Diversity and Ethical Codes

Managing Ethically Cultural Diversity: Learning from Thomas Aquinas

João César das Neves • Domènec Melé

Received: 22 September 2012 / Accepted: 1 July 2013 / Published online: 3 August 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract Cultural diversity is an inescapable reality and

a concern in many businesses where it can often raise

ethical questions and dilemmas. This paper aims to offer

suggestions to certain problems facing managers in dealing

with cultural diversity through the inspiration of Thomas

Aquinas. Although he may be perceived as a voice from

the distant past, we can still find in his writings helpful and

original ideas and criteria. He welcomes cultural differ-

ences as a part of the perfection of the universe. His sys-

temic approach leads one to place the problem in its proper

context, and to reflect on it from the perspective of virtue

ethics, with a central role for practical wisdom and giving

primacy to neighborly love and natural moral law. Rather

than a set of rigid standards with no consideration of

diversity Aquinas focuses on the common human ground,

which allows for the indispensable dialogue between dif-

ferent positions. When dealing with practical questions, the

problem is one of finding the right balance between general

principle and cultural specifics, tolerance, and dialogue,

always guided by practical wisdom. In this way, Aquinas’

approach is neither rigid ethical universalism with no

consideration for diversity nor moral relativism with no

place for any transcultural and absolute morals.

Keywords Thomas Aquinas � Cultural diversity � Ethical dialogue � Managing diversity � Natural law � Virtue ethics

Introduction

Cultural diversity, generally understood as the quality of

diverse or different cultures, often concerns many busi-

nesses. This diversity may typically include differences in

race, ethics, age, gender, religion, and cultural background

though the list of factors reflecting diversity could, in fact,

be wider. In the last few decades, business organizations

have been becoming increasingly diverse and some com-

panies are trying to create multicultural organizations (Cox

1991, 1993, 2001). Cultural diversity appears as a conse-

quence of globalization, and also due to workgroup

diversity in business activities in many places.

Diversity matters regarding competitiveness and per-

formance, as we will see below. Nevertheless, beyond

these goals, although often in connection with it, cultural

diversity posits ethical matters (Gilbert et al. 1999; Noon

2007; Nelson et al. 2012, among others). These include

attitudes toward the ethics of different peoples, the influ-

ence of diversity in making moral judgments, the possi-

bility of reaching basic agreements, universalism and

cultural relativism, dialogue between people of different

cultural background and giving opportunities to histori-

cally disadvantaged groups. Although, some ethical theo-

ries have been applied to these problems, as we also

discuss below, we are far from having a convincing theory

to deal with such dilemmas, which are often very

complex.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to managing

diversity ethically by an exploration of some insights of

Thomas Aquinas–Saint Thomas for the Catholic Church–,

one of the outstanding Scholastic thinkers (Melé 2013). We

place special emphasis on his thought in the realms of

natural moral law and practical rationality –closely related

to the virtue of practical wisdom.

J. C. das Neves (&) CLSBE Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Palma de Cima,

1649-023 Lisbon, Portugal

e-mail: [email protected]

D. Melé

IESE Business School Av Pearson, 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain

e-mail: [email protected]

123

J Bus Ethics (2013) 116:769–780

DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1820-1

The choice of this 13th century philosopher and theo-

logian may seem awkward, as he lived more than 600 years

before the birth of cultural anthropology, and his approach

to the questions of ethics on cultural diversity is very dif-

ferent from those which tend to be used in our globalized

era. We are, of course, aware that there is a large gap

between contemporaneous conditions and those existing

some 700 years ago, but we assume that if we attempt to

bridge this chasm, we may make valuable discoveries and

identify important ideas. Underlying Aquinas’s writings

there is a certain cultural philosophy, albeit this may only

extend to ‘‘the deduction, demonstration and criticism of

the values and goods of culture according to the meta-

physical and theological principles and guidelines of his

system.’’ (Grabmann 1925, p. 37)

It should be stressed here that this is not a first attempt to

consider Aquinas in business ethics. His influence was

clear in early business ethics (Melé 1999; Wren 2000;

Alves and Moreira 2010; Schlag 2013) from the 14th to

17th centuries, and he is still significant nowadays (das

Neves 2008; Melé 2013; Alford 2013). Several scholars

have applied Aquinas’ thought to specific topics of busi-

ness and management, such as motivation (Llano 1991;

Schoengrund 1996), wealth creation (das Neves 2000), just

price (Friedman 1980; Koehn and Wilbratte 2012, see also

Elegido 2009), social responsibility of business (Wishloff

2009), decision-making (Velasquez and Brandy 1997;

Grassl 2010), just wage (Frémeaux and Noël 2011), and

justice for global business (Dierksmeier and Celano 2012),

among others.

The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we will try to

identify the nature of some questions of cultural diversity

which arise in business ethics. Secondly, we will present

some insights from Aquinas’ on cultural diversity. Thirdly,

we will discuss some relevant aspects of Thomas Aquinas’

ethics and, in the following section, their significance in

dealing with diversity. Finally, we will present some

practical suggestions taken from Aquinas for an intercul-

tural dialogue.

The Challenge of Cultural Diversity

Cultural diversity presents the practical consequence that

people from different cultural backgrounds may have dif-

ferent belief structures, priorities, perceptions, assumptions

about future events, beliefs about the role of information, and

information-processing methods as Pieterse et al. (2013,

p. 784) pointed out, mentioning a review from several

authors (Cox and Blake 1991; Ely and Thomas 2001; Maz-

nevski 1994; Tsui and O’Reilly 1989; and others). This

indicates that cultural diversity has an impact on organiza-

tional groups (Milliken and Martins 1996; Williams and

O’Reilly 1998, with a review of 40 years of research) and

implications in organizing work (Ely and Thomas 2001; van

Knippenberg and Schippers 2007), in managing derived

conflicts (Pelled et al. 1999) and in retaining talented

minorities within organizations (Thomas and Gabarro 1999).

Cultural diversity can also have an influence on orga-

nizational competitiveness (Cox and Blake 1991; DiRienzo

et al. 2007) and performance (Cox 1991, 2001; Milliken

and Martins 1996; Thomas and Ely 1996; Williams and

O’Reilly 1998; Pelled et al. 1999; Kochan et al. 2003;

Jackson et al. 2003, with a review of previous research on

the influence of organizational diversity on team perfor-

mance; Joshi and Roh 2009; McMahon 2010; Pieterse et al.

2013). Cultural diversity can be also related to human

capital. Martı́n-Alcázar et al. (2012) suggests the notion of

‘human capital diversity’ to refer to a construct formed by

demographic attributes (age, gender, nationality, education,

kind of training, tenure, and functional experience) and

human capital attributes (knowledge, experiences, cogni-

tive styles, and values).

At the root of cultural diversity are certain worldviews,

sociocultural heritages, norms, and values shared by

members of one cultural identity (Cox 1993; Ely and

Thomas 2001; Worchel 2005). From ancient times, such

diversity has posited difficult questions. A classical pre-

sentation of cultural diversity, which offers different

judgments and suggests mutual cultural respect, is the

experience of Persian king Darius, as related by Herodotus:

When he [Darius] was king of Persia, he summoned

the Greeks who happened to be present at his court,

and asked them what they would take to eat the dead

bodies of their fathers. They replied that they would

not do it for any money in the world. Later, in the

presence of the Greeks, and through an interpreter, so

they could understand what was said, he asked some

Indians, of the tribe called Calltie, who do in fact eat

their parent’s dead bodies, what they would take to

burn them. They uttered a cry of horror and forbade

him to mention such a dreadful thing. So firmly

rooted are these beliefs; and it is, I think, rightly said

in Pindar’s poem that custom is lord of all. (Herod-

otus 1996, III, 38, pp. 219–220)

Nowadays, cultural diversity challenges many business

firms, especially those which operate in different countries

or have employees with a variety of beliefs, backgrounds,

styles, ages, language, religions and customs. When

considering the clash between different customs at the

firm or market level, it is easy to fall at either of the

extremes, postulating a universal ethics, excluding any

cultural diversity or a cultural relativism, rejecting any

universal principle (Donaldson 1996). Both of these

positions eliminate the question without solving it. This

770 J. C. das Neves, D. Melé

123

seems akin to a certain often-raised issue in economic

theory of the markets. The extreme models of monopoly

and perfect competitions are the easier to solve, but also the

less relevant. Facing a debate encompassing diverse

cultural elements, one must search for a solution including

both the common ground and the diversity of elements

present. 1

Some companies, however, at least in their corporate

statements, show that it is possible to harmonize cultural

diversity with universal ethical principles. This is the case

of two well-known companies which accept both cultural

diversity and universal ethical principles. One is Deloite, a

firm of professional services with 195,000 professionals

and operating in more than 150 countries, which not only

accepts cultural diversity but also stresses that it is a source

of success. Thus, its ‘‘strength from cultural diversity’’ is

presented as one of its main corporate shared values 2

, and

in its 2011 Annual Review makes the self-observation that

‘‘Talented people choose to work where their differences

are respected and they have access to the opportunities to

realize their potential. Diversity is a Deloitte core value—

an intentional part of talent and business decisions; a driver

of innovation and opportunity; and a strength.’’ (Deloitte

2011, p. 12) This emphasis on diversity does not prevent a

strong commitment to ethical principles, including honesty,

compliance with the law, competence, confidentiality,

integrity, objectivity, fair business practices, respect and

fair treatment (Deloite, Ethics & Compliance, s.d).

The second example regards the multinational oil

company, Shell. On one hand, this company adopted a set

of principles (‘‘Shell General Business Principles’’, SGBP),

some of which are related to certain cultural practices,

including dilemmas related to gift and hospitality practices

in certain countries and bribery. The third principle on

‘‘Business Integrity’’ states: ‘‘Shell companies insist on

honesty, integrity and fairness in all aspects of our business

and expect the same in our relationships with all those with

whom we do business. The direct or indirect offer, pay-

ment, soliciting or acceptance of bribes in any form is

unacceptable. Facilitation payments are also bribes and

should not be made.’’ (Royal Dutch Shell plc. 2006) On the

other hand, this company recognizes diversity in taking

into account that some cultural practices should not be

considered as bribes, as a rigid observer might say:

‘‘Understand local customs for the giving or receiving of

gifts, payments, entertainment or benefits. Customs

regarding tips and fees differ depending on the culture.

When a tip is customary and is fair reward for a genuine

service, then that is acceptable. Tips are given after the

service has been received not before. Adaptation to local

customs is not acceptable when this leads to acting in conflict

with the SGBP’’ (Royal Dutch Shell plc. 2003, p. 18)

These two examples, however, do not mean that har-

monizing universal values with cultural diversity is always

an easy exercise, as noted by Donaldson:

When we leave home and cross our nation’s bound-

aries, moral clarity often blurs. Without a backdrop of

shared attitudes, and without familiar laws and judi-

cial procedures that define standards of ethical con-

duct, certainty is elusive. (1996, p. 48)

Definitively, management faces many challenges regarding

cultural diversity, and many companies have introduced

policies and practices to solve these. However, some

findings show that desirable benefits, such as reduction of

turn-over among talented people from minority groups, the

improvement of the quality of life at work or the creation

of an atmosphere of inclusion are often not achieved (Pless

and Maak 2004, mentioning some studies). Considering

this fact, Pless and Maak (2004, p. 130) suggest building a

culture that ‘‘embraces diversity and fosters humanity’’.

We now turn to what we can learn from Thomas

Aquinas in this regard and in other relevant aspects of

managing cultural diversity.

Aquinas’ Insights on Cultural Diversity

Sympathy for Diversity

Several insights on cultural diversity can be found in

Aquinas’ writings. The first is his sympathy for diversity,

which comes from both his faith and from the rational

consideration of the richness of diversity. He argues that

diversity among creatures was necessary in order that ‘‘the

divine goodness might the more perfectly be bestowed on

things’’ and adds ‘‘there should be diversity among them,

so that what could not be perfectly represented by one

single thing, might be more perfectly represented in various

ways by things of various kinds.’’ (Aquinas 1997, III, 97)

The degree of goodness is not the same in everything:

‘‘Perfect goodness would not be found in things, unless

there were degrees of goodness, so that, to wit, there be

some things better than others: else all the possible degrees

of goodness would not be fulfilled, nor would any creature

be found like to God in the point of being better than

others.’’ (Aquinas 1997, III, 71) It is interesting to add that

he connects this with beauty, and even sees here a justifi-

cation for the presence of evil in the universe. He affirms

that the beauty of the universe ‘‘results from the ordered

1 This may be seen as an application of the motto Alfred Marshall

used in his 1919 classic Industry and Trade: ‘‘The many in the one,

the one in the many’’ (Marshall 1919, p. 1). 2

See, e.g., Code of Conduct of Canada Deloite: http://www.deloitte.

com/assets/Dcom-Canada/Local%20Assets/Documents/Code%20of%

20Conduct.pdf Accessed on January 31, 2013.

Managing Ethically Cultural Diversity 771

123

unity of good and evil things, seeing that evil arises from

the lack of good, and yet certain goods are occasioned from

those very evils through the providence of the governor,

even as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant.’’

(Aquinas 1997, III, 71)

Influence of Culture and Rational Morality

The second pertinent insight regards the influence of cul-

ture and education on moral behavior, on one hand, and

rational morality, on the other. Regarding the former, he

affirms that ‘‘custom, especially if it dates from our

childhood, acquires the force of nature, the result being that

the mind holds those things with which it was imbued from

childhood as firmly as though they were self-evident’’

(Aquinas 1997, I, 11). Actually, this is no great novelty but

an application of the old Aristotelian principle that ‘‘cus-

tom is a second nature’’ pointed out in De Memoria et

Reminiscentia (Aristotle, 1931, chap. 2).

Aquinas, although recognizing the influence of culture

on moral behavior, holds that in spite of such influence a

permanent basic question remains: what is the right thing

for me to do here and now? In order to answer this axio-

logical question, according to Aquinas, it is necessary first

to assert the meaning of the particular situation. Evaluating

specific actions must start by determining their general

sense. Thus, beneath the ethical question there is another

query, which is not ethical in itself, but which is crucial for

the foundation of ethics—it is necessary to know what the

game is before establishing what constitutes a good move

or a good player. Listening to Aquinas and his coherent and

integrated vision of reality allows us to go a step further

and state that the meaning of any specific situation is

connected to the deeper meaning of reality. This leads us to

inquire about the purpose of reality and life, the funda-

mental investigation of human existence. Where did we

come from? Where do we go from here? What is the reason

for life? Is there the Absolute?

From Aquinas’ perspective it is not possible to have a

reasoned and defensible answer to any ethical question

about the right thing to do without a specific answer to the

ontological, anthropological, and metaphysical questions

on the meaning of the activity and the purpose of

behavior. In the philosophical system of Thomas Aquinas

this connection is obvious precisely because it is a system.

The whole structure deducing choice and ethics from

happiness (in the sense of human flourishing) as the ulti-

mate human end is an expression of this relation. 3

This

connects with another old Aristotelian principle, men-

tioned by St Thomas: ‘‘such a man is, such does the end

seem to him’’ (1981 I-II, 58, 5; Aristotle 1934, III, 5).

This raises the need to acquire knowledge of the ultimate

end of the human being and behave in accordance with it.

Both faith and reason, which in Aquinas are in full har-

mony, provide the answer, which comes from both divine

law and rational moral law. The latter, according to

Thomas Aquinas, can be discovered in human nature. We

will return to this point below when dealing with natural

moral law.

Tolerance and Non-Discrimination

A third insight is an attitude of tolerance. Tolerance for St

Thomas and his contemporaries meant respect for other

persons and their ideas, but without showing ambivalence

or weakness in one’s convictions. Similarly, Aquinas is

aware of the importance of avoiding discrimination against

persons (acceptione personarum), since this is a violation

of distributive justice (see Aquinas 1981, II–II, 63). 4

Albeit quite different from topics pertinent nowadays,

we may find useful cues in specific analyses by Aquinas,

since certain controversies in the 13th century are in some

way akin to our current debates. This is the case of a

question his posited in the Treatise of Faith (Aquinas 1981,

II–II, 10, 11), dealing specifically with unbelievers. He asks

whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated.

Business ethics is at first sight alien to this inquiry, but, it is

very relevant to today’s economy. It is not difficult to find

examples of immigrant workers practicing their own reli-

gion in a company within a country in which the majority

has a different faith. The attitude recommended by Tho-

mas, accompanied by a justification, is the following:

Human government is derived from the Divine gov-

ernment, and should imitate it. Now although God is

all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He

allows certain evils to take place in the universe,

which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater

goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue.

Accordingly in human government also, those who

are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest

certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be

incurred. (…) Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of

some good that ensues there from, or because of some

evil avoided. (Aquinas 1981, II–II 10, 11)

Notice that the purpose, as always, is the highest good

possible, but this may require accepting some evil.

Again, this general attitude of lenience and open-

mindedness finds its justification in the actions of God

3 See Aquinas 1981, I–II, 1, particularly article 6, on ‘‘Whether man

ordains all to the last end?’’.

4 The general principle here is: ‘‘a just judge regards causes, not

persons.’’ (Aquinas 1981, II-II 63, 1).

772 J. C. das Neves, D. Melé

123

himself. 5

It should be said this tolerance is an application of

an old principle, today mostly ignored in political activism,

which was stated first by Augustine of Hippo and quoted by

St. Thomas: ‘‘human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds:

since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do

away with many good things’’ (Aquinas 1981, I-II 91, 4)

Relevant Aspects of Thomas Aquinas’ Ethics

Virtues and the Primacy of Love

The moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, presented in

several of his works 6

has been studied by many scholars

(among whom we find, Garcı́a-López 1979; McInerny

1982, 1992; Wadell 1991; Westberg 1994; Finnis 1998;

Schockenhoff 2003, Chap. IV; Houser 2004; DeYoung

et al. 2009; in addition to twenty-seven scholars in a col-

lective work edited by Pope 2002). Although Thomas

Aquinas’ ethics is frequently known for his doctrine on

natural law (see below), it is essentially a virtue ethics. He

discusses ethics through virtues, but virtues are not inde-

pendent from the natural moral law. On the contrary,

transgressions of the moral law (sins) are ‘‘contrary to all

the acts of virtue’’ (1981, I-II, 100, 2).

Following Christian tradition, Aquinas’ ethics is a virtue

ethics in which love or charity (charitas) has primacy

(Wadell 1991). In Aquinas’ words, charity (love) is the

form of all virtues. As he explains, ‘‘in morals the form of

an act is taken chiefly from the end’’ (198, I-II, 23, 8); and

ultimately all virtues have love as their true end. This

means that charity directs the acts of all other virtues to the

last end and, consequently, gives the form to all other acts

of virtues. In other words, charity is the efficient cause of

all virtues (Ibidem).

In line with Aquinas, the official teaching of the Roman

Catholic Church points out that the practice of all the

virtues is animated and inspired by charity (love), and

charity binds everything together in perfect harmony; it is

the form of the virtues and articulates and orders them.

Charity is the source and the goal of Christian practice; it

upholds and purifies our human ability to love, and raises it

to the supernatural perfection of divine love (cf. Catholic

Church 2003 n.1827).

Practical Reason

Along with the primacy of love, practical reason is central

in Aquinas’ ethics. He explains what practical reason is by

saying: ‘‘the reason that deals with things to be done for an

end is the practical reason’’ (1981, II–II, 47, 2). In other

texts, he also affirms that practical rationality is intellectual

discernment between good and evil (1981, II–II, 94, 12)

which leads one to knowing the human good and to acting

in accordance with it (1981, II–II, 94, 1, 3). Practical

rationality presupposes we have an innate habit, termed

‘synderesis’, which incites us to seek good and to reject evil,

inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover,

and judge what we have discovered (1981, I, 79, 12).

The existence of practical reason and ‘synderesis’ in

every human being is shown by the common experience of

moral discernment between good and evil. This discern-

ment includes certain behaviors. While some of these are

universally understood as good, such as sacrificing oneself

to help another person, the contrary is the case with others,

such as trampling underfoot another person in pursuit of

one’s own interests.

In contrast with theoretical reason which is ‘contem-

plative’, i.e., oriented to the knowledge of the truth and

with no connection to the action, practical reason seeks

‘practical truth’ which makes a choice morally right. In this

sense, Aristotle, who is followed by Aquinas to great

extent, although with certain differences (Celano 2010),

introduced the idea of practical reason, by considering

firstly the role of moral virtues in making (ethically) right

choices. He affirms: ‘‘moral virtue is a disposition of the

mind in regard to choice, and choice is deliberate desire, it

follows that, if the choice is to be good, both the principle

must be true and the desire right, and that desire must

pursue the same things as principle affirms.’’ (1934, VI, 2)

In other words, a correct desire is necessary for good

behavior, but this requires both understanding what is right

and having the will to do it. Then Aristotle adds: ‘‘We are

here speaking of practical thinking, and of the attainment

of truth in regard to action (…) The attainment of truth is indeed the function of every part of the intellect, but that of

the practical intelligence is the attainment of truth corre-

sponding to right desire. 7 ’’ (1934, VI, 2, italics are ours)

There is a specific intellectual virtue, termed prudence

or practical wisdom, which reinforces the capacity of

practical reason. According to Aristotle, practical wisdom

(or prudence) ‘‘is a truth-attaining rational quality, con-

cerned with action in relation to things that are good and

bad for human beings.’’ (1934, VI, 5) Practical wisdom,

does not deal with universals only, but needs to take

5 This may remind us of the necessity to imitate the patience of the

Divine Providence, which ‘‘causes his sun to rise on the evil and the

good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.’’ (Bible,

Matthew 5: 45). 6

Particularly, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (In

decem libros Ethicorum expositio) (Aquinas 1993 [1271–1272]);

Summa Theologica (Summa Theologiae) (1981, 2nd part [1273]);

Summa contra gentiles (1997, 3 rd

part [1261–1263]).

7 That is truth about the means to the attainment of the rightly-desired

End (note in the Rackham’s translation of Nicomachean Ethics).

Managing Ethically Cultural Diversity 773

123

cognizance of singulars also (Aristotle 1934, VI, 7).

Similarly, Aquinas affirms that practical wisdom or pru-

dence as ‘‘right reason in action’’ (1981, II–II, 47, 2), or

‘‘right reason about things to be done’’ (1981, I-II, 58, 3).

In other words, in both Aquinas and Aristotle, prudence

‘‘represents the agent’s ability to deliberate, decide and

properly to order the process of practical reason to

action.’’ (Westberg 1994, p. 187) Practical wisdom rein-

forces practical reason to discern in each particular situ-

ation what is truly good and to choose the right means of

achieving such good.

Practical wisdom also acts as a driver of all moral vir-

tues. Acting with generosity, for instance, requires deter-

mining what action means being generous in a given

situation. Such determination requires practical wisdom

(prudence). As Aquinas affirms, ‘‘choice of the means is

the concern of prudence.’’ (Aquinas 1981, I-II, 58, 3, 1)

This is in line with Aristotle who said ‘‘true virtue cannot

exist without Prudence’’ (Aristotle 1934, VI, 13), and

‘‘virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Pru-

dence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain

that end.’’ (Aristotle 1934, VI, 12)

Natural Moral Law

Virtues, animated and inspired by love, and practical wis-

dom converge into natural moral law. Practical rationality

discovers human good as something which should be done.

According to Aquinas, ‘‘good is the first thing that falls

under the apprehension of practical reason, which is

directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under

the aspect of good.’’ (1981, I-II 94, 2) This leads him to

enunciate the first principle of natural moral law, which is

founded on the notion of good, and expresses as a funda-

mental ethical duty inherent to good. ‘‘The first precept of

law is that ‘good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be

avoided’. All other precepts of the natural law are based

upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally

apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts

of the natural law as something to be done or avoided’’

(1981, I-II 94, 2).

According to Aquinas, the first general principle of the

natural law includes two principles, sometimes jointly-

termed the ‘double precept of love’: ‘‘You shall love the

Lord your God’’ and ‘‘You shall love your neighbor as

yourself’’ (Bible 1966, Matthew 22:37-39). Drawing from

Aristotle he understands that in loving others, one is

seeking his or her own good. He adds that these ‘‘two

principles are self-evident to human reason, either through

nature or through faith.’’ (1981, I-II, 100, 1, 1) Thus,

although the first principle of natural law is compatible

with Christian faith (and others religions too), basically it is

a rational discovery, not only a matter of religious faith.

Related with the first principle of natural law is the

Golden Rule, proposed by most religious traditions (Melé

2009, p. 79), which can be formulated as: ‘‘So whatever

you wish that men would do to you, do so to them’’ (Bible

1966, Matthew 7:12). For Aquinas, the Golden Rule is an

explanation of the rule of neighborly love (1981, I-II, 99, 1,

3). For Aquinas, love of one’s neighbor as oneself is ‘the

master principle of morality’ while the Golden Rule is ‘a

means by which we can bring specificity to that principle’

(Duxbury 2009, p. 1593).

The crucial aspect of Aquinas’ natural law theory is that

it is directly founded in the basic elements of humanity.

This does not exclude a transcendent foundation of natural

law, implied by the deeply systemic form of his philoso-

phy. He states: ‘‘It is evident that the natural law is nothing

else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal

law.’’ (Aquinas 1981, I-II 91, 2)

From the first principle of the natural law, Aquinas

deduces a set of precepts grasped by reason from natural

inclinations, such as preserving human life and of warding

off its obstacles, practicing sexual intercourse in a proper

way and caring for the education of offspring, goods

derived from the inclination to know the truth about God,

living in society, shunning ignorance, avoiding giving

offense to those among whom one has to live, and other

related practices (Aquinas 1981, I-II 91, 2).

According to Aquinas (1981, I-II, 100, 3) some ele-

mental precepts of natural law—derived from the first

principle and its immediate precepts—are contained in the

Decalogue or Ten Commandments as ‘proximate conclu-

sions’ from the first principles of natural law. All of the

precepts of the Decalogue refer to the double precept of

love, as conclusions from general principles. (1981, I-II,

100, 3, 1) They can be known by everyone through

immediate refection or, in some cases, through wise per-

sons. 8

The Ten Commandments are shared, with small

differences, by Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Ali et al.

2000) and most likely by other great religions and wisdom

traditions. Other secondary precepts of natural law can be

inferred from the Ten Commandments, such as the obli-

gation of giving back a loan or honoring legitimate con-

tracts, which can be inferred from the precept ‘‘you shall

not steal’’, one of these Ten Commandments.

As noted above, Aquinas’ ethics is a virtue ethics, but

not of contextual or ‘autonomous’ virtues. On the contrary,

8 He affirms that ‘‘two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the

precepts of the Decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they need

no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural

reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should

do evil to no man, and other similar principles: and again those which

the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason;

since the people receive these principles from God, through being

taught by wise men.’’ (1981, I-II, 100, 3).

774 J. C. das Neves, D. Melé

123

he understands that virtues are interrelated with natural

law—their precepts direct all the acts of virtue (1981, I-II,

100, 2). Among the virtues, justice is quite relevant for

social life, ‘‘life in common of man with man pertains to

justice, whose proper function consists in directing the

human community (Ibidem; see also Dierksmeier and

Celano 2012).

Criticisms and Responses to Aquinas’ Natural Moral

Law Theory

Some concerns have been raised regarding the acceptance

of natural moral law, but many of these are due to misin-

terpretations of what it is. This is not the appropriate place

to present the current debate on natural law in any depth, 9

but a brief review of some criticisms of Aquinas’ approach

to the natural moral law and the corresponding answers

seem worthwhile.

A quite simplistic criticism is that the existence of a

natural law is a naı̈ve, simplistic and old-fashioned view of

a period before significant exposure to remote civilizations.

The quote from Herodotus above may serve to discard this

as mere ignorance. Cultural interrelationship is a multi-

secular experience. Nevertheless we must face this chal-

lenge on its own terms.

Another misinterpretation is in seeing natural law as an

inevitable law, like physical or biological laws are. It is

possible to break moral law, including natural moral law.

Moral law is a driver for our freedom. Violations of natural

law tend to prove, not disprove its existence. If there were

no law, there would be no violations. 10

Another possible confusion is presenting a uniform view

of natural law theories. There is a rationalist view of nat-

ural law developed from the 17th century onward which is

completely different from Aquinas’ approach. This is the

case, for instance, of John Locke (1989) who defended the

existence of self-evident natural rights in every human

being, which are the main content of what he termed ‘law

of nature’ or natural law. In the rationalistic approach the

reflection on natural law was split from any teleological

connotation. In contrast, Aquinas’ natural law is rational,

but not rationalistic. He, like Aristotle, was a realist phi-

losopher, and focused on intrinsic ends of the human

nature. His starting point is the observation of the world

and from sense experience forming ideas in the mind. He

looked for a sense of reality which should guide human

behavior.

The natural law proposed by Aquinas should not be

accused of falling into the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ (Moore

1951/1903), nor of falling foul of the so-called ‘Hume

Law’, which holds that, ‘‘ought to’’ (prescription) cannot be

derived from ‘is’ (description) (Hume 2000/1739, III, I, 1).

A naturalistic fallacy would be explaining good in terms of

‘pleasant’ or ‘desirable’ or, similarly, understanding that

what is natural is inherently good and that what is unnatural

is inherently bad. As noted above natural law, as proposed

by Thomas Aquinas, takes into account natural tendencies

to understand what constitutes human good, but these

tendencies are neither morally good nor bad in themselves.

It is through rationality that we discover human good from

the ends to which these tendencies are oriented. Thus, the

good of life is understood from the tendency to strive to

survive; the good of sociability and friendship from the

tendency of living in society, the good of the truth from the

tendency to know, and so on. Consequently, ‘‘ought to’’ is

not directly derived from ‘‘is’’. It is known from a rational

understanding of the teleology of the human nature express

through its basic tendencies. Natural law is ‘natural’ basi-

cally due to the rational nature of the human being,

although it also considers natural tendencies of human.

Aquinas’ Ethics in Dealing With Cultural Diversity

The three previously-mentioned elements essential in

Aquinas’ ethics–the primacy of love, practical wisdom,

helping practical reason, and natural law–provide guide-

lines for dealing with diversity, and more specifically, for

making decisions related with diversity. Starting with the

latter, natural law presents basic universal ethical norms or

precepts, but its application takes each specific situation

into consideration.

Thomas Aquinas makes it clear that natural law is

knowable to every human being in its most general

principles: ‘‘The natural law, as to general principles, is

the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowl-

edge.’’ (1981, I-II 94, 4) But, at the same time, he rec-

ognized that in some cases it may be difficult to know

certain goods and the duty to act in accordance with

them. Thus, some aspects of the natural law can fail in

terms of both knowledge (knowledge of good) and rec-

titude (willingness to do good), since ‘‘in some the reason

is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposi-

tion of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is

expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered

wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates’’

9 For a brief presentation of the present state of the debate on natural

law theory see, among many others, George (1999) and Biggar and

Black (2000), Murphy (2008), and the International Theological

Commission (2009). 10

As G. K. Chesterton puts is ‘‘A false ghost disproves the reality of

ghosts exactly as much as a forged banknote disproves the existence

of the Bank of England—if anything, it proves its existence’’

(Chesterton 1908, Chapter IX, p. 160). The same may said about

the violation of natural law, which proves more than disproves its

existence.

Managing Ethically Cultural Diversity 775

123

(1981, I-II 94, 4). 11

This could explain, at least partially,

the diversity of moral judgments within cultural diversity,

without denying a common moral law based on human

nature.

In Aquinas’ thought, natural law contains common

principles for all people, but it is not a close set of stan-

dards. Thus, taking natural law as written in stone and

unchallengeable is a misconception. Further reflection can

discover and add new contents to the natural law. Aquinas

writes, ‘‘nothing hinders the natural law from being chan-

ged: since many things for the benefit of human life have

been added over and above the natural law.’’ (1981, I-II 94,

5) This could be the case, for instance, of modern issues

regarding the natural environment (pollution, responsible

use of resources and waste disposal, etc.) which had not

been considered as a part of natural law up to recent times,

although the Christian attitude has generally shown great

respect for the natural environment, as can be seen in

people like St. Benedict (6th century) and St Francis of

Assisi (12th century).

Thomas Aquinas was very much aware we live in a

pluralistic and diverse world. This is exactly the reason he

states for the existence of positive laws: ‘‘The general

principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in

the same way on account of the great variety of human

affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws

among various people.’’ (1981 I-II 95, 2, ad 3). However,

positive laws should not be contrary to natural law.

Among the multiplicity and divergences, we may

glimpse at human nature, in which each culture is present.

Natural law, being based on human nature, is a basic ref-

erence for dealing with diversity, since we all are human

beings. This allows us to combine natural law with cultural

diversity. A correct interpretation of Aquinas’s thought on

this point is again provided by the official teaching of the

Catholic Church:

Application of the natural law varies greatly; it can

demand reflection that takes account of various con-

ditions of life according to places, times, and cir-

cumstances. Nevertheless, in the diversity of cultures,

the natural law remains as a rule that binds men

among themselves and imposes on them, beyond the

inevitable differences, common principles (…) [It] provides the solid foundation on which man can build

the structure of moral rules to guide his choices. It

also provides the indispensable moral foundation for

building the human community. (Catholic Church

2003 n.1957).

On the other hand, as noted above, natural law contains

fundamental first principles and secondary principles, i.e.,

‘‘certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the

first principles’’ (Aquinas 1981, I-II 94, 5). According to

Aquinas, ‘‘the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its

first principles’’, but regarding its secondary principles, he

adds: ‘‘the natural law is not changed so that what it

prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed

in some particular cases of rare occurrence’’ (1981, I-II 94,

5). In example he mentions ‘‘goods entrusted to another

should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the

majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that

it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore

goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the

purpose of fighting against one’s country.’’ (1981, I-II 94, 4)

What does not changed is rationality: ‘‘it is right and

true for all to act according to reason.’’ (Ibidem)

As noted, natural law presents basic universal ethical

norms or precepts, but its application takes each specific

situation into consideration. According to Aquinas, it is

‘‘through the conscience we judge that something should

be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to

incite or to bind.’’ (1981, I, 79, 13) Due to the natural habit

of ‘synderesis’ (se above) we can make moral judgments

about particular situations (Ibidem). As Langston (2011)

explains ‘‘the function of conscience for Aquinas is to

apply the general principles of ‘synderesis’ and the more

content-laden secondary principles developed from pru-

dence to particular circumstances. Prudence is involved in

the application to particular circumstances, according to

Aquinas, because it is connected to the correct perception

of individual circumstances.’’

In Aquinas’ ethics, particular situations should be

judged in the light of the natural law with practical wisdom

as a prudent person would do. As noted above, practical

wisdom does not deal with universals only, but needs to

take cognizance of singulars also (Aristotle 1934, VI, 7). In

line with this, Aquinas affirms, ‘‘it is necessary for the

prudent man to know both the universal principles of rea-

son, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.’’

(1981, II–II, 47, 3) Applying this to our problem means

considering both universal principles of natural law and

particular situations, including every aspect of diversity.

Practical reason and prudence or practical wisdom seems,

therefore, a key element for diversity as well as the cor-

rectly application of universal principles.

11 According to Aquinas, general principles of the natural law, in the

abstract, cannot be blotted out from men’s hearts. But ‘‘natural law is

blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason is

hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of

practice, on account of concupiscence or some other passion’’ In

addition, ‘‘the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out

from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative

matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious

customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even

unnatural vices (…) were not esteemed sinful.’’ (Aquinas 1981, I-II 94, 6).

776 J. C. das Neves, D. Melé

123

Regarding universal principles, the first principle of the

natural law –‘good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to

be avoided’– includes what is generally accepted as human

values and good and also show the ends of virtues. Living

in accordance with such values and virtues should be at the

core of dealing with diversity. As noted, this includes the

Golden Rule and justice, one of the first requirements of

which is respect for human dignity and rights.

From Aquinas’ thought one can infer that every human

being has intrinsic dignity, because (s)he is a person, and

person ‘‘signifies what is most perfect in all nature’’ (1981,

I, 29, 3). Human dignity is discovered from both faith and

reason. According to the Bible (1966, Genesis 1:27), man

and woman are made God’s image. In addition, the human

being is intelligent and free to be judge and master of him

or herself; and he or she is the source of actions, which are

his or her own and fall under his responsibility and control

(cf Aquinas 1981, I-II, Prologue). Human rights, at least in

a seminal way, can be related with Aquinas’ natural law

(Messner 1965, pp. 278, 326; Maritain 1951, pp. 95, 97ff)

and with the fundamental virtue of justice.

Natural law entails human dignity and natural human

rights. These notions are in many consensual and com-

monplace elements of our culture, above all in the uni-

versal declarations of human rights, and they are used in

codes of conduct of business firms. 12

Neighborly love, and all other virtues animated and

inspired by it, are also very relevant in Aquinas’ ethics, as

noted above, and this has implications in dealing with

diversity, since this love does not reject diversity. In

Christian tradition, assumed by Aquinas, love for one’s

neighbor in universal, diversity does not matter –we will

remember here the parable of the good Samaritan (Bible

1966, Luke 10:25–37), in which someone (a Samaritan)

takes care of a man, from a tribe which was an enemy of

his own, who had been attacked and was badly wounded.

To sum up, Aquinas’ ethics provides universal princi-

ples through natural law, which includes, on one hand, an

absolute respect for human dignity, along with the exis-

tence of natural rights, human values and virtues; and on

the other hand the consideration of particular situations,

including diversity, and their evaluation with practical

wisdom. This is not too far from the Donaldson’s proposal

the above-mentioned article (1996), although with some

qualifications. This scholar suggested three principia or

criteria for companies operating in a global context–we can

add in dealing with diversity: (1) Respect for core human

values, which determine the absolute moral threshold for

all business activities (2) respect for local traditions, and

(3) the belief that context matters when deciding what is

right and what is wrong (1996, p. 52). Aquinas’ approach

as presented here permits us to accept ‘core human values,

which determine the absolute moral threshold for all

business activities’, if such values are consistent with

‘human good’ understood though practical wisdom. As we

have mentioned this should include absolute respect for

human dignity and human rights. Local traditions can also

be accepted in everything which is not contrary to the

natural law. Of course, context matters and it should be

considered by reflecting from universal principles of nat-

ural law with the support of practical wisdom.

Ethical Dialogue

Last, but not least, Aquinas suggests not only a normative

approach for making moral judgments but also practical

suggestion for an ethical dialogue, and the possibility to

rise certain consensus, without putting aside the search for

the truth. In St Thomas’ time, debates (disputatio) were a

method widely used in academic work to reach conclu-

sions. He would thus be very much in favor of ethical

conversations between different positions. The starting

point is a sincere respect for good and truth, which exists in

everybody. This is derived from the general principal that

good and truth are everywhere:

As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in

relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible

to find one that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore

it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly

false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede

says (Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12) that ‘no teaching is

so false that it never mingles truth with falsehood’

(Aquinas 1981, II–II 172, 6).

This approach is neither relativism nor a skepticism

regarding the truth, but tolerance with people, carefully

considering their arguments and showing one’s own

reasons. It is by no means imposition of one’s opinion.

In the 13th century, the firmness of each debater’s

conviction was obvious –although presently is much

muddled. In most of the articles of the Summa Theologiae,

the major work of Aquinas, we find the author gathering

those bits among the several positions to reach the answer.

But all efforts must aim at the truth, not neutral consensus,

not vague average or eclectic ambivalence.

Among many ideas about ethical debates found in St

Thomas works, we may comment on two. The first is to

12 Thus, Apple Supplier Code of Conduct explicitly quotes the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and one of the sources and

has as its first rule: ‘‘Suppliers must uphold the human rights of

workers, and treat them with dignity and respect as understood by the

international community.’’ A different question is whether or not this

is applied in some cases or situations. Thus, Apple has been accused

by The Economist of having lied regarding its activities in China

(Anonymous 2012).

Managing Ethically Cultural Diversity 777

123

always make sure all parts in the conversation have the

right motives. Many discussions increase the problem,

because this aspect is overlooked. When considering how

to debate with unbelievers he says: ‘‘On the part of the

disputant, we must consider his intention. For if he was to

dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did not

hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended

to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as

being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other

hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order

to confute errors, or for practice.’’ (Aquinas 1981, II–II 10,

7) All conversations are only virtuous if the participants

have the right intention. If in the discussion someone aims

only at attacking truth, profiting from distortions or creat-

ing confusion, the dialogue is better avoided.

A second very useful rule we can learn from Aquinas

has to do with the kind of reasoning we should use. If, as

was stated above, cultural differences are relevant due to

differences in world view, then it is very important to find

the common ground, in order to derive the logic and

argumentation. Again a theological discussion of Aquinas

time sheds light on the importance of seeking common

points:

In a debate [ordained to eliminate doubts about the

truth of something] one should use the authorities

accepted by those with whom we dispute. For

example, if we debate with Jews, it is necessary to

present the authorities of the Old Testament. With

Manicheans, which reject the Old Testament, it is

necessary to use only authorities of the New Testa-

ment. But, in debating with Schismatics, which

accept both the Old and New Testament, but not the

teaching of our saints, as is the case with Greeks, it is

necessary to debate with them from the authorities of

the Old and New Testament and the doctors which

they accept. If they are not convinced by any

authority, we should descend to natural reasoning to

convince them. (Aquinas 1269, IV, 9, 3)

This finds application in business. An example of this

general attitude, conveyed by the two principles, may be

found in Marks and Spencer code of ethics: ‘‘Discuss the

concern with your line manager. They have a responsibility

to listen and respond to any matter that is of concern to

you.’’ (Mark and Spencer 2010, p. 8)

Conclusion

Cultural diversity is an inescapable reality and a concern in

many businesses where it can often posit ethical questions

and dilemmas. Our discussion leads us to conclude that,

although Thomas Aquinas may be perceived as a voice

from the distant past, his writings content helpful and

original ideas and criteria to inspire managers in dealing

with cultural diversity.

According to Thomas Aquinas, cultural differences are a

part of the perfection of the universe, their impact on ethics

proceeds mostly through their world visions, and they exist

over a common ground of human nature. He suggests an

attitude of tolerance toward people ideas and religious or

ethical position, without giving up the search for truth, and

to avoid discriminations in judgments, acting with impar-

tiality as a requirement of justice.

Aquinas systemic approach aids us in placing the

problem in its proper context, where it can be reflected on

from the perspective of virtue ethics, with a central role of

practical wisdom and the primacy to neighborly love, and

the moral natural law.

Rather than a set of rigid standard without considering

diversity, Aquinas focuses on the common human ground,

which allows for the indispensable dialogue between dif-

ferent positions. When dealing with practical questions the

problem is always one of finding the right balance between

conviction and compromise, general principle and cultural

specifics, tolerance and dialogue, always guided by prac-

tical wisdom. Aquinas provides many valuable guidelines

in the search for this balance, which can be applied in

current business situations when dealing with diversity.

Aquinas’ moral system may be useful for modern man-

agers who face ethical issues and dilemmas raised from

cultural diversity. A system, however, which requires fur-

ther research and development. Our finding show, however,

some basic attitudes for managing diversity: (1) deal with

diversity with sympathy, (2) being tolerant with other

positions without adopting a skeptical or relativistic position

in searching the truth, (3) remembering that everybody has

some aspect of truth to be considered, (4) applying neigh-

borly love toward everyone as a first principle of morality,

(5) developing practical wisdom to be able to apply uni-

versal principles to specific situations risen from diversity,

(6) Balancing universal and permanent basic standards (first

principles of natural law) with local customs and particular

context, (7) trying to proceed though conversation and

debate, finding a consensus with good arguments, but

always with respect for human dignity and rights.

References

Alford, H. (2013). The influence of thomistic thought in contempo-

rary business ethics. In C. Lüetge (Ed.), Handbook of the

philosophical foundations of business ethics (pp. 227–250).

Heidelberg: Springer.

Ali, A. J., Camp, R. C., & Gibbs, M. (2000). The ten commandments

perspective on power and authority in organizations. Journal of

Business Ethics, 26(4), 351–361.

778 J. C. das Neves, D. Melé

123

Alves, A. A., & Moreira, J. M. (2010). The School of Salamanca. New

York, London: Continuum.

Anonymous. (2012). Apple in China—Lying to lots of people is very

risky. The Economist http://www.economist.com/blogs/demo

cracyinamerica/2012/03/apple-china. Accessed 26 Mar 2013.

Aquinas, T. (1269). Quaestiones Quolibetales, available at http://

www.corpusthomisticum.org/index.html. Accessed on March

26, 2013.

Aquinas, T. (1981) [1273]. Summa Theologica. London: Burns Oates

and Washbourne.

Aquinas, T. (1993) [1271–1272]. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nico-

machean Ethics. Introduction of R. M. McInerny. South Bend:

Dumb Ox Books. St. Augustine’s Press.

Aquinas, T. (1997) [1261–1263]. In A.C. Pegis. Summa contra

Gentiles. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Aristotle, (1931). The Memoria et Reminiscentia. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

Aristotle: 1934, Nicomachean Ethics. In H. Rackham (Edition online:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu). Accessed Mar 26 2013.

Bible, The Holy. (1966). New Revised Standard Version (Catholic

Edition). Princeton: Scepter.

Biggar, N., & Black, R. (Eds.). (2000). The revival of natural law:

Philosophical, theological and ethical responses to the Finnis–

Grisez School. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Catholic Church. (2003). Catechism of the Catholic Church. Available

in: www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM. London:

Random House.

Celano, A. (2010). Medieval Theories of Practical Reason. In E.

N. Zalta (Ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://

plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/practical-reason-med/.

Accessed Mar 26 2013.

Chesterton, G. K. (1908). Orthodoxy. New York): Dodd, Mead and Co.

Cox, T, Jr. (1991). The multicultural organization. Executive, 5(2),

34–47.

Cox, T, Jr. (1993). Cultural diversity in organizations: Theory,

research, and practice. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Cox, T, Jr. (2001). Creating a multicultural organization. San

Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Cox, T, Jr., & Blake, S. (1991). Managing cultural diversity:

Implications for organizational competitiveness. Academy of

Management Executive, 5(3), 45–56.

das Neves, J. C. (2000). Aquinas and Aristotle’s distinction on wealth.

History of Political Economy, 32(3), 649–657.

das Neves, J. C. (2008). Ética Empresarial. Parede: Princı́pia Editora.

Deloite: s.d., Ethics and Compliance, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_

GX/global/about/overview/ethics-compliance/index.htm#Ethical_

Principles. Accessed Mar 26 2013.

Deloitte. (2011). Annual Review. Available in: https://www.deloitte.

com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/Annual%

20review/Deloitte_2011_Annual_Review.pdf. Accessed Oct 31

2012.

DeYoung, R. K., McCluskey, C., & Dyke, C. V. (2009). Aquinas’s

ethics: Metaphysical foundations, moral theory, and theological

context. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Dierksmeier, C., & Celano, A. (2012). Thomas Aquinas on Justice as

a Global Virtue in Business. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(2),

247–273.

DiRienzo, C. E., Das, J., & Burbridge, J. (2007). Does diversity

impact competitiveness? A cross country analysis. Competitive-

ness Review, 17(3), 135–152.

Donaldson, T. (1996). Values in tension: Ethics away from home.

Harvard Business Review, 74(5), 48–57.

Duxbury, N. (2009). Golden Rule Reasoning, Moral Judgement and

Law. Notre Dame Law Review, 84, 1529–1605.

Elegido, J. M. (2009). The Just Price: Three insights from the

Salamanca School. Journal of Business Ethics, 90(1), 29–46.

Ely, R. J., & Thomas, D. A. (2001). Cultural diversity at work: The

effects of diversity perspectives on work group processes and

outcomes. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(2), 229–273.

Finnis, J. (1998). Aquinas: Moral, political, and legal theory. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Frémeaux, S. & Noël, C. (2011). ‘Revue Management et Avenir’,

Qu’est-ce qu’une juste rémunération ? Ce que nous enseigne la

conception du juste salaire de Thomas d’Aquin (French) 48,

p. 76–93.

Friedman, D. D. (1980). In defense of Thomas Aquinas and the just

price. History of Political Economy, 12(2), 234–242.

Garcı́a-López, J. (1979). Los Derechos humanos en Santo Tomás de

Aquino. Pamplona: Eunsa.

George, R. P. (1999). In Defense of Natural Law. Oxford, New York:

Clarendon Press.

Gilbert, J. A., Stead, B. A., & Ivancevich, J. M. (1999). Diversity

management: A new organizational paradigm. Journal of Business

Ethics, 21(1), 61–77.

Grabmann, M. (1925). Die Kulturphilosophie des hl. Thomas von

Aquin. Augsburg: B. Filser.

Grassl, W. (2010). Aquinas on management and its development.

Journal of Management Development, 29(7/8), 706–715.

Herodotus, (1996). The Histories. London: Penguin Classics.

Houser, R. E. (Ed.). (2004). The cardinal virtues. Aquinas, Albert and

Philip the Chancellor. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval

Studies.

Hume, D. (2000). [1739]. In David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton

(eds.) A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford, New York: Oxford

University Press.

International Theological Commission. (2009). In Search of a

Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law, http://www.

vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_

con_cfaith_doc_20090520_legge-naturale_en.html). Accessed Mar

26 2013.

Jackson, S. E., Joshi, A., & Erhardt, N. L. (2003). Recent research on

team and organizational diversity: SWOT analysis and implica-

tions. Journal of Management, 29, 801–830.

Joshi, A. A., & Roh, H. (2009). The role of context in work team

diversity research: A meta-analytic review. Academy of Man-

agement Journal, 52, 599–627.

Kochan, T., Bezrukova, K., Ely, R., Jackson, S., Joshi, A., Jehn, K.,

et al. (2003). The effects of diversity on business performance:

Report of the diversity research network. Human Resource

Management, 42(1), 3–21.

Koehn, D., & Wilbratte, B. (2012). A defense of a thomistic concept

of the just price. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(3), 501–526.

Langston, D. (2011). Medieval Theories of Conscience. In E. N. Zalta

(ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stan

ford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/conscience-medieval/ Accessed

Feb 21 2013.

Llano, C. (1991). El empresario ante la responsabilidad y la

motivación. México: McGrawHill, Ipade.

Locke, J. (1989) [1689]. In Richard Aschcraft (ed) The Two Treatises

of Civil Government. London: Routledge.

MacInerny, R. M. (1992). Aquinas on human action: A theory of

practice. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

Maritain, J. (1951). Man and State. Chicago: Chicago University

Press.

Mark and Spencer. (2010). MandC Code of Ethics. Available at

http://corporate.marksandspencer.com/documents/specific/howwe

dobusiness/our_people/code_of_ethics. Accessed Feb 21 2013.

Marshall, A. (1919). Industry and Trade. Available at http://socserv2.

socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/marshall/Industry%26Trade.

pdf Accessed Feb 21 2013.

Martı́n-Alcázar, F., Romero-Fernández, P., & Sánchez-Gardey, G.

(2012). Transforming human resource management systems to

Managing Ethically Cultural Diversity 779

123

cope with diversity. Journal of Business Ethics, 107(4),

511–531.

Maznevski, M. L. (1994). Understanding our differences: Perfor-

mance in decision-making groups with diverse members. Human

Relations, 47, 531–552.

McInerny, R. (1982). Ethica Thomistica. The Moral Philosophy of

Thomas Aquinas. Washington DC: The Catholic University of

America Press.

McMahon, A. M. (2010). Does workplace diversity matter? A survey

of empirical studies on diversity and firm performance, 2000–09.

Journal of Diversity Management, 5(2), 37–48.

Melé, D. (1999). Early business ethics in Spain: The Salamanca

School. Journal of Business Ethics, 22, 175–189.

Melé, D. (2009). Business ethics in action. Seeking human excellence

in organizations. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.

Melé, D. (2013). Scholastic thought and business ethics: An overview.

In C. Lüetge (Ed.), Handbook of the philosophical foundations of

business ethics (pp. 133–158). Heidelberg: Springer.

Messner, J. (1965). Social ethics. Natural law in the modern world.

St. Louis: Herder.

Milliken, F. J., & Martins, L. L. (1996). Searching for common

threads: Understanding the multiple effects of diversity in

organizational groups. Academy of Management Review, 21,

402–433.

Moore, G. E. (1951/1903). Principia ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Murphy, M. (2008). The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics. Stanford:

The Metaphysics Research Lab (Center for the Study of

Language and Information, Stanford University).

Nelson, J. K., Poms, L. W., & Wolf, P. P. (2012). Developing efficacy

beliefs for ethics and diversity management. Academy of

Management Learning & Education, 11(1), 49–68.

Noon, M. (2007). The fatal flaws of diversity and the business case for

ethnic minorities. Work, Employment & Society, 21, 773–784.

Pelled, L. H., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Xin, K. R. (1999). Exploring the

black box: An analysis of work group diversity, conflict, and

performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 1–28.

Pieterse, N., Van Knippenberg, D., & Van Dierendonck, D. (2013).

Cultural diversity and team performance: The role of team

member goal. Academy of Management Journal, 56(3), 782–804.

Pless, N. M., & Maak, T. (2004). Building an inclusive diversity

culture: Principles, processes and practice. Journal of Business

Ethics, 54(2), 129–147.

Pope, S. J. (2002). The ethics of Aquinas. Washington: Georgetown

University Press.

Royal Dutch Shell plc. (2003). ‘Dealing with Bribery and Corruption.

A Management Primer. 2nd ed. Available at http://www.shell.com/

static/envirosoc-en/downloads/management_primers/dealing

withbriberyprimer_final.pdf. Accessed Mar 26 2013.

Royal Dutch Shell plc. (2006). Shell Code of Conduct. How to live by

the Shell General Business Principles. Available at http://s06.static-

shell.com/content/dam/shell/static/public/downloads/corporate-

pkg/code-of-conduct-english.pdf. Accessed Mar 26 2013.

Schlag, M. (2013). Economic and business ethics in select Italian

scholastics (ca. 1200–1450). In C. Lüetge (Ed.), Handbook of the philosophical foundations of business ethics (pp. 179–205).

Heidelberg: Springer.

Schockenhoff, E. (2003). Natural law & human dignity: Universal

ethics in an historical world. Washington DC: Catholic Univer-

sity of America Press.

Schoengrund, C. (1996). Aristotle and total quality management.

Total Quality Management, 7(1), 79–91.

Thomas, D. A., & Ely, R. D. (1996). Making differences matter: A

new paradigm for managing diversity. Harvard Business Review,

74(5), 79–90.

Thomas, D. A., & Gabarro, J. (1999). Breaking through: The making

of minority executives in corporate America. Boston: Harvard

Business School Press.

Tsui, A. S., & O’Reilly, C. A. (1989). Beyond simple demographic

effects: The importance of relational demography in superior-

subordinate dyads. Academy of Management Journal, 32, 402–423.

van Knippenberg, D. & Schippers, M. C. (2007). ‘Work group

diversity’. In M. I. Posner & M. K. Rothbart (eds.) Annual review

of psychology. (pp. 515–541) Palo Alto: Annual Reviews.

Velasquez, M., & Brandy, F. N. (1997). Natural law and business

ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly, 7(2), 83–107.

Wadell, P. J. (1991). The primacy of love: An introduction to the

ethics of Thomas Aquinas. New York: Paulist Press.

Westberg, D. (1994). Right practical reason: Aristotle, action, and

prudence in Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, K. Y. & O’Reilly, C. A. (1998). Demography and diversity

in organizations: A review of 40 years of research, In B. M. Staw

& R. Sutton (eds.) Research in organizational behavior. (pp.

77–140). Greenwich: JAI.

Wishloff, J. (2009). The land of realism and the Shipwreck of Idea-

ism: Thomas Aquinas and Milton Friedman on the social

responsibilities of business. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(2),

137–155.

Worchel, S. (2005). Culture’s role in conflict and conflict manage-

ment: Some suggestions, many questions. International Journal

of Intercultural Relations, 29, 739–757.

Wren, D. A. (2000). Medieval or Modern? A Scholastic’s View of

Business Ethics, circa 1430. Journal of Business Ethics, 28/2(28),

109–119.

780 J. C. das Neves, D. Melé

123

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.