their infl uence and
profi t, and those of political groupings using the media for equally self-interested
purposes (often within authoritarian regimes). Although they are diff erent, both these
types of interest have often confl ated and worked hand in hand. As a result, most
large media groups in the region have benefi ted from the discretionary powers of
authoritarian regimes. Th e consolidation of democratic regimes and the progressive
nature of many national governments have made it possible to rupture this dynamic.
Moreover, this political opportunity coincided with the arrival in Latin America of
the global process of digital television switch-over. Th e degree to which governments
across the region are now willing and able to break with the symbiotic relationships
between political power and large media groups will be tested and revealed by the way
this transition is regulated and implemented.
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Regarding the impact of the internet, the role of states has so far been limited, partly
because the global nature of the internet creates additional complexities for national
policy initiatives and regulations, and partly because the highly commercialized
environment of the internet seems refractory to any possible state intervention.
However, online communication is currently a signifi cant and growing force in media
systems across the region. Any assessment of its impact is bound to be mixed, because
some serious problems remain unresolved:
• while internet access is growing, the digital divide—in all its variations—is still
clearly present;
• while the internet has reduced the fi xed costs of starting new media outlets,
there are no successful business models to sustain online journalism in the long
run;
• while there are new and interesting voices producing quality journalism, the
majority of the most visited news websites replicate established offl ine outlets
belonging to dominant media groups;
• while citizens have been empowered to produce and distribute content online,
a growing portion of online activities is conducted through and controlled by
global U.S.-based digital platforms;
• while new opportunities have been created to produce and distribute investigative
journalism, journalists seem to be increasingly vulnerable—both in terms of
violence and pressure, and in terms of work conditions.
1. Risks
Th e ambivalent nature of the internet’s impact in the region can be extended to all
the issues aff ecting the transformation of media systems. Every opportunity is a risk,
and every risk brings new opportunities. Th us, talking of risks and opportunities often
entails looking at the same issues from two diff erent points of view.
Media concentration is a concern in most Latin American countries, where large groups
possess a commanding position in the media market: Televisa in Mexico, Globo in
Brazil, Clarin in Argentina, El Comercio in Peru—to name but four. Th ere is a tangible
risk that digitization will reproduce this status quo in many media systems across the
region. Th ese large groups are in a position to reap the benefi ts of digitization:
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 6 8
• Groups with an established position in the television market can smoothly
transition into digital television and replicate their dominant status in the new
environment—especially if, as in Peru, the regulation of the digital transition
privileges incumbents.
• Over the last decade the leading incumbent media outlets, particularly
newspapers, have become leading news sources on the internet.
Given this situation, both aspects of digitization may end up having a limited (or even
a negative) eff ect in generating a more diverse and plural media system. In this sense,
the design of the transition to digital television—in terms of allowing for new voices,
and reducing the share of voices enjoyed by incumbent groups—and the creation
and sustainability of alternative online news sources become key if the opportunities
opened up by digitization are not to be wasted.
While the power of these established national media groups cannot be overlooked as a
possible threat to the social benefi ts of digitization, two other groups of powerful actors
need to be taken into consideration when analyzing the risks posed by digitization
in the region, since they can create a layer of control above and beyond the national
media groups: large telecoms, and U.S.-based online platforms.
Regarding telecoms, two companies stand out: America Móvil (owned by Mexican
tycoon Carlos Slim) and Telefónica (the former public telecommunications monopoly
of Spain). Th ese companies have a presence in most of the national markets in the region,
operating mobile networks and providing internet services. Th eir direct presence in
the media market is limited, at least offi cially, for unoffi cial stories about middle-men
and benefi cial ownership abound in the region. Nonetheless, the convergence between
media and telecommunications industries means their infl uence in the regional media
systems is unavoidable. And the size and fi nancial muscle of these telecoms fi rms
compared with that of media groups make it clear that they will have the upper hand
in the process of convergence.
Th e second group of actors that need to be seriously considered as possible risks in
the digitization process are those online platforms, all U.S.-based, that have become
unavoidable entry points to the internet: search engines (particularly Google), social
networks (particularly Facebook), and micro-blogging sites (particularly Twitter)—not
to mention multi-faceted intermediaries (such as Apple). Th ese have all been growing
steadily across the region. Google and Facebook in particular top the ranking of most
visited sites in most Latin American countries. While they provide useful services to
users, allowing access to diff erent content and communication tools, and while they
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attempt to portray themselves as transparent and neutral intermediaries, the truth is that
they exert enormous power in regulating public communication. As the recent National
Security Agency (NSA) scandal over surveillance has demonstrated, these platforms also
pose a risk from a privacy and security point of view, a risk that needs to be taken
seriously when assessing the impact of digitization in the region—and beyond.
Regardless of the forms of control exerted by intermediaries in the process of online
communication, there is a prerequisite if Latin American citizens are to benefi t from the
opportunities created by digitization: internet access. Connectivity levels have clearly
increased across the region over recent years, such that several countries now have more
than half the population using the internet. Th ere are, however, some risks in this
growth: digital divides across the region are gaping and certain population groups risk
being left on the wrong side. Th ese divides clearly refl ect age, wealth, education, and
the urban/rural demarcation.
Th ere is a lack of policy initiatives on this issue in Latin America. What is more,
researchers point out the need to take a step further and move policy goals beyond mere
facilitation of access to technology and toward issues of digital literacy—in terms of
production as well as consumption—by teaching citizens how to use new technologies
to produce content as well as consume it. Except for a few initiatives—such as the
Ceibal plan in Uruguay—little has been done to narrow digital divides and improve
digital literacy.
When considering the practice of journalism in the digital environment, certain risks
need to be pointed out. Professional journalism in the mass media tradition has its own
shortcomings. For instance, it limits the exercise of certain rights to a reduced group
of people and it often creates alliances of convenience with economic groups that
help sustain the media. In this sense, the openness allowed by online communication,
the facilitation of freedom of expression without requiring a complex business and
organizational structure, seem positive. However, professional journalism also off ers
certain advantages that may be lost—some are already being lost in Latin America—
when journalism moves online:
• In a region where violence against journalists is not uncommon, especially
in countries with long-running violence problems—Mexico, Guatemala, or
Colombia—those practicing journalism outside established and professionalized
media organizations are even more vulnerable to threats and violence.
• While professional journalists in legacy media have achieved certain working
conditions, the process of digitization demands additional skills and additional
work, which are often not compensated.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 7 0
• Latin America’s media landscape is characterized by defi cient or non-existent
self-regulatory mechanisms. Th is lack of self-regulation is even more pronounced
in the digital environment.
• Th e economic solvency of established media may shield professional journalists
from pressure and grant them a certain degree of independence. Th is
independence may easily disappear when no viable business model seems able
to sustain online news outlets in the long run, as is the case in the region.
In addition to the aforementioned risks, there is another risk that has to do not
so much with any specifi c area but with the overall ability to study and diagnose
media markets and to propose and advocate media policy initiatives in the digital
environment: the availability of reliable data about the media. Th e shortage of data on
some key issues, such as equipment ownership (radio ownership in Chile, for instance)
and audience size and composition (particularly acute in Central America), predates
the advent of digitization, but it has only become worse as digitization increases the
complexity of media markets and media consumption. Th ere is, for instance, a lack
of reliable information on news consumption through social networks, or about the
eff ect of online news in print circulation, or even about the most visited websites in a
specifi c country. And without those data it is diffi cult to research, assess, regulate, and
understand the consequences of regulation.
2. Opportunities
Th e digital migration of television is an opportunity to promote a more diverse and
plural media system. Th e countries in the region are currently at diff erent stages in
the process of transition toward digital terrestrial television. None has reached analog
switch-off , but many have taken the fi rst steps in the digital transition by choosing a
standard. Most countries have adopted the Japanese (or Japanese-Brazilian) standard
ISDB-T; all the Latin American countries in the MDM project have done so,
except for Colombia, which adopted the European standard DVB-T (Digital Video
Broadcasting-Terrestrial), and Mexico, which adopted the North American standard
ATSC (Advanced Television Systems Committee).
Th e relevant issue, however, is not the selection of a particular technical standard;
rather, it is the ways in which the transition will be regulated and managed and the
impact it will have on the media systems of these countries. Seven of the nine Latin
American countries in the MDM project—all but Nicaragua and Guatemala—have
initiated regulatory changes in this regard, or started implementing the technology—
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the latest being Chile, where the Senate passed the law on digital television in October
2013, though this is still pending a possible review by the Supreme Court.
In some countries—Peru, Mexico, Brazil—the digital transition of television could
become a wasted opportunity because of the focus on technical and commercial
issues and the strength of present incumbents. In other countries, such as Argentina
and Uruguay, there is a clear interest in including new actors and reducing—or at
the least limiting—the power of established media groups. Th is opening up to new
voices coincides with the current process of reassessing the role of public media and
recognizing the role of community media in the region.
Public media in the region have been weak or non-existent, and can be considered for
the most part as state media—or they are so commercialized, as in Chile, that they are
indistinguishable from private media. In recent years, however, interest has grown in
reconsidering the meaning of public service media and in devising a model of public
media that places them clearly—and legally—at the service of the general interest and
distinguishes them from state and commercial media alike. Th is current interest in
public media is manifested in the reserving of a signifi cant portion of the spectrum
for public media—as in Argentina and Uruguay—and on new initiatives aimed at
developing and strengthening public media in countries as diff erent as Mexico and
Uruguay.
Th e opportunities that digitization has created for rethinking and strengthening the
role of public media across the region have also opened the door to a reconsideration of
the role of community media. Even though the situation and legal status of community
media range from almost prosecution (such as in Guatemala) to recognition and
support (such as the 2007 Uruguayan Law on Community Media), the trend is toward
increasing legal protection and promotion. Over recent years, these media have been
(a) legally recognized in most countries in the region, and (b) included in the plans
and regulations regarding spectrum management and the granting of new digital
broadcasting licenses.
Regarding new forms of online communication, and despite the risks identifi ed in the
previous section, there are some opportunities that should be pointed out. Even though
most of the online news outlets that attract large audiences across the region are replicas
of established offl ine media, a series of small online publications that produce high-
quality journalism and investigative reporting have blossomed in diff erent countries.
Th is is the case of La Silla Vacía in Colombia, Confi dencial in Nicaragua, Plaza Pública
in Guatemala, CIPER in Chile, Animal Político in Mexico, or IDL-Reporteros in Peru.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 7 2
Th ese news outlets take advantage of the reduction in fi xed costs allowed by online
distribution and their ability to attract skilled reporters to become sources of reference,
if not in terms of audience size, at least in terms of quality and infl uence.
Nonetheless, the issue of long-term sustainability remains. Most of these new players
are heavily subsidized by foreign organizations in the media development fi eld. Th ough
some of them are exploring new revenue sources—such as consulting, organizing
events, book publishing, or documentary production—they lack at this point clear
alternative business models, and this poses a threat to their mid-term survival.
Beyond the issues mentioned here as opportunities created by digitization, the
region in recent years has undergone a process of re-regulation, due partly to
technological changes and partly to wider political transformations. While some of
these new regulatory initiatives are closed—Colombia’s Law 1341 on Information
and Communication Technologies of 2009, Argentina’s Law 26.522 on Audiovisual
Communication Services of 2009, Brazil’s Law 12.485 on Pay-TV of 2011—a series
of regulatory processes is currently in progress.
Th e most relevant measures in the MDM countries at this point are as follows.
• Mexico’s new regulation derived from the “Pacto por México:” in December
2012, the recently elected president joined with representatives of the main
political parties in signing a political, social, and economic agreement to
strengthen Mexico’s democracy. Parts of this agreement, known as the “Pacto
por Mexico,” dealt with media and telecommunications regulation and markets.
As a result of this agreement, changes to the Mexican constitution were approved
in June 2013, and these changes will be followed by additional changes to
diff erent laws, and new regulation dealing with economic competition and
with telecommunications and broadcasting—a fi rst draft of which was sent to
Parliament in March 2014.
A series of very relevant issues have been or will be subject to new regulation.
Th ese include media monopolies, concentration, and cross-ownership; foreign
investment in the media sector; spectrum management and licensing—including
licenses to citizens, communities, and indigenous people; public media and
public service obligations for private media; journalists’ rights, telecoms users’
rights, and audiences’ rights—including the right to reply; broadcasting content
and the promotion of national production; advertising—including issues of
false or misleading advertising; management of the fi ber optic networks and
network neutrality; and regulatory and supervisory bodies.
2 7 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
• Brazil’s Marco Civil da Internet: often referred to as Brazil’s “Internet
Constitution,” the Marco Civil became a sort of regulatory poster child for the
proponents of a free, diverse, and open internet—both because of the values
that frame it and because of its participatory elaboration process. Since 2009,
this regulation has gone through ups and downs, from being on the verge of
approval in Parliament to being almost defunct. Recent revelations regarding
the ramifi cations in Brazil of the NSA’s surveillance programs brought the
Marco Civil back to the top of the national political agenda. As a result, the
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies fi nally passed it on 25 March 2014 and sent it
to the Senate for its fi nal vote.
• Audiovisual Communication Services Law in Uruguay: this law, being debated
at this time of writing in Parliament, where it received a fi rst favorable vote
from the Chamber of Deputies in December 2013, aims at regulating and
transforming the broadcasting system. Among other issues, it recognizes
and reserves spectrum for three types of media (commercial, public, and
community), sets limits to concentration and cross-ownership, creates a national
public broadcasting system (National Radio and Television of Uruguay System,
Sistema Nacional de Radio y Television de Uruguay), redesigns the institutional
structure of media regulation (creates a new Council for the application and
implementation of the law, a consulting body with citizen participation, and an
Ombudsman to defend the rights included in the law), and avoids dealing with
content-related issues (except in the areas of children’s protection, deception and
false advertising, and national production quotas).
Beyond the substance of the new media laws being discussed in diff erent countries,
the regulatory changes taking place across the region have also brought to the forefront
procedural issues that have to do with processes of consultation and citizen participation
in media policy formulation and implementation. Experiences such as the elaboration
of the 2007 Community Media Law and the 2012 plan for the digital transition of
television in Uruguay or the Marco Civil da Internet in Brazil, though exceptional to a
large extent, are becoming common points of reference, even models, for civil society
involvement in the media’s regulatory process.
3. Digital Champions
Given the current situation of digitization in Latin America, it is diffi cult to select a
single country as digital champion. Despite obvious national diff erences in approaching
switch-over, there is a certain regional homogeneity linking almost all the countries
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 7 4
covered by the MDM project; for they are in the process of transitioning to digital,
while none of them has completed it; and in all countries the internet is increasingly
relevant as a communication tool and a source of news, while none has developed
comprehensive regulations or policies to address the consequences of this growing
prominence.
Th e diffi culty of identifying a digital champion becomes even more complicated
because digitization is not a one-dimensional process. It has, at the very least, two
clearly diff erentiated facets and two distinct levels. Th e two facets of digitization are,
on the one hand, the transition of analog legacy media to digital media—in particular,
the transition of free-to-air television to digital terrestrial television—and, on the other
hand, the realm of online media—digital by birth. Th e two levels at which these facets
can be examined have to do, on the one hand, with the actual implementation of
digitization—how signifi cant digitization is in the overall media ecology—and, on the
other hand, with the policies and regulations that are being developed to harness this
process.
Regarding the fi rst facet of digitization, all the MDM countries in the region—except
for Guatemala and Nicaragua—have started the process of transitioning from analog
to digital television. Th ough the technical decisions regarding the selection of the
standard and the diff erent stages of implementation and coverage have caused almost
no controversy, some other fl aws have been pointed out in diff erent countries—such
as the encroachment of commercial interests in Mexico and Peru.
In this regard, Uruguay could serve as a positive example. Although it approved a plan
for the digital transition only in 2012, making it one of the last countries to initiate
this process—or perhaps because it has had a chance to learn from other countries’
experiences—Uruguay seems to be moving ahead with transparency and a lack of
arbitrariness, and with clear goals to improve diversity and pluralism. Th e Uruguayan
plan requires license applicants to present and defend their project at a public event,
and the decision is not made through bidding but by evaluating the project in terms
of diversity, employment generation, access for audiences with disabilities, or share of
national production, among other criteria.
Th e plan aims to increase the number of voices in the television market by adding
new commercial channels—while restricting the right of present incumbents to receive
additional licenses—and reserving a third of the licenses for community media and a
third for public media. Th ere has been signifi cant citizen consultation and participation
in drafting the plan, implementing it, and monitoring its results. And even though
2 7 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Uruguay was one of the last countries to start the transition, it will be among the fi rst
to fi nish it: switch-over will take place in 2015.
Regarding the second facet of digitization—the development of the internet in terms
of penetration and use—several countries are at the forefront of digitization; according
to International Telecommunication Union (ITU) data Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay
have more than 10 broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, and more than half
of the population uses the internet. However, the actual development and impact
of the internet on a particular country is contingent upon a series of variables that
often lie outside the scope of media policy and regulation, such as overall economic
development, geography, and social structure.
In this sense, data such as internet or broadband penetration statistics do not provide
a clear picture of whether countries are handling eff ectively the opportunities provided
by online communication. A series of key issues may provide more accurate guidance to
identifying the regional champions in this facet of digitization: issues such as promotion
of access, and the regulation of network neutrality and of intermediary liability.
In terms of access to digital technology, Uruguay’s Ceibal Plan is perhaps the most
signifi cant eff ort in the region. It started in 2007 with the goal of providing every
school child and every teacher with a laptop enabled to connect via Wi-Fi to the
internet, and it has already distributed more than one million machines.
Most recently, the inclusion of access to information and communication technologies
as a right in Mexico’s 2013 constitutional reform is a signifi cant step in the promotion
of access, though implementation has yet to happen.
Regarding network neutrality, Chile had a head start in 2010 when it became the fi rst
country in the world to regulate this signifi cant and contentious issue by law. However,
problems with interpreting and implementing the law on net neutrality seem to have
limited and even impeded the application of this pioneer regulatory eff ort. Other
countries in the region—Peru and Colombia—have regulated network neutrality, but
the impact of that regulation is still uncertain.
With regard to intermediary liability, the situation seems also to be wide open. Court
cases in diff erent countries have involved intermediary liability, but there is no clear
framework in the region for dealing with such cases—although it seems clear that the
interests of copyright holders and the Free Trade Agreements with the United States are
a force to be reckoned with. Since internet regulation covers many diff erent topics, and
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 7 6
no country in the region has tackled them all in a comprehensive way, Brazil’s attempt
at doing so through the Marco Civil da Internet, approved by the Brazilian Chamber
of Deputies in March 2014 and pending a Senate vote at this time of writing, will very
likely become a reference point in the region.
2 7 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Digital Media in South-East Asia Graham Watts
Context
Since the end of the fi nancial crisis that crippled much of emerging Asia, including
all of South-East Asia, in 1997–1998, the region has enjoyed sustained economic
growth and confi dence. Average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth for
the 10 ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) countries has been around
6 percent during the past decade.1
Th e region as a whole has undergone some momentous political changes during the
same period, most notably the fall in 1998 of Suharto, the strongman who ruled
Indonesia for three decades, and his replacement by a democratic order that, despite
occasional wobbles, has gone from strength to strength.
Th ailand, meanwhile, has veered from democratic populism to a military coup and
back again, almost without missing a beat in its relentless export-driven economic
expansion. While Singapore and Malaysia have remained in thrall to the respective
dominant parties that have run them since their founding, both have witnessed
pronounced challenges to that dominance in recent elections, prompting promises of
more responsive government.
C H A P T E R T H I R T E E N
1. See http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/asean.pdf.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 7 8
Neighbors of these four countries, notably the Philippines and Myanmar, have also
undergone substantial political changes for the better. All of which has added to a sense
of purpose and confi dence in the run-up to the regional economic integration project
known as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), due to come into being at the
end of 2015, comprising 600 million people. 2015 is also the year that the 10 ASEAN
countries have agreed to begin the switch from analog to digital terrestrial broadcasting.
Th e four countries in this report diff er in ways that are important for assessing their
experience of digitization. Totally urban, small, rich, educated, and wired to the gills,
Singapore is run by a paternalistic authoritarian party that keeps strict control of all
media. Th is puts it very low in global measures of freedom of expression. However,
unlike almost all its neighbors, the city-state enjoys a reputation at home and abroad for
corruption-free government. It also comes near the top of the class on competitiveness
and economic freedom.
Malaysia has similar authoritarian leanings, but is much less rich and is preoccupied with
policies regarding the ethnic, religious, and socio-economic divides between the Islamic
Malay majority and the relatively large Chinese minority (as well as the smaller Indian
minority). It also has a reputation for cronyism, whereby business friends of the ruling
coalition win government contracts and other opportunities. Corruption is customary.
Th ailand and Indonesia have more in common. Apart from both societies also enduring
endemic state and private corruption, the governments of both countries have to keep
an eye on their restive politically and commercially infl uential militaries, while shaping
policies that take into account the democratic voting power of much poorer and
less educated populations than their neighbors. And Indonesia’s far-fl ung geography
(nearly 250 million people spread over 6,000 inhabited islands) makes it a special case.
Introduction
Television is still overwhelmingly the dominant medium and the primary source of
news in all four countries, where terrestrial television penetration is near saturation
point; even in far-fl ung Indonesia, 96 percent of households have a television and they
watch it for up to four hours a day.2
More important, however, are the alternatives—mainly satellite and cable—and how
much these are preferred or supplement television news consumption. Th ere is no
2. See http://participatorymedia.lab.asu.edu/fi les/Lim_Media_Ford_2011.pdf.
2 7 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
satellite in Singapore, but half of all households have cable, which allows access to
international channels. As many as 30 percent of users name CNN as a source of news,
but this trails the local 24-hour cable news operator Channel News Asia (75 percent),
the Straits Times newspaper (71 percent), and local terrestrial channels (45 percent).3
In Malaysia, viewers have been switching from the state-owned terrestrial television
monopoly to satellite news via the only satellite operator, Astro, but the top terrestrial
television news program still commands 10 times more viewers than the top satellite
news program.4
In Th ailand, where data are poor on this, audiences overwhelmingly favor the state-
and army-run terrestrial news programs that focus on news about the royal family,
entertainment and celebrities, and news “portraying the lives of ordinary people.”5
Th ai PBS, the highly professional and balanced public service broadcaster (PSB), has
about 5 percent of the free-to-air news audiences.6 While Th ailand is well served with
satellite and—in condominium-rich Bangkok—cable, it seems (in the absence of data)
that relatively little news is consumed on these platforms.
Th e real changes are in online and mobile. Audiences in all four countries are going
online and connecting via mobile at an astounding pace, commensurate with the
economic growth and confi dence referred to above.
Table 14.
Mobile and internet penetration, 2012
Country Mobile penetration
(% of total population)
Of which, smartphones
(% of total mobiles)
Internet penetration
(% of total population)
Indonesia 92 20 23
Malaysia 124 27 62
Singapore 150 73 184
Thailand 115 n/a 37
Note: n/a – not available
Source: Mobile Monday market research7
3. See http://www.mediacorp.sg/en/home.
4. Nielsen, “TV Viewership Report,” proprietary data, not published.
5. See http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Th aiTV3-gains-from-rivals-internal-woes-30178399.html.
6. See http://www.mediahubaccess.com/v1_0/mag/mar12/original.pdf and http://mcot.listedcompany.com/misc/
analyst_briefi ng/Analyst_Brifeing_21010.pdf.
7. See http://www.mobilemonday.net/reports/SEA_Report_2012.pdf.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 8 0
But this does not mean that audiences are seeking out news and public debate on
current aff airs. In Th ailand and Indonesia, consuming news from alternative sources
to the mainstream media is less common than in the other two countries. And social
media, blogs, and dissident websites are less of a phenomenon than in Singapore and
Malaysia. Only 4 percent of Indonesians say the internet is a main source of news.
Th ere seems to be a law of alternative media consumption in Asia (and perhaps
elsewhere): the tighter the controls on freedom of expression, the more audiences turn
to independent online and mobile digital sources.
1. Risks
1.1 Clamping Down on the Internet
Singapore announced at the end of May 2013 that news websites would, with immediate
eff ect, have to apply for licenses (conditions of which include a “performance bond” of
the equivalent of US$ 40,000). Th e government says this will bring them into line with
broadcasting media, which have to observe news content guidelines. Th ese include
being required to remove “prohibited content” within 24 hours of being notifi ed
by the authorities. However, the regulator said: “An individual publishing views on
current aff airs and trends on his/her personal website or blog does not amount to news
reporting,” so would not be included.8 Th is was just the latest of many formal curbs the
government has imposed on all media over the years, in spite of what has been going
on in practice—a widening of the parameters of debate (what it calls “out of bound”
or OB markers).
Singapore was regulating internet content before most other countries had even thought
of it. In 1996, internet content providers were subsumed under the Broadcasting Act,
which subjected them to various conditions and an Internet Code of Practice covering
undesirable and illegal content such as pornography and extreme violence, as well as
content regarding religious and political issues.
Established in 2003, Singapore’s Media Development Authority (MDA) is essentially an
instrument of the Ministry of Communications and Information, run by government-
appointed technocrats. It is an industry promoter, a policy implementer, and a
regulator of television, radio, fi lm, video games, digital media, music, and publishing.
8. See http://www.asiaone.com/print/News/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1Story20130531-426503.html.
2 8 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
While there is no pretense at being independent from government, it has adopted a
light-touch approach to regulation.
In Indonesia, while the reforms introduced after the fall of Suharto have included
progressive measures aimed at free expression, there have been some reversals. Th ree
laws raise concerns: the Law on Information and Electronic Transactions and the
Pornography Act, both 2008, and the Law on State Intelligence, 2011. Th e fi rst of
these had a widely followed early outing in 2009, when it was used to jail a middle-
aged Jakarta housewife who had criticized, in an email to friends, a hospital’s diagnosis
of her condition.9
Th e Pornography Act goes beyond prohibiting explicit sexual images and is regarded
by many, especially non-Muslim minorities, as an attempt to enforce stricter social
codes on them, in order to appease militant Islamists. Th e Law on State Intelligence,
meanwhile, broadly authorizes (under Article 6) the State Intelligence Agency to
engage in eff orts “to prevent and/or to fi ght any eff ort, work, intelligence activity, and/
or opponents that may be harmful to national interests and national security,” echoing
the measures used by the state under Suharto.
Th ere have been few cases of abuse of these laws so far, however, and the greatest
constraints on Indonesia’s media freedom arise from the ownership of the media
themselves: big business and political interests coincide in the media landscape.
Journalists practice self-censorship and the media are nakedly used to promote their
owners’ business and political interests.10
While Malaysia’s club of ruling coalition and business friends likewise serve as the
chief curb on freedom of expression in that country, the state has some eff ective legal
weapons at its disposal. Apart from the all-encompassing Sedition Act, inherited from
British rule, an amendment to Malaysia’s Evidence Act in 2012 makes website owners,
administrators, and editors responsible for content published on their sites, including
comments posted by others. If they are to avoid punishment, they must prove they
did not publish the content. Meanwhile, the internet is specifi cally governed by the
Communications and Multimedia Act; Section 233 makes it a crime to publish
content that is “obscene, indecent, false, menacing or off ensive in character with intent
to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person.” Yes, “annoy.”
9. See http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/facebooking-for-reform.
10. For example, Visi Media Asia is owned by members of the very politically active Bakri family. One big media
group is owned by a government minister. In fact, media moguls with ties to the former ruling Golkar party might
well be among those running for president in 2014.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 8 2
Nonetheless, the government has deployed its legal arsenal with restraint, limiting
much of its pressure to “investigations” that serve as warnings rather than actual
prosecutions of media organizations of journalists. Print media editors and journalists
talk openly about getting “the call” when they publish content that displeases their
owners and government heavyweights. Editors of various media have been suspended
or resigned shortly after such an event.
Th e Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), the state
appointed and directed regulator, has let internet service providers know that it is
monitoring their content and that they should adhere to their licensing conditions,
including a code of content, under the Communications and Multimedia Act.
Potential fi nes of more than US$ 30,000, a jail term of up to two years, and suspension
or revocation of their licenses tend to concentrate the mind.
A sinister new development has been cyber-attacks on the websites known to be critical
of the ruling coalition and which provide more coverage to opposition political groups
than is provided by the state-owned media. Th e MCMC denies responsibility.
At the same time Radio Televisyen Malaysia (RTM), which is state-owned and
housed under the broadcasting department within the Ministry of Information,
Communications, and Culture, makes little eff ort to be anything more than a
mouthpiece for the ruling coalition. Bernama, the state news agency, is largely a
noticeboard for government announcements.
1.2 Divisions and Hate Content
Most countries in the region have signifi cant ethnic/religious divides, and digital
media have provided new and prolifi c opportunities for these to be exploited through
hate speech and extremist content. While Singapore keeps a tight lid on all forms of
communication about these issues (to the extent that the city-state ranks very low on
most freedom indices), extremist groups in Indonesia and Malaysia have indulged in
online expressions of hate and militancy.
In Th ailand, the divide between “reds” (broadly speaking, rural “commoner” followers
of the exiled populist Th aksin Shinawatra) and “yellows” (pro-monarchist allies of the
military and Bangkok elite) persists with great intensity in highly partisan satellite
television channels, notably ASTV and People Channel PTV, and juvenile name-
calling on social media sites. Both sides use the country’s strict lèse majesté law, which
forbids criticism of the king, queen, and crown prince, in order to intimidate and
silence the other.
2 8 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Th e most negative development in Th ailand’s embrace of digitization has been
the willingness of the authorities to use the Computer-Related Crime Act of 2007
(introduced during the military government that followed the toppling of Th aksin)
to prosecute those who post comments or who run websites that contain comments
they regard as defamatory or which fall under the lèse majesté terms. Th e webmaster of
Prachatai, a fi ercely independent news website, Chiranuch Premchaiporn, was recently
given a suspended jail term for not taking down content posted on her website quickly
enough.
Other notable cases include a man who was sentenced to 20 years in jail for sending
SMS messages to an aide of the prime minister that were found to be grossly insulting
to the queen.11 Th en there is Daranee Chamchoengsilpakul, the red shirt fi rebrand
known as Da Torpedo, who was sentenced to 18 years in jail for making anti-
monarchist speeches during street protests in 2008. (If you search Da Torpedo from
inside Th ailand, many of the links that come up are blocked.)
During the State of Emergency declared in April 2010 to counter the massive “red
shirt” street protests in the center of Bangkok, the government blocked hundreds of
websites and thousands of specifi c URLs. Community radio stations sympathetic to the
red shirt movement were raided and closed down, and the transmissions of PTV, the
major mouthpiece of the red shirts, were suspended by Th aicom, a satellite operator,
under the orders of the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology.
Red shirt print media, Voice of Th aksin, Red News, and Truth Today, were also banned.
1.3 Regulators: Under the Government Thumb
In not one of the countries is there a truly independent broadcast and telecoms regulator.
Th ailand comes closest with the long delayed establishment of a National Broadcasting
and Telecommunications Commission. Financed by license fees, it is required by law
to be independent, with autonomous day-to-day operations. And commissioners may
not hold a position in a political party or have been employed in the industry in under
a year previous to their appointment. However, they are appointed by the Senate, half
of which is itself appointed rather than elected. Perhaps it is little wonder, therefore,
that fi ve of the 11 commissioners are former military or police top brass and only one
is a woman.
11. Th e man, who was in his sixties and said he didn’t even know how to send an SMS and didn’t know the person to
whom he was alleged to have sent the messages, died just a few months into his sentence, apparently from cancer.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 8 4
In Indonesia, the Broadcasting Act of 2002 established the independent Indonesia
Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia, KPI). However, in 2006
new government regulations passed eff ective control of licensing, regulation of
program content, and ownership concentration to the Ministry of Communications
and Information. Th is in eff ect sidelined the KPI, restricting its role to making
recommendations about the ability of an applicant to be a broadcaster.
Malaysia’s MCMC was set up by the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998
with “powers to supervise and regulate the communications and multimedia activities
in Malaysia.” Th e information, communications, and culture minister appoints all
commissioners, including the chair. Th e Act explicitly states that the commission is
responsible to the minister.
In Singapore’s paternalistic system, the idea of giving “independence” to a regulator
is a foreign, not to say peculiar, idea. Th e state directly and indirectly owns all media,
sets policies for them, and regulates them. It is by defi nition a common enterprise.
Independence has no place in such a system.
1.4 Uncritical Journalism
One last issue should be noted. Journalism in most of East Asia—including this
region—has suff ered from a lack of critical and independent professionalism. News
is still widely regarded as what the newsmakers say—so-called “he-said-she-said”
reporting. If a briefi ng is called, it must be news—and because so many reporters are
based in the press rooms of the ministry they cover (very rarely showing up in their
own newsrooms), the news agenda is set by politicians, offi cials, and the PR industry.
To make matters worse, there is very little “added value” reporting in the form of
background, context, analysis, balance, or multiple sourcing. Digitization has made
this worse. Press releases and offi cial “backgrounders” can be copied and pasted into
stories; competitors’ stories can be read online soon after news events (some reporters
share their stories with their friends from other publications to enable them to skip
briefi ngs), making for more homogenized news judgment; and alarming numbers of
journalists have subscribed to the unsupported myth that online stories have to be
short.
2 8 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
2. Opportunities
2.1 Social Media Frenzy
South-East Asians are prolifi c social media junkies. Th ey are tapping away and
uploading pictures in their hundreds of millions, mainly on Facebook. While current
aff airs junkies might discount the progressive signifi cance of billions of bits of trivia,
we should not underestimate how important it is for particularly young people in more
conformist societies to be able to express their more individualistic selves and to be
able to take risks in cultures that place a high premium on “saving face,” or at least not
“losing face.”12 Th ere are about 50 million Facebook users in Indonesia (approaching
20 percent of its far-fl ung population that has an internet penetration rate of just 23
percent), behind only the more developed United States and two other large population
countries, India and Brazil (although some stats say it is second only to the United
States, or was until very recently).13 Much more connected and wealthier Singapore
and Malaysia have penetration rates of 54 percent and 46 percent, respectively, while
Th ailand’s is 26 percent, the same as Brazil’s. Th is compares with the United States’ 55
percent and South Africa’s 13 percent.14
Malaysians enjoy a higher than global median number of Facebook friends in the
world (233 each compared with a global median of 200).15 In Indonesia, Twitter has
about 5.6 million users, the most in the region. Th ailand has fewer than a million.16
Th us, digitization has equipped hundreds of millions of South-East Asians with the
means to express themselves freely. If, when, and how they do that is part of that
freedom.
Of course, they are already doing so in impressive ways in all four countries. Th ey
carry news that would otherwise never be published in the traditional media because
of the latter’s closeness to government and business, and they have an excellent record
of arranging mass protests. Th e most recent—and apt illustration of that, given the
subject matter—was the homepage of Singapore’s Th e Online Citizen (TOC) on 8
12. Paradoxically, the conformist factor might even account for at least a part of the Facebook craze.
13. See http://www.techinasia.com/india-indonesia-facebook.
14. See http://www.internetworldstats.com.
15. See http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/04/facebook-in-numbers-statistics.
16. See http://www.forest-interactive.com/twitter-users.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 8 6
June 2013, advertising a protest against the government curbs on online freedom
mentioned above:
Figure 12.
2.2 Outspoken, Brave Young Media
Apart from TOC, several other independent sites are now part of everyday public life
in Singapore. Head north and you will fi nd much the same thing, led by one of the
world’s fi rst and best known internet interventions, Malaysiakini, brave, outspoken,
and—very importantly—fi nancially viable through a combination of subscriptions
and advertising. Many other online news sites have sprouted up in the past fi ve years.
Th e biggest public anti-government protests ever held in Malaysia in the form of the
so-called Bersih rallies over the past three or four years were promoted and directed by
a full range of digital platforms. (“Bersih” means “clean” in Malay.) Proposed online
sedition guidelines and plans to put the online media under the Printing Presses and
Publications Act were shelved indefi nitely after a sustained online protest campaign.
And during the general election on 5 May 2013, both the ruling coalition and
opposition candidates put digital media at the heart of their campaigns.17
17. See http://www.digitalnewsasia.com/digital-economy/ge13-a-social-media-election-after-all.
2 8 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In Th ailand, Prachatai stands out as one of the most active websites for alternative news
sources and citizen journalism. Many of its articles are written by professional journalists,
scholars, and social activists, and it carries content in both Th ai and English. It was shut
down in April 2010 during the State of Emergency along with more than 30 other websites.
In Indonesia, online alternatives to the dominant traditional media are less independent.
Th e one that stands out is Detik.com. Founded by two journalists in 1998 as the post-
Suharto era began, it is now owned by CT Group, which has interests in other media,
including two national television channels, as well as banking, insurance, retail, and
entertainment. Other leading online news websites also belong to much bigger media
organizations.
Digitization has also brought to the region a range of televisual alternatives to the
dull, self-serving off erings of state television that dominated the fi rst generation of the
medium. Even though the industry is dominated in Th ailand and Indonesia by the sort
of low-grade content much beloved of audiences the world over, there are alternatives
to these out there, from global to domestic news channels.
2.3 Freeing Up Licenses
In this respect, the best digitization-related news to come out of the region was the
creation of Th ai PBS, a truly independent and professional public broadcaster in
Th ailand. Never mind that it was set up during military rule after the coup that unseated
Th aksin in 2006.18 While Th ai PBS has yet to prove popular in any signifi cant way, it
has already provided an important alternative for audiences dissatisfi ed with the diet
off ered by mainstream media and the more partisan off erings on satellite. It encourages
civic participation, including in primetime news programs that allow ordinary people
to report news from their perspective, and in talkshows. It even ran fi ve controversial
programs on successive week nights in March 2013, robustly debating the country’s
lèse majesté laws.19
18. Th e full story has not yet been told, but it appears that some social and media campaigners provided the military
government with an opportunity it could not resist. Th ey had seized a TV channel that Th aksin had largely turned
into his mouthpiece and weren’t sure what to do with it. So the campaigners persuaded them to take it away from
him and anyone else like him forever and turn it into a PSB at a very long arm’s length from the state.
19. Th e issue of lèse majesté should not be mistaken as an anachronism. Th e role of the royal family is very much a
part of the red–yellow divide in Th ai politics. Th e fi nal program was cancelled at the last minute, presumably
when someone must have panicked (there was a protest from royalists outside the station’s HQ and the army chief
expressed outrage at the program), but it was broadcast on the following Monday despite a clamorous exchange
on social media and quotes from the usual suspects in the mainstream media. Th e deputy minister described the
programs as a disgrace and the commander in chief of the police ordered all police stations to be “ready to accept
lèse majesté complaints from the public.” Th is was a shining case study of independence and courageous profes-
sionalism in a public broadcaster.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 8 8
Yet Th ailand has not been entirely alone in this endeavor. After the fall of Suharto,
Indonesia set about freeing up all manner of state institutions. From 1998 to 2002,
more than 900 new commercial radio and fi ve new commercial television licenses
were issued. Th e principle of press freedom was enshrined in the new Press Law of
1999. Th e Broadcasting Act of 2002 stressed media decentralization and emphasized
accountability and transparency in licensing procedures for public service and
commercial broadcasting licenses. Th e Indonesian Broadcasting Commission was set
up as an independent regulatory body representing the public interest, especially in the
licensing processes. Th e Act also established Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI) as a
public broadcasting institution with a mandate for neutrality and independence.
One of the most encouraging elements of the post-Suharto era of more open government
has been Indonesia’s Transparency of Public Information Law (2008), an important
example for such a large and diverse country. Th e law has received mixed reviews,
however. While the law off ers legal guarantees for public access to information, it also
provides for a year-long jail term for anyone who “misuses” that information—with
the defi nition of “misuse” left vague and potentially open to abuse. Other critics point
out that the interpretation of exemptions has proved problematic, with government
offi cials taking much the same view of secrecy as before the law was passed.20
In Singapore, MediaCorp, the state-owned broadcaster, has widened its remit to
something closer to a public service broadcaster, but without the fi nancial and
governance independence usually associated with a fully fl edged PSB. Its remit is to
“inform, educate and entertain,” and racial diversity is an important guiding principle
for its programming. In July 2012, the government gave US$ 515 million for what it
calls “public service content,” up 35 percent on the previous fi ve-year period.
Th e story is, then, primarily one of access and capacity, even though both are mostly
being expended on status updates. In all four countries, however, it has not taken much
for the banal to give way to the brave when governments abuse their powers, or indeed
when people are asked to choose their governments. Th e same smartphone that snaps
the plate of food you are about to eat in a restaurant has been just as eff ectively used to
record election fraud or an act of police brutality, for the world to see. Little Brother
is watching you.
20. See http://www.freedominfo.org/2012/03/reports-critically-assess-rti-performance-in-indonesia.
2 8 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
3. Digital Champions
If the measure of a digital champion was freedom of expression alone, Singapore would
not be the region’s most progressive and fast-developing nation. Perhaps Indonesia
would win the title (Th ailand and Malaysia would not), but not by a wide margin.
Most of the victories on that front in Indonesia are the result of post-Suharto reforms,
not the opportunities off ered by digital technology, and even some of those have been
rolled back. In any case, Singapore was authoritarian before digital technology—and it
is more open now because of it, even if other rich and educated countries are far freer
and regard the city-state as an embarrassing laggard. But freedom of expression is not
the only measure, and on all the others, Singapore canters home in fi rst place.
How could it not when this research project’s comparative tables show Singapore in
the top three countries in the world on the most important measures of digital media
consumption, internet (in eff ect 100 percent of households have some sort of high-
speed broadband), and mobile penetration (150 percent at the start of 2013)? Eight
out of 10 mobile subscribers are on 3G, and 4G coverage at street level is now close
to 100 percent.21 And unlike so many other countries where mobile is so pervasive, all
households also have fi xed-line telephone links. Close to one in four digital consumers
in Singapore (23 percent) now have a tablet computer in the household.22
According to the Media Development Authority, the city-state’s digital policy executive-
cum-regulator, “internet awareness” and “media literacy” are fast approaching 100
percent of the population. Th e MDA defi nes these as basic awareness of new media
technologies, competence in using media via diff erent platforms, and an ability to use
media tools responsibly and safely. Th e MDA has likened media literacy to a “life skill”
that is essential for work, learning, and play in the digital age.23
And Singaporeans are working, learning, and playing hard. Th ey move readily and
seamlessly from offl ine to online and mobile, while still reading in print and watching
television and movies on mobile devices and sharing news in a variety of forms, from
SMS alerts through to full-scale news channels and websites. Th ree in fi ve adults (60
percent) now go online daily. According to comScore’s Media Metrix statistics as of
21. See http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-is-closer-to-4g-coverage-islan/649388.html.
22. See http://www.blackbox.com.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Blackbox-YKA-Whitepaper-Smartphones.
pdf.
23. See http://www.mda.gov.sg/PUBLIC/PUBLICEDUCATION/Pages/MediaLiteracy.aspx.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 9 0
April 2012,24 94.7 percent of Singapore’s online population aged 15+ engaged in social
networking (second only to the Philippines at 96 percent). Another 2012 survey25 of
over 50,000 Singapore users found 68 percent using social media at least once a week.
Much of this takes place on the island’s free public WiFi hotspots, which have more
than 2 million subscribers making use of it for on average 25 hours a month.26
As with so much of Singapore’s success over the past two generations, these leaps and
bounds have been planned, engineered, implemented, and policed (not to put too
strong a word on it) by the technocratic-paternalistic state and its close—indeed often
state-owned—partners in business. It is quite conceivable that a state with so much
power and control would be complacent and defensive, disinclined to innovate, slow to
take risks, and probably happy to treat digitization more as a rent-seeking opportunity
than one to empower its citizens.
By contrast, it has been Singapore’s two media monopolies that have done the most
to provide new platforms, helping to deliver a greater diversity of news and debate
in what was long a cautious, middle-aged, and middle-of-the-road kind of public
sphere. Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), the dominant print group, for example, hosts
increasingly popular online editions of its newspapers (claiming more than 270 million
page views and 18 million unique visitors every month),27 as well as iPad and iPhone
applications for Th e Straits Times and an Android smartphone application as well as
iPad and smartphone apps for Th e Business Times.
Apart from Straitstimes.com, SPH has launched a lively news portal AsiaOne, a citizen
journalism site STOMP (Straits Times Online Mobile Print), and a video news channel
RazorTV—which collectively had 5.2 million unique visitors in January 2010, and
crossed the 80-million mark for the fi rst time. SPH, meanwhile, launched a bilingual
(English-Chinese) news and interactive web portal Omy.sg as long ago as 2007. Th is is
not catch-up or keep-up. It’s being fi rst, fast.
Th e other pillar of Singapore’s state-controlled media monopoly, MediaCorp, has taken
its newspaper and magazines online with services such as the “EasyReader” for users
to download the news from any internet connection and read it on the go. Its fl agship
24. G. Dale, “State of the global and local internet,” comScore Presentation at AdTech Singapore 2012, at http://
www.slideshare.net/nguyenht/comscore-presentation-adtech-singapore-2012.
25. Rock Publicity, “Th e state of social media in Singapore,” 2012, at http://trainingedgeasia.com/download/2012-
RP-SINGAPORE-SOCIAL-MEDIA-STUDY.pdf.
26. See http://www.zdnet.com/sg/singapore-looks-to-extend-free-public-wi-fi -7000003495.
27. See http://www.sph.com.sg/ourproducts.shtml.
2 9 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
online product, Channelnewsasia.com, has “my news playlist” for people to pick from
a two-week archive of news and lifestyle videos and create their own news video. “News
In Singapore” on YouTube has news clips from Channel NewsAsia’s nightly “Singapore
Tonight” bulletin.
MediaCorp is also responsible for Xinmsn,28 a portal with video services launched
in March 2010, bringing together Microsoft and MediaCorp’s services and media
platforms. It enjoyed 70 million page views by October 2010—an increase of 94 percent
from launch and 192 percent from the same time in 2009 when MSN Singapore
and Xin.sg operated independently.29 Th e portal’s news, lifestyle, and sports channels
received a combined 14 million page views. Th is early success was partly attributed to
the addition of “Catch-Up TV” for free video-on-demand from MediaCorp channels
and Hollywood studios such as FOX and Disney. In 2011, it introduced “webisodes,”
short episodes typically between four and 15 minutes that air initially as internet
television.
All of this without any serious damage to the traditional print sector. Daily readership
remains steady, hovering at around three-quarters (77 percent) of the population.
According to a global study, 68 percent of Singapore respondents said they trusted
“traditional media.”30
While the state and its media organizations have led the way with innovation in digital
media, independent bloggers and news websites have also joined the game. It has not
been easy. Apart from a couple of professionally staff ed newsrooms in foreign-owned
technology companies (MSN and Yahoo!) with offi ces in Singapore and a modest
operation set up in 2012 by homegrown telecommunications giant Singtel, practically
all sources of homegrown alternative media are volunteer run, often relying on online
advertising or crowd-funding. Given Singapore’s reputation for political apathy and
aversion to dissent, they have nonetheless been courageous and eff ective, succeeding
in forcing sensitive issues more and more onto the mainstream agenda and galvanizing
opposition politics.
Meanwhile, various government agencies are collaborating in the development of a
“media hub” for the incubation of start-ups as well as testing new forms of interactive
28. See http://xin.msn.com.
29. Report by Channel NewsAsia, “Xinmsn emerges as Singapore’s top online portal,” 23 November 2010, at http://
www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1095090/1/.html.
30. See http://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanAPAC/fi nal-presentation-trust-barometer-2013-singapore-31-jan.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 9 2
digital media, fi lm, and broadcasting, which they hope will make Singapore a leader
in Asia in digital media innovation. And they have already begun trials for so-called
“super WiFi” that exploits unused parts of the television spectrum known as white
spaces.31
It is clear, then, that Singapore has been a remarkably fast-developing digital nation.
Many more platforms are now speedily accessible to all. But has this growth been
progressive?
We live in a world where many countries have long criminalized holocaust denial and
the espousal of Nazi sympathies, and where social media—including Facebook—are
showing that they are ready to take down misogynist content. Th e smell of burning
fl esh during race riots on the Malay Peninsula in the 1950s and 1960s still haunts
many Singaporeans.
Even so and for all its caution, the Singapore government and its media establishment
have shown a willingness to widen the parameters of what they deem acceptable debate.
In modern Singapore, these parameters are a lot tighter than most progressives would
regard as acceptable, but the term “progressive” surely derives some of its meaning from
the notion of moving forward. No one in Singapore gets taken out and shot if they
break the rules. In fact, there is nothing brutal about the way Singapore does all this,
apart from its effi ciency. And it does not make sense to say if they put it up they can
just as easily take it down again. Th e same holds true for any government. In sum, the
extremely high levels of media literacy that Singapore has attained, and the range of
platforms upon which that literacy can be deployed, are very signifi cant achievements.
31. See http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2012/09/06/singapore-launches-super-wi-fi -internet-trials.
2 9 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Digital Media in Asia: India and Pakistan Graham Watts
Context
Whatever the many diff erences between India and Pakistan, they have much in
common in their experience of digitization. Th e most important factor has not been the
adoption of digital technology itself, but the eff ects on it of the economic liberalization
and deregulation that both countries have pursued, with occasional interruptions, over
the past two decades.
Th e forces unleashed by liberalization (which include market-driven trends of
privatization, deregulation, and opening up to global trade and foreign investment)
have led to a rapid expansion of the two predominantly rural countries’ urban middle
class. India’s gross domestic product (GDP) per head rose fi vefold between 1991 and
2011. By comparison, over the previous 20 years (1971–1991) it increased by less than
half. Pakistan’s GDP per head rose threefold compared with a mere 50 percent increase
in the 20 years from 1971.1
Th is rapid growth in turn laid the groundwork for a remarkable expansion of digital
media consumption. In Pakistan, for instance, consumer spending increased by an
C H A P T E R F O U R T E E N
1. See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 9 4
average of 26 percent a year between 2010 and 2012, more than three times the rate
for Asia as a whole.2
With the coming of digitization, therefore, both countries have enjoyed spectacular
growth in private sector media and telecoms, in particular cable and satellite television
and mobile telephony, which has been further fuelled by the fact that their populations
are exceptionally young. Nearly half of India’s 1.2 billion people and 55 percent of
Pakistan’s 190 million are under the age of 25.3
India and Pakistan’s constitutional commitments to democracy have been undermined
by endemic political patronage, corruption, and business favoritism. Th is has been
made worse by the inertia of offi cialdom, known as the “license raj,” which has long
infested policymaking, including all matters related to digitization. In Pakistan’s case,
these things have been complicated by the armed forces’ persistent meddling. Ethnic,
caste, and religious divides lurk in dark corners of both countries and indeed across
their territorial and electronic borders.
Introduction
Th e most notable trend has been a voracious appetite for television news in several
languages across all regions of both countries, making television by far the primary
source of news. It is diffi cult to know which came fi rst, supply or demand, given the
magnetic force of sensational and frenzied 24-hour breaking news. More than a third
of Indian households (overwhelmingly in the large urban conurbations) have cable or
satellite television, and numbers of mobile subscribers rose from about 15 percent of
the population to more than 80 percent in fi ve years.4 In Pakistan, more than half of
households (again, predominantly in the big cities) have cable or satellite television and
70 percent of the population have mobile phones.5
Th e strong growth in pay-TV and mobile telephony contrasts sharply with strikingly
low rates of internet usage. Just over 2 percent of India’s population have internet
2. F. Mangi, “Pakistan loving Fat Burger as fast food boom ignores drones,” Bloomberg.com, 7 January 2013, at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-07/pakistan-loving-fatburger-as-fast-food-boom-ignores-u-s-drones.
html.
3. See http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/india.pakistan/demographics.
4. See http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/mapping-digital-media-india.
5. Gallup, Pakistan, 2010 proprietary data, unpublished.
2 9 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
subscriptions,6 and Pakistan’s nearly 20 percent, although substantially ahead of India’s,
is still only half that of China.7
Whereas satellite television and, to some extent, FM radio, have brought a wider
choice of both language and content to both countries, large numbers of people
(in Pakistan, half the population) have no alternative to the terrestrial delivery of
(mostly government-serving) programs by the state-owned (nominally public service)
broadcasters.
1. Risks
In both countries, the state has largely stepped aside and passed the media technology
baton to business. Th e result has been that they are far behind in the digital switch-
over stakes (neither has gone beyond broadly outlined intentions) and their nominally
public broadcasters have further degenerated into grey government mouthpieces
through a paradoxical mix of neglect and protection.
At the same time, nimble and highly competitive private sector media organizations
have consolidated their analog era dominance in the broadcast, online, and mobile
worlds in which business interests meet political patronage. Th e absence of adequate
cross-media ownership limits—and in the case of Pakistan their relaxation in 2007—
has allowed further consolidation of that dominance.
Aggressively pursued commercial goals color every aspect of this new media landscape,
pushing up ratings and circulations while dragging down journalistic standards and
ethics. Th e result is often a news agenda in which attracting audiences becomes the
driving force behind content, usually a mix of cricket, entertainment, celebrity, and
crime, with politics thrown in when it is especially egregious or combative.
Indian media companies have gone farthest through such practices as “paid news”
(undeclared advertorials) and “private treaties” (advertise with us and we’ll give you
good coverage in exchange for equity in your business). Journalists cannot alienate
companies (or governments and local authorities) that advertise a lot, and in any case
some media organizations are simply part of a vast business group with interests in
6. See http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/mapping-digital-media-india.
7. Gallup, Pakistan, 2010 proprietary data, unpublished.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 9 6
many sectors and fi nd themselves being required to promote and defend those business
interests.
Meanwhile, the big media companies have subsumed much of the critical blogosphere
by providing platforms for leading commentators, thereby co-opting the more
independent voices heard on social media in other countries. Most social media activity
is thus limited to social networking and entertainment. Where more serious issues
do come up, the newly empowered middle classes tend to talk to themselves about
their own problems—such as urban crime, poor services, and corruption that annoys
them—highlighting the profound digital divides in both countries.
Spectrum allocation and regulation policies pay more attention to pricing logic and
commercial potential (maximizing government rents) rather than public interest
considerations and institutional independence, which partly explains why there
has been little public consultation on these issues. Competition is good and more
competition is best.
Blatant corruption aside, India’s fragmented policy apparatus also creates fertile ground
for politicization and favoritism in decisions on resource allocation, technology choice,
licensing criteria, and ownership. Furthermore, in India, because of the considerable
power wielded at the state level by local politicians and their business allies, extra-legal
pressures are brought to bear on broadcasters and content makers who produce or
distribute critical content.
In Pakistan, violent extremist organizations and militant groups increasingly use
social networks and video-sharing platforms to spread hate content and to recruit new
members. Journalists get caught up in the deadly divides between various sectarian
groups and the security forces. In fact, it is the most dangerous country on earth to be
a journalist.
2. Opportunities
India and Pakistan have traditions of robust public discourse. Digital media have
played a big role in increasing the number of voices involved and the audiences that
can hear and see this discourse. In the analog era, an educated urban elite waded
through an exchange of views in excruciatingly lengthy newspaper op-eds (occasionally
spread over several days) written in stilted Victorian English or its equivalent in the
vernacular languages.
2 9 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
To their credit, many of the same media companies took the digital bull by the horns
and, among other things, delivered 24-hour news interspersed with live interviews and
vigorous talkshows and commentaries that have massively multiplied the numbers of
those who follow the news—and also, incidentally, those who produce it.
While in both countries a lot of the journalism that has come with this burgeoning
news-consuming culture has been shallow and unprofessional, there has also been much
innovation and new opportunities created. For instance, cross-media ownership allows
important stories to be given a longer shelf-life across more platforms. And even content
that is not published or broadcast by mainstream media outlets because of pressure
from the state, advertisers, political parties, or the bias of the media organization itself is
increasingly available to the public. Th is is because some journalists upload their content
to blogs and video-sharing sites. In Pakistan, a group of professional journalists manages
Saach.tv, a news website that aims to “address the many shortcomings of mainstream
television channels,” and “restore basic values of news – objectivity and fairness.”8
In India, the so-called “sting” method of exposing corruption has received considerable
attention following what is probably the most noteworthy case in 2001, when the
website Tehelka.com laid bare a web of bribery in the defense ministry and government
through spycams and reporters masquerading as arms dealers. Th ere has been a patchy
record of credibility and accuracy related to sting operations over the years, but they have
contributed signifi cantly to knowledge about the brazen and extensive nature of offi cial
corruption and they have amplifi ed demands by civil society organizations for cleaner
government. Th is is partly to do with the fact that exposés of this kind have forced their
way onto the agenda of the more cautious mainstream media in both countries.
Beyond specifi c investigations, digital media have made a signifi cant contribution to
political and civil campaigns. In 2007, a blog that brazenly named itself the Emergency
Times coordinated and reported on protests against the imposition of emergency rule
by the then military strongman General Pervez Musharraf. It posted photos and videos
captured on mobile phone cameras as well as live SMS2blog updates from rallies and
other pro-democracy meetings. Since the government had blocked broadcasts of such
meetings, this kind of citizen journalism became the only source of information about
the campaign. Due to the deployment of other digital media and street protests, the
campaigners triumphed when the general stepped down and went into exile a year later.
8. See http://www.saach.tv.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S2 9 8
Since then, the emboldened media have exposed offi cial corruption, highlighted poor
service delivery and other governance issues in urban centers, and brought attention
to human rights violations by militant groups as well as by the army and intelligence
agencies. Th e independent digital news media have also played a vital role in relief
eff orts during humanitarian crises sparked by natural disasters or the mass displacement
of people from north-western Pakistan as a result of clashes between militant groups
and the army. News reporting from fl ood-hit areas in 2010 and 2011, which aff ected
up to 20 million people, helped the government and donor agencies to coordinate
relief and reconstruction eff orts.
In India, the most signifi cant online activism has been the India Against Corruption
(IAC) campaign launched in April 2011 on Facebook, Twitter, and a dedicated
campaign website.9 Th e IAC marked a watershed not only because of its scale, the
campaign also had roots in offl ine activism. Th is marked a crucial diff erence from most
middle-class initiatives that germinate online. Th e struggle continues.
Coverage of the issues that matter most to the many religious and/or regional ethnic
and language minorities in both countries has improved because of the proliferation
of privately owned vernacular television and FM radio channels. Th e internet has also
provided the space for other marginalized groups to at least express their own vision
and air issues of importance to them, even though little fi lters through into the national
conversation and the state broadcasters have largely failed to exploit the opportunities
provided by digital media for greater inclusivity.
3. Digital Champions
In footballing terms, the match between India and Pakistan is a no-score draw. Both
countries have taken such a long time to decide how and when they might seize the
opportunities that digital technology off ers to improve their tired state broadcasters.
It might be said that India scored fi rst in the most ironic way with the exposure in 2008
of jaw-dropping malfeasance in the allocation of 2G mobile frequencies, a process
at the heart of digitization policy. Th ough the fallout continues in the courts to this
day, a judge cancelled 122 mobile telecoms licenses as a result of the revelations that
emerged, as it happens, not via digital media, but in two old-fashioned print magazines.
9. See http://www.indiaagainstcorruption.com.
2 9 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Taped conversations, which implicated journalists among many others, were made by
police investigating a tax case, not in some courageous act of digital technology-aided
investigative journalism.
Once the story broke, however, it spread everywhere—and digital media played their
part. But the biggest thing about it was that it revealed in great detail the byzantine web
of intrigue and corruption at the heart of Indian government and business and no one
could stop the story coming out. Th ere is something progressive about that.
Pakistan equalized with its “Lawyers’ Movement,” a much less complicated—and
equally far-reaching—campaign aided by all forms of digital media that eventually led
to the fall of military strongman General Pervez Musharraf.
Both countries, of course, score highly with the proliferation of news content on
satellite and cable television, multiplying by millions those who are informed about
current events and who follow the debates in their society.
Beyond that, however, there is little that might be described as progressive or fast
developing. What possibly gives the game to India in this contest are two initiatives that
are designed to address the questions of widening access and narrowing the digital divide.
One is the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) that dates back to 2003
and was initially designed with telegraph and fi xed phone line provision in mind.
Generated from a portion of private operators’ fees, the fund is intended to help with
the expansion of mobile telecoms infrastructure in rural areas, often where this task,
shouldered by the public sector telecoms operators, would be deemed commercially
non-viable.
It might come as no surprise, however, that the Consumer Online Foundation, a
watchdog, said in June 2012, that “the Government has failed to utilize the resources
raised for the purpose of developing infrastructure in the telecom sector.”10
Th e second initiative is the roll-out obligation for 3G provision whereby operators are
required, for instance, to ensure that within fi ve years (by 31 August 2015) 3G will be
off ered in at least 50 percent of districts (local administrative divisions), of which at
least 15 percent should have a 50 percent rural population.
10. See http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/info-tech/uso-fund-not-being-utilised-by-govt/
article3576363.ece.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 0 0
Again, this appears to be making little diff erence. Th e Department of Telecommunications
still has not drawn up a list of rural districts because it is “undecided about whether to
follow the 2001 census or the 2011 census fi gures to prepare the list.”11
Th is is a pertinent case study of the abject failure of India to do much that is either
fast developing or progressive. It would have been nice had Pakistan been any better.
11. See http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/doubts-over-roll-out-obligations-of-3g-spectrum-
winners-continue-113052200892_1.html.
3 0 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Digital Media in the Arab World Aboubakr Jamaï
Context
In Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Morocco—the four countries in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region included in the Mapping Digital Media (MDM) project—
the political situation is in fl ux.1 If the wave of revolution known as the Arab Spring had
its greatest impact on Egypt, it has also aff ected the other countries in varying degrees.
Jordan and Morocco witnessed months of demonstrations for greater democracy. Th e
power elites in both countries responded with promises of sweeping reform. Th ree
years on, however, the structure of these regimes has not changed much. Freedom of
the press in both countries, especially digital media, has witnessed serious setbacks. In
Lebanon, the fragile politico-sectarian modus vivendi has been further undermined by
the civil war in Syria. As for Egypt, freedom of speech and the press have been curtailed
as a result of the extreme polarization of the political landscape.
Th e region faces formidable economic challenges. Not the least of these is youth
unemployment. Unemployment in the MENA region is the highest in the world and
is largely a youth phenomenon. Some 65 percent of the population in the region is
under the age of 30. According to the World Bank, the share of young people (aged 15
C H A P T E R F I F T E E N
1. Tunisia was also included in the MDM series, but it proved impossible to complete the report. Th is overview
draws on unpublished data and analysis prepared for the Tunisia report.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 0 2
to 24) in total unemployment at least doubles the total rate. Youth unemployment is
25 percent higher than in any other region in the world.
It is precisely the regimes’ failure to create economic opportunities for its young
citizens while simultaneously denying them a voice that fueled the protests in 2011.
One positive consequence here is the emergence of a culture of protest. Events during
the last three years, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, have demonstrated the willingness
of young people to challenge authoritarianism. Moreover, this culture of protest has
taken hold amid fast-growing access to digital media.
Most of the region is still plagued by gender and urban/rural disparities. Th ese divides
manifest themselves in the illiteracy and poverty gap between men and women; and
between city dwellers and those living in the rural areas. Th e MENA region is the
bottom-ranking region in the Global Gender Gap Index published by the World
Economic Forum. In Egypt, 56 percent of the population lives in the countryside. In
Morocco, 37 percent does. Th ese divides have their digital equivalents.
If illiteracy and poverty impede the spread of the benefi ts of digitization in Egypt and
Morocco, the relatively high levels of education and literacy present great opportunities
in Jordan and Lebanon.
Television still reigns supreme as the media platform of choice; virtually every
household has a television set (as of 2012, ownership varied from 94 percent in Egypt
to 98.5 percent in Jordan). Regional satellite television networks have been popular
for a long time, thanks to the aff ordability of satellite television services, toleration
of piracy, and the ineptitude of local television content. While the level of personal
computer equipment ownership is still low, it is rising steadily. In Jordan, household
computer ownership grew from 23 percent in 2005 to 36.3 percent in 2009. Increasing
internet connectivity and the rising popularity of social media are making the internet
an increasingly popular medium for consuming news. Finally, the ubiquity of mobile
telephony is expected to boost the provision of digital content and news across the
region in the coming years.
Introduction
Th e most discernible and general trend in digital media in the region is the increasing
popularity of social media. Th e Arab Spring showed how social media uptake has
broadened civic engagement. Albeit still low in some countries, increasing literacy rates
3 0 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
reinforce this trend. Increasing numbers of citizens can access the internet because they
have the skills to do so, but also because they can aff ord to acquire computers and pay
for their internet connections. As a result, media consumers in the region have more
choice today than ever before.
Unfortunately, the citizens’ expressed yearning for greater transparency and freedom
of speech and of the press is stifl ed by their governments’ negative attitude toward free
speech and democratization in general. A persistently hostile regulatory environment
impedes the development of free expression. Censorship and self-censorship still
plague the region, damaging freedom of speech and undermining the emergence of
viable business models for independent media. Economic pressure in the guise of
government-organized advertising boycotts is much used, as they are diffi cult to trace
back to the regime.
Besides censorship and an unfriendly regulatory framework, the delay of digital switch-
over has weakened the positive impact of digitization. None of these four countries
has initiated the switch-over process, and it is highly doubtful whether any of them
will meet their international commitment to switch off analog signals by 2015. No
measures have been taken at this time of writing to off er incentives to consumers or
assist them to purchase set-top boxes (STBs).
Journalists are a long way from fully exploiting the vast opportunities off ered by
digitization. Journalism practices do not seem to have improved. Generally, a digital
“de-professionalization” eff ect is taking place. Th e impact of the internet on journalists’
ethics has been negative. Internet-based journalism has led to less fact-checking and
more sensationalism.
Investigative journalism has not exploited the potential for publishing leaked documents
and better communication with sources. Th e absence of a Freedom of Information
Act—and the weakness of implementation where such laws do exist, as in Jordan—as
well as the costliness of this type of journalism were the main reasons why digitization
has not empowered investigative journalism.
1. Risks
Given the authoritarian nature of most regimes in the region, the stifl ing of critical
voices in the media presents a major threat to the realization of the libertarian benefi ts
of digitization.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 0 4
In Morocco, journalists avoid the three taboo subjects: the monarchy, Islam, and
territorial integrity (southern Sahara). Th ese taboos are carefully respected by broadcast
and print media alike. While commercial radio provides a somewhat more open forum
by focusing on local, regional, and national news, it too avoids sensitive political issues.
In Lebanon, in an attempt to eliminate critical content online, government repression
has targeted social media activists and bloggers. Th e government has regularly closed
social media forums and tracked down their promoters. In 2010, the public prosecutor
accused three citizens of defaming President Michel Suleiman after they posted negative
comments on their blogs and in a Facebook group that the president’s supporters had
created. Th e za’im (Leader) system, a socio-political power structure where a feudal
elite dominates public life and represents the interests of the country’s religious sects,
leaves little room for independent and marginalized voices, or for diversity—unless it
be the diversity of this same elite.
Th e Jordanian authorities led a reactionary crackdown on media freedom in 2011, and
on the internet in particular. Th e newspapers’ inability to capture online audiences is
as much a consequence of their slow progress in developing multimedia and interactive
services as of their lack of independence. Mainstream news outlets continue to avoid
criticism of political elites. Th e infl uence of the state was felt in 2012 when Josat TV,
one of two terrestrial competitors of the state-run channel, lost its license over opinions
expressed by a guest during a program. Th e broadcaster was charged with incitement
against the regime and undermining the king’s dignity.
In Egypt, the state retains vast legal and administrative latitude to suppress dissent.
State censorship targets both traditional and digital media. Key articles of the penal
code in place under the former regime have not been abolished and continue to
give the authorities broad powers to keep a close eye on communications and detain
individuals. One example of the persistent willingness of Egyptian authorities to clamp
down on the rising potential of freedom of speech through the internet is the case of
the blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad, sentenced to three years in prison in March 2011
following a posting which criticized the military. Broadcast media are also suff ering
from post-revolutionary repression.
While 16 new television channels started operating after the end of the Mubarak
regime and the abolition of the Ministry of Information, the ministry was reinstated
in July 2011 and the issuing of licenses for new satellite stations was suspended
completely in September. In the same month, police forces raided the offi ces of Al
Jazeera’s Mubasher Misr channel, confi scated transmission equipment, and arrested a
3 0 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
technician. Despite a persistently hostile environment, digital media gave voice to a
wide range of political groups both before and after January 2011. However, they did
not help to generate overall diversity in gender and ethnic representation. During the
parliamentary elections in late 2011 and early 2012, women featured in less than 7
percent of the news coverage.
Th e benefi ts that digitization is supposed to bring in improving the environment for
free speech have also been hampered by a hostile regulatory environment. None of
these countries has initiated digital switch-over, and thus none is likely to meet its
international commitment to switch off analog signals by 2015. Governments have not
adopted any legal provisions to off er incentives or assist consumers to purchase STBs.
In Morocco, the Press Code is a major tool for silencing independent voices. As in
most countries in the region where there is no self-regulation in the media sector, the
code is a legal instrument imposed on the press. Despite a supposedly liberalizing
revision in 2002, the code maintains prison sentences and heavy fi nes for anybody who
publishes information deemed by the government to violate its provisions. In short,
the inadequate policy framework for traditional media has simply been extended to
digital media.
In Lebanon, the regulatory framework is designed to preserve the interests of the
operators and businesses, instead of empowering citizens to access a varied off ering of
news sources. Th e same regulations that help perpetuate the sectarian power-sharing
in the traditional media sector are applied to the digital media sector. Th e licensing of
internet service providers (ISPs) and the operation of mobile phone services is modeled
on the same system that governs the broadcast media, where broadcast licenses are
allocated to the dominant political powers.
Th ere is no regulatory independence In Jordan, where the government appoints and
controls those in charge of regulation and licensing. Th e authorities took a step in the
right direction in 2007 when Parliament passed a freedom of information law (the fi rst
in the Arab world). Since then, unfortunately, public bodies and institutions have been
able to ignore this law with impunity. Spectrum liberalization—which began with the
Audiovisual Law in 2002—showed its limits in 2012 when Josat TV lost its licenses
because of its critical coverage of the regime.
Th e legal framework of broadcasting in Egypt has not helped to move things ahead.
Terrestrial broadcasting is the preserve of the government-fi nanced and controlled
broadcaster, the Egyptian Radio and Television Union. Although legislation prohibits
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 0 6
individuals from owning more than a 10 percent stake in any newspaper, the lack
of transparency of media ownership makes it impossible to measure and enforce
ownership-related legal provisions. As a matter of fact, the media regulatory framework
is entirely opaque. Th ere are no formal regulatory bodies for the media: to date, satellite
broadcasters have been licensed by the General Authority for Investment (GAFI),
which has no other oversight role. Licensing procedures have been run in secrecy and
decisions have been massively politicized, with national security agencies signifi cantly
infl uencing the process.
Lack of aff ordability and access remain major impediments to digitization. Most
households in the four countries are not equipped to access content provided by digital
media. Personal computers and internet access are beyond the purchasing power of
most citizens. Internet access and use are largely limited to urban areas and to educated
urban segments of the population—and also, predominantly, to men.
Th ere are also language issues. In Morocco, the public service television stations and,
with few exceptions, the printed media use formal Arabic, a language understood by
an estimated 40 percent of Moroccans, or formal French, which only 10 percent of
Moroccans understand. In Jordan, the limited range of Arabic-language content online
prevents very large numbers of Jordanians from going online. In Egypt and Morocco,
internet penetration growth has been slowed signifi cantly by high illiteracy and income
inequalities.
Th e impact of digitization on journalism in the region has been no better than
mixed. Journalists and scholars interviewed for the MDM reports denounced a
digital “de-professionalization” eff ect in the region. Journalists are a long way from
fully exploiting the potential of digitization when it comes to accessing sources,
improving the dissemination of their work, increasing the diversity of sources and
opinions in their stories, and generally increasing transparency around their activity.
Th e impact of the internet on professional ethics has been mostly negative; fact-
checking declined sharply, while sensationalism grew. Patterns of data theft and
plagiarism increased.
Newspapers simply post their printed stories online without taking advantage of
interactivity. Th e development of audiovisual content on digital platforms has been
hindered by a lack of multimedia skills among journalists. Where new sources are
exploited, they often simply replicate the voices expressed through traditional (offl ine)
media. Such plurality as does exist mostly predated digitization.
3 0 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In Morocco, the low level of popular political engagement is a debilitating factor. In
Lebanon, journalists argued that digital media outlets that support citizen journalism
in fact use citizens to exacerbate their established partisan bias. Most households prefer
local news channels. However, this does not translate into greater plurality of opinions.
Investigative journalism has not reaped any of the benefi ts brought by digitization.
Publication of leaked documents has been rare or non-existent, and communication
with sources has not improved. Th e absence of freedom of information laws—or their
poor implementation, as in Jordan—coupled with the high costs that investigative
journalism incurs, have been the main barrier to improved investigating reporting.
In terms of the media economy, the region grapples with many sustainability-related
woes. Th ere is still no viable business model for online news media in the region.
Digitization has had little or no eff ect on the media market, media ownership, media
economics, or media independence. Th ere is an incestuous relationship between
commercial media interests and political elites. Commercial success depends more
on proximity to political decision-makers than on business acumen or journalistic
craft. Particularly in Lebanon, because of its political sectarian model, the main media
business model in both traditional and digital realms still relies on partisan and,
sometimes, foreign fi nancial support.
Moreover, journalism across the region is under pressure from advertisers. In Jordan,
the case of Al Ghad is revealing. Established in 2004 as the second independent
national newspaper, it rose quickly to become one of the best-selling titles with a
healthy online readership. But the owner’s attempts to launch a commercial television
service foundered in 2007 when the Audiovisual Commission (AVC) unexpectedly
suspended its transmission shortly after launch.
2. Opportunities
Although the ultimate impact of the internet on the Arab Spring is still not clear, there
is no doubt that digitization and social media have enabled an unprecedented level of
political activism and debate in the region. Despite many structural limitations, such
as illiteracy or aff ordability, social media uptake has nurtured a culture of socialization
and debate that has never been seen before in the region.
In Egypt, there is evidence to suggest that the events of January 2011 were a cause (at
least as much as an eff ect) of internet expansion. Use of social media platforms has
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 0 8
grown sharply in the post-revolution period. Most notably, the number of registered
Facebook users more than doubled over just nine months between January and
September 2011 to 8.55 million.
Since the January 2011 revolution, bloggers and social media activists have become
both regular sources of news and guests on political television shows. In a way, this has
helped to cement a bridge between old and new media and to mitigate somewhat the
eff ects of the digital divide. It has also helped to make more voices heard in society. Th e
blogger Sanad, for example, was released in January 2012 after a long struggle by civil
society and human rights groups, which demonstrated the capacity for civil society to
mobilize eff ectively against state repression of digital activists. Th is capacity is probably
the foremost legacy of change since January 2011.
Th e growing culture of citizen journalism also became an eff ective watchdog that helps
to redress inaccuracies and biases emanating from professional news organizations.
Eff orts in this regard are starting to be noticed, however, despite a very diffi cult
environment for obtaining information.
In Jordan, the inability of traditional media to fulfi ll their watchdog role vis-à-vis
political decision-makers has given the opportunity to social media to take up the task.
It became a platform of choice for activists and reformers. In Lebanon, despite the
stifl ing sectarian nature of politics, some emerging voices have managed to carve out a
space with blogs and online social networking tools. A growing community of online
activists exerts some infl uence in the socio-political and cultural realms. Social media
are also booming in Morocco and are used increasingly for political activism. With an
estimated fi ve million users, Morocco has the third largest Facebook community in the
Arab world after Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
While social media development bodes well for enhanced political scrutiny, it also gives
social activism a tool of choice. Many recent cases illustrate the effi cacy of social media
in waging successful campaigns. In Jordan, an online petition in 2011 to save over
2,000 trees that had been marked for felling to make way for a new military academy
was largely successful: the project was delayed and most of the trees were spared. In
Lebanon, the adoption of a comprehensive animal rights law, the banning of honor
crimes, the protection of 170 historic buildings slated for demolition, and greater
media coverage of issues concerning migrant and domestic workers were all achieved
through digital activism. Organizations’ offi cial websites and Facebook groups were
the most commonly used digital tools, and had the greatest impact.
3 0 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Media consumers in the region have more choices today, because higher literacy rates
allow them to benefi t from a somewhat more diversifi ed media landscape, and/or
because they can aff ord to purchase computers and pay for internet connections. If
illiteracy and poverty in Egypt and Morocco prevent people there from benefi ting
from digital opportunities, it is equally true that relatively high levels of education and
literacy in Jordan and Lebanon present great opportunities in those countries.
Meanwhile, technological development continues unabated in Egypt and Morocco as
well. Th e proportion of Egyptian households owning a computer rose by 40 percent
between 2008 and 2012. As a result, the segment of the population that regularly
accesses the internet reached 56 percent in mid-2012. In Morocco, the number of
internet users grew by an estimated 60 percent from 2005 to 2010. Th e internet is now
the communication platform preferred by Moroccan youth.
In the television sector, satellite has enlarged viewing choices for the populations in
all four countries. It remains a positive development, although not directly related to
digitization, because it off ers an alternative to state broadcasters. In order to keep up
with satellite television competition, terrestrial broadcasters in Jordan extended their
coverage of local issues and appealed to viewers outside the capital. Localizing their
news off er was the solution to fi lling the gaps left by foreign networks.
Digitization has provided journalists in the region with new working tools and new
distribution channels. Investigative journalists can challenge economic and social
taboos, if not (yet) political ones. Th e Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism
(ARIJ) has actively supported this trend, especially on issues concerning the abuse of
vulnerable people in institutions, including children and the disabled.
In Jordan, while the traditional press struggles to maintain its readership, the
following for online news has soared and even surpassed that of the print media. Pure-
play providers fare better than established local brands and better even than global
networks such as Al Jazeera and the BBC. Recent survey data suggest that the appeal of
online news lies in its perceived independence and, increasingly, its opportunities for
participation via comments. Independent online news services were the only ones that
off ered sustained and relatively extensive (compared with mainstream print outlets)
coverage of Jordan’s “Friday demonstrations” in 2011. By and large, the twin impact of
digitization and satellite television growth has improved the quality of news in Jordan.
What seems clear is that the media reform movement since 2011 has become embedded
in the wider struggle for political change. Inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt,
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 1 0
journalists at the government-owned Al Rai newspaper in Jordan protested for several
weeks in early 2011. Th eir main demands were for greater freedom, opportunities to
enhance professionalism, higher salaries, and an end to editorial interference by the
state. In September 2012, online journalists took to the streets with placards declaring,
“Th ere can be no reform without press freedom.” Th ere is evidence to suggest that self-
censorship among journalists waned in the wake of these movements.
In Lebanon, journalists said that digitization has had some positive eff ects on their work.
One recent positive example of digitization empowering a media outlet to preserve its
independence is Al-Akhbar newspaper. Th is Arabic-language daily represents a unique
form of independent journalism and an exceptional economic success story, propelled
at least partly by advances in online media.
In the MENA region as elsewhere in the developing world, hopes are high that the
ubiquity of mobile telephony will boost the provision of digital content and news. In
Jordan, the mode of access is shifting toward both fi xed home connections and mobile
(especially smartphones, since 2010) at the expense of internet cafés.
In Morocco, attempts to use mobile phones to provide news and information have
not succeeded. However, mobile penetration is increasing fast, showing the potential
to deliver media content to illiterate audiences and help overcome the problem of
access to news. Th e future of the media in Morocco may lie with mobile multimedia
platforms.
At the same time, although no case of a viable business model for news media exists
in the region, shifts in advertising spending patterns provide hope for the emergence
of profi table models. In Jordan, the share of digital advertising is growing rapidly, up
from 1 percent in 2009 to over 11 percent in 2013.
3. Digital Champions
It is hard to speak of digital champions in a region such as MENA, where advances in
the regulation and legislation of digital media have been inadequate and investments
remain small.
Perhaps unexpectedly, Tunisia may be the MENA country with the best prospects of
making a democratically progressive switch-over to digital media, and then reaping
the fruits of digitization. Although it is not technically the most advanced country in
3 1 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
the region, it is the only one to have undertaken a credible democratization process
since 2011. In its 2014 report, Freedom House ranks Tunisia as the most democratic
country in the Arab world. Th e report does not even take into account the adoption
of the new constitution in January 2014, which has been hailed by many as the fi rst
truly democratic Arab constitution. Th e relative solidity of Tunisian democratization is
based on its widely praised inclusiveness.
Prior to the Arab Spring, Tunisia was considered to be one of the most repressive
societies in the world. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime stood out as draconian even
by the region’s standards. For the year 2010, Freedom House ranked Tunisia as not
free with the worst possible rating (7) for political rights. Reporters without Borders
included Tunisia among the infamous “Internet Enemies” group of countries deemed
particularly repressive of freedom of expression on the internet. Independent journalists
were harshly treated.
However, Ben Ali’s repression turned out to have a silver lining. Although the regime
relentlessly quashed freedom of speech, it still wanted to present a façade of modernity
and international acceptability. It did this by developing a sturdy technological
infrastructure. In 2005, the government hosted the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) under the aegis of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
In 2004, it launched a “Family Computer Program” to subsidize the household
acquisition of computers. According to the ministry in charge of communications
technology, the number of computers per 100 inhabitants doubled from 9.6 in 2008
to 18.3 in 2013, while internet subscriptions per 100 inhabitants almost quadrupled
over the same period from 2.7 to 12.8. Internet users multiplied more than fourfold
between 2005 and 2012 to over 41 percent.
Th e 2012 World Economic Forum Arab competitiveness report stated that Tunisia’s
core competitive strengths bode well for the future. Th e new constitution voted in
January 2014 enshrines freedom of speech and the press. It established an Audiovisual
Communication Commission as an independent regulatory body in charge of
developing the audiovisual sector and seeking to “guarantee freedom of expression and
of the media,” and ensure “the existence of pluralistic and fair media.” In September
2012, Tunisia became the fi rst and still only Arab country to join the Freedom Online
Coalition, an intergovernmental group of 22 countries “committed to advancing
internet freedom (free expression, association, assembly, and privacy online) worldwide.”
Prior to the revolution, the regime tightly controlled the fl ow of online information.
It did so by forcing all ISPs to route their traffi c through the government-controlled
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 1 2
Tunisian Internet Agency (Agence Tunisienne d’Internet, ATI). Th e ATI was in charge
of fi ltering internet traffi c and clamping down on information and speech deemed
undesirable by Ben Ali’s regime. Since the revolution, the ATI no longer fi lters the
internet. Under new leadership, its practices have been made transparent.
Th ese eff orts were acknowledged in 2012 with the ATI winning the “Best Public
Institution in Tunisia” Prize awarded by OpenGovTN, a non-governmental
organization promoting government transparency. In 2013, the government amended
the telecommunications regulation so that telecoms operators can bypass the ATI in
directing their traffi c. According to Freedom House’s “2013 Freedom of the Internet
report,” the amendments to the 2011 Telecommunication Code improved the legal
environment of the internet ecosystem. “Th e amended law has, for instance, put an
end to the legal vacuum under which virtual mobile networks and ISPs had to operate,”
according to the report. Th e law also introduced a defi nition of the Internet Exchange
Point (IXP), which is important as IXPs are gatekeepers to the international internet.
With this technological infrastructure in place, Tunisia meets the necessary conditions
for a successful digitization process. Th e chances that digitization will be structured
to limit the liberties of Tunisians have been vastly reduced. What remains to be seen,
however, is whether political support will remain solid.
3 1 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Digital Media in Africa: Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa Russell Southwood
Context
Sub-Saharan Africa is the cockpit for change in terms of the global digital divide;
in little over a decade it has gone from being largely unconnected to the internet to
having millions of people using it. Because media have been relatively undeveloped—
for a host of reasons, including education, income, and lack of access to electricity—
the impact of the digital changes has been and may continue to be somewhat more
dramatic than in countries where traditional media have been much better established.
Data in the reports on which this study is based are from 2009–2011 and much has
changed since that date.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project reported on three Sub-Saharan African countries:
Nigeria (with 160 million inhabitants), South Africa (50 million), and Kenya (40.5
million). Th ese countries represent the vanguard of the digital transition. South Africa
is the most urbanized (61 percent) and the wealthiest (US$ 7,521 per capita) of the
three, followed by Nigeria with a 48 percent urban population and a per capita GDP
of US$ 1,753, and Kenya with only 33 percent urbanized and a GDP per capita of
US$ 1,049. All three countries have considerable disparities of wealth and for Kenya
and Nigeria agriculture is an important component of their economies in terms of
employment, although it is mining and oil that give Nigeria and South Africa most of
their wealth.
C H A P T E R S I X T E E N
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 1 4
All three countries are ethnically very diverse. Nigeria has three main groups (Hausa,
Igbo, and Yoruba) that make up 68 percent of the population, but it also has many
smaller communities. South Africa has eight main language groups and many more
communities. Kenyans speak at least three languages (English, Kiswahili, and their
mother tongue) and fi ve ethnic groups make up 65 percent of the population.
Th e three countries represent the spectrum of media development in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Th e digital divide is in many ways an access-to-electricity divide: 85 percent
have such access in South Africa compared to a mere 20 percent in Kenya.
Table 15.
Main Media Metrics in South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, 2010
Country TV set
ownership
(% of total
number of
households)
Radio set
ownership
(% of total
number of
households)
PC
ownership
(% of total
number of
households)
Number
of internet
subscribers
Broadband
penetration
(% of total
number of
internet
subscribers)
South Africa 82.0 77.2 18.3 1,560,000 29.4
Nigeria 60.0 43.5 5.5 n/a* n/a
Kenya 30.0 79.0 7.9 6,150,000 35.9
Notes: n/a – not available; * no reliable fi gures
Source: Mapping Digital Media reports
In terms of the transition to digital broadcasting, Nigeria is the most advanced of the
three, with between 5 percent and 10 percent of the population having access to digital
television. South Africa has not started the process and at the time this report was
written, the numbers in Kenya were negligible.
Introduction
Th e main trends across the three countries—which to some extent mirror trends in
many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa—are as follows:
• Th ere is undoubtedly a wider range of media sources available, particularly
online. However, despite much wider access to the internet (largely on mobile)
there is still a “media defi cit”: people in rural areas have a much narrower choice
of media outlets.
3 1 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
• As elsewhere, printed newspaper circulations are falling or stagnating, and
the presence of online news 24 hours a day is exerting the same pressures on
journalists as found elsewhere.
• Th e use of internet and social media sites for news consumption and social
activism has risen, although South Africa does not seem to have a well-developed
digital activist space.
• Given the high level of mobile internet use for news and information, it is
surprising that no media platforms designed specifi cally for mobile phones have
yet emerged. Even with mobile internet access, the small screen size and the
limits on text reading mean that a complete rethink may be necessary to get
eff ective mobile media.
• All three countries have experienced diffi culties in making the digital transition
in broadcasting, but only South Africa has put in place a clear policy for dealing
with those households which are unable to aff ord a set-top box.
• Th ere are high levels of political interference in media regulation and law, and
in the PSBs, which in reality are state-run, with the partial exception of SABC.
Viewers in Nigeria and Kenya have low levels of trust in their state broadcasters.
Nevertheless, in both Nigeria and South Africa, the state broadcasters are
powerful players with signifi cant resources.
1. Risks
Th ere is a signifi cant risk to newspapers from the same kind of pressures that have
built up in the developed world. Local news sites in all three countries are among the
20 most used websites. It is less clear what direct impact this has on print readership.
It could either be a supplement to print readership or—more likely over the medium
term, as internet use grows—a substitute for reading the print version.
In Kenya, for example, the Nation Media Group sells an online subscription that is
cheaper than the print version; take-up has been low for a number of reasons, including
the presence of a free version online and the lack of credit cards. In South Africa,
however, year-on-year fi gures over the last decade show newspaper circulation is in
decline.
While it is not possible to track frequency of use on online news sites in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the number of users is often close to the number of print readers. Online
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 1 6
consumption is still secondary to print, but in time it may overtake it. Th e diffi culty for
media groups producing newspapers is that most of the income is currently attached
to the print sector of their business and it has proved very hard to generate online
revenues, despite the growing online readership.
According to journalists in all three countries, the pace of the news cycle and the
quantity of potential material available digitally seems to have led to a decline in
news quality. Th e chief complaint is the lack of time available to check stories that are
published online in general, and on social media in particular. Th is causes particular
problems when the news published on websites is the same as appears in the print or
broadcast versions. Otuma Ongalo, a senior editor in charge of quality at the Standard
newspaper, put it succinctly: “Th e online material is not subject to the high standards
expected of print or broadcast journalism in Kenya.”
Journalists also rely increasingly on online content and user-generated content
(UGC) rather than fi rst-hand reporting. Th is problem is most acute in Kenya and
Nigeria. Th e country reports also raise the issue of plagiarism where journalists
simply cut and paste material from the internet without crediting or paying for it.
As the Nigeria report notes, the specialized nature of foreign, business, and sports
reports renders them particularly vulnerable to plagiarism. But while there is now, for
example, a great deal more government information available on which to base
investigative reporting, there is also far more eff ective surveillance of mobile phones
and e-mail.
In terms of the public broadcasters, all three suff er from signifi cant problems. South
Africa has the most well developed public broadcasting but it is increasingly challenged
by the government. While views about SABC are very varied there is a strong perception
that SABC news diff ers from (the private broadcaster) e.tv news and from community
television news; it is seen as including more content about the government, and as
taking a sympathetic stance toward the ruling party—even though it does regularly
feature opposition party criticisms of the government.
After the 2007 elections in Kenya, the European Union’s Election Monitoring Mission
reported that the public broadcaster KBC had failed to fulfi ll even its minimal
legal obligations as a public service broadcaster (set out in the Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation Act and the IPPG agreement 1997). KBC Radio’s English and Kiswahili
language services showed a high level of bias and granted a combined total of 76 percent
of coverage to the PNU coalition partners. Th is high-profi le assessment gives some idea
of the kind of coverage that makes viewers trust it less than other news sources.
3 1 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
In Nigeria too, there is a disparity between the letter of the law and the practice of
public broadcasting at federal and state levels. Government interference has always
undermined broadcasters’ ability to operate impartially. According to a 2006 report
by the BBC World Service Trust, “there are no public service broadcasters in radio
or television, but rather government-owned radio and television outlets directly
accountable not to the public but to state offi cials.”
Th e digital transition in broadcasting has proved particularly challenging for most
Sub-Saharan African countries as it involves the need for a mixture of government
resources and attention and the ability to work with a wider stakeholder group
including private broadcasters. In each of the three countries, the process has been
fl awed. In Nigeria, where 5 percent to 10 percent of the population has access to digital
television, the transition came about through a commercial agreement between the
Chinese pay-TV operator Star Times and the federal broadcaster NTA. Government
policy—which should ensure a level playing fi eld for all involved—has been slow to
catch up with this initial move.
In Kenya, the government decided to move from the DVB-T standard to DVB-T2
and has failed to mount an eff ective public information campaign. As a result, it is now
threatening to switch off the analog signal to an unrealistic timetable, leaving viewers
in the dark. In South Africa, the process was meant to be underway by the 2010 World
Cup but disagreements between the private stakeholders and with the government
have delayed the process. However, South Africa is the only country to have made
provision for subsidizing those who are unable to aff ord the cost of the digital set-top
box, which might be as high as US$40–60.
Th e legal and regulatory framework for media ownership is very diff erent across all three
countries. Ownership and advertising placement in Kenya and Nigeria, as in many
other Sub-Saharan African countries, are far from transparent. Th ere is no legislation
on cross-media ownership in Kenya and as a result, major media houses are able to
own newspapers and television and radio stations. Th is concentration, according to
Daniel Obam of the National Communications Secretariat, is harmful to plurality and
diversity of opinion. Almost more damagingly, the decision-making on advertising
placement is concentrated in a series of agencies owned by a single company that has
over three-quarters of the advertising revenues in the country under its control. Th is
level of cross-media ownership is much less of an issue in Nigeria and South Africa.
Two sets of relationships are usually opaque: the relationship between politicians
and the media, and the relationship between government in its role as one of the
largest advertisers and the media. Politicians lurk in the shadows but there is no way
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 1 8
of knowing who the benefi cial owners of a particular company are. In Nigeria, the
broadcast regulator requires licensees to provide information on ownership but is
under no obligation to make this information public.
Likewise in the case of advertising placement; the lack of market data in general makes
it impossible to know whether the government’s advertising decisions are soundly
based or simply refl ect political support for their friends or media they own.
In the case of Nigeria, the MDM report raises an issue that can be found in many Sub-
Saharan African countries: the threat of physical violence against reporters. Although
the number of deaths of reporters in Nigeria is relatively small, this form of violence
has a knock-on eff ect. According to the report, civil society activist groups such as the
Media Rights Agenda have indicated that physical attacks are on the rise. As a result,
many journalists have resorted to self-censorship.
As the news process becomes increasingly digital, there has been an increase in the
number of cases of hacked websites and hijacked email and social media accounts
belonging to journalists; the Nigeria report argues that these incidents have had a
signifi cant impact on journalism and the safety of individual journalists. African media
businesses, which are relatively new to digital work processes, are vulnerable when
needing to protect both their personnel and technical infrastructure.
Th e Kenya report highlights a gap in news coverage that may also apply to the other
two countries. Television stations dedicate substantial time to local news and current
aff airs. However, given that they broadcast 24 hours a day, the allocation to local news
and current aff airs is only a small percentage of the total content. Th is may change as
the new constitution decentralizes budgets to new centers of local government.
2. Opportunities
Many of the negative risks of digitization cannot be separated from countervailing
positive opportunities. For example, digital multimedia increase the pressure on
journalists to do more things but, in turn, there is often far more material available
quickly online than when print was the only medium for documents.
An Ipsos-Synovate survey showed that Kenyan internet users spent on average about
70 minutes on the internet per visit. “Th is level of media usage is close to the average
time spent on television daily. We are seeing signifi cant shifts in the way people receive
3 1 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
content, and this could have implications for traditional media going forward,” said
Joe Otin of Ipsos-Synovate.
While internet use continues to grow rapidly, it remains a largely urban phenomenon.
However, infrastructure and use continue to ripple outwards to include smaller towns
and some rural areas. It already forms a signifi cant part of the news consumption and
debate for the middle class.
Th e most notable instance of digital activism in these three countries has been the
Occupy Nigeria movement. Th e South Africa report suggests that online activism
could be seriously lagging in terms of reaching mobile internet users and tapping into
their UGC. Th is was underlined by the experience, in July 2009, of U.S. President
Barack Obama successfully eliciting more than 200,000 messages when he reached out
to MXit users ahead of his visit to Africa. While activist groups say they are seeking
to harness digital communications technologies, some opportunities are being missed.
Th e issues of language and mobile customization are often inadequately dealt with by
both activists and political players who use digital platforms.
Internet availability in Kenya and Nigeria has given citizens access to a far wider range
of sources and news materials, most notably foreign news—especially foreign news
about their own countries. However, in Nigeria, in terms of online news there is a
preference for local news outlets, with the exception of the BBC Hausa site.
Th is preference is also seen in the rise of so-called vernacular radio stations (mother
tongue and pidgin), which is also a trend across Sub-Saharan Africa. Th ese stations
are shifting media consumption patterns. Th e example of Kenya—where the trend
may be most developed—gives some idea of where things may be heading. Ipsos-
Synovate research indicates that 70 percent of radio audiences listen to Swahili stations
compared with 68 percent and 52 percent to vernacular and English radio stations,
respectively. Th e rise of local-language stations has undoubtedly contributed to the
popularity of Royal Media Services, which has eight vernacular stations in addition to
its two Swahili and one English stations.
Vernacular television stations have also launched but have been slower to take
off because their audiences are to some extent a niche within a niche in the media
landscape. Th e language used in media will become a big issue in the next fi ve to 10
years, with increasing fragmentation of audiences in both of what elsewhere would be
described as mass media—radio and television. As with many digital developments,
this off ers both risks and opportunities.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 2 0
Media organizations in the three countries and in many other countries across the
continent have developed an eff ective online news presence. Initially, these sites were
much used by diaspora communities but in more recent years—as internet access has
improved—they have increasingly been used locally. Mobile operators have also played
a part in this process by promoting news headline services from local media companies
by SMS. Services of this kind have had signifi cant uptake.
Th e internet has also changed the pattern of newspaper distribution in Nigeria.
Previously, copies went out by road across this vast country and companies produced
separate editions for Lagos and the West, the east, and the north. Th e now defunct
Concord Press used to produce two editions, for instance, with the Lagos-West edition
as the second, more up-to-date edition. Nowadays, three of the leading newspapers
use Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to transmit the fi nal copy of editions to printing
presses across the country. Nevertheless, each edition has to be regionally tailored to
cater for the diverse audiences across the country.
As well as creating a media landscape with far more sources and material, the internet
has led to a signifi cant amount of UGC. All three of these African countries are among
the biggest users of social media. Social media have many functions for their users, and
news is only one of them. According to one study, however, Kenyans are the heaviest
users of Twitter in Sub-Saharan Africa and a great deal of tweeting relates to news and
political issues.
A blogging culture has developed in Nigeria, with blogs by enthusiastic individuals
who have developed strong followings. According to Nigerianblogawards.com, there
were at least 885 Nigerian blogs in July 2011. Although often poorly designed, content
is becoming richer and the best of them attract lively conversations through comments.
Blogs that focus on news have grown in popularity. Th e same is true of Kenya where
they have fi lled particular niches like technology news: some show signs of turning into
businesses that attract advertising.
Most media organizations have sought to get to grips with the arrival of social media
by using them as tools for audience engagement and also as channels for encouraging
citizen journalism. Community media in Kenya such as Pamoja Radio, Radio
Mang’elete, and Ghetto Radio often use digital technologies in their broadcasts. Even
though these are small organizations, the combination of social media and mobile
phones calling in to talk shows ensures a livelier and arguably deeper engagement with
their audiences than before.
3 2 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Th is use of social media by media organizations is matched by the increasing use of it
by government, the private sector, and NGOs. (In Rwanda, government ministers all
have Twitter accounts and post regularly.)
Although this was only highlighted in the Kenya report, the mobile handset continues
to increase in infl uence both as a platform for delivering other media (such as radio and
television) and increasingly as a medium in its own right. According to a 2011 Ipsos-
Synovate report: “Mobile as a media now rivals radio.”
Market research from a range of Sub-Saharan African countries shows that a signifi cant
minority of those sampled used their mobile for news and information in the previous
week. Th is is disproportionately true for those in the 16–34 age range, most of whom
are much more comfortable with accessing the internet on their phone. With an
increasing proportion of phones (so-called smart and feature phones) having access to
the internet, these users will have access to news on a more detailed basis than simply
SMS headlines. One of the leading handset manufacturers (producing for all segments
of the market) told us that all of its phones would have internet access except for the
most basic one.
At present, all media output to mobile phones is either a cut-down version of other
output or the internet version seen on a small screen. Th e tantalizing possibility is
that someone will eventually create a news media product specifi cally designed for
consuming and engaging with on a mobile handset. Th e current magazine-style output
of Every1Mobile gives some idea of what might be possible, and the scale of following
it might attract.1
All three country reports highlight the importance of digital media in allowing a voice
to minority groups, whether for gay rights or for smaller ethnic groupings, to make
themselves heard—for example, by using SMS to organize rallies and share updates,
blogspots, listservs, and existing websites. Th e listservs constitute a means of information-
sharing among subscribers and others who may be interested in their aff airs. Th is has
helped to internationalize campaigns at a faster pace than before. Th e authors of the
Nigeria report believe it has also helped to create a global public sphere for Nigerians,
enabling issues to be exposed that might otherwise have been suppressed by legal or
other constraints. Th e attraction of online content is that it allows these groups to
publish their own content and can act as a reference point for mainstream media.
1. A. Williams, “Every1Mobile on its African mobile social networks, the most popular of which is SmartSex,” at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YMgi1FL5fzo.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 2 2
3. Digital Champions
Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa are among the most advanced and progressive
countries in the region. Even so, all three are a work in progress. Other countries of
note would include Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. Making generalizations of
this kind is hard, as more general progress with digital media and online access is rarely
matched by regulation or law that encourages wider expression.
Until relatively recently, governments in Africa did not take the internet seriously as a
media platform; as a result, it is still much less controlled than other platforms or types
of media. Th is will not last. Governments have already sought, usually unsuccessfully,
to control access to social media sites like Twitter (in Cameroon) and Facebook
(in Uganda). As mobile internet turns phones into a medium in its own right, the
endeavors to control what is available on it will undoubtedly increase.
In Kenya, the last president promised that the government would make greater use of
the internet to reach out to the people to communicate policy, because this medium
has “become an integral part of the modern world.” Th e current president is equally
committed to this approach. Th e government has invested in an international fi ber
cable (TEAMS) and built its own national fi ber network (operated by Orange). Th e
regulator CCK has also allowed a high level of competition amongst service providers.
As a result, retail internet prices have fallen. Th is has all laid the foundation for a
thriving online community of internet and social media users.
Kenya also prides itself on having very liberalized media ownership. Despite the lack of
legislation on cross-media ownership, noted above, many radio and television stations
are in competition, including in several of the country’s vernacular languages.
Most television stations, including public broadcaster KBC, have devoted signifi cant
space since 2005 to discussing key issues such as proposed changes to the constitution
and their implications for the country, the government, and citizens. Similarly, the
concerns surrounding the post-election violence of 2007–2008 and the attendant
consequences have been widely aired. Public broadcaster KBC has devoted one of
the new digital broadcasting channels to showing live debates in Parliament. KBC
also runs numerous local-language radio stations which broadcast news content to
audiences across the country. Some 52 percent of viewing time is spent on news. Th e
country has a not very commercially successful news channel called K24.
3 2 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Nevertheless, the transition to digital broadcasting has been problematic for a number
of reasons and the government has postponed completion until June 2014. More than
60 applicants have applied for licenses to start broadcasting—a number well beyond
the existing 20 existing channels. Th e government has a provision that 40 percent of
all content should be locally produced but there has been no attempt to enforce this
quota. In news terms, however, there is a range of locally produced news programs and
talk shows.
Kenya’s Nation Media Group operates one of the most successful online news sites on
the continent, both with the diaspora and local users. Kenyans are the second highest
tweeters in Africa, much above their population size and there is what is claimed
to be the largest blogging community on the continent. Kenya is home to several
well-known blogs, and some of the bloggers like the Kenyan Pundit (written by Ory
Okelloh), Afromusing, Bankelele, Gathara’s World, Joseph Karoki, Mama Junkyard’s,
Mental Acrobatics, Kumekucha, Th inker’s Room, and Mzalendo (Kenya Parliament
Watchdog) often carry news commentary. Kumekucha boasts of having published
exclusive news that mainstream media won’t touch.
Th ere is signifi cant online activity in Kenya. Civil society activists, politicians, and
other actors constantly use the internet to campaign for various issues, although its
effi cacy has yet to be determined. For example, Mzalendo (Kiswahili for “patriot”),
a Kenya Parliament Watchdog, has been used particularly during election periods
to let citizens know about the performance of their representatives. Mzalendo was
particularly useful in revealing the amount of work parliamentarians did and their
contributions in the House prior to elections. Th e referendum on the constitution
in Kenya in 2010 was another good example of how mobile telephony and especially
SMS can be used to mobilize the people.
Any news provider has to have a license from the regulator CCK to disseminate news,
whether on the internet or on mobile phones. Th e Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
(Revised) Act of 2009 and the Kenya Information and Communications (Amendment)
Act of 2009 do not fi t a converged world and make no mention of online.
Th e internet in Nigeria reaches 16 percent of the population—a huge number of
people—but it remains largely an urban phenomenon. Th e regulator NCC supported
a competitive market for international fi ber landing stations, of which the country
now has fi ve. But while it now has considerable bandwidth at the coast, it has been
far less successful in connecting it to the cities inland. Th e government has sought
to encourage the spread of the internet through laptop purchase schemes for civil
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 2 4
servants, the computerization of passport and car license applications, and the creation
of a Universal Service Fund. But it has been far less successful than the much smaller
Kenya.
State broadcasting had dominated the media landscape in the country, with both
federal and state level radio and television stations. State broadcaster NTA has a total
of 95 stations and reaches over 90 million viewers. But there is now a considerable
number of private broadcasters, although very few have national reach. In a 2010
survey, over 60 percent of the population cited news as their most popular program,
a signifi cant increase over previous years, possibly encouraged by the wider range of
private news sources available. Th e country has a news-only channel called Channels
TV. According to the NBC’s broadcasting code, its radio stations must have 80 percent
local content.
Th e digital transition in broadcasting had reached 1.8 million people by February
2014—probably the largest number in any country in Sub-Saharan Africa, although
this total is still quite small relative to the overall population and to the total number
of television households (24 million). Th is was brought about through a joint venture
between a Chinese company Star Time and the state broadcaster NTA. Until relatively
recently, no policy was in place governing the whole process.
Five of the top 20 websites in Nigeria are news sites. Like Kenya, Nigeria has a signifi cant
blogosphere but the quality varies enormously. According to Nigerianblogawards.com,
there were at least 885 Nigerian blogs in July 2011. Th e majority of the best known
and most used sites are not news-oriented.
Th ere have been isolated examples of digital activism, most prominently the Occupy
Nigeria movement that fought against the removal of subsidies on fuel.
In 2011, the Freedom of Information Act increased access for investigative journalists.
Th e Act’s passage was probably bought about in part by online campaigning. Recent
legislation has opened up the airwaves to community radio.
South Africa has extremely high levels of mobile penetration and one of the highest
levels of internet penetration in Sub-Saharan Africa; one-third of South Africans have
some form of internet access, largely on their mobile phones. However, despite various
government policies over the years, the country has not yet been able to get low-cost
access to higher speed broadband. Th ere is a signifi cant gap at the local access level in
the network. However, this is likely to change quickly over the next two years.
3 2 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
South Africa also has one of the highest levels of broadcast television penetration on the
continent, but only a relatively small number of private sector broadcasters compared
to Kenya and Nigeria, which is surprising given its size and relative wealth. By contrast,
there are 138 radio stations across the country, including community radio stations.
Th e public television broadcaster, SABC, is fairly dominant in the television broadcast
fi eld, but a series of political disputes over its management and a lack of resources
relative to its ambitions have curtailed its impact. A relatively high proportion of the
population (compared to other countries on the continent) access pay-TV by satellite.
At the time the MDM report was written, there was no dedicated news channel.
Th e digital transition in broadcasting was supposed to have taken place for the World
Cup in 2010 but it has still not been launched. Delays have been caused by uncertainties,
now resolved (about the broadcast standard to be used and with the broadcast sector
itself about who gets access to which DTT platform and how). Nevertheless, it is the
only country in Sub-Saharan Africa with a clearly stated policy of subsidizing those
who cannot aff ord the set-top box.
Online news sites based on their print counterparts are widely used by the middle class.
Th e internet is likely over time to allow new entrants into the digital space and will be
to some extent harder to control than other forms of media.
Social media are extremely widely used among those with internet access, especially
Facebook and MXit, a local platform. However, these new media have not become new
carriers because there is a fairly well used print and broadcast media, with the former
performing an agenda-setting function. Th e use of digital media for social activism has
been limited compared to Kenya and Nigeria.
Although the post-Apartheid government has in place public consultation processes
for new policy and law, the long-established ANC Government has sought to try and
control the media in various ways, including by independent statutory regulation and
also existing press self-regulation structures.
Project Information
3 2 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Published reports WESTERN EUROPE
France
Lead researchers Thierry Vedel
Marina Bellot
Karolina Koc Michalska
Agnes Granchet
Christine Leteinturier
Gael Villeneuve
Germany
Lead researcher Uwe Hasebrink
Assistant researcher Hermann-Dieter Schroeder
Stephan Dreyer
Wiebke Loosen
Felix Schröter
Italy
Lead researchers Gianpietro Mazzoleni
Giulio Vigevani
Assistant researcher Sergio Splendore
Netherlands
Lead researchers Martijn de Waal
Thomas Poell
Andra Leurdijk
Levien Nordeman
Spain
Lead researcher Carlos Llorens Maluquer
Assistant researcher Helena Puertas Grau
Sweden
Lead researcher Lars Nord
UK
Lead researcher Des Freedman
Assistant researcher Justin Schlosberg
Finland
Lead researchers Sampsa Saikkonen
Paula Hakamies
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 3 0
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA & CANADA
USA
Lead researchers Tom Glaisyer
Sascha Meinrath
Phil Napoli
Benjamin Lennett
Jessica Clark
Canada
Lead researchers Jonathan Obar
Gregory Taylor
Derek Antoine
Rena Bivens
Nadia Caidi
Arndis Johnson
Catherine Middleton
David Skinner
CENTRAL/EASTERN EUROPE/TURKEY
Albania
Lead researcher Ilda Londo
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Lead researcher Amer Dzihana
Assistant researchers Kristina Cendic
Meliha Tahmaz
Erdem Dizdar
Bulgaria
Lead researcher Ognian Zlatev
Assistant researcher Vessislava Antonova
Denitsa Sacheva
Croatia
Lead researcher Viktorija Car
Assistant researcher Ivana Andrijasevic
Czech Republic
Lead researcher Eva Rybkova
Assistant researcher Vera Rihackova
Estonia
Lead researcher Urmas Loit
Assistant researcher Andra Siibak
3 3 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Hungary
Lead researcher Borbala Toth
Latvia
Lead researcher Janis Juzefovics
Lithuania
Lead researcher Arturas Racas
Assistant researcher Liutauras Ulevičius
Macedonia
Lead researchers Roberto Belichanec
Zoran Ricliev
Montenegro
Lead researcher Ranko Vujovic
Assistant researchers Daniela Seferovic
Zarija Milic
Poland
Lead researcher Andrzej Krajewski
Assistant researcher Karim Diakite
Romania
Lead researchers Manuela Preoteasa
Iulian Comanescu
Researcher Ioana Avadani
Serbia
Lead researcher Jelena Surculija
Assistant researchers Biljana Pavlovic
Durda Jovanovic Padejski
Slovakia
Lead researcher Miroslav Kollar
Assistant researcher Tomas Czwitkowics
Slovenia
Lead researchers Tanja Kersevan Smokvina
Marko Milosavljevic
Assistant researcher Nina Meden
Turkey
Lead researcher Asli Tunc
Assistant researcher Vehbi Gorgulu
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 3 2
RUSSIA/CIS
Armenia
Lead researcher Ashot Melikyan
Assistant researchers Mesrop Harutyunyan
Martin Aivazyan
Suren Deheryan
Olga Safaryan
Artur Papyan
Georgia
Lead researchers Ana Keshelashvili
Nino Danelia
Ninia Kakabadze
Kazakhstan
Lead researchers Dariya Tsyrenzhapova
Frederick Emrich
Adil Nurmakov
Yevgeniya Plakhina
Moldova
Lead researcher Victor Gotisan
Assistant researchers Cristina Mogildea
Tatiana Etco
Vitalie Dogaru
Olivia Pirtac
Roxana Teodorcic
Russia
Lead researcher Alexei Pankin
Assistant researchers Andrei Fedotov
Andrei Richter
Daria Osipova
MENA
Egypt
Lead researcher Rasha Abdulla
Assistant researcher Dalia Yousef
Sara El Khalili
Jordan
Lead researcher Rana Sweis
Assistant researcher Dina Ghassan Baslan
3 3 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Lebanon
Lead researcher Jad Melki
Assistant researchers Yasmine Dabbous
Khaled Nasser
Sarah Mallat
Morocco
Lead researcher Bouziane Zaid
Assistant researcher Mohamed Ibahrine
AFRICA
Kenya
Lead researchers George Nyabuga
Nancy Booker
Nigeria
Lead researchers Ben Akoh
Abi Jagun
Assistant researchers Akintunde Akanni
Fola Odufuwa
South Africa
Lead researcher Guy Berger
Assistant researcher Zikhona Masala
ASIA
China
Lead researcher Hu Yong
Assistant researcher Fang Kun
Liu Yang
Iris Ha
Zhang Yuping
Wang Mengyao
Kathryn Nute
India
Lead researcher Vibodh Parthasarathi
Assistant researcher Alam Srinivas
Archna Shukla
Supriya Chotani
Anja Kovacs
Anuradha Raman
Siddharth Narain
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 3 4
Indonesia
Lead researchers Christiana Chelsia Chan
Kuskridho Ambardi
Assistant researchers Dyah Aryani
Abdul Manan
Firdaus Cahyadi
Ignatius Haryanto
Juni Soehardjo
Japan
Lead researchers Yutaka Oishi
Yoshihisa Takada
Shuzo Yamakoshi
Yoshiko Nakamura
Arata Kamino
Malaysia
Lead researcher Jo-Ann Ding
Assistant researcher Lay Chin
Jacqueline Ann Surin
Pakistan
Lead researcher Huma Yusuf
Singapore
Lead researcher Lau Joon-Nie
Assistant researchers Trisha Lin
Low Mei Mei
Thaliand
Lead researcher Somkiat Tangkitvanich
Assistant researcher Worapoj Wongkit
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina
Lead researchers Guillermo Mastrini
Martin Becerra
Assistant researcher Santiago Marino
Brazil
Lead researchers Ronaldo Lemos
Joana Varon
Pedro Mizukami
Jhessica Reia
3 3 5O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Chile
Lead researcher(s) Sergio Godoy
Assistant researcher Maria Elena Gronemeyer
Colombia
Lead researcher Jimena Zuluaga
Assistant researcher Maria Paula Martinez
Guatemala
Lead researcher Renata Avila
Assistant researchers Alejandra Gutierrez Valdizan
Andres Zepeda
Mario Palomo
Mexico
Lead researchers Rodrigo Gomez
Gabriel Sosa Plata
Assistant researchers Primavera Tellez
Jorge Bravo
Nicaragua
Lead researcher Cornelio Hopmann
Assistant researchers Leonor Zúniga
María Edith Arce
Sofía Montenegro
Peru
Lead researcher Ursula Freundt-Thurne
Assistant researchers Cesar Pita
Maria Jose Ampuero
Uruguay
Lead researchers Rosario Radakovich
Gustavo Matías Ponce Martínez
María Julia Morales
Santiago Escuder Rodríguez
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 3 6
Translated reports
Albania Albanian
Argentina Spanish
Armenia Russian/Armenian
Brazil Portuguese
Bulgaria Bulgarian
Chile Spanish
China Chinese
Colombia Spanish
Czech Republic Czech
Egypt Arabic
France French
Guatemala Spanish
Hungary Hungarian
Indonesia Bahasa Indonesia
Italy Italian
Jordan Arabic
Kazakhstan Kazakh & Russian
Latvia Latvian
Mexico Spanish
Moldova Moldovan/Romanian
Morocco French, Arabic
Nicaragua Spanish
Peru Spanish
Russia Russian
Serbia Serbian
Slovenia Slovenian
Spain Spanish
Uruguay Spanish
3 3 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Reference series
Online Media and Defamation l Toby Mendel
Digital Media and Investigative Reporting l Mark Lee Hunter
Mobile TV: Challenges and Opportunities Beyond 2011 l Ronan de Renesse
Digitization and Media Business Models l Robert G. Picard
Freedom of Expression Rights in the Digital Age l Andrew Puddephatt
Citizen Journalism and the Internet l Nadine Jurrat
Gatekeeping in Digital Media l Peter Olaf Looms
Net Neutrality and the Media l Stefaan Verhulst
Technical Standards in Terrestrial Television l David Wood
Th e Digital Dividend l Gerard Pogorel
How Television Went Digital in the Netherlands l Nico van Eijk & Bart van der Sloot
Th e Media and Liability for Content on the Internet l Cynthia Wong & James X. Dempsey
German Public Service Broadcasting and Online Activity l Johannes Weberling
Online Advertising—Origins, Evolution, and Impact on Privacy l Fernando Bermejo
Social Media and News l Paul Bradshaw
Digital Media, Confl ict and Diasporas in the Horn of Africa l Iginio Gagliardone & Nicole Stremlau
Digital Television, the Public Interest, and European Regulation l Petros Iosifi dis
On-Demand Services and Media Diversity l Laure Kaltenbach & Alexandre Joux
News and New Media in Central Africa—Challenges and Opportunities l Marie- Soleil Frère
Regional editors
Fernando Bermejo l Latin America Aboubakr Jamaï l MENA & Africa Rita Ruduša l CIS/Russia Graham Watts l Asia
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 3 8
Editorial commission
Yuen-Ying Chan l Christian S. Nissen l Dušan Reljič l Russell Southwood l Damian Tambini l (Th e Editorial Commission is an advisory body. Its members are not responsible for the information or assessments contained in the Mapping Digital
Media texts (unless authored by them)
Open Society Program on Independent Journalism
Marius Dragomir l senior manager/publications editor Mark Th ompson l policy projects offi cer Meijinder Kaur l program assistant Sameer Padania l program offi cer Stewart Chisholm l associate director
Open Society Open Society Program
Vera Franz l senior program manager Darius Cuplinskas l director
Methodology
Our methodology for assessing the global opportunities and risks is to recruit researchers
in each country who will provide answers to the questions contained in the research
template set out below. Th ese researchers will be assisted where possible by a partner
organization. In some cases, this organization may be the OSF national foundation in
that country; in other cases, it will be a civil society organization active in media and
information issues.
Researchers are expected to carry out research that will answer the questions in the research
template. Not all of the questions will require equally full answers in every country.
Researchers should be guided by our list of opportunities and risks, as they collect data
and prepare assessments. However, this list is not exhaustive; the researchers themselves
know best which risks and opportunities are most relevant in their countries.
In order to maximize the comparability of fi ndings from diff erent countries, and to
limit the subjectivity of the reports, we have separated the questions into three tiers.
• Th e purple questions are intended to produce answers that permit the project
managers – and, later, our readers – to draw systematic comparisons.
• For orange questions, researchers must follow the guidelines set forth in the
3 3 9O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
research template. While we cannot always expect comparable data between
countries, we specify the sources that reporters should seek to use. (Other sources
may also be required.)
• Questions in blue are liable to greater subjectivity; for these, we propose that
researchers supplement the data from suggested sources with information from
other available sources (e.g., expert interviews, published comments, essays,
reports in the media), to ensure that we are not just receiving one person’s opinion
or impression.
• Th e Assessments chapter does not refl ect a personal view, but rather convey
the range of commentary and opinion – and the main political positions – in
your society. Without repeating what has been said in the respective section, or
presenting new data and information, they should highlight the main issues and
draw key conclusions.
In order to test this Research Template, pilot research was conducted during 2010
in the following countries: Armenia, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania,
Serbia and Th ailand. On the basis of this review, and also of discussions with all the
country research teams, the Template has been improved and refi ned and ready for use
in all the 52 countries studied in the principal phase of the project. In addition, we
commissioned a series of research papers on a range of topics related to digital media
and more or less relevant for all countries. In total, 56 country reports were completed
in this project.
3 4 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
Report Structure
Context
• Fill in the two sets of indicators below and write a short country background based on
these indicators
Social composition indicators
Population (number of inhabitants)
Number of households
Rural/urban breakdown (in % of total population)
Ethnic, linguistic and religious composition (% of total population)
TABLE: Economic indicators (2005–2013)
GDP (current prices), total in US$
GDP (current prices), per capita in US$
Average monthly net income
Unemployment (% of total labour force)
Infl ation (average annual rate in % against previous year)
1. Media Consumption: The Digital Factor
Sources: 1.1 Local statistics offi ces or ITU
1.2 Audience surveys;
1.3 Audience surveys
1.1 Digital Take-up
1.1.1 Are households prepared to access content provided by digital media? Which of these
devices or platforms are used most often to access news?
• Fill in the table below using data from national statistical offi ces, and write an
analysis based on these indicators. Add information relevant to the analysis
(e.g., internet usage patterns, place of internet usage) from available media
consumption surveys.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 4 2
TABLE: Households owning equipment (2005–2013)
TV set
Radio
PC
1.1.2 What is the take-up of platforms that carry news?
• Fill in the tables below using information from national statistical databases
and write an analysis based on these indicators. Pirated access to broadcast
platforms, where this represents a major trend, should be mentioned in this
section.
TABLE: Platform for the main TV reception and digital take-up1 (2005–2013)
Terrestrial reception (– of which digital)
Cable reception (– of which digital)
Satellite reception (– of which digital)
IPTV
Total (– of which digital)
TABLE: Internet penetration rate (total internet subscriptions as % of the total population)
and mobile penetration rate (total active SIM cards as % of total population) (OSF to
provide data from ITU that will serve as a basis for calculation of these fi gures), 2005–2013
Internet (– of which broadband)
Mobile telephony (– of which 3G)
1.2 Media Preferences
1.2.1 What have been the main changes in news consumption, particularly those which may
be linked to digital migration (i.e., audience transferring to digital broadcasters and the
internet)?
• Analyze the patterns of media consumption based on data on aggregate
viewership/readership/listenership/online visitorship (2005–2010).
Where consumer surveys are available, give the reasons behind consumer
choice.
1.2.2 Have these changes aff ected the availability of a diverse range of news over the past fi ve
years? If yes, how and to what extent?
• Using data from 1.2.1, analyze news content consumption, with a focus on the
diversity of available news sources.
1. Th e fi gures refer to the main TV set in the households for multi-TV households.
3 4 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
1.3 News Providers
1.3.1 What are the most widely-used news providers? How has the ranking of the fi ve most
popular sources of news changed over the past fi ve years?
• Analyze the performance of print and online media over the past fi ve years, based
on the following criteria: paid circulation for print media, website visitorship
data for online media, audience share for radio and TV broadcasters. Th e
ranking should include up to fi ve news providers. It should be followed by a
short description of the media outlets listed, with a focus on how commercially-
oriented in terms both of content and of style (‘framing’) these outlets are.2
Th e section should thus consist of four main rankings with a fi ve-year table of
audience data as indicated.
1.3.2 What have been the most popular news bulletins in the country on analog television
over the past fi ve years? Have they lost audiences during this period? If yes, how much,
and can these losses be attributed to digital migration?
• Collect annual average ratings for the main primetime newscasts on the
largest commercial and non-commercial TV channels (up to a total of fi ve for
both) and write an analysis of the audience dynamics over the period. Where
multilingualism and language diversity are signifi cant issues for public policy,
including media policy (see also 4.3.1), describe TV news consumption by
language.
1.3.3 Have digital media (both new digital channels and new media) contributed to the
quality of news? If yes, how and to what extent?
• Based on 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, analyze the trends in the news off ering focusing on
the impact of digital broadcasters and the internet. Th e analysis should also
describe trends in the mass-market versus quality news production.
1.4 Assessments
1.4.1 What has been the impact of digitisation on the news off er and choice?
2. Commercially-oriented news focuses on sensational political and crime stories, gossip columns, the personal lives
of celebrities and sports stars, etc. Another categorization of the two types of news providers is mass-market vs.
quality news providers.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 4 4
2. Digital Media and Public or State-Administered Broadcasters3
Sources: – Annual reports of public service media (where they exist)
– Parliament reports on public service media and spending
– Media reports
– Interviews with media observers/experts
2.1 Public Service and State Institutions
2.1.1 What kind of public service or state media exist, how much news and current aff airs
content do they produce and distribute, and to what size of audience/user base?
• Write an analysis based on data on the output of news and current aff airs
(as a percentage of total programming) and on audience share data. Where
qualitative content analyses are available, use them to describe the type of news
and current aff airs content produced by public service or state media. Trends
(such as improvement as a result of commercial competition) should be noted
and analyzed.
2.1.2 Has the process of digitization led the public service or state media to alter the number
of services they provide?
• Describe the changes in the services off ered by the public service or state media.
Refer to services such as specialized channels, websites, etc.
2.1.3 Has there been state-level support for the digitization of public service media (through
regulation, legislation, fi nancial and/or political support)? If yes, has this support
aff ected their independence and/or the diversity of their output?
• Using reports in the media, interviews with media experts and observers, infor-
mation from independent assessments (where available), and/or inside infor-
mation from the broadcaster(s), write an outline of fi nancial and investment
incentives, legal advantages off ered to these media, privileged access to digital
spectrum, privileged coverage of political or other events, etc.
3. Public or public service broadcasters should be independent from both the state and the market, with a mandate
to serve society by – in the classic formulation – informing, educating and entertaining. Th ey are usually required
to address the whole of society (universal access) with a range of diverse, high-quality content. Th ey should be
protected from direct political interference by ‘arm’s length mechanisms’, which may or may not be eff ective in
practice. Th ey are typically funded by a combination of license fee revenue (levied on owners of devices that can
receive TV signals), government budget allocation, and advertising. State-administered media operate explicitly
under government control. Many nominal public service broadcasters are, in reality, covert state broadcasters. In
principle, a broadcaster may be state-administered but still operate as a public service outlet; in practice, however,
this does not happen. Other types of non-commercial, not-for-profi t broadcasters that are required by law or
pledge through their own statute to fulfi ll a public service mission should be covered in this chapter. Th ey can
include, but are not restricted to, community radio broadcasters or outlets operated by non-governmental orga-
nizations, including churches.
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2.1.4 Has the process of digitizing terrestrial platforms helped or hindered public service or
state media to increase their reach and infl uence, and to engage with their audience?
• Write an account of the consequences of digitization for these media’s territorial
coverage, audience reach (including their reach to Diaspora populations,
production budgets, etc.
2.2 Public Service Provision
2.2.1 How is public service provision by the media regarded and understood by the public,
politicians and journalists?
• Using reports, surveys and debates on the role of public service media, describe
how the public service mission in the media is seen in society, referring, for
example, to perceptions of ‘public’ or ‘public service’ media as ‘state’. Refer
too, if appropriate, to rates of payment/non-payment of the license fee as an
indicator of public respect for the public service broadcaster.
2.2.2 Are any specifi c obligations imposed on, or incentives provided to, commercially-funded
media to produce and/or disseminate public service content? Have these changed over
the past fi ve years? If yes, have reasons for this change been given, and are these reasons
related to digitization?
• Describe public service provisions on commercial media. Refer to arguments
that the end of spectrum scarcity, the emergence of new platforms, and the
migration of ad-spend remove any justifi cation for special obligations on
commercial broadcasters, etc.
2.3 Assessments
2.3.1 What have been the gains and losses of public service or state media caused by the digital
switchover of terrestrial platforms and the rise of new media?
2.3.2 Have public service provisions become more or less signifi cant in recent years, or have
they not changed?
3. Digital Media and Society
Sources: 3.1 – Online audience surveys (Alexa.com; whenever possible, local online
audience surveys should be used)
– Consumer surveys on online usage
3.2 – Media reports
– Interviews with civil society organizations/groups
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 4 6
3.1 User-Generated Content (UGC)
3.1.1 What are the most popular types of UGC and the most popular UGC websites in the
country, by number of unique visitors? To what extent have websites of established
media included UGC?
• Take the top (up to 10) most popular websites in the country and analyze
those websites that qualify as UGC websites. (Th ese may include consumer,
campaigning, personal or special interest sites – do not restrict your selection
to hard news sites.) Analyze how many of these are run by established media.
Based on your own analysis and on available consumer surveys, describe the
types of UGC on the most popular websites in the country: online forum/
comments on established media websites, independent or media-embedded
blogs, wikis, social networks, video and photo sharing websites.
3.1.2 What are the ten most used social networks? (Refer to international – Facebook, Twitter,
etc. – and national, according to the data.)
• Write an analysis of the popularity of social networks based on the number of
active users, as a share of registered users.
3.1.3 How much of the usage of social networks and blogs, in particular, involves news
consumption, and how much personal or other communication?
• Using available internet consumer surveys, analyze the trends in usage of social
networks, i.e., for personal reasons or for news consumption. (Twitter may be
included as a social network.)
3.2 Digital Activism
3.2.1 Are any of the digital platforms used for civil society activism?
• Give a critical account of several recent examples of mobilization involving
(a) individuals and (b) groups (e.g., activists cooperating with media via
UGC, activists using social networks, political parties/groupings and civil
society organizations using digital platforms, etc.) Key indicators of activism’s
signifi cance may include breakthrough to mainstream media, and impact on
offi cial attitudes or public policy. If you are unable to provide examples, please
explain why.
3.2.2 Are these digital mobilizations only interesting to a small minority or are they relevant
to mainstream society?
• Analysis of achievements of such eff orts/initiatives; refer to the scale of such
mobilizations, actual impact, etc.
3 4 7O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
3.3 Assessments
3.3.1 How has digitization contributed to the overall news off er?
3.3.2 Are citizens taking the opportunities off ered by new media for civil and political
activism?
4. Digital Media and Journalism
Sources: Th is chapter may be commissioned to local media observers/experts who have
followed journalism closely. Available content analysis studies should be used for
subsections 4.2 and 4.3. Th e chapter should be written based on (between 5 and
10) interviews with journalists and editors and answers to questionnaires submitted
by country authors to journalists, editors and media activists.
4.1 Impact on Journalists and Newsrooms
4.1.1 What are the main changes in the work of journalists over the past fi ve years, and which
factors produced these changes? To what extent are these factors digital-related?
• Analyze the changes in the ratio of original to aggregated news content in major
outlets; newsroom convergence; possible increases in unverifi ed information;
increase in the number of voices/sources in stories
4.1.2 Has digitization had any consequences for the ethical behavior of journalists?
If yes, what are they?
• Write an account of any changes in practical respect for ethical standards, as
well as in their letter or implementation, breaches of privacy, data theft, etc.
4.2 Investigative Journalism4
4.2.1 Has digitization helped investigative journalists to improve their work?
• Write an account of the means and tools made available by digitization to
improve the work of journalists.
4. In this report, ‘investigative journalism’ is understood as a form of journalism that investigates in-depth a topic
of public interest. It is characterized by lengthy research and preparation, involving primary sources (legal docu-
ments, tax records, government and regulatory reports), analysis of social and legal issues, and a signifi cant num-
ber of interviews on and off the record. Key areas for investigative journalism include crime, corporate wrongdo-
ing, political corruption, and public policy of all kinds.
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 4 8
4.2.2 Has digitization aff ected or created threats to the work carried out by investigative
journalists? If yes, how?
• Write an account of issues such as data theft, blocked content and other forms
of censorship, including self-censorship as a result of political pressure or
security threats. Give examples and an indication of whether it is possible for
investigative journalism to be carried out.
4.2.3 What sort of, and how much, investigative journalism is done through blogs and other
new entrants?
• Identify the most prominent blogs that publish investigative content and write
an analysis of journalistic content in the new media.
4.2.4 Has digitization helped to improve the dissemination and impact of investigative
journalism?
• Write an analysis of the opportunities to disseminate investigative reporting
content created by digitization. Refer to number of platforms, changes at
policy level, etc.
4.3 Social and Cultural Diversity
4.3.1 What are the most sensitive issues in terms of social and cultural diversity?
• Write an account of such issues at the societal level, referring to ethnic,
linguistic, or religious minorities, migrants, sexual minorities, etc.
4.3.2 Is coverage of such issues regulated? How have these issues been reported and discussed
in the media? (In particular, how have inter-ethnic tension and confl ict – where these
occur – impacted on this coverage of these issues by the media?)
• Describe the existing standards on minority coverage in the media, such as
quotas for minority programming or any other requirements on minority
coverage. Analyze how these standards have been implemented.
4.3.3 Have digital media aff ected (reduced, enlarged or improved) the space for public
expression of the groups mentioned at 4.3.1, and the content that targets these groups?
• Based on available content analyses and interviews with journalists, analyze
the role that digital media play in the coverage of minorities.
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4.4 Political Diversity
4.4.1 Has digitization triggered any changes in the regulation of media coverage of elections
and politics in general? If yes, have these changes aff ected the overall diversity of political
communication?
• List changes in provisions on media coverage of elections and politics in
general over the past fi ve years, and establish which of these were prompted by
digitization. List examples of news providers moving from traditional media
to new platforms that are less regulated (such as the internet) and describe the
main trends in coverage of political issues, with a focus on political diversity.
4.4.2 What has been the impact of digital media on political communication and on the
diversity of voices in political life?
• Analyze how digital media have aff ected the diversity of voices in political life,
drawing on such factors as (a) new patterns of communication employed by
political parties, (b) changing numbers and kinds of actors in the political
space, and (c) interest generated in politics through digital media.
4.5 Assessments
4.5.1 Has digitization aff ected the work of journalists and the quality and accuracy of their
reporting? If yes, how?
4.5.2 Has digitization aff ected coverage of elections and of marginalized groups, and
investigative journalism? If yes, how?
5. Digital Media and Technology
Sources: 5.1 – Reports of the technical regulatory authority
– Interviews with policy-makers in telecommunications and spectrum
allocation
– Independent assessments and reports
5.2 – Reports of the technical regulatory authority
– Interviews with policy-makers in telecommunications and spectrum
allocation
5.3 – Telecom annual reports
– Independent assessments
– Interviews with IT&C experts
– Media reports
M A P P I N G D I G I T A L M E D I A G L O B A L F I N D I N G S3 5 0
5.1 Broadcasting Spectrum5
5.1.1 Are any categories of users/groups/institutions favored by broadcasting spectrum
allocation policy? If yes, how?
• Describe who is responsible for allocating broadcasting spectrum and what the
basis or principle of the allocation of digital spectrum is. Refer to broadcasters that
are disadvantaged vis-à-vis other businesses, low spectrum usage fees, privileges
in broadcast licensing, distribution of white spaces and digital dividend. Include
a description of the allocation of spectrum for telecom and other services if this
process is relevant to the allocation of spectrum for broadcasting.
5.1.2 Is spectrum awarded in a transparent, non-biased way?
• Refer to public tenders on the basis of calculated costs or benefi ts, selective
application of legal provisions in the award of spectrum, etc. Examples should
be given.
5.1.3 Have operators tried to reduce broadcasting spectrum availability for potential rivals?
• Refer to eff orts to obtain control and management of digital multiplexes, etc.
Also refer to any self-interested lobbying by commercial operators for certain
technical standards over others (e.g. MPEG-2 over MPEG-4).
5.2 Digital Gatekeeping
5.2.1 Are there any debates in public or the media about the adoption of technical standards
for platforms that carry news? If yes, have these debates highlighted any problems that
the adoption of such standards poses for media reception and consumption?
• Describe the process of adoption of technical standards for digital broadcasting.6
Specify whether independent experts have indicated any ways in which this
process (which is and has to be commercially driven), and also the resulting
decisions on standards, fail to take due account of the public interest.
5.2.2 Have been there any problems related to the gatekeepers in digital broadcasting?7
• Write an account of access-related problems posed by gatekeepers, such as
companies bundling a large number of TV channels and running subscription
5. By ‘broadcasting spectrum’, we refer to the radio frequencies or waves in the electromagnetic spectrum, which
carry radio (including mobile phone), television and radar signals.
6. Th ey are broadcast standards (such as DVB, ATSC, ISDB, Chinese, DMB) and to codecs such as MPEG-2,
MPEG-4.
7. We look in this report at the main gatekeepers in the digital chain, such as multiplex operators (MUX), Electronic
Programming Guides (EPGs), Conditional Access (CA) and Subscription Management Systems (SMS).
3 5 1O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
management systems (SMS), exclusion of channels from EPGs, digital
multiplexes charging prohibitive fees for channels, etc. Focus on the main
changes in analog broadcast arrangements.
5.2.3 Have transmission network operators intervened in any way in the distribution of
spectrum resources? If yes, how?
• Analyze cases of spectrum allocation, identifying any instances where the
transmission network administrators have intervened to privilege particular
groups, companies or individuals.
5.3 Telecoms
5.3.1 What role, if any, do cable and telecom companies (including mobile operators) play in
the distribution of media content, and in particular of news, over recent years?
• Write a short summary of the existing state of aff airs on the telecom and cable
market in your country. Th en, analyze how trends such as increasing off ers of
bundled services, IPTV deployment, criteria on program packaging, among
telecom and cable companies etc., have infl uenced the availability of news
services. Refer, where applicable, to must-carry and must-allow rules.
5.3.2 Have there been any cases where cable and telecom operators (including mobile
operators) have exerted pressure on news providers?
• Give an account of any cases where such companies have put pressure on news
providers through, for example, restrictions of access to services, imposition of
high fees, etc. At the same time, examples of such companies off ering incentives
to news providers should be looked at. Evidence about the purpose of their
moves should be provided. Issues aff ecting net neutrality may be mentioned.
5.4 Assessments
5.4.1 Is the spectrum allocation process politicized? If yes, how and to what extent? Does the
regulator take account of the needs of all society when allocating spectrum?
5.4.2 Is spectrum regulation appropriate for the country? (Refer to whether/how it secures a
healthy level of competition, accessibility of services, the digital divide, etc.)
5.4.3 What role has public interest played in the allocation and regulation of white spaces
and digital dividend? (For example, do laws and policy documents mention the public
interest? If yes, do they defi ne it? Have civil society organizations addressed this question
with reference to the public interest?)
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6. Digital Business
Sources: 6.1 – Media reports
– Market reports and assessments (independent consultancies such as
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, or industry organizations such as
WAN-IFRA)
– Annual reports of media companies
– Interviews with media experts/observers
6.2 – Media reports
– Market reports and assessments (independent consultancies such as
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, or industry organizations such as
WAN-IFRA)
– Annual reports of media companies
– Interviews with media experts/observers
6.3 – Interviews with editors and media managers
6.1 Ownership
6.1.1 Have there been any legal developments on news media ownership over the past fi ve
years? If yes, how have these developments aff ected diversity of ownership?
• Analyze changes in legislation that aff ect media ownership over the past fi ve
years, and explain which of these are related to digitization. Relevant changes
can include relaxation of ceilings on ownership concentration, introduction
of cross-ownership rules between online outlets and broadcasters, rules on
foreign ownership in the media, etc. Analyze the impact of such changes on the
diversity of owners in the media.
6.1.2 Who are the new entrants in the news market over the past fi ve years?
• Write an account of the major owners of media companies that started
operations in the country over the past fi ve years. Th ese could be foreign owners,
intergovernmental organizations, domestic commercial news providers, not-
for-profi t organizations, etc.
6.1.3 Among horizontal/vertical mergers and consolidations of ownership, which have been
(a) the most helpful and (b) the most detrimental to pluralism and diversity?
• Write an analysis of how consolidation of ownership has aff ected and is aff ecting
the pluralism of media and diversity of voices, based on interviews with
journalists and independent media experts. Th is sub-section should include
cases of publishers putting pressure on their journalists not to cover certain
topics because of the owners’ interests, limits on access of various politicians or
businessmen to media outlets because of pressures from owners, cases of media
that are purchased to be used for gaining political infl uence, etc.
3 5 3O S F P R O G R A M O N I N D E P E N D E N T J O U R N A L I S M 2 0 1 4
6.1.4 What, over the past fi ve years, have been the most signifi cant business involvements
of the telecom industry in the media sector that have infl uenced the independent
performance of the media?
• Write an account of mergers and acquisitions in, or aff ecting, the media
sector, with a focus on telecoms. Refer to telecoms’ purchases of media outlets,
takeovers of digital multiplexes, etc. If there is information available on the
rationale behind these deals, it should be explained here.
6.1.5 Is media ownership transparent?
• Write an account of (a) the requirements (legal or otherwise binding) on media
organizations or media owners to report ownership information to a media
authority or other public body, (b) the level of public access to this information
and (c) the level of implementation of requirements on transparency where
they exist. Assess whether citizens are able to know, though publicly available
information, who controls the media.
6.2 Funding
6.2.1 How have private and public funding developed over the last fi ve years? How are these
trends projected to evolve in the near future?
• Gather data on public (or state) spending: this includes state budget allocations,
license fees, state advertising, etc. Gather data on private funding: this includes
advertising spend,8 sponsorship by private companies, fi nancial sources, etc.
On the basis of this data, analyze how public and private spending in the
media has evolved over the past fi ve years, and the reasons for this evolution.
Based on interviews with media experts and on your own judgment, describe
which of these developments are seen as (a) the most helpful and (b) the most
detrimental to the fi nancial independence and sustainability of the media?
6.2.2 What other sources of funding have emerged in the media?
• Write an account of other sources of funding, public or private, that
have appeared in the media. Th ese may include new forms of advertising,
subscriptions, Diaspora funding,9 etc. Hybrid forms of funding such as PPP
(public-private partnerships) if such have emerged in the media, should also
be mentioned. If there is evidence of how such sources contribute to improving
the fi nancial sustainability of news media, provide this information here.
8. Collect advertising data in net fi gures. Where data are not available, estimate the advertising spend based on
ratecards. (Ratecards are defi ned in the advertising industry as a list of tariff s for advertising provided by media
outlets to interested advertisers.)
9. Funding from abroad.
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6.3 Business Models
6.3.1 Have digitization and (where applicable) the economic crisis prompted any changes to
media business models?
• Based on extensive interviews with CFOs and CEOs of media companies, analyze
the changes in cost-expenditure balance, sources of revenues, marketing budgets,
etc. over the past fi ve years. Reference to business plans and fi nancial projections
released by companies should be made where these are available and are not
covered by confi dentiality agreements.
6.4 Assessments
6.4.1 Has digitization aff ected monopolies and dominant positions in the media market and
media ownership by politicians? Has transparency of ownership increased in the past
fi ve years?
6.4.2 Has the impact of ownership on the performance and independence of the media
changed under digitization? If yes, how?
6.4.3 What are the most sustainable fi nancing models for the production of publicly-relevant
news content? Which sources of funding are seen as (a) the most helpful and (b) the
most detrimental for media diversity, pluralism and independence? Have any changes
to media business models had a positive or negative impact on journalistic output and
quality?
7. Policies, Laws and Regulators
Sources: 7.1 – Legislation and policy documents
– Legal analysis and legal impact assessments
– Regulatory impact assessments
– Media reports
– Interviews with legal activists and journalists defense groups
7.2 – Legal analysis
– Regulatory impact assessments
– Media reports
7.3 – Media reports
– Interviews with editors/regulators
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7.1 Policies and Laws
7.1.1 Digital Switchover of Terrestrial Transmission
7.1.1.1 Are there public provisions that govern access by citizens and provide for aff ordability?
If yes, are they implemented?
• Give an account of the legal and political commitments on access of citizens
to programs on digital platforms and of the aff ordability requirements that
must be met before analog signals can be switched off . Describe whether these
provisions are fair (as between minority or ethnic groups and the majority, as
between the economically disadvantaged and the advantaged, and so forth)
and whether they have been, or are being, implemented.
7.1.1.2 Is there a scheme that provides for the payment of subsidies to those who cannot
aff ord set-top boxes or digital TV sets? If yes, how adequate is this scheme?
• Describe any schemes that are provided by law or government decree to
subsidize digital reception equipment.
7.1.1.3 Does the legal framework ensure that the digital switchover of terrestrial platforms
serves the public interest? If yes, how? Also, if yes, are there transparent criteria to
ensure that the public interest is, in fact, served?
• Refer to provisions regarding public interest in policy documents and laws
concerning switchover, describing if and how public interest is defi ned, and
what mechanisms are in place to ensure that it is served. Refer also to the
transparency (or not) of funding for digital switchover, etc.
7.1.1.4 Have citizens/civil society groups been consulted, or have they been otherwise
involved, in decision-making with respect to the policies or provisions you have
mentioned in 7.1.1.1?
• Give a critical account of any public consultations, feedback from civil society
groups and citizens and their impact on the decision-making process. If there
have been no such activities, comment on any relevant proposals or initiatives
and assess whether civil society groups are up to speed on these issues.
7.1.2 Internet
7.1.2.1 Is news delivery regulated on the internet and mobile platforms? If yes, how?
• Give an account of the most important requirements for content distribution
on internet and mobile phones. Th ese include provisions on news aggregation,
content regulation, legal relations between various parties on the internet,
etc. Explain whether these provisions are implemented.
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7.1.2.2 What legal liability exists for internet content? How does that liability aff ect the
performance and independence of news media?
• Describe whether legal liability for internet content rests with the author/
poster, the site, or the server. Write an analysis, based on existing cases, of how
these provisions aff ect the independent performance of the media.
7.2 Regulators
7.2.1 Has the structure of media content regulators changed over the past fi ve years? If yes,
how?
• Give a short account of the regulatory framework in the analog era, and
then describe what structures have taken over (or have been created to take
over) regulation of digital broadcasting and the internet. Describe the main
changes in content regulation, and analyze whether traditional ‘linear’ content
regulation has been weakening and internet regulation has been increasing.10
7.2.2 Are there mechanisms for ensuring the independence from government and political
parties of those regulating the digital environment (including the internet)? If yes, do
these mechanisms deliver independence in practice? And have they altered during the
past fi ve years?
• Write an analysis of these mechanisms, which include criteria for appointing
and dismissing members of the regulator, funding mechanisms, etc. Summarize
the state of regulatory independence in the analog era, and then describe
the situation in the regulators that took over (or were created to take over)
regulation of digital broadcasting and the internet. Cases where regulators
become dependent on state-owned companies, particularly telecoms, should
also be discussed here.
7.2.3 Is the system of licensing fair?
• Analyze the mechanisms in place to ensure that every application for a license
(analog or digital) will be considered independently of the applicant’s political
or religious or ethnic affi liation. Write a description of the state of licensing in
the analog era and then analyze the process of licensing digital broadcasters,
referring to specifi c cases of unfairness, lack of transparency, etc.11
10. ‘Linear content’ refers to scheduled media content that progresses without any control from the viewers, such as
broadcast, scheduled programs. ‘Non-linear content’ refers to content, such as internet content, that allows for
user interactivity.
11. Th e content of this section diff ers from 5.1 Spectrum. While in this section we ask you to analyze the system of
digital licensing by the content regulators, in 5.1 Spectrum, we ask you to identify the groups that have been or
are being advantaged by the general policy spectrum.
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7.2.4 Are there mechanisms of self-regulation? If yes, do they have any infl uence in the
digitized environment?
• Write an account of the existing self-regulatory mechanisms in your country,
including press councils, complaint mechanisms, ombudsmen, ethical
committees in journalists association. Assess which of these mechanisms (self-
regulatory mechanisms of online media, new ethical codes covering online
media, etc.) disappeared or emerged as a result of digitization. Where there is no
digitized environment, write about other relevant self-regulatory mechanisms.
7.3 Interference by State Authorities
7.3.1 Are there any cases of interference by state authorities that distorts the media market?
• Th is sub-section analyses indirect interference with the media by the state
authorities. Summarize any such cases and trends in the pre-digital media
market, and then assess whether this pressure has increased or decreased in
the digital market. Refer to cases of state authorities awarding preferential
state funding in the form of subsidies or advertising to media outlets, cases of
governmental decisions to adopt new levies on the media aimed at hurting the
fi nancial independence of particular outlets, etc. Establish the link between
such moves and their goals.
7.3.2 Are there any cases of digital regulators abusing their powers?
• Th is sub-section analyzes interference with the media by state authorities
through regulatory bodies. Summarize any such cases and trends in the pre-
digital media market, and then describe whether this pressure has changed
(increased or decreased) in the digital market. Refer to, e.g., cases of licensing
media outlets, orders given by regulators for inspections on compliance with
tax and other legal provisions.
7.3.3 Are there any cases where the state authorities have exerted extra-legal pressure on digital
media?
• Th is sub-section analyzes the level of overt interference of the state authorities
with the media. Summarize any such cases and trends in the pre-digital media
market, and then describe whether this pressure has changed (increased or
decreased) in the digital market. Refer to direct pressures or threats against
editors and owners regarding content, editorial orientation and personnel.
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7.4 Assessments
7.4.1 Is the overall framework of policy, law and regulation responsive to the challenges of
digitization? (Refer to mechanisms to ensure transparent licensing process, economic
competition, guarantees for free and independent news production and dissemination,
etc.) If not, where are the shortcomings? What has been done well?
7.4.2 Have the nature and degree of interference by state authorities changed over the past fi ve
years? If yes, can the changes be attributed to digitization?
7.4.3 Has there been a relative increase in public consultation (in terms of debate and
participation) with respect to new media technologies, in comparison with the amount
of such consultation in the analog context?
7.4.4 Which policies and legal provisions relating to digitization have had an impact, direct or
indirect, on pluralism and diversity in digital broadcasting?
8. Conclusions
8.1 Media To day
Which developments, over the past fi ve years, have most enhanced, and which have
threatened or diminished:
(a) the independence of news media
(b) the diversity of news media and news media content
(c) the pluralism of voices across the news media?
Which of these developments are attributable to the process and results of digitization,
and which are attributable to other causes?
8.2 Media Tomorrow
Over the next fi ve years, what do you expect to be the principal areas of development in
your country’s media, in the light of digitization?
• Note that your answers should emerge naturally from the analyses which you
have carried out in the preceding chapters. If you fi nd that your answers do not
refer to anything you have already mentioned in the report, there is a problem!
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9. Recommendations
Format Th e recommendations should be formatted as following:
9.1 Short subtitle: summing up the recommendation
9.1.1 Problem (short description: what the problem is in one or two sentences)
9.1.2 Recommendation (e.g., “A certain institution/entity SHOULD DO X TO ACHIEVE
Y.”)
• Th ese recommendations should be practical and achievable, in large part if not
entirely.
• Th ey should emerge from the analyses provided in the report.
• Choose carefully among the potential issues. Do not choose problems for
which no viable solution exists, because there is no actor or agent to take the
required action.
• Th ese recommendations will be the foundation for advocacy in your country.
Focus Th is is a report focused on digital media. Hence, there are two types of issues that require
recommendations:
1. Issues relevant for the analog environment, which are also relevant for digital media
2. Issues relevant only for digital media.
Do not make recommendation on issues that are relevant only for the analog environment, not
for digital media.
Recommendations should fall under the following categories
(N.B. Th e bullet points identify issues and principles that may focus your recommenda-tions.
Not all the issues on this check-list will necessarily be relevant in your country.)
1. Policy
1.1 Media Policy
• Legal provisions to boost access to digital media
• Digital broadcast policy to ensure that digital switchover serves the public
interest
• Public participation in preparation of media policies
• Provisions barring inappropriate state intervention in media and regulation
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1.2 Spectrum Policy
• Norms for fair and transparent allocation of spectrum
• Legal norms to prevent problems for access posed by gatekeepers
1.3 Telecom Policy
• Legal norms preventing telecommunications and cable companies from exerting
pressure on news providers
1.4 Internet Policy
• Norms that aim to protect the internet against applications of repressive media laws
and measures; and norms that ensure the internet is not subject to any additional
excessive registration requirements and controls on content, and other restrictions.
• Legislation to protect intermediaries (ISPs, website hosts, etc.) from liability,
particularly for third-party content
2. Media Law and Regulation
2.1 Media Ownership
• Legal provisions against concentration of media ownership
• Legal provisions ensuring transparency of media ownership
• Legal provisions about cross-ownership
2.2 Regulation
• Independence of media regulators
• Fair systems of broadcast licensing
• Self-regulation of content that does not infringe on users’ rights to free expression
3. Public Service in the Media
• Legislation supporting public service media activity on digital platforms
• Legal provisions and mechanisms ensuring the independence of public media
• Support for public service content in the media by funding or legislation
4. Journalism
• Support for investigative journalism
• Support for ethics in journalism
• Legal provisions and incentives for unbiased coverage of sensitive issues
• Norms of fair coverage of elections in digital media
5. Digital Media Literacy
• Initiatives to teach the use of digital media and digital platforms, including initiatives
of digital activism
(N.B. It is unlikely, however, that issues of literacy will be such a priority that they require a
recommendation.)
For more information:
Open Society Media Program
Open Society Foundations
7th Floor Millbank Tower, 21–24 Millbank
London SW1P 4QP, United Kingdom
www.mappingdigitalmedia.org
www.soros.org/initiatives/media
Cover Design: Ahlgrim Design Group
Design and Layout: Judit Kovács l Createch Ltd.
Mapping Digital Media is a project of the Open Society Program on Independent
Journalism and the Open Society Information Program.
Open Society Program on Independent Journalism
The Program on Independent Journalism (formerly the Media Program) works globally to support
independent and professional media as crucial players for informing citizens and allowing for their
democratic participation in debate. The program provides operational and developmental support to
independent media outlets and networks around the world, proposes engaging media policies, and
engages in eff orts towards improving media laws and creating an enabling legal environment for good,
brave and enterprising journalism to fl ourish. In order to promote transparency and accountability, and
tackle issues of organized crime and corruption the Program also fosters quality investigative journalism.
Open Society Information Program
The Open Society Information Program works to increase public access to knowledge, facilitate civil
society communication, and protect civil liberties and the freedom to communicate in the digital
environment. The Program pays particular attention to the information needs of disadvantaged groups
and people in less developed parts of the world. The Program also uses new tools and techniques to
empower civil society groups in their various international, national, and local eff orts to promote open
society.
Open Society Foundations
The Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose governments are
accountable to their citizens. Working with local communities in more than 70 countries, the Open
Society Foundations support justice and human rights, freedom of expression, and access to public health
and education.
