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Independent Review Panel (IRP)

The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)

Inquiry Report

Jorge E. Reynardus, Esq., Chairperson

Civilian Oversight of

Miami-Dade Police and Corrections & Rehabilitation Departments

September 20, 2004

IRP

Panel Members

Jorge E. Reynardus, Esq., Chairperson, nominated by the Community Relations Board. Mr. Reynardus is a Senior Associate at Holland and Knight LLP where his practice focuses on commercial and international litigation. He is an attorney ad litem and works with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and Lawyers for Children America.

John W. Thornton, Esq. 1st Vice Chairperson, nominated by the Dade County Bar Association. Mr. Thornton is a partner at Thornton & Rothman, PA. , practicing in the area of federal and state criminal defense. Mr. Thornton is President-Elect of the Dade County Bar Association and Secretary of the Florida Bar Foundation, the philanthropic arm of The Florida Bar.

Rev. James Phillips, Jr., 2nd Vice Chairperson, nominated by People United to Lead the Struggle for Equality (PULSE). Rev. Phillips is pastor of the Highland Park Baptist Church and past president of PULSE, a civil rights group established in 1981. He has a B.A. in psychology with an emphasis on chemical dependency.

Sandra A. Antor, RN, BSN, nominated by the Black Affairs Advisory Board. Ms. Antor is of Haitian heritage. She is dedicated to her community and her church, and has volunteered on medical mission trips to Haiti. She works as a registered nurse at a local community hospital. Her interests are civilian oversight of law enforcement and conflict resolution.

Julia Dawson, Esq., nominated by the League of Women Voters. Ms. Dawson is a community activist committed to securing the human rights of all people. She has worked with many grassroots and non-profit organizations, including most recently SAVE (Safeguarding American Values for Everyone) and the Miami Workers Center.

Joseph Lopez, Esq., nominated by the Puerto Rican Bar Association. Mr. Lopez practices general law. He is Chairman of the Puerto Rican Chamber of Commerce of South Florida and a founding member of PROFESA, the Puerto Rican Professional Association of South Florida.

Chief John S. Ross, currently President of the organization that nominated him, the Dade County Association of Chiefs of Police. Chief Ross serves as Chief of the Bay Harbor Islands Police Department. He also sits on the Miami-Dade Community College School of Justice and Safety Administration Advisory Board.

Doris Shellow, non-permanent member. Mrs. Shellow was an active Panel Member for many years. She now serves as an alternate. Mrs. Shellow was Executive Director of the South Florida Psychiatric Society for 27 years, until she retired in 2000.

Moiez A. Tapia, Ph.D., nominated by Asian American Advisory Board. Dr. Tapia is a professor in the Electrical & Computer Engineering Department of the University of Miami. Dr. Tapia served as Chairman of the Islamic Center for many years. He is currently a member of the Board of Directors of the Urban League of Miami and a member of the Jew Arab Dialogue Association.

IRP

Staff

Eduardo I. Diaz, Ph.D. , Executive Director. Dr. Diaz is a peace psychologist who actively advocates for improved police/community relations and a variety of other violence reduction efforts.

Carol J. Boersma, MSW, Executive Assistant to the Director

Sagrario Lopez, BA, Senior Executive Secretary

Duhamelle Desire, MPA, Conflict Resolution Specialist

Linda Pierre, MPA, Conflict Resolution Specialist

iii

FTAA MIAMI

Table of Contents

Background................................................................................... 1 Findings

Police Training, Organization and Deployment.....................3 Use of Force .........................................................................9 Prisoner Processing..............................................................9 Labor Community Concerns ...............................................13

Recommendations ..................................................................... 14 Public Hearings

Police Training, Organization, Deployment.........................16 Use of Force .......................................................................23 Prisoner Processing ...........................................................35 Labor Community Concerns ...............................................41

Appendix

MDPD After-Action Report Recommendations ..................53

FTAA MIAMI

Background

The Independent Review Panel (IRP) is a mechanism for external community fact-finding and dispute resolution. The nine volunteer Panel Members conduct independent reviews and hold public hearings concerning serious complaints against Miami-Dade County Departments. The IRP conducted multiple public hearings and fact-finding meetings regarding the actions of the Miami-Dade Police Department and the Miami Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department during the FTAA ministerial. Panel members listened carefully to all sides. The IRP review included extensive reading of after-action reports and news media articles as well as the viewing of video and photographic evidence provided by demonstrators and the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD). People who came to downtown Miami from November 18th to the 21st, 2004 experienced an unprecedented police presence that elicited citizen commentary ranging from celebration of “The Miami Model” of Law Enforcement preparation for large scale demonstrations to complaints of overreaction representing a “Police State.” The Panel commends MDPD and various civilian groups that helped us by providing testimony. MDPD cooperated with civilian oversight at every stage of this investigation. The exception being that MDPD Operational Plans were not provided based on a public records exemption found in Chapter 119.07(3)(d), which reads in part: “any comprehensive policies or plans compiled by a criminal justice agency pertaining to the mobilization, deployment, or tactical operations involved in responding to emergencies… are exempt…[from production]” The IRP and the City of Miami’s Civilian Investigative Panel (CIP) conducted an historic joint meeting on January 15, 2004 and shared information throughout the period of inquiry. The CIP is investigating the actions of Miami PD. The IRP expresses gratitude to all the demonstrators and police personnel who stepped forward to do their civic duty and contribute evidence for consideration. The IRP findings and recommendations are the product of a deliberate and thorough review of all the available evidence. It is important to note that the vast majority of MDPD officers acted honorably, commendably and with considerable restraint. The IRP commends those police departments and police officers who wisely limited their use of force to situations where all alternatives had been exhausted. It is also important to note that the vast majority of demonstrators acted honorably, commendably and with considerable restraint. The IRP commends those protestors who wisely limited their actions to peacefully expressing their views. Theirs is the honor of preserving those values which we cherish.

The members of the Independent Review Panel strongly condemn and deplore the unrestrained and disproportionate use of force by various police departments in Miami during the FTAA. Most importantly, we extend our heartfelt apologies to the visitors who came to our city to peaceably voice their concerns, but who were met with closed fists instead of open arms. Nationally televised images of police violence against non-violent protesters stained our community. For a brief period in time, it appeared as if Miami was a “police state.” Civil rights were trampled and the socio-political values we hold most dear were undermined. The right of every citizen to publicly proclaim their approval or disapproval for the actions of their elected leaders in a peaceful manner lies at the heart of what it means to be an American. The curtailment of that right is the first step from freedom towards bondage. It is important to note that the Miami-Dade Police Department only used less-lethal munitions two times during the FTAA week. The internationally publicized pictures of police deploying gas and shooting less-lethal weapons at non-violent protesters were not pictures of Miami-Dade Police Department officers. The readers who are interested in whether constitutional rights were violated are directed to track civil rights litigation that has been filed in the federal courts, available for review on the internet. The findings and recommendations that follow are focused on the areas within the jurisdiction of the Independent Review Panel, an advisory body mandated to do “external community fact- finding and dispute resolution” with the aim to have a constructive impact on relevant County policy and practice. The volunteers that serve on the IRP offer Miami-Dade County government the following citizen oversight of law enforcement in the spirit of constructive conflict management focused on the County’s vision and improvements in “Delivering Excellence Every Day.”

IRP

Findings

Police Training, Organization and Deployment 1. There was no “Unified FTAA Command.”

Approximately 40 law enforcement agencies participated in the FTAA law enforcement operations. The City of Miami Police Department (Miami PD) was the lead law enforcement agency. MDPD did not cede command to the Miami PD or any other command, instead MDPD responded to Miami PD requests. There was a “Joint Law Enforcement Command,” comprised of representatives from involved law enforcement agencies. According to the Miami PD After-Action Report: “These agencies were given an equal voice in the decisions in the decision making process in the planning stage. During the mobilization, each agency received directions from the Joint Law Enforcement Operations Center or the Operations Commander.”

The downtown area was divided into geographical command areas with primary responsibility assigned to specific law enforcement agencies:

North – Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) NE 4 St to NE 12 St. (Under I-395); from the Bay to I-95. MDPD and Miami

PD overlapped from NE 4 St. to NE 6 St. The MDPD area included the port and the AAA Arena.

Central – Miami Police Department (Miami PD) NE 4 St. south to the Miami River and from I-95 east to Biscayne Bay South – Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) South of the Miami River - the Brickell Financial Corridor and the I-95 and

I-395 interstates. Bayside Marketplace – Hialeah Police Department. Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO) was “utilized as a Reactionary Field Force and was only

deployed with direct orders from the Joint Law Enforcement Operations Center (JLOC).”

Approximately 35 other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies were also part of the joint FTAA security operations. Miami PD supervised the work of several “partner” police agencies.

FTAA

Geographical Command Areas (As described by Major Louis Battle on May 27, 2004)

Miami PD

MDPD

MDPD & Miami PD Hialeah

FTAA Meeting

Miami PD Hard Perimeter

FTAA

North – Miami-D NE 4 St t

PD overl and the A

Central – Miami P NE 6 St.

South – Florida H South of t

I-395 inte

Bayside – Hialeah

FHP

ade Police Department (MDPD) o NE 12 St. (Under I-395); from the apped from NE 4 St. to NE 6 St. Th merican Airlines Arena.

olice Department (Miami PD) south to the Miami River and from I-9

ighway Patrol (FHP) he Miami River - the Brickell Financi rstates.

Police Department.

Por

Site

Bay to I- e MDPD

5 east to

al Corrido

95. M area

Bisca

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Torch of Friendship

DP inc

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Amphitheater

D and Miami luded the port

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e I-95 and

2. The lack of a unified FTAA command made it difficult to determine

accountability for police actions.

Although the JLOC coordinated various law enforcement agencies, the absence of a truly unified FTAA command made it difficult, and at times impossible, to determine accountability for police actions, and often resulted in “we don’t know who is responsible for that” as the response to questions about specific police actions.

3. The vast majority of MDPD personnel performed their duty without incident and conducted themselves in a professional manner under trying circumstances.

MDPD officers spent long hours in special gear waiting to be called into action and generated a small number of individual citizen complaints. The IRP received 27 complaints about police and correctional officer actions during the FTAA events.

Most individual complaints were grievances that failed to identify a particular wrongdoer, which may be explained by the lack of individual police identification. Also, some groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Lawyers Guild, urged citizens not to file complaints with the IRP or Citizens Investigative Panel (CIP). At the January 15, 2004 joint CIP-IRP meeting MAD stated, “The Miami Activist Defense [MAD] has encouraged people with pending criminal charges or contemplating civil rights claims to not file complaints with either the IRP or the CIP.” Four complaints were referred to MDPD or C&R for Internal Affairs investigations of specific allegations. These complaints will follow the regular IRP process, which includes a Dispute Resolution and Fact-finding committee meeting prior to public hearing.

4. Extensive pre-FTAA ministerial training was conducted with

emphasis on preparation for violent protesters.

MDPD spent 40,000 “work hours” preparing for this event, yet the training materials in the After-Action Report document little pertaining to the protection of citizen rights of free expression. A document entitled “FTAA Training for Task Force/Field Force Commanders,” dated November 7, 2003, identifies 20 items relating to legal matters. Demonstrators’ rights are not among these items. On June 14, 2004, MDPD provided references to relevant sections of the departmental manual “issued to every member of the MDPD” and “a copy of the Special Events Response Team (SERT) Lesson Plan regarding First Amendment Legal Issues as used by members of the Legal Bureau when instructing SERT classes. Although SERT training was given in preparation for the FTAA event, it is not FTAA specific…”1

1 Quoted from MDPD Legal Advisor William Monhan’ s June 14, 2004 letter to the IRP

5. The police were trained to address massive civil disturbance and smaller incidents.

According to the After-Action Report, intelligence indicated some groups might attempt to “violently disrupt the FTAA conference and cause damage to both private and public property,” as well as “overrun and occupy government buildings.” Police anticipated “mass arrests.” Unlike other cities where anti-globalization meetings have taken place, there were no massive disturbances or extensive damage to public or private property. There were two disturbances that resulted in a large number of arrests and several smaller incidents. This is a testament to both police training and the restraint exercised by most of the demonstrators.

6. Media coverage and police preparation emphasized “anarchists,

anarchists, anarchists.”

The quote is from Major Battle, the MDPD incident commander for the FTAA event, who expressed a determination not to fail in the protection of innocent citizens and accepted responsibility for the MDPD operational plan design and execution. The emphasis on anarchists contributed to a police mindset to err, when in doubt, on the side of dramatic show of force to preempt violence rather than being subject to criticism for avoidable injury and destruction based on a reserved presence of police force. This same mindset and perhaps inadequate training may have led to failure by the police to respond appropriately to civilian inquiries for directions, street closings, and other assistance.

7. The police were prepared to address potential terrorist activity and

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

The Panel found no evidence of terrorist activity or presence of WMDs during FTAA week, but the possibility was a substantial factor in preparations for the FTAA event and it was appropriate to prepare for such.

8. The involvement of volunteer lawyers from the private sector or civil-liberty-focused organizations could have reduced the level of confrontation between police and demonstrators. That involvement could also have diminished the questionable dispersal orders or their execution.

9. Captain Rasmussen testified that officers were trained to address

problem individuals in crowds and to isolate them. MDPD reported it dispersed the peaceful demonstration outside the jail on November 21, 2003 because MDPD observers on the ground and in a helicopter provided information that protesters were inside the SAO going through the contents of garbage cans and “privacy groups” were being set up. Two demonstrators were observed picking up rocks. MDPD said both the protest negotiators and the police were beginning to lose control of the crowd.

Police officers observed two demonstrators collecting rocks. In this case MDPD did not isolate the problem individuals and instead required all demonstrators to disperse. A police photograph shows a young man with a box, wearing a T-shirt with the number 37 on the back. In this case, MDPD chose to address all the demonstrators rather than the “problem individual.”

10. The overwhelming riot-clad police presence, when there was no

civil disturbance, chilled some citizen participation in permitted and lawful demonstrations and events.

Some described Miami as a “police state.” Rev. Dr. Donna Schaper testified that police in riot gear blocked access to an ecumenical worship service at the First United Methodist Church on November 18, a time when no demonstrations were occurring.

11. MDPD officers in “riot gear” had no visible name or number

identification, hindering accountability via citizen complaints.

Given that there were about 40 different law enforcement agencies involved, citizens found it difficult to identify individual police officers or their departments. The proper identification of police officers is essential for public accountability

12. MDPD prioritized the safety of people in the area and the security of the Seaport over the protection of Amnesty International’s right to public protest. An Independent Review Panel committee considered the complaint of Amnesty International that MDPD blocked access to its permitted demonstration at the Torch of Friendship (Biscayne Blvd. at about Third Street) on the morning of November 20, 2003. The Police lines created by Miami-Dade and Hialeah Police Department in response to the violence occurring on Biscayne Blvd. did interfere with access to the Amnesty International demonstration. In a meeting held the night before, Miami PD asked Major Battle to take a position on Third Street, which MDPD did on November 20th. That position may have directly impacted Amnesty International’s lawful assembly. The police lines were opened and closed throughout the day in reaction to what was happening on the streets. MDPD did not close their lines to prevent access to the Amnesty International demonstration. The Police focused on the security of the Sea Port and Miami PD reports of a violent crowd moving north.

13. MDPD assumed responsibility for all closures of Metrorail and Metromover stations, and service suspensions.

MDPD made these decisions based on reports of bomb threats, fires and reports of violent crowds from Miami PD.

14. Jail Protest on November 21, 2003:

a. Insufficient time to disperse was given to some demonstrators

arrested following the Jail Protest Demonstration. Video tapes document individuals being arrested even though they began to disperse prior to the 2 minute deadline announced by megaphone.

b. Seventeen jail protesters were arrested three or more blocks

from the site of the two-minute dispersal order and charged with unlawful assembly.

c. Police testimony that the decision to arrest jail protesters was

predicated by the actions of protesters who, police claim, “rushed back toward the police” after the dispersal order was given is not substantiated by video evidence. Video tapes provided by the demonstrators and MDPD show police officers cutting off the departing protesters and backing them up.

15. The MDPD Operational Plan was not made available for review to

assess the extent to which it was designed to protect the rights of citizens to exercise their first amendment rights. MDPD cooperated with civilian oversight at every stage of this investigation. The exception being that MDPD Operational Plans were not provided based on a public records exemption found in Chapter 119.07(3)(d), which reads in part: “any comprehensive policies or plans compiled by a criminal justice agency pertaining to the mobilization, deployment, or tactical operations involved in responding to emergencies… are exempt…[from production].” A national broadcast of Now with Bill Moyers addressed “the criminalization of dissent” as an issue during the FTAA police actions and, without access to the undisclosed MDPD or Miami PD Operational Plans, it is not possible to evaluate thoroughly this concern.

Use of Force

16. MDPD only reported two uses of less-lethal weapons, specifically a “pepper spray” canister and “pepper ball” munitions.

Both occurred on the afternoon of Friday, November 21, 2003 during the jail protest arrests.

17. The two Use of Force reports did not conform to established standard operating procedures (SOP) or more recent policy directives.

MDPD Manual Chapter 31 Sec. 3 states: “Chemical agents will not be used until all other reasonable efforts to control an incident have failed.” The deployment of a pepper spray canister occurred without exhausting more reasonable means to control. The MDPD Less-Lethal Munitions Policy dated 10/2/03 states: “A Supervisor’s Report of Use of Force To Control shall be prepared whenever Less-Lethal Munitions are deployed…” There was an initial failure to complete a “Use of Force to Control Report” on the deployment of three rounds of pepper ball munitions.

Prisoner Processing

18. There was no systematic problem with prisoner processing by MDPD or C&R.

Most prisoners were processed at the FTAA prisoner processing site located at the Earlington Heights Metrorail station. The Miami PD and MDPD had independent processing sites at opposite ends of this same location. Miami PD used their facility to process those arrested by its partner agencies. A few of those detained complained about handcuffs that were too tight during prisoner processing. No one filed a complaint with MDPD or Corrections during actual detention; however some complaints were filed after the fact.

19. The IRP received no direct testimony of sexual abuse.

An allegation of sexual abuse during prisoner processing was raised at more than one public meeting by Naomi Archer (Save Our Civil Liberties Campaign), but could not be investigated due to lack of direct testimony. Ms. Archer declined to give further information regarding the alleged victim because litigation is pending.

20. An eyewitness stated that some arrested demonstrators were subjected to improper post-arrest procedures.

There is testimony that officers left arrestees’ property on the street, a violation of MDPD Departmental Manual 18-02.5.I: “Personal property…shall be transported with the prisoner…” and violation of the FTAA Property Policy which states: “Prisoner property and evidence will be transported to the [Prisoner Processing Site ]PPS.” The IRP referred a complaint, in which abandonment of prisoners’ property is an allegation, to Internal Affairs for investigation.

21. Arrestees were handcuffed from the time they were arrested until

they were secured in Corrections Facility.

That included the time at the arrest site, the time in transport to the prisoner processing site, the time at the prisoner processing site, and the transport to the jail. Some arrestees provided testimony of being handcuffed for more than eight hours. MDPD policy states that: “Handcuffs shall not remain on prisoners for unreasonable periods of time, i.e., when prisoners may be otherwise properly secured.” There is no C&R policy that addresses the length of time a prisoner may be handcuffed. MDPD staff testified that handcuffs were temporarily removed when prisoners had to sign papers or use the restroom. Corrections staff testified that handcuffs were removed once in the actual jail.

22. Some prisoners may not have had access to restroom facilities or

water at the Prisoner Processing Site.

Two detainees arrested by Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO) reported they were not provided water and restroom facilities until they reached the jail about 8 hours after being arrested. Both recalled that a man named “Ricky” soiled himself after begging for medical attention for pain in his shoulder. MDPD and Corrections staff indicated no knowledge of the event and stated that water and toilets were available when requested.

23. Neither MDPD nor Corrections have a written policy addressing

transport of chemically contaminated detainees.

Some arrestees contaminated with pepper spray may have been transported with non- contaminated arrestees.

24. Most of those arrested by MDPD were from outside the State of Florida.

About 82% of the MDPD arrest forms reviewed indicate arrestees were not from Florida.

25. There is no support for the statement found in the MDPD After-

Action Report, that: “The courts assisted by staggering bond hearings and releases so that arrestees were not able to quickly return to the conference site.”

This quote is from the MDPD After-Action Report Executive Summary, Page 6. No one from MDPD or Corrections has since acknowledged such policy or practice was implemented. C&R Acting Director Charles McRay stated that he was unaware of the basis for the quote. The Administrative Office of the Courts responded to an inquiry about the statement by saying that the Court increased the number of bond hearings “to process arrested demonstrators in a timely fashion, rather than delaying their ability to quickly return to the conference site.” MDPD Attorney William Monahan stated that ‘it appears this was suggested in the event of the jail or court house being overrun but was never implemented.”2

26. All media personnel were not treated equally, some being subject to selective arrest and others not.

Independent Media personnel were at times subjected to arrest when more mainstream media personnel covering the same activities were tolerated. Video tapes provided by a demonstrator and MDPD, of Friday afternoon arrests, document someone saying “she’s not with us” immediately prior to the arrest of an independent media person by the name of Ana Nogueira. Ms. Nogueira was acquitted by the court.

2 Quoted from MDPD Legal Advisor William Monhan’ s June 14, 2004 letter to the IRP

27. Most MDPD arrests did not result in prosecutions. Although the MDPD After-Action Report states, “…most arrests made by MDPD officers resulted in probable cause findings by judges,” the State Attorney’s Office did not prosecute 56% of the arrests. Staff looked at 133 MDPD arrests made during FTAA week. The following information regarding the 133 arrests was taken from the Eleventh Circuit Court Criminal Justice Information System on 8/26/04:

Nolle

Prossed3 by SAO

Acquitted4 by Court or Jury

Dismissed5 by Court

Deferred Prosecution6

Program

Withheld Adjudication7

(Plea)

Pending8 Incomplete Record9

TOTAL

77 7 3 13 17 7 9 133

28. Most FTAA arrests, regardless of the police department making the arrest, did not result in findings of guilt.

The State Attorney’s Office provided a breakdown of dispositions of all arrests as follows (compiled 5/25/04):

Nolle

Prossed by SAO

Acquitted by Court or Jury

Dismissed by Court

Deferred Prosecution

Program

Withheld Adjudica-

tion

No Action

Trans to

Other Case

Convic- tions

Pending TOTAL

87 6 6 15 55 10 1 3 30 213

Miami Activist Defense (MAD) at www.stopftaa.org/legal reports few convictions. This website contains a copy of a pending civil rights lawsuit filed by the National Lawyers Guild (NLG).

3 Nolle Prossed Latin term meaning "unwilling to prosecute." The State Attorney’s Office did not pursue the charges. 4 Acquitted The defendant was found not guilty of the charges. 5 Dismissed The court ruled that the state could not proceed with the charges. 6 Deferred Prosecution The defendant agreed to go through a program in lieu of being prosecuted. Successful completion of the program results in a “nolle pross” by the state and therefore no conviction. 7 Withheld Adjudication The court makes a finding of guilt but there is no resulting conviction. This usually occurs as the result of a plea bargain. A plea bargain is a negotiated deal worked out between the prosecutor and the defense lawyer, and is usually approved by the court. 8 Pending Pending court action. 9 Incomplete Record Criminal Justice Information System provides no information regarding the case.

Labor Community Concerns 29. There were specific plans for the disembarkation and

embarkation of AFL-CIO and Florida Alliance for Retired Americans (FLARA) bus passengers.

Prior to FTAA week, AFL-CIO representatives met with representatives from the City of

Miami, to plan for AFL-CIO and FLARA demonstrations and bus routes. These plans were verbal agreements with Miami police officials and were not communicated to MDPD, as expected by the AFL-CIO and FLARA.

30. MDPD and Miami PD had some streets blocked before and after

the AFL-CIO march, causing major confusion with the AFL-CIO and FLARA buses.

Florida Highway Patrol had control of I-95 and I-395 and some buses could not exit these

interstates in the downtown area. MDPD did not block exits from I-95 or I-395, however, MDPD and Miami PD did have some downtown streets blocked due to violent protesters at the time the buses were trying to reach the amphitheater. As a result, some seniors had to walk long distances to arrive at the amphitheatre site, some buses were turned away and returned home, and others went back and forth trying to find a place to unload passengers.

31. MDPD did not intervene in the Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO)

arrests of non-violent protesters who were following MDPD directions as to where they could and could not walk.

Two FLARA members were arrested by Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO) while walking

along the railroad tracks as a result of following the directions of MDPD officers. They were charged with Disorderly Conduct. MDPD Lt. Robert Brown had a “discussion with the BSO officers, but did not interfere with their arrests.”10

32. The police response was successful in protecting the FTAA

ministerial from disruption but was not successful in protecting the anti-FTAA peaceful demonstrations from being disrupted.

Police did not give the same consideration to the protection of demonstrators civil rights

as it did to the protection of the FTAA ministerial. There was no balanced consideration of duty evident in police deployment of forces. Actions to show police preparedness to protect the ministerial from attack were more evident than actions to protect committed peaceful protesters from police actions that would limit the constitutionally protected peaceful protest.

10 Quoted from MDPD Legal Advisor Tom Guilfoyle’s April 21, 2004 letter to the IRP.

IRP

Recommends

1. That MDPD identify and commend those officers and supervisors who performed their duty with distinction, upholding the department’s mission statement at all times when faced with taunts and obscenities by misbehaving protesters.

2. That MDPD commend Thomas Guilfoyle, Esq., Police Legal Advisor, and Major Louis A.

Battle for outstanding commitment in attending multiple IRP committee meetings and public hearings, and their cooperation in providing information to the IRP.

3. That MDPD adopt a written policy and practice regarding future events where multiple law

enforcement agencies are involved, that insures there will be one unified command and control system, where every agency involved is committed to the common goal of protection of people, property and constitutional rights, where there is a clear chain of command for all local law enforcement actions that insures accountability for all individual and agency actions, where the communication system between agencies is adequate to support the chain of command, and where the cooperating law enforcement agencies prepare a combined after- action report, unless contrary to law.

4. That MDPD develop written training materials, for large demonstration preparation, that

proactively address protesters’ constitutional rights and encourage officers to enhance trust in government by engaging protesters and visitors with respectful treatment.

5. That MDPD participate in coordinated field force drills and training with other involved law

enforcement agencies, at the same time and place, to assure that independent actions are limited and a joint operational plan is executed.

6. That MDPD, when preparing for events such as this one, seek pro-bono legal training and

consultation assistance from local bar association volunteers. 7. That MDPD adopt both written and training materials to insure the protection of lawful

demonstrations from disruption, as well as the protection of the subject event from disruption.

8. That MDPD clearly mark police armor and tactical uniforms so that every individual officer

is identifiable from a reasonable distance and can be held accountable for his/her actions. 9. That MDPD adopt specific written standards pertaining to the method of announcement and

the execution of dispersal orders, with sample deadlines in minutes, to insure that all affected citizens can hear dispersal orders and have a reasonable time to disperse, and that police actions that may result in arrests do not compromise prosecution of those who violate the order.

10. That MDPD revise written policy and practice:

• to insure that every less-lethal munition issued by the MDPD armory is accounted for, whether it is used, or not.

• To re-emphasize the pre-existing policy that all use of less-lethal weapons, including “pepper spray,” occur only after all reasonable alternative actions have been exhausted.

• To spell out examples of when less-lethal weapons may be utilized without specific authorization of the on-scene commander.

• To use the court dispositions of FTAA arrests in training, to insure that officers only arrest individuals they have observed committing a crime, and not individuals simply in the vicinity of an illegal activity.

11. That the Corrections & Rehabilitation Department revise policy and practice:

• To effectively set a standard as to the length of time a prisoner may be handcuffed, and • To monitor assurance that water and toilet opportunity has been offered.

12. That MDPD specifically train officers in how to respond if they observe another officer,

including anyone from another agency, take inappropriate action against lawful demonstrators.

13. That MDPD create a media policy which provides equal treatment for affiliated and

independent media. 14. That the details of agreements made between a citizen group and a specific department be

shared with all those in command of areas which are impacted by the agreements. 15. That MDPD take the initiative in communication with protester organizations and coalitions

so that MDPD understands protester expectations based on negotiations with other police agencies.

16. That MDPD design Field Force training scenarios, utilizing the Amnesty International, AFL-

CIO and FLARA (Florida Alliance for Retired Americans) FTAA experiences, which would protect the lawful permitted demonstrations from violence in a manner that does not disrupt the planned peaceful demonstration.

FTAA

Police Training Organization and

Deployment

Public Hearing

Department Reviewed: Miami-Dade Police Department Hearing Date: February 13, 2004 IRP Public Discussion Dates: March 24, April 22, and May 27, 2004 Committee: IRP Members: Joseph F. Lopez, Esq., Committee Chairperson; Jorge E.

Reynardus, Esq.; Chief John S. Ross; and Julia Dawson, Esq. IRP Staff: Eduardo I. Diaz, Ph.D., Executive Director; Carol Boersma, Executive Assistant to the Director; and Duhamelle Desire, Community Affairs Specialist.

Present: MDPD: Captain Steve Rasmussen, Lieutenant Bruce Nelson, Major Tony Galindo,

Captain Don Kausal, Robert Knabe, Miami Dade Police Department MDPD, Legal Advisor.

Audience: Steven Wetstein, Amnesty International, Miami. Media: Jeffrey Keating, FSTU/IMC; Al Crespo, Photojournalist.

The discussion was focused on Police Training, Organization and Deployment during the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Ministerial conference.

Who was in charge of Police Operations during the FTAA Ministerial? There was no unified FTAA Command. There was a “Joint Law Enforcement Command,” comprised of representatives from involved law enforcement agencies. According to the Miami PD After Action Report: “These agencies were given an equal voice in the decisions in the decision making process in the planning stage. During the mobilization, each agency received directions from the Joint Law Enforcement Operations Center or the Operations Commander.”

MDPD Captain Steve Rasmussen responded that the Miami-Dade Police Department covered a geographic area from 4th street to I-395, the bay to I-95, and other areas such as the Government Center, Vizcaya, Metrorail, Metromover, and courthouse. The City of Miami along with its

partners covered from 4th Street south. MDPD participated at the request of the City of Miami but worked independently of City of Miami. There was constant communication, however. The MDPD Incident Commander was Chief Randy Heller, who reported to the MDPD director. The Field Commander was Major Lou Battle. Captain Rasmussen stated that he was not aware of any specific FTAA agreements among police departments; however prior mutual cooperation agreements were in existence. The comment was made that the community needs to have an understanding as to who was in charge because some believe Miami Police Chief Timoney commanded all FTAA police operations, when in fact he was in charge of the City of Miami, municipalities and other entities that partnered with the City. MDPD operated independently, but did respond to City of Miami requests.

Training What were the pre-ministerial training procedures? Lieutenant Bruce Nelson elaborated on the MDPD training, which consisted of 40,000 man hours of training, beginning in April of 2003. Task Force and Mobile Field Force Command training was a 3-day session from June 30-July 2 of 2003. There was one 40-hour course for commanders conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, and another 40-hour course that addressed communications, mobile field force formation, crowd dynamics, intelligence, prisoner processing, use of force and legal issues. Mobile Field force training was 16 hours for each mobile field force. There was also Chemical Agent Training and Bike Training. Cut Team training was for dismantling an apparatus demonstrators might use called a Sleeping Dragon. Supplemental Rehearsal Training was held in downtown areas where the task force would be operating. Captain Rasmussen added that peaceful demonstrations, violent crowds and other types of situations were all part of scenario training. What was done specifically in training to address the First Amendment rights of demonstrators? Captain Kausal responded that all trainings addressed demonstrators’ rights. A document entitled “FTAA Training for Task Force/Field Force Commanders,” dated November 7, 2003, identifies 20 items relating to legal matters. Demonstrators’ rights are not one of the issues. MDPD did subsequently provide references to relevant sections of the departmental manual “issued to every member of the MDPD” and “a copy of the Special Events Response Team (SERT) Lesson Plan regarding First Amendment Legal Issues as used by members of the Legal Bureau when instructing SERT classes. Although SERT training was given in preparation for the FTAA event, it is not FTAA specific.”

Was training focused on a “worst case” scenario? Training focused on a variety of scenarios, including “worse case” scenarios. Were there training strategies aimed at isolating the violent from the peaceful, or did MDPD train to react to the crowd in general? Captain Rasmussen responded that when a specific situation takes place in a crowd, officers address the individual involved. There is a specific tactic to isolate the problem from the crowd and specific tactics on how to deal with large crowds. Captain Kausal explained that MDPD tries to identify the perpetrator. If the individual cannot be identified, then MDPD will proceed in lines. Is there any additional training that MDPD officers should have received or could benefit from for future events like the FTAA? Captain Rasmussen stated that there have been several committee meetings discussing future outcomes although he has not been part of them. He can’t elaborate on findings.

Deployment MDPD had a tactical operations center at the AAA arena under the command of Major Louis Battle. Representatives from other jurisdictions were present. There were a total of 12 field forces: 8 standard field forces with 64 officers each, 4 enhanced field forces of 84 officers each, 4 mobile forces of 60 officers each, 2 special events response team of 30 officers, and a bike squad of 40 officers. What orders were issued to MDPD in terms of reacting to the crowd? Captain Rasmussen replied that Field Force units were under the command of lieutenants. Officers were instructed to be tolerant, to try to identify protest leaders and negotiate with them. How did MDPD communicate dispersal orders? Captain Kausal stated that orders were communicated through megaphones. Megaphones could be heard from 20-30 feet. Captain Rasmussen added that there was also equipment on loan called LRAD. It was a good device that could project sound, very expensive and never used by the department. The City did not request use of the equipment and may not have known it was available. The equipment was not used by MDPD Friday afternoon because it was returned that morning. Who decided to corral demonstrators on Thursday? The City of Miami Incident Commander Deputy Chief Fernandez was responsible for the decision to move the demonstrators with Field Forces.

Was dramatic show of force a planned strategy? Captain Rasmussen responded that MDPD used that strategy only when necessary. When the Immokalee Workers groups marched south on Tuesday, armored officers were deployed due to intelligence reports of a planned Bayside gate penetration attempt. What was the policy regarding individual identification of police officers in riot gear? Captain Rasmussen explained the riot gear was new and they only thought to insure identification of those in command of the Field Forces and other designated units. Al Crespo expressed surprise of the lack of consideration for all officers to be readily identifiable given it has been an after action issue in other cities.

Metrorail and Metromover Stoppage Why was service stopped? Captain Rasmussen replied the Metrorail and Metromover were stopped briefly 2-3 times during the week for different reasons such as a bomb hoax and violent groups congregating. Who ordered service stopped? Major Battle made the decisions.

Undercover Activity What was the extent of undercover activity? Captain Kausal stated that MDPD had officers in plainclothes on the street to observe and relate information to command personnel. MDPD also used civilian “sources.” MDPD officers were not assigned to attend meetings of church groups. Were “provocateurs” utilized? Captain Rasmussen responded that MDPD did not use undercover police officers to provoke incidents.

The protest outside the main jail on Friday Captain James O’Donnell was the commander of the Task Force. Captain Rasmussen stated that a group of peaceful protestors were outside the State Attorney’s Office and they were allowed to remain in the parking area. However, that changed when intelligence was received that some protestors in the crowd were collecting rocks and planning to assault officers. When the protestors became disruptive and unruly, MDPD gave dispersal orders. Some people did not disperse and were placed under arrest. How far did the crowd have to disperse? There was no specific distance required to satisfy a dispersal order. Some arrests were made more than 5 blocks from the dispersal order point.

Can an individual leaving the scene still be subject to an arrest? Captain Rasmussen stated that it would be at the discretion of the officers to determine if an individual was cooperating or not. What if everyone didn’t hear the dispersal order? There were noisy helicopters in the area. Captain Rasmussen replied that dispersal orders are exact instructions given by megaphone and repeated over and over. The two minute dispersal order given by Lt. Jeff Schmidinger on November 21, 2003 was clearly audible on videotape provided by the demonstrators. Was there any rock throwing? Captain Rasmussen replied, “Not to his knowledge.” Al Crespo, who was taking pictures during the incident, stated no rocks were thrown. Arrest affidavits provided to the IRP did not document rock throwing.

Other Matters Some citizens, including union members, said they negotiated agreements with the City of Miami to protest at specific times and places. Was MDPD aware of the agreements that had been made between City of Miami, their partners and demonstrators and unions? Captain Rasmussen remarked that Miami-Dade was aware that negotiations had taken place. Testimony in later committee meetings revealed that MDPD was not aware of all the details of some agreements relating to Thursday, November 20. Was MDPD involved in the decisions to prevent the passage of busses to the Amphitheatre protest site? The evidence does not support a decision to block buses, but rather that buses were blocked by MDPD decisions made to place perimeters along certain streets to control protesters. Would police have been threatened if a map had been published in The Miami Herald showing designated access sites to the protest areas? Captain Rasmussen responded that traffic routes were published. He did not see a problem with publishing demonstration sites. Did MDPD consider involvement of non-government lawyers from the local Bar Association? Captain Rasmussen stated that MDPD got legal assistance from the MDPD Legal Bureau and the State Attorney’s Office (SAO). There was a legal committee and questions such as the above would have to be addressed by the MDPD Legal Bureau. Did MDPD work with the Miami-Dade CRB in regards to FTAA? Captain Kausal said he gave a presentation to the CRB. Are video records made by the police available for the public inspection? Captain Rasmussen replied yes, all documents of MDPD are public records. What policy and/or procedures need to change?

The MDPD After-Action report documents several MDPD concerns regarding what needs to change and recommendations (See appendix).

How did MDPD make its decisions about use of chemicals, tear gas and other less-lethal weapons? The latest Less-Lethal Munitions Policy was approved by the MDPD Director on October 29, 2003 and reads as follows: “It is the MDPD policy to consider the option of Less-Lethal Munitions force technology to overcome resistance to a lawful arrest or apprehension, or for defensive purposes. The actual deployment of Less-Lethal Munitions is “authorized by the Task Force or the MFF Commander at the scene of a MFF operation.” Captain Rasmussen replied MDPD used one pepper ball and one use of pepper spray on Friday. Later testimony documented the use of three pepper balls on Friday.

Comments from floor Al Crespo inquired about the use of predetermined strategy for the dispersal of the protestors Thursday afternoon. Captain Rasmussen replied that there were no predetermined strategies; MDPD just followed orders given by commanders and did respond to requests by the City of Miami to move Field Forces. Al Crespo also elaborated on residents in Overtown and their concerns about the violent protestors in their area. This created a problem for Overtown citizens because the so-called violent behavior that was created in downtown was now pushed into Overtown. Mr. Crespo stated there were videos where residents stated that police went into Overtown and warned residents that protestors would be moving in their direction. Mr. Crespo questioned whether the driving of demonstrators into Overtown was intentional, as suggested by some media people. He stated that protestors were between 1st and 2nd Avenues for some time and orders to disperse could have directed the crowd to the empty parking lot next to the City parking garage. Here police could have encircled the protesters and prevented them from moving into Overtown. Steve Wetstein expressed concern about the cordons of Miami-Dade police that were on NE 4th St. and NE 3rd St. These cordons, and the large presence of officers on Biscayne Blvd., prevented many people from attending the Amnesty International event at the Torch of Friendship. Steve Wetstein also expressed concerns about the Hialeah Police actions in The Torch of Friendship area. Dr. Diaz replied that the Hialeah Police Department was a City of Miami “partner,” and their actions may have been requested by the city. Jeffrey Keating inquired about effectiveness of police training. Captain Rasmussen believed that MDPD training was effective; every officer did an excellent job.

FTAA

Use of Force

Public Hearing

Department Reviewed: Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) Public Hearing Dates: February 24, 2004 and March 5, 2004 IRP Discussion Dates: April 22, 2004 and May 27, 2004 Committee: IRP Members: Julia Dawson, Esq., Committee Chairperson, Moiez A. Tapia, Ph.

D., Committee Co-Chairperson, Jorge E. Reynardus, Esq., and Chief John S. Ross. IRP Staff: Eduardo I. Diaz, Ph.D., Executive Director; Carol Boersma, Executive Assistant to the Director; Duhamelle Desire and Debbie Penha-Cumbermack, Conflict Resolution Specialists.

Present: MDPD: Major Louis Battle, FTAA Operations Commander; Sergeant Michael

Barry, FTAA Training; Major Tony Galindo, Tom Guilfoyle, Esq., Legal Bureau; Captain James O’Donnell and Lt. Jeff Schmidinger.

Audience: Juanda Ferguson; David Douglas; Nikki Hartman; Jessica Morris; Erick Morris; Noel Cleland; Naomi Fisher; Dr. Donna Schaper, Senior Pastor, Coral Gables Congregational Church; Carol Abia, City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel (CIP); Ada Rojas and Sam Feldman, Miami Community Relations Board; Steven Wetstein, Amnesty International, Miami; Terry A. Coble, ACLU Greater Miami President Elect; Benjamin Waxman, Esq. and Marc Alain Steier, Esq., National Lawyers Guild; Naomi Archer, Save Our Civil Liberties; Terrance Rothman, Peace Worker of Luke 5 Movement; Rev. Willie Sims, Office of Community Relations.

Media: Raffio Stotlase, Ch. 4 Photographer; John Lang, NBC 6 Photographer; Carolyn Salazar, Miami Herald reporter; Jeffrey Keating, Free Speech TV reporter; Erik Bojnansky, Sun Post reporter.

The discussion focused on Police Use of Force during the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Ministerial conference held in Miami. There was testimony concerning two incidents: Protest actions in downtown Miami on November 20, 2003 and protest actions around the jail on the afternoon of November 21. MDPD reported that they used less-lethal weapons only on November 21.

Downtown Thursday Morning About 9 AM on November 20, 2003, a group of approximately 150 activists gathered at the security fence, located at the south end of Biscayne Blvd., approximately one block north of the Intercontinental Hotel where the FTAA meetings were being held. The Miami PD was monitoring the crowd. MDPD forces were positioned along NE 4th Street. The MDPD Command Post was receiving information that the activists were hanging signs on the security fence and were going to set them on fire. Some activists threw fireworks; others began to attach ropes and grappling hooks to the security fence. At 9:45 AM Miami PD gave a “gas disperse order,” directing the crowd to move north. Within a few minutes Miami PD was deploying pepper spray and beanbags, and pushing the crowd north. Amnesty International had a permit to hold a demonstration from 10 AM - 2 PM, at the Torch of Friendship (Bayfront Park at NE 3rd Street), about 4 blocks north of the security fence. About 10 AM a group of Hialeah officers, who said they were under the command of Captain Overton, approached the Torch and told the Amnesty group they had to move because a group of protesters was heading toward the Torch. At this time MDPD had a line of officers stationed at Biscayne and 4th Street, blocking access to the Torch from the north. Mr. Wetstein stated these cordons, and the large presence of officers on Biscayne Blvd., prevented many people from attending the Amnesty International event at the Torch of Friendship. Major Battle testified that Miami PD Captain Thomas Cannon asked him to move to Third Street and block the north side of Third in a meeting the night before.

Why was the Amnesty International demonstration at the Torch of Friendship asked to disperse? There is no evidence that Amnesty demonstrators were asked to disperse, however around 9:40 AM Hialeah directed the Amnesty people who were making preparations at the Torch to move away from the Torch. According to testimony provided by Hialeah Captain Overton on 5/20/04, Miami PD asked Hialeah to move from Bayside to Biscayne Blvd., because Miami PD was pushing violent protesters north on Biscayne, away from the security fence. Hialeah formed a skirmish line on the east side of Biscayne Blvd. between NE 3 and 4 Streets, to prevent protesters from moving into Bayfront Park. This formation caused the Amnesty demonstration site (Torch of Friendship) to be behind the police line. Major Battle stated that the City was dealing with demonstrators who had grappling hooks, rocks and bottles and were setting fires on the Boulevard. Major Battle advised MDPD officers that the crowd was being pushed toward MDPD’s area, so that MDPD officers would be prepared to ensure the Port remained open.

What permitted and scheduled protest activities did police deployment prevent or interfere with? Steven Wetstein, representing Amnesty International Miami, complained that Amnesty International had scheduled a permitted demonstration at the Torch of Friendship and access to the demonstration was blocked by the deployment of the police forces. Mr. Wetstein stated MDPD set up a cordon on NE 4th St. and later another cordon on NE 3rd St. which, along with the large police presence of officers on Biscayne Blvd., prevented protesters from attending the Amnesty International demonstration at the Torch. The operations log reveals that at 10:12 AM the City requested that MDPD move from 4th to 3rd Street. Whenever MDPD received information that Miami PD was battling a crowd, as it was in this instance, MDPD would shut down its area. Pedestrians and motorists would be let out of the area, but not into the area. Major Battle stated that Amnesty demonstrators could have come down 1st Avenue, 2nd Avenue or 3rd Street to get on the Boulevard. What was the Tactical Plan to Address the Activists? Major Battle said the Miami PD-MDPD tactical agreement was that Miami would push violent demonstrators north on the Boulevard to 3rd Street and then west. They did not want to push them down Flagler, 1st or 2nd because there are a lot of businesses in that area. MDPD would be the northern buffer on 4th St. In order to ensure the safety of everybody in the area, Major Battle set up a perimeter. Once the City regained control, MDPD moved back to the American Airlines Arena. On 5/20/04 Hialeah Captain Overton testified that there were meetings with MPD and MDPD the night of November 19th, because there was intelligence information that an illegal demonstration could occur as early as 5 AM the following day. There were several contingency plans:

1. There was a plan that would have allowed for non-violent protesters to march along Biscayne Blvd and turn west at 3rd or 4th Streets.

2. There was a plan for the unpermitted protesters to be blocked between Biscayne Blvd. and 1st Ave., and taken into custody by Miami PD and other field forces.

3. There was a plan that, if protesters attacked the fence or committed other illegal acts, Hialeah would move to the amphitheater and MDPD would move south to 3rd St.

Dr. Diaz read the following from the Command Post Log:

“9:41 Intel advises that when the city disperses that they will deploy gas. 9:41 Major Battle advises they have to give us warning so that we can mask up. 9:42 On northeast 4th and Boulevard, standing by. 9:42 We are advising Hialeah in Bayside. 9:43 Metromover now shut down. 9:44 Hialeah to deploy, moving crowd westbound. 9:45 City giving gas disperse order now.

10:12 City req we move from 4th down to 3rd St."

What caused the demonstrators to move into Overtown? The City of Miami After-Action Report indicates that Miami PD considered “corralling’ protesters to a parking lot to initiate mass arrests, but that didn’t happen. The report suggests “some people were slow to close folks off.” Miami PD, with the help of BSO, pushed the crowd west to NE 2 Ave. and then north on 2nd Avenue. MDPD held a north lateral line on Third Street and locked down the Boulevard from NE 4 St. to NE 12 St. No traffic was allowed east of NE 2 Ave., Just past NE 2 Ave. and 6 St., a 45 degree line of MDPD officers blocked access north and east. As a result people were driven onto the railroad tracks and toward the Overtown area. What led to the Thursday afternoon police decision to march down Biscayne Blvd as a closely arranged line of officers? Who ordered it? On what basis? Based on testimony at the February 5th CIP meeting, the City of Miami Incident Commander, Deputy Chief Fernandez, was responsible for the decision to move the demonstrators with Field Forces, based on observations of demonstrator violence. Who used less-lethal force on 11/20/04 in the area of the demonstrator clinic? The evidence reviewed suggests that MDPD was not in that area at that time. The specific involved law enforcement agency was not identified.

Demonstration Outside the Pre-Trial Detention Center (Jail) On November 21, 2003, about 2 PM, there was a gathering of different protest groups in the parking lot of the State Attorney’s Office (SAO), which is located across the street from the jail, to support protesters who had been arrested. It was not a permitted demonstration; however MDPD Captain James O’Donnell spoke with protest negotiators and agreed to allow a demonstration in the parking lot of the SAO, as well as a press conference at 2:30 PM. Representatives from the SAO agreed to the use of their parking lot. After the press conference about 125 demonstrators remained in the area, some walking along the sidewalk and in the street. Captain O’Donnell agreed the demonstrators could continue to demonstrate for an hour, from 4- 5:00 PM. Some time after 4 PM Major Battle, who was located in the Command Center at the American Airlines Arena (AAA), made the decision to disperse the crowd, based on intelligence reports that demonstrators were gathering rocks and were beginning to move into the street. That intelligence information was not documented in the Command Post Log. More MDPD officers, some in riot gear, began to arrive after 4 PM. At 4:36 PM, Captain O’Donnell communicated Major Battle’s decision with the demonstrator negotiators, giving the crowd three minutes to disband. According to the Command Post Log, “legal gave a 3 min warning. After this time is up—Push them back & start arresting.” The negotiators agreed to call for the demonstrators to disperse, east on NW 14th Street. The announcement was made by megaphone and the crowd began to disperse.

The crowd, followed and edged by police officers, began to disperse east on 14th Street. Most of the protesters crossed NW 12th Avenue and proceeded east or north, however six activists sat down on the corner of 14th Street and 12th Avenue in an act of civil disobedience. Many camera people stopped to film the civil disobedience. Many protesters stopped as well, to see what was happening. Minutes before 5 PM Lt. Jeff Schmidinger, who was standing on 14th Street east of 12th Avenue, gave the formal dispersal order, giving two minutes to disperse east on 14th Street. OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) “pepper” spray was deployed at 5 PM. 83 protesters were arrested, some as far away as NW 9th Avenue and 15th Street. On March 5, 2004 the committee looked at two videos of the dispersal order given by Lt. Jeff Schmidinger and subsequent arrests made by MDPD on November 21, 2003. One video was taken by a protester and is labeled “Ana Nogueira – November 21. 2003 – Arrest Evidence.” The other was provided by MDPD. The videos show a line of protesters facing west in the 1100 block of NW 14th Street, shouting at the officers. Lt. Schmidinger then gives a two minute dispersal order and the protesters move onto the sidewalk and begin to walk east. A short time later, a line of officers blocks the eastward movement of the protesters and the protesters appear to be forced to back up. They are surrounded by officers and told to get on the ground. Statement of Naomi Archer Ms. Archer was one of the persons who negotiated with MDPD during the incident. She drew a diagram of the area on the chalkboard. Ms. Archer stated that she spoke to officers stationed at the jail, the Justice Building and the SAO, informing them that protesters were present for a press conference and a peaceful vigil for demonstrators who were jailed. No one she spoke to objected. The press conference was held in the parking lot about 2:30 PM. After that some people began to walk along the sidewalk. As she was walking, Ms. Archer noticed MDPD officers in riot gear arriving and she asked Captain O’Donnell why he was escalating the situation with a “show of force.” Ms. Archer stated that Captain O’Donnell had agreed to the gathering, however he broke his agreement. The officers started to form lines. Ms. Archer said Captain O’Donnell told her “intelligence” advised that demonstrators were gathering rocks, had wrecked the bathroom in the SAO, and had filled containers with urine and feces. Ms. Archer stated that she and Captain O’Donnell agreed on a 15-20 minute frame for dispersal before officers moved in. They shook hands. Ms. Archer advised the crowd to disperse via megaphone. As activists were dispersing, Captain O’Donnell gave an official order to disperse. People continued to move away and officers started to move in, however a group of six demonstrators decided to use civil disobedience to protest by sitting on the sidewalk.

Statement of Captain O’Donnell Captain O’Donnell stated that when he arrived on the scene about 2 PM “things were peaceful.” Later the protesters moved toward the jail. His three lieutenants met with Naomi Archer and Brenna Bell, another protest negotiator, who advised that they wanted to demonstrate. Even though it was not a permitted event, MDPD set the parameters for the protest: The protesters could not come off the curb on NW 13th nor could they move south of the SAO. The time was set for one hour, from 4-5 PM. At 4:36 PM, reports from the Command Center indicated “privacy groups” were being set up, protesters had gone into the SAO and rocks were being piled up. At 4:40 PM Captain O’Donnell advised Ms. Archer and Ms. Bell that the crowd had to disperse. He requested them to give a three-minute dispersal order and the crowd started dispersing immediately. MDPD officers followed behind. The crowd stopped in the 1100 block of NW 14th Street, turned and took a stance. About 5 PM Lt. Schmidinger declared over the megaphone that the assembly was unlawful and gave a formal dispersal order by megaphone: the crowd had two minutes to disperse east on 14th Street. Most of the protesters followed the order, but some tried to go through a parking lot, so MDPD set up an arrest perimeter and pushed everyone to one area to stabilize the area. People were ordered to the ground and the fence collapsed. Some protesters began to lock arms and kick their feet to avoid being arrested.

The Dispersal Why were dispersal orders given? MDPD observers on the ground and in a helicopter provided information that protesters were inside the SAO going through the contents of garbage cans, “privacy groups” were being set up, and rocks were being piled up. Major Battle said both the protest negotiators and the police were beginning to lose control of the crowd.

What technology was used to assure calls to disperse were heard? Both police and/or demonstrators used megaphones, or bullhorn amplifiers. The dispersal orders given by Lt. Schmidinger on the east of 12th Avenue were clearly heard on videotape supplied by MDPD and protesters. The order is given to move onto the sidewalk and disperse east on 14th St. The video shows protesters standing in a line across 14th street, facing the officers and yelling as the dispersal order is given. The protesters continue yelling as they move onto the sidewalk and begin to walk east.

Did orders to disperse follow established guidelines? What are those guidelines? A sample dispersal order from a document entitled “Field Force and Task Force Commander’s Handout” reads, in part, as follows: “The following routes of dispersal are available and give the most expeditious routes of dispersal. You have (a reasonable amount of time) minutes to disperse.” Major Battle stated that the normal time frame is 5-10 minutes; however the situation on November 21 was becoming urgent. There were reports that protesters were gathering rocks. The crowd was starting to move into the street. Five o’clock traffic was building. Major Battle, who was in the Triple A Command Center, made the decision to disperse the crowd and communicated his decision to his staff. Captain O’Donnell, the Task Force Commander, consulted with MDPD legal advisors in the field and decided on the initial three-minute time frame. Lt. Schmidinger communicated a two-minute time frame. Bob Knabe and Bill Monahan were the MDPD legal advisors on the scene. What dispersal orders were given? There appear to be two agreements made between the police and the negotiators. The initial agreement to have a vigil and a “First Amendment Zone” in the parking lot of the SAO around 2:30 PM. The second agreement, made after Major Battle made the decision to disperse, was for the negotiators to announce the dispersal decision around 4:36 PM. About 5 PM Lt. Schmidinger gave another dispersal order from 14th St. east of 12th Ave., in which he directed protesters to get out of the street and disperse east on 14th Street in two minutes. After awhile, Lt. Schmidinger got back on the bullhorn and advised they had 90 seconds remaining. What is expected to happen by the dispersal deadline? Captain O’Donnell at first said he expected the protesters to be gone. Later he acknowledged the expectation that demonstrators would begin to disperse. Was the dispersal time reasonable? Mr. Feldman, Miami CRB, stated many were trying to disperse and he questioned the reasonableness of the time frames. He does not believe sufficient time was given. The video provided by MDPD shows arrests of people who had begun moving east on 14th Avenue before the two minutes were up.

Who was subject to arrest after the dispersal orders? Major Battle stated that: “Everybody would be subject to arrest once they violated the order to disperse…but, the arrestees would have been the ones that were most likely obstructing traffic, or continuing to resist the police and not move. The ones that were on the sidewalk and moving along the pre-determined route, had they not been causing something else to warrant their arrest, would not have been arrested.” According to the police, some demonstrators complied; others violated the dispersal order by turning north or south on 12th Avenue. The Use of Force Report also indicates that orders to “stop resisting arrest” were ignored. Mr. Guilfolye explained that anyone who does not comply with the order of a police officer can be charged with “resisting arrest without violence.”

Less-Lethal Weapons What less-lethal weapons were deployed? On November 21, 2003, one officer deployed three pepper balls and another deployed a canister of OC spray. Major Battle stated that on Friday afternoon, pepper balls were used against one individual that grabbed an officer’s shield and the OC spray dispensed against two demonstrators. A Use of Force Report should have been written regarding the pepper balls, but was not initially.

Who fired less-lethal weapons? One MDPD Supervisor’s Report of Use of Force To Control, regarding the use of less-lethal weapons, was generated during FTAA week, and one five months later. The 11/21/03 report documents that Sergeant Carlos Acin deployed a canister of “OC (Oleoresin Capsicum) Spray” against two females, Angela Drobnica and Laura Ripple, “to facilitate compliance so the officers could effect the arrest without injury to the protesters or officers.” The report dated 4/20/04 documents that Officer Christopher Fabian deployed “approximately three pepperball rounds” at an unknown subject who attempted to grab the officer’s shield. Were the less-lethal weapons deployed according to policy? Dr. Diaz read the MDPD Use of Non Lethal Weapons SOP. Major Battle stated that he believes there is a later version. (Mr. Guilfoyle subsequently provided the newer policy, specific to projectile “Munitions,” dated October 2, 2003 and approved 10/29/03. Both the SOP and the newer policy call for a Supervisor’s Report of Use of Force To Control to be generated upon any use.)

The SOP states that “The actual deployment and use of Less-Lethal Munitions will be authorized by the Task Force or the MFF [Mobile field Force] Commander at the scene of a MFF operation.” MDPD testimony is that Sergeant Acin, who was in possession of the OC canister had the authority to make the independent judgment as to when to deploy the canister. However, the reported deployment of the pepper spray canister occurred without exhausting “all other reasonable efforts to control”, given the overwhelming police presence and the close proximity of non-resisting demonstrators that were unnecessarily contaminated.

What were the justifications to fire at people who were fleeing/dispersing? The evidence does not show that the pepper spray or pepper balls were used against persons who were actively dispersing. The video shows Sergeant Acin spraying demonstrators after officers told them to get on the ground. Some had their arms interlocked and were rolling on the ground. The Use of Force Report states persons were kicking. Arrests What led to the arrests? Mr. Steier stated that the police encircled the demonstrators and cut them off before the allotted dispersal time. Lt. Schmidinger testified in the trial for Gan Golan that he sent his field forces to begin arrests “approximately one minute and 45 seconds” after the two-minute dispersal order because the crowd “made the overt act to charge back and go west.” Captain O’Donnell said the protesters moved onto the sidewalk but did not disperse. They stopped; it was an unlawful assembly. The assembly became unlawful when Lt. Schmidinger declared it unlawful. Mr. Guilfoyle later clarified that legally, the assembly “became unlawful when the demonstrators blocked the roadway.”11 The decision to send an arrest team was made when the crowd, which had been dispersing east, turned and moved west. Rev. Sims stated that he arrived after the protesters had moved east of 12th Avenue and he observed a lot of intimidation from the protesters toward the police. Some demonstrators defied the order to disperse. Protesters on the northwest side of the building “rushed back toward the police.” Rev. Sims stated they were not rushing the police, but rather trying to rush past the police back to 12th Avenue. Rev. Sims stated that it seemed like everybody had press credentials and cameras, and those with cameras remained standing when the police told everyone to get down on the ground. The videotapes show several protesters shouting at the officers after the dispersal order is given. The crowd then moves from the street to the sidewalk and begins moving east, away from the police line. Several seconds later, a line of officers cuts off the eastward movement of the protesters and the protesters are seen backing up.

11 Quoted from Mr. Guilfolye’s May 21, 2004 letter to the IRP

The testimony that the decision to begin arresting protesters was predicated by the actions of protesters, who “rushed back toward the police,” is contradicted by the video evidence. The videotapes do not substantiate the perception that the crowd “rushed back,” but rather that the crowd was “pushed back” toward the police line by other police officers. 83 people were arrested. Most were arrested in the 1100 block of NW 14th St., however some protesters were arrested as far away as 9th Ave. and 15th St. by bicycle officers. What evidence is there that protesters were gathering rocks on Friday afternoon outside the jail? MDPD provided the following evidence:

• Affidavits from three police “observers” stationed in the Cedars Parking Garage, attested to two males collecting rocks. One put them in a box and another a yellow plastic bag.

• Pictures of one man with a box. • Pictures of rocks, bricks and a gas can found on the ground after the fact.

There is no record that weapons were taken from any demonstrator’s person. Was excessive use of force deployed? The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that the reported utilization of less- lethal weapons was an unnecessary use of force. The utilization of arrest powers upon demonstrators that were attempting to disperse within a very tight time frame was an unnecessary use of arrest powers. What Policy and/or procedure need to change? The evidence suggests that the practice of who is authorized to use less-lethal munitions is not consistent with the SOP. Court dispositions of charges relating to the two-minute dispersal order suggest that the SOP and training related to dispersal orders should be reviewed.

From the Audience Rev. Dr. Donna Schaper (Senior Pastor at the Coral Gables Congregational Church) testified regarding two specific occasions. The first was Tuesday evening, November 18th. Dr. Schaper was the opening speaker an ecumenical worship scheduled for 7 PM at First United Methodist Church downtown. Dr. Schaper stated that “dozens of men in riot gear” blocked all access to the area of the church. “Hundreds” of people were turned away by the police. She was finally able to get to the church at 8:50 PM. Dr. Schaper said she was deeply offended by police in riot gear that early. Dr. Schaper believes that the police violated a promise not to put on the riot gear until Thursday. Dr. Schaper also believes that officials confused protesters and terrorists; and they confused closing down the city with security. She stated that wearing riot gear when there is no riot is provocative and intimidating.

The second occasion was November 20th. Dr. Schaper stated she was downtown from 10 AM to 4 PM on and personally saw no demonstrators throw anything at police. However she did see police push demonstrators, around 3 PM at the Burger King near the Wolfson Campus. About 3:55 PM she felt the tension rising and decided to leave, however she could not get out because the College Metromover Station was closed. Nikki Hartman submitted a videotape labeled “Ana Nogueira – November 21. 2003 – Arrest Evidence.” Ms. Hartman stated she would provide the Panel with an article from Laura Ripple, a protester who had her pepper-spray-contaminated clothes cut off by four male officers. Naomi Fisher stated that on Saturday, 11/22/04, at about 5 PM, she was driving north on North Miami Avenue when she came behind a group of bicycle officers wearing white shirts and blue shorts. She heard the officers make crude sexual remarks to three young people who were walking down the street. The officers turned onto 23rd Street where the convergence center was located, and made similar remarks to people standing around the center. Ms. Fisher said she would provide the Panel with photographs taken during the incident. Mr. Reynardus responded that the locations and uniform descriptions suggest they were Miami police officers. Ada Rojas (Miami Community Relations Board) testified that she was not present during the demonstration outside the jail. At that time she was in charge of a permitted event at the Miami Arena where approximately 200 people demonstrated peacefully from 10 AM to 4:30 PM. Noel Cleland inquired whether the orders to disperse and get on the ground applied to the media. Mr. Guilfoyle replied that they did. Deborah Dion, (AFL-CIO) asked who in the command center made the decision to block the union buses. She was advised that labors concerns are scheduled for review at a later date. Erick Morris stated that he was one of 14-15 who were obeying the dispersal order when they were arrested by MDPD “riot police on bicycles’ who took pictures with personal cameras.

November 21, 2003

FTAA

Jail Protest MDPD Arrests

Jackson Memorial Hospital

JAIL

Cedars Medical Center

Civic Center

UM Sylvester Cancer Center

Two-minute dispersal order given at this location

State Bldg

VA Hospital

Justice Bldg

NW 14 St. Southwest

NW 14 St. East of 12th

NW 14 St

(Information taken from Arrest Affidavit

/ 12 Ave. Corner

/ 12 Ave. Ave.

. / 11 Ave.

NW 12 St. / 14 Ave.

NW 12 St. / 12 Ave.

NW 15 St. / 9 Ave.

NW 18 St. / 9 Ave.

Public Hearing Departments Reviewed: Miami-Dade Corrections & Rehabilitation Department (C&R) Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) Public Hearing Date: February 9, 2004 IRP Discussion Dates: February 26, March 24, April 22, and May 27, 2004 Committee: IRP Members: Sandra A. Antor, Committee Chairperson; Jorge E. Reynardus,

Esq.; Chief John S. Ross; and Joseph F. Lopez, Esq. IRP Staff: Eduardo I Diaz, Ph.D., Executive Director; Carol Boersma, Executive Assistant to the Director; and Debbie Penha-Cumbermack, Conflict Resolution Specialist.

Present: MDPD: Major Tom Knigge, Miami-Dade police Department FTAA Commander.

C&R: Chief Ron Kovacs, Corrections & Rehabilitation Department FTAA Coordinator; and Chief Mary Ann Puig, C&R Professional Compliance Bureau Audience: Steven Wetstein, Amnesty International, Miami; Juanda G. Ferguson.

Media: Rafael Campo – Ch. 7; Rick Morris – Ch. 6; Raffo Ubillus – Ch. 4;

Carolyn Salazar – Miami Herald reporter. The discussion was focused on Prisoner Processing during the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Ministerial conference held in Miami. Issues discussed included treatment of detainees, the type and disposition of charges and the relevant contents of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) After-Action Report.

Prisoner Transportation and Processing Detail MDPD established the FTAA Prisoner Transportation and Processing Detail at Earlington Heights Metrorail Station (located at NW 22 Avenue and 41 Street) to process persons arrested by MDPD. City of Miami Police Department (MPD) used the same location to process those arrested by all other law enforcement agencies. The process used by MDPD and MPD was not identical, but no one present could specify the MPD process. Prisoner processing was staffed by MDPD and C&R staff from Sunday, 11/16/03 to Friday, 11/21/03. Staffing included approximately 50 MDPD officers of all ranks and gender.

FTAA

Prisoner Processing

The total number of MDPD arrests processed at the Prisoner Processing Site was 130.

Tuesday, 11/18/03 Arrests: 1 Wednesday, 11/19/03 Arrests: 0 Thursday, 11/20/03 Arrests: 28 Friday, 11/21/03 Arrests: 101

At the processing site, chain-link fence holding cells were built to hold arrestees until the officers were able to process them. The MDPD prisoner processing included:

• Completing Arrest Forms (A-forms); • Conducting a complete search of prisoners; • Removing hats/glasses and/or additional items from prisoners in order to take a

photograph of the prisoner; and • Bagging/packaging prisoners’ property.

FTAA Prisoner Processing Commander, Major Tom Knigge, stated that MDPD was located on the west side. Corrections staff was located on the east side, along with the City of Miami Police Department (MPD). Chief Ron Kovacs, C&R FTAA Coordinator, stated the following: Once arrestees were turned over to C&R at Earlington Heights, C&R conducted its pre-processing prior to transporting the arrestees to Turner Guilford Knight (TGK) Correctional Center. The pre-processing included: review of arrest affidavits; medical screening by Correction’s Health Services for injuries and medical needs; securing prisoners’ property; and searching for contraband. The IRP committee raised the following questions and MDPD & C&R representatives responded to those concerns. Were people handcuffed longer than dictated by policy? Major Knigge stated that, at Earlington Heights, there may have been instances when arrestees were handcuffed for several hours. Prisoners who alleged that they were handcuffed for eight or more hours likely included time prior to their arrival at the processing site. He added that once at the processing site, handcuffs/flex-cuffs were taken off when arrestees had to sign paper work or go to the restroom, and then placed back on. On occasions, there were complaints that the flex- cuffs were too tight, and the cuffs were either removed temporarily or adjusted. Major Knigge said that with the exception of juveniles and a few violent prisoners, most of the arrestees were processed at Earlington Heights. Leaders and violent prisoners were transported directly to the County Jail, and juveniles to the Juvenile Assessment Center (JAC). Chief Kovacs stated that once arrestees were in custody of C&R, the flex-cuffs were removed, due to arrestees having to sign a property receipt. Prior to loading the buses, arrestees were re- cuffed. The arrestees were then transported to TGK for completion of the intake and identification process. Once the intake process at the jail was completed, the arrestees were placed in a regular cell without the flex-cuffs. The processing time at TGK was no more than 45 minutes.

Chief Kovacs stated there is no C&R policy addressing how long a person can be handcuffed, however, the goal is to get arrestees out of the holding cells in 4-6 hours. Chief Kovacs said there was no delay in processing FTAA arrestees at TGK due to the low number of arrests. Chief Kovacs and Major Knigge said no one complained of employee misconduct while at the processing site or at any of the jails. Larry Winawer and Bentley Killmon are associated with the Florida Association for Retired Americans (FLARA) and were arrested by Broward sheriff’s Office (BSO) about 5 PM on November 20. Mr. Winawer stated that he was handcuffed behind his back for about 7 hours and in front for 5 hours. Mr. Killmon testified he was handcuffed behind his back for 7 ½ hours. A complaint filed on behalf of five Bates College students alleges handcuffing for over 8 hours. Prisoners were handcuffed from the time they were arrested until they arrived at a C&R Facility. The time included transport from the arrest site to the Earlington Heights Prisoner Processing Center, time in the Processing Center and transport to the C&R Facility, usually TGK. Part of the time arrestees were under the custody of MDPD, and part of the time, C&R. Arrestees were generally kept handcuffed while at the Processing Center, except when using the restroom or signing papers. Since there is a log-in time when arrestees arrived at the processing site, one could track the time on a case-by-case basis. The MDPD After-Action Report addresses intelligence reports that arrestees may use tactics to stall the process, such as changing clothes, hats or glasses with another prisoner before pictures were taken. Some intelligence also suggests some arrestees were encouraged to give false names or no name to complicate the processing. Were some detainees denied water and the restroom use? Both Major Knigge and Chief Kovacs replied that to their knowledge, no one was denied water or restroom use while at the processing site and the jails. Major Knigge expressed that there were portable toilets at the processing site and water was available. Both Chief Kovacs and Major Knigge said they were unaware of a complaint about a person being denied restroom use, and as a result, defecated or urinated on his/her person. Larry Winawer and Bentley Killmon were at the Prisoner Processing Center from approximately 8:30 PM – 12:30 AM. Both recalled that a man named “Ricky” soiled himself after begging for medical attention for pain in his shoulder. Mr. Killmon testified that he was without water for 10 hours and water was not provided until one hour after he arrived at the Turner Guilford Knight Center (TGK.) He saw no one go to the bathroom or drink water while he was at the Prisoner Processing Center.

What evidence exists of alleged sexual abuse? No evidence of alleged sexual abuse was provided. This allegation was made at more than one public meeting by the same person, who advised that legal counsel advice precluded providing specific testimony.

Were prisoners transported per policy? Chief Kovacs said to his knowledge, all prisoners were transported in accordance with policy. Ten vans were assigned to pick-up and transport arrestees directly to jail. There is no record of policy violations by MDPD officers involved in detainee transport to the processing site. Was the property of people arrested dumped on the street and left there? Major Knigge said that he was not on the street. He was assigned to the processing site. The agreement with C&R was for C&R to transport small property. MDPD had a truck available to transport larger property. The IRP referred one complaint, in which one of the allegations was that the complainant’s backpack was left on the street when she was arrested, to MDPD for investigation. One witness provided a written statement that he picked up the abandoned backpack. Who is accountable for alleged misconduct and/or policy failure? Major Knigge replied that officers are responsible for governing themselves in accordance with departmental Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). The command staff is responsible for investigating and/or responding to complaints. Both Major Knigge and Chief Kovacs said that they did not observe any misconduct and/or procedural violations during prisoner processing. What were the arrest charges? IRP staff was able to decipher the information on 121 of the Arrest Affidavits provided by MDPD; 62% had a “primary” charge of Unlawful Assembly, 17% Loitering and Prowling, 7% Resisting Without Violence and 6% Failure to Obey a Lawful Command, 2% Carrying a Concealed Weapon, and the remainder included Possession of Marijuana, Obstruction, Disorderly Conduct, etc. Some arrestees complained that they did not know why they were arrested. Apparently it is not a constitutional right to be advised of the charges at the moment of arrest, even though FSS 901.17 requires officers inform of authority and cause of arrest. The legal opinion suggests it is a “ministerial duty.” Some were charged with “resisting” if they refused to give their name which, according to a legal opinion documented in the After-Action Report, is allowed. At a subsequent meeting of the Independent Review Panel, February 26th, it was clarified that during prisoner processing each arrestee received a copy of the Arrest Form (A form) with charges that formed the basis for the arrest. What were the dispositions of the charges? The MDPD After-Action Report states, “…most arrests made by MDPD officers resulted in probable cause findings by judges.” The State Attorney’s Office did not prosecute 56% of the arrests.

How many people arrested were local? Out- of-towners? An assessment of MDPD arrest forms provided to the IRP suggests that 13% of MDPD arrestees were from Florida and 5% gave a Miami address. 82% were from out-of-state or gave no address. What Policy and/or procedure need to change? The MDPD After-Action Report addresses this (section entitled “Prisoner Processing, Concerns and Recommendations” on p.12). Major Knigge added that the overall function of prisoner processing worked well. Chief Kovacs said he was present at the processing site from 12-14 hours a day. He commented that the site was well supervised and personnel were very professional. Chief Kovacs said “to this day [2/9/04], the Department has received not one complaint” and he does not recommend any policy changes. Chief Mary Ann Puig, of C&R Professional Compliance Bureau (PCB), expressed that she checked the C&R complaint logs before and after the FTAA conference, from 11/11/03 to 12/9/03, and no complaints were received by C&R. On 1/27/04 the IRP formally requested that C&R investigate allegations made by 5 Bates College students relating to handcuffing and the provision of water.

Detainee Decontamination The Miami-Dade Fire Rescue HazMat Bureau provided a copy of its FTAA “Earlington Heights Decon” policy. Fire Rescue had Decon units in the field and a more complete facility at the Prisoner Processing Center. Major Knigge said that any prisoner who exhibited signs of being exposed to chemicals, approximately 10-20 arrestees, received a “wash down” for decontamination. One person who was arrested, Laura Ripple, stated in an article that she was stripped by members of the opposite sex during decontamination procedures. In a follow-up letter dated May 21, 2004, MDPD Legal Advisor Tom Guilfoyle stated that: “Prisoner decontamination and wash down were conducted by firefighters of the same gender as the prisoners.” In a letter dated June 23, 2004, Fire Chief Antonio Bared stated that “The decontamination of the female demonstrator was performed by our female firefighters and out of public view.” Tear gas was deployed on Thursday by the City of Miami Beach Police, according to testimony heard at the February 5th Miami Civilian Investigative Panel (CIP) meeting. However, the chemical used on Friday by MDPD was pepper spray. At a subsequent Use of Force Committee meeting, March 5, 2004, Major Battle clarified that in addition to the one OC canister mentioned above, 3 pepper balls were deployed as well.

Courts and Prisoner Processing Ms. Antor asked about a statement in the MDPD After-Action Report Executive Summary, Page 6, which reads: “The courts assisted by staggering bond hearings and releases so that arrestees were not able to quickly return to the conference site.” No one present from MDPD or C&R was aware of any such policy or practice was implemented. C&R Acting Director Charles McRay stated that he was unaware of the basis for the quote. The Administrative Office of the Courts responded to an inquiry about the statement by saying that the Court increased the number of bond hearings “to process arrested demonstrators in a timely fashion, rather that delaying their ability to quickly return to the conference site.” MDPD Attorney William Monahan stated that “it appears this was suggested in the event of the jail or courthouse being overrun but was never implemented.”12 Comments from the Floor: Steven Wetstein inquired about the early withdrawal of the Miami Dade Fire Department (MDFD) decontamination unit. Major Knigge replied that MDFD returned and were active before prisoners arrived at the processing site on Friday. Juanda Ferguson stated she was on Biscayne Boulevard on Thursday, November 20, and she saw no misconduct by protesters or police officers. However, she did see on TV a citizen pushed down by a police officer in riot gear.

12 Quoted from MDPD Legal Advisor William Monahan’s June 14, 2004 letter to the IRP.

Public Hearing Department Reviewed: Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) Public Hearing Date April 15, 2004. IRP Discussion Date: May 27, 2004 Committee: IRP Members: John Thornton, Esq., Committee Chairperson, Jorge E. Reynardus,

Esq., Rev. James Phillips and Chief John S. Ross. IRP Staff: Eduardo I. Diaz, Ph.D., Executive Director; Carol Boersma, Executive Assistant to the Director; Duhamelle Desire, Conflict Resolution Specialist.

MDPD: Major Louis Battle, FTAA Operations Commander; Tom Guilfoyle, Esq., Legal

Bureau; Sgt. Sheree Dibernardo, CAB. Audience: Fred Frost, South Florida AFL-CIO President; Deborah Dion, AFL-CIO; Tony Fransetta, Florida Alliance for Retired Americans (FLARA) President; Larry Winawer, FLARA; Bentley Killmon, FLARA; Linda Romero, Field Representative Government Supervisors Association of Florida/OPEIU Local 100 AFL-CIO; Terry A. Coble, ACLU; Emilio Vazquez, representing US Senator Bill Nelson; Steven Wetstein, Amnesty International, Miami; Donald F. March, Citizens Investigation Panel (CIP); Neil McCool; James B. Wright; Julia Trujillo. Media: Chris McKinney, WSVN; Lazaro Lopez, WFOR; Michael Hibben, Miami Herald Radio; Jeffery Keating, Indy Media.

AFL-CIO Pre-FTAA Planning with the City of Miami AFL-CIO representative Deborah Dion, and a local attorney, met 16 times between 8/28/03 and 11/18/03, with representatives from the City of Miami Police Department, City Attorney’s Office and City Community Relations Board, to negotiate plans and agreements for AFL-CIO (and its coalition partners) events during the FTAA Ministerial. All AFL-CIO events had permits from the City of Miami.

FTAA

Labor Community Concerns

The agreements included the following events scheduled for Thursday, November 20, 2003: 7:00 am - Training for Peacekeepers, Bayside Amphitheater 10:00 am - Pre-Rally for Florida Alliance for Retired Americans (FLARA), Bayside

Amphitheater 12 Noon - Rally, Bayside Amphitheater 2:00 pm - March, Downtown Miami

The AFL-CIO written agreement with the City of Miami included:

• The closing of Biscayne Blvd, from Flagler to NE 4th St., to vehicular traffic on 11/20/03 from 10 am to 6 pm, with the exception of buses providing transportation to and from AFL-CIO events.

• The specific parade route.

The AFL-CIO verbal testimony identified the bus routes as follows:

• The route for 52 AFL-CIO buses: I 395 or I 95 to Biscayne Blvd (or 2nd Avenue) exit to the front of Amphitheater (drop-off and pick-up site). Buses park at Miami Arena and return to pick-up site after the march.

• The route for 24 FLARA buses: I 395 or I 95 to Biscayne Blvd. exit to Biscayne (or

2nd Ave) to 3rd St. access road behind Bayside Market Place. Drop-off site was the Bayside elevators/escalators near the Amphitheater. Buses park at Miami Arena and return via NW 2nd Ave. to the front of Amphitheater to pick-up Retirees at 2 pm, after the marchers left Bayfront. (Most retirees were not to march.)

The actual routes of the 76 buses on November 20

8 union buses got to Bayfront between 7 – 7:30 am. 2 FLARA buses unloaded from the access road, according to the agreed-on plan. 3 FLARA buses unloaded from Biscayne Blvd. 63 buses failed to reach Bayfront.

Several FLARA buses had to unload at increasing distances from Bayfront.

Several buses were stopped at the interstate 395 exit to Biscayne Blvd.

2 FLARA buses from Holiday, FL were told by police officers they could not enter and to go home. They never unloaded for the event.

Some buses circled around for several hours, attempting to find a way to get to Bayside.

No buses were allowed to pickup seniors at Bayside.

Testimony Fred Frost, South Florida AFL-CIO President

Mr. Frost stated that AFL-CIO had about 15,000 people come to Miami to support Labor’s position regarding FTAA agreements. There were 90 coalition partners. The police violated the first and fourth amendment rights of these people when officers in riot gear prevented them from gathering in permitted events. No one is this community accepts responsibility for what happened. Mr. Frost said many of these people are emotionally scarred for life, yet every police jurisdiction is saying: “Not our jurisdiction.” No jurisdiction will accept responsibility for blocking access to the FLARA and ALF-CIO prearranged events on November 20. Mr. Frost submitted a video which the AFL-CIO showed at a Civilian Investigative Panel Meeting. (Panel members present accepted it but did not play it. They had already seen it.)

Deborah Dion, AFL-CIO

The AFL-CIO spent ½ million dollars for FTAA activities, but the organizers do not want the money back. They want to know who was responsible for the disruption of AFL-CIO events scheduled for November 20. Ms. Dion said that in her meetings with Miami officials, she was led to believe that the City of Miami was overseeing all jurisdictions involved in FTAA security, and that Miami representatives were communicating the results of these meetings with other jurisdictions. Ms. Dion stated that she was never told during these meetings that MDPD was responsible for a specific geographic area. During the FTAA Ministerial, it was clear that on-site officers were not aware of the AFL- CIO agreements with the City of Miami. The rules changed with every shift change. Ms. Dion asked whether the Miami PD informed MDPD about the AFL-CIO bus operations and why MDPD stopped the buses.

Tony Fransetta, Florida Alliance for Retired Americans (FLARA) Mr. Fransetta stated that his group did not come to march and protest, but to express their concerns in a seminar on how the FTAA would affect seniors. Mr. Fransetta said FLARA had “guaranteed special arrangements” for FLARA buses to drop off seniors behind Bayside, where they had escalator and elevators to access the Amphitheater. FLARA believed it had the cooperation of the departments policing the areas where the buses passed. FLARA complied with all requests officials made to ensure the smooth passage of the buses. On the morning of November 20, a couple of buses arrived at the Bayside drop-off point and then police blocked further access. Mr. Fransetta said there was no discernable reason or visible action that caused the plan to be shut down at this time.

MDPD prevented buses from exiting I-395, told a couple buses to go back home, and told others there was a perimeter and vehicles were not allowed in. Some people got off the buses and walked. After the AFL-CIO march, FLARA buses were denied access to pick up seniors from Bayfront and no one would tell the seniors where the buses were. Mr. Fransetta stated that, to date, no one in the County has addressed the treatment of the seniors during the FTAA Ministerial, and “whoever ordered the disruption of the seniors’ plan, has to apologize publicly.” He asked that the person who made the decision to block the buses be identified. Mr. Fransetta stated the City and the County “trashed” an event that cost $41,000 and many months planning. There was no way the police could have confused the seniors with the anarchists or terrorists. Mr. Fransetta stated that, after being treated at the hospital for dehydration, he took a taxi to his hotel, the Holiday Inn across from Bayfront. When he showed the officer at the door his room key and identification band from the hospital, and said he needed to lie down, the officer told him: “Leave or go to jail.” Mr. Fransetta felt it was criminal for those in authority to psych officers up to believe that protesters were coming to destroy the city.

Larry Winawer, FLARA Retiree Organizer

Mr. Winawer was responsible for the coordination of the 24 retiree buses. There was an agreement with the Miami PD to drop off seniors on the access road behind Bayside so they could walk through Bayside to the Amphitheater. Two FLARA buses were granted access to drop off retirees at the agreed-on drop-off point; three FLARA buses dropped off passengers in front of Bayside. No buses were allowed to pick seniors up from Bayside. As a result, seniors had to walk through a frightening maze of riot-geared police in an attempt to locate their buses. As Mr. Winawer was assisting seniors to find their buses after the parade, he encountered FLARA member Bentley Killmon. He and Mr. Killmon were walking east on NE 5 St. toward Biscayne Blvd. and the Holiday Inn (Biscayne Blvd. and NE 3 St.) where Mr. Winawer was staying. They were stopped by police at the corner of NE 5 St and 2 Ave., and “funneled north.” Just past NE 2 Ave. and 6 St., a 45 degree line of MDPD officers blocked access north and east. They were forced west along the railroad tracks, along with about 13 other citizens scattered in an area about the size of a football field. At the same time about 50 Broward Sheriffs Office (BSO) officers, clad in riot gear with guns drawn, marched east on the railroad tracks and forced everyone to the ground. BSO arrested about 15 people, held them handcuffed in BSO vans for about 3 hours and then transported them to the Earlington Heights Processing Center. Mr. Winawer recalls that a man named “Ricky” soiled himself after begging for medical attention for pain in his shoulder. He believes the incident happened in the Prisoner Processing Center.

Mr. Winawer stated that he was handcuffed behind his back for about 7 hours and in front for 5 hours. He described the time from arrest to release as follows: 5:00 pm Arrest 8:30 pm Prisoner Processing Center 12:30 am Jail 5:30 am Booking completed 5:00 pm Released

Bentley Killmon

Mr. Killmon stated that, on the afternoon of November 20, he asked many police officers for the location of the buses and none would respond. When he was arrested by BSO, he provided his name several times. At the Prisoner Processing Center he showed his Drivers License, yet he was identified as “John Doe” on the Arrest Affidavit. Mr. Killmon said he was handcuffed behind his back for 7 ½ hours and was without water for 10 hours. Water was not provided until one hour after he arrived at the Turner Guilford Knight Center (TGK.) He saw no one go to the bathroom or drink water while he was at the Prisoner Processing Center. During the prisoner processing, Mr. Killmon heard a Black prisoner, wearing an AFL-CIO vest, complain about severe pain in his shoulder. No one responded to his pleas for relief. He finally lost control of his bladder. Mr. Killmon is not sure whether this happened in the BSO van, in the Processing Center or on the way to TGK.

Major Louis Battle, Commander of MDPD Special Patrol Bureau The Special Patrol Bureau handles all pre-planned and spontaneous events within Miami- Dade County. The Tactical Operations for spontaneous events include SWAT, K-9 and the Bomb Squad. His Bureau also does all the strategic planning for major Miami-Dade County events. Major Battle was involved in over 80 FTAA meetings, many with the City of Miami Police Department. Major Battle stated that for the FTAA: “I am the person; the buck stops with me.” Major Battle:

• drafted the operational plan to train all the Miami-Dade police officers, • created a philosophy as well as policy and procedures, and • executed the operational plan.

Major Battle stated that he gave the commands, including the commands to shut down Metrorail, Metromover and roads, and he is “comfortable” with MDPD’s performance during FTAA week. Major Battle expressed regret for the bus problems but added he would rather be chastised for having an overwhelming force of police officers on the road than for allowing seniors to be bused into the middle of a violent confrontation and get hurt because the police didn’t do their job.

Major Battle stated he cannot answer for the City of Miami. Miami PD was the lead law enforcement agency and they brought over 30 other police departments under their umbrella. MDPD did not work under the Miami PD umbrella, but agreed to handle a specific geographic area. MDPD was in command and control of its own assets, while Miami PD handled its department and the other police agencies. There were two law enforcement operations going on during FTAA week and they were very different. MDPD assisted Miami PD but was not under Miami PD command. MDPD was not specifically involved in Miami PD planning and decision-making. Major Battle described the City’s plan as follows:

The four largest groups were the City of Miami Police, Miami-Dade Police, Florida Highway Patrol (FHP), and Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO). FHP, BSO, some municipalities, as well as some federal and state agencies, worked under the Miami PD umbrella. The City covered the Miami River, up to NE 6 St., including the Hyatt and the Intercontinental Hotel. The Intercontinental was the meeting site for the trade ministers. The Hyatt was the meeting site for the American Business Forum. Miami PD secured the conference sites in the downtown area with a large mass of police officers and a “hard fence line;” they called it their “hard perimeter.” That was complemented with field forces, fixed posts and bicycle patrol. Miami PD ran a soft perimeter from about Flagler St. up to NE 6 St. Miami PD dealt with parade routes and permits for demonstrations and events. The Bayfront Amphitheater was the main demonstration site. The Miami Arena was the staging area. The Miami perimeter was surrounded by other jurisdictions:

BSO: West of I-95 and north of I-395. BSO and the City of Miami entered into a specific mutual aid agreement for the FTAA event.

FHP: South of the Miami River—the Brickell Financial Corridor and the interstates—I-95 and I-395.

MDPD: North: NE 4 St to NE 12 St. (Under I-395); from the Bay to I-95. MDPD and Miami PD overlapped from NE 4 St. to NE 6 St. The MDPD area included the port and the AAA Arena.

Major Battle stated that the City, intel and the media were all advising that there would be 30,000 to 100,000 protesters. A lot of planning was “intel driven,” based on what might happen. Everyone was drilled with “anarchists, anarchists, anarchists.” One thing learned from FTAA meetings in Washington and Cancun was to keep conference attendees in the conference site area, so police could lock down the conference site and the conference would not be interrupted. This meant that other sites became viable targets, such as the airport, seaport, the train stations, the courthouse, the jail, the hospital, and the Government Center.

On Thursday morning, MDPD received “Intel” that some of the anarchists’ websites had posted a Call to Action: Be at the Government Center [One-Eleven Building] at 7 am. When MDPD Officers arrived at 6 am, demonstrators were already showing up. Rather than shut down the non-permitted demonstration, Major Battle met with the protest leaders. He allowed them to protest around the One-Eleven Building, including the street, the courtyard and the park on the west side. The protest continued without incident for about an hour and then there was provocation. Demonstrators began pushing on the officers’ lines and on their shields. Major Battle walked between the demonstrators and the officers, trying to keep the police line straight, the officers were composed. Supervisors walked behind the officers saying, ‘”Hold the line. Hold the line.” MDPD officers held their line, showed their discipline and no one was arrested. Then the protesters moved to the City of Miami fence line. Ten minutes later, the same demonstrators that had not left a piece of graffiti or a piece of litter at the One-Eleven Building, were throwing grappling hooks on the fence. Gas was dispersed, officers had paint thrown at them, tear gas was thrown into the crowd, fires were set, and barricades were in the street. There was a “pitch battle” up and down Biscayne Boulevard for about two hours. Miami PD asked that MDPD take a position on NE 3 St., a block south of its regular perimeter. MDPD held a north lateral line on Third Street and locked down the Boulevard from NE 4 St. to NE 12 St. No traffic was allowed east of NE 2 Ave., but MDPD did not stop vehicular or pedestrian traffic at any time on Third Street. NE 2 Ave., NE 1 Ave. and Miami Ave. were open arterials to Third Street, where demonstrators could have turned east to the Amphitheater. Later Major Battle said he did not shut down Third Street eastbound, but he did not know if the City or BSO might have. Major Battle said he was aware that AFL-CIO buses were going to drop off people at the Amphitheater, but he did not know that senior buses had specific drop-off points. He added that the City was fighting a violent group, and they probably should have contacted whoever was driving the buses to tell them: ‘We’ve got a violent confrontation going on.” The City Command Post probably had a roster of the bus drivers with cell phones. The communications aspects of a plan are often just as important as the logistical and the operational aspects of a plan. After the AFL-CIO March in the afternoon, another violent confrontation began between Miami PD and some protesters on Biscayne Blvd., from Flagler to about NE 3 St. Miami PD, with the help of BSO, pushed the crowd west to NE 2 Ave. and then north on 2nd Avenue. Major Battle saw dumpsters being pushed in the street and lit on fire. He saw rocks and bottles. Major Battle lined up his officers on NE 2 Ave. He did not know that the violent crowd was being pushed down NE 1 Avenue as well. MDPD had no direct communication with BSO. He communicated with Miami PD through the Command Post.

Major Battle stated that BSO and Miami were pushing people north on Second and First Avenue. He did not order his officers to push people west along railroad tracks where they would be trapped, but he could envision the field force commander, seeing a violent crowd coming up Second Avenue, make a decision to box them in.

Appreciation: At the end of the meeting, both IRP members and representatives of the AFL- CIO and FLARA thanked Major Battle for his forthright presentation.

Linda Romero, Field Representative, Government Supervisors Association of Florida/OPEIU Local 100 AFL-CIO (Provided to IRP staff on 4/21/2004) Ms. Romero was an AFL-CIO Field Marshall on Thursday, November 20. After the AFL-CIO march, about 3:30-4:00 PM, she was at the foot of “the hill” by the amphitheater. People, including seniors and children, were standing around and sitting on the lawn, having a good time. Then she heard drums and she saw a police line marching north on the Boulevard, toward her. She heard popping sounds, screaming and saw puffs of smoke. She could not see what caused the police advance. Ms. Romero called City Commissioners Regalado and Winton because she saw the police line advancing toward demonstrators who were doing nothing wrong. Ms Romero saw no violence toward the police and she heard no dispersal orders. She estimated that 95% of the people who were “swept up” by officers had no idea what was going on. Many of them were like “gawkers” at an auto accident. If they had been told to move, they probably would have moved. Ms. Romero also called Chief Timoney’s office and spoke with Major Roell because no one could locate the buses that were supposed to pick up the senior citizens. According to Major Roell, the buses were supposed to be on NE 2 Ave., possibly at 2nd, 3rd or 4th Streets. Ms. Romero sent people north to avoid the approaching police line, but then she saw police marching south on the Boulevard. She tried to direct people toward 2nd Avenue where the buses were supposed to be, but the police had that blocked as well. She was with a group of about 100 people who avoided the police sweep by entering, or standing next to, the amphitheater. Ms. Romero and a friend, Dawn Addy, left the area after the police line passed. They were advised by Deborah Dion to remove their union vests. Ms. Romero stated that she believes officers were targeting people who participated in the AFL-CIO march, because earlier in the week, during an AFL-CIO conference, Miami PD was “very present in our face.” They were very intimidating and wanted to “teach us a lesson.” Ms. Romero stated she found it difficult to believe Major Battle’s lack of knowledge about the buses. The AFL-CIO participated in many meetings during the planning process. Miami PD, Miami CRB, MDPD and Miami-Dade CRB were all represented at one time or another. The buses and the removal of people after the march were discussed in one of the meetings. The ALF-CIO wanted to avoid what happened in Seattle: violent protesters hiding among the peaceful union people after the march.

Ms. Romero’s only encounter with MDPD on that afternoon, to her knowledge, was with MDPD intelligence officers who tried to get her to identify the hotel where the union marshals and trainers were staying.

AFL-CIO Questions 1. Did the MPD notify the Miami-Dade police about the AFL-CIO bus operation?

Major Battle said he was aware that AFL-CIO buses were going to drop off people at the Amphitheater. He did he not know that seniors (FLARA) were on several of the buses or that there was a specific route for the senior buses.

2. Who gave the order to stop the buses?

The evidence does not support that there was a specific order to stop the buses. MDPD and Miami PD locked down certain streets to control aggressive demonstrators. MDPD held a north lateral line on Third Street and locked down the Boulevard from NE 4 St. to NE 12 St. MDPD did not block exits from I-95 or I-395. No traffic was allowed east of NE 2 Ave., but MDPD did not stop vehicular or pedestrian traffic at any time on Third Street, although Miami PD may have.

3. Did the MPD inform the Miami-Dade police that there was peacekeeper training at the Amphitheater on November 20 at 7:00 am?

There was no testimony that MDPD knew about the peacekeeper training.

4. Did the Miami-Dade police know that the AFL-CIO had peacekeepers?

There was no testimony about MDPD’s knowledge of AFL-CIO peacekeepers.

5. On November 20, at 7:00 am Biscayne Blvd. and adjacent streets were lined with police officers in riot gear – later about 9:00 am the police presence was even greater. Who gave the order for different jurisdictions to move in position, including the Miami-Dade police? And more importantly why?

Major Battle gave the orders for MDPD. Major Battle’s primary mandate was to protect people and not allow innocent bystanders to wander into an area where there were violent confrontations. Major Battle shut down streets whenever there was “intel” of a pending act or something was already occurring. All other jurisdictions were under the direction of Miami PD Chief Timoney.

6. AFL-CIO staff members were unable to access their communications truck, parked between 3rd and 4th Streets on Biscayne Blvd. 400 cases of bottled water and two thousand signs were also at this site. Miami-Dade police blocked access to the Biscayne Blvd. median. Why and who gave the order? Why did the AFL-CIO get no explanation of what was going on?

Major Battle said the group in the communication truck was “the happiest, friendliest group of people out there that day.” They never communicated there was a problem.

7. The AFL-CIO march route was cut short with no explanation. They were not able to go past Flagler. What did Miami PD communicate to MDPD when the AFL-CIO started leaving Bayfront and marching up Biscayne toward 3rd street?

Major Battle acknowledged that MDPD blocked the pre-arranged parade route at Biscayne and 3rd St. because the night before, Miami PD Captain Thomas Cannon asked him to move to Third Street and block the north side of Third. Captain Cannon told Major Battle that he told the AFL-CIO they were not “going to Fourth Street.” Miami Police blocked the parade at Flagler.

8. On November 20th at 4:00 pm the marchers were coming back to Bayfront for a finale. They were trying to locate their retiree buses and other buses as well as trying to reach the Miami PD to see if they would allow the buses to pick up folks in front of Bayfront. This did not happen.

MDPD had no jurisdiction over Miami PD or the perimeters it established. Biscayne Blvd was closed to vehicular traffic by MDPD and Miami PD. An October 30, 2003 letter from Miami Major Thomas Roell to the AFL-CIO attorney confirms that Miami PD closed Biscayne Blvd. to vehicular traffic on 11/20/04 from 10 AM to 6 PM, however buses were permitted “to drop off and pick up AFL-CIO event participants.” The MDPD perimeter on the north side of NE 3 St. and on NE 2 Ave. blocked access to Bayfront from NE 4th Street and streets north.

9. At approximately 4:30 pm protesters gathered in front of the fence line on Flagler and all of a sudden Miami police officers shot off tear gas and started advancement up Biscayne Blvd toward 3rd street. The advancement happened quickly. AFL-CIO was trying to get their people out of Bayfront and moving toward the port. The advancement included officers firing tear gas, rubber bullets and pepper spray as well as hitting protesters with clubs.

The MDPD Command Post Log indicates this action was taken by Miami PD:

3:52 pm Large group (approximately 400) at 2nd and Biscayne. City deployed gas. 3:55 pm Crowd running northbound up Boulevard. 3:56 pm City deployed pepper spray and pepper balls.

10. Where was the Miami-Dade Police during this advancement?

On November 20, between 4 pm and 6 pm, MDPD had Biscayne Blvd. blocked from NE 4th St. to 12th St. Officers were stationed on the north side of NE 3 St., along NE 2 Ave. and throughout the area under MDPD command.

11. Why were Broward officers arresting people in a Miami-Dade jurisdiction?

Downtown Miami was divided into three geographical jurisdictions, but that did not preclude crossing over jurisdictions when necessary to maintain control. Broward Sheriff’s Office had a mutual aid agreement with Miami PD, which gave them arrest powers in Miami-Dade County.

12. Mayor Penelas said he would have the Miami-Dade police conduct an internal investigation

and report back their findings. As of April 13, nothing had been heard from Mayor Penelas.

On February 13, 2004, Miami-Dade Mayor Alex Penelas met with Fred Frost and Deborah Dion, from the AFL-CIO, and Larry Winawer and Tony Fransetta from FLARA. Also present were former MDPD Director Carlos Alvarez, Chief Randy Heller and representatives from the ACLU. Following that meeting, Mr. Frost sent Mr. Penelas a letter thanking him “for directing the Miami-Dade Police Department investigate specific incidents of abuse that might have taken place at the hands of Miami-Dade police officers.” In a May 11, 2004 letter to the IRP, Police Legal Advisor Thomas Guilfoyle addressed Mr. Winawer’s concerns: “Chief Heller and I subsequently determined that the allegations did not fit within the parameters for investigation by the Professional Compliance Bureau. However, Chief Heller did direct the Special Patrol Bureau to investigate Mr. Winawer’s complaint. It was determined that he was arrested by Broward Sheriff’s Office… I believe we addressed all [AFL-CIO] concerns” at the IRP Labor concerns Committee Meeting.

13. On January 30th Fred Frost requested several documents from the Miami-Dade police. He received a response from the Assistant County Manager stating that they were in the process of putting together the documents.

It is a fact that, as of May 11, 2004, Mr. Frost had not received a response to his public records request. In a February 10 letter to Mr. Frost, Assistant County Manager Susanne Torriente stated: “We are in the process of gathering the specific information you requested.” In a May 11, 2004 letter to the IRP, Police Legal Advisor Thomas Guilfoyle wrote: “we will follow up on the request.”

On July 16, 2004 Mr. Frost advised that he received the documents he requested.

14. Miami-Dade was blocking the planned parade route at Biscayne at NE 3 St. Did Miami

Captain Thomas Cannon tell MDPD to block the area?

Yes. The AFL-CIO march was supposed to exit the amphitheatre, go north on the Boulevard to Fourth Street, make a U-turn go down to Third Street and go west. The night before, Captain Cannon asked MDPD to block the north side of Third Street. Captain Cannon told Major Battle that he had told the AFL-CIO that they weren’t going up to Fourth Street.

Other Questions

15. What is the responsibility of MDPD officers and supervisors who witness unlawful arrests?

Testimony indicates that MDPD prevented a group of about 15 people, walking north on NE 2 Avenue, from turning east on arterials leading to Biscayne Blvd., from 3rd St. north. MDPD directed them to turn west on the railroad tracks, where they encountered BSO in riot gear with guns drawn. BSO “swept them up.” If, in fact, MDPD officers directed citizens to go west on the railroad tracks, and MDPD officers witnessed BSO arrest those people, even though the officers saw no probable cause to arrest, what is the responsibility of the MDPD officers or their supervisors, who witnessed the arrests? Major Battle said Mr. Winawer met with Chief Erched or Chief Heller about this matter and they were looking into it. Mr. Guilfoyle will look into it and stated that he believes IA is investigating two FTAA related complaints.

16. What instructions were given to MDPD officers regarding communication with protesters or other citizens?

Major Battle stated officers were instructed to remain where posted and be disciplined. Supervisors were walking behind the line of officers and, if any questions arose, a supervisor responded immediately. No directions were given to not communicate with people.

17. What did MDPD know about AFL-CIO plans?

MDPD only knew what Miami PD told them and no written details as to bus routes and specific drop-off plans were provided. Both Deborah Dion and AFL-CIO attorney Libby Herrera-Navarrette, in a later phone conversation, stated that no MDPD representatives were present in ALF-CIO meetings with City officials. They assumed that City officials were communicating with MDPD as well as other jurisdictions.

18. Who was the Field Force Commander closest to BSO on the afternoon of November 29th?

MDPD identified two Lieutenants: Jack Solomon and Robert Brown. Lt. Solomon was directed to prevent any persons from going east of NE 2 Avenue near the railroad tracks. Lt. Solomon recalled that individuals were proceeding east along the railroad tracks, followed by BSO officers. Lt. Brown had a discussion with the BSO officers but did not interfere with the arrests.

MDPD After-Action Report Excerpts of Concerns and Recommendations

FROM THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SECTION Concerns and Recommendations:

The overall operational aspects of the FTAA Conference were a great success, and through the collaborative efforts of all MDPD FTAA Committees, the primary goal of protection persons and property was achieved, and the rights of citizens and demonstrators were protected, while maintaining public safety. Although this operation was achieved through a multi-jurisdictional effort, the minor adversities that did arise were overcome through proper planning, training, tactics, and teamwork. As with any large-scale operation, concerns arose, which could be dealt with more efficiently during future events of this magnitude. The main area for future improvement deals with external communications, information sharing, and distribution with some of the other law enforcement agencies involved in the FTAA Conference via the JOC. Although the JOC was staffed daily and information was shared amongst agencies, there were too many layers for the expeditious flow of information to all concerned personnel. Concern: It is critical to identify issues important to the community (police use-of-force, demonstration management principles, street closures, event impacts) and develop a proactive program of public information, utilizing local media resources. Recommendation: MDPD should work with the community and local media to increase understanding of issues relevant to major events, including police use-of force and demonstration management principles. The involvement of Media Relations personnel is integral to this process. Concern: Many law enforcement vehicles experienced mechanical problems after “normal” business hours. This caused delays in providing emergency service to officers and the public.

Appendix

Recommendation: Plan for strategically located vehicle maintenance shops to be open 24/7 during the course of the operation. Additionally, have mobile repair vehicles with maintenance personnel that would be able to respond to assist with the disabled vehicles for minor repairs, i.e., dead battery, flat tires, etc. Concern: During events of this unusual nature, Police Legal advisors should be able to review all arrest affidavits, when feasible. Recommendation: That all arrest affidavits be forwarded to a Police Legal Advisor for review, prior to being approved by on scene supervisors. Concern: Communications Between Agencies Development of a comprehensive operations plan for an event of this size is critical, and interagency communication is at the pinnacle of importance in plan preparation. The communications flow between various command posts, field commanders and operational personnel was effective. However, as previously stated, the time delay of the flow of information, via the JOC, at times became a concern. Recommendation: The development of any comprehensive plan for large-scale events may require modification as the event unfolds. Any operational changes must be communicated via the JOC to outside agency field force commanders utilizing a checklist of deployed field forces. This checklist will ensure that all concerned operations personnel have been made aware of the change. Concern: Equipment Needs To ensure the confidentiality of Special operations, Identification and Roving Team members, yet facilitate recognition by field force personnel, it was agreed that a nondescript clothing item would be provided by the lead agency to all plainclothes personnel. Due to a supplier’s oversight, an insufficient quantity was available for assignment to all concerned personnel. Recommendation: Any inter-agency agreement to purchase some type of officer recognition/safety items must include a sufficient quantity ordered to allow for any unanticipated increase in personnel. It is further recommended that any such agreements address funding source and disbursement procedures to minimize or eliminate these issues at the outset. It is important to emphasize that in an operation of this size with the large number of personnel involved, few concerns arose which required highlighting. It is because of the early implementation of planning phases; extensive task oriented training, as well as a committed collaborative effort by everyone involved that the success of this operation can be measured.

FROM THE OPERATIONS COMMITTEE SECTION

• Tactical / Support Concern: The Camel Pak hydration systems proved to be a great advantage to TF personnel who utilized them during extended line formation deployments. However, some personnel unwisely chose not to carry the Camel Paks and had to rely on bottle water brought forward to the line by supply vans. Reliance on the supply vans to provide drinks could have led to dehydration, as the vans took a long time to reach the front lines. Recommendation: That the carrying of the issued Camel Paks be made mandatory instead of optional. Concern: An unintended consequence of providing good hydration for front line personnel was the increased need for restroom facilities. Same front line personnel were able to use the portable toilet facilities provided by the Teamsters Union (TU) as they rotated to the rear lines. Had it not been for the hospitality of the TU in allowing the officers use their toilet facilities, the situation could have been an unnecessary distraction. Recommendation: That consideration be given to the purchase or rental of portable toilet facilities to be deployed during prolonged mobilizations. Concern: There were several reported instances of food not being delivered to the intended personnel. For example, the SRT units staged at the Mahi Shrine Temple never received any food during the entire week. Other field forces reported food shortages on certain days. Recommendation: That consideration be given to the purchase or rental of a canteen truck similar to the one deployed by the Fire Union. Concern: Florida Highway Patrol troopers assigned to assist our Department with traffic posts in and around our assigned area, withdrew the first day to assist the MPD and never returned. Recommendation: That additional County resources be allocated during future events to avoid personnel shortfalls and dependencies on other agencies.

Concern: Hialeah Police Department personnel were withdrawn from their assignment at Bayside without notice. MDPD was forced to assign personnel to this location to protect access to the POM, AAA, and Bayside. Almost all questions regarding this and other requests for information from the Joint Operations Command Post (JOC) were never answered. Recommendation: That additional personnel from our Department be assigned to the JOC in order to ensure better coordination and communication between agencies. Concern: Marine Patrol personnel assigned to the MPD ran their boats over an established buoy line that was placed in the waters near VMG to establish a security zone. The line was repaired and reinstated by MDPD Marine Patrol Unit personnel prior to the event. Recommendation: Since the other agency was aware that the buoy line was in place, it is unknown what improvements could be placed into effect. Concern: Protesters detained by MDPD personnel at the request of MPD, and pending arrest, were later released from custody by MPD personnel. Recommendation: That all agencies mutually agree on arrest policies and assistance contingencies prior to an event.

• Seaport Operations Concern: City of Miami Police did not coordinate media tours aboard the USCG vessel “Oak,” which served as the USCG CP. Recommendation: That clear lines of communication be established during multi-agency operations, to include media protocol issues. Concern: Meals were being delivered toward the latter part of the shifts. Recommendation: That meals be delivered earlier in the operation.

Concern: There was no hook-up in the CP to monitor news channels. Recommendation: That arrangements for cable hook-up be made in advance of the event. Concern: The crowd control fence that ran from the American Airlines Arena to the Bayside Marketplace had security flaws (not properly bolted to base). Recommendation: That the installers utilize two bolts at the bottom of the base to supplement the existing hardware. Concern: MDPD officers, other than those assigned to the Seaport FTAA detail, were observed on the DBFPOM wearing gray (Nomex) one-piece jumpsuits without any police identifiers. Recommendation: That all police apparel be clearly identified by “police” and or “MDPD” identifiers to reduce risk of insurgent infiltration.

• Airport District Concerns and Recommendations: While the overall operations at the airport were successful and the security of the ministers and vice ministers was provided to them as requested by the FTAA committee, there were times a lack of accurate arrival and departure information provided to MDAD and the escort details resulted in officers and aviation department personnel being dispatched to meet a delegate who did not arrive or depart as indicated.

• Prisoner Processing Concern: Personnel assignments to the prisoner-processing site were not completed until the week before the event. This caused the PPC to have to rush training and did not allow all the personnel to take place in a mock exercise. Recommendation: It is recommended that personnel for the prisoner processing be identified and assigned early in the planning process so that they can participate in joint training with the Mobile Field Forces.

Concern: The PPC established procedures to ensure appropriate identification and processing of prisoners in mass arrest situations. These procedures were reviewed with the MFFs during one training session. However, when a mass arrest was performed, the established procedures were not followed and prisoners were not wrist banded at the site of arrest. This was because the application of the wristband was deemed to be too time consuming. Additionally, procedures in a mass arrest called for the MFF supervisor to designate one officer to prepare arrest forms for ten people at a time. This would have minimized the depletion of manpower from the arresting MFF. Recommendation: It is recommended that prisoner-procedures be reviewed with MFFs at all stages of their training and implemented during their mock exercises. Additionally it is recommended that instead of using the wristbands we utilized for this event, that we use half a flex cuff that has been numbered. The flex cuff will take only a few seconds to apply and requires no special tools, unlike the wristbands. Also, MFF personnel supervisors should continue to designate one officer to prepare arrest forms for every ten prisoners in mass arrest scenarios. Concern: Two command posts were established during this event. One at the MDPD headquarters building and one at the American Airlines Arena (AAA). Reporting to both command posts proved time consuming and awkward. Recommendation: It is recommended that future events should only have one central command post to prevent information lag time and to increase efficiency in decision-making. Concern: The Miami-Dade Fire Rescue Department broke down its decontamination area early on Friday, November 21, 2003. This required that we contact them to return to the Prisoner Processing Site and set up a decontamination area after the Mobile Field Forces made mass arrests. Recommendation: That we establish better liaison with the Fire Department and ensure that they obtain approval from both the Incident Commander and Prisoner Processing Site Commander before breaking down the decontamination area.

• Site Coordination Concerns: The AAA CP became the MDPD CP throughout the entire incident. The efficiency and competency of the AAA CP personnel made the Headquarter CP under utilized, and a duplicative effort. In an operational undertaking of this great magnitude it is apparent that an operational CP must be established near the actual event to ensure immediate support for the operational personnel in the field. When working with multiple Departments, entities, and agencies clarity of boundaries and authority can at times become obscured. Recommendation: It is recommended that policy be established as it pertains to all MDPD personnel, that orders of the IC shall supersede any directive or request of another Department, entity or agency. Should a question arise regarding the proper action to take or protocol to follow the IC or Deputy IC will have the final authority. Concern: Food deliveries were for the most part, timely, however, the one sandwich per employee allotment was not practical for the extended shifts worked during this detail. One food delivery contained sandwiches that had been prepared with mayonnaise. These sandwiches were difficult to preserve, even with an adequate supply of ice. As a result, at least one officer is known to have become ill, and numerous sandwiches were discarded uneaten. Recommendation: It is recommended that provisions be made for greater portion allotments in the future, and that greater consideration be taken in the content of the meal as it pertains to storage. Additionally, it is recommended that in future preplanned events, large coolers be made available for the use of operational units staged in designated areas. Concern: That personnel assigned to FTAA Miami to assist with the identification of guests and VIPs never showed up. There were numerous incidents where police personnel had to intervene with FTAA invitee related issues due to no representation by FTAA at any of our gates or checkpoints. Recommendation: That for future events of this magnitude, officers be accompanies at the entry gates and screening points by event staffers, thus minimizing the potential for a negative exchange between members of our Department unfamiliar with the guest list and invited guests.

Concern:

• A list with assigned personnel was not provided until November 11, 2003. This delay did not allow for adequate time to resolve scheduling and assignment responsibilities.

• Some weak points were detected in the fence surrounding the AAA. Recommendation:

• When time permits the list with personnel assignments be provided with at least a two- week notice.

• The fencing contractor should conduct a final inspection of the fence after the initial installation to determine any weaknesses or necessary adjustments.

Concern: It is critical to identify issues important to the community (police use-of-force, demonstration management principles, street closure, event impacts) and develop a proactive program of public information. Recommendation: MDPD should work with the community and media to increase understanding of issues relevant to major events, including police use-of-force and demonstration management principles. The involvement of Public Information Officers (PIOs) is integral to this process. Concern: Many officers did not receive breaks, food, or water in a timely manner. Recommendation: In addition to the Training Bureau, forward bases of distribution must be established in the field to support our officers in the theater of operation. Concern: Many law enforcement vehicles experienced mechanical problems after “normal” business hours for the vehicle maintenance shops. This can cause delays in providing emergency service to officers and the public. Recommendation: Plan for strategically located vehicle maintenance shops to be open 24/7 during the course of the operation. Additionally, have mobile repair vehicles with mechanical maintenance personnel that would be able to respond to assist with the disabled vehicles for minor repairs, i.e., dead battery, flat tires, etc.

Concern: The Police Legal Bureau is an essential part of the CP. The need to facilitate legal issues and opinions in a timely fashion requires immediate access to these documents via the use of Intra and Internet capabilities. Recommendation: The Incident Command System will need to provide laptop computer(s), printers and Intra and Internet access during mobilizations. All satellite locations also need to be equipped.

• Court Services Bureau Concerns and Recommendations: The preparation, training, and action plan for this event allowed us to achieve our objectives. There were no concerns or recommendations arising out of our operation.

• Media Relations Concerns and Recommendations On Saturday, November 15, 2003, at 3:30 p.m., MDPD Captain Brian Ackerman notified MDPD MRB personnel that members of the City of Miami Police Department (MPD) Public Information Office, along with local media reporters, were located on the port of Miami and ready to begin filming on the Coast Guard Cutter “Oak”. Captain Ackerman expressed concerns indicating that the location of certain tactical apparatus (i.e., water cannons and communications) would be exposed if they were shown on television. MPD’s Public Information Officers Delrish Moss and Amy Salas-Jacobson were present with the media and Captain Ackerman, as a conference call with MRB Commander O’Brien was established, in order to resolve this matter. It was learned that an agreement with the City of Miami P.D. had been made, allowing the concerned media representatives to be embed with the MPD. In accordance with this agreement, clearance had been arranged for filming at certain locations within sensitive areas that were not accessible without a police escort. Pursuant to this information, Captain Ackerman requested that they suspend filming until clarification concerning the MDPD’s areas of responsibility and the MPD’s media agreement could be resolved. Ultimately, the matter was addressed as Commander O’Brien reinforced the MDPD’s position concerning the filming of restricted areas, articles, and resources, to which the MPD personnel expressed acknowledgement and agreement. It was decided and agreed upon by all concerned parties that filming from the Oak would be permitted; however, it was also established that any media personnel escorted onto the OAK would be from waterside, after boarding transport vessels from the Coast Guard Base. In addition, MPD PIO Salas-Jacobson was to forward a copy of the MPD’s embedded media agreement to Commander O’Brien for further review and assessment. It should be noted that the MRB was never notified by the MPD, prior to this incident, of their embedded media agreement concerning the filming from the Oak at the Port of Miami.

FROM THE FINANCE COMMITTEE SECTION

• Budget and Planning Concerns and Recommendations: Include Budget and Planning Bureau (BPB) liaisons in the ORACLE Command Post system for e-mail tracking. The e-mail is used for authorization of incident related purchases and should include BPB staff in order to capture costs. BPB is working with Systems Development Bureau to develop an automatic cost analysis system to allow for decentralized data entry and report generating capabilities. Concerns and Recommendations: The staff of the FMB wishes to commend and express its gratitude to all the FTAA committees that conducted business and interacted with the Bureau. During future events that require departmental mobilization, FMB would recommend that the Personalized Patrol Vehicle Program (PPVP) be deactivated for the duration of the mobilization. Officers with assigned personalized patrol vehicles, not in need of the vehicle due to mobile field force assignments, should turn their assigned vehicles keys to the elements’s administrative supervisor for safekeeping or emergency use. This action will provide the element commanders the latitude to use the vehicle as he sees or deems necessary. Many times probationary officers find themselves without a vehicle to conduct the Department’s business while several marked police vehicles are parked idle for the entire shift. These vehicles, if properly planned, could be used as decoys or to block restricted areas within the MDPD complex or elsewhere. Concerns and Recommendations: Include RMB liaisons in the ORACLE Command Post system for e-mail tracking. The E-mail is used for authorization of incident related purchases and should include RMB supervisory staff.

• Food / Training Concerns: During this operation, the Training Bureau was notified that the Alpha shift would be held over. Our food vendor was immediately notified; however, due to his food on hand, he was only able to make an additional 500 meals. A total of 2,300 meals were needed. Training Bureau personnel were able to obtain the additional 1,800 meals from the Intercontinental Hotel. Recommendations: During a pre-planned event of this magnitude, a second food vendor needs to be awarded and both vendors would share in the preparation of meals. Occasionally, large orders were needed on short notice; for example, when several field forces were held over without notice.

FROM THE LOGISTICS COMMITTEE SECTION

• Manpower Resources Concerns: Some entities provided staffing rosters detailing a list of names only, without an exact identifier such as a badge number. This posed a problem with common names, i.e., “Officer J. Gonzalez”. Also personnel with hyphenated last names were submitted with only one last name. The MRC spent valuable time researching the names in order to ensure that the correct officer was being assigned. Recommendation: Whenever a name is submitted to the MRC, it is recommended that the roster contain the officer’s full name, badge number and unit of assignment. Concern: Original personnel rosters were provided to the MRC in order to enter the names into the database. The names would then be checked to see if any conflicts arose; if none appeared the names would be entered. In some cases, names on the rosters would change over the course of time either due to injury or reassignment and the MRC would not be notified. Additionally, when updated rosters were submitted, some committees would submit the entire updated roster and not indicate which person was replaced, and who was replacing them. Therefore, the MRC would either have to contact the entity that submitted the updated roster to verify what changes were made, or check the entire roster again to confirm the changes. Recommendation: When an updated roster is provided, it is recommended that the submitting entity clarify who is being replaced and by whom. Bolding of this information was requested to further clarify and enhance changes made, for ease of interpretation. Concern: The MRC was responsible for coordinating, entering, tracking, and accounting for approximately 3,000 sworn MDPD personnel, as well as daily telephonic and email liaison with committee/detail commanders regarding staffing concerns, meeting arrangements, and overall support to the MRCC. Due to the large scale of the FTAA and the MRC’s responsibility to staff this event, it became apparent towards the final month leading up to the event that the workload presented was extremely taxing for the two MRCPC’s assigned. Recommendation: That additional Police Sergeant be assigned to the MRC to share the total workload for a future event of this magnitude. This would allow for one sergeant to be designated for each service within the Department (Police/Investigative/Support). This will ensure a more fair and equitable workload amongst the coordinators while maintaining a proper span-of-control over the tasks assigned so that no individual is overburdened, while also decreasing the number of total hours worked and thereby reducing the stressors associated.

Concern: In one case, a detail coordinator whose staffing need was fulfilled requested the MRC to also make notification to the chosen personnel as to their assignment, staging area, dates and times of detail. This request was not only impractical but outside the realm of responsibility for the MRC. Recommendation: Again, the MRC’s role will be clarified in the preliminary email sent to all Command Staff Committee members. This clarification will state that the role of the MRC is to serve as a “broker” of personnel as well as a point of coordination for detailing staffing. The individual detail coordinator will assume the responsibility of notifying his/her personnel as to the specifics of the detail. Concern: In one case, an entity provided a roster of names to the MRC for usage in the pool. These names were assigned to a detail at a later date by the MRC. However, the entity took it upon themselves to substitute the originally assigned names with a secondary set of names without notifying the MRC. This resulted in confusion when a different set of personnel appeared on an updated roster received by the MRC. Recommendation: Whenever a request is made for personnel from a given entity, a statement will be included in the request that under no circumstances are arbitrary changes to be made in the personnel staffing without first notifying and consulting the MRC. This way, any changes can be properly communicated and documented between the MRC and the detail coordinator. Concern: Promotions and transfers that were made before, during, and after the FTAA related staffing assignments were issued by the MRC created confusion. Personnel were uncertain if their promotion or transfer had affected/changed their assignment. Recommendation: A memorandum be prepared for the Director’s signature informing all personnel that once an assignment has been issued, they will maintain that assignment during the event. Concern: While the Department prepared for mobilization, the issue concerning the incorporation of the City of Miami Gardens developed. The City of Miami Gardens wanted to incorporate in early November 2003, and integrate a large portion of Carol City District personnel. This assimilation of Carol City District personnel to the City of Miami Gardens would have had an extremely negative impact upon the FTAA as the utilization of their personnel were a vital component for the safe and successful completion of this event. Recommendation: The MRC prepared a memorandum for the Incident Commander detailing the number and specific assignments of Carol City personnel already committed to the FTAA, and the importance of maintaining this number for the safe and successful completion of this event. The memorandum also outlined the negative impact that the incorporation would have on the FTAA if Carol City personnel were removed from their assignments and placed in the city.

• Vehicle Towing

Concern: Intelligence information was not disseminated to all Departmental personnel. Recommendation: That information is supplied at least among the Command level to ensure that all parties that need to have information receive it.

• Transportation Concern: A portion of this Subcommittee’s responsibility included the rental of a variety of vehicles and research of departmental vehicle inventories to identify the most appropriate source from which to obtain the necessary vehicles. The Fleet Management Bureau has a staff familiar with these tasks and experience in related matters. Recommendation: That the Commander of the Department’s Fleet Management Bureau be considered for the role as this committee’s chairperson based upon the experience and relationships currently maintained by someone in that role. The duties and responsibilities for these tasks are closely associated with many of the current tasks undertaken by that Bureau.

• Facilities Concerns and Recommendations: None.

• Corrections Liaison Concerns and Recommendations: After conferring with Chief Ron Kovacs, Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, it was determined that there were no problems noted with the use of the facility, and that he recommended its future use for any future events of this nature.

• Supply / Resource Tracking During previous mobilizations the Supply Committee has been involved in the procurement of equipment for all department entities involved in the effort. This past practice has at times created confusion and unnecessary delays in the procurement process. During this mobilization effort, the procurement of supplies and equipment was managed more effectively by each requesting entity/sub-committee. Each entity was better qualified to determine their own needs, research and procure their supplies in a manner conforming to their requirements and timelines. This procedure fit more closely with normal departmental procurement procedures and had the effect of creating less confusion and duplication of effort.

• Communications Concerns and Recommendations: The entities involved in the operation should provide their needs more timely. Requests for equipment came in during the last week making it difficult to acquire the necessary equipment. This included requests from outside agencies and entities. The mapping of the frequencies should be discussed with the Tactical/Operational Commander in the planning stage so that the requested requirements can be evaluated and discussed to determine feasibility. FROM THE PLANNING COMMITTEE SECTION

• Intelligence Concerns: Communications Between Agencies: Development of a comprehensive operations plan for an event of this size is critical, and interagency communication is at the pinnacle of importance in plan preparation. The communications flow between various command posts, field commanders and operational personnel was effective. However, as previously stated, the time delay of the flow of information, via the JOC, at times became a concern. Equipment Needs: To ensure the confidentiality of Special Operations, Identification, and Roving Team members, yet facilitate recognition by field force personnel, it was agreed that a nondescript clothing item would be provided by the lead agency to all plainclothes personnel. Due to a supplier’s oversight, an insufficient quantity was available for assignment to all concerned personnel. Recommendations: Communications Between Agencies: The development of any comprehensive plan for large-scale events may require modification as the event unfolds. Any operational changes must be communicated via the JOC to outside agency field force commanders utilizing a checklist of deployed field forces. This checklist will ensure that all concerned operations personnel have been made aware of the change. Equipment Needs: Any inter-agency agreement to purchase some type of officer recognition/safety items must include a sufficient cushion of quantity ordered to allow for an unanticipated increase in personnel. It is further recommended that any such agreements address funding source and disbursement procedures to minimize or eliminate these issues at the outset.

• Legal Bureau Concerns and Recommendations: The four handouts prepared by the Legal Bureau, in addition to being provided to other law enforcement entities, were given to all Task Force and Field Force commanders during training sessions. Copies of legal handouts are provided to officers and first-line supervisors for review when preparing arrest affidavits. Additionally, a short handout containing sample A-Form language or elements of probable cause is useful during unlawful assembly or mass arrest situation. This contains changes including unlawful assembly, failure to obey a police officer, obstruction, and blocking streets or roads. During events of this unusual nature, legal advisors should review all arrest affidavits when feasible. Further, the Assistant Director, Incident Commander, and Tactical Operations Commander emphasized the value of having legal advisors on scene at significant incidents. This can be performed by sworn legal advisors or non-sworn legal advisors with a police escort. During arrest situations, this can enhance distinguishing between lawful and unlawful protestor behavior, ensuring proper arrest affidavits, and preventing or minimizing claims of false arrest or civil rights violations. Legal Advisors should also contact the State Attorney’s Office or U.S. Attorney’s Office to facilitate the filing of appropriate charges. The prosecutor’s office must ensure that its attorneys who attend bond hearings are briefed on the types of arrests which are made during unlawful assembly or other circumstances.

Table of contents
Background
Findings: Police Training, Organization and DeploymentUntitled
Findings: Use of Force
Findings: Prisoner Processing
Findings: Labor Community Concerns
Recommendations
Public Hearing: Police Training, Organization and Deployment
Public Hearing: Use of Force
Public Hearing: Prisoner Processing
Public Hearing: Labor community Concerns
Appendix: Excerts from MDPD After-Action Report