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# A TRANSFORMED LATIN AMERICA IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD

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The diverse countries of Latin America and the Caribbean relate with the rest of the world in ways that are quite different from how they did in the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s, and even at the turn of the twenty-first century.

This is so for several reasons. Latin American and Caribbean nations have changed a great deal over these years, in different ways and degrees. The global diffusion of power and wealth and the international policies and relative world influence of the United States have been altering significantly. Nations from beyond the Western Hemisphere that had not been substantially engaged with Latin America before have expanded their presence, while the influence of the US government has been declining in some respects, especially in South America. The number and the impact of Latin American and Caribbean actors, many of them nongovernmental, have radically increased outside their countries and beyond the entire region while international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become much more active in Latin America.

In the 1960s, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (Cuba excepted) were generally marginal to relations beyond the Western Hemisphere, indeed several were less engaged in international affairs than they had been earlier. In most cases, their main international relationships by far—economic, political and diplomatic—were governmental, and they were primarily with the United States and with international financial institutions greatly influenced by the United States. Many countries, especially those geographically closest to the United States, behaved in effect as client states, following the US lead on many issues in regional and world affairs. They were not without agency, and they often found ways to exercise their sovereignty and influence, but they operated within structures dominated by the United States. From the late 1940s into the 1960s, most Latin American countries comprised a virtual voting bloc in the United Nations General Assembly, almost always supporting US positions. In the Cold War context, only three Latin American countries—Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay—even maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1960, for example.

Many Latin American countries, by contrast, now have highly diverse and often important international ties, not only elsewhere in the Americas but also in Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The participation of extra-hemispheric governments in Latin America has been expanding and the activities of nongovernmental actors, both domestic and external, have exploded in the region and around the world. The influence of the US government on many South American governments has declined since the turn of the twenty-first century with regard to both the domestic affairs and the external relations of the countries of the region.[1] The engagement of Latin America with the rest of the world has grown, as have the region's relevance to the global agenda and the impact of Latin America on global affairs.

Latin American and Caribbean governments are building multiple relationships within the region and beyond. Many are now taking international positions independent of and in some cases directly antagonistic to the US government, reversing the prevailing pattern of the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1990s. They are attracting attention and resources from outside the hemisphere. And they are influencing international issues in ways that in the 1960s or even later might have seemed threatening to the managers of US foreign policy, subject as they were to the hegemonic presumption (Lowenthal 1976).

Most Latin American countries can no longer be counted on to support the international policies of the United States at the United Nations and elsewhere. Despite strong US pressures, only four of thirty-four Latin American countries sent troops in support of US military action in Iraq in 2003, for example: three Central American nations (El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua), and the Dominican Republic, where the foreign minister resigned in protest of his government's decision. Colombia (then the fifth-largest recipient of US foreign assistance in the world and by far the largest in the Americas) was the only South American nation to support the US decision to go to war in Iraq (Tarnoff and Lawson 2011, 14; and 2012, 14). The two Latin American countries then serving in the UN Security Council, Chile and Mexico, were crucial in blocking the US effort to gain Security Council approval for military action.

Rather than continue to concentrate their regional relationships within the Organization of American States (OAS), headquartered in Washington and largely financed by the host country, Latin American countries have been launching new regional institutions, based in South America and pointedly excluding US participation. These include the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) and the incipient South American Bank (BANCOSUR).[2]

The political, diplomatic and economic relationships of many Latin American nations have been diversifying away from close ties with Washington. At the same time, however, human connections between the United States and Latin America, especially the northern countries of the region, have been growing much stronger, mainly because of migration, trade, investment, education and tourism and of transnational business and professional networks. The number and intensity of intimate linkages between the United States and Mexico and with some of the countries of Central America and the Caribbean is unprecedented.

This chapter highlights these shifts in Latin America's role in the world. It quickly reviews broad tendencies in Latin America's international relations over some fifty years, concentrates on the sources and nature of changing trends since the turn of the twenty-first century, and emphasizes the multiple ways in which diverse Latin American and Caribbean countries—and their citizens, corporations, civil society organizations, and transnational networks, as well as their governments—are now active across and outside the region.

## From the 1960s to the Twenty-first Century: Latin America's Changing International Relations

In the 1960s, the US government had a paramount position throughout almost all of Latin America and the Caribbean, except in revolutionary Cuba, where Fidel Castro had boldly taken his country out of the US orbit. Battered by World War II, the countries of Western Europe had lost much of their presence in the Americas, except in the small colonial territories in and around the

Caribbean. European military advisors in South America had been largely replaced by US military missions and by an inter-American defense system designed and led by Washington. By the early 1960s, almost all military weapons in the region came from the United States. European business enterprises had been displaced by US companies and by nationalizations of public utilities and mining enterprises. US foundations were expanding their influence on Latin American agricultural development, public health and universities. US-based religious organizations were growing in numbers and influence. South America was still significantly shaped by European culture and higher education, but US music, literature, cinema and universities were fast gaining prominence.

The United States was then the main trading partner of most Latin American nations. The share of Latin American exports coming to the United States had climbed from 12% in 1910 to 45% in 1958. The share of US imports coming from Latin America had reached 37% in 1950, a 50% increase over pre–World War II levels, and remained nearly as high in the 1960s. US private investment in Latin America had quintupled in the twenty years after World War II.

The United States was also providing substantial economic assistance, especially through the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), established in 1959, and the Alliance for Progress, launched in 1961.[3] For several Latin American countries, the main sources of foreign exchange in the 1960s were US bilateral economic assistance, flows from multilateral institutions—such as the IADB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD)—where the US government had disproportionate influence, and exports of primary commodities (especially sugar and coffee) subject to quotas that were determined in part by US political decisions. In these circumstances, maintaining good political relations with US authorities was vital for Latin American governments and elites. Throughout Latin America, the United States was a much more important reference point than any other nation outside the region.

The US government was then also deeply involved in the internal affairs of many Latin American nations. Washington used diplomatic and economic pressures and inducements, public diplomacy and media manipulation, police and military training and equipment, intelligence penetration, trade union development, electoral campaign financing, the provision or suspension of economic and technical assistance, covert intervention and sometimes overt military action, to shape political developments in the region. The main aim was to thwart leftist movements that might be, or might become, linked to the Soviet Union, the Cold War rival of the United States. A second goal, compatible and sometimes intertwined with the first, was to advance the interests of US corporations. The US government had local supporters and even partners, but the main impetus came from Washington.[4]

The apogee of US interventionism in the Americas was the unilateral military intervention in the Dominican Republic in April and May 1965, when more than 22,000 US troops landed to forestall what President Lyndon B. Johnson and some of his advisers feared would become a "second Cuba," that is, a communist takeover. The United States quickly secured an OAS vote to establish an "Inter-American Peace Force" in Santo Domingo, into which the US contingent could be incorporated under the nominal command of a Brazilian general.

Ten years later the US Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee) documented extensive overt and covert involvement by the United States in Chile's domestic affairs in the 1960s and 1970s. These included efforts to thwart the election and then derail the constitutional accession to the presidency of Chilean Socialist leader Salvador Allende, and subsequently to weaken his government until its overthrow in 1973.

By that time, however, the underlying economic and political bases of US preponderance in South America had already begun to decline. The US share of Latin America's exports and imports was decreasing, US investment in the region dropped significantly as a share of all US private foreign investment, and the Alliance for Progress was petering out. Washington could contribute to Allende's fall but could not shape Chile's course under the Pinochet dictatorship. Nor could the United States get the OAS to establish a multilateral force to negotiate a political transition in Nicaragua from the crumbling Somoza dictatorship to a moderate democratic government. Washington failed to prevent the leftist Sandinista takeover and then could not oust the Sandinista government, despite strong attempts to do so. The United States could not secure the support of fifteen Latin American nations for the US-led boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow or dissuade Argentina from invading the Malvinas/Falklands Islands in 1982. The diversification of weapons purchases by Latin American countries caused arms sales to the region from the Soviet Union, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Israel *each* to exceed those from the United States by the mid-1980s. The economic, political and cultural presence in the Americas of West Germany and other European countries, the Soviet Union and Japan were all rising in the 1970s and 1980s, and US predominance was beginning to diminish.

These trends were reinforced as the increasingly autonomous Latin American nations, especially those in South America, pursued their own international interests, even when that was in direct opposition to Washington's policies. This was illustrated by Brazil's recognition of the Soviet and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and by the Brazilian efforts to obtain advanced nuclear technology from West Germany, against the express policies of the US government; Mexico's promotion of the UN Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States and its activist opposition to US policies in Central America; Venezuela's leadership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); and majority Latin American support for the election of Nicaragua to the UN Security Council, even as Washington was trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. It was also clearly evident at the United Nations, where only one country from Latin America and the Caribbean coincided with the US position on more than half the recorded votes in the 1985 General Assembly.[5]

Latin America's break from easy alignment with the United States was also clear in the increasingly frequent efforts, mainly by South American nations, to counter US influence, both within the region and in broader South–South fora: in the "Group of 77," the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Latin American Economic System (SELA), the four-nation Contadora initiative to seek diplomatic settlements in Central America, strenuously opposed by US policy, and the formation in the mid-1980s of the "Rio Group," combining the four Contadora nations with the four members of the "Contadora Support Group" to coordinate policies on international debt negotiations with the United States and other industrial countries.[6]

The efforts that Latin American nations have been making in the twenty-first century to reduce and redirect US influence and to diversify their own international links are thus not at all new. Concerted Latin American attempts to exert autonomy and take distance from the United States eventually decreased over time, however. Military regimes that supported US Cold War national security doctrines ruled in several South American nations. International financial realities after the debt crisis, beginning in the early 1980s, undercut the conditions for South–South cooperation. And the fall of the Berlin Wall and its aftermath in the Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the decade restored the United States, at least for a time, to virtually unchallenged global and regional stature. Long-standing Latin American complaints of excessive US interventionism in the region gave way in some countries to complaints about US neglect in the post–Cold War world.

In this new era, President George H. W. Bush proposed the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative in June, 1990, offering free trade agreements to all Latin American countries, beginning with Mexico, and negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada.[7] His successor, Bill Clinton, finished the NAFTA negotiations and got them approved by Congress. In 1994, Clinton convened a Summit of the Americas in Miami and proposed multilateral negotiation of a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). These initiatives, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, attempted to reenergize a central US role in the Americas. The US government returned to activist policies, largely driven by US domestic policies: reinstalling the overthrown, democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti in 1994; tightening the commercial embargo against and increasing political distance from Cuba; providing a $50 billion rescue package to Mexico to help resolve its financial crisis in 1995; and mobilizing Latin American support for US-led antinarcotics programs through the Andean Initiative of 1989 and Plan Colombia, approved by the US Congress in 2000.

From the early 1980s into the 1990s, many Latin American countries undertook both transitions from authoritarian rule toward democratic governance and a regional turn toward market-opening economic reforms, trends eventually reinforced by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. By the early 1990s, most Latin American and Caribbean nations had freely and fairly elected governments, and these were aligned with each other and with the US government in support of democracy and human rights.[8] Most Latin American governments were also converging on market-oriented economic approaches, adopting balanced macroeconomic policies, undertaking privatization, deregulation and lowered tariffs and welcoming foreign investment; these were the policies prescribed by the so-called Washington Consensus that had become the orthodox canon of the international financial institutions. Latin American and Caribbean countries seemed to be moving at different speeds in the same direction along a common path, led by Chile. The high point of inter-American convergence was registered at the Miami summit in December 1994, when the ambitious goal of free trade from Alaska to Patagonia was adopted, with an announced aim to achieve this by 2005.

From the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century, however, the diverse countries of Latin America have been embarked on two broadly different trajectories, flowing from diverging political trends in the region.

Led by charismatic soldier-politician Hugo Chávez, Venezuela took the lead, encouraged by Fidel Castro in Cuba, in establishing the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) including Venezuela and Cuba, and eventually Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras (for a time) and five small Caribbean island states. The governments of the ALBA nations, and to some extent the Argentine government under Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, his successor, are profoundly suspicious of international capitalism and of multinational corporations. They prefer plebiscitary "direct" democracy to representative liberal institutions and favor extraordinary executive power rather than checks and balances and horizontal accountability. They also advocate redistributive economic approaches and a dominant role for the state in the economy, as well as resource nationalism. In specific circumstances they have attempted to attract international investment in the mining and energy sectors, but their political resistance to multinational corporations and to foreign control of natural resources have led them to do so ambivalently at best, and often ineffectively. They are also skeptical of regionwide economic integration schemes that include the United States.

Most other Latin American governments, however, including those of all the larger countries, seek to harness international resources while trying through social welfare programs to soften global capitalism's adverse effects on equity and social cohesion. They invite foreign investment to develop extractive industries, despite opposition by local, often indigenous, communities, environmental groups and antiglobalization movements. On the whole, these countries seek to strengthen the institutions and the checks and balances needed to achieve effective democratic governance rather than to concentrate executive authority.

The two clusters are in practice more works in progress than settled models. Countries in both clusters eclectically work to combine pragmatic and ideological elements in order to improve the terms of their insertion into the global capitalist economy. They do, however, pursue significantly different underlying approaches to international relations. The Bolivarian Alliance nations base their domestic and international legitimacy in large part on confronting the United States, countering US influence and eschewing inter-American cooperation. They seek to strengthen ties with each other and with international rivals of the United States such as China, Russia and Iran. The other countries—including Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and most of the nations of Central America and the Caribbean—have generally sought to build pragmatic cooperation with the United States on specific issues while at the same time most are developing stronger links with many other countries, in and beyond the hemisphere, and with global corporations. These countries want to diversify their ties and trade but without confronting, rejecting or ignoring the United States.

As this fundamental division of Latin America emerged, the notion of a continent-wide free trade agreement faded and then virtually disappeared. The ALBA governments and Argentina resisted it mainly for ideological reasons. Brazil was unenthusiastic for commercial, domestic political and geostrategic motives. Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay preferred separate bilateral agreements with the United States, with each other and with other countries, and have negotiated countless such accords.[9] The "Western Hemisphere Idea," that the countries of the Americas stand together and apart from the rest of the world, has been replaced by complex patterns of differing Latin American relationships with each other, with the United States and with the rest of the world. "Latin America" neither as a unified bloc juxtaposed with or even opposed to the United States nor as an "inter-American community" that includes both North and Latin America in cooperation is an operationally useful construct for understanding or managing the diverse international relationships that have emerged in the Americas.

## Latin America's Transformations: Five Decades of Change

Underlying these changing patterns of Latin America's international relations have been the major transformations over time of demographic, economic, social, political and institutional conditions throughout most of the region, as well as the shifts in the international distribution of power. Continuing trends that were evident in the 1940s and in some cases earlier, most Latin American countries have become much more populous, urbanized, healthy and literate. Demographic transitions, educational and social programs and improved social mobility, together with expanded participation in the global economy, have produced significant economic growth in most countries of the region. That growth, in turn, has rapidly expanded middle classes that are reshaping economies, society and politics in many countries. In Brazil, for example, the middle class is estimated to include at least 53% of the country's population, creating a market for consumer products—from cell phones and white goods to automobiles, motorcycles and apartments—of more than 100 million persons, a dramatic expansion (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2013).[10] Similar socioeconomic changes, albeit on a smaller scale, have been occurring in many countries of Latin America; they are evident in the shopping malls and urban and suburban housing developments, not only in national capitals but in many provincial centers.

Many Latin American countries had several years of robust growth beginning in the 1990s, as liberal, market-opening policies took hold, global markets opened and considerable international investment entered. Although there was a downturn at the end of the 1990s, increasing global prosperity after the turn of the century, much of it driven by rapid growth in China and Asia more generally, expanded demand for South America's commodity exports. The costs of doctrinaire adherence to the Washington Consensus approach—extreme openness to foreign investment and trade, unregulated privatization, excessive deregulation and indiscriminate reduction of the state—also became evident. Latin Americans increasingly came to recognize that active and efficient states, strong and independent judicial institutions, effective regulation and the rule of law are all needed to make markets work well.

Impressive economic growth has taken place in this century, especially in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, El Salvador, Panama and the Dominican Republic. At the heart of this growth in most cases has been modernized agriculture, focused on both traditional and nontraditional products and the development of niche agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors. Many of these exports have been aimed at the voracious demand from China and other Asian countries for agricultural products and raw materials. Aggressive development of natural resource endowments has attracted major international investment. Also important have been significant (but still insufficient) investment in infrastructure, and the export not only of commodities, but also of manufactured goods and services often marketed by *Multilatinas*, Latin America–based multinational firms that operate throughout Latin America and across the globe. Some countries still export mostly primary products to a few select markets, especially China in the past decade, and are therefore vulnerable to a decline in demand, but some have diversified their exports both by sector and by destination. South America's economies, bolstered by the commodities bonanza and with strengthened financial institutions, were able to weather the international financial crisis that began in 2008 and to accumulate and protect large hard currency reserves as a buffer against future shortfalls; these reserves have also allowed some to resist austerity policies they might have been forced by the IMF to adopt in earlier times.

Underlying these achievements has been the emergence in a number of countries—Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru foremost among these—of a high level of *previsibilidad*, that is, stability of expectations about the rules of the game and about the procedures by which these rules can be gradually altered. This stability of expectations has unleashed creative energies of all sorts: not only that of investors, foreign and domestic, but also that of students, parents, NGOs and governments. Confidence in the operating framework facilitates longer-term and more rational decisions by all, and the building of policies and institutions for the medium- and long-term, including countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies.

Latin America's picture is not all bright, to be sure. Many countries remain plagued by violence, although it is not caused by interstate conflict and is no longer mainly by internal civil wars as it was from the 1960s through the 1980s. The remnants of insurgent movements in Peru and Colombia are mostly contained and the principal Colombian insurgency (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) has been negotiating with the government to end the hostilities. Civil violence, responsible for as many deaths in Central America since the 1990s as during its brutal internal wars of the previous decades, arises now mainly from crime, organized and unorganized; from the response of criminal cartels to redoubled efforts by governments to destroy or badly wound them, especially evident in Mexico; and from the incapacity of weak states to protect citizen security. Honduras has become the world leader in homicide rates. Violence is also notably high in Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, still in Colombia and in parts of the Caribbean.[11]

Although Latin America continues to be the world's most unequal region, equity indicators have markedly improved since the turn of the twenty-first century, largely due to redistribution of increased revenues, social and subsidy programs and conditional cash transfers in several countries. Improved income distribution has been accomplished in a period of bounty, however, primarily based on commodity exports. It is uncertain whether these improvements will fully survive a downturn when commodity prices decline. Major segments of the population—especially the indigenous, Afro-descendants, and the rural poor—remain seriously disadvantaged and provide a ready constituency for populist movements. The political leaders of the ALBA nations generally retain considerable popular support despite growing inflation and loss of investor confidence, primarily because they have provided recognition as well as concrete material benefits to large segments of society that were previously economically, politically and culturally marginalized. Disapproval of governing authorities has been growing in several other countries of the region, however. The political complexion and international orientations of much of Latin America and the Caribbean therefore remains uncertain. The profiles will change over time, but they will surely not go back to the pattern of the 1960s. Many Latin American nations are now upper-middle-income countries, are no longer dependent on foreign aid, are confident of their national legitimacy and political support and are more eager to and capable of defining their own national interests than they were decades ago.

## Changing Latin American Foreign Policy Orientations

As Mexico and most nations in Central America and the Caribbean have changed, these countries have also become much more closely tied to the United States: demographically, commercially, financially, culturally and politically. To cite only a few of many indicators, Mexican exports to the United States multiplied from US$42 billion in 1993 to US$263 billion in 2011, and US exports to Mexico in that year were greater than the sum of US exports to Brazil, India, Japan and Great Britain combined. Some 11.4 million Mexicans, about half of them unauthorized to remain in the United States, reside in the United States in 2013 (Gonzalez-Barrera 2013).[12] Some 20% of Mexico's workforce is employed in the United States, and some 15% of living persons born in the Caribbean reside on the mainland of the United States. Remittances back to Mexico and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean amount to more than US$45 billion a year of a total of US$61.5 billion to all countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; in some countries they exceed the total of foreign investment and international economic assistance. Tourism from the United States and Canada adds another important source of foreign exchange and income for many Caribbean Basin countries.

The borders between the United States and its closest neighbors are porous, serving more as intersections than as barriers. Massive and sustained migration from south to north and some from north to south, mainly by retirees; private investment and trade in both directions; the flow of remittances, tourists and deported criminals north to south; and integrated production systems and labor markets have all contributed to the ever greater linkages of the whole region's economies and societies. Debates continue about the impact of NAFTA on both sides of the border, but no one doubts that greater functional integration of the two countries' economies and societies has been occurring. The presence and impact of so many individuals, families, businesses and NGOs on both sides of national borders are shaping Mexico, the United States and many of the Central American and Caribbean nations.

The foreign policies of Mexico and most Caribbean Basin nations necessarily concentrate, therefore, mainly on relations among themselves and with the United States (and to a much lesser extent Canada), rather than on those with South America or countries outside the hemisphere. They are focused primarily on managing quotidian bilateral issues with the United States: border questions, immigration and the rights of migrants, labor standards, human and narcotics trafficking, environmental protection, access to education and to bank credit and social services, medical tourism, driver's licenses and auto insurance.

Even in the case of Cuba, there is far more travel back and forth to the United States, much more tourism from Canada, more academic exchange, far more trade with the United States (in food and pharmaceuticals), more remittances of dollars to Cuba from emigrants and more cooperation with the US government on practical matters (including hurricane tracking, antinarcotics operations, immigration and humanitarian relief) than seemed likely fifteen years ago or than is generally noted today. Cuba's reintegration into its neighborhood is likely to accelerate.

In contrast, as Brazil has grown it has become less tied to the United States and far more extensively involved beyond the Americas. Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has been expanding and modernizing its agriculture and rapidly increasing its international markets for agricultural products, developing industries with continental and even worldwide reach and building up the international competitiveness of its engineering, financial and other services. Brazil ranks first or second worldwide in the production and export of fifteen different agricultural products, including sugar, ethanol, coffee, tobacco, orange juice, soybeans, chicken and beef. Brazilian multinationals in steel, cement, aluminum, iron ore, paper and meat are global powerhouses, acquiring major firms in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. Such enterprises as Petrobras, Vale, Embraer, Gerdau, Odebrecht and Natura are international business leaders.[13]

The per capita income of Brazilians has risen some 45% over twenty years, while annual inflation has been slashed from about 200% to about 5%. All this has produced the expanding middle class and its thirst for consumer goods, in turn fueling more economic expansion. Brazil has become the world's seventh-largest economy, likely by 2025 to be the fifth (behind the United States, China, India and Japan), and is already the world's fourth-largest manufacturer of automobiles. It accounts for more than half of all South America's economic production, dwarfing that of any of its many neighbors. Brazil's National Development Bank (BNDES) has lent more money in this century for economic projects in South America than the World Bank and the IADB combined (Christensen 2013). Brazil's growth rate has been reduced by slowed growth in China and by the limits of consumer-based expansion, but the country's medium- and long-term prospects remain strong.

Brazil has developed important stakes and relationships around the world. Within the hemisphere, Brazil has exerted major influence on neighboring Paraguay on both commercial and political matters. It has maintained cordial relations with both the ALBA countries and their more democratic and market-oriented neighbors. It has also been rapidly expanding its relations with and presence in Cuba, where Odebrecht is building a deepwater port at Mariel that will service the huge Panamax container ships and may eventually enable Cuba to become a major transshipment center for global commerce.

Brazil is playing increasingly important international roles. It is one of the influential BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the darlings of international investors and geopolitical analysts. With India and South Africa, Brazil has formed a three-nation consortium (IBSA), which works together on a number of issues, and it cooperates with China on questions relating to the international economy and governance. It has been developing relationships in Africa, opening sixteen embassies there during the presidency of Luiz Inacio (Lula) da Silva.[14] Brazil has taken a leading role in UN efforts to stabilize Haiti and in other peacekeeping efforts, now participating in such missions because of its own reasons and stature. Brazil has become actively engaged on such questions as nuclear nonproliferation and the Middle East peace process, and it is especially active in international negotiations on trade, intellectual property, climate change, the environment, public health and food security. It actively seeks a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Few countries anywhere in the world are more actively engaged on a global scale than Brazil.[15]

Several other countries in the Americas—notably Chile, Colombia and Peru—have also strengthened the competitiveness of their economies, with private corporations taking the lead in building economic activities in other nations of the hemisphere and in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Chile has higher exports to Asia than to Europe, North America or the rest of Latin America, but substantial trade with all four regions. Chile's international diplomatic and political influence, based on its "soft power"—its strong political institutions, consolidated democratic politics and expert diplomacy—is much greater than its size, military prowess or economic strength alone would command. Colombia and Peru are also increasingly integrated into the world economy. Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru have formed a Pacific Alliance aimed at strengthening economic ties with the dynamic Asian economies, building upon earlier relationships developed through APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and they are helping construct a new Trans-Pacific Partnership with the United States, Canada and several Asian countries. These may well become more important in coming years.

The ALBA countries have also been actively cultivating international relationships, with a different animus. Venezuela has used its petroleum resources to supply energy at concessional prices to many Caribbean and Central American countries in tacit exchange for political/diplomatic support. It has also developed international ties with China, Russia and Iran, seeking to advance both reciprocal economic interests and mutual geopolitical leverage. Venezuela has also opened links in recent years with Syria, Libya, Sudan, Belarus and North Korea, countries united by little more than their deep antagonism to the United States. Cuba no longer has the hyperactive international profile it achieved from the 1960s through the 1980s. But Havana parlays its human resources (especially doctors and teachers) and its remaining political assets to stay active and visible in Africa, parts of Latin America, China, Vietnam and some countries in Europe. It draws upon these multiple relationships to stabilize and begin to open its economy and to mobilize international opposition to US pressures.

Most Latin American nations are by no means bystanders in today's international arena. They are actively articulating and pursuing their interests and cultivating relationships to advance them. Their interests and perspectives differ, as do their policies and ties, but most are no longer peripheral to world affairs.

## A Rapidly Changing World

All these developments within Latin America and the Caribbean and in the international relationships of the countries of the region have been taking place against the background of major shifts in the international distribution of power and wealth and have been affected by these shifts.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and the countries of Western Europe accounted between them for considerably more than two-thirds of global production. The United States and its North American Treaty Organization allies had international military dominance and largely controlled the institutions of international finance and governance, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As the immediate impact of World War II diminished and the extraordinary degree of US predominance decreased, Western Europe's dynamism and influence began to rebound, as did Japan's, the Soviet Union achieved significant military power and some political influence, and most of the former colonial enclaves gained their political independence. The presence in Latin America and the Caribbean of both Japan and the Soviet Union, and the expanded presence of some Western European countries grew over time. Japan, with economic growth at more than 4% annually, eagerly expanded its presence in Latin America as elsewhere, but always respecting the interests of the United States, its vital international partner.[16] The Soviet Union expanded its close relationship with Cuba with a political and military presence in Nicaragua and Peru, and looked for other places to engage, until the USSR dissolved. The countries of the European Union—especially Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy—rebuilt some of their presence in Latin American industrial, financial and service sectors and in expanding commerce. Rapid growth in Spain and the limits of its national market brought a burst of Spanish investment as well as governmental programs in Latin America in the 1990s.

Since the end of the Cold War and especially after the boom of the 1990s, however, a very substantial further redistribution of global economic power and political influence has been occurring. Most countries of the European Union have experienced several years of very slow or negative growth, high unemployment, unsustainable social welfare programs and growing tensions over immigration, integration and social exclusion. Spanish firms that had invested heavily in Latin America in the 1990s have been forced to divest, withdraw or retrench. Japan has had more than a decade of economic stagnation, with growth averaging 0.5% since 2000. It faces the rapid aging of its population and political gridlock, and has lowered its international profile, especially in Latin America. The United States has had economic growth rates below 2% annually for more than a decade; suffered a deep financial crisis in 2008 that resulted in lower growth, major unemployment and decreased consumer and investor confidence; and still faces reduced median household income, levels of poverty higher than at any time since the 1930s, worsening income distribution and prolonged political dysfunction in confronting these and other challenges.

With its evident internal difficulties, the United States has been much less able to project national influence around the world, in Latin America as elsewhere (Lowenthal 2013). As Mark Eric Williams emphasizes, Latin American rejection of the established US approach to the narcotics issue has been growing. Latin American opposition to the US commercial embargo of Cuba and to Cuba's exclusion from inter-American organizations has become nearly universal. US proposals for democracy-monitoring mechanisms in the OAS have been defeated. Washington's response to the overthrow of the Honduran government in 2009 was sharply criticized, not only by the ALBA nations, politically allied with the ousted president Manuel Zelaya, but also by Brazil and some others. The decision by Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff to put off her long-scheduled state visit to the United States late in 2013, avowedly to protest revelations that the US National Security Agency had monitored telephone conversations of senior Brazilian officials, including herself, seemed to symbolize the decline of US stature, although the lasting effects of this incident may not be great.[17]

Dynamism has largely shifted from the established industrial countries to the "emerging economies," and to some extent from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The share of world production accounted for by China, India, Indonesia and Korea has grown from 5.5% in 1990 to more than 17% in 2013 and continues to rise steadily, while that of Europe, Russia and Japan together has declined from 47% in 1990 to 32% in 2013 and continues to fall.[18] China and other Asian nations, meanwhile, have made concerted efforts to improve their effectiveness as international exporters, importers and lenders; to step up their diplomatic influence; and to win international recognition as rising powers and dynamic market economies.

After years of double-digit economic growth, China's shares of world production, trade and investment have grown to important levels. China's exports and investments are greater in the United States, Europe and Africa than in Latin America, but China's presence in Latin America and the Caribbean has recently exploded. China has become the third-largest external investor in Latin America, and investments are likely to continue to grow. Chinese trade with the countries of Latin America has risen from US$12 billion in 2000 to more than US$250 billion in 2012. China is already the largest importer of goods from Brazil and Chile, and the second-largest importer from Costa Rica, Cuba and Peru. Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, together with all the aforementioned countries, take at least 10% of their imports from China, in most cases starting from a very low base at the turn of the century. Chinese consumer goods have become ubiquitous in most of Latin America.

The dramatic growth of Chinese trade with Latin America has coincided with and partly accounts for the decline of the US share of Latin America's commerce. The US share of Latin American and Caribbean exports fell from 61% in 2000 to 41% in 2010, whereas the share of Latin American and Caribbean imports coming from the United States fell from 55% in 2000 to 30.8% in 2010. The share of Latin American and Caribbean exports going to the Asia-Pacific countries rose from 5% to 16.6% in these same years, while the share of Latin American imports coming from the Asia Pacific economies jumped from 10.9% to 26.9% (Rosales and Kuwayama 2012, 67). The trends have clearly been shifting.

China has also become an important source of finance for many Latin American countries and projects, supplying an amount equivalent to 40% of all funds made available from the World Bank and the IADB from 2005 to 2011; by 2010, Chinese loans actually exceeded the levels provided that year by these two major sources. Much of the financing from China is linked to "loans for oil" agreements, by which China has assured itself of major supplies of petroleum, mainly from Venezuela and Ecuador.[19]

Senior Chinese leaders have spent more time in Latin America in the past decade than the president, the vice president and the secretary of state of the United States. Chinese state bureaucracies, regional banks, state financial institutions, shipping enterprises, private companies and universities have all been active in Latin America. China has expanded its educational exchange programs, establishing forty-two Confucius institutes in fourteen countries of the region. China's overall presence in Latin America considerably exceeds that achieved by Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s or by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.[20]

Although no other extra-hemispheric nation rivals China's presence, Latin America's economic ties have increased with Korea, India and other Asian countries. Korea's trade with the region has quadrupled over the past decade, from US$13.4 billion in 2003 to US$54.4 billion in 2012, with minerals and agricultural products from South America exchanged for Korean manufactured goods, including automobiles, electronics, computers and heavy machinery. Commerce between India and Latin America grew from about US$3 billion in 2004 to more than US$20 billion in 2010 and continues to grow. The nearly simultaneous openings both of India's economy and of many Latin American economies have created major potential for productive exchange and there is considerable room for further expansion of investment and trade (Heine and Viswanathan 2011).[21] Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia are also increasingly important commercial partners for various Latin American countries; in all these cases, trade was scant fifteen years ago (Forum for East Asia–Latin American Cooperation [FEALAC] 2011).[22]

There have also been targeted efforts in recent years by Russia to reestablish a presence in Latin America, mainly focused on commerce and energy, but also involving military-to-military relations and arms sales as well as rhetorical solidarity with the Bolivarian Alliance nations. Iran has also attempted to gain a foothold, particularly in Venezuela, and since 2005 has opened embassies in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay. Israel and the Palestinian Authority have strengthened ties with the Jewish and the Syrian/Lebanese/Palestinian communities, respectively, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other countries and with broader Latin American political and social movements. Several African countries have developed expanding partnerships with Brazilian government agencies and private enterprise. Latin American relations with the Arab countries of North Africa, the Middle East and West Asia are also beginning to percolate, with an annual summit meeting and various investment missions and pilot projects.

Latin America, in short, is no longer off the international radar screen. Various countries of the region, especially Brazil and Mexico, have become of considerable interest to many international players: governmental, corporate, nonprofit and transnational. Latin American initiatives to expand the region's global international engagement have been mostly successful and actively reciprocated. Latin American countries have broader, denser and more diverse international relationships than ever before.

## Beyond Governmental Relations: The Growing Importance of Nonstate Actors

One of the most striking changes in the international relationships of Latin America over the last fifty years, and especially the last twenty, has been how much more of the region's international connections are now forged *outside* government channels: by corporations, trade unions, political parties, professional associations and networks, foundations, national and transnational NGOs and other civil society associations.

An important example is the increasing significance of Multilatinas, Latin America-based multinational corporations operating throughout the hemisphere and in many cases around the world. No one fifty or even fifteen years ago could have imagined the global reach that has been achieved by such Latin American companies as the aforementioned (and other) Brazilian firms and by counterpart enterprises from Mexico and other countries: ALFA, América Móvil, Bimbo, Cemex, FEMSA, Pemex, TELMEX and Televisa, all from Mexico; Cencosud, Concha y Toro, Fallabella, Latam Airlines Group and Sigdo Koppers, all from Chile; ARCOR and Techint from Argentina; and several companies in other countries. The spectacular growth of Multilatinas since the beginning of the twenty-first century has been facilitated by the impact of international competition in an open world economy, technological advances that nimble Latin American companies could quickly apply, a globally educated and entrepreneurial managerial class, and especially by greatly expanded access to international capital at affordable rates of interest. These corporations comprise an ever more important part of Latin America's role in a changing world.[23] Their international counterparts have large roles in Latin America as well. CNN is more important in Latin America than is the Voice of America, and Moody's and Walmart are more influential than is US economic assistance programs in Latin America.

Civil society organizations, both Latin America–based entities operating in other countries and international organizations active in Latin America, provide a second important example of how much of Latin America's role in today's world is carried out by nongovernmental actors. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Open Society Foundation and other such organizations are influential both within Latin America and by projecting Latin American values elsewhere in the world. Local civil society organizations from Latin America are particularly recognized for building awareness and alliances, using network activism and setting international standards for the promotion of indigenous rights and in recent years for pressures on local, regional, state and national governments to recognize same-sex marriage and to guarantee the right to express one's sexual identity. They have also been influential in international movements against torture, forced disappearances and domestic violence.

The annual World Social Forum, associated with and supported by Brazil, where it first took place in 2001, is a major vehicle for international civil society networking, providing a counterpoint to the Switzerland-based DAVOS Forum, in which Latin American business executives, political leaders and public intellectuals often take part. Environmental organizations—the Environmental Defense Fund, Amazon Watch, World Wildlife International, Greenpeace International, the green political parties and other organizations work to protect the environment in the Amazon region and elsewhere in the Americas; Latin American environmentalists participate actively in international fora and negotiations. Humanitarian relief organizations—the American and International Red Cross, CARE, Caritas, Doctors Without Borders, OXFAM and others—played as large a role as official government agencies in the humanitarian crisis in Haiti after its devastating earthquake in 2010 and have an ongoing presence in much of the region. Political party associations—especially the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, each backed by German parties—have built ties with their Latin American counterparts to strengthen democracy and human rights in the region and have cooperated with Latin Americans in providing advice and assistance in such countries as South Africa and Egypt.

The Carter Center has played a major role in helping to assure free and fair elections in various Latin American situations. The center, together with the National Democratic and Republican Institutes of the United States and various European-based organizations, has drawn extensively upon Latin American political figures for election monitoring elsewhere in the world. Religious organizations, too—especially Roman Catholic, evangelical Protestant and Mormon—have established important transnational and international linkages. So, too, have students, athletes, musicians and artists of all sorts, as well as numerous professional associations—of physicians, engineers, lawyers, professors and others. Latin America's presence in the world is rich and diverse. So is the participation in Latin America of organizations from outside the region; these often have more presence on the ground than the governments of their home countries and often shape those governments' perceptions and policies.

## Individuals on the Move

One of the biggest changes in the international connections of Latin America over the last fifty years has been the result of the individual choices of millions of Latin American emigrants who have left the region to live and work, primarily in the United States, but also in other countries, especially Spain, Canada, Japan, Israel and Australia (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLAC] 2006).[24] Latin America is also an increasingly attractive destination for international migrants, particularly from Asia and Africa, who are drawn by its recent economic growth, particularly to Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia.

More than 20 million people born in Latin America and the Caribbean live in the United States, with more than half from Mexico, 1.2 million from El Salvador and 1.1 million from Cuba (OAS 2012).[25] US politicians and the private sector are beginning to cater to the now 53 million people of Latino origin in the United States, 17% of the total US population and growing. Latinos are strengthening their voice and visibility: in the media, cultural production and in US politics, where they are beginning to influence domestic and foreign policies, particularly on immigration issues. In the United States, more generally, Latin American migrants are broadening and bolstering transnational economic, social and cultural networks, helped by new technologies that facilitate increasing access to families, friends, news and products across borders and that create new forms of connection. Latin America is tied to the rest of the world today by much more than distant origins and contemporary commerce. Latin America's diaspora is growing, its presence and power in the new host countries is expanding and the connection of migrants in both their countries of origin and their destination help shape today's world.

## International Governance

As Kathryn Sikkink, Diego García-Sayán, Jacques Hymans and Kathryn Hochstetler argue in their respective contributions to this volume, Latin American governments, social movements and regional organizations have contributed importantly to the norms and practice of international human rights, the development of international law, norms regarding nuclear nonproliferation and international environmental standard setting. Latin American officials—particularly from Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Argentina—have been key leaders in global governance bodies that deal with trade, finance, human rights, labor and globalization. In 2013, Roberto Azevêdo, a Brazilian, heads the World Trade Organization at a critical juncture. Rubens Ricupero, also from Brazil, headed UNCTAD from 1995 to 2004. Mexico's Ángel Gurría has been secretary-general of the OECD since 2006. Chilean Juan Somavía headed the International Labour Organization from 1999 to 2012 and made important contributions on the social impacts of globalization. Since 2012, José Graziano da Silva of Brazil has headed the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Latin American economists have served in prominent roles in the IMF, the World Bank and related organizations. Those active in the democratic transitions in Chile and Argentina, recognized for their transitional justice practices, are globally recognized advocates for universal human rights. Luis Moreno Ocampo, who prosecuted the human rights abuses of the Argentine military, became the first chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; Argentine Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, archbishop of Buenos Aires, became Pope Francis in 2013, the first non-European pope in more than a thousand years. Latin American leadership in global fora is no longer an exotic rarity. Latin Americans bring skills, experience and new perspectives into arenas that had long been dominated by the advanced industrial countries.

## A Final Word

A well-informed observer of how Latin America related to the rest of the world fifty years ago would be amazed by how different those relations are today. She would see a very different, much more diverse set of Latin American and Caribbean nations, engaged in much more varied ways with far more countries beyond the region; taking a much more important role in, and having much more effect on, a broader variety of issues; interconnected in multiple and different ways; with interests, ties and significance that could not have been imagined in the 1960s. No single theoretical paradigm or academic construct can capture and explain this rich and complex tapestry, but the chapters in this book, taken together, make important contributions.

## Notes

1 For a more sweeping and perhaps time-bound assessment of the supposed demise of US influence, see Mark Eric Williams, "The United States and Latin America," Chapter 13 in this volume.

2 Some of these efforts have not yet developed much traction or concrete significance, but both ALBA and UNASUR have already been active on several regional issues, and they all represent important indications of intent and direction. UNASUR has taken important positions, for example, on the coups in Honduras and Paraguay, on regional conflict in Bolivia, and on an apparent threat to President Correa in Ecuador. See Natalia Saltalamacchia Ziccardi, "Regional Multilateralism in Latin America: UNASUR, ALBA and CELAC," Chapter 20 in this volume.

3 Both the IADB and the Alliance for Progress depended on Washington's decisions and largesse, but the initial concepts and political initiative came in large part from Latin America.

4 Examples abound: the Central Intelligence Agency–orchestrated overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala, the clandestine involvement against Cheddi Jagan in Guyana, the support extended to the military coup against João Goulart in Brazil and, most notoriously, the various unsuccessful US efforts to overthrow or assassinate Fidel Castro.

5 That country was tiny Grenada, where the government had been installed by the US military intervention of October 1983. In addition to Cuba and Nicaragua, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico differed from the US position on some 85% of the votes.

6 The original Contadora group included Colombia, Panama, Mexico and Venezuela. The Support Group involved Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Uruguay. The Rio Group eventually added a number of additional members.

7 NAFTA, too, began with an initiative of Mexico's president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, embraced by the (first) Bush administration.

8 This was enshrined by the Santiago Commitment of the OAS in 1991 and in OAS Resolution 1080, which gave the organization new authority and means to act in defense of democracy. See Mark Eric Williams's chapter in this volume.

9 Indeed, the United States itself encountered domestic resistance to free trade approaches from both agricultural and manufacturing interests.

10 The OECD (2013) estimates that Brazil's middle class numbered 115 million in 2013, up from 66 million in 2003.

11 Many Latin Americans see the United States as a major cause of this violence because of the US demand for narcotics, the insistence on criminalizing the drug trade (thus making it more violent) and the role as a source of arms for Latin American drug cartels and youth gangs. Critiques of the US supply-side approach to reducing the harm caused by the narcotics trade provides another reason for taking distance from the United States. See Peter Andreas and Angelica Duran Martinez, "The International Politics of Drugs and Illicit Trade in the Americas," Chapter 25 in this volume.

12 Authoritative data on the number of Mexicans in the United States and the share of them who are unauthorized are difficult to obtain. These estimates are from Gonzalez-Barrera (2013).

13 Odebrecht, for example, began in the 1960s as a construction firm in one of Brazil's poorest states, and became the country's largest construction company by the 1990s. It now has 175,000 employees in twenty-six countries of the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, with revenues of $41 billion annually, more than the GDP of Panama, and plans to invest $20 billion outside Brazil in the next three years. Odebrecht is in charge of the major improvements at Miami International Airport and of projects of similar magnitude in the Middle East, Africa, China, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and elsewhere. It is a Brazilian asset internationally, and its particular interests, in turn, affect Brazilian foreign policy. For more on the other Brazilian companies mentioned, see Gustavo Herrero, "Business beyond Boundaries in Latin America: The Power of the Multilatinas and Innovative Practices to Address Growth with Social Advancement," Chapter 29 in this volume.

14 Lula made more than a dozen trips to more than thirty African countries during his two terms in office (2002–2010).

15 See Monica Hirst and Maria Regina Soares de Lima, "Rethinking Global and Domestic Challenges in Brazilian Foreign Policy," Chapter 9 in this volume.

16 See Kanako Yamaoka, "Japan's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean: Broad Changes under Globalization," Chapter 16 in this volume.

17 See Mark Eric Williams, "The United States and Latin America," Chapter 13 in this volume, for a general discussion of declining US influence. Apart from the cancellation of President Rousseff's state visit, more attention should be accorded to the many ongoing programs of consultation and cooperation between Brazil and the United States.

18 Authors' calculations based on World Bank Data GDP by country for 1990 and 2013. The figures for Europe are for the member countries of the European Union as of 2013.

19 Venezuela alone has borrowed more than $45 billion from China since 2005 and has pledged oil exports to China of a million barrels per day (bpd) by 2015, up from just 49,000 bpd in 2005. Ecuador has borrowed some $13 billion from China, enabling Ecuador to grow despite negative international credit ratings and lack of domestic and international investor confidence. China has helped finance and launch Bolivia's first communications satellite and has reportedly offered to fund half the cost of developing its iron ore deposits.

20 See Margaret Myers, "Shaping Chinese Engagement in Latin America," Chapter 14 in this volume.

21 India, which had less than $500 million in annual trade with Latin America thirty years ago, has become an increasingly important trade partner and source of investment. Indian firms have invested more than $12 billion in Latin America since 2000, half of that in Brazil. Indian companies employ thousands of Latin Americans, primarily in technology and pharmaceuticals, but also in energy, mining and manufacturing (Heine and Viswanathan 2011).

22 Latin American trade with Singapore reached $29.3 billion in 2012, and trade with Indonesia reached $8.3 billion in 2011 (FEALAC 2011; Harahap 2012).

23 See Gustavo Herrero, Chapter 29, this volume.

24 Approximate number of persons from Latin America and the Caribbean registered living abroad in these countries in the year 2000: Europe: 1.8 million, Canada: 600,000, Japan: 300,000, Israel: 80,000, and Australia: 75,000 (ECLAC 2006; Martínez Pizarro 2005).

25 See also Alejandra Délano, "Migration in the Americas," Chapter 27 in this volume.

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