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Mandatory Assignment Resources/Leadership in Crises - The Ultimate Challenge.pdf

Advances in Economics and Business 2(6): 232-237, 2014 http://www.hrpub.org DOI: 10.13189/aeb.2014.020603

Leadership in Crises : The Ultimate Challenge

Sam Eldakak

University College, Abu Dhabi University, United Arab Emirates *Corresponding Author: [email protected]

Copyright © 2014 Horizon Research Publishing All rights reserved.

Abstract The modern companies normally face the issue how they can manage successfully a disaster as a consequence of faulty product, environmental & financial problem or due to personal scandals. It should be noted that the consequences of any disaster afflicting the businesses are significantly expensive and it takes lot of time to re-establish the reputation of the company. It is prime role of the leadership of the organization to judiciously deal with the situation and to act in the positive manner. Leaders’ tasks are to take up the stock of the existing situation and to take the necessary steps for the restoration of the position, image and reputation of the company. Moreover, leadership in managing crises in the organizations can reduce the harm caused by the catastrophic event. On the other hand, the lack of successful leadership deteriorates the impact. The Leaders in the companies should have necessary skills and competencies with the aim of successfully managing the crises. This paper deals with the essential leadership skills and competencies during the crises besetting the companies and how a good leader should act and take necessary steps to restore the companies’ images and standing.

Keywords Crisis, Leadership, Competence, Management, Learning and Reflection

1. Leadership in Crisis Management: An Overview

Both the management of common emergencies and key calamities necessitates a wide variety of leadership management skills. Moreover, the objective of contingency management is: “…to devise policy and to implement programs that will reduce vulnerability, limit the loss of life and property, protect the environment, and improve multi-organizational coordination in disasters” [24]. In certain complex and tense state of affairs of emergencies, the people believe the managers deal with critical incidents effectively and assist the workforce in several ways.

The emergencies and critical incidents do not essentially imply the same significance. A crisis incident denotes a comprehensive perception of incidents that vary from

natural calamities man-made and social troubles [15], whilst contingences have context-focused and rather narrow implications.

Crisis and leadership in the companies are interlinked in that both notions have a character to supplement each other. Accordingly, it is the manager’s task to react to the risks and ambiguities arising from the crises. Moreover, it is the task of the manager to work for the normalcy in the organizations. In spite of the harmful impacts that are existed in critical times, it is significant to recognize the fact that the crises create a vista of prospects wherein a manager has the occasion to modify organizational framework and long-lasting policies. In accordance with this “crisis-reform thesis,” a manager should prevent being infected by the critical emergencies [4]. In the modern business world, the companies owe the existence of critical emergencies due to globalization, deregulation, and information technology. Whilst these developments generate a strong business environment, the companies, however, cannot avoid the fact that this only makes them all more vulnerable to the catastrophic effects of even one crisis. As well, when the crises take place in the companies, the workforce relies on the managers for security and guidance. It is significant to see that crises are not incidents that are clearly outlined, however, are rather of high insecurity.

2. HR’s Strategic Leadership Role As a result of crisis management planning, the

contemporary businesses can be better equipped to manage unanticipated incidents that may create critical or irreversible damage. Conventionally, the human resources has not been sponsored or aimed to systematize or supervise safety and security programs.

Nevertheless, irrespective of the company size, the human resources managers in the modern times have a business strategic part and duty to guarantee their companies are cognizant of the human aspect of a crisis and plan for future to help reduce its impacts [3]. For a company to become most efficient, the human resource managers perform their tasks jointly with the dedication to create business-focused solutions. As stressed by human resources analysts gurus Ulrich and Brockbank[6] “as change agents,

Advances in Economics and Business 2(6): 232-237, 2014 233

HR strategic partners diagnose organization problems…help set an agenda for the future and create plans for making things happen” [36].

The future of the companies’ labor force is an understandable approach for human resource managers to help in both crisis management and long-lasting strategic planning in the companies. For instance, scenario planning is a business strategy that the modern organizations are using to help planning for unforeseen incidents. Whilst human resources managers are unable to envisage the future events, they can assist their companies prepare for it recognizing the most critical matters that could impact the employees in the future events [19].

To be incorporated as a strategic business partner in the crisis management of the companies, it is significant for the HR managers to understand the “lingo” of crisis management. For instance, the phrase “business continuity” points out both the short- and long-range sustainability of the modern companies. As a result of crisis management, the human resource managers have the prospects to show intangible ideals in the companies with concrete “deliverables”. Moreover, in collaboration with other organizational managers, the human resources can create an infrastructure for crisis management of the companies’ human capital—rooted on the organizational philosophy, capabilities and requirement— and consequently offer caring leadership before, during and following a crisis [11].

3. Leadership in Organization Crisis: An Introduction

The majority of the companies’ executives are cognizant of the harmful impacts linked to the organizational crisis and concentrate on communications and public relations as a responsive strategy. Nevertheless, many companies ignore the other leadership tasks related to organizational crises. This may cause the need of proper training and on-the-job competencies that help the managers dealing with the crises.

The leaders in the organizations facilitate their organizations to revive from a crisis and show a versatile set of competencies in each of the 5 stages of a crisis in the organizations, namely, signal identification, preparation and prevention, damage control and containment, business recovery, and reflection and learning. This paper examines the leadership skills throughout each stage of a crisis. Besides, this paper discusses the significant aspect of HR development to create organizational capabilities by means of crisis management operations. Leadership competencies & Crisis Management

Newspaper critiques, radio, and TV nearly daily highlight many companies in crisis. These organizational crises consist of incidents like natural calamities, product recall, business scam, pervasive sexual nuisance, or workforce prejudice against workers. In the majority of cases, the leaders are not able to deal with the crisis, and mistreating

an organizational crisis can have harmful, long-term impacts for the company’s success, standing, market position, and HR management systems [18]. Knight and Pretty [21] noted in their study, that the organizations that mismanaged crises had a 10% reduction in stock price following the first week of the crisis and a 15% reduction under pre-crisis prices subsequent to the first year following the crisis. In contrast, the companies that successfully dealt with the crisis had only a 5% stock price reduction following a crisis, and in the following year, it saw a quick stock revival.

Despite the fact, the majority of companies’ leaders are responsive to the harmful effects related to an organizational crisis, their prescribed training and on-job learning skills do not help them in crisis management. Approaches, for instance, sense making, running the change process, taking risks, and promoting organizational alertness throughout a crisis may take a back seat to deal with the apparently more critical matters related to communication and public relationship [20]. Nevertheless, crisis leadership does necessitate leaders to espouse a complex set of skills to strictly direct an organization by means of the different crisis stages and into a successful revival [5], [7]. Moreover, when these proficiencies are performed, the prospects that the company will be resilient after the crisis are significantly improved. In brief, crisis leadership requires an incorporation of skills, capabilities, and characteristics that help a leader to plan for, react to, and learn from crisis events whilst under public analysis In its most determined form, the crisis leadership is also about managing a crisis in such a way that the company is comfortable following a crisis than it was earlier [6]; [38].

There have been few studies to methodically establish crisis leadership skills that are important in crisis management. Past study has concentrated mostly on framing crisis management steps. In accordance with some researchers [27], [34], a core feature of the framing process is to acquire better transparency or identification the situation, especially the need to know the 4Cs of crisis management: (a) Cause, (b) consequences, (c) cautionary measures for prevention, and (d) coping methods for responding [29]. Clearly, missing from this list is a group of leadership competencies that can assist the companies successfully and competently resolve the crisis and accomplish a resiliency in its strategy and human resources. It is thought that this disparity is due to some extent to crisis studies being housed in the communication field [34]. Consequently, the scholarly growth of the crisis management field is focused mostly on communication strategies and plans (See [9], [10]. Though the strategy research work discusses crisis management in the creation of strategic matter (See [14]), not all strategic matters relate to crises. Thus, the appearance of crisis management as a strategic issue has not firmly occurred as it might have otherwise. In view of the fact that competency development is vital to the work of HR professionals, it is reasonable to explore the role of HRD activities in promoting crisis

234 Leadership in Crises : The Ultimate Challenge

leadership skills. In an unstable milieu like a crisis situation, HRD

operations can cause the success by exploiting and creating workforce [23]. This is realized by means of a strategic collaboration, where the HRD operations are aligned with the objectives of the company’s overall strategy generally, and crisis management planning especially [38]. These HRD alignment operations can consist of ecological scanning for potentials and risks, creating crisis management policies and processes, collaborating with line management on operational matters, and promoting an education culture [32].

4. Leadership Competencies vis-à-vis Crisis Management

A major challenge facing the contemporary businesses is the shortage of empirical study into the crisis leadership. Indeed, Schoenberg [33] explained crisis leadership as one of the most critical however, least analyzed aspects in crisis management. Similarly, Wooten and James [40] stated that, though past crisis management studies have explained how crises showed all over different stages, “there is virtually no research that identifies the knowledge, skills or abilities necessary to lead an organization through these phases’ (p. 372).

Thus, according to Pauchant and Mitroff [28] was that “the involvement of top managers is absolutely essential for developing a systemic strategy in crisis management and convincing others in the organization to co-operate” (p. 130). However, their influential research of top managers in key companies noted that 50% of the managers noted crisis management as a normally technical concern and “considered crisis management efforts to be reactive in nature, to be applied strictly for the purpose of returning to ‘business and usual’ as soon as possible” (p. 198). As well, Wooten and James believed that theoretical progress of the crisis management domain is focused on communication strategies and outlines. “Viewing crisis management only through a communication lens,” they said, “undermines other important leadership responsibilities” [40].

James and Wooten pointed out: “The best organizational crisis leadership is generally not evident, because these firms are less likely to experience a crisis, and when a crisis does occur they are managed in such a way that the sensationalism of the crisis is weakened” [20].

5. Leadership, Development and Crisis Management

Organizational crises are termed as low-probability and high-consequence incidents and are normally typified by uncertainty. The successful management of an organizational crisis is conditional on the leadership behavior that supports members to dynamically involve in

knowledge realization and the creation of strategies to solve the crisis [39]. With the change of business settings and due to its increasingly complex growth, it is especially significant that leaders create a set of competencies that will assist them, preventing and successfully responding to crisis and other strategic matters of the company [18], [25].

Learning as well as development is at the core of what is thought to be in the crisis leadership. Crisis leadership skills are especially pertinent in coping with the operational, strategic, and HR functions and consequences when crises take place [12], [37]. Hence, it is argued that leaders must undertake direct responsibility for organizing a work environment that instills a competency-based method for crisis management. This requires the recognition of the important tasks and activities required in a crisis situation, the skills required to successfully finish these tasks, and a perception of the framework for implementing of the crisis management strategy [42]. When a competency-focused method to analyze crisis management exceeds past the outcomes and concentrates on the real behavior throughout each stage of a crisis, it can create valuable data for various training programs, the choice of business simulations, and administrative coaching session [37], [42].

6. Leadership and Crisis Management Stages

The examination of leadership skills showed throughout each stage of the crisis management process gives a composition for creating the process through the filtering of knowledge and by offering a guideline for decision making [5]; [38]. Generally, the crisis management analysts have noted five phases that show a typical business crisis: (a) signal identification, (b) preparation and deterrence, (c) damage control, (d) recovery, and (e) learning [8], [27], and [31]. The first stage needs leaders to sense early warning signals that declare the change of a crisis. In the second stage, leaders are expected to avoid crises and prepare, should the crisis takes place. The third phase entails controlling the damage by keeping the crisis from developing in other parts of an organization or its surroundings. Throughout the recovery stage, the leaders are responsible for executing short- and long-term plans aimed to assist resume business operations. Lastly, in the fifth stage of crisis management, the leadership support learning and analyzes the critical lessons from the crisis.

7. The Context of Crisis Leadership Like crisis stages, contextualizing crisis types offers an

outline that assists the leadership to deal with the ambiguity and uncertainty concerning the roots of a crisis and the stakeholders engaged [34]. Thus, perceiving the framework helps to identify the crisis and can therefore guide the activities of leaders. Marcus and Goodman [22] noted three

Advances in Economics and Business 2(6): 232-237, 2014 235

categories of organizational crisis, namely (a) accidents, (b) scandals, and (c) product safety and health incidents. Accidents take place unpredictably and are distinct one-time incidents. Moreover, the accidents generally have certain victims that help the leaders to concentrate on their crisis containment strategy on fulfilling the requirements of that group. Compared with other types of crises, the organizations can more easily reject responsibility for a mishap. Scandals, nevertheless, are outrageous or unconfirmed incidents or communications that disrepute the company’s standing. The crises arising from a scandal are hard for an organization to contradict since the incidents are normally the consequence of faults or wrongs. Contrary to accidents, the sufferers of scandals are generally more complex to recognize, hence making the damage control a more complex task. Lastly, in contrast to accidents, a distinct or one-time product safety or health event does not cause mass suffering. In fact, it is the repetition of the issue over an extended time that harms a company’s standing, brand, and possibly financial safety.

As stated by James and Wooten[20], the employee-centered crises generally create over time and are caused by flawed or poorly supervised HR management practices that give rise to perceptions of injustice or unjust treatment. Coombs’s study explained an interrelated form of crisis as an avoidable harmful incident that is sustained by the organizational members and puts stakeholders in danger or breaks the law. Similarly, Pearson and Clair termed employee-centered crises as ones that develop from a failure of sociopolitical systems or a breach of formal management practices, rules, and traditions. Examples of employee-centered crises comprise of discrimination lawsuits and workers’ strikes [20], [26].

It is important to see that not all competencies were shown in a positive or beneficial way. In fact, there were many instances in which leadership behavior has been the just opposite of what might be thought as a display of competence in crisis management. The harmful examples, though, were just as critical as the affirmative ones for outlining relevant leadership competencies all over the crisis management life cycle

8. Leadership: Learning and Reflection In spite of the growing recognition of the impacts of

crisis incidents, the majority of businesses are ill-prepared for their occurrence [16], [30]. As regards the companies that do have crisis management plans, they generally find themselves at a loss when experienced with a concrete crisis. This may, to some extent, explicate the reasons the companies have a tendency to cope with crisis incidents inefficiently. The need of sufficient readiness reveals the contemporary businesses to environmental risks that may harm them of sustainability and individual wellbeing [2].

Moreover, the common incidents of organizational crises show the need for HR Development in preparing the

companies and leaders for crisis events. Nevertheless, little efforts have been made in studying this issue within the HR community in spite of the amount of studies available on organizational emergencies and crisis management. Consequently, the HR managers may not have a strong perception of the characteristics of crises, and its effects on workforce and companies. More notably, the deficiency of knowledge regarding this subject may affect HR managers’ ability to identify and design efficient HR programs, and therefore, decrease the prospective contribution that HR managers may make to organizations’ crisis management endeavors.

Furthermore, whilst the significance of organizational learning is well recorded, its role for efficient crisis management has been studied only to a limited extent and mainly by analysts in the domains outside of HR.

9. Discussion and Conclusion The paper initially stressed upon an objective of

promoting HRD theory and practice by identifying and relating leadership competencies to successful crisis management strategies. This paper develops earlier theoretical work by James and Wooten [20] in which the authors stated various crisis leadership skills. Though, there is some overlap in the skills recognized in the articles, the present study contrast in that it identifies crisis leadership skills that have been espoused by decision makers in a crisis. Consequently, it presents a more detailed set of competencies than the past work. Moreover, the present study concentrates on mainly on the competencies that can be linked particularly with the HRD operation, rather than crisis leadership skills in general. It is found that there are various skills, abilities, or characteristics that describe crisis leadership and that these competencies are linked to core stages of the crisis management procedure.

Throughout the damage control and containment phase of a crisis, the leaders find themselves requiring moving past the emotional stage to danger in such a way that helps them to involve in successful decision making, risk taking, and communication. In later phases of a crisis, successful crisis leaders must show resiliency and support a resilient approach within their workforce.

Of late, the practice and scholarship linked to customary HR has been split off the strategic operation of the company. Indeed, the role of HR has developed over time. At first, the motivation of HR was on workforce issues and functions. In due course, training and development became a more vital feature of the HR professional. Furthermore, the HRD field surfaced [41] with a big motivation for incorporating workforce training, education, and advancement [35]. Even more important is the development toward incorporation of the activities linked with HRD into the strategic aims of the company [13]. In other words, human resources are now assisting to create competencies for the organizations to perform their strategies [36].

236 Leadership in Crises : The Ultimate Challenge

The paper concentrates on identifying a set of major competencies that are essential to a company’s crisis management strategy. Though the prior crisis management study has explained how crises spread across different stages, there is practically no research that finds the knowledge, skills, or capabilities vital to guide an organization through these stages. This research paper fills an evident gap in the study by expressing some of the vital competencies for successful crisis management, and consequently associates the practice and scholarship of human resource department to an important strategic process. Thus, it helps both the body of literature that stresses a competency-based outlook of HRD and as a strategic partner [17]. In the framework of crisis leadership, the research supports the claim for a strong relationship between HRD operations that advance the use of an organization’s human capital and help unambiguous business strategies [23].

Besides, this research highlights human resources activities as a contributor to the learning organization’s outlook [1]. Future studies can examine how HRD helps organizational learning during each stage of a crisis. This necessitates research that examines organizational learning as a repetitive, constant process entailing the creation and importing of knowledge to evade and revive from crises [37].

As well, the research paper presents several prospects for creating human resource and training programs. First, it can be inferred from the data that HRD professionals should work with the leaders in the deterrence of a crisis. This may necessitate the HRD operation to keep an eye on environmental developments and evaluate internal fields of weakness. There is, however, a need to develop training programs for the managers to the realize skills needed during the damage control stage of a crisis. The leadership competencies required of executives during relative calm are quite different from the skill set required to successfully deal with a crisis. Therefore, human resource department plays a critical part role in finding out those managers who can be competent under the critical conditions, time pressure, and strain, in addition to help others to develop these capabilities, and be a dynamic force of the crisis management team. In fact, this is vital throughout the crisis as the leaders are likely not to have enough time to generate new knowledge, particularly for the crisis issues or events for which there is no model for the company. Besides, throughout the damage control and containment stage of a crisis, the companies must be alert so they can promptly take advantage of the expertise of the leaders from various operational departments of the organization. Furthermore, human resource department should be engaged as a strategic partner in the revitalization, reflection, and learning stages of a crisis. In these stages, the human resource department can support training and development programs with the company’s revival strategy. As well, human resource issues should be an essential part of the decision-making process if leadership resolves that

reorganization is needed. Thus, throughout a crisis, the leaders must employ a

particular set of competencies that will not only force the crisis towards the resolution, however, also do so in a manner that maintains or improves the company’s operational capabilities, economic and other resources, workforce esteem and dedication. To be skilled at crisis leadership eventually necessitates leaders to realize or improve their human and social capital by means of education, training, practice, skill, or natural talents.

In sum, in a crisis management team, the human resource leaders incorporate major value to the management of an organization. The crisis management deals with the protection of human capital protect company stakeholders and ensure critical business procedures in the short and long term basis.

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[11] Deming, P. S. (2002, April). Crisis management planning: A human resource challenge [SHRM White Paper].

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[13] Dunn, J. (2006). Strategic human resources and strategic organizational development: An alliance for the future. Organizational Development Journal, 24 (4), 69-77.

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[38] Wooten, L. P., & James, E. H. (2004). When firms fail to learn: The perpetuation of discrimination in the workplace. Journal of Management Inquiry, 13 (1), 23-33.

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  • 1. Leadership in Crisis Management: An Overview
  • 2. HR’s Strategic Leadership Role
  • 3. Leadership in Organization Crisis: An Introduction
  • 4. Leadership Competencies vis-à-vis Crisis Management
  • 5. Leadership, Development and Crisis Management
  • 6. Leadership and Crisis Management Stages
  • 7. The Context of Crisis Leadership
  • 8. Leadership: Learning and Reflection
  • 9. Discussion and Conclusion
  • REFERENCES

Mandatory Assignment Resources/The Role of Informal and Hidden Networks in the Management of Crises.pdf

Financial Accountability & Management, 30(3), August 2014, 0267-4424

What Lies Beneath? The Role of Informal and Hidden Networks

in the Management of Crises

DENIS FISCHBACHER-SMITH AND MOIRA FISCHBACHER-SMITH∗

Abstract: Crisis management research traditionally focuses on the role of formal communication networks in the escalation and management of organisational crises. Here, we consider instead informal and unobservable networks. The paper explores how hidden informal exchanges can impact upon organisational decision-making and performance, particularly around inter-agency working, as knowledge distributed across organisations and shared between organisations is often shared through informal means and not captured effectively through the formal decision-making processes. Early warnings and weak signals about potential risks and crises are therefore often missed. We consider the implications of these dynamics in terms of crisis avoidance and crisis management.

Keywords: risk, crisis, informal networks, control, organisational performance

INTRODUCTION

A striking characteristic of organizational life is that there is a lot of talk about decisions, decisions that have been made, are to be made, will be made, should be made, will never be made; talk about who makes decisions, when, how, why and with what results. Organization members interpret a significant part of activities around them in terms of decisions (Laroche, 1995, p. 67).

The processes of decision-making are central to accountability and control within organisations. It is well known, however, that organisations tend to manage what they can measure and that behaviours and reporting alter accordingly,

∗The first author is research Professor of Risk and Resilience in the Adam Smith Business School at the University of Glasgow. The second author is Dean of Learning and Teaching in the College of Social Sciences and Senior Lecturer in the Adam Smith Business School at the University of Glasgow. This paper is based on research funded by the EPSRC (Grant EP/G004889/1) and by the Glasgow Centre for Population Health.

Address for corresspondence: Denis Fischbacher-Smith, University of Glasgow Business School, Gilbert Scott Building, Glasgow G12 8QQ. e-mail: [email protected]

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260 FISCHBACHER-SMITH AND FISCHBACHER-SMITH

often to the neglect of important but un-measurable information and activity (Seidl, 2007; and Smith, 2005a). The focus on measurement encourages decision- making that attends primarily to those activities that are known, visible and that can be made explicit. Decision making in relation to risk and risk assessment in particular, has become increasingly prominent in organisations due in part to the reputational damage that can ensue following a crisis and from which organisations have great difficulty recovering (Sipika and Smith, 1993; and Smith and Irwin, 2006). Such assessment relies primarily on calculations of probabilities and the consequences of particular hazards, and this process becomes contextualised within information sharing about organisational risks. This process often relies on experts and senior staff within the organisation to calculate the nature of the risk. These groups draw mainly on hard data or information that is known within the organisation around failure modes and their effects. This information is then shared amongst decision makers. There are, however, several problems with this approach.

Firstly, the process is more effective when the probabilities of failure are known and the consequences are well understood. The approach has problems when it is applied to low probability, high consequence events where the frequency of occurrence is so low or the process is so new that there is uncertainty around the statistical judgements of occurrence (Fischbacher-Smith, 2010). Secondly, there are potential issues around the role that technical expertise can play in the process as powerful interests can serve to distort the assessment of risk under certain conditions (Collingridge, 1992; Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; and Smith, 1990). Thirdly, even where information is available about a particular hazard, the decision-making process can also be shaped by judgement of that risk which is based on informal or more qualitative information. We argue here, that despite the use of such information and expertise, the distribution of knowledge across and between organisations presents significant challenges to organisations in the context of decision-making and risk management because many of the early warnings of crises are shared through informal networks that are both unobserved and potentially unobservable. It is for this reason that organisations often only discover that many of these indications existed about the potential for a crisis after the event. These warnings were either undiscovered until after the event or had been discovered in advance but were not fully understood or prioritised because they did not fit with the decision making paradigm of the organisation (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). As many of these early warnings exist within intra- and inter-organisational networks, the challenge for management is that of identifying and managing this otherwise hidden information amongst often unobserved and unobservable networks and it is the nature of this challenge that forms the core of the paper.

How information and knowledge informs the decisions that managers make, is something which has been the subject of considerable research interest (Argyris, 1990; Boisot, 1995; Collingridge, 1992; Collingridge and Reeve, 1986;

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and Seidl, 2007). Of importance within this literature has been the role of socio-technical networks in shaping the supply of information, verifying and challenging assumptions around decision parameters, and in identifying early warnings of the potential failures associated with particular decisions (Ballinger, et al., 2011; Cross et al., 2006; and Jansen et al., 2011). In many respects, socio-technical networks are a central dynamic of organisational performance, particularly in the context of human services such as healthcare (Doolin, 1999). Here, an organisation’s dynamic capabilities (Augier and Teece, 2008; and Barreto, 2010) are a function of the individuals and teams that interact together to deal with the demands of the ‘problem space’ (Boisot, 1995; and Boisot and Child, 1999) as well as the ways in which the organisation communicates information, structures its knowledge management processes, and develops its staff. The nature of the information and data that is provided, and the processes through which it is analysed and stored, are important elements in shaping how effectively organisations manage this information space and make decisions in the process.

The recent Europe-wide crisis around the contamination of processed foods illustrates the nature of the problem well. In January 2013, beef products in the UK and Ireland, were found to contain significant proportions of horsemeat (Castle and Dalby, 2013; Meikl et al., 2013; Meikle and McDonald, 2013; and Williams, 2013). This horsemeat had made its way into food supplied in hospitals and schools, despite public sector procurement regulations and quality control processes. The subsequent testing by government agencies revealed this to be an endemic problem within the European Union (Leake et al., 2013; Linchfield et al., 2013; and Meikle et al., 2013) and highlighted the difficulties associated with auditing information surrounding the international production and transfer of food products. What became evident from the early stages of this crisis was that financial drivers were a key factor in shaping behaviours in a globalised supply chain. The crisis also illustrated the problems associated with a weak regulatory framework (or at least one that was weakly enforced) and a range of issues around auditing compliance. The horsemeat crisis was not the only event to illustrate problems around regulation and compliance. The death of patients at mid-Staffordshire hospital (in the UK) (Francis, 2010), the so-called ‘horsemeat scandal’ (Castle and Dalby, 2013; Leake et al., 2013; and Thomson, 2013), and the presence of non-clinical grade silicone in breast implants (Berry and Stanek, 2012; and Freshwater, 2012) also highlighted the problems around accountability and control against a backdrop of economic pressures.

In human services, such as health care, where organisations are heav- ily dependent on their human capital to achieve effectiveness, knowledge, information, data and decision making can be seen as being largely co- produced with other organisations involved such as social care, education, and third sector agencies providing social support (Osborne, 2006 and 2009). As such, the quality of the human, relationships between service providers (which are often informal), and between these providers and their consumers

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(or patients) also significantly influences the nature of organisational perfor- mance and effectiveness. Much of the literature on service provision emphasises these interactions in terms of improving service integration, strengthening inter-agency cooperation, and clarifying protocols between agencies so as to reduce gaps in service provision. Some stimulus for this has arisen out of cases concerning child protection and older people’s services, especially those where the system was deemed to have failed a vulnerable child or older person. Such services have often provided a focus on the difficulties associated with this network of co-production especially in relation to communicating problems or near misses, or following up on concerns as early warnings. Both children’s and older people’s services are particularly good examples because protection and care depends almost entirely on effective inter-agency (health and social-care) working. Information flows and knowledge management are thus often identified as processes where failures can occur around early warnings and near-miss events (Rasmussen, 1982 and 1983; Reason, 1990 and 1997; and Turner, 1976 and 1978). Within this literature, however, little attention has been given to the substantial limitations organisations have in controlling informal information sharing and decision making between networked organisations and thus the vulnerabilities networks can create.

Our aim here, therefore, is to consider how networked service organisations rely on informal human interaction as an essential conduit of information and knowledge exchange, and to illustrate how these interactions often remain unobservable and uncontrollable by managers, thus having significant potential to directly cause and/or escalate crises. Drawing on both inter-organisational theory and the extensive body of work in crisis management, we examine how vulnerability may be created and early warnings ignored and we consider the implications of informal networks for managerial intervention, contingency planning, and managerial control. Before exploring these processes further, we first need to outline some of the key factors around the management of risk and the limitations of control.

RISK, CONTROL AND UNOBSERVABILITY

Risk is typically understood in terms of estimating both the likelihood and the consequences of a particular event occurring (see for example, Royal Society, 1983 and 1992). Risk management is concerned with the processes of identifying areas of potential hazard, reducing the probability of their occurrence and mitigating the remaining potential vulnerability that exists in relation to that risk. Residual risks are ideally removed, or if that is not possible, then the potential losses are insured. In terms of contingency planning for risk, well- prepared organisations will develop policies to deal with a range of hazards from ‘natural’, through technological accidents, to malicious or erroneous damage caused by the actions of employees or external agents. Such policies invariably seek to ensure a coordinated, efficient and effective response to situations that

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arise, and staff will be trained (to some extent) to respond to such situations (Smith, 2000 and 2004).

An important consideration within the risk management process is how the activities and information flows that occur within the organisation are controlled through the (risk) management function and the limitations associated with that process. Figure 1 shows the relationship between three employees: a manager (designated as ‘M’) and two members of staff (‘A’ and ‘B’). A great deal of management theory and practice tends to assume that sufficient information will be captured through formal processes, and that early warning signals about potential problems will also be captured in this way (Brookfield and Smith, 2007). As such, this conforms what Seidl terms the ‘structures of observation’ – which leads to those elements of organisational performance that are observed (the zone of observability) and those that are effectively ignored (the zone of non- observability) (Merton, 1957; and Seidl, 2007). These ‘structures of observation’ involve two considerations: the first concerns how such structures can shape observations and the second concerns how these observations relate to each other across time and place (Seidl, 2007). Knowledge also provides the mechanism by which certain observations are excluded and Seidl argues that:

knowledge is a selection of certain (generalized) distinctions for observation from all possible ones. Thus, the reverse side of knowledge is an exclusion of distinctions for observation; an exclusion of possibilities of observation (Seidl, 2007, p. 20).

Figure 1

Elements of Organisations

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Management will invariably seek to shape the nature of observations and the processes around knowledge creation and transfer. Invariably, this is seen as taking place through formal managerial processes and the bureaucratic functions of the organisation, rather than through any informal processes. In reality, however, a considerable amount of information is exchanged informally between employees and may bypass formal management mechanisms/functions.

The logical extension of this argument is that at any point in time, managers will have incomplete information around discussions pertinent to risk and, more importantly, may fail to identify information that would point to early warnings of impending failure. In some respects, these early warnings may be missed as a result of what Seidl (2007) terms non-knowledge and the exclusion of certain forms of observation. Similarly, the leakage of information and knowledge outside of the organisation can bypass existing control mechanisms and be used to generate harm for the organisation through direct and malicious actions by outsiders. The insider threats are increasingly seen as important due to the threats from espionage (both commercial and state), terrorism, and organised crime. Inevitably, such processes are also (or aspire to be) invisible to detection and therefore also to management. When one considers that there is a normal degree of misbehaviour within organisations such as bending rules, cutting corners, bypassing ‘unnecessary’ bureaucracy (see Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999), then it requires little imagination to see how intentional harm may be caused by those with malicious intent seeking to exploit weaknesses.

Although managers are likely to want to create structures where they themselves become the key connector between individuals, in reality, situations are more complex for various reasons. Firstly, and particularly in healthcare, multidisciplinary teams, integrated services and managed clinical networks for example, all require team-wide formal communications and the ability of team members, who may not all be employed by one organisation, to take devolved decisions along the lines of their professional training, autonomy and judgement. It may be, for example, that a social worker and community psychiatric nurse (employed by the NHS and Council/Local Authority respectively) need to undertake a joint visit to a patient in the patient’s own home. Their decision making will be influenced by their training, the particular circumstances, the health and wellbeing of the patient, any informal ‘modus operandi’ that the two individuals have reached after working together over time, any relationship of trust, and prior knowledge of the patient or locality. Such dimensions do not fall within the structures of observation to any great extent despite the role of formal inter-agency protocols and the extensive documentation of visits and assessments.

Their manager(s) will be geographically and temporally remote from that decision so will have limited control over the nature of their interaction, little opportunity to identify the existence of an informal relationship between them and therefore, limited opportunity to capture the information shared. In the majority of cases, this will not give rise to a crisis and whilst it may render the

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manager a less socialised perspective of their own area of responsibility, day to day service may be provided to a high level and patient needs met. However, there are sadly cases where difficulties arise and crises do emerge. One need only read the newspapers to hear frequently of cases where a patient has injured someone, where the patient was known to health and care services and where, ‘poor communication’ is deemed to have allowed the situation to occur and indeed to escalate to the point that it has. The issue then is how, and indeed if, it is possible for a manager to ever be able to capture or ensure that key knowledge in a situation like that is communicated and acted on appropriately.

When multiplied to consider the exponential number of informal relationships within and between organisations in which risk-related issues might be communicated, the challenge to organisations and their managers dealing with risk grows significantly. Figure 2 captures the formal risk analysis processes between teams (within or between organisations). It also identifies the informal communications (dotted lines between A and B) and the way in which they feed into wider sets of informal network communications they engage in.

The challenge for organisations is that where multiple departments or organisations are linked together, the focus is normally on formal risk analysis processes which will, in turn, be based on the structures of observation that are in place within the organisation(s) involved in delivering a service or responding to a crisis where it occurs. The structures of observation will help to shape perceptions of the range of anticipated events and any worst-case scenario. The

Figure 2

Knowledge Transfers Around Early Warnings

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outer interactions within Figure 2 are largely of an informal nature and may capture information that is present within the zone of non-observability. As the informal networks extend beyond the span of formal controls, early warnings (often fairly weak signals) are not likely to be identified in an effective manner.

Many of the information flows and communication processes that take place within organisations occur informally. Colleagues share with their peer groups the shortcomings of processes, the inadequacy of information, the limitations of data, the distortions within management information systems, and yet often, managers themselves are unwilling to acknowledge such shortcomings and so do not recognise the potential for failure. Interactions between individuals ‘A’ and ‘B’ are typically interpreted by managers through the lenses of formal organisational structures and formal reporting mechanisms, to the neglect of the informal, yet, as the dotted lines in Figure 1 denote, it is likely that there will be multiple informal communications between ‘A’ and ‘B’, and these potentially transcend formal boundaries as discussed above. Bureaucratic processes will therefore inevitably fail to capture the detail of early warnings and will often prove to be too slow to react when these warnings are captured. They may also be unable to contain the flow of sensitive information outside of the organisation. Overly-bureaucratic environments may also cause individuals to violate (in order to get the job done), thereby moving the organisation closer to the potential for failure whilst allowing managers to believe that their perceived higher levels of controls will guarantee increased safety (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Reason, 1990 and1997; Weick, 2001; and Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).

This process is shown in simplified manner in Figure 2, where a set of interactions take place that lie outside of the normal sphere of managerial control and which generate a perception of order in a situation where the reality is disorder. It is within these informal relations that a great deal may be discussed about the organisation, about the range of tasks and activities undertaken (e.g., discussion of management’s approach to a particular project) and that will thereby generate considerable potential for sharing essential knowledge about hazard and risk. The organisation’s inability to capture this information will inhibit its ability to prevent crises as this informal system is an essential transmitter and creator of knowledge around risk. Unfortunately, the formal processes surrounding risk assessment will often not take account of these informal networks (as a source of early warning information) as they sit outside of the structures of observation imposed by the organisation. Thus, early warnings and weak signals shared within these informal networks will not be captured by the organisation. In response to these problems and information asymmetries, many organisations seek to add multiple layers of controls and build further redundancy into the system in order to prevent failures from escalating. However, not only can such approaches bring with them problems around the escalation of risk (through processes of emergence) but they serve to make the system more opaque and therefore more difficult to manage. These additional layers of control are also no better able to deal with unobservability.

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If systems designers and those involved in managerial and accounting control functions do not consider certain elements to be important then they will remain marginalised and essentially unobserved. During the horsemeat crisis in the UK, for example, a senior manager within a large food retailer observed that the industry does not routinely check for the DNA of some animals and so its presence or absence is never verified. Many organisational controls are based on such assumptions. The underlying problem of hidden networks of knowledge therefore remains.

A NETWORK PERSPECTIVE ON CRISES AND VULNERABILITY

The myriad relationships perpetuated by globalisation and by government approaches to involving private sector providers in the delivery of public services mean that all aspects of the design, delivery, management and measurement of product and service delivery ultimately need to be considered from a network perspective (Kickert et al., 1997). Organisational performance is deemed to be improved through the increased flexibility and responsiveness afforded by carefully designed inter-organisational relationships and by improvements in the transparency, auditability and governance of information within that process (de Bruijn, 2007). Other alleged benefits include quicker decision making processes, improved communications and a reduced emphasis on command and control. A concomitant focus on core business activities and efficient means of delivery has frequently resulted in efficient internal and external networks that allow for ‘just in time’ delivery and lean production. Better integration is thought to reduce duplication, improve the efficiency of resource allocation and resource utilisation, and to ensure that decisions are taken close to the consumer, i.e., at the locus of service provision.

Paradoxically, the same networks that generate these efficiencies for organisa- tions in terms of the speed of interaction and the extent of the supply chain, also generate problems. Networks have brought with them the potential for failures to migrate quickly through the ‘tightly coupled’ and ‘interactively complex’ (Perrow, 1984) nature of the organisation as a system. In this way, ‘just-in- time’ processes can easily become ‘just-too-late’ (Smith, 2005b) as organisations no longer have the resource slack that they need to deal with surges in task demands. The capacity of a regional health authority to respond to a disease outbreak or a major incident, for example, is often largely contingent on its resource slack, and the effectiveness of its emergency planning arrangements with other agencies. Where the communication of information, decision-making, the utilisation of resources, and the network infrastructures that support them are inefficient or ill informed, then an existing crisis can escalate quickly across that system and exceed the capabilities of service providers to deliver what is necessary despite contingency arrangements (Smith, 2005a).

The central role of public-private supply chain networks within a highly globalised industry raises some significant challenges for public management

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regulatory systems, especially in a period of intense cutbacks and austerity. What is clear from a consideration of several crises in recent years is that any weaknesses in state regulatory systems at the national level can have a major impact on vulnerabilities within the single market of the European Union. As this economic trading block increases its membership and given the differential impacts of the economic downturn across this economic landscape, we should not be surprised that the various state regulatory agencies differ in terms of their performance. Clearly, the contamination of the food chain by horsemeat is indicative of this problem.

The emergence of the breast implant case in late 2011 and early 2012 also illustrated how the interconnected nature of organisations can generate problems, in this case, arising from unethical behaviours, to have a deleterious effect on other organisations in the network. The use of non-medical grade silicone by the French-based company PIP and the subsequent concerns of women who had them fitted, resulted in a crisis that spread throughout Europe and internationally (Keogh, 2012). In the UK, the crisis prompted a government assessment of the safety of PIP implants (Keogh, 2012) and, despite the low level of calculated risk, there was considerable pressure placed on private providers to remove implants (O’Dowd, 2011a and 2011b; and Templeton and Follain, 2012). As many of these implants were part of a cosmetic procedure, they were carried out privately. For those implants carried out by the NHS, an undertaking was given to replace them.

Both cases also illustrate the impacts of a de-regulation culture and an associated erosion of regulatory capability around monitoring and enforcement. Within an age of austerity, this erosion of regulatory capability can be seen to decrease the chances of the state being able to detect violations and may, at the same time, increase the pressures on organisations within the supply chain to violate in an attempt to maximise profitability. Within such a context, warnings around violations are more likely to emerge from informal networks and whistleblowing rather than through inspection regimes. The deaths at mid-Stafforsdhire hospital serve as an illustration of the failures in regulatory processes to identify poor performance around patient safety and to learn effective lessons from such events (Francis, 2010; Ocloo and Fulop, 2012; and Reid and Catchpole, 2011). Both the PIP and horsemeat contamination examples also illustrate the role of trust within the regulation of risk across extended supply chains and networks. At the core of this is how receiving elements within a supply chain assume that the products received into their own processes meet the standards required. Invariably, this involves some degree of trust between members of the supply chain network; often supported by informal relationships that evolve over time.

The challenge for public management is therefore how to leverage informal networks when the formal regulatory mechanisms are degraded and how to understand and manage the informal dimension of inter-organisational networks so as to minimise their vulnerabilities. Yet our understanding and

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management of formal and informal networks and network performance is demanding both conceptually and practically, meaning there is as yet, limited research-based insight for public managers to draw upon in practice. Attention has typically been given to aspects of inter-agency collaboration such as sustaining collaborative effort, achieving collaborative advantage and evalu- ating the success of such endeavours (Head, 2008; Huxham and Vangen, 2005; Jaaskelainen and Lonnqvist, 2011; and Rodan and Galunic, 2004) rather than with the management of informal networks and their impact on the generation and migration of crises across organisations, spaces and places.

Socio-technical networks generally, and informal networks in particular, are not routinely seen as a source of vulnerability and much of the literature emphasises the benefits derived from social interactions and relationships. These include the rapid dissemination of information, the communication of tacit knowledge, potential improvements in organisational performance, and the ability to quickly galvanize interest and support where networks are supported by communications structures (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; and Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001).

There is, therefore, a double-edged aspect to socio-technical networks: they can both allow risks to escalate and can provide organisations with a degree of resilience around crisis prevention. The more resilient an organisation can become, the more effective it should be in picking up on, and dealing with, early warnings. It becomes important therefore to understand how such hazards, and the risk of these hazards, can be affected by, and also affect, socio- technical networks within and between organisations. However, as we go on now to explore, much of the interaction within socio-technical networks is informal and frequently hidden presenting significant challenges to managers and accountants seeking to ensure transparency, probity and accountability.

HIDDEN AND INFORMAL NETWORKS

Networks transcend formal organisational boundaries and formal means of observation and control. They are also usually characterised by elaborated codes (Bernstein, 1966) representing the language used by expert groups within the network. These codes are often impenetrable by those outside of the expert group and serve as a barrier to discourse. At its core, knowledge is constructed (or rejected) as a function of how we make sense of what we ‘observe’ in the world around us (Weick, 2001; and Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). We tend to select or accept information that suits our needs, and that we recognise as relevant to our interests (Boisot, 1995; Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; and Taylor, 2000). In part, this sensemaking process is shaped by the values and core beliefs that we hold. For example, in a healthcare setting, clinical staff may readily identify and accept information that reinforces their views on particular approaches to patient care, but be much less receptive to (and thus pay less attention to)

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information about cost, purchasing options or managerial incentives. As Powell observes:

The most useful information is rarely that which flows down the formal chain of command in an organisation or that which can be inferred from shifting price signals. Rather, it is that which is obtained from someone whom you have dealt with in the past and found to be reliable. You trust best information that comes from someone you know well (Powell, 1991).

Thus, informal networks may become powerful conduits of knowledge that is often deemed to supersede or negate organisationally-produced knowledge. Such exchanges are, however, largely hidden and thus evade the normal management and control processes within organisations.

Seidl (2007) argues that observation and knowledge are linked but they are not the same thing:

. . . knowledge is something that guides observation. That is, it is something that in the concrete moments of observation provides an orientation for where to draw the distinction. In that sense, we can parallel knowledge with structures of observation (Seidl, 2007, p.19).

How we define and frame a problem will largely determine how we observe and perceive it and this will, in turn, shape our response to it. Informal networks can, however, allow for ‘non-knowledge’ (Seidl, 2007) to be challenged, as evidence from other contexts and other perspectives is brought to bear on the constrained observations that are codified within organisations. Professional bodies are a key conduit for this process as they provide a range of mechanisms for information sharing and networking. The issue then becomes one of whether the organisation absorbs and responds to this knowledge. The interactions between individuals generate a set of connecting fabrics that both exist, and are perpetuated beyond, the control and sphere of any single organisation.

In these ‘spaces’, knowledge is created and disseminated and serves to shape the views and behaviours of individuals within the network. This, in turn, creates social capital and knowledge that is the possession of the individual (and the network) and not, necessarily, their employer. Not all of this information is necessarily actionable. For example, local authority education staff who deal with vulnerable children come to know the children’s circumstances well, often develop informal ties with staff in related agencies such as healthcare, social care, schools and the police. This is particularly the case around those families where there are anti-social behaviour or addiction problems such that families are brought into contact with multiple agencies. During informal exchanges, background information is often passed between individuals that is not officially permissible (due to client confidentiality) but which front line staff value and deem necessary to effectively undertaking their role. Such communications can result in interventions (under other auspices) that avert a potential crisis. It is also conceivable though that within the network space there is also the

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potential for disinformation and failure as the knowledge communicated may be inaccurate, decontextualized, or out of date, thereby leading to inappropriate actions. Such failures can migrate quickly and create multiple ‘pathways of vulnerability’ (Smith, 2005b) in which the potential for failure can be embedded and remain undetected across a range of connected organisations. These pathways are an extension of Turner’s (1976 and 1978) notion of incubation and Reason’s (1990) resident pathogens by elevating the importance of space, place and time in both the generation of failure (failure modes and probabilities) and its ‘complexion’ (failure consequences and cascades). If we consider the failures that can be generated within (supply chain) networks then it is possible to see organisations as having multiple ‘pathways of vulnerability’ embedded within their sphere of operations. Many of these pathways will originate outside of the organisation’s formal boundaries but will have consequences within them. Informal networks are, therefore, an important but essentially neglected element of an organisation’s risk portfolio as there is a largely under-explored ‘dark side’ to them.

DECISION MAKING: DEVELOPING CONTINGENCIES AND MANAGING CRISES

The managerial limitations we have highlighted so far create both intra- and inter-organisational vulnerabilities. The gaps in knowledge combined with an inability to observe and control much of the communication and knowledge concerning technical and non-technical issues, will serve to create holes in organisational defences. Reason (1990) argues that these gaps may become aligned with gaps in other parts of the organisation, creating vulnerabilities at a number of levels within the organisation. Where gaps become aligned due to the range of issues noted previously with regards to information, communication, error reporting behaviours, hierarchy and so forth, then latent error pathways are created such that hazards can permeate through the organisation(s) and its networks, thereby creating significant losses in terms of control, reputation, and service provision. At its worst in a healthcare context, this means an adverse event in hospital, failure to respond to a community crisis on time, poor diagnosis and inappropriate pathways of care or the death of a patient or innocent victim (Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith, 2009). A multi-agency network thus potentially incubates a significant risk of destabilising a number of organisations simultaneously or in a domino effect. As a consequence of these non-observed networks, there will be information about the various risks that are generated as part of the organisation’s activities that is not captured by managerial control systems i.e., through the formal processes. The essential issue here is that at any point in time, the risks that are identified and measured within a formal process will represent only a proportion of the hazards that are faced by the organisation.

There are important implications for contingency planning given this line of argument. Organisations’ contingency planning processes will generally be

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based on the formal interactions that are measured and managed. Senior staff who typically develop contingency responses, will rely on formal information and data analysis to calculate capacity and to determine a portfolio of risks, typically informed by a local risk register. Informal communications amongst those who deliver services, may present quite different accounts of capacity, knowledge, understanding, decision making and communication pathways that will render some contingency planning assumptions invalid. This means conditions may arise that move the organisation beyond its contingency limits and outside of the scope of the plans that are put into place to deal with serious adverse events (Smith, 2005a). Thus, although it is often assumed that the identification of risk and the development of associated contingency plans is largely sufficient to deal with any ensuing crisis or hazardous situation, it is more likely to be the case that there will be various circumstances in which this proves to be a grossly inadequate assumption. It is not unlikely given our argument above, that a healthcare provider would quickly find that many of its assumptions were inadequate during contingency planning activities and that a crisis situation therefore quickly escalates beyond the contingency limits. Moreover, given the networked nature of organisations, as the PIP case illustrates, events combine and create emergent conditions that are unexpected and uncontrolled, taking the organisation(s) beyond anticipated and controlled limits.

It is at this point that we again recognise the dual role of informal networks. When the organisation is dealing with issues that have been anticipated and are within the scope of the contingency response, they will marshal teams of staff, commandeer equipment and take up residence in premises within their control centres to house crisis teams. The level of mobilisation will vary between organisations and there will be a concerted process of monitoring and evaluation that is aimed at preventing the ‘event’ from escalating further (Smith, 2000 and 2004). The extent of this crisis management process will, of course also be shaped by the ‘structures of observation’ (Seidl, 2007) that are in place. At this stage, one of two things may occur. The event may escalate but nonetheless retain certain characterstics that are conceivable within the dominant paradigm, although this does not make them readily manageable. It is also the case, however, that scenarios may occur that challenge the dominant paradigm within the organisation. They may not have been accepted by management prior to the crisis (e.g., the idea that NHS doctors might commit a terrorist attack), as the evidence-base to support such a challenge had not been accumulated by the formal processes. In both situations, informal networks can play an important role in allowing crisis management team members to leverage the knowledge and resource bases that exist within their informal networks and to alleviate the crisis, preventing further escalation. These informal networks could provide management with (indirect) access to expertise and knowledge held by people outside of the formal crisis teams. A key consideration will also be the ability of informal networks to challenge the organisational paradigm

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following the event. It will be interesting to see how the medical devices sector responds in the wake of the PIP case and increasing calls for a tighter regulatory enforcement regime.

HUMAN NETWORK CHALLENGES TO MANAGERIAL CONTROL

How organisations manage the knowledge that is present within their control, and how they deal with the more informally generated knowledge that exists within the hidden networks that permeate the organisation is an essential consideration. It is increasingly the case that organisations must be sensitive to both internal and external signals, and as a consequence must find a means of capturing information throughout and beyond the organisation. An effective transfer of knowledge between organisational members, along with the challenges made to core assumptions in the process, should allow for a more effective crisis response capability, especially around early warnings. Such a perspective invariably takes the view that the essential knowledge needed to run the organisation is distributed across the organisation and is not just concentrated at the senior management level of the organisation.

Another important aspect of informal, hidden networks is that highly sensitive information that is essential to organisational performance may find more opportunities for ‘leakage’ or, in some cases, early warnings of problems might not be picked up by those who are in a position to take action to prevent escalation. The development and maintenance of lines of communication between members of the organisation, needs therefore, to be a key focus of managerial attention. Whilst many organisations would agree with this, there are several important barriers to effective implementation, especially when dealing with issues around risk.

Firstly, risk assessment by its very nature involves predicting the likelihood of an event occurring and taking subsequent steps to mitigate those risks. Prediction is based on both known and unknown factors, and thus the organisation’s ability to capture relevant information and make informed judgements on which to base their predictions, becomes essential. Much of this information is, however, complex and requires interpretation and analysis by experts. Much of it also lies within the zone of unobservability, exchanged within hidden networks. This interpretation may, under certain conditions, generate the potential for future risks as the decisions taken on the basis of a flawed perspective will serve to shape the control methods put into place.

A second issue, and one that is also important in relation to issues of expertise, is the hierarchy within which information is collated, shared, analysed and disseminated. If error reporting is initiated by a relatively junior member of staff within an organisation that is characterised by professional hierarchy, then the problems of authority gradients can be a significant factor in preventing information flows and subsequent action. Such hierarchies are common to a range of industries such as healthcare, engineering and

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airlines. In some circumstances the power-dynamics within organisations can mean that errors are either not reported (as frontline, junior, staff may feel unable to challenge higher level decisions), or are ignored because the reporter is deemed to be inexperienced or a non-expert. Yet again, the issues will commonly be well-known and communicated among informal but hidden networks.

A third issue concerns the problem associated with constrained boundaries of consideration amongst decision makers who tend not to consider issues beyond the short term. They prioritise the requirement to deal with immediate problems at the expense of the possible long-term cost. These factors, combined with the issues around determining the legitimacy of knowledge and the social construction of risks, generate challenges to the ways in which organisations deal with risk and crisis. The problem becomes compounded when we consider the impact of such problems across the multi-organisational networks that characterise public services such as health and social care. What is less comprehensively acknowledged is the significance that these issues will have within the wider inter-organisational context in which both risk and crisis occur and are transmitted (Smith and Irwin, 2006). A crisis may no longer be confined to one organisation and there is a clear potential inter-agency effect as organisations become more tightly coupled (Perrow, 1984) to each other through complex supply chain networks. What is becoming increasingly clear as a result is:

that in a highly interconnected world, the actions of other organisations may also play an important role in the development and migration of crisis potential (Smith and Barton, 2007, p. 65).

Thus, it is also the case that the ability of one organisation to respond to a crisis situation will potentially enable or disable others within the network, as supply and value chains generate the potential for common mode failures or as critical national and international infrastructures become vulnerable to external attack and failures (Boin and Smith, 2006). The issues here also relate to the limits of managerial control across boundaries and to the interaction effects of one organisation’s performance on another under conditions of crisis. The latter relates very much to the collective capacity of inter-connected organisations – the ability to perform in what Kauffman terms a ‘fitness landscape’ (Kauffman, 1993), but such issues go beyond the scope of this paper.

CONCLUSIONS

Our aim in this paper has been to set out the problem space for information capture and analysis within organisations. We have tried to frame the information terrain in terms of what is measured (because that is invariably what is managed) and what is unobserved. It is these unobserved spaces that generate the dark territory within organisations and which serve to allow crises

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to be generated. In the crisis of legitimation that follows every crisis, it is invariably the unobserved aspects of the organisation that are held up as key factors in shaping the evolution and escalation of the crisis. Often these issues, unobservable interactions and knowledge exchanges will have conveyed some form of early warning but the warning will have been missed or rejected as having little or no importance in determining organisational performance. The concerns expressed within informal networks are thus strangled at birth by a formal system that both fails to recognise their significance and is almost incapable of dealing with them because no structures and processes are available to ‘manage’ them. Even after a crisis, organisations often display a degree of paradigm blindness towards the issues (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012).

Organisations embody informal relationships that are beyond their physical, political, economic, and managerial boundaries. They are, therefore beyond man- agerial control and yet significantly influence organisations acting individually and collectively. Although informal networks are hugely beneficial in terms of organisational performance, especially in complex systems such as healthcare, the problems associated with structures of observation are significant. They are also likely to be compounded across organisational boundaries, yet there has been relatively little consideration of how informal networks may have the capacity for self-harm through quickly transmitting errors via uncontrolled social means of communication. Similarly, there has been little attention on how they might create vulnerabilities for the organisations who are embedded within a set of tightly-coupled linkages.

As economies move increasingly towards mixed forms of public, private and third sector provision of public services, it is essential that this interconnectivity is recognised and understood. Given that organisations will seek to perform at optimal levels, their ability to identify and manage error or hazard potential is crucial. In their attempts to do so, informal networks become significant to the performance of individual organisations. Where network communications are inadequate, informal networks will exacerbate individual organisations’ vulnerabilities such that the network as a whole contains penetrable layers of vulnerability.

This paper has argued that the limits to managerial control within organ- isations are such that the informal networks between individuals within and across organisations may serve to bypass established internal systems designed to reduce the organisation’s vulnerability to external hazard. The challenge for professionals and managers within organisations is, therefore, to recognise and reconceptualise the destructive capacity of informal networks (the ‘dark’ side of networks), particularly in light of the non-knowledge or unobservable transmission of information that is nonetheless strategically and operationally essential to organisations in terms of protection and mitigation of risk. The argument is not intended to negate the role of managers or to suggest that efforts to identify and manage a risk portfolio are fruitless. Rather, we propose that the mindset towards sources of risk be adapted to recognise the vulnerabilities

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that (could) exist within an organisation’s set of network linkages. Moreover, we suggest that managers recognise the vulnerabilities generated due to non- knowledge such that greater awareness is created within organisations of the potential for informal networks to identify and generate risk. We also argue that in considering organisational responses to crisis situations, that crisis management strategies take more conscious account of the inter-dependence of organisations, and the extent to which the underperformance of one organisation within the network, may be detrimental to the survival of others.

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Mandatory Assignment Resources/The Role of Social Approval at the Onset of a Crisis.pdf

Q Academy of Management Review 2015, Vol. 40, No. 3, 345–369. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2013.0027

A BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL APPROVAL AT THE ONSET OF A CRISIS

JONATHAN BUNDY The Pennsylvania State University

MICHAEL D. PFARRER University of Georgia

We extend research on social evaluations and crisis management by explicating the sociocognitive mechanisms that influence how an organization and its external eval- uators perceive and respond to the onset of a crisis. Specifically, we highlight the role of social approval—evaluators’ general affinity toward an organization—not only as a crit- ical outcome of crisis management but also as an important antecedent. We first identify the distinct aspects of social approval and explain why it is an important perception in a crisis context. We then detail how managers attempt to limit the probability and magnitude of social approval loss when responding to a crisis, and how an organization’s existing endowment of social approval affects this decision. We theorize that social ap- proval will serve as either a buffer or a burden in influencing evaluators’ crisis sense- making and attributions. As a result, we argue, organizations endowed with higher and lower levels of social approval may bemotivated to take less responsibility at the onset of a crisis than has been previously theorized. We conclude with a discussion of the broader managerial and social implications of our theory and how it expands our understanding of the crisis management process.

Management scholars have become increasingly interested in understanding the sociocognitive processes associated with how external evaluators perceive and make sense of an organization’s behavior (e.g., Bitektine, 2011; Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Mishina, Block, & Mannor, 2012). Much of the research in this area has focused on the more de- liberate and analytical sociocognitive processes that often serve as the foundation for a number of social evaluations, including organizational repu- tation and legitimacy (e.g., Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Jensen, Kim, & Kim, 2012; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). However, researchers have also begun to explore evaluators’ more intuitive and affective sociocognitive processes that serve as the foundation for an organization’s “social approval,” which we define as evaluators’ general affinity toward an organization (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger,

& Shapiro, 2012: 1079). Hence, management re- search is beginning to show that the degree to which evaluators like or how they feel about an organization can be leveraged to build and main- tain relationships, engender higher performance, and enhance an organization’s chances of survival (e.g., Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Despite these recent efforts, scholars have yet to

fully explore the underlying sociocognitive pro- cesses associated with social approval and how social approval influences organizational out- comes. Additionally, scholars have yet to fully understand the role of social approval when an organization is associated with negative behav- iors, such as when experiencing a crisis—an un- expected, publicly known, and harmful event that has high levels of initial uncertainty, interferes with the normal operations of an organization, and generates widespread, intuitive, and negative perceptions among evaluators (cf. Coombs, 2007b; Fink, 1986; Roberts, Madsen, & Desai, 2007). Recent examples of organizational crises include BP’s Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill, Apple’s labor and human rights issues in China, and Target’s consumer data breach. Given the intuitive and affective nature of social approval, it seems particularly important to examine its role at the onset of a crisis, where similarly heuristic and

We thank former associate editor Cindy Devers and the three anonymous reviewers for their exceptional guidance during the review process. We also thank Katy DeCelles, Ashley Gangloff, Amy Guerber, Patrick Haack, Jason Kiley, Alan Muller, Christine Shropshire, and Anastasiya Zavyalova for their helpful comments on previous versions of the man- uscript. Finally, we thank participants at the 2012 Academy of Management annual meeting, especially those who partici- pated in the Pecha Kucha organized by David Deephouse.

345 Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved. Contents may not be copied, emailed, posted to a listserv, or otherwise transmitted without the copyright holder’s express written permission. Users may print, download, or email articles for individual use only.

affective information processing dominates (cf. Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980; van der Meer & Verhoeven, 2014; Weick, 1988).

In this article we seek to advance research on social evaluations and crisis management by explicating the role of social approval in the sociocognitive processes that shape managers’ and evaluators’ perceptions of and responses to the onset of a crisis. Recent commentary suggests that scholars often rely too heavily on anecdotal, case-based evidence instead of theory-based arguments to systematically identify and model the key sociocognitive properties of crisis man- agement (Coombs, 2007a). Additionally, scholars have largely ignored the role of an organization’s endowment of social approval in the crisis sensemaking process. Given that evaluators rely on their prior social evaluations as a “cognitive shorthand” to “gauge the probable outcomes of interacting with [an organization]” (Mishina et al., 2012: 460), endowed social approval likely plays an important role in how evaluators initially in- terpret and react to a crisis. We therefore draw from research on social judgment formation, per- ception management, and decision making to examine not only how an organization’s social approval acts as a key outcome of crisis man- agement but also how it acts as an important antecedent. In so doing, we contribute to multi- disciplinary organizational research in four pri- mary ways.

First, we define social approval and identify its sociocognitive properties. We highlight the in- tuitive and affective basis of social approval, as well as several additional characteristics, in- cluding its ability to be collectively understood and its individuating nature. We also compare social approval with two related evaluations: or- ganizational legitimacy and reputation. Finally, we position social approval as a key evaluation at the onset of an organizational crisis, matching its distinct properties to those that similarly define a crisis.

Second, in focusing on social approval as an outcome, we apply a sociocognitive framework to understand the onset of a crisis in terms of the expected probability and magnitude of social approval loss. We argue that evaluators will use two primary sources of information to make sense of a crisis and formulate their attributions: (1) the perceived degree of an organization’s re- sponsibility based on the characteristics of the crisis, which we term situational attributions, and

(2) an organization’s response strategy, which is the set of coordinated communication and actions used to influence evaluators’ crisis per- ceptions (Barton, 2001; Coombs, 2007b). The de- gree to which these two sources of information are matched will facilitate evaluators’ initial crisis sensemaking and attributions. For exam- ple, for a crisis that triggers greater perceptions of responsibility (e.g., financial fraud or environ- mental malfeasance), a response strategy that accepts more responsibility will match eval- uators’ situational attributions and will simplify sensemaking. We theorize that a matched strat- egy will result in a more normalized loss of social approval such that the expected mean and vari- ance of social approval loss will be reduced. In contrast, a mismatched strategy will complicate evaluators’ sensemaking and attribution efforts, which can increase the mean and variance of social approval loss. Third, because prior social evaluations of an

organization influence “what observers expect and notice, as well as how actions and state- ments will be interpreted” (Mishina et al., 2012: 462), we theorize that an organization’s endow- ment of social approval is an important yet often overlooked antecedent for evaluators as they make sense of a crisis at its onset. We extend organizational research exploring the “double edge” of social evaluations (cf. Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 177; Brooks, Highhouse, Russell, & Mohr, 2003; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006) by arguing that an organization’s endowment of social approval can serve as either a buffer or a burden in influencing evaluators’ perceptions of a crisis. We explain the sociocognitive mechanisms behind this double edge and show how an organization’s response strategy is an important factor in de- termining whether endowed social approval will act as a buffer or a burden. We ultimately argue that higher and lower levels of social approval are likely to be a burden when an organization accepts more crisis responsibility, whereas they are likely to be a buffer when an organization accepts less responsibility. Fourth, we theorize that an organization’s en-

dowment of social approval will also influence its choice of response strategy. We utilize argu- ments frommanagerial decisionmaking and risk taking (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987) to suggest that—because of the burden of responsibility associated with social approval—organizations endowed with higher and lower levels of social

346 JulyAcademy of Management Review

approval may be motivated to take less re- sponsibility for a crisis. In doing so we contribute to organizational research by specifying a moti- vation that goes beyond the typical legal and fi- nancial reasons an organization may choose one response strategy over another.

SOCIAL APPROVAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CRISES

There are several sociocognitive properties that make social approval distinctly suited for exami- nation at the onset of a crisis. These properties include (1) social approval’s more intuitive and af- fective cognitive basis and (2) its collective and individuating nature. Throughout this section we highlight how social approval compares with two related evaluations, organizational legitimacy and reputation. Table 1 summarizes all three evalua- tions along the dimensions detailed below.

Social Approval As the Result of a More Intuitive and Affective Process

Research in social psychology has shown that evaluators engage in two types of cognitive pro- cessing tomake sense of the social world (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000). The first, deliberate processing, is slow and effortful, in- volvingmore analytical reasoning and a controlled application of decision rules to reach optimal con- clusions (Bazerman, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The second, intuitive processing, is fast and effortless, involving more heuristic and affective reasoning and a loose application of decision rules to reach satisfactory conclusions. Both

processes have been shown to influence a variety of social judgments, ranging from statistical rea- soning to medical diagnoses to military strategy (Kahneman, 2011). Drawing on this “dual-process” perspective

(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002: 51), researchers investigating how evaluators perceive and un- derstand an organization have often emphasized the specific outcomes of more deliberate socio- cognitive processes. For example, in research on organizational legitimacy, scholars have often focused on the result of evaluators’ more analyt- ical assessments of an organization’s conformity to a set of social norms and values (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Tost, 2011). Thus, legitimacy is frequently characterized as a more deliberate judgment as to “whether the organization, its form, its processes, its outcomes, or its other features are socially acceptable” (Bitektine, 2011: 157). Similarly, researchers typi- cally have characterized organizational reputa- tion as the outcome of a more deliberate process based on an organization’s ability to deliver value according to evaluators’ idiosyncratic expectations (Jensen et al., 2012; Rindova, Petkova, & Kotha, 2007). Thus, reputation is often described as a more “analytical interpretive frame” used by evaluators to understand an organization’s ability to deliver value (Pfarrer et al., 2010: 1134). In addition to these more deliberate and ana-

lytical assessments, some scholars have begun to investigate evaluators’ more intuitive and affective perceptions of an organization (e.g., Deephouse, 2000; Highhouse, Broadfoot, Yugo, & Devendorf, 2009; Love & Kraatz, 2009; Raithel & Schwaiger, in press). For example, Lange, Lee,

TABLE 1 A Comparison of Social Evaluations

Sociocognitive Property Social Approval Legitimacy Reputation

Definition Perception of general affinity toward an organization

Assessment of an organization’s appropriateness

Assessment of an organization’s ability to deliver value

Cognitive reference point

No explicit reference Social norms and values Expectations based on idiosyncratic relationship

Emphasized cognitive basis

Intuitive and affective Deliberate and analytical Deliberate and analytical

Collective understanding? Yes Yes No Individuating?

(Range) Yes (Continuous)

No (Categorical)

Yes (Continuous)

2015 347Bundy and Pfarrer

and Dai recognize a “generalized favorability” dimension of reputation, described as “an over- all, generalized assessment of the organiza- tion . . . asmore or less goodandattractive” (2011: 159). Similarly, the concept of cognitive legitimacy describes an organization’s intuitive taken-for- grantedness as an appropriate entity (cf. Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995), and research has begun to explore how more affective perceptions in- fluence legitimacy judgments (e.g., Haack, Pfarrer, & Scherer, 2014).

Despite these developments, however, the in- tuitive versus analytical nature of social evalua- tions remains in debate, as does the role of affect among related constructs (cf. Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Fombrun, 2012; Jensen et al., 2012). For example, Bitektine (2011) suggests that the intuitive taken-for-grantedness inherent in cognitive legitimacy is still the end result of a more deliberate categorization process grounded in widely held beliefs and norms. Sim- ilarly, Jensen et al. argue that conceptualizing reputation as an intuitive and affective construct has resulted in “definitions that are vague and indistinguishable from other related theoretical constructs” (2012: 143). Furthermore, research has recognized that assessments of reputation and legitimacy—either as more deliberate or more intuitive judgments—do not necessarily involve perceptions of affinity (Haack et al., 2014; Pfarrer et al., 2010). That is, an organization can be judged as legitimate and reputable without evaluators necessarily attaching affective value to the judg- ments. Given this debate, Lange et al. (2011: 154) argue that we are still in a “formative phase” of research on the subject, characterized by un- certainty surrounding definitions, dimensionality, processes, and interrelationships.

In response to the “confusions and conflations” (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008: 62) associated with a conceptual thicket of related labels and defi- nitions, researchers have begun using the term social approval as an overarching construct to describe the more intuitive and affective per- ceptions inherent in the social evaluations of an organization (cf. Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012). As Jensen et al. (2012: 144) argue, dis- tinguishing such an overarching construct to represent the “diffuse general impressions or sentiments among diverse audiences” is needed for conceptual clarity. Research in social psy- chology also provides support for the use of overarching constructs to attenuate the potential

confusion related to more intuitive and affective perceptions. For example, the dual-process per- ception of cognition recognizes that affective reactions are often separated from recallable content knowledge. In other words, “one may feel strongly about . . . [something] without re- membering all the reasons why” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991: 452). Consistent with this logic, we argue that it is difficult for scholars and evaluators to distinguish between the more affective and intuitive perceptions that may be inherent in different social evaluations.1 Instead, intuitive perceptions of an organization’s affinity are often indiscriminate and overlapping. We therefore posit that the more affective and

intuitive perceptions inherent in social evalua- tions can be holistically summarized as social approval. As such, social approval reflects eval- uators’ general affinity toward an organization, including perceptions of its inherent goodness or badness, attractiveness, or likability. Unlike more deliberate and analytical assessments, social approval perceptions operate “automati- cally and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” (Kahneman, 2011: 20). As the result of a “feeling state” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002: 397), the evaluative question underlying social approval does not necessarily make an explicit reference to a social norm (as with legitimacy) or specific value ex- pectation (as with reputation); it is simply, “Do I like this organization?” In this way social ap- proval is a nonspecific perception of affinity, whereas more intuitive forms of legitimacy and reputation have a cognitive reference grounded in norms or expectations.2 Additionally, while we recognize that more analytical andmore intuitive forms of information processing are not mutually exclusive, we also recognize that certain evalu- ations tend to emphasize one form of processing

1 Evidence of this difficulty is shown in the academic lit- erature through the use of similar concepts and measures to capture reputation (e.g., Deephouse, 2000), legitimacy (e.g., Lamin & Zaheer, 2012), and social approval (e.g., Zavyalova et al., 2012).

2 Because of their inherent overlap, an organization’s social approval likely increases as it gains legitimacy and reputa- tion, and vice versa. While the nuances of this relationship are beyond the scope of this article and remain under- developed (cf. Deephouse& Suchman, 2008; Lange et al., 2011), the key difference in the context of our theorizing is the emphasized cognitive basis and reference point for each assessment.

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over the other (cf. Pfarrer et al., 2010; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Thus, as Table 1 depicts, we use “social approval” to capture evaluators’ more nonspecific, intuitive, and affective perceptions toward an organiza- tion, while we use “reputation” and “legitimacy” to reference more deliberate and analytical evaluations, consistent with their dominant characterizations in the literature.

An organization accrues social approval by regularly engaging in positively perceived behav- ior (Vergne, 2012; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Higher levels of social approval are reflected in external accounts of praise, such as positive media cover- age, institutional endorsements, and placement on popular social lists or rankings (Vergne, 2012). In contrast, lower levels of social approval are reflected in external accounts that “challenge, criticize, or condemn [an organization’s] activities, behaviors, or values” (Vergne, 2012: 1027), such as negative media coverage, institutional scrutiny, and placement on unpopular social lists or rank- ings. An organization’s level of social approval is also important for building and maintaining rela- tionships with evaluators. For example, individ- uals have a natural tendency to direct their behaviors toward positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli (Elliot, 2006; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Lange et al., 2011). As such, evaluators will be more inclined to interact with an organization they perceivemore positively and less inclined to interact with an organization they perceive more negatively. Thus, an organization with higher social approval may benefit from better perfor- mance and more diverse and longer-lasting relationships. In contrast, while an organization with lower approval may find ways to remain profitable, it also may have difficulty creating and maintaining relationships and may be hampered with excessive regulation and scru- tiny, which may threaten its long-term viability and performance.

Social Approval As a Collective and Individuating Perception

Scholars have asserted that individuals and organizations are “immersed in cultural systems fromwhich standards for judging favorability are socially constructed” (Lange et al., 2011: 159-160). For example, moral intuition researchers have argued that an individual’s innate sense of right and wrong is the product of a group socialization

process (Haidt, 2001), and social psychologists have long recognized that individuals validate their thoughts and opinions via social compari- son (Festinger, 1954). In the same way, eval- uators’ perceptions of social approval are shaped by a collective and intuitive social construction process (Devers et al., 2009; Highhouse et al., 2009). Because of this, social approval perceptions tend to “transcend stakeholder group boundaries” (Rindova & Martins, 2012: 22), whether eval- uators are directly engaged with an organization or are more diffuse observers, such as the gen- eral public or media. Thus, social approval can be understood as a collective perception within a social system. However, it is important to recognize that

evaluators’ collective understanding of an orga- nization’s social approval does not require complete agreement among all evaluators. Instead, we ar- gue that an organization collectively gains higher or lower levels of social approval when evaluators reach “concurrence” (Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008: 733), which reflects evaluators’ gener- ally shared perceptions or their dominant opinion of an organization (Devers et al., 2009; Highhouse et al., 2009; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Thus, while an organization with higher or lower levels of social approval may have defectors, the concurring perception among most evaluators will be consistent. For example, research has shown that evaluators generally viewDisney and Amazon positively and Goldman Sachs and Halliburton negatively (RepTrak, 2013), despite the fact that not all individual evaluators would agree. In contrast, when evaluators fail to reach con-

currence in their affinity toward an organization, its social approval fails to collectivize in a useful manner. For example, evaluators’ perceptions of Walmart and McDonald’s are quite varied, both within and across evaluators and evaluator groups (RepTrak, 2013). Because of this lack of concurrence, we argue that such organizations have mixed levels of social approval. Given these conflicting perceptions of positive and negative affinity, a mixed level of social ap- proval is ill-defined and therefore less useful at a collective level (cf. Bitektine, 2011). Thus, an organization’s social approval is most salient at higher and lower levels, where evaluators have reached concurrence about the organization’s goodness or badness and the perception is widely shared. As Table 1 shows, concurrence also makes social approval an individuating

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evaluation—meaning that higher and lower lev- els of social approval can set the organization apart such that it is perceived as a distinct entity (Devers et al., 2009).

Additionally, we limit our arguments to those organizations that maintain a minimum level of approval among evaluators. For example, a cig- arette manufacturer’s negative media coverage, consistent regulatory challenges, and encoun- ters with advocacy groups suggest lower levels of social approval. However, while facing col- lective perceptions of lower approval, the man- ufacturer still maintains standing as a credible and legally bound organization; it is “approved” to exist and maintain operations, even if such approval is tenuous. In contrast, organizations that fail to maintain a minimum level of collec- tive social acceptance become “disapproved.” Such organizations are often made explicitly illegal, are disparaged by a concurrence of evaluators, and generally struggle to exist. Thus, we use the terms higher approval and lower approval to describe a social approval continuum—with higher approval representing increasingly positive perceptions and lower ap- proval representing increasingly negative per- ceptions. We use the term disapproved to describe a point on the negative side of the continuum, beyond which an organization is no longer ap- proved to exist by a concurrence of evaluators. Finally, we use the terms mixed approval and average approval to describe the middle of the continuum. As with mixed approval, we argue that average approval is ill-defined as a collective and individuating construct. Average approval captures those organizations that have neither positive nor negative affinity, resulting in neutral perceptions. Examples include Safeway and Dollar General (RepTrak, 2013).3

Scholars have also considered the collective and individuating nature of organizational legiti- macy and reputation. As with social approval, legitimacy is often understood as a collective perception (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). How- ever, unlike social approval, legitimacy generally is not considered individuating. For example, Devers et al. argue that “rather than conveying the unique aspects of organizations, it [legitimacy] categorizes organizations into those either having legitimacy (legitimate) or not having legitimacy (nonlegitimate)” (2009: 156). Once legitimacy has been conferred on an organization, evaluators consider it socially acceptable, but the judgment does not convey unique or evaluative attributes. Because of this, legitimacy is often considered a categorical construct (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Devers et al., 2009). In contrast, organizational reputation is often

viewed as an individuating assessment convey- ing distinct aspects of an organization that can be used to compare that organization against others (Devers et al., 2009). As such, reputation is often considered a continuous construct and fundamentally differentiating (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). However, unlike social approval and legitimacy, an organization’s reputation is generated from how well it meets different eval- uators’ specific and idiosyncratic expectations (Devers et al., 2009; Fombrun, 2012; Lange et al., 2011; Rindova et al., 2007). Different evaluator groups have different perceptions of an orga- nization’s ability to provide value, including via financial performance, innovation, or social re- sponsibility. Thus, many current conceptualiza- tions of reputation do not depict it as a collective construct (cf. Fombrun, 2012; Jensen et al., 2012).

The Role of Social Approval in a Crisis

An organizational crisis is an unexpected, publicly known, and harmful event that has high levels of initial uncertainty, interferes with the normal operations of an organization, and gen- erates widespread, intuitive, and negative per- ceptions among evaluators. We focus on how an organization manages evaluators’ perceptions of a crisis, as opposed to how it minimizes harm and controls physical damage. We are also par- ticularly interested in evaluators’ perceptions and reactions at the onset of a crisis. This stage includes the public disclosure of the crisis, evaluators’ initial attempts to make sense of the

3 As evaluators’ affinity toward an organization decreases, their negative perceptions may also increase. This suggests that higher (positive) and lower (negative) approval may exist on two separate continua (cf. Brooks et al., 2003; Vergne, 2012). However, the possibility of two continua is less important for our theorizing, given our focus on higher and lower levels of social approval. For example, higher-approval organizations can be defined either by the positive end of one continuum or by the presence of high positive approval on one continuum and low negative approval on another continuum. An orga- nization simultaneously facing high positive approval and high negative approval would have mixed approval and be ill-defined as a collective perception.

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crisis and attribute responsibility, and the orga- nization’s initial response (Fink, 1986; Mitroff, 1994; Turner, 1976; Veil, 2011).

There are three characteristics of the onset of a crisis that make the role of social approval im- portant to our theorizing. First, the onset of a crisis is characterized by high levels of uncertainty both within the organization and with external eval- uators. Crises often have multiple explanations, ambiguity regarding responsibility and potential damages, and several feasible solutions (Billings et al., 1980; Pearson &Clair, 1998; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). Under conditions of high uncer- tainty, most evaluators—whether directly en- gaged with the organization or more diffuse—will rely on more heuristic and intuitive processes as they attempt to quickly make sense of the situa- tion (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sinaceur, Heath, & Cole, 2005). These pro- cesses are also necessarily more affective, with evaluators reacting emotionally to the perceived negative consequences of a crisis (Coombs, 2007b; Sinaceur et al., 2005; van der Meer & Verhoeven, 2014). Similarly, managers also rely on more heuristic decision making in their responses to uncertainty, often making rapid and emotional decisions in the heat of the moment (Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe, 2004; Weick, 1988). Given evaluators’ and managers’ greater reliance on intuition and affect to make sense of uncertainty, it is more likely their attention will be directed toward social approval at the onset of a crisis— itself the result of a more intuitive and affec- tive process.

Second, a crisis has a widespread impact on a range of evaluators, from direct stakeholders—for example, investors and customers—to more in- direct evaluators—for example, themedia and the general public (Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008). In this way a cri- sis is a collectively perceived event. Similar to evaluators’ concurrence about an organization’s social approval, our definition of a crisis requires that evaluators within and across groups concur in their perceptions of a crisis as a negative event, even if some evaluators may diverge from the dominant opinion.

Third, a crisis can be understood as an in- dividuating event because it compels evaluators to make attributions of responsibility. Attribution theorists argue that individuals have an “innate need to understand and control their envi- ronments” and act as “naı̈ve psychologists” to

develop “causal explanations for significant events” (Martinko, 1995: 8; see alsoHeider, 1958). In turn, these causal explanations influence indi- viduals’ perceptions and behaviors (Martinko, 1995; Weiner, 1986). Researchers have applied the basic tenets of attribution theory to crisis management, arguing that determining crisis re- sponsibility assigns individuality to the event (cf. Coombs, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2002). As such, evaluators quickly begin to associate a crisis with an individual organization, such as Exxon’s oil spill or Enron’s scandal. Thus, both the cognitive processes related to

social approval assessments and those associ- ated with the onset of a crisis can be character- ized as more intuitive, affective, collective, and individuating. We are therefore able to develop theory that pairs our key construct and context along similar cognitive properties and at the same level of analysis. In summary, we argue that an organizational crisis, which generates high uncertainty and negative perceptions among a wide range of evaluators, should be paired with an equally broad construct, such as the “generalized, non-attribute-specific positive attitudes” inherent in an organization’s social approval (Rindova & Martins, 2012: 22). We next consider the sociocognitive processes associated with how evaluators formulate their crisis attri- butions and modify their perceptions of an organization’s social approval as an outcome of a crisis.

CRISIS ATTRIBUTIONS AND THE CRISIS-RESPONSE MATCH

A key element in understanding how eval- uators make sense of a crisis lies in their attri- butions of crisis responsibility: as evaluators attribute more crisis responsibility to an organi- zation, the threat to the organization’s social ap- proval increases (Coombs, 1995). Two sources of information are critical in influencing these attributions. First, evaluators rely on the char- acteristics of a crisis—including its perceived intentionality, controllability, and severity—to formulate initial situational attributions along a continuum of responsibility (Coombs, 2007b). Situational attributions are the result of a heu- ristic simplification process in which evaluators intuitively combine past experiences and expec- tations to reduce the complex nature of a crisis into easier-to-understand cognitive schemas (Coombs

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& Holladay, 2004; Mitroff, 1988). For example, evaluators will intuitively attribute more re- sponsibility to an organization for a crisis origi- nating within the organization (e.g., an executive scandal) or resulting from a more controllable situation (e.g., an industrial accident). In contrast, evaluators will intuitively attribute less re- sponsibility to an organization for a crisis origi- nating outside the organization (e.g., a natural disaster) or resulting from a less controllable situation (e.g., product tampering).

Situational attributions can serve as useful ceteris paribus heuristics for understanding how evaluators comprehend crisis responsibility, and research confirms that evaluators make such simplified judgments when initially perceiving a crisis (cf. Coombs & Holladay, 2004). However, evaluators’ situational attributions are also a negotiated feature of crisis management and, therefore, subject to social influence (cf. Fediuk, Coombs, & Botero, 2012; Gephart, 2007; Roberts et al., 2007). Thus, the second important source of information for evaluators as they make crisis attributions is an organization’s response strategy. An organization’s initial response is influential in anchoring evaluators’ first impressions, which “form quickly and color the remainder of . . . [their] reception of the crisis communication efforts” (Coombs, 2011: 139).

Similar to the continuum of situational attri- butions detailed above, crisis management scholars have described a response strategy continuum in terms of the amount of responsibility an organization takes for a crisis (Coombs, 2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Elsbach, 2003; Marcus & Goodman, 1991). Response strategies that ac- cept less responsibility—generally labeled defensive—attempt to avoid social approval loss by eliminating an organization’s perceived association with a crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Elsbach, 2003; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Examples range from outright denial of responsibility to attacking accusers and shift- ing blame onto other entities (Coombs& Holladay, 2004; Elsbach, 2003). In contrast, strategies that accept more responsibility—generally labeled accommodative—attempt to manage social ap- proval loss by acknowledging an organization’s causal role in a crisis and reducing evaluators’ negative perceptions (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Coombs & Holladay, 2004). Examples range from outright acceptance of responsibility to apologies and displays of

mortification (Coombs, 2011; Kim & Yang, 2009). Finally, response strategies in the center of the continuum attempt to reframe how eval- uators perceive a crisis, while not necessarily accepting or denying responsibility (Coombs & Holladay, 2004). Examples include providing excuses (downplaying an organization’s respon- sibility), justifications (minimizing the negativity of the event), and partial deflections (Elsbach, 2003).4

The Crisis-Response Match

Communication and public relations research- ers have argued that an effective response strategy should match evaluators’ situational attributions of a crisis (Coombs, 1995, 2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 2004). A crisis with higher situational attributions of responsibility should be matched with a response strategy that accepts more responsibility, and a crisis with lower situ- ational attributions of responsibility should be matched with a response strategy that accepts less responsibility (Coombs, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2004). Empirical research provides sup- port for this logic. For example, Zavyalova et al. (2012) found that a more accommodative strategy led to less negative media coverage than a more defensive strategy after a product recall—a cri- sis with generally higher situational attribu- tions. Similarly, Coombs and Holladay (2004) found that a matched response that neither ac- cepted nor rejected crisis responsibility led to less social approval loss than a mismatched response that denied responsibility after a tech- nical industrial accident—a crisis with gener- ally moderate situational attributions. However, despite the breadth of work on

evaluators’ situational attributions of a crisis and an organization’s response strategy, crisis management scholars have yet to fully consider the sociocognitive mechanisms that generate a crisis-response match (or mismatch) and the resulting benefit (or burden) to an organization’s social approval.

4 In addition to response strategies used to manage eval- uators’ attributions, we make the assumption that an organi- zation provides instructing information to help evaluators avoid harm that may result from the crisis (cf. Coombs, 2011).

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A Sociocognitive Perspective of the Crisis- Response Match

As mentioned above, evaluators’ situational attributions are subject to a degree of social in- fluence from an organization’s response strategy. However, the extent of this influence varies. For example, an organizationwill have a difficult time denying complete responsibility for an on-site explosion or a scandal emanating from the exec- utive office. Thus, the degree to which a response strategy is able to influence evaluators’ sense- making will be constrained by how well the strategy conforms to the evaluators’ intuitive sit- uational attributions of the crisis. Figure 1 depicts the matched and mismatched zones between evaluators’ situational attributions of a crisis and an organization’s response strategy. Matched strategies conform to evaluators’ situational attributions, as shown in the center diagonal area of Figure 1, which we label the “zone of confor- mity.” In contrast, mismatched strategies either

underconform by accepting less responsibility than evaluators expect, based on their situational attributions (shown in the lower right “zone of underconformity” in Figure 1), or overconform by accepting more responsibility than evaluators expect (shown in the upper left “zone of over- conformity” in Figure 1). We argue that the crisis-response match can

best be understood in how it influences the probable distribution of social approval loss for a given crisis. All crises are uncertain events that generate initial negative reactions. An organi- zation therefore can expect a negative residual effect on its social approval at the onset of any crisis, regardless of its response and the level of situational attributions. All else being equal, a crisis that generates higher situational at- tributions of responsibility should result in a greater average magnitude loss to an orga- nization’s social approval than a crisis that generates lower attributions of responsibility. However, given the high uncertainty at the onset

FIGURE 1 The Crisis-Response Match

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of a crisis, the expected probability distribution surrounding social approval loss for any given crisis is less clear. We argue that a matched response strategy that conforms to evaluators’ situational attributions normalizes the proba- bility distribution of social approval loss for a given crisis such that the uncertainty sur- rounding potential loss is reduced. Stated more formally, “normalize” describes a distribution of expected outcomes that is centered around the mean, thus reducing the variance of social ap- proval loss.

Figure 2 depicts a set of crises with lower, moderate, and higher situational attributions. The x-axis depicts a hypothetical scale representing the potential magnitude of social approval loss. The y-axis represents the hypothetical probability of experiencing a particular magnitude of loss (scaled as percentages, with the total area un- derneath each distribution equal to 100 percent). Each distribution can be thought of as the aggre- gate of anyN number of organizations responding to a similar yet independent crisis with a matched strategy. The three distributions in Figure 2 show that the average magnitude of expected loss

to social approval increases as situational attributions increase. Figure 2 also highlights the normalized probability distributions resulting from the use of a matched strategy for a given attribution level (as identified in Figure 1). For example, the hypothetical scales suggest that the large majority of organizations responding to a moderate attribution crisis with a matched strat- egy would experience a midrange magnitude social approval loss. In contrast to a matched strategy, we argue

that a mismatched strategy that either overcon- forms or underconforms to evaluators’ situational attributions not only increases the average magnitude of loss by shifting the peak of the distribution to the right but also broadens the curve such that the variance of potential out- comes increases. Figure 3 depicts the distribu- tion of social approval loss expected for a matched strategy compared to the distribution for a mismatched strategy, assuming a moderate attribution crisis. We explain each distribution in more detail below. Matched strategy. The solid curves in Figures 2

and 3 depict a normalized distribution of social

FIGURE 2 Expected Probability and Magnitude of Social Approval Loss for a Matched Response Strategy and

a Lower, Moderate, and Higher Attribution Crisisa

aThe probability and magnitude scales represent hypothetical unit increases.

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approval loss associated with amatched response strategy from Figure 1. There are two primary sociocognitive explanations for this distribution. First, as mentioned above, a matched strategy provides information to evaluators about an organization’s role in a crisis that conforms to their situational attributions. Scholars have long recognized that evaluators display reluctance to revise already formed judgments and attributions (e.g., Bottom et al., 2002; Nickerson, 1998; Traut- Mattausch, Schulz-Hardt, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This confirma- tion bias restricts evaluators’ attention to con- firming information, causing them to ignore or resist disconfirming information (Traut-Mattausch et al., 2004). As such, a matched strategy creates a state of cognitive consonance in which eval- uators are likely to agree with an organization’s posture. A matched strategy therefore facilitates evaluators’ sensemaking and can normalize the loss to social approval for a given level of situa- tional attributions.

Second, there is also a normative component to the crisis-response match along the entire

zone of conformity in Figure 1. For example, an organization’s acceptance of responsibility for a crisis with higher situational attributions sat- isfies social expectations of justice, sincerity, and fairness (Coombs, 2007b; Dean, 2004; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Tyler, 1997). Evaluators may interpret an organization’s ac- commodativeness as a sign of goodwill (Benoit, 1995; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Evaluators may also grant an organization a pardon, in which case it is essentially rewarded—or penalized less—for coming forward and taking responsibility (Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2008; Tyler, 1997). Thus, accepting increasing responsibility as eval- uators’ situational attributions increase should contribute to a more predictable and normal dis- tribution of social approval loss. For crises generating moderate situational

attributions of responsibility, evaluators’ norma- tive expectations may be focused more on “set- ting matters aright going forward” than on having an organization take responsibility for the crisis (Koehn, 2013: 249). Thus, a response in the

FIGURE 3 The Trade-off Between a Matched and Mismatched Response Strategya

aThe probability and magnitude scales represent hypothetical unit increases. The matched strategy for the moderate attribution crisis from Figure 2 is used for clarity.

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center of the response strategy continuum that neither accepts nor rejects responsibility is likely an effective match. For example, in response to a product recall that resulted when rogue sup- pliers added lead paint to toys, Mattel took efforts to prevent a similar situation from happening in the future but did not accept outright re- sponsibility for its suppliers’ actions (Koehn, 2013). Mattel’s response was consistent with evaluators’ normative expectations, since few expected the company to have “omniscient” control over unprecedented supplier deviance (Koehn, 2013: 247).

Finally, evaluators typically have lower nor- mative expectations of an organization for crises with lower situational attributions. Thus, a more defensive response strategy where an organiza- tion does not accept responsibility is not likely to violate evaluators’ normative expectations and, therefore, is the matched response for such cri- ses. For example, while a general expression of sorrow may be appropriate in the wake of a nat- ural disaster or an act of terrorism, evaluators likely do not have expectations for an organiza- tion to accept responsibility for the event itself (Koehn, 2013).

Returning to Figure 1, we expect the response strategies in the matched zone of conformity to normalize the distribution of social approval loss because of their conformity to evaluators’ initial situational attributions of responsibility and normative expectations. This normalized distri- bution is depicted in Figure 2 for a range of situational attribution crises. In contrast, we theorize that the mismatched strategies in the zones of underconformity and overconformity from Figure 1 will generate a distribution of so- cial approval loss more reflective of the mis- matched (dashed) curve in Figure 3.

Mismatched strategy. Instead of conforming to evaluators’ situational attributions, a mis- matched strategy challenges evaluators’ initial perceptions of a crisis. Such a challenge is a “sensebreaking” event that triggers cognitive dissonance among evaluators (Festinger, 1957; Pratt, 2000: 464) and results in a higher average magnitude of loss distributed over a wider range for a given crisis. As with the matched curve, there are several explanations for this distribution.

First, we argue that cognitive dissonance cre- ated by the sensebreaking response is a strong motivator for evaluators to increase information

search (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Elliot & Devine, 1994). This search can lead to con- clusions that are contrary to the organization’s mismatched response. In such instances eval- uators may deduce that an organization’s mismatched response was careless at best, or inaccurate, wrong, or even deceitful at worst (Benoit, 1995; Dean, 2004; Elsbach, 2003; Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2008). For exam- ple, an organization that is overconforming by being accommodative during a crisis with lower situational attributions risks being perceived as insincere or overreaching, leading evaluators to reduce their perceptions of social approval as they attempt to rectify their dissonance (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Similarly, an organization that is underconforming by being defensive in response to a crisis with higher situational attributions risks being perceived as unethical and manipu- lative. In such cases amismatched responsemay lead to a state of “perpetual discordance,” pre- venting crisis resolution and likely increasing an organization’s social approval loss (Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008: 737). This in- crease in expected loss is depicted by the mis- matched (dashed) curve in Figure 3, which shows a higher average magnitude loss compared to the matched curve. Second, evaluators’ attribution biases can

lead them to resist an underconforming or over- conforming mismatched strategy. As mentioned above, the confirmation bias leads evaluators to prefer their initial attributions, either ignoring or challenging inconsistent information. Similarly, the anchoring bias suggests that even if eval- uators do make subsequent adjustments, they will be hesitant to stray too far from their initial attributions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Thus, the more a response strategy is mismatched to evaluators’ situational attributions, the less likely evaluators are to view it as appropriate. For example, evaluators will likely respond nega- tively to a defensive response from an executive caught misappropriating organizational funds. As a result, the distribution of social approval loss shifts to the right since evaluators are inclined to reject a nonconforming response. Finally, we also recognize that the distribution of

potential outcomes is wider and more uncertain when using a mismatched strategy. The dis- confirming information in an organization’s mis- matched strategy can hinder evaluators from making definitive attributions regarding the nature

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of a crisis and an organization’s responsibility. This may cause some evaluators to alter their perceptions of the response or the crisis. For ex- ample, evaluators may perceive an organization’s overconformity in taking more responsibility for a moderate attribution crisis as an additional sign of goodwill rather than as a sign of disingenuous- ness. Similarly, some evaluators may resist their biases and begin to doubt their original intuitive attributions. Others will be reluctant to expend the time and effort required to gathermore information and, thus, will be pacified by an organization’s mismatched posture (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Sanders & Carpenter, 2003). Still others will continue their search but may not find the diagnostic information needed to challenge the mismatched response. For instance, an under- conforming defensive response to a crisis with higher situational attributions may sow seeds of doubt among evaluators. Thus, uncertainty from the disconfirming response—and the effect of un- certainty on evaluators’ sensemaking and attribu- tions—can increase the expected distribution of social approval loss.

In sum, a mismatched strategy, whether lying in the zones of overconformity or underconformity in Figure 1, is likely to increase the average magnitude of social approval loss for a given crisis. However, because it is difficult to predict how evaluators will collectively perceive an organization’s nonconformity, especially amid high uncertainty (cf. Heckert & Heckert, 2002), we argue that the variance of the distribution will also increase. Figure 3 shows that the peak of the mismatched curve is to the right of the matched curve, indicating an increased probability for a higher-magnitude loss. Figure 3 also shows that the mismatched distribution is wider and more uncertain, making it more difficult for man- agers and evaluators to understand and predict the consequences for an organization’s social approval. Combining these arguments with our arguments related to a matched strategy, we propose the following.

Proposition 1: The more an organiza- tion’s response strategy matches eval- uators’ situational attributions of crisis responsibility, the lower the mean and variance of social approval loss.

In this section we focused on an organization’s social approval as an outcome of a crisis. Below we examine how an organization’s endowment of

social approval acts as an important antecedent for evaluators’ perceptions of a crisis.

THE EFFECT OF AN ORGANIZATION’S ENDOWMENT OF SOCIAL APPROVAL ON

EVALUATORS’ CRISIS PERCEPTIONS

In addition to situational attributions and an organization’s response strategy, one important— yet often neglected—source of information for evaluators as they make sense of a crisis is an organization’s endowment of social approval. Evaluators rely on social evaluations as a “cog- nitive shorthand” to help them make sense of an organization’s actions (Mishina et al., 2012: 460). Consequently, an organization’s endowment of social approval will likely influence the way evaluators perceive and react to a crisis and, thus, the probable social approval loss associ- ated with an organization’s response strategy. In this section we theorize that the probability

distributions associated with the matched and mismatched strategies described above are al- tered as an organization’s endowed social ap- proval increases or decreases. These altered distributions are depicted in Figure 4. We argue that endowed levels of social approval can serve as a buffer to decrease the magnitude of social approval loss (depicted as the darkly shaded matched [solid] curve on the far left side of Figure 4) or as a burden to increase the magni- tude of social approval loss (depicted as the mismatched [dashed] curve on the far right side of Figure 4), relative to the average-approval organization (depicted as the lightly shaded matched [solid] curve in the center of Figure 4).

Crisis Perceptions of an Organization with Higher Social Approval

Research investigating the influence of endowed social approval following a negative event sug- gests a conundrum. On the one hand, scholars have argued and found that evaluators give higher-approval organizations the benefit of the doubt when disconfirming information arises (cf. Burgoon, 1993; Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Hollander, 1958; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Schnietz & Epstein, 2005). Because of evaluators’ affinity to- ward a higher-approval organization, they may be hesitant to conclude that such an organiza- tion could be as responsible for a negative event as other organizations. Thus, an endowment of

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higher social approval can serve as a buffer against loss as evaluators either ignore or downplay negative information that is incon- gruent with their prior positive social judgments (Burgoon, 1993). In this way evaluators may be inclined to attribute less responsibility for a cri- sis to an organization with higher levels of so- cial approval, even if the crisis characteristics might normally signal higher situational at- tributions. Empirical findings provide support for this buffer. For example, Coombs and Holladay (2001) found a significant negative cor- relation between evaluators’ perceptions of crisis responsibility and an organization’s social approval.

On the other hand, a separate stream of re- search suggests that higher levels of social ap- proval can serve as a burden that exacerbates loss following a negative event (cf. Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Brooks et al., 2003; Graffin, Bundy, Porac,Wade, & Quinn, 2013; Merton, 1968; Mishina et al., 2012; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Sutton & Galunic, 1996). Evaluators may have heightened standards and expectations for organizations they

view positively (Burgoon, 1993; Pfarrer et al., 2010). When a higher-approval organization is associ- ated with a negative event, it can serve as a stark violation of these standards and expectations, which can lead to dissonance and feelings of betrayal (e.g., Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Decker, 2012; Mishina et al., 2012; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Sutton & Galunic, 1996). Evaluators may also begin to suspect that “ulterior motives” were behind a higher-approval organization’s prior behavior, causing them to question the orga- nization’s values and motivations (Mishina et al., 2012: 466). For example, describing a product re- call as a breach of an “implicit promise,” Rhee and Haunschild (2006: 103) found that more highly approved companies suffered a greater loss of market share when issuing recalls than did less approved competitors. Taking these past theoretical arguments and

empirical findings together, it remains unclear how higher levels of social approval might affect evaluators’ perceptions of and reactions to the onset of a crisis. We theorize that this conundrum is best understood by considering the effects of

FIGURE 4 The Trade-off Between aMatched and Mismatched Response Strategy for Higher- and Lower-Approval

Organizationsa

aThe probability and magnitude scales represent hypothetical unit increases. The matched strategy for the moderate attribution crisis from Figure 2 is used for clarity.

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an organization’s endowment of social approval on evaluators’ initial situational attributions of responsibility combined with an organization’s response strategy.

The higher-approval buffer.As detailed above, different biases and expectations may incline evaluators to attribute less crisis responsibility to a higher-approval organization, regardless of the situational crisis characteristics. However, evaluators can only attribute less responsibility as long as the higher-approval organization’s response strategy matches the evaluators’ al- tered perceptions of the crisis. For example, Figure 4, like Figure 3, illustrates a crisis that has moderate situational attributions for an average-approval organization. As Figure 1 and 2 show, an average-approval organization’s matched strategy would be in the center of the response strategy continuum, and the organi- zation would expect a moderate-magnitude so- cial approval loss. Figure 4 depicts this match as the lightly shaded matched (solid) curve. In contrast, a higher-approval organization facing the same crisis would likely be buffered such that evaluators would attribute less respon- sibility to the organization—perceiving the moderate attribution crisis as a lower attribu- tion crisis. The effect of the buffer makes a more defensive strategy a more suitable match for a higher-approval organization, as depicted in the lower left of Figure 1. Combined with eval- uators’ reduced attributions, a more defensive strategy should decrease the expected magni- tude of social approval loss when compared to an average-approval organization facing the same crisis. This buffering effect of higher social approval is shown on the far left side of Figure 4 by the darkly shaded matched (solid) curve.

By matching its response to evaluators’ re- duced attributions, a higher-approval organiza- tion allows evaluators to rely on their positive prior judgments to downplay divergent crisis information. For example, when referring to Apple’s defensive strategy related to its iPhone 4 antenna issues, an industry analyst noted, “Ap- ple has a history of making ridiculous claims and having them accepted by an adoring fan base and worshipful press” (Lyons, 2010: 1). Apple’s higher social approval—combined with its more defensive response—likely reduced evaluators’ situational attributions of responsibility. What could have been perceived as a crisis with

moderate situational attributions (a technical product error) for an average-approval organi- zation was instead largely perceived as a crisis with lower situational attributions (a rumor) for Apple, a higher-approval organization. The overall implication of the buffer is that, for

a given crisis, a higher-approval organization has the opportunity to accept less crisis re- sponsibility than its average-approval coun- terpart. In contrast, when a higher-approval organization accepts the same or more crisis responsibility, we expect a burdening effect to prevail. The higher-approval burden. The heuristics

and biases associated with the social approval buffer are likely only effectual when an orga- nization’s response strategy matches evaluators’ reduced attributions of crisis responsibility. Thus, a response strategy that accepts more cri- sis responsibility than indicated by evaluators’ altered situational attributions is mismatched and creates a sensebreaking situation of non- conformity. In such situations evaluators are likely compelled to question their prior judg- ments and may be forced to face the conclusion that a higher-approval organization is respon- sible for a crisis. To rectify their cognitive dis- sonance, evaluators likely will reduce their approval of the organization. As mentioned above, such dissonance is also likely to trigger feelings of betrayal (Koehler & Gershoff, 2003; Mishina et al., 2012), further exacerbating loss as evaluators intuitively react to a higher-approval organization’s failure to meet their heightened standards. Returning to Figure 4, we argue that a higher-

approval organization’s movement away from a more defensive strategy and toward a more accommodative strategy will trigger evaluators’ perceptions of mismatched overconformity. The organization’s acceptance of more crisis re- sponsibility does not conform to evaluators’ prior positive perceptions and their reduced situa- tional attributions. The effect of this burden of responsibility is depicted on the far right side of Figure 4 by the mismatched (dashed) curve. The mismatched curve shows a higher probability for a higher-magnitude social approval loss. Importantly, a mismatched strategy for a higher- approval organization may be a matched strat- egy for an average-approval organization. For example, an average-approval organization would match a higher attribution crisis with

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a more accommodative response, while eval- uators would likely respond to the same re- sponse from a higher-approval organization as a mismatch.

We also recognize that the distribution of potential outcomes is increased when a higher- approval organization uses a mismatched re- sponse strategy. Again, this is due to the heightened uncertainty and sensebreaking that accompany a mismatched response. It may be difficult for evaluators to make sense of the non- conformity, which increases the distribution of po- tential outcomes. For example, a higher-approval organization providing a comprehensive accom- modative explanation of a crisis—including offer- ing compelling logic for its responsibility and specific details of its proactive efforts to prevent reoccurrence—may be spared excessive social approval damage, even when the response is perceived as a mismatch (Coombs, 2007a). How- ever, such a nuanced response may be difficult to deliver at the onset of a crisis, when uncertainty is at its peak.

In summary, we expect a burdening effect to prevail when a higher-approval organization accepts the same or more crisis responsibility for a given crisis, relative to an average-approval counterpart. As a result, the distribution of social approval loss identified by the mismatched (dashed) curve in Figure 4 is more likely to occur. In contrast, we expect a buffering effect to prevail when a higher-approval organization accepts less crisis responsibility, relative to an average- approval counterpart. As a result, the distribution of social approval loss identified by the darkly shaded matched (solid) curve in Figure 4 is more likely to occur.

Proposition 2: For an organization with higher social approval, a response strategy that accepts less crisis re- sponsibility, relative to an average- approval organization, will generate a lower mean and variance of social approval loss than a response strategy that accepts the same or more crisis responsibility.

Crisis Perceptions of an Organization with Lower Social Approval

Scholars have done little research on the effects of negative social evaluations in the

context of a negative event. We develop theory in this domain by arguing that a lower-approval organization in a crisis also faces a potential buffer or burden. Unlike for a higher-approval organization, however, the buffering effect for a lower-approval organization does not result from evaluators’ altered attributions of crisis re- sponsibility (cf. Coombs & Holladay, 2001). Rather, it results from evaluators’ reduced standards for the lower-approval organization. An organization accrues lower approval by

consistently invoking negative feelings and affinity. Over time, evaluators may become desensitized to a lower-approval organization’s behaviors, giving each successive disappoint- ment less attention and concern (e.g., Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001). Because evaluators’ standards of conduct are intuitively reduced for a lower- approval organization, it is harder for such an organization to violate evaluators’ expectations (Burgoon, 1993). Additionally, evaluators are likely to be less motivated to engage in extensive sensemaking when an organization they per- ceive negatively is associated with a crisis. Such an organization is effectively “screened out of consideration” in the first place (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001: 385). Thus, for a lower-approval organization, evaluators’ response to a crisis—in terms of the expected magnitude of social ap- proval loss—may be muted. However, as with a higher-approval organiza-

tion, evaluators’ reactions to a lower-approval organization may also be more extreme, sug- gesting a potential burdening effect. For exam- ple, in research on reciprocity and recidivism, scholars argue that a crisis may serve as a breaking point, compelling evaluators to enact “durable changes to the rules” and to punish a lower-approval organization for its repeated failures (Ballinger & Rockmann, 2010: 374; Braithwaite, 1989; Davidson, Worrell, & Lee, 1994; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Thus, rather than facing the same measurable magnitude of social approval loss that a higher-approval organization faces, a lower-approval organization risks evoking collective disapproval, which may threaten its survival. As with higher approval, we argue that this

conundrum is best understood by considering the influence of evaluators’ situational at- tributions and an organization’s response strategy.

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The lower-approval buffer. We argue that a re- sponse strategy that rejects or is more equivocal about crisis responsibility is likely to buffer a lower-approval organization. As mentioned above, evaluators already have reduced expec- tations and reduced standards for a lower- approval organization and likely will not be surprised when such an organization is associ- ated with a crisis (Burgoon, 1993). A more de- fensive strategy does little to alter these beliefs and, instead, can generate additional uncertainty. As evaluators’ dissonance and sensemaking are reduced in response to this uncertainty, so, too, is the potential magnitude of damage to social approval. For example, in responding to chal- lenges regarding the addictive nature of nicotine, many cigarette manufacturers denied the accu- sations in an attempt to “place an element of doubt or confusion in the minds of consumers or potential consumers” (Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997: 231). When confusion and doubt grow, a lower- approval organization can be spared further loss as many evaluators become desensitized and disengaged. Thus, a lower-approval organiza- tion’s response strategy that accepts less re- sponsibility can be understood as a conforming matched response and can trigger a buffering effect.

The lower-approval burden. In contrast, a lower-approval organization that accepts more responsibility for a crisis is likely to trig- ger evaluators’ extreme negative reactions. Accepting more crisis responsibility risks rein- forcing evaluators’ negative affinity and trig- gering a tipping point, beyond which evaluators can no longer accept the organization as an approved entity. That is, responsibility for a cri- sis is likely to compel the active punishment of a lower-approval organization as evaluators enforce notions of reciprocity and signal the importance of positive behavior (e.g., Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2000; Davidson et al., 1994; Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Thus, we argue that a response strategy that accepts the same or more crisis responsibility relative to an average-approval organization is mismatched and will trigger a burdening effect for a lower- approval organization. This effect of the burden of responsibility is represented by the mismatched (dashed) curve on the far right of Figure 4, which shows a greater probability of a higher-magnitude social approval loss for a lower-approval organization, relative to an

average-approval organization. As with higher approval, what is considered a mismatched strategy for a lower-approval organization can be considered a matched strategy for an average- approval organization. We also recognize that, as with a higher-

approval organization, the variance of outcomes is increased when a lower-approval organization uses a mismatched response strategy. For ex- ample, it is possible that evaluators may per- ceive a lower-approval organization’s more accommodative response as a positive expec- tancy violation (Burgoon, 1993) and a signal that the organization is motivated to change its ways. This could trigger evaluators to reward the lower- approval organization for its acceptance of re- sponsibility, so the magnitude of social approval loss would be reduced. However, proactive ac- commodation can also confirm evaluators’ gen- eral perceptions of lower approval, which is likely to reinforce evaluators’ perceptions that the organization deserves conferral of negative affinity. Thus, the resulting probability distri- bution would widen because of the increased uncertainty regarding how evaluators might re- spond to the nonconformity of a mismatched response. In summary, we expect the burdening effect to

prevail when a lower-approval organization accepts the same or more crisis responsibility for a given crisis, relative to an average-approval counterpart. As a result, the distribution of social approval loss identified by the mismatched (dashed) curve in Figure 4 is more likely to occur. In contrast, we expect the buffering effect to prevail when a lower-approval organization accepts less crisis responsibility, relative to an average-approval counterpart. The resulting distribution of social approval loss will resemble the darkly shaded matched (solid) curve on the far left of Figure 4, which shows a greater proba- bility of a lower-magnitude loss relative to an average-approval organization.

Proposition 3: For an organization with lower social approval, a response strategy that accepts less crisis re- sponsibility, relative to an average- approval organization, will generate a lower mean and variance of social approval loss than a response strategy that accepts the same or more crisis responsibility.

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PREDICTING RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR ORGANIZATIONS ENDOWED WITH HIGHER

OR LOWER APPROVAL

Given our arguments above, managers at a higher- or lower-approval organization may be tempted to accept less crisis responsibility at the onset of a crisis. Managers at a higher- approval organization will want to protect a valuable asset, whereas managers at a lower- approval organization will want to avoid dis- approval and potential failure. Spurred by these motivations, a higher-approval organization may act more defensively, knowing that its endowed approval can provide a buffer from more unfavorable attributions of crisis re- sponsibility. A lower-approval organization is also likely to respond more defensively, know- ing that it has little to lose in the way of goodwill and hoping that evaluators perceive the crisis as just another example of why the organization deserves lower approval—as opposed to out- right disapproval.

Research investigating managerial risk pref- erences and decision making provides support for how endowed social approval influences managers’ choice of response strategies (e.g., Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert & March 1963; March & Shapira, 1987). For example, in situations of high uncertainty, such as the onset of a crisis, managers will look for strategic opportunities to control loss (Cyert & March 1963; March & Shapira, 1987, 1992). Managers at a higher- or lower-approval organization are likely to per- ceive that a more accommodative strategy will present an almost certain social approval loss, whereas a less accommodative strategy will present an opportunity to reduce loss. Addition- ally, when making risky decisions, such as responding to a crisis, managers are often more sensitive to the potential magnitude of loss rather than to the probability of loss (March & Shapira, 1987). Given that managers are likely to perceive that a more accommodative re- sponse will increase the magnitude of loss, managers of a higher- or lower-approval or- ganization may be motivated to avoid such outcomes.

Proposition 4: Managers of a higher- or lower-approval organization will be more likely to accept less crisis re- sponsibility, relative to managers of an average-approval organization.

DISCUSSION

In this article we have applied theories from social judgment formation, perception manage- ment, and decision making to examine the role of an organization’s social approval as both a criti- cal outcome of and important antecedent to evaluators’ perceptions of a crisis. In doing so we offered four primary contributions to re- search. First, we specified the sociocognitive mechanisms that make social approval a distinct social evaluation ideally suited for research on crises. Second, we advanced understanding of crisis management by identifying the socio- cognitive processes underlying the crisis- response match. Third, we detailed how an organization’s endowment of social approval influences this match, arguing that higher and lower levels of social approval act as either a buffer or a burden to modify evaluators’ crisis perceptions and attributions. Finally, given the burden of responsibility associatedwith endowed social approval, we theorized that managers at higher- and lower-approval organizations will be more likely than managers at other organizations to use a response strategy that accepts less re- sponsibility for a crisis. Below we discuss the social and theoretical implications of our theory, as well as limitations and directions for future research.

Social Implications

We recognize that our theory may raise nor- mative and ethical concerns for scholars and managers. Our intention has been to theorize and describe how evaluators’ sociocognitive biases and reactions related to social approval in- fluence an organization’s crisis management strategies. Importantly, we do not prescribe that higher- and lower-approval organizations should accept less responsibility for a crisis. Rather, we suggest that they could be buffered from social approval loss, at least at the onset of a crisis. Who is responsible for a crisis is often a question of perception rather than fact, especially at the onset (Coombs, 2007b; Gephart, 2007; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). Such equivocality serves as a foundation for investigating the sociocognitive effects we describe in this article. Additionally, because of this ambiguity, many scholars have challenged whether it is appropriate and ethical for organizations to always be accommodative in

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response to a crisis (cf. Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Koehn, 2013). Indeed, some have suggested that, in extreme cases of uncertainty, the most ethical response is to “remain strategically am- biguous” so as not to unnecessarily fan the flames (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013: 227).

This tension highlights an important boundary condition for our theory, which only considers the effects of social approval under the conditions of high uncertainty prevailing at the onset of a crisis. Of course, as a crisis evolves, more in- formation may come to light, and uncertainty about an organization’s responsibility may be reduced. Thus, in the latter stages of a crisis, a truly misleading defensive strategy may offer few benefits for a higher- or lower-approval or- ganization, and the burden of being overly de- fensive may lead to greater social approval loss than being more accommodative in the first place (cf. Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2008). This is also true for crises in which managers un- ambiguously know that their organization is re- sponsible. Thus, like Benoit, we advocate that “those who are truly at fault should admit it im- mediately and take appropriate corrective ac- tion” (2005: 409). Of course, we also contend that such unequivocal knowledge of responsibility is rare at the onset of a crisis, and it may take much time before an organization and evaluators agree on the facts, rather than their perceptions of what happened and why (cf. Gephart, 2007; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008).

Given these social implications, it is our hope that our theory can have important societal and organizational applications. From a societal per- spective, an understanding of the role of an orga- nization’s social approval should allowevaluators to recognize their potential biases when making crisis attributions. This may help them be wary of overly defensive strategies or more accepting of accom- modative strategies, especially from higher- and lower-approval organizations and particularly at the onset of a crisis. It should also allow evaluators to have a deeper consideration of the crisis situa- tion, reducing their tendencies toward intuitive and visceral reactions. Such consideration may change the dynamics of the social approval buffer and burden and, ultimately, may encourage higher- and lower-approval organizations to take more re- sponsibility for a crisis than theory, investors, and their legal counsel might suggest.

From an organizational perspective, an en- hanced awareness of the trade-offs associated with a given endowment of social approval, the different response strategies, and the dynamics of the crisis-response match should reduce the common tendency for organizations to offer an initial, automatic, and often defensive response that limits attributions of responsibility. Such awareness should also enhance the ability of organizations to focus on resolving crisis sit- uations and to move more quickly toward re- integration with evaluators (Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). The result would be more effective organizational communication, more ef- fective management, and, ultimately, increased benefits for society.

Implications for Theory and Future Research

Research in risk management and managerial decision making has highlighted the trade-offs among strategic choices in terms of probability distributions and expected outcomes (e.g., Gephart, Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 2009; March & Shapira, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Using this logic, we identified the sociocognitive mech- anisms that drive the probable distributions of social approval loss in a crisis. In doing so we added refinement to traditional research on the crisis-response match, including highlighting zones of overconformity and underconformity and the trade-offs associated with matched and mis- matched strategies. Our sociocognitive focus on the crisis-response

match was centered on evaluators’ situational attributions of responsibility relative to the amount of responsibility an organization takes for a crisis. Underlying our argument was an assumption that an organization is satisfying evaluators’ “basic information needs,” such as providing emergency information to protect evaluators from harm (Coombs, 2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 2004: 99), and that the organization is taking appropriate actions to contain the crisis (cf. Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Al- though these assumptions are inherent in crisis communication research (cf. Coombs, 2011), fu- ture research could investigate the moderating effects of substantive organizational actions other than response strategies that influence evaluators’ attributions (e.g., Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Additionally, some organizations are more

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prepared to handle a crisis than others (cf. Turner, 1976). For example, high-reliability organiza- tions may emphasize substantive actions to control the crisis over more symbolic actions to manage social approval (Roberts, 1990; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). An organization’s ability to assert control over the crisis, especially at its onset, may influence the dynamics of our theory and could dampen the effect of the respon- sibility burden.

Our theory focused on crisis-response strate- gies in terms of an organization’s level of ac- ceptance of responsibility. However, we recognize that, in practice, organizational responses are sometimes more nuanced (e.g., Coombs, 2007a; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012). For instance, we suggested that an organization with higher or lower social approval may benefit from using a more de- fensive strategy at the onset of a crisis. Future research could investigate how that benefit would be moderated by more or less extreme defen- siveness (e.g., an outright denial versus a de- flection strategy), more or less extreme crises (e.g., those with particularly high or low situational attributions of responsibility), or during the latter stages of a crisis. Additionally, we did not con- sider an organization’s reticence at the onset of a crisis. However, researchers have found evi- dence that reticence is often suboptimal to other response strategies (e.g., Decker, 2012; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). Because theory and find- ings suggest the need for an organization to pro- vide a consistent message at the onset of a crisis (Massey, 2001), we assumed that if an organization wants to protect its social approval, it not only will provide an initial response but will provide a re- sponse that speaks to both direct andmore diffuse evaluators.

We also recognize the special case of a mis- matched strategy for higher- and lower-approval organizations facing crises that would normally trigger higher situational attributions of re- sponsibility. In such crises the burdening effect may be possible when a higher- or lower- approval organization goes too far by giving an overly defensive response. Such a response risks incurring evaluators’ anger and resentment should it be found to be untrue, particularly when diagnostic information suggests that the orga- nization is indeed responsible for the crisis. For example, once a member of the highly ap- proved Big Five group of accounting firms, Arthur Andersen found its higher social

approval threatened as its role in the Enron crisis was revealed. Arthur Andersen executives im- mediately denied all responsibility for Enron’s failures, while secretly destroying evidence (McLean & Elkind, 2003). Pundits claimed that when this came to light, it “tar[red] the name of the venerable Arthur Andersen” (Kadlec, 2002), and several scholars have argued that Arthur Andersen’s subsequent loss of social approval led to its eventual downfall (e.g., Chaney & Philipich, 2002; Krishnamurthy, Zhou, & Zhou, 2006; Linthicum, Reitenga, & Sanchez, 2010). Additionally, research on product recalls has shown that a lower-approval organization imple- menting an aggressive defensive response risks being perceived as overly self-interested and lacking credibility, which can increase evaluators’ negative perceptions and threaten the organization’s survival (Siomkos & Shri- vastava, 1993). This suggests a fine line for higher- and lower-approval organizations, which may be afforded the opportunity to accept less crisis re- sponsibility, but only to a certain point, beyond which an overly defensive strategy could backfire. Our interest in the sociocognitive mechanisms

of crisis management made focusing on the onset of a crisis, when uncertainty and sensemaking are high and, thus, when a response strategy can have its greatest effect on evaluators’ percep- tions, a natural boundary for our theorizing. Yet, as mentioned above, uncertainty may decrease and sensemaking may be reduced as a crisis evolves. An organization therefore may switch its response strategy based on new information and feedback from evaluators. How an organization’s endowment of social approval would influence the likelihood and effectiveness of switching is an interesting question. For example, switching is often triggered by the release of authoritative information that conflicts with an organization’s initial response (e.g., the U.S. government’s challenges to BP’s initial estimates of oil leaking from the Deepwater Horizon rig). Because such information is difficult to contest, it is likely that any organization would alter its message to be consistent with the message evaluators will perceive as more credible. Nevertheless, a higher- or lower-approval or-

ganization may face more or less extreme reac- tions to its switching response strategies than the average organization. For example, the buffering effect of endowed approval may continue to in- fluence evaluators’ reactions through the latter

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stages of a crisis, giving a higher- or lower- approval organization some leeway in either maintaining its initial response or switching to a new one. In contrast, the burdening effect of social approval may trigger enhanced nega- tive reactions. Evaluators’ heightened expec- tations for a higher-approval organization may include that it provide a consistent response throughout the crisis. Alternatively, evaluators may view a lower-approval organization’s lack of persistence as further evidence that it should be disapproved. Ultimately, the role of social approval on an organization’s switching be- havior may be another theoretical conundrum, or it may be an empirical question worthy of future study.

We also extended organizational research by specifying the sociocognitive foundations of so- cial approval and its role as an intuitive per- ception ideal for a crisis context. We treated social approval as a distinct construct, but we also acknowledged that a crisis could have negative effects on legitimacy and reputation. While social evaluations scholars continue to debate definitions, dimensionality, and proper levels of analysis (e.g., Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Lange et al., 2011; Rindova & Martins, 2012), future work should consider how more deliberate and more intuitive social evaluations may in- teract to influence the crisis management pro- cess. Incorporating social approval and crisis responses into the processes related to reputa- tion formation (cf. Rindova et al., 2007) and legit- imation (cf. Haack et al., 2014) may also provide fruitful future research opportunities. Addition- ally, beyond the onset of a crisis, different eval- uators may become more or less salient, and an organization’s response may become more nu- anced and targeted (Mitchell, Agle, &Wood, 1997; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). We therefore encourage future research to explore the multiple interactions among the nature of the crisis, the response strategy, and the range of stakeholders and social evaluations.

Finally, we recognize that our theory could be enhanced by a number of additional moder- ators. For example, we suggested that diagnostic information contrary to an organization’s under- conforming or overconforming mismatched re- sponse strategy could lead to more severe social approval loss. Thus, the presence of a “smoking gun” could be an important moderator to en- hance our understanding of the trade-offs

among response strategies. Additionally, we suggested above that Arthur Andersen’s overly defensive response likely contributed to its downfall. However, the Enron crisis was excep- tional, being one of the largest corporate frauds in U.S. history. Thus, the magnitude or salience of the crisis could represent an important modera- tor altering the effect of different response strat- egies on social approval. Similarly, the concept of moral intensity—the perceived moral impera- tive in a crisis situation—could influence how evaluators respond (Jones, 1991). In conclusion, organizational scholars are

continuing to add to their understanding of the “microfoundations of strategic management concepts” (Mishina et al., 2012: 460). Extending this line of inquiry, we theorized that social ap- proval can act as both a buffer and a burden in a crisis context, and we identified the socio- cognitive mechanisms behind this seeming con- tradiction. We believe that future research can continue to untangle the mechanisms and pro- cesses that generate social approval and crisis perceptions, as well as other factors that may contribute to the double edge of social approval in crisis and noncrisis situations.

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Jonathan Bundy ([email protected]) is an assistant professor of management and orga- nization in the Smeal College of Business at The Pennsylvania State University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Georgia. His research investigates the social and cognitive forces that shape organizational outcomes, with a focus on social eval- uations, crisis management, stakeholder management, and corporate governance.

Michael D. Pfarrer ([email protected]) is an associate professor in the Terry College of Business at the University of Georgia. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland. His research focuses on social evaluations of the firm, including reputation and celebrity; impression and crisis management; media accounts; and the role of business in society.

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