3 pages

Managing projects in war-torn societies

A case study from Kosovo principles, practices and challenges of “project management”

in conflict zones James Earnest

School of Management, Curtin University, Perth, Australia

Abstract Purpose – Planning and implementing reconstruction projects in areas that are affected by conflict has proven to be far more challenging than expected and has often been considered to be inappropriate response from practitioners, aid agencies and government. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore reconstruction and development projects in Kosovo given its history of non-sovereign state under United Nations administration and analyse how they were planned and executed that would more likely yield progressive outcomes for the society. Design/methodology/approach – The study was designed to explore how projects are planned and implemented, as well as help in understanding the phenomena in the historical, social, cultural and governance context within the project implementation practices of multilateral agencies in Kosovo. Applying action research principles and using a detailed case study approach to the interviews, the study identified programme strengths, weaknesses and implications of project management practice and theory and differences of opinion within the project team in project planning and implementation in their wider sense. Findings – There is evidence that both aid organisations’ constructed project management processes and international aid agencies practices do not work effectively in a community service delivery setting. The study showed that there continue to be challenges in project processes, implementation, stakeholder coordination, communication, cost, quality, procurement and risk management. Practical implications – Forward looking and grounded in traditions, the study indicated a need to promote a better understanding of how reconstruction and development projects are undertaken at all levels of the organisation and to describe processes, procedures and tools used for the actual application of projects in war-torn societies. Originality/value – The study is among the first academic research worldwide to examine traditional practices of project management which are wildly applied and to explore if the same processes can be applied in post-conflict settings. This study is timely and beneficial in fulfilling its responsibility to post-conflict communities.

Keywords Project management, Conflict

Paper type Research paper

Introduction Success in post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) depends on the ability to understand the full complexities of the socio-political environment, as well as the ability to coordinate peace- building operations in an effective manner. Kosovo’s history has been marked by various aspects of humanitarian intervention. The socio-economic and political challenges faced by

The author would like to acknowledge Ruth Taylor from Curtin University for the constructive help, support and comments of this paper.

Managing projects in war-torn societies

585

Received 2 February 2019 Revised 2 February 2019

Accepted 3 February 2019

Journal of Management History Vol. 25 No. 4, 2019

pp. 585-602 © EmeraldPublishingLimited

1751-1348 DOI 10.1108/JMH-02-2019-0007

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at: www.emeraldinsight.com/1751-1348.htm

post-conflict transitioning of societies are multifaceted, interdependent and vary from one country to another. In post-conflict societies, the security situation is volatile and permissive and depends largely on the scale and context of any given disastrous situation. Implementing agencies and the government need to design and implement PCR policies and projects that promote local community participation, equity and ownership in rebuilding programmes. The reconstruction/development process is lengthy and requires a multifaceted, multiorganisational approach to overcome inequities caused by past and recent history, integrate culture and traditions and build viable sustainable structures to support democratic decisions that can lead to a high quality of coordinated administration and governance practices.

Every post-conflict country truly represents a unique situation. PCR, more so than any other development trajectory, must be underpinned by institutions capable of facilitating the transition from war to sustainable peace. It must also lay the groundwork for the physical, social and economic recovery of communities by adopting a comprehensive, well-sequenced and flexible approach. During the past few decades, Kosovo, a southern province of Serbia and central to Serbian identity, experienced upheaval and instability. Peace, democracy and stability are critical for Kosovo, an impoverished territory which is undergoing a transformation of its domestic political, social and economic systems after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) comprising Montenegro and Serbia in March 1999. The Provincial Institutions of the Self-Government of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008 (Tansey and Zuam, 2009). In supporting peace processes, the donors and international partners, through the United Nations (UN), played a valuable role in facilitating local communities to fulfil their agenda of reconstruction and development, thereby shaping the future of the Republic of Kosovo.

Background History In January 1993, Broun (1993) stated that the history of what had happened in Bosnia– Herzegovina, located in the Balkan peninsular, must never be allowed to happen again. Broun (1993) further affirmed that there would be disastrous consequences if the same were to extend to the province of Kosovo and to neighbouring Macedonia. The landlocked and impoverished province of Kosovo has a history of tension between two ethnic groups: the Albanians and the Serbs. The community has suffered from a host of economic, social and political/development problems arising from four generations of communism and a decade of serious financial crisis and continual ethnic discrimination. For the Serbs, Kosovo has been revered as a cradle of the Serbian medieval state and spirituality since the Middle Ages. The Albanians, who form a majority in Kosovo, claim that their Illyrians ancestors, the Dardanians, had inhabited the area long before the Serbian tribes arrived in the Balkans in the sixth century AD (Rogel, 2003). For centuries, the whole province of Kosovo was ruled by Turkey and was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1455 until the first Balkan war in 1912, following which Serbia took control of the Kosovo region (Blumi, 2001; Salla, 1998). In 1974, Kosovo became an autonomous province with access to the federal structure of the government of Serbia, and the people of Kosovo established their own government: a parliament with legislative powers, constitution and state institutions (Salla, 1998).

After the Second World War and until about 1980, the FRY had 90 per cent literacy levels and an exceptionally rapid economic growth. Between 1960 and 1980, it experienced one of the most successful socio-economic transformations in the region with an average life expectancy of 72 years, free medical facilities and a guaranteed right to income supplemented with annual leave pay (Parenti, 2000). After the death of Tito[1] in early 1980,

JMH 25,4

586

ethnic divisions and conflict grew in Yugoslavia. The political landscape began to change with Serb nationalists taking control of the Yugoslavian military and paramilitary structures. At the same time as the growing intra-ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, the economy began to falter under unprecedented foreign debt and soaring unemployment (Rogel, 2003). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Kosovo Albanians continued with their desire to gain the status of a separate federal republic and broke away from Yugoslavia, aspirations that were perceived in some circles as exacerbating a long and continuing climate of ethnic tensions (Salla, 1998).

In March 1989, the Serbian Government stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, and the overwhelming majority of ethnic Albanians were forced to resign from their state jobs in the province. This imbroglio led to the movement of a “parallel state” of Kosovo Albanians in opposition to the Serbian authorities. The governance of the parallel state, headed by Dr Ibrahim Rugova[2], the eponymous leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, had its own extensive network of financial and social councils, education and health-care institutions, political parties and a government-in-exile (Pula, 2004).

By the early 1990s, an estimated 200,000 Serbs still lived in Kosovo, and many had left the province long before the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991 (Posen, 2000). The disintegration of the FRY started in the 1990s and, together with poor economic policies, social and economic development started to deteriorate in the region. Fuelling tension and contributing to political instability in 1998, the ethnic Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) became progressively more prominent in the rural areas of Kosovo. The KLA engineered the struggle for independence from Serbia and the FRY (Charlesworth, 2002). The Serbian security forces’ paroxysmal retaliation against the rebel group prompted international intervention in 1999, first in the form of negotiations being convened in Rambouillet, France and then the US-NATO (USA/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) intervention through its continuous bombing campaign of the FRY (Bellamy, 2002).

When the ethnic tensions, magnified by the significant weakening of economic management, deteriorating and inadequate infrastructure and services and political frustrations, reached their peak, NATO launched air operations against Yugoslavia in March 1999 without the authorisation of the UN Security Council (Williams, 2005). The military intervention was necessary only after repeated attempts to withdraw the Yugoslav military and paramilitary troops engaged in human rights abuses against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo and after negotiations by the US and its NATO allies failed (Naumann, 2002). Until then, Kosovo, poor and deeply divided between the Kosovo Albanians and the minority Serbs, was relatively unknown to many Americans and the rest of the world (Griffith and Allen, 2007).

After 79 days of intensive bombings, the Yugoslav forces started to withdraw from Kosovo (Wheatley, 2000) and an estimated 130,000 Kosovo Serbs left the province (Posen, 2000). Following the end of hostilities, the Kosovo Albanian refugees who had fled Kosovo returned to the shattered remnants of their war-ravaged homeland (Satterwhite, 2002). During this time, an international civil and security presence was deployed in the shape of the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo and a NATO-led multinational Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (Gerasimov and Temiashov, 2004; Williams, 2005). The challenge then was to lay the foundation for economic recovery and development. In contributing to the economic reconstruction of Kosovo, it was determined that pursuant to a widely applicable strategy under European Union (EU) direction and under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, economic development should be coordinated and directed to be compatible with the largely market-driven economies of the EU (Skogstad et al., 2003).

Managing projects in war-torn societies

587

Challenges for reconstruction and development As the war came to an end, it became apparent that there had been a significant level of destruction to life, property and business. To a large extent, key infrastructure such as roads, bridges, water supply systems, health centres, schools’ and telecommunications was severely damaged or destroyed. There was also an urgent need to address the problems of the humanitarian crisis involving a large number of internally displaced persons and returning refugees (Tarnoff, 2001). The slow economic growth and more than a decade of inchoate governance had deteriorated the public sector infrastructure. Business enterprises were not self-sufficient, and there was a substantial disruption of public utility services leading to intermittent supplies of water and electricity (Williams, 2005). In Kosovo, the following six priorities were identified for intervention from 2001 to 2003:

(1) develop private sector reforms; (2) ameliorate the performance of the education sector; (3) rehabilitate and reform the crumbling health care system; (4) develop and manage sustainable social welfare reforms; (5) build the capacity of Kosovars to deliver higher standards of service in public

administration; and (6) develop the ability of the private sector to provide adequate housing and support

services to ethnic groups (Hasic and Bhandari, 2001).

Policies, projects and programmes In a conflict settings, “defining a programme or project as peacebuilding implies that it promotes positive peace in three dimensions: the activities undertaken, the process of implementation, and the impact or outcomes” (Llamazares and Levy, 2003, p. 11). Over 40 years ago, Rondinelli (1976, p. 14) noted that “if policies are to be translated into development activities [. . .] planning in developing countries must become more project-oriented”. This statement is still true for development professionals and practitioners who undertake a wide variety of tasks, identify their work as project-based activities and consider development work as a series of projects and programmes: “a vast interlocking series of them” (Wield, 1999, p. 36). In many developing countries around the world, projects are the key element of implementing development activity and are the basic means of translating national policies into action programmes. Although it has been noted that there has been a sharp decline in state activity, many of the activities are implemented in the form of projects as “a process of projectisation” (Wield, 1999, p. 36).

Establishing a strong nation and strengthening local governance requires both short- term and long-term projects and programmes. Reconstruction and development projects should reinforce the local capability of the governing regime to strengthen security, provide a stable political environment, eradicate violent conflict, generate sustained economic activities and combat poverty and inequality (Rondinelli and Montgomery, 2005). Emphasised by Locurcio (2005, p. 26) that “well managed projects produce lasting benefits to the society”. The planning and the application process of projects in the field is a complex exercise for the implementing partners in a post-conflict society, with limited knowledge and understanding, and insufficient resources and expertise, being major hurdles in this process. PCR should facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace and permeate the groundwork for physical, economic and social development by adopting a comprehensive, well-sequenced and flexible approach.

JMH 25,4

588

Conventional “project-based management” tools and techniques are usually applied to technology-intensive areas in construction, engineering and information systems industries. It has been now recognised that project management knowledge and practices can be applied in many disciplines other than technological areas; these would include sociology, psychology, education and health management (Winter et al., 2006; Ika, and Hodgson, 2014). The use of project-based management tools, techniques and methodologies assists the successful completion of projects in a wide variety of areas and within the agreed timeline, cost and performance criteria (Smith, 2003). It has great potential to address the complex process accompanying the risk and challenges of reconstruction efforts.

Therefore, to ensure effective implementation of reconstruction and development programmes, local partners and the wider society have to undertake a series of interrelated and interdependent development projects (Nel, 2000; Wield, 1999). To respond to these challenges, the provision of services commences with the making of a policy. Policies are strengthened further through the establishment of a programme that is implemented by a number of projects. It is evident that, even though the terms “policy”, “program” and “projects” in the post-conflict context are increasingly complex and often confused, they remain closely interrelated (Kerzner, 2001; Nel, 2000). Given the complexities involved in post-war reconstruction and recovery, practitioners, academics and policy makers working in post-conflict environments have not established the essential “theoretical foundations” and “strict conceptual and operational framework” for successfully executing reconstruction project management processes (Hasic, 2004, p. 4).

Project “development” application through project life cycle A project life cycle is not just about the start and finish dates; rather, it is a defined and logical approach to planning and managing the development life cycle process. According to the Project Management Institute, the processes are guided through five process groups: defining and organising, planning, managing execution, controlling and closing (Muriithi and Crawford, 2003; Nel, 2000). PMBOK (2017) emphasises that though the project management processes are generally acknowledged and applied, this does not however imply that the practices should be broadly applied on all projects. In a post-conflict environment, the project management team, in collaboration and partnership with the wider project steering committee and the participating community, should be responsible for determining what governance, planning, tools and techniques are appropriate in the given situation (Ika, 2015).

The project cycle consists of a number of progressive phases that, broadly speaking, lead from the identification of needs and objectives through to the planning and implementation of activities to address pre-determined needs and objectives, and onto the assessment of the outcomes. It serves to provide structure and direction to development activities while, at the same time, allowing for key objectives and issues to remain in focus. Though the exact number of stages varies somewhat according to each organisation and each project, as do the names given to each stage, it is possible to identify certain generic phases that are present in almost all project cycles (Biggs and Smith, 2003).

The project initiation phase represents a critical initial stage, where the options are identified and formulated as a preliminary project proposal by the stakeholders. From the outset, it is imperative that the project has clearly defined objectives and that the organisation has petitioned for all the expertise and resources it needs to ensure successful implementation (Locurcio, 2007). In the planning phase, the project proposal developed is tested through a series of feasibility analyses to enable a first appraisal of potential hurdles. These analyses also include scenarios for potential changes using project assumptions and

Managing projects in war-torn societies

589

possible risks involved in implementation. This phase identifies the many operational tasks or activities that need to be accomplished. It identifies potential and likely constraints that will impact on the time estimates in the complex environment. The formalised project plan is then implemented and reviewed with careful monitoring of progress by the project team and handed over to the local community after completion of the project.

Methodology Kosovo represented a form of support and collaboration among the international donor community in countries emerging from a destructive civil war. Following the end of hostilities, the local community welcomed the military intervention, and the international community appeared poised to support the local development. Kosovo received a large amount of financial aid after the conflict, unlike other post-conflict states such as East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. The presence of humanitarian organisations and the implementation of donor programmes in Kosovo were more effective. In spite of having a history of ethnic conflict, the province has had substantially high levels of human capital concentrated in a small geographic region of Europe. Espoused by all these apparently causal factors, Kosovo is an optimal case study to examine the effectiveness of international engagement in implementing projects and programmes in post-conflict societies (Percival and Sondorp, 2010).

In a post-conflict society, it is vital to identify the various complex, interactive processes and functions carried out in an organisation, and to determine how this affects the development and implementation of systems and influences the way an organisation functions and is structured. Action research using the principles of historical continuity, reflexivity, dialectics, workability and evocativeness (Heikkinen et al., 2007) was undertaken with the knowledge of the practitioners (Bradbury-Huang, 2010). The local stakeholders have the ability to understand and contribute to the issues confronting them and the local communities (Brydon-Miller et al., 2003). In this context, the case study approach gives an ideal opportunity to study a problem in depth within an acceptable time frame (Bell, 2005). The practice of selecting and applying a data collection technique is the same as in any other research process (Veal, 2005). Stake (1994) posited that not all case studies were qualitative. Yin (1994) noted that a case study may even be limited to quantitative evidence and should therefore not be viewed always as qualitative. Thus, case studies can be based on both qualitative and quantitative evidence. In the context of the study, the case study research method provided a greater opportunity than other available methods to obtain a holistic, actual view of an empirical inquiry (Gummesson, 1988).

Qualitative data as to the experiences of those implementing projects were obtained through semi-structured interviews and a focus group discussion conducted with key project personnel during the research data collection from August to October 2008. To understand particular processes in a case study, an interview is used to review participants’ experiences (Cooper and Schindler, 2008), and according to Lee (1999), a semi-structured interview has an overarching topic, highlights a number of themes at the heart of the research and investigates specific issues and questions for more focused information. In the study, the interview questions designed for practicing project managers (PMs) was intended to gather information on desirable skills and knowledge areas of project management and to find the degree of satisfaction with past and currently implemented projects. The qualitative data from both the focus group discussions and the project staff interviews (Table I) were collated and interrogated for patterns and insights with respect to the key research questions.

JMH 25,4

590

Discussions Planning process for development projects To strengthen civil society’s infrastructure projects, organisations should have a detailed work plan with specific and measurable goals and objectives. Good planning and project preparation are essential prerequisites to successful project implementation (Zwikael, 2008) and, arguably, are even more critical in fragile post-conflict situations (Flavin, 2003). Civil society organisations should have the ability to plan, facilitate and implement resources to the correct projects, and it should be done by the right people qualified for the job (Wescott, 1999). The project organisation should involve the community in the decisions that affect their lives (Johnson and Wilson, 2000), and the practice of community participation in the selection of projects helps to rebuild their shattered economy (Botes and van Rensburg, 2000; World Bank, 2006). Given the multifarious irregularities of each conflict situation, the organisation is encouraged to have flexible alternative approaches by which to achieve commonly agreed upon goals and objectives (Brown, 2005).

The majority of respondents felt that they had never come across any strategic or even basic project management plans for any of the reconstruction projects they had administered during the previous couple of years. The respondents argued that most organisations come with an assumption that because the projects were implemented in other post-conflict countries, they should work effectively in any post-conflict situation. Some respondents also felt that planning only starts after the funding or the donor approves the project budget.

Respondents reported that, though some organisations have a tentative plan on paper, when it comes to implementing the project management plans, they are not detailed enough or the PMs execute what is more convenient at the time of implementation. Similarly, even though some respondents reported having reviewed organisation manuals on how to implement projects in the field, they had not seen any PM following an organisation’s structured planning steps and processes. Taking into account the resources available, the well-reasoned views of the implementing agencies on how planning is taken in consideration were stated as follows:

Planning comes from where the development aid agencies come from [. . .] each project manager comes up with their own plan. I work for International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the planning for their projects is done in Geneva [. . .] too many organisations like Catholic Relief Services (CRS) who I used to work for, all planning came from Baltimore. They say this is how we do reconstruction projects everywhere.

Not a lot of them pay a lot of attention to the planning phase, the concept of spending a lot of time in the planning phase is a concept that means for most organisation it’s a lost time, and you always have to just rush to working and doing stuff [. . .] the planning phase is almost non-

Table I. Sources of qualitative

data collection

Primary data Secondary data

Thirty-six interviews with Country directors Programme coordinators Project managers Project engineers Management consultants, and beneficiaries four focus groups (20)

Project documents Organisations reports

Managing projects in war-torn societies

591

existent [. . .] hence we have so many problems during implementation [. . .] go over budget, longer time [. . .] this is one of the major weaknesses that they have in the planning phase.

They have a plan on paper but when it comes to implementation, they do not do what is written on the plan.

People were really working on assumptions much more that any kind of detailed plan using any particular criteria, so for a very long time it was just an ad hoc thing.

I think 70 per cent of projects failed, the mistake was during the planning of the projects, assigning all the people, local and international, and there was no supervision there [. . .] I think local people need to be more involved in the projects and designs, and to be monitored by the internationals.

When you plan projects, you should really identify needs in cooperation with the recipients. Therefore, the recipient’s side should be consulted, what are the most urgent needs, and then design projects according to that. Then should have ex-post evaluation when the projects are completed to learn and to see how successful they were.

It is worth stressing from the above quotes that though the international community has a critical role to play in supporting post-conflict stability, the project plan must be embedded into the community to foster agreement that will contribute to peace and stability in a society.

Managing cost In post-conflict situations, the allocation of funds becomes restricted and the challenge for organisations is to engage more effectively with the stakeholders to have the right estimate (Mutebi et al., 2003). In an ever-changing environment where tasks are often difficult to implement, it is vital for the project organisation to categorise the total expenditure of the project. Along with the explanation of actual costs and variations, subsequent decisions of the corrective actions should be included in the progress report. Within the changing economic context, it would be logical for the organisation to have the capacity to provide an estimate of the project budget and connect it to project objectives (Diamond, 2006). Reconstruction activities are linked inextricably to the availability of resources, and the organisation should ensure that the limited resources are used efficiently and effectively to complete the project on time and within budget (MacDonald, 2005). Traditionally, PMs tend to compare the scheduled expenditure of the project with the budget cost. Given the uncertainty inherent in project forecasting and valuation, it is important to ensure that cost controls are considered in such intervention to maintain the delivery of a project (Diamond, 2006).

Respondents stated that they were aware that the cost of financing community-based projects could have a significant effect on the overall outcome for the civil society. Several respondents mentioned that managing budgets and comparing costs were critical process for reconstruction projects; however, they do not have the tools that help to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Respondents stated that in the post-conflict environment, it is standard practice for the finance department to control the flow of funds, and the project team has little control over the handling of funds.

Respondents also acknowledged that the primary tools in a post-conflict society are the project timelines and the budget and, by having appropriate tools to manage and control the project, finance estimates help minimise costs. In the case of large infrastructure projects and donor-dependent input, the respondents affirmed that organisations should have a clear

JMH 25,4

592

understanding of cost estimates before they seek funds for the projects. The respondent’s quotes below adequately convey the current practices and needs:

Projects have failed because the costing was not done properly.

You need to go to the field and to find the exact cost estimate. It is different when you are in the field.

When it comes to reconstruction projects in Kosovo [. . .]. I do not think they use any kind of sophisticated software to control time and cost [. . .] if they do not know how to manage time and cost they are going to suffer in quality.

I think it is very important to manage the cost especially since most of these projects are driven by strict budgets and it takes a lot of bureaucracy to change the budgets if the need arises.

Drawing from the responses to qualify for financing demonstrates the importance of indulging local communities and by having proper costing strategies to strengthen the transition for local communities with major project impacts.

Managing project time In supporting reconstruction operations for organisations which have a scarcity of resources because of poor infrastructure, scheduling time frames and prioritising resources across function boundaries can benefit the implementing organisation (Bertucci et al., 2008). To engage a civil society and in the process to bolster progress against the schedule, PCR operations require continued long-term monitoring (Garcia, 2008). More often than not, in reconstruction development projects, there are inherent changes in the project structure and delivery processes. The project team working on the deliverables of the project should accommodate changes to the project milestone plan in pursuit of the final objectives (Cleland, 1999). As scheduling tools Gantt charts, bar charts and milestone charts provide a graphical overview and are excellent models for scheduling. With skills lacking in many agencies involved in developmental processes, simple scheduling and communication tools can be used to keep track of progress for each activity (Cobb, 2011).

The respondents revealed that almost a decade after the cessation of the war, a realistic summary of the situation suggests that Kosovo still has significant unmet basic needs in every sector. Owing to the apparent lack of familiarity with the local environment and the changing political situation, respondents also stressed that in such an operational context, many international organisations working in Kosovo found that the development processes were slowed down. Respondents categorically stated that management of the programme requires a special blend of experience and skills, and that many implementing partners were limited by resource constraints when trying to deliver quality projects within budget and time. Here are just some of the many factors quoted as likely to influence the project timeline:

I think first and foremost you need to consider the human factor. Who you plan to engage in the implementation of those activities and, in most cases that was one of the short falls of international consultants who implemented projects here [. . .] and then come the short falls of not being able to complete the task in time it’s a multi-effect of one, not being able to complete in time, then everything else sort of stagnates.

Working in such an environment is really stressful [. . .] when considering the complexity of a post-conflict society [. . .] there are multiple factors which may slow down the implementing, even

Managing projects in war-torn societies

593

make it sometimes impossible to successfully implement it [. . .] one of the many factors is the lack of efficient government structures.

Specifically in some Serb areas we have obstacles because the community is split into two, there are people who are loyal to the Kosovo Government and people who are loyal to the Belgrade Government and they come to conflict between themselves [. . .] so sometimes it comes to a conflict of who actually takes the ownership of the project, and until such thing happen we can stop the project or it can also affect our project while it’s being implemented. Therefore, it was not planned during the planning of the timeline of the project. Therefore, these would be the key factors.

Project communication challenges In societies emerging from conflict, there is a sense of commitment and urgency to identify and communicate with the stakeholders early in the life of the project. In the light of changes in its operating environment, there is a need for a clear and transparent channel of communication to be outlined for reporting project problems (Gordon et al., 2006). There is a lack of effective community participation in the decision-making process by representatives from all major groups in the society. This deprives the community of the right to participate and to be consulted before initiating any development projects. Implementing understandable mechanisms and processes of communication between the organisation and the community can assist effective community participation (Orr, 2002). The implementing agency should be committed to openness and transparency in its decision-making and must keep all relevant stakeholders proactively informed of the project’s activities and anticipated impacts (Mutebi et al., 2003).

All respondents zealously stated that communication is one of the biggest problems in a conflicting society where one is working with the team, and multiple stakeholders, to deliver the project on time and to a given budget. Moreover, in addition to bureaucratic and political influences, most respondents indicated that by not having proper communications standards and processes planned out much earlier in the life of the project, it does have a strong impact on project success or failure. Respondents emphasised that, faced with a high level of uncertainty and complexity, miscommunication amongst project stakeholders, contractors and relevant government departments leads to a slowing down in the delivery of development programmes.

To make a practical contribution to improve the project standards, respondents stated that in some instances, giving and receiving honest feedback both good and bad among all stakeholders would facilitate timely and effective project delivery. Finally, respondents felt that there was a necessity for building relationships and trust between factions of the conflict-affected groups to support the peace-building agenda:

There is a lack of communication sometimes [. . .] there is sometimes miscommunication between different departments, which unnecessarily slows down the project implementation process and it does affect efficient delivery.

Well communication challenges are left out because the stakeholders are not always involved in the implementation of a project. Therefore, that could create a lot of confusion, and there are no proper procedures for communication [. . .] and if there is a problem, people gather around, but there are no standard procedures of how to do it.

In the planning phase we need to initiate, we need to clarify, what communications processes are used, who is responsible for what, and what is the process of communication that needs to be used for decision-making, or for solving problem.

JMH 25,4

594

The Albanian community generally will tell us everything we do is great and they love us, even when we know that things were not so great, on the other hand, the Serbian community tends to be very critical of us, regardless of how great we do.

From the responses, it is evident that the two major intertwined factors are the failure to communicate and keep the stakeholders informed, validates the success or failure of post- conflict reconstructions efforts.

Managing project risk After a conflict, the situation is fluid, volatile and uncertain, and organisations implementing project activities often face heightened risks. To maintain broad community support for the project, it should be considered good practice to involve the community to make the members identify where project risks can occur and respond to changes that arise over the life of the project (van Aalst, Cannon and Burton, 2008). In its decisions and activities that impact on society and the environment, the project team should develop a strategy to proactively identify potential risk and continually implement risk strategies (Audergon et al., 2010). The risk of implementing projects in these areas should be clearly identified and mitigating strategies clearly allocated with their potential impact on project delivery (Kafle and Murshed, 2006).

A community development fund organisation sponsored by the World Bank was the only organisation that said the community was involved in identifying and analysing the risks in projects and planning mitigating strategies with the project team and other stakeholders. All other respondents stated categorically that though the organisations had limited community consultation, involvement in the risk management of the project was not the norm in the organisation.

Respondents mentioned that in many projects, the local municipal government was a partner in the project and controlled the power within a local community. Though many respondents considered the support of the local government to be vital, they also revealed that once the local government became involved in the project implementation process, nepotism and corruption became apparent in the system. Respondents reported that the local government tries to impose its power and force the organisation to implement projects in areas not previously planned. Despite having to avoid all these scenarios, the organisations were cautiously optimistic about getting the community involved in the risk management of the project:

Not at all, they do not care [. . .] they see the immediate requirement on the ground, the risk to them is nothing. They have already gone through the conflict, now they want to get on with reconstruction.

These societies are most vulnerable to risk and effective resources, and investment should be given to aid agencies to identify risk throughout the development process.

Managing project quality Project organisations and the planning team should ascertain compliance with all applicable local laws and design measurable quality standards essential for long-term sustainability (Musoni, 2005). Changes happen more frequently in post-conflict environment, and similar projects are implemented across many areas. For quality control and to ensure operations are executed as planned, a checklist is used to assess the activities performed in the implementation process (Natsios, 2005). Donors and development agencies struggling for quality need to strengthen monitoring mechanisms and report on any evidence of major non-conformities with other agencies (Watt and Regehr, 2008). Although every aid

Managing projects in war-torn societies

595

organisation may have hidden agendas, projects in post-conflict society should contribute to sound economic expansion and social development of the community (Hass, 2006). Project implementation in the post-conflict environment should be monitored intensively to evaluate the progress, to ensure quality and timely progress and to report on the findings (Rummel- Shapiro, 2004).

Despite the challenges of reconstruction in a post-conflict and fragile environment, respondents revealed that only a small number of organisations’ projects oversee the quality performance of all operations and ensure that administrative functions are undertaken. Respondents indicated that organisations do not have the required skills and trained resources to monitor and evaluate projects as well as assess the quality of their operations. They considered that most project staff had limited understanding of quality assurance methods and mentioned the importance of training in quality management for engineers and field staff. Four factors were mentioned to ensure quality: having responsibilities for the selection and management of contractors, having defined roles and responsibilities for the selection of materials, having critical path charts and developing project management reporting structures. There was also mention of developing a quality plan for the project along with the project proposal submitted to the donor. Organisations often implement more than one project at a given time; by having reporting strategies with stakeholders about the project’s progress and by reporting of evaluation outcomes that needed special mention, control of the project was improved:

In the post-conflict, the quality is extremely important, because there is a huge need for infrastructure projects. Usually there is no set up unit to manage the process, to manage the quality of the infrastructure being serviced or built. Therefore, it is a big problem. Now they think of quality, they think of assembling right people to assess the quality, depends on the project of course [. . .] now they are moving more towards it.

Quality is definitely part of every project; sometimes it is not clear what quality is. It is not defined, is it quality to finish the project on time? Is it quality to finish the project on budget? Is it quality to build great houses with good materials? That has to be defined.

Managing project procurement Procurement is a most significant undertaking and, at the same time, a complex process. Early engagement of suppliers and contractors is critical in the developmental process. As far as is practical, organisations should facilitate stakeholder involvement and consultations for satisfactory procurement decisions and procure goods and services that benefit the community (Schultz and Soreide, 2008). The selection criteria for suppliers and contractors should be reviewed with the stakeholders of the conflicting society, which also includes organisational project representatives and beneficiaries of the project. Clear reporting channels and addressing contractual conflicts are particularly fundamental in the context of post-conflict economies, and failure to address these issues adequately does significantly affects cost and schedule overruns of projects (Schultz and Soreide, 2008). The challenge for contractors in post-conflict economic reconstruction is to provide goods, services and commitment to work in unstable and often fragile environments (MacDonald, 2005). With diverse transactions and often-arduous negotiating mechanisms in PCR projects, a procurement process can be considered too costly, bureaucratic and uncertain which, in turn, affects the economic performance (MacDonald, 2005).

Within the limited time available, procurement does not receive due attention because organisations have complicated and time-consuming processes. It was noted that plans need

JMH 25,4

596

to be developed through an understanding of the complex situation the country faces. It was also revealed that a project procurement team should understand that fraud and corruption are committed at a very high level in post-conflict societies and should ensure that the plan is flexible but also robust at the same time.

Almost all respondents mentioned that the procurement plan should be an early priority for the project organisation, and the understanding of these collaborative practices needs to be transparent and further reinforced. Most respondents commented that each donor organisation does have its own procurement policies and tendering procedures, but the project team has limited understanding of the organisation’s practices and standards. Respondents also reported that the project staff were not happy with the resultant delay of goods and equipment, as the procurement processes were thwarted by the complex, cumbersome and time-consuming approval processes of the organisation. In general, regarding the capacity to deal with conflict situations, the respondents stated that:

Procurement plans exist, but there is no one to force these people to implement the procurement plan.

I would say one of the weakest things that I found in the international agencies is procurement. There is a lack of setting priorities, because there are other things going on in post-conflict areas. I think they are worth their weight in gold, somebody who understands the procurement system [. . .] and, different agencies have different standards, an example, the UN takes the lowest bid. That is absolutely foolishness! I mean why we would take the lowest bid when we know that the second one, second lowest has proven that they are capable. So you get different standards with different agencies.

In the beginning of every project here, they put together a procurement plan [. . .] we have a project plan but we do an awful lot that is not planned for originally. Things just pop up automatically.

The above responses emphasises that training is critical in project procurement processes. Also early investment in procurement planning and by having contingency plans for alternative action can reduce significant implementation delays in reconstruction projects.

Conclusion As outline in the discussion, this case study has gone some way to answering the following reconstruction questions raised by Zupan (2005, p. 49):

How does development assistance contribute to peace building? Do projects consider the local conflict settings and are they designed accordingly, or do they - unintentionally – prolong or even reinforce conflict? [. . .] after all, programs and projects have to be adjusted to the difficult and ever changing context of violent conflicts and post-war societies.

In the immediate aftermath of war, the ability to withstand the scale and complexity of transitional PCR operations and activities cannot be understated. Political and democratic governance in transition was identified as critical to the successful implementation of national programmes and policies, and they need to be a continued effort to build national and local capacities linked to development goals. Humanitarian agencies should no longer plan civilian reconstruction and development projects/programmes in isolation. To facilitate the planning and implementation on the ground, it is critical to have an effective state wide consultation and coordination mechanism between local and international agencies operating in a country. There should be an appropriate level of flexibility and a greater level of participation by stakeholders in policy and project cycle activities. The organisation

Managing projects in war-torn societies

597

should consider varying levels of participation, as all stakeholders cannot participate at the same time.

It is important in this context that donors, in association with aid agencies, undertake a feasibility study before authorising construction for any given project. In addition to ascertaining its feasibility, the key stakeholders should define and understand its scope before a project is executed. Agencies and donors should ensure that project objectives and goals have measureable benchmarks by which to evaluate project milestones, and beneficiaries should participate in the selection and decision-making processes. Projects should be approved only after understanding the overall goals and objectives, which should be clearly defined as easily measured, verifiable and finite.

Coordination of project activities and consistency in the procedures require a proactive communication strategy and transparency in the decision-making process. The project team and the organisation should make information accessible to key stakeholders at key project stages in a transparent and timely manner. It is essential to establish formal channels of communication standards within the project plan. Schedule delays need to be avoided and costs must not exceed the sum of the amount allocated to projects. Organisations should initiate project risk assessments and potential mitigation strategies along with key stakeholders. Although international donors pledge to reconstruction and stabilisation efforts, it is important to recognise that financial risks faced by many organisations contribute to delays in project implementation.

Post-conflict projects require very close monitoring and control, which may also necessitate numerous changes; controlling overall project cost changes to the budget requires appropriate techniques and cost models for documenting and monitoring project plans. Control measures and policies within the project management framework should openly address the challenges of corruption at all levels of the project cycle. Significantly, projects do not attract continued and sustained funding by donor institutions, and it is therefore imperative that funds received are well coordinated and dispersed to implement critical projects.

The validity of procurement practices in post-conflict societies needs to be examined, particularly because requirements are complex, and there is a general scarcity of goods in the country. Speed and timely delivery of goods and services are critical; however, lengthy bureaucratic practices cause delays in delivering services and exacerbate the situation. There is a need for a procurement strategy to build on lessons learned and best practices that can contribute to support aid agencies. Further, the PMs should be more flexible and should make special effort to ensure that the needs of the community are met and that their continued participation is meaningful. Local beneficiaries should have ownership and an operational stake in the development of a project plan and programme. It is critical that the project planning team consults the beneficiaries in project procurement, design and implementation.

Managing post-conflict projects in Kosovo has proven far more challenging to the international organisations and the local communities. Project planning and design must be informed by the accurate analysis of the post-conflict environment driven by local conditions. Sound preparation, execution and monitoring are vital for efficient and effective use of donor funds to help ensure that resources are used for the intended purpose and, more importantly, to achieve long-term goals. There is still a wide gap between theoretical and practical knowledge, as well as a lack of research-based applications of systematic methods of project management in PCR development. This paper has addressed the complexities of PCR project planning and implementation and helped shape the future planning of development projects.

JMH 25,4

598

Notes

1. Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) was a leading Yugoslav communist. From 1945 to 1953, he was the Prime Minister, and from 1953, he was the President of Yugoslavia. He was one of the founder member of the non-aligned movement (Klemencic, 2002).

2. Dr Ibrahim Rugova, a Veteran Politician and Charismatic Leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo was appointed as President of the self-proclaimed independence, by the Kosovo Albanians in 1992 (Duke, 1998).

References Audergon, A., Audegon, J.-C., Arye, L., Ivelja, N., Skopelja, S. and Bijelic, M. (2010), Back to Our Future:

A Handbook for Post-War Recovery and Violence Prevention, CFOR Force for Change, London. Bell, J. (2005), Doing Your Research Project: A Guide for First-Time Researchers in Education, Health

and Social Science, (4th Ed.), Open University Press. England. Bellamy, A.J. (2002), Kosovo and International Society, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, NY. Bertucci, G., Cooley, L., Fn’Piere, P.A., Hughes, P.D. and Manning, N. (2008), “The state and international

development management: commentary from international development management practitioners”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 68 No. 6, pp. 1002-1008.

Biggs, S. and Smith, S. (2003), “A paradox of learning in project cycle management and the role of organisational culture”, World Development, Vol. 31 No. 10, pp. 1743-1757.

Blumi, I. (2001), “Kosova: from the brink – and back again”, Current History, Vol. 100 No. 649, pp. 369-374. Botes, L. and van Rensburg, D. (2000), “Community participation in development: nine plagues and

twelve commandments”, Community Development Journal, Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 41-58. Bradbury-Huang, H. (2010), “What is good action research? Why the resurgent interest?”, Action

Research, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 93-109. Broun, J. (1993), “Worse yet to come? Kosovo and Macedonia”, Commonweal, Vol. 120 No. 2, pp. 4-5. Brown, R.H. (2005), “Reconstruction of infrastructure in Iraq: end to a means or means to an end?”,

Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26 Nos 4/5, pp. 759-775. Charlesworth, H. (2002), “International law: a discipline of crisis”, Modern Law Review, Vol. 65 No. 3,

pp. 377-392. Cleland, D.L. (1999), Project Management: Strategic Design and Implementation, (3rd ed.), McGraw-Hill,

New York, NY. Cobb, A.T. (2011), Leading Project Teams: The Basics of Project Management and Team Leadership,

(2nd ed.), Sage. CA.

Cooper,R.D.andSchindler,S.P.(2008),BusinessResearchMethods,(10thed.).McGray-Hill/Irwin,NewYork,NY. Diamond, J. (2006), Budget System Reform in Emerging Economies: The Challenges and the Reform

Agenda, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Duke, S. (1998), The Trouble with Kosovo, Working Paper 98/W/03, European Institute of Public

Administration. Flavin, W. (2003), “Planning for conflict termination and post-conflict success”, Parameters, Vol. 33

No. 3, pp. 95-112. Garcia, S.F. (2008), Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Rebuilding Society, Peace and Conflict Monitor.

University for Peace. available at: www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=503 Gerasimov, I. and Temiashov, A. (2004), “Kosovo: five years later”, International Affairs, Vol. 50 No. 3,

pp. 114-120. Gordon, C., Rodt, A.P. and Wolff, S. (2006), “The EU and global conflict prevention, management and

resolution”, Policy, Vol. 44 No. 1, pp. 29-74.

Managing projects in war-torn societies

599

Griffith, K. and Allen, R. (2007), Kosovo Crisis Far From Over, The Boston Globe, Boston: MA. Gummesson, E. (1988), Qualitative Methods in Management Research, Chartwell-Bratt, Bromley. Hasic, T. (2004), Reconstruction Planning in Post-Conflict Zones: Bosnia And Herzegovina and the

International Community, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. Hasic, T.D. and Bhandari, S. (2001), “New outlooks on reshaping and revitalizing post-conflict regions:

strategies, principles and models for reconstruction”, Paper presented at the 41st Congress of the European Regional Science Association, Zagreb-Croatia.

Hass, T. (2006), “Economic agendas, strategy and proactive planning in post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia And Herzegovina”, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, Vol. 3 No. 5, pp. 621-639.

Heikkinen, H.L., Huttunen, R. and Syrjälä, L. (2007), “Action research as narrative: five principles for validation”, Educational Action Research, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 5-19.

Ika, L.A. (2015), “Opening the black box of project management: does world bank project supervision influence project impact?”, International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 33 No. 5, pp. 1111-1123.

Ika, L.A. and Hodgson, D. (2014), “Learning from international development projects: blending critical project studies and critical development studies”, International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 32 No. 7, pp. 1182-1196.

Johnson, H. and Wilson, G. (2000), “Biting the bullet: civil society, social learning and the transformation of local governance”, Word Development, Vol. 28 No. 11, pp. 1891-1906.

Kafle, S.K. and Murshed, Z. (2006), Community-Based Disaster Risk Management for Local Authorities, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Bangkok.

Kerzner, H. (2001), Project Management: A System Approach to Planning, Scheduling, and Controlling, (7th ed.), John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY.

Klemencic, M. (2002), “The rise and fall of Yugoslavia: from King Aleksandar to Marshall Tito, 1918-1980”, in Steven, E. (Ed.), Empires and States in European Perspective, University di Pisa, Edizioni Plus, Pisa.

Lee, T.W. (1999), Using Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Llamazares, M. and Levy, L.R. (2003), “NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo”, Working paper no. 13,

Centre for conflict resolution, Bradford, available at: www.centreforconflictresolution.org.uk

Locurcio, R.V. (2005), “Project management during the reconstruction of Kuwait”, in Carayannis, E.G., Kwak, Y.-H. and Anbari, F.T. (Eds), The Story of Managing Projects: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Praeger, Westport, CT.

Locurcio, R.V. (2007), “Rebuilding the Gulf Coast: lessons learned from the reconstruction of Kuwait”, Logistics Spectrum, Vol. 41 No. 2, pp. 19-25.

MacDonald, M. (2005), Provision of Infrastructure in Post-conflict Situations, Department for International Development, London.

Muriithi, N. and Crawford, L. (2003), “Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for international development projects”, International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 21 No. 5, pp. 309-319.

Musoni, P. (2005), “Decentralised governance for effective grassroot service delivery: Rwanda’s experience”, in United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and Regional Assembly of Tuscany, Decentralized Governance for Democracy, Peace, Development and Effective Service Delivery, United Nations, New York, NY.

Mutebi, F.G., Stone, S. and Thin, N. (2003), “Rwanda”, Development Policy Review, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 253-270. Natsios, A.S. (2005), “The nine principles of reconstruction and development”, Parameters, Vol. 35

No. 3, pp. 4-20.

Naumann, K. (2002), “NATO, Kosovo, and military intervention”, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 13-17.

JMH 25,4

600

Nel, H. (2000), “Engaging the community in the conception of development projects in the local government sphere”, Journal of the Departments of Political Sciences and Public Administration, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 48-68.

Orr, R.D. (2002), “Governing when chaos rules: enhancing governance and participation”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 139-152.

Parenti, M. (2000), To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia, Verso, New York, NY. Percival, V. and Sondorp, E. (2010), “A case study of health sector reform in Kosovo”, Conflict and

Health, Vol. 4 No. 7, pp. 1-14. PMBOK. (2017). A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK guide) (6th ed.).

Newtown Square, Project Management Institute, PA. Posen, B.R. (2000), “The war for Kosovo: Serbia’s political-military strategy”, International Security,

Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 39-84. Pula, B. (2004), “The emergence of the Kosovo ‘parallel state,’ 1988-1992”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32

No. 4, pp. 797-826. Rogel, C. (2003), “Kosovo: Where it all began”, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society,

Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 167-182.

Rondinelli, D.A. (1976), “International assistance policy and development project administration: the impact of imperious rationality”, International Organization, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 573-605.

Rondinelli, D.A. and Montgomery, J.D. (2005), “Regime change and nation building: can donors restore governance in post-conflict states?”, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 15-23.

Rummel-Shapiro, S. (2004), “Monitoring and evaluation of service delivery in decentralized governance institutions”, in The First Conference of the European and African Regional Assemblies on the Theme of Decentralization, the New Dimension of Peace, Democracy and Development, Florence.

Salla, M.E. (1998), “Travelling the full circle: Serbia’s ‘final solution’ to the Kosovo problem”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 229-239.

Satterwhite, J. (2002), “Forestalling war in Kosovo: opportunities missed”, Peace and Change, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 600-611.

Skogstad, S., Bertone, T., Dimas, A., Long, L. and Anderson, J. (2003), “Evaluation of the USAID/ Kosovo economic reconstruction project, Kosovo: USAID”, available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/ pdf_docs/PDABZ157.pdf

Smith, A.D. (2003), “Surveying practicing project managers on curricular aspects of project management programs: a resource-based approach”, Project Management Journal, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 26-33.

Stake, R.E. (1994), “Case studies”, in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.

Schultz, J. and Soreide, T. (2008), “Corruption in emergency procurement”, Disasters, Vol. 32 No. 4, pp. 516-536.

Tansey, O. and Zuam, D. (2009), “Muddling through in Kosovo”, Survival, Vol. 51 No. 1, pp. 13-20. Tarnoff, C. (2001), “Kosovo: reconstruction and development assistance”, Congressional Research

Service Report for Congress (7 June 2004): CRS-4. van Aalst, M.K., Cannon, T. and Burton, I. (2008), “Community level adaptation to climate change: the

potential role of participatory community risk assessment”, Global Environment Change, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 165-179.

Veal, A.J. (2005), Business Research Methods: A Managerial Approach, Pearson Education Australia, NSW. Watt, F. and Regehr, E. (2008), The New United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Prospects for Effective

Civil Society Contributions. A report by United Nations Peace Building Commission. Ottawa: Canada. Wescott, C. (1999), “Guiding principles on civil service reform in Africa: an empirical review”,

International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 145-170.

Managing projects in war-torn societies

601

Wheatley, S. (2000), “The foreign affairs select committee report on Kosovo: NATO action and humanitarian intervention”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 261-273.

Wield, D. (1999), “Tools for project development within a public action framework”, Development in Practice, Vol. 9 Nos 1/2, pp. 33-42.

Williams, G.H. (2005), Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC.

Winter, M., Smith, C., Morris, P. and Cicmil, S. (2006), “Directions for future research in project management: the main findings of a UK government-funded research network”, International Journal of Project Management, Vol. 24 No. 8, pp. 638-649.

World Bank (2006), Community-Driven Development in the Context of Conflict Affected Countries: Challenges and Opportunities, Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, World Bank, Washington, D C.

Yin, R.K. (1994), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (2nd Ed.), Sage, Thousand Oaks. Zupan, N. (2005), “Development assistance and peace building projects in conflict areas: background,

tools, lessons learned, and challenges ahead”, International Politics and Society, Vol. 4, pp. 49-62. Zwikael, O. (2008), “Al Qaeda’s operations: project management analysis”, Studies in Conflict and

Terrorism, Vol. 30 No. 3, pp. 267-280.

Corresponding author James Earnest can be contacted at: [email protected]

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website: www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm Or contact us for further details: [email protected]

JMH 25,4

602

Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.