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Terrorism and Political Violence

ISSN: 0954-6553 (Print) 1556-1836 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20

Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures

Patrick D. Ellis

To cite this article: Patrick D. Ellis (2014) Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures, Terrorism and Political Violence, 26:1, 211-225, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.849935

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.849935

Published online: 20 Dec 2013.

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Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures

PATRICK D. ELLIS

U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA

Today, the specters of lone wolves and autonomous cells acquiring and using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction, whether in their traditional military forms or the more non-traditional industrial forms, seems less far-fetched. Fortunately, military CBRN agents and weapons are not normally accessible to lone wolves or autonomous cells and are often located in highly secured areas. Therefore, lone wolves and autonomous cells may be drawn to materials similar to CBRN located in less secure areas. These commonplace industrial chemicals, bio- logical contaminants, and radioactive materials could be used to cause disruptions or mass casualties. The dual use nature of these materials and technologies enables them to be turned into weapons and delivered by nonmilitary means. Future ‘‘over-the-hor- izon’’ threats, such as the proliferation of new biotechnologies and amateur do-it-your- self capabilities, pose a risk that lone wolves could develop weapons at a time when travel, access to knowledge, and dual-use technologies, in the globalizing environment, make lone wolf terrorists more dangerous. Thus, the author explores existing counter- measures, such as laws, strategies, passive and active measures designed to stop these dangerous threats. In particular, capabilities to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from CBRN terrorist acts are examined.

Keywords biological agents, chemical agents, countermeasures, industrial material threats, lone wolf, radiological agents, terrorism, WMD capabilities

Introduction

To a greater degree than at any point in history, individuals and small groups—from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the one hand, to criminal networks and terrorist organizations on the other—have the ability to engage the world with far-reaching effects, including those that are disruptive and destructive.

—Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report1

This article not subject to U.S. copyright law. Patrick D. Ellis is a WMD=Homeland Security Analyst and Instructor at the U.S. Air

Force Counterproliferation Center, Air University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect

the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force, Air University, or the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center.

Address correspondence to Patrick D. Ellis, U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, Air University, 125 Chennault Circle, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 36112, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Terrorism and Political Violence, 26:211–225, 2014 ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 online DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2014.849935

211

In 1995, two incidents raised the specter of post-modern terrorism. First, on March 20, 1995, members of a nihilistic but well-financed cult—Aum Shinrikyo—released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, killing nine persons and injuring many others. Just weeks later, a disgruntled U.S. Army veteran—Timothy McVeigh—destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 persons. These two events prompted governments to take the issue of terrorism more seriously. For instance, the Anti-Terrorism Law of 1996 increased penalties for terrorism. Around this same time, then President Bill Clinton read Richard Preston’s novel Cobra Event, about a rogue scientist who genetically engineered a bio terror agent. Suddenly, there was greater awareness of the potential threat posed by weap- ons of mass destruction (WMD).2 As the new century approached, the specter of terrorists employing WMD seemed less and less far-fetched. By the late 1990s, nihilistic and apocalyptic individuals wanting to create or help others create mayhem were emerging. People who only years earlier would have been excluded from the WMD club were now making headlines as potential terrorists with these capabilities.

This article examines the kinds of WMD attacks lone wolves and autonomous cells could conduct and some of the countermeasures that might be used to stop them. To understand what WMD are in the purview of lone wolves, we must first define what WMD are in the current military arsenals. However, because chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents and weapons are normally located in highly secured areas, lone wolves and autonomous cells may be drawn to materials similar to CBRN that are often located in less secure areas. These varia- tions of CBRN available to lone wolf terrorists will also be discussed. This article will also examine some ‘‘over-the-horizon’’ future threats that must be anticipated in a globalizing environment in which travel, access to knowledge, and dual-use tech- nologies make lone wolf terrorists more dangerous. Finally, some countermeasures will be explored with a final analysis and recommendations.

WMD Defined and Traditional Classification

Currently, there is no widely accepted definition of the term ‘‘WMD,’’ even though it has been around for over 30 years.3 Weapons of mass destruction can be gener- ally defined as any military grade chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons capable of creating large-scale destruction against people, infrastructures, and property.4 These kinds of ‘‘military grade’’ weapons are not normally accessible to lone wolves or autonomous cells. However, there are non- military CBRN materials available that fall into a more specific Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definition of WMD. These are any materials that can be turned into weapons that disseminate or use explosives, poisonous chemicals and their precursors, any biological agent or toxins, and any radiation or radioactivity at levels dangerous to human life.5 Historically, WMD were the province of nation states, and required vast amounts of resources, manpower, materials, and facilities to procure and weaponize these agents. During the Cold War, the United States and Russia had extensive nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.

The first nuclear bomb was detonated on July 16, 1945 at Trinity Site in New Mexico, the culmination of the Manhattan Project. Since that morning, the world has been under the threat of nuclear calamity. Developing nuclear weapons is

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a demanding process that is monitored by various international agencies. The radioactive materials used for these weapons are uranium-235 (U-235) and plutonium-239 (P-239), which are products of the nuclear energy enrichment pro- cess. To date, nuclear weapons are confined to nation state programs; however, the proliferation of nuclear weapon technologies continues to be a threat. Terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons is still difficult, as the United States and other nations have made efforts to stop the spread of the technology.6 Pilfering modern nuclear weapons is also difficult due to the extreme amount of security at nuclear weapons sites. For now, a nuclear weapon in the hands of a lone wolf terrorist or autonomous cell is a low threat.

Chemical agents, in their most basic forms, are within the realm of the lone wolf terrorist. Although not easy to make, the technology, industrial processes, and infor- mation to build them have been on the open market for years. There are five cate- gories of military grade chemical agents: nerve, blister, choking, cyanides (blood), and incapacitants. Their names reveal how they physiologically affect the body. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had large stockpiles of chemical weapons which today are being destroyed to fulfill their Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC)7 treaty obligations. Recent events in Syria’s ongoing civil unrest have raised global concerns that Bashar al-Assad’s regime has used a chemical weapon—Sarin nerve agent—against its own people,8 a haunting reminder of Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against his Kurdish populations. There is also growing concern about where these WMD weapons will go if the Syrian regime collapses. Could they end up in terrorist hands? The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo successfully produced a low quality sarin nerve agent for their 1995 attack in Tokyo, Japan. They placed five plastic bags, to be punctured by a sharp point, on five subway trains that all intersected at a specified target. Fortunately, the crudity of these weapons limited their effectiveness, but the lesson for lone wolves is how the attack created a wave of fear.

The use of diseases as weapons has been around since wars began. However, by the 20th century countries began developing modern biological weapons using bacterias, viruses, and toxins. Bacteriological agents such as Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), Bubonic Plague (Yersinia pestis),9 Tularemia (rabbit fever),10 and Q Fever (a disease communicable from animals to humans) could be used as terrorist weapons.11 Viruses most likely to be used in bioterrorism are smallpox, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis, and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers.12 Toxins are harmful sub- stances produced by living organisms (animal, plants, and microbes) and are gener- ally more toxic than chemical agents.13 However, they are less ideal for causing mass casualties. There are four categories of toxins: Botulinum, Staphylococcal Entero- toxin, Ricin, and Mycotoxins. Aum Shinrikyo’s biological program worked with dis- eases such as anthrax, botulinum toxin, Q fever, and went as far as Africa—a failed attempt—to obtain the deadly Ebola virus.14 These agents were used unsuccessfully in ten attacks,15 demonstrating the difficulty in making such weapons. In the early 1980s, another biological attack was carried out by the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon. They were able to use their medical laboratory to acquire the salmonella bacterium that causes food poisoning to make a weapon. The Rajneeshee cult secretly field tested their bacterium at local restaurants. Over 751 people were recorded sick and admitted to local medical facilities.16 While Aum and the Rajneeshee’s attempts to make biological agents were both costly and resource intensive they did, however, demonstrate what could be done by a group.

Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 213

WMD Variations

With the difficulty in obtaining or making a military grade WMD, lone wolves and autonomous cells may look elsewhere and be attracted to hazardous materials to replicate traditional WMD weapon’s affects. The dual use nature of these materials enables them to be turned into weapons and delivered by nonmilitary means. Com- mon sprayers, public and private transportation modes, and a host of other technical devices could become delivery platforms for improvised weapons.17

Since chemical weapons are difficult to procure, a lone wolf might instead have greater success with industrial chemicals such as poisonous gases, flammable liquids, infectious organisms, and radioactive substances.18 These hazardous industrial che- micals are problematic because they are transported in ways that expose them to possible sabotage that may result in destruction. They are often transported by rail- road tanker cars and specially designed road trailers. Some are also transported through millions of miles of underground pipelines.19 Any intentional act of terror could, in a worst case, replicate the 1984 Bhopal, India incident, in which the acci- dental release of the highly toxic chemical methyl isocyanate gas killed thousands. More recently, during the Iraq conflict, insurgents were using chlorine chemicals attached to bombs to create fear and death.20

An examination of accidents involving chemical carrying railcars could be very instructive to a would-be lone wolf terrorist. For example, a 2005 train accident in Graniteville, South Carolina, released approximately 60 tons of liquefied chlorine gas from several tanker cars. It cost the lives of nine people, forced the evacuation of 5,400 people, and led to 550 seeking treatment.21 The cause? Someone forgot to toggle the switch to disconnect a spur from the main line, thus mistakenly diverting one freight train into a parked train.22

The biological approach also seems to be of interest to lone individuals. In 1995, Larry Wayne Harris—a self-proclaimed microbiologist—ordered three vials of Yersinia pestis (plague) from the American Type Culture Collection.23 Suspicious federal authorities investigated him but could not charge him since it was not a crime to have the agent at the time. However, since he misrepresented himself, he was charged with mail fraud.24 Three years later in 1998, Harris was in the news again. This time he was arrested in Las Vegas for what officials thought was lethal ‘‘military grade anthrax,’’ but instead it was a nonlethal veterinary vaccine strain.25 In October 2001, four letters containing high grade anthrax powders were mailed through the United States Postal System. Passing through associated sorting facilities, they ended up at Senate offices in Washington, DC and news agencies in New York City and Florida. This attack killed five people and sickened 22. Occurring on the heels of 9–11, Al-Qaeda was first suspected; however, as the anthrax agent was examined, evidence suggested a homegrown source for this attack, possibly a microbiologist at a military laboratory. In 2008, the FBI identified Dr. Bruce Ivins, a research scientist at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, as the individual who had sent the letters. Before being arrested, he overdosed on medication and later died in a local hospital.26 This last case illustrates the possibility of a lone wolf actually being an ‘‘insider’’ possessing materials associated with WMD.

Ricin toxin is another agent lone wolves might attempt to make using cook- books.27 Extracted from the castor bean, ricin would never be considered a mass casualty weapon, but for smaller attacks it could be deadly. Ricin toxin is poisonous

214 P. D. Ellis

if inhaled, injected, or ingested. Ricin has also been developed by groups such as the Minnesota Patriots Council (1991)28 in the United States, the London Ricin Cell (2003)29 in London, UK, and Al-Qaeda in Yemen (2011).30 An attacker could create a weapon that could be disseminated on unsuspecting victims. One only has to think about how the Soviet KGB in 1978 aided the Bulgarian Secret service in their effort to kill Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident living in London. Using a sophisticated umbrella as a dissemination device, they were able to shoot a ricin-filled pellet into the body of Markov, which led to his death.31 A lone wolf utilizing a similar device could attack people indiscriminately in crowds. Witness the effect the two Washington, DC Beltway snipers had on the region in 2002. Fear and paralyses abounded for three weeks until the perpetrators were caught.

One of the many fears law enforcement and response communities have is the detonation of a radiological dispersal devise (RDD), or ‘‘Dirty Bomb.’’ The military defines a RDD as ‘‘an explosive device that is intended to spread radioactive material from the detonation of conventional explosives.’’32 Ideal radioactive sources—found in medical and industrial equipment—include radioisotopes with strong radioactivity such as Cobalt 60 (Co-60), Cesium (Cs-137), and Strontium-90 (Sr-90). Radioactive sources that have been removed from their controlled locations are called ‘‘orphan sources.’’33 The intentional release of radiation or the detonation of an RDD in some public forum would be devastating. Casualties would be lower than other WMD attacks, but the negative psychological and economic effects associated with radiation contamination would be vast. An example of this was an accidental release of Cesium-137 in September 1987 in the city of Goiania, Brazil. This highly soluble Cesium chloride salt source was stolen and its shield ruptured, and the material was subsequently released in the city.34 According to one report, the ‘‘dispersal of radiation was equivalent to what scientists would classify as a medium-size dirty bomb.’’35 Four people died from exposure, 28 suffered radiation burns,36 and over 112,000 people were monitored for possible exposure.37 Many buildings had to be decontaminated or destroyed. A total of 3500m3 of radioactive contaminated materials was created.38 The amount of Cesium that caused this mayhem was only 93 grams.39 There are several cases of terrorists trying to make or use RDD weapons.

The most well-known RDD event happened in 1995, when Chechen rebels obtained some Cesium-137, wrapped it up with explosives, and buried it in Mos- cow’s Izmaylovsky Park. The rebel leaders then notified the media of the unexploded device’s location. In 2002, an Al-Qaeda operation to develop a dirty bomb was exposed. It involved a suspected Al-Qaeda terrorist, Jose Padilla, who was arrested and charged with planning an attack.

Over-the-Horizon Threats

Since the mapping of the human genome in the early 2000s, the biotechnological fields have grown dramatically.40 A driver for this growth has been the convergence of engineering, physical sciences, and life sciences, creating a cross-pollination environment for the transfer of individual ‘‘tool sets from one science to another.’’41

This of course is of concern to military professionals who are worried that the pro- liferation of ‘‘biotechnology and life sciences—including the spread of expertise to create modified or novel organisms—present the prospect of new toxins, live agents,

Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 215

and bioregulators.’’42 With these skills, it would be possible for a small group to take the convergence in sciences and ‘‘inflict untold damage if armed with the right unconventional weapon.’’43 It is the dual nature of these dynamic technologies that could bring unforeseen horror if used improperly and ‘‘provide bad actors increased capacity to build and deploy more dangerous biological weapons.’’44 As these technologies and sciences are diffused through more than 4,07045 biotechnology companies, security professionals should be aware that a lone wolf insider could have access to these skills, especially since these technologies and knowledge are also being diffused to larger populations. In recent years, there has emerged a community of amateur do-it-yourself biologists ‘‘dedicated to making biology an accessible pursuit for citizen scientists, amateur biologists and biological engineers.’’46 They provide the ‘‘mechanisms for amateurs to increase their knowledge and skills.’’47 However, while the majority of these do-it-yourself biologist activities remain benign, there runs a risk that lone wolves could acquire this technology to develop a weapon.

In his book Hot Zone, Richard Preston points out how easy it is for diseases to move globally: ‘‘A hot virus from the rain forest lives within a twenty-four hour plane ride from every city on earth. All of the earth’s cities are connected by a web of airline routes. The web is a network. Once a virus hits the net, it can shoot anywhere in a day—Paris, Tokyo, NewYork, Los Angeles, wherever planes fly.’’48 In 2008, passen- gers travelled over 4,621 billion kilometers,49 compared with over 1,500 billion kilometers in 1990,50 and by 2028 it will rise to 12,090 billion.51 If a lone wolf terrorist infected himself with an infectious disease, such as plague or a future DIY disease, and flew on a major airline through several major hubs, a serious pandemic could occur. Just note how the 2002–2003 outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)—starting in Hong Kong—became a global problem very quickly.

Health officials of modern countries have made great strides in ensuring safe food and water sources, but in recent years events have demonstrated that the global ‘‘farm to table’’ food chain continues to be vulnerable to contamination.52 When this happens, the cascading effects are often economic and psychological as people become scared to purchase food products for fear of contamination. Even the hint of possible contamination leaked into the media, or a false positive, could have a tremendous impact on the food industry. Witness the 2011 E. coli outbreak in Germany in which officials incorrectly identified cucumbers from Spain as the culprit, resulting in Spanish exporters losing approximately $200 million per week until the mistake was corrected.53 In the future, a lone wolf individual could develop a DIY bacterium and contaminate any one of the distribution points in the food chain, replicating an untraceable outbreak. Ongoing investigations are still underway to find the individual(s) that contaminated Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules that killed seven people in Chicago 30 years ago (1982). As recently as May 2011, inves- tigators have turned to ‘‘Unabomber’’ Ted Kaczynski as a possible suspect.54

Current Countermeasures

Before the early 1990s, our ability to deal with any WMD terrorist event was negligible. However, over the last ten years, and $36 billion55 dollars later, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has worked hard building various capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist acts. The vast range of exploitable targets and threat actors, however, lessens the possibility of finding one countermeasure, one ‘‘silver bullet,’’ and forces us to

216 P. D. Ellis

depend on a collection of countermeasures—acting like a web of obstacles—making it harder for terrorists. And these countermeasures appear to have worked, since there has not been a successful major terror attack in the U.S. since 9–11, but there have been many foiled attempts.

The foundation for many of the countermeasures starts with having the neces- sary laws that give Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies the authority and tools to prosecute illegal use of CBRN materials. Prior to the 1990s, there existed few laws addressing the use or possession of CBRN materials. However, after the Oklahoma City bombing and September 11 attacks, stronger laws were passed. For example, the ‘‘Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’’ crimina- lized the use of nuclear materials, chemical or biological weapons, and regulated the distribution of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins.56 Later, revisions and clarifi- cations to U.S. Code – Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure further addressed specific threats. Section 175, known as the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act (BWAT), details biological weapons.57 Section 229 prohibited activities dealing with Chemical Weapons.58 And a more general catchall rule is Section 2332a, Use of Certain Weapons of Mass Destruction, which makes it unlawful for any person to use, threaten, or attempt or conspire to use a weapon of mass destruction, including any biological agent, toxin, or vector.59 The penalty for knowingly making, trans- porting, storing, or weaponizing any of these agents or toxins is imprisonment or punishment by death if the attack results in deaths. Other types of legislation such as the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996—a.k.a. the ‘‘Nunn-Lugar Act’’—equipped and trained law enforcement, fire services, and para- medics to deal with WMD terrorism.60

If laws provide the foundation for countermeasures, then strategies provide the structural framework and direction for enacting countermeasures. The guidance for the implementation of these countermeasures is embedded within the broader security strategies outlined by the White House and DHS.61 Since the first National Strategy for Homeland Security was issued in 2003, a host of other strategies62 have been generated. All of these strategies provide a clear vision for a secure homeland and a framework for how to protect the homeland. However, over time these stra- tegies have evolved, always revolving around the tension between the ‘‘primary focus’’ on terrorism and the ‘‘broader focus’’ on terrorism, all-hazards, and border security. The latest strategic manifestation is DHS’s U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2012–2016, which continues the focus of previous documents on preventing terror attacks, stopping the acquisition and use of CBRN within the United States, and reducing the threat against our critical infra- structure, key resources, and essential leadership.63 However, laws and strategies by themselves cannot stop lone wolf terrorists or autonomous cells. More passive and active measures must be in put into action.

Passive countermeasures are necessary for safeguarding chemical, biological, and radiological materials located in facilities throughout the United States. To help protect chemical facilities, the Department of Homeland Security created the Chemi- cal Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), designed to help over 4,500 chemical facilities64 provide Security Vulnerability Assessments for their at-risk facilities and associated security plans.

Another major concern is the response to biological events, since most of these attacks are time delayed. Thus, the countermeasures required to deal with a bio threat has to be multifaceted. Threat awareness is fed by the multitude of public

Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 217

health and intelligence information coming in from state and local partners through various channels and local fusion centers. One center is the National Biological Threat Characterization Center, which conducts assessments and laboratory experi- ments looking for gaps in information to better understand current and emerging biological threats.65 Likewise, prevention and protection measures create layered approaches to mitigate the effects of bioterror attacks with programs like Project BioShield,66 which helps the private sector develop CBRN medical countermeasures for a guaranteed federal market.67 Other measures, like surveillance and detection, provide the necessary network and grid to identify the advent of bio attacks. Thus, the DHS National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) provides early detection and warnings of attacks.68

Radiological and nuclear countermeasures revolve around activities to either remove or secure radiological threats before a terrorist could access them. Central to these efforts are the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Orphan Source Initiative69 and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP).70 Both of these programs work to find and recover radioactive materials and keep them out of the hands of terrorists. It is up to the Department of Homeland Security’s Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) to detect terrorists trying to smuggle radioactive or nuclear materials around the United States, or through its borders.71 As part of this architecture, Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) and other types of radiation detection technologies are deployed at ports and mail facilities around the world to detect radiation before it gets to the U.S.72 Within the United States, DHS’s Securing the Cities (STC) initiative works to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in high-risk cities.73

Passive countermeasures alone will only slow down lone wolf terrorists or auton- omous cells or cause them to look for softer targets. It is the active engagement of state and local law enforcement and other responders closest to the threat that pro- vides the first tangible countermeasures. However, the vast multitude and differences among law enforcement agencies creates problems for coordinating, communicating, and capturing information that could prevent a terrorist act. To correct this prob- lem, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to resolve this disconnection and provide a centralizing structure. Made up of investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from over 600 state, local, and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the JTTF has 71 task forces based in 103 cities nationwide.74 These task forces have been used to respond to all kinds of threats and incidents and provide a key factor to stopping potential lone wolves and autonomous cells. A more directed effort led by the FBI is their 2008 ‘‘Operation Vigilant Eagle’’ initiative to pre-empt lone-wolf individuals by identifying them before they can commit a terrorist act.75 This program is spear- headed by the ‘‘Lone Wolf Initiative’’ program, which develops comprehensive information on possible lone wolves in an effort to disrupt their attacks before they are launched.76 Limited information exists on both programs.

Another important countermeasure key to making it difficult for lone wolves to commit acts of terror is the proper preparation of the communities that surround them. It is true that one person is often harder to find than a group or a more orga- nized terror cell that could present more leaks to law enforcement, but a prepared community is more able to identify possible threats. Therefore, the U.S. government has been making great strides to help communities become the eyes and ears that can detect anomalies before they actually become a threat. The FBI set up

218 P. D. Ellis

countermeasures called ‘‘tripwires,’’ which are in essence outreach activities designed to create a network of frontline informants from medical, academic, and industry communities to alert the FBI of potential risks turning into a WMD threat.77 Like- wise, to help make communities part of the solution, DHS’s homeland security enter- prise is being built around four initiatives: a) Fusion Centers in 77 state and urban areas that will centralize information, analyze it, and then take action;78 b) The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative designed to train law enforcement to recognize behaviors associated with terrorism, analyze those observations, and improve sharing information;79 c) The Security Information Network (HSIN) allows federal and local first responders to share real-time information on a secure, Internet-based network;80 and d) The ‘‘If You See Something, Say SomethingTM’’ campaign to raise public awareness of behaviors related to terrorism.81

However, a key element of a terrorist attack is surprise, and a lone wolf terrorist using CBRN must be equally stealthy, so as to avoid capture, enabling an attack to occur anywhere in the United States. Therefore, the U.S. government has extended vast resources to build and outfit specialized WMD response teams as a counter- measure to deal with the threat. Coordinating the FBI’s response capability is the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD), which also focuses on WMD preparedness and prevention.82 The WMDD has access to two state-of-the-art tech- nology response units. The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Sciences Unit (CBRNSU) enables the FBI Laboratory to conduct detailed forensic assess- ments of dangerous CBRN materials and related evidence,83 and the Hazardous Material Response Unit (HMRU) responds to criminal acts and incidents involving hazardous materials (HAZMAT).84 Seeing the necessity of having these CBRN response capabilities nearer to a likely event, the federal government, under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, authorized the creation of 55 high-tech WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs). These National Guard WMD-CST teams are located in each state, two per state in some cases. These teams fall under the jurisdiction of the state’s governor, with a mission to support civilian responders. They provide early assessments of a CBRN event, advise the incident commander, and facilitate request for assistance to bring in state and federal assets.85

A more direct capability to respond to biological attacks is the Centers for Dis- ease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The SNS stockpiles and distributes medical countermeasures to affected areas. These resources are strategically located throughout the United States to be distributed when required.86 Also of significance is the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), which provides a national capacity to test biological threat agents and hazardous toxins, in particular anthrax, smallpox, plague, and botulism. Laboratories within the LRN are classified as either a) a national laboratory—which characterizes special strains, conducts bioforensics, and handles infectious diseases;87 b) a reference laboratory—150 state and local public health, military, international, veterinary, agriculture, food, and water testing laboratories;88 or c) a sentinel laboratory— approximately 25,000 private, commercial,89 and hospital-based laboratories in the United States that test clinical specimens.90

Analysis and Recommendations

This article focuses on the issue of lone wolves and autonomous cells acquiring and using CBRN types of weapons, whether in their traditional military form or in the

Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 219

more non-traditional industrial forms. Lone wolves and autonomous cells could operate anywhere along these two bookends of the WMD spectrum; however, initial observations suggest that advanced security barriers make it difficult for sophisti- cated autonomous cells, unless insiders are involved, to gain access to such weapons. Lone wolves would have an even harder time acquiring or creating military grade CBRN weapons. Any attempt at acquiring precursor agents to make such weapons would certainly alert authorities. For the moment, it seems unlikely that a lone wolf or autonomous cells will get a modern WMD device; nevertheless, it should not be ruled out as completely impossible.

Lone wolves or autonomous cells may not have to pursue sophisticated, mili- tary grade CBRN agents. Instead, they could use industrial chemicals, biological contaminants, and radioactive material that are so commonplace as to cause disrup- tions rather than mass casualties. Fear and economic consequences might be the acceptable goal for a lone wolf or group. The emergence of new technologies and systems will continue to present possible alternatives to CBRN agents. As govern- ments apply current and new countermeasures, there will be continuous tension in governments to allocate limited resources to support a terrorism focus approach or an ‘‘all hazards’’ focus. This has implications for all of the programs discussed above as funding becomes scarcer in a budget restraint era. However, the country must be continuously on guard for any CBRN terror attack and build national preparedness.

Further assessment points to the problem of lone wolves being hard to detect and stop before an attack. Lone wolves have no organization that can be exploited for information or penetrated by undercover agents. One former counter-terrorism expert alluding to this problem pointed out that the ‘‘lone wolf is arguably one of the biggest challenges to American law enforcement. How do you get into the mind of a terrorist?’’91 Thus, countermeasures may have to become more intrusive into society to ferret out lone wolves and autonomous cells, especially if they are trying to obtain CBRN weapons. This creates a tension between what countermeasures can be used and the freedoms and civil liberties they are supposed to protect. Former President Bush addressed this tension when he said that ‘‘we know that [in] a free society—there’s no such thing as perfect security. That’s the challenge. To attack us, the terrorists only have to be right once; to stop them, we need to be right 100 percent of the time.’’92 Being right 100 percent of the time must still include consider- ation of our freedoms, as Michael A. Clancy—of the FBI—says: ‘‘We must always act within the confines of the rule of law and the safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution. It is not enough to stop the terrorists; we must always do so while maintaining civil rights and civil liberties.’’93 This will be an ongoing challenge as we balance countermeasures against lone wolf or autonomous cell acquisition of a CBRN weapon that could cause great destruction.

In order to be prepared, governments, law enforcement, security agencies, and first responder communities must continue to develop countermeasure strategies as a multifaceted, layered approach, understanding that no single approach succeeds by itself. In action, these measures follow a cyclical pattern in that authorities take initial measures to prevent WMD terrorism and actions to mitigate the impact of an attack on populations or infrastructures. The capacity of authorities and citizenry to bounce back after a WMD attack significantly aids the response effort to quickly save lives, protect property and the environment, and to meet basic human needs. The cycle comes full circle when the recovery process begins to restore and rebuild

220 P. D. Ellis

communities damaged by a lone wolf WMD attack. These measures can contract and expand depending on the event, and governments and communities must continue to develop the means to successfully deal with these threats.

Conclusion

A WMD in the hands of a lone wolf terrorist is a scenario we all hope will never happen. However, we live in a world where traditional WMD weapons are being proliferated and new Janus-headed technologies and systems can become weapons. The proliferation of WMD technology through legitimate as well as illegitimate programs in recent years continues to warn us of the uncertain nature of who might be able to acquire such weapons in the future. A more clear and present danger may very well be from the more accessible sources of radiation, bacteria, or other industrial chemicals that are always in our communities. Do-it-yourself biology and access to other technologies might open the doors for newer forms of violent diseases that could spread through populations. The ease of acquiring the skills and knowledge to cultivate known diseases such as plague and anthrax are as close as a small university microbiology program. Access to dual-use miniaturized labora- tory technologies is not as hard to obtain as it was in the past. The future possibility of cross-pollination between bad actors such as terrorist and criminals due to ‘‘a convergence of interests and methods’’94 will become more problematic and of grave concern to security practitioners. The requirement for security professionals to con- tinue to develop their capacity to envision future threats based on technological advancements will become key to creating future solutions to potentially destructive new weapons.

Notes

1. DHS, ‘‘Today’s Security Environment,’’ in Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: Author, February 2010), 5.

2. Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: Macmillan, 2000), 363; and Richard Preston, About the Cobra Event, http://richardpreston.net/books/ce.html.

3. Jeffrey A. Larsen, Eric A. Croddy, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History, Volume II: Nuclear Weapons (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 408.

4. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joint Publication 3-40 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 10, 2009), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/doctrine/CDM%20 resources/manuals/jps/jp3_40.pdf.

5. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd_faqs.

6. International export control regimes have emerged to help stop the proliferation of WMD weapons technology: organizations such as the Australia Group that control chemical and biological technologies; the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee that watch nuclear technologies; the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is a multilateral export control regime monitoring conventional and dual use technologies.

7. The CWC was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. The treaty aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, or use of chemical weapons by States Parties. It is administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/.

Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 221

8. Kelsey Davenport and Daniel Horner, ‘‘U.S. Says Chemical Weapons Used in Syria,’’ Arms Control Association 43 (July=August 2013), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_ 0708/US-Says-Chemical-Weapons-Used-inSyria.

9. USAMRIID, Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook (Blue book), 6th ed. (Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, April 2005), 56.

10. Ibid., appendix C, BW Agent Characteristics, C-1. 11. USAMRIID, Medical Management of Biological Casualties (see note 9 above), 64. 12. Ibid., 78. 13. Ibid., 116. 14. David E. Kaplan, ‘‘Aum Shinrikyo,’’ in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror:

Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 213. 15. Ibid., 217. 16. W. Seth Carus, ‘‘The Rajneeshees,’’ in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror (see

note 14 above), 115. 17. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (see note 4 above). 18. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG), 3,

http://phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/Hazmat/ERG2012.pdf. 19. Ibid., 14. 20. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and Its Evolving

Insurgency Developments Through Spring 2007 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2, 2007), 100.

21. A. E. Dunning and Jennifer L. Oswalt, ‘‘Train Wreck and Chlorine Spill in Graniteville, South Carolina: Transportation Effects and Lessons in Small-Town Capacity for No-Notice Evacuation,’’ in Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, No. 2009 (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 2007), 130–135, http://www4.nau.edu/itep/waste/HazSubMap/docs/ EmPlanning/TrainWreckChlorineSpillGranitevilleSC.pdf.

22. Ibid., 130. 23. ATCC is an independent, private, nonprofit biological resource center (BRC) and

research organization. As a biological resource center, ATCC authenticates microorganisms and cell lines and manages logistics of long-term preservation and distribution of cultures for the scientific community. ATCC supports the cultures it acquires and authenticates with expert technical support, intellectual property management, and characterization data, http://www.lgcstandards-atcc.org/en/About/About_ATCC/Who_We_Are.aspx.

24. Jessica Eve Stern, ‘‘Larry Wayne Harris,’’ in Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror (see note 14 above), 228.

25. Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘‘Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis,’’ Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (August 1999), http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/ article/5/4/99-0406.htm.

26. Bob Coen and Eric Nadler, Dead Silence: Fear and Terror on the Anthrax Trail (Berkeley: Counterpoint Press, 2009), 6–7.

27. Some examples of cookbooks are Uncle Fester’s Silent Death, 2nd ed. (Green Bay, WI: Festering Publications, May 1, 1997), William Powell’s The Anarchist Cookbook, reissue ed. (Ozark Pr LLC, June 2002), and Maynard Campbell’s Catalogue of Silent Tools of Justice (Ashland, OR: Maynard’s Avenging Angel Supply, 1991). However, official open sources confirming their effectiveness are limited.

28. Jonathan B. Tucker and Jason Pate, ‘‘The Minnesota Patriots Council,’’ in Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror (see note 14 above), 159.

29. Glen Segell, ‘‘The London Ricin Cell,’’ Strategic Insights 6, no. 5 (August 2007), http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/11406/The%20London%20 Ricin%20Cell.pdf?sequence=1.

30. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ‘‘Qaeda Trying to Harness Toxin for Bombs, U.S. Officials Fear,’’ The New York Times, August 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/ 13/world/middleeast/13terror.html?pagewanted=all.

31. W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (Washington, DC: Center of Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University; reprinted by Amsterdam: Fredonia Books, 2002), 58–59.

222 P. D. Ellis

32. Defense Threat Reduction Agency AR-40H, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms Reference Handbook (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, September 1, 2001), 124.

33. Charles Ferguson, Tahseen Kazi, and Judith Perera, Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks, Occasional Paper no. 11 (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, January 2003), 16.

34. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiânia (Vienna: Author, September 1988), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PubDetAR.asp? pubId=3684, 21.

35. Lisa Foderaro, ‘‘Columbia Scientists Prepare for a Threat: A Dirty Bomb,’’ The New York Times, July 8 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/nyregion/09dirty.html?_r= 1&scp=11&sq=Goi%C3%A2nia&st=cse.

36. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Radiological Accident in Goiânia (see note 34 above), 11.

37. Ibid., 2. 38. Ibid., 11. 39. Ibid., 22, see Table I. Basic Data on Cesium-137, Radioactive material, mass,

0.093 kg, converted to grams is 93. 40. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Third Revolution: The Convergence of the

Life Sciences, Physical Sciences, and Engineering, January 2011, http://www.cimit.org/ images/about/MIT-White-Paper-on-Convergence.pdf, 6–8.

41. Ibid., 8–9. 42. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (see note 4 above), II-4. 43. Patrick Cronin, ed., Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in a

Changing World (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2009), 5.

44. Strategic Foresight Initiative, ‘‘Technological Development and Dependency,’’ FEMA Office of Policy and Program Analysis (OPPA) (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, May 2011), 4, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/programs/oppa/ technology_dev_%20paper.pdf and http://www.fema.gov/about/programs/oppa/strategic_ foresight_initiative.shtm.

45. Major Pharmaceutical & Biotechnology Companies of the World (Hampshire, UK: Graham & Whiteside Ltd., 2009). Promotional of directory, see http://www.gale.cengage. com/pdf/facts/GML25609_MPBCOW_GDL.pdf.

46. Laura H. Kahn, ‘‘DIY Biology,’’ Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 18, 2012, http:// thebulletin.org/diy-biology.

47. ‘‘An Institution for the Do-It-Yourself Biologist,’’ DIY BIO, http://diybio.org/. 48. Richard Preston, Hot Zone (New York: Anchor, 1995), 16. 49. S. Hajkowicz and J. Moody, Our Future World: An Analysis of Global Trends, Shocks

and Scenarios (Draft Document) (Canberra: CSIRO, 2010), 8, http://www.csiro.au/ resources/Our-Future-World-report.html.

50. International Air Transport Association (IATA), ‘‘The Impact of Recession on Air Traffic Volumes,’’ IATA Economic Briefing, Global passenger kilometers flown Chart, December 2008, 3, http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/IATA_Economics_Briefing_ Impact_of_Recession_Dec08.pdf.

51. Hajkowicz and Moody, ‘‘Our Future World’’ (see note 49 above), 8. 52. The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical

Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, DC: Author, February 2004), 36–37. 53. ‘‘E. coli Cucumber Scare: Cases Likely to Increase,’’ BBC News, May 31, 2011,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13597080. 54. Ann Woolner, ‘‘FBI Wants Unabomber’s DNA for 1982 Tylenol Poisoning Probe,’’

Bloomberg News, May 19, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-19/unabomber- says-fbi-suspects-him-in-1982-tylenol-poisonings.html.

55. Department of Homeland Security, Preventing Terrorism Results, November 2, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/preventing-terrorism-results.

56. Charles Doyle, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary (American Law Division, 3 June 1996), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/ 96-499.htm.

Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 223

57. U.S. Code, ‘‘Prohibitions with respect to biological weapons,’’ 18 USC x175, http:// us-code.vlex.com/vid/prohibitions-respect-biological-weapons-19190447.

58. U.S. Code, ‘‘Prohibited activities,’’ 18 USC x229, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/ uscode/18/I/11B/229.

59. U.S. Code, ‘‘Use of certain weapons of mass destruction,’’ 18 USCx 2332, http:// us-code.vlex.com/vid/use-certain-weapons-mass-destruction-19190085.

60. Public Law: 104-201, ‘‘Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996,’’ http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1996/pl104-201-xiv.htm; Aaron Weiss, ‘‘When Terror Strikes, Who Should Respond?,’’ Parameters, Autumn 2001, http://www.carlisle. army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/01autumn/Weiss.htm.

61. Shawn Reese, Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considera- tions, R42462 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2012), 5.

62. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington DC: The White House, February 2003); The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington DC: Homeland Security Council, October 2007); The DHS Strategic Plan—One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Homeland, March 2008); The National Security Strategy (Washington DC: The White House, May 2010); The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Homeland, February 2010); The Bottom-Up Review (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Homeland, July 2010); and The National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington DC: The White House, 2011).

63. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years (FY) 2012– 2016 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security Office of Policy Office of Strategic Plans, 2012).

64. Department of Homeland Security, Chemical Security, http://www.dhs.gov/ chemical-security.

65. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Biological Security, http://www.dhs.gov/ biological-security.

66. Public Law 108–276, ‘‘Project BioShield Act of 2004.’’ 67. William L. Painter, Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 112th Congress, R42025

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 22 September, 2011), 7–8. 68. DHS, Biological Security (see note 65 above). 69. Environmental Protection Agency, About Radioactive Source Reduction and Manage-

ment: Overview, http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb00/source-reduction-management/about.html. 70. Ibid. 71. Painter, Issues in Homeland Security (see note 67 above), 30, and also Department of

Homeland Security, Nuclear-Security, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/nuclear-security. 72. DHS, Nuclear-Security (see note 71 above). 73. Ibid. 74. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint

Terrorism Task Forces, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs. 75. Gary Fields and Evan Perez, ‘‘FBI Seeks to Target Lone Extremists,’’ The Wall Street

Journal, June 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124501849215613523.html. 76. Kevin Johnson, ‘‘Feds Try to Detect ‘Lone Offenders,’ ’’ USA Today, December 8,

2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-08-11-lone-offenders_N.htm. 77. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Key Programs,

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/key-programs. 78. Department of Homeland Security, Preventing Terrorism Results, http://www.dhs.

gov/topic/preventing-terrorism-results. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Key Programs (see

note 77 above); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Frequently Asked Questions section ‘‘Why does the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD) exist?,’’ http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd_faqs.

83. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory Services, Chemical, Biological, Radio- logical and Nuclear Sciences, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/cbrnsu.

224 P. D. Ellis

84. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory Services: Hazardous Evidence Response, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/hmru.

85. James (Marc) Williams, Disaster Response Staff Officer’s Handbook: Observations, Insights, and Lessons, Handbook no. 11-07 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 2010), 21.

86. Painter, Issues in Homeland Security (see note 67 above), 8. 87. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Laboratory Network for Biological

Terrorism, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/biological.asp. 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 90. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Preparedness, 2011 State-

by-State Update on Laboratory Capabilities and Response Readiness Planning: An Update on CDC-Funded Preparedness and Response Activities in 50 States and 4 Cities, 9, www.cdc. gov/phpr/pubs-links/2011.

91. Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress, R42536 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 15, 2012), 56–57.

92. The White House, President Bush Commemorates Fifth Anniversary of U.S. Depart- ment of Homeland Security, March 6, 2008, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2008/03/20080306-4.html.

93. Michael A. Clancy, ‘‘Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommit- tee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights Division, Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation’’ (Washington, DC, September 19, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/ the-domestic-terrorism-threat.

94. Daniel Möckli, ed., Strategic Trends 2011 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2011), 10, http://www.sta.ethz.ch/Strategic-Trends-2011 or http://www.sta.ethz.ch/.

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